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G.R. No. 101630 August 24, 1992 Under Sec. 9 of B.P. 129, the Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction to issue writs
VICTOR DE JESUS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE EDDIE R. of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus and quo warranto, whether or
ROJAS, MTCC, Br. II, General Santos City, CITY PROSECUTOR FRANKLIN not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction is concurrent with that of
GACAL and SALUSTIANO SONIDO, respondents. Supreme Court 3 and with the Regional Trial Courts, for writs enforceable within their
BELLOSILLO, J.: respective regions. 4
Petitioner Victor de Jesus, then Director and Finance Officer of Southern Island Indeed, the refusal of the Court of Appeals to take cognizance of the petition would
Colleges, together with his octogenarian stepmother, Eugenia de Jesus, who was have been proper prior to the effectivity of B.P. 129 5 when the writ of certiorari was
then the Directress-Chairman of the Board of Directors, was charged with violation available in the appellate court only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As explained
of Section 28 (h) of the Social Security Law for failure to remit the SSS loan in Breslin vs. Luzon Stevedoring Co. 6
amortizations of private respondent Salustiano Sonido, an employee, in the amount; A writ of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari against a lower court is said to be in
of P583.35 covering the period from January to August 1988. The Information, aid of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals within the meaning of section
signed by Third Assistant City Prosecutor Andres Lorenzo, Jr., was filed with the 30 of Republic Act No. 296, known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, and the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Br. II, General Santos City, docketed as Crim. Case corresponding provision of the former Organic Act of the Court of Appeals, if the
No. 16886-2, presided by respondent Judge Eddie R. Rojas. latter has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the Information on the ground that (a) the City decisions of the former, and said writs are issued by the Court of Appeals in the
Prosecutor was not authorized to file the Information in the absence of prior exercise of its supervisory power or jurisdiction over the wrongful acts or omissions
authority from the SSS; (b) the SSS and not the MTCC has jurisdiction over the of the lower court that are not appealable. But if the Court of Appeals has no
case; (c) the criminal action has been extinguished by the sale of his shares in the appellate jurisdiction it could not issue writs of mandamus, prohibition
school before the complaint for estafa was filed against him and his stepmother; or certiorari in aid of an appellate jurisdiction which it does not have . . .
and, (d) damage as an element of estafa was not present in view of Sec. 22 (b) of Perforce, the Resolution of 31 July and 28 August 1991 must be reversed for want
the Social Security Law which guarantees enjoyment of SSS benefits by the of basis in law.
employee notwithstanding failure of his employer to remit deductions. While We are not unaware of the practice of the Court of Appeals of remanding to
On 27 February 1991, respondent Judge denied the motion to quash for lack of the proper Regional Trial Court for appropriate disposition petitions of this nature,
merit.1 yet, this is done only when there is no cogent reason advanced why the appellate
Petitioner challenged before the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari, court should hear the case. Plainly, therefore, respondent Court of Appeals could
prohibition and mandamus the Order of respondent Judge denying his motion to still have transmitted the petition to the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City
quash. not because the former has no jurisdiction but more of convenience and propriety
On 31 July 1991, the appellate court dismissed the petition holding as the latter court exercises administrative supervision over the Municipal Trial Court
thus — as the next higher tribunal in the judicial hierarchy, instead of the Court of Appeals.
We refrain from any discussion on the merits of this case since it involves an Order Indeed, such established practice is not without basis. For, in Vergara, Sr. v.
of a Municipal Trial Court whose decisions are not directly reviewable by this Court. Suelto, 7 penned by Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa (then Associate Justice), this
. . . The instant petition should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court, the Court discussed quite extensively the concurrent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
proper and competent tribunal. 2 Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court over judgments and orders of Municipal
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by respondent Court of Appeals Courts —
on 28 August 1991, petitioner now comes to Us seeking inter alia to set aside the We turn now to the second question posed . . . as to the propriety of a direct resort
resolutions dismissing his petition. to this Court for the remedy of mandamus or other extraordinary writ against a
Outright, We discern a procedural misconception by the Court of Appeals of its municipal court, instead of an attempt to initially obtain that relief from the Regional
jurisdiction over matters brought to it by way of petition for certiorari, prohibition Trial Court of the district or the Court of Appeals, both of which tribunals share this
and mandamus from Municipal Trial Courts. Obviously, it is error to hold that Court's jurisdiction to issue the writ. As a matter of policy such a direct recourse to
decisions of Municipal Trial Courts are not directly reviewable by the Court of this Court should not be allowed. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and
Appeals, and that such petition should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the
being "the proper and competent tribunal." fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be
burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original
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jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where necessary jurisdiction. Consequently, the SSS is not vested with legal competence
absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, to adjudicate criminal complaints and must necessarily seek recourse in the regular
that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings courts for the prosecution of criminal actions arising from violations of the Revised
before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or Penal Code and the Social Security Law. 10
agencies whose acts for some reason or another, are not controllable by the Court On the third ground, it must be stressed that criminal liability is personal to the
of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the offender and cannot be transferred to another by contract. Criminal culpability
competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that instant,
courts that the specific action for the writ's procurement must be presented. This is liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law. The time of filing of
and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers the criminal complaint is material only for determining prescription. Consequently,
must strictly observe. petitioner's reported transfer of his shares in the Southern Island Colleges to Ramon
Ordinarily, the next step would be to remand this case to the Court of Appeals to Magsaysay Memorial Colleges did not extinguish his criminal liability nor transfer the
resolve the propriety of the denial of petitioner's motion to quash. But this is no same to his vendee or assignee.
longer necessary. Since the records are with Us, We are now in a position to settle On the fourth ground, the argument that there is no estafa for want of damage since
the issue with dispatch. Consequently, We opt to meet the issue right here if only the employee's entitlement to SSS benefits is not impaired by his employer's neglect
to obviate further delay in this seemingly uncomplicated case. to remit loan payments from his compensation is likewise untenable. It must be
On the first ground raised by petitioner, Sec. 28 (i) of the Social Security Law noted that petitioner was charged in connection with Sec. 28 (h) of the Social
provides: Security Law which states:
(i) Criminal action arising from a violation of the provisions of this Act may be (h) Any employer who, after deducting the monthly contributions or loan
commenced by the SSS or the employee concerned either under this Act or in amortizations from his employee's compensation, fails to remit the said deductions
appropriate cases under the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That such criminal action to the SSS within thirty days from the date they became due shall be presumed to
may be filed by the SSS in the city or municipality where the SSS provincial or have misappropriated such contributions or loan amortizations and shall suffer the
regional office is located if the violation was committed within its territorial penalties provided in Article Three Hundred Fifteen of the Revised Penal Code, 11
jurisdiction or in Metro Manila, at the option of the SSS. 8 and not under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, which is material only in
Clearly, prior consent of the Social Security System (SSS) is not essential before an determining the penalty to be imposed.
employee can commence a criminal action arising from a violation of the Social Section 28 (h) speaks of two elements which must concur: (1) the employer deducts
Security Law. In other words, whether under the Social Security Law or "in monthly contributions or loan amortizations from his employee's compensation, and
appropriate cases under the Revised Penal Code," the employee can institute (2) said employer fails to remit said deductions to the SSS within 30 days from the
criminal suits independently of the SSS. date they fall due, after which the employer is ipso facto presumed to have
On the second ground, petitioner submits that it is the SSS and not the regular misappropriated such contributions or amortizations of the employee and
courts which is empowered to prosecute the alleged estafa pursuant to Sec. 5 of the accordingly penalized under Art. 315 of the Penal Code. Plainly, damage is not an
Social Security Law. This is untenable. Section 5 provides: element in the act punished under Sec. 28 (h) as differentiated from the ordinary
Sec. 5. Settlement of Disputes. — (a) Any dispute arising under this Act with respect estafa wherein deceit and damage are considered essential elements.
to coverage, benefits, contributions and penalties thereon or any other matter Other arguments advanced by petitioner which were not contained in his motion to
related thereto, shall be cognizable by the Commission, and any case filed with quash may not be passed upon in this extraordinary petition, for no abuse of
respect thereto shall be heard by the Commission, or any of its members, or by discretion may be ascribed to respondent Judge when he was not provided with the
hearing officers duly authorized by the Commission and decided within twenty days opportunity to rule thereon.
after the submission of the evidence. The filing, determination and settlement of WHEREFORE, as regards the Resolutions of 31 July and 28 August 1991 of
dispute shall be governed by the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondent Court of Appeals, the same are SET ASIDE. However, with respect to
Commission. 9 the Order of 27 February 1991 of respondent Judge, the writ prayed for is denied
The foregoing defines the "dispute" falling within the coverage of the Social Security and the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, hereby AFFIRMING his Order
Law and lays down the procedure to be followed by the SSS in any case filed before denying petitioner's motion to quash. Consequently, respondent Judge is directed
it with respect to such "dispute." Definitely, prosecution of criminal offenses is not to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case No. 16886-2 pending before his court.
alluded to above, as this will require further legislation to clothe the SSS with the SO ORDERED.
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FIRST DIVISION 7. At a special meeting of the Board of Directors — which petitioner Garcia claims to
G.R. No. 114135 October 7, 1994 have been held on July 22, 1993 without notice to him — petitioner and another
director were deemed terminated as members of the UCPB Board and were duly
LEON M. GARCIA, JR., petitioner, replaced, petitioner Garcia in particular by respondent Cesar A. Sevilla;
vs.
8. While he may have been elected to the Board through the action of the Board,
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
petitioner claims that he can be removed therefrom only by a vote of the
GOVERNMENT, as represented by Chairman MAGTANGGOL C. GUNIGUNDO,
stockholders representing 2/3 of the outstanding capital stock at a regular
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK,
stockholders' meeting or at a special stockholders' meeting called for that purpose.3
represented by Chairman TIRSO D. ANTIPORDA and CESAR
SEVILLA, respondents. The petitioner then filed with the Sandiganbayan on 20 August 1993 a petition for
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, damages and attorney's fees with
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
preliminary injunction and a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
The chief issue raised in this case is whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction order4 (docketed as SB No. 0154) against the PCGG, Cesar Sevilla, and others.5 The
over the special civil actions of prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto. prayer of the petition reads:
The antecedent facts as summarized by the Sandiganbayan in its challenged decision WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully prayed that:
are as follows:
Before hearing:
1. On June 26, 1990 petitioner Garcia was elected to the Board of Directors of the
A temporary restraining order be issued against respondent
UCPB1 at a regular meeting thereof to fill a vacancy therein as a PCGG2 nominee;
Cesar A. Sevilla from performing the duties of a member of the Board of Directors
2. Almost three (3) years later, petitioner Garcia received a letter from PCGG and against the PCGG and Board Members Cesar A. Sevilla, Tirso D. Antiporda, Jr.,
Chairman Gunigundo asking him to resign from the UCPB Board in order that a Juan J. Carlos, Gloria C. Carreon, Renato L. Cayetano, Ma. Corazon K. Imperial,
replacement might be made in his stead; Eduardo K. Litonjua, Sr., Jesus N. Manalastas, Jose V. Romero, Jr., Celso L.
Samaniego, Daniel P. Santiago, Jr., and Oscar F. Santos from recognizing Cesar A.
3. Garcia refused to resign and instead asserted in his reply letter dated May 21,
Sevilla as a member of the Board of Directors.
1993 his membership in the Davao City Chapter of the COCOFED and, therefore, his
representation of the coconut planters of Davao City; After hearing:
4. By a letter dated July 6, 1993, PCGG Chairman Gunigundo informed Garcia (and (1) a writ of prohibition be issued (a) to prohibit respondent PCGG chairman and the
two other directors) that his membership in the Board of Directors of UCPB had been members of the Board of Directors from recognizing respondent Cesar A. Sevilla as
terminated upon instruction by the Office of the President, copy of which letter was a member of the Board of Directors of the Bank, and (b) Cesar A. Sevilla from
furnished to the Chairman and the Corporate Secretary of the UCPB; performing the duties of a member of Board of Directors.
5. By a letter dated July 8, 1993, Garcia (together with two other directors whose (2) to compel respondents to recognize petitioner as a director of UCPB.
services as directors had also been terminated) wrote PCGG Chairman Gunigundo
(3) to declare respondent Cesar A. Sevilla not entitled to said office and ousting him
reiterating their refusal to step down from the Board and announced that they would
therefrom.
wait for the next regular stockholders' meeting since, according to Garcia, he had a
fixed term as a director; (4) to declare that the herein petitioner is entitled to said office and placing him in
possession thereof.
6. In the same letter, Garcia further stated that since he and his fellow directors
were not mere agents of the PCGG, their removal would have to be done in the (5) to hold all the respondents solidarily liable to pay petitioner the costs of suit and
manner provided by the Corporation Code, citing the case of Baseco v. PCGG (150 expenses of litigation and attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00 because the
SCRA 181) that, at all events, the PCGG cannot change the composition of the Board acts or omissions of the respondents have compelled the petitioner to litigate and
of Directors of sequestered corporations; thus incur expenses to protect his rights and interests.
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(6) to hold all the respondents solidarily liable to pay nominal, temperate and xxx xxx xxx
exemplary damages, by way of example or correction for the public good and for
(c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers or
unlawful and illegal acts committed and to be awarded at the discretion of this
managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations." [Sec. 5(c)].
Honorable Court.
xxx xxx xxx
(7) to grant such and other remedies as may be just and equitable in the premises.6
The fact that this Court for its part has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases —
Perceiving that the issue raised was not just the propriety of the petitioner's
whether civil or criminal — filed or prosecuted by the PCGG does not set it in conflict
separation or removal as director of the UCPB but the court's own jurisdiction over
with the authority of the Securities and Exchange Commission under its own Charter.
the subject matter, the Sandiganbayan set the petition "for hearing on 3 September
1993 on the issuance of a restraining order with the issue of jurisdiction indicated Undoubtedly, the Supreme Court has affirmed the exclusivity of this Court's
as primordial."7 At the hearing on the said date, it expressed its concern as to "its jurisdiction over cases filed by PCGG as well over the very acts of the PCGG therein,
jurisdiction over the petition upon certain premises, namely, whether or not the acts thus:
complained of by petitioner Garcia, which do not appear to be factually disputed by
". . . Necessarily, those who wish to question or challenge the Commission's acts or
the respondents herein, constitute merely acts of the Board, which would make the
orders in such cases must seek recourse to the same court, the Sandiganbayan,
conflict an intra-corporate problem cognizable only by the Securities and Exchange
which is vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction ." (PCGG v. Peña, 159 SCRA
Commission or, considering the peculiarity of the circumstances, particularly the
556, 564, emphasis supplied).
alleged totality of the dominance by the PCGG over the United Coconut Planters
Bank, the acts attributed to the Board of Directors by the petitioner are acts of the The point of this, of course, is the juridical abhorrence to split jurisdictions resulting
PCGG under the mantle of its special functions under Executive Orders No. 1, No. 2, in multiplicity of suits (id., p. 565).
No. 14 and No. 14-A." It then required the respondents to submit their "memoranda
and/or oppositions and/or answers" to the petition and the petitioner to submit his Indeed, even in proceedings on issues which appeared at first blush to have been
memorandum of authorities herein, immediately after which the petition would be peripheral to the PCGG's exercise of its authority, the Supreme Court has withdrawn
deemed submitted for decision.8 cases from the Regional Trial courts and even from the Securities and Exchange
Commission where it turned out that the conflict among the parties was one ". . .
After the parties had complied with the above requirements, the Sandiganbayan arising from, incidental to, or related to such cases . . ." i.e., the cases involving the
(First Division) promulgated on 1 October 1993 its decision9 dismissing the petition recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth ". . . such as the dispute over the sale of shares,
because "both the allegations in the petition and the relevant supporting annexes the propriety of the issuance of ancillary writs of provisional remedies relative
demonstrate that the issues presented by the petitioner refer solely to the election thereto, the sequestration thereof, which may not be made the subject of separate
or appointment of directors in a corporation and, therefore, within the original and actions or proceedings in another forum . . ." (Soriano III v. Yuzon, 164 SCRA 226,
exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission under Section 5(c) 242).
of P.D. 902-A, as amended." It found such issues as having "nothing to do, except
very peripherally, with the PCGG's functions of preserving property under Having said all of the above, however, this Court itself has also drawn the limits of
sequestration or of determining the its authority to hear matters when the PCGG would somehow be involved.
ill-gotten character of propriety [sic] already under sequestration." Thus, this Court was upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of Holiday Inn v.
In view of its relevance to the proper disposition of this petition, it is well to quote Sandiganbayan (186 SCRA 447) when it refused to look into the propriety of a
the Sandiganbayan's disquisition supporting its judgment: contract entered into by the New Riviera Hotel and Development Co., Inc., which
was sequestered by the PCGG and where two-thirds of the Board of Directors were
It is the view of this Court that the issue brought by the petitioner to the bar is one PCGG nominees. In a ruling that was approved of by the Supreme Court, this Court
that concerns the acts of the Board of Directors of a corporation as such with respect said:
to one of its members and, therefore, under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Pursuant to P.D. No. 902-A as amended, the ". . . . This court is of the view that its jurisdiction refers to acts of the PCGG acting
Securities and Exchange Commission ". . . shall as such whether alone or with other persons, natural or juridical, and not generally
have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving: where PCGG representatives act as part of another juridical person or entity. A rule
of thumb might be thus: if the PCGG can be properly impleaded on a cause of action
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asserted before this Court as a distinct entity, then this Court would generally PCGG. We, therefore, have clearly a simple case of a Board of Directors ousting two
exercise jurisdiction; otherwise, it would not, because, then the "PCGG character" of its members for reasons which it had deemed proper.
of the act of omission in question may, at best, be only incidental.
Whether the Board did act properly or not in this regard has nothing to do, except
After all, the presence of PCGG representatives in sequestered companies does not very peripherally, with the PCGG's functions of preserving property under
automatically tear down the corporate veil that distinguishes the corporation from sequestration or of determining the ill-gotten character of propriety [sic] already
its officers, directors or stockholders. Corporate officers whether nominated by the under sequestration. In fact, both the allegations in the petition and the relevant
PCGG or not act, insofar as third parties are concerned, are corporate officers. supporting annexes demonstrate that the issues presented by the petitioner refer
Contracts entered into by the San Miguel corporation, for example, in connection solely to the election or appointment of directors in a corporation and, therefor[e],
with its poultry operations and the cancellations thereof, are not PCGG activities within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange
which would justify the invocation of this Court's jurisdiction, even if the contract or Commission under Sec. 5(c) of P.D. 902-A, as amended.
the suit were unanimously approved by its board of directors where PCGG
His motion for the reconsideration 10 of the decision having been denied in the
representatives sit. (Resolution, Annex "O", p. 143, Rollo).
resolution of the Sandiganbayan of 9 February 1994,11 the petitioner then filed the
— Holiday Inn (Phils.), instant petition. He asks this Court to give due course to the petition and to order
Inc. vs. Sandiganbayan, the Sandiganbayan "to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for
186 SCRA 447, 452 prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, etc. in the case of Leon M. Garcia, Jr. vs.
PCGG, et al. in S.B. No. 0154." 12
Going farther, the Supreme Court in that case ruled that the Sandiganbayan would
not have jurisdiction over issues which did not relate to the propriety of the He imputes upon the Sandiganbayan the commission of the following errors:
sequestration nor to the "ill-gotten" or "crony related" character of the subject of
(1) . . . IN RULING THAT IT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITION
the PCGG's acts. (id. p. 453).
FOR PROHIBITION, MANDAMUS, QUO WARRANTO ENTITLED LEON M. GARCIA, JR.
In the instant petition, petitioner Garcia protests the act of the Board of Directors of VS. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) PARTICULARLY
the UCPB on July 22, 1993 which resulted in his ouster from the UCPB Board. IN RESOLVING THE PROPRIETY OF PETITIONER'S SEPARATION OR REMOVAL FROM
HIS POSITION.
While it is not denied that the PCGG through its Chairman had asked petitioner
Garcia to resign, Garcia had refused to do so; while PCGG Chairman Gunigundo had (2) . . . IN NOT RULING THAT THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF ARE DIRECT AND OVERT
written petitioner Garcia on July 6, 1993 to tell him that his representation of the ACTS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) IN
Government in the UCPB Board had been terminated, petitioner did not there and RELATION TO ITS POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF SEQUESTRATION HENCE WITHIN
then cease to be a member of the UCPB Board of Directors. Instead, it was the THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN.
Resolution (No. 66-93) of the Board of Directors at its meeting on July 22, 1993
(3) . . . IN RULING THAT THE REMOVAL OF PETITIONER AS MEMBER OF THE BOARD
which replaced petitioner Garcia with respondent Cesar A. Sevilla in the Board, albeit
OF DIRECTORS BY THE PCGG AND HIS REPLACEMENT BY THE UCPB BOARD OF
undoubtedly upon the request or, if petitioner pleases, upon instigation of the PCGG
DIRECTORS IS WITHIN THE ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE
Chairman.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION.
Respondent members of the Board of Directors Tirso D. Antiporda, et al., have well
It is the contention of the petitioner that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
pointed out that while PCGG Chairman Gunigundo had also terminated the
his petition because (1) "the acts complained of are direct and overt acts of the
representation of Director Manuel Concordia, as Gunigundo indeed had in his letter
respondent PCGG in relation to its powers and functions of sequestration," (2) the
of July 6, 1993 (Annex "C", Petition), the UCPB Board declined to follow that lead
petitioner's cause of action against the PCGG "arose from its act of removing and
resulting thus in the termination only of petitioner Garcia and Wencelito T. Andanar
directing the Board to elect his replacement," and (3) the PCGG as the conservator
(Annex "F", Petition).
of sequestered UCPB shares of stock, directly exercised its power of sequestration
We then have a situation, both as a matter of law and as a matter of the UCPB shares of stock." Accordingly, citing "PCGG vs. Securities and Exchange
of fact, where an entity other than the PCGG — the UCPB Board of Directors — acting Commission, G.R. No. 82188, January [should be June] 30, 1988, p. 15," and
independently although in acquiescence to or accommodation of the behest of the "Holiday Inn vs. The Sandiganbayan, 186 SCRA 447," the petitioner posits the view
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that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case. He further contends that constitutionally-mandated court, 18 is a regular court, 19 it has, nevertheless, only a
since the PCGG is the "real party in interest" and it was its "act . . . in abruptly special or limited jurisdiction. As the Sandiganbayan puts it in the challenged
removing the petitioner from his position and its urgent importunings that prompted decision:
UCPB Board of Directors to elect Cesar Sevilla in his place," then, following "PCGG
its jurisdiction encompasses only those enumerated under Section 4 of
vs. SEC," the SEC would have no jurisdiction over his petition since the PCGG, "as
P.D. No. 1606 as amended and those provided in special laws such as
co-equal body, is a co-equal entity over which actions the SEC has no power of
R.A. No. 7080 on "Plunder" and the enabling enactments of Presidential Commission
control."
on Good Government (PCGG) particularly Executive Order No. 14 as amended (May
This Court required the parties to Comment on the petition. 7, 1986), especially Secs. 1 and 2 thereof which read:
In their Comment filed on 14 June 1994, the private respondents maintain that the Sec. 1. Any provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, the Presidential
controversy falls within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the SEC since it Commission on Good Government, with the assistance of the Office of the Solicitor
involves a protest against a corporate act to replace a member of the Board of General and other government agencies, is hereby empowered to file and prosecute
Directors. 13 all cases investigated by it under Executive Order No. 1, dated February 12, 1986,
and Executive Order No. 2, dated March 12, 1986, as may be warranted by its
In its Comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, respondent PCGG submits
findings.
that:
Sec. 2. The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases,
THE SOLE ISSUE POSED FOR RESOLUTION IS WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT
whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan, which shall have exclusive and
SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITION FOR
original jurisdiction thereof.
PROHIBITION, MANDAMUS, QUO WARRANTO, ETC. FILED BY PETITIONER. 14
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. Nos. 1860 and 1861, provides as
Its arguments to support the negative of the proposition are actually anchored not
follows:
on the Sandiganbayan's lack of jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs but on
the fact that the petition in SB No. 0154 "essentially assails the validity of Resolution Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
No. 66-93 of the UCPB Board which removed petitioner as a director thereat" and
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
"the allegations therein have nary a bearing on the question of whether or not the
sequestered shares in UCPB are ill-gotten by the specified defendants in Civil Case (1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
No. 0033 (Republic vs. Eduardo Cojuangco, et al.) pending before respondent Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Sandiganbayan"; "it is thus evident that the subject matter of the petition below Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
refers to the corporate act of the UCPB Board and not that of PCGG's as a public or
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation
government entity." Otherwise stated, "the petition below is not thus per se a PCGG
to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
case," and in light of Holiday Inn (Phils.), Inc. vs. Sandiganbayan, 15 the
corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over it.
prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
This Court resolved to give due course to this petition and decide it on the basis of years, or a fine of P6,000.00; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies
the pleadings already submitted which sufficiently expound the parties' respective mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not
views and positions. exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00
shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
As this Court sees it, the larger and more crucial issue in this case is not just the
Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
separation or removal of the petitioner as a director of the UCPB representing the
PCGG, but, as stated in the exordium of this ponencia, the jurisdiction of the (b) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction:
Sandiganbayan over the special civil actions of prohibition, mandamus, and quo
(1) On appeal, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial
warranto.
courts in cases originally decided by them in their respective territorial jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction, which is the authority to hear and the right to act in a case, 16 is
conferred by the Constitution and by law. 17 Although the Sandiganbayan, a
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(2) By petition for review, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the Having reached the foregoing conclusion, discussions on the other issues raised
Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over cases would no longer be necessary.
originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncements as to costs.
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
It is settled that the authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly
conferred by the Constitution or by law. In Garcia vs. De Jesus, 20 this Court stated:
In the Philippine setting, the authority to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction. Thus, such authority
has always been expressly conferred, either by the Constitution or by law. As a
matter of fact, the well-settled rule is that jurisdiction is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law (Orosa, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76828-32, 28
January 1991; Bacalso v. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-22488, 26 October 1967, 21 SCRA
519). It is never derived by implication. Indeed, "(w)hile the power to issue the writ
of certiorari is in some instance conferred on all courts by constitutional or statutory
provisions, ordinarily, the particular courts which have such power are expressly
designated" (J. Aquino's Concurring Opinion in Pimentel, supra, citing 14 C.J.S. 202;
Emphasis ours).
Thus, our Courts exercise the power to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus by virtue of express constitutional grant or legislative enactments.
To enumerate:
(1) Section 5[1], Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution conferred upon this Court such
jurisdiction;
(2) Section 9[1] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, to the Court of Appeals (then Intermediate Appellate Court);
(3) Section 21[1] of the said Act, to Regional Trial Courts;
(4) Section 5[1] of Republic Act No. 6734, or the Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, to the newly created Shari'ah Appellate Court; and
(5) Article 143[e], Chapter I, Title I, Book IV of Presidential Decree No. 1083, or the
Code of Muslim Personal Law, to Shari'ah District Courts.
With respect to petitions for quo warranto and habeas corpus, original jurisdiction
over them is expressly conferred to this Court by Section 5(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution and to the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts by Section
9(1) and Section 21(1), respectively, of B.P. Blg. 129.
In the absence then of a specific statutory grant of jurisdiction to issue the said
extraordinary writs, the Sandiganbayan, as a court with only special and limited
jurisdiction, cannot exercise jurisdiction over the petition for
prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto filed by petitioner.
SPECPRO 8
RULE 64 & 65

G.R. No. L-47270, April 15, 1988 was not a party to the lease contract sought to be enforced by the plaintiff. In
ERNESTO DORIA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE JUDGE ARTEMON D. dismissing the complaint against defendant Manuel Oximer, the court a quo stated:
LUNA, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, “x x x Unless a lease is recorded, it shall not be binding upon third persons.
BRANCH I, SILAY CITY; & MANUEL OXIMER, RESPONDENTS. Considering that when lots 368-A and 362 covered by TCT Nos. T-71274 and T-
71275 were sold to defendant Oximer on July 24, 1975, the 1st lease contract was
DECISION not yet annotated at the back of the TCT'S aforesaid and it was only a month
YAP, J.: afterwards, or on August 25, 1975 that the said 1st lease contract was registered,
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner seeks to annul the order of the Court of First inevitably, the said lease shall not be binding upon third persons including defendant
Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, dated June 30, 1977, dismissing the Manuel Oximer.”
amended complaint against defendant Manuel Oximer (herein private respondent),
for specific performance with damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 707, entitled Instead of appealing from the above order of dismissal, the petitioner has chosen to
"Ernesto Doria vs. Arcadia Doria, Angelina Bedonia and Manuel Oximer"; to declare file the instant petition for certiorari. But we have time and again held that the
that there is a valid cause of action against respondent; and to order the respondent extraordinary remedy of certiorari can not be a substitute for appeal. The petitioner
judge to try the case on the merits. should have appealed the challenged order to the proper appellate court, i.e., the
Court of Appeals, where alleged errors of fact and law can be corrected.
It appears from the questioned order: 1) that the defendant Arcadia Doria owned
three (3) lots, Lots Nos. 362, 365-A and 368-A of the cadastral survey of Saravia, Accordingly, the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
situated in E. B. Magalona, Negros Occidental, covered by TCT Nos. T-4150, T-4151
and T-4152, which she leased to plaintiff for a period of seven (7) crop years, SO ORDERED.
starting with crop year 1973-1974 up to 1979-1980 with an annual rental of
P1,500.00; 2) that Arcadia Doria leased the same lots to Angelina Bedonia on
January 10, 1973, for a term of four (4) agricultural years, covering crop years 1973
to January 1976 with an annual rental of P9,000.00, of which a downpayment of
P6,000.00 was made upon the execution of the contract, and by virtue of which
lease contract Angelina Bedonia took possession of the property; (3) that on July
24, 1975, Arcadia Doria sold the property in question to defendant Manuel Oximer
(herein private respondent) for P67,500.00, the receipt of which was acknowledged
by Doria, and on condition that vendee would take possession of the property only
after the expiration of the lease contract with Angelina Bedonia; 4) that on August
25, 1975, plaintiff had his lease contract annotated at the back of the certificates of
title covering the lots in question; 5) that on November 26, 1976 defendant Manuel
Oximer registered the deed of sale in his favor, by virtue of which new transfer
certificates of title were issued in his name, which carried the annotations of
plaintiff's lease contract appearing in the cancelled certificates of title; 6) that on
September 25, 1975, plaintiff filed his complaint against defendant Arcadia Doria for
specific performance with damages, which he amended on November 17, 1976 to
include Angelina Bedonia and Manuel Oximer as defendants; 7) that defendant
Arcadia Doria in her answer alleged that her non-delivery of the leased property to
plaintiff was due to the latter's failure to pay the lease rental agreed upon; that
defendant Manuel Oximer on his part maintained that he bought the properties in
good faith and for valuable consideration without being aware of any lease, except
that of Angelina Bedonia, and that plaintiff had no cause of action against him as he
SPECPRO 9
RULE 64 & 65

G.R. No. L-44980, February 06, 1990 The motion to dismiss, which was made orally in open court, was submitted for
VIRGINIA MARAHAY, PETITIONER, VS. HON. MENELEO C. MELICOR, AS resolution by the trial court. As earlier stated, the court below in its order dated
PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, BRANCH VI, CARIGARA, February 27, 1976, dismissed the complaint. Two motions for reconsideration were
LEYTE; ALIWANAG B. VALLERAMOS, LIGAYA BRAZIL Y PEREZ, FRUTO filed by petitioner but the same were denied by respondent judge, hence, the
BRAZIL, MATIBAY BRAZIL Y PALADIN AND DALISAY BRAZIL Y AYASO, present special civil action.
RESPONDENTS.
The sole issue is whether or not respondent judge committed grave abuse of
DECISION discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering the dismissal of the
REGALADO, J.: case and, consequently, denying petitioner the right to fully prosecute her case.
In this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner imputes Before resolving said issue, it would be judicious to first clear the air of any
grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent judge for issuing an order, dated misconception as to the procedural propriety of giving due course to this petition.
February 27, 1976, in Civil Case No. C-1222, entitled "Virginia Marahay vs. Aliwanag An order of dismissal, whether right or wrong, is a final order. If it is erroneous,
B. Valleramos et. al.," dismissing the complaint; an order, issued on June 26, 1976, ordinarily the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal, hence the same cannot be
denying the motion for reconsideration filed by therein plaintiff; and an order, dated assailed by certiorari.[8]
September 18, 1976, denying her second motion for reconsideration.
Nevertheless, in the broader interests of justice, this Court has given due course to
The records show that on June 20, 1974, petitioner filed with respondent court an the present petition in consideration of the fact that this is not the first time we have
action for recovery of real property against Aliwanag B. Valleramos. Later, the passed upon a petition for certiorari, although the proper remedy is appeal,[9] where
complaint was amended to implead and include other defendants, the other private the equities warrant such extraordinary recourse. This is especially true where, as
respondents herein, as indispensable parties.[1] in the case, petitioner's affidavit of merits shows that she has a good cause of action,
that her counsel's affidavit of merits avers justifiable reasons for his non-appearance
After the issues were joined, the case was set for pre-trial on August 9, 1974, but at said hearing, and the trial court is faulted with gravely abusing its discretion to
this was deferred to a later date due to the absence of petitioner and her the extent of denying due process to therein plaintiff. Significantly, it was respondent
counsel.[2] On April 4, 1975, the same case was again scheduled for pre-trial but judge himself who advised petitioner to avail of said remedy in his order dismissing
the same did not proceed due to the fact that petitioner appeared without her petitioner's second motion for reconsideration,[10] obviously because appeal would
counsel while only one of the defendants appeared with counsel.[3] Later, informed not be a speedy and adequate remedy under the circumstances and considering that
of her lawyer's inability to attend the pre-trial, petitioner secured the services of dismissals on technicalities are viewed with disapproval.
another lawyer, Atty. Dominador Monjardin, who was present at the next pre-trial
conference held on October 9, 1975. Turning now to the main issue, petitioner asseverates that respondent judge acted
capriciously in denying her day in court by not postponing the continuation of the
Trial on the merits commenced on November 13, 1975 with the petitioner taking the trial to some future time and giving her an opportunity to secure the services of
witness stand on direct examination.[4] The defense failed to cross-examine her since another lawyer. Parenthetically, it is of record that petitioner is an invalid and moves
the proceedings were cut short for lack of time and the continuation thereof was set around in a wheel chair.
for January 19, 1976.
The petition has the imprint of merit and the writ will lie.
On January 7, 1976, Atty. Monjardin filed a motion for postponement for the reason
that he was taking the examination for government prosecutors in Manila on January Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court provides that —
15, 1976, with a prayer that the case be reset either in the first week of January or "If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute his action for an
the second week of February of said year.[5] The court eventually issued an order unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order of the court,
resetting the trial to February 18, 1976 with notice to petitioner and her counsel.[6] the action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own
On said date, petitioner appeared without counsel prompting private respondents, motion. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication on the merits, unless
through their counsel, to move for the dismissal of the case for petitioner's alleged otherwise provided by the court."
inability to prosecute her case and for apparent lack of interest.[7]
SPECPRO 10
RULE 64 & 65

It is, therefore, the absence of the plaintiff, and not the absence of the lawyer, which While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test for
may warrant the dismissal of the case on the ground of non-suit.[11] In the case at the exercise of such power is whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is
bar, only the counsel for plaintiff was absent, plaintiff herself being in attendance in chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable
court. promptitude.[15] In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of
the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on
While the aforequoted provision also provides sanctions for failure to prosecute for the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense with
an unreasonable length of time, despite the presence of the interested parties, it rather than wield their authority to dismiss.
cannot be said that such neglect or failing obtains in the present case. There is
failure to prosecute when the plaintiff, being present, is not ready or is unwilling to Further, when a party, without malice, fault, or inexcusable negligence, is not really
proceed with the scheduled trial.[12] In the instant case, petitioner did not in the least prepared for trial, the court would be abusing its discretion if a reasonable
manifest unwillingness to proceed with the hearing. Upon the call for appearances, opportunity is denied him for preparing therefore and for obtaining due process of
petitioner responded that her counsel was in Manila and that he had not yet law.[16]
returned. Unschooled as she is in the vagaries of procedural law, petitioner indeed
could not have responded otherwise nor done any better. Time and again, we have emphasized that the rules should be liberally construed in
order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining not only speedy but,
Considering all the attendant circumstances, the least that the trial court could have more importantly, just and inexpensive determination of every action or
done was to afford petitioner a reasonable time, especially considering her handicap, proceeding.[17]
to procure the services of another lawyer and, if necessary, with a stern warning
that any further postponement of the trial shall cause the dismissal of the case. ACCORDINGLY, the writ of certiorari is hereby granted and the order of the court
a quo of February 27, 1976 dismissing petitioner's complaint, as well as its orders
The counter-argument that petitioner had already moved for postponements in the dated June 26, 1976 and September 18, 1976 denying petitioner's first and second
past should take into account the fact that the circumstances thereof were not of motions for reconsideration, respectively, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
her making nor intended to be dilatory and that no substantial prejudice has been Civil Case No. C-1222 is hereby REINSTATED and the Regional Trial Court which
caused private respondents. Besides, judgments of non-suit are generally disfavored replaced Branch VI of the defunct Court of First Instance and/or in which this action
in the same manner that default judgments are discouraged. Thus, in Padua vs. is now pending is DIRECTED to continue with the trial of petitioner's action and
Ericta, etc., et al.,[13] we had the occasion to rule that: decide the same on the merits in due course.
SO ORDERED.
"Courts should not brook undue delays in the ventilation and determination of
causes. It should be their constant effort to ensure that litigations are prosecuted
and resolved with dispatch. Postponements of trials and hearings should not be
allowed except on meritorious grounds; and the grant or refusal thereof rests
entirely in the sound discretion of the Judge. It goes without saying, however, that
discretion must be reasonably and wisely exercised, in the light of the attendant
circumstances. Some reasonable deferment of the proceedings may be allowed or
tolerated to the end that cases may be adjudged only after full and free presentation
of evidence by all the parties, especially where the deferment would cause no
substantial prejudice to any party. The desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases
should not, if at all possible, result in the precipitate loss of a party's right to present
evidence and either in the plaintiff's being non-suited or of the defendant's being
pronounced liable under an ex-parte judgment."

Indeed, after the issues had been duly joined, a plaintiff is entitled to present his
case. Seldom does departure from orderly procedure bring satisfactory results.[14]
SPECPRO 11
RULE 64 & 65

G.R. No. L-44980 February 6, 1990 The sole issue is whether or not respondent judge committed grave abuse of
VIRGINIA MARAHAY, petitioner, discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering the dismissal of the
vs. case and, consequently, denying petitioner the right to fully prosecute her case.
HON. MENELEO C. MELICOR, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance, Before resolving said issue, it would be judicious to first clear the air of any
Branch VI, Carigara, Leyte; ALIWANAG B. VALLERAMOS, LIGAYA BRAZIL y misconception as to the procedural propriety of giving due course to this petition.
PEREZ, FRUTO BRAZIL, MATIBAY BRAZIL Y PALADIN and DALISAY BRAZIL An order of dismissal, whether right or wrong, is a final order. If it is erroneous,
Y AYASO, respondents. ordinarily the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal, hence the same cannot be
REGALADO, J.: assailed by certiorari. 8
In this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner imputes Nevertheless, in the broader interests of justice, this Court has given due course to
grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent judge for issuing an order, dated the present petition in consideration of the fact that this is not the first time we have
February 27, 1976, in Civil Case No. C-1222, entitled "Virginia Marahay vs. Aliwanag passed upon a petition for certiorari, although the proper remedy is appeal, 9 where
B. Valleramos et. al.," dismissing the complaint; an order, issued on June 26, 1976, the equities warrant such extraordinary recourse. This is especially true where, as
denying the motion for reconsideration filed by therein plaintiff, and an order, dated in the case, petitioner's affidavit of merits shows that she has a good cause of action,
September 18, 1976, denying her second motion for reconsideration. that her counsel's affidavit of merits avers justifiable reasons for his non-appearance
The records show that on June 20, 1974, petitioner filed with respondent court an at said hearing, and the trial court is faulted with gravely abusing its discretion to
action for recovery of real property against Aliwanag B. Valleramos. Later, the the extent of denying due process to therein plaintiff. Significantly, it was respondent
complaint was amended to implead and include other defendants, the other private judge himself who advised petitioner to avail of said remedy in his order dismissing
respondents herein, as indispensable parties. 1 petitioner's second motion for reconsideration, 10 obviously because appeal would
After the issues were joined, the case was set for pre-trial on August 9,1974, but not be a speedy and adequate remedy under the circumstances and considering that
this was deferred to a later date due to the absence of petitioner and her dismissals on technicalities are viewed with disapproval.
counsel. 2 On April 4, 1975, the same case was again scheduled for pre-trial but the Turning now to the main issue, petitioner asseverates that respondent-judge acted
same did not proceed due to the fact that petitioner appeared without her counsel capriciously in denying her day in court by not postponing the continuation of the
while only one of the defendants appeared with counsel. 3 Later, informed of her trial to some future time and giving her an opportunity to secure the services of
lawyer's inability to attend the pre-trial, petitioner secured the services of another another lawyer. Parenthetically, it is of record that petitioner is an invalid and moves
lawyer, Atty. Dominador Monjardin, who was present at the next pre-trial conference around in a wheel chair.
held on October 9, 1975. The petition has the imprint of merit and the writ will lie.
Trial on the merits commenced on November 13, 1975 with the petitioner taking the Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court provides that —
witness stand on direct examination. 4 The defense failed to cross-examine her since If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute his action for an
the proceedings were cut short for lack of time and the continuation thereof was set unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order of the court,
for January 19, 1976. the action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own
On January 7, 1976, Atty. Monjardin filed a motion for postponement for the reason motion. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication on the merits, unless
that he was taking the examination for government prosecutors in Manila on January otherwise provided by the court.
15, 1976, with a prayer that the case be reset either in the first week of January or It is, therefore, the absence of the plaintiff, and not the absence of the lawyer, which
the second week of February of said year. 5 The court eventually issued an order may warrant the dismissal of the case on the ground of non-suit. 11 In the case at
resetting the trial to February 18, 1976 with notice to petitioner and her counsel. 6 bar, only the counsel for plaintiff was absent, plaintiff herself being in attendance in
On said date, petitioner appeared without counsel prompting private respondents, court.
through their counsel, to move for the dismissal of the case for petitioner's alleged While the aforequoted provision also provides sanctions for failure to prosecute for
inability to prosecute her case and for apparent lack of interest. 7 an unreasonable length of time, despite the presence of the interested parties, it
The motion to dismiss, which was made orally in open court, was submitted for cannot be said that such neglect or failing obtains in the present case. There is
resolution by the trial court. As earlier stated, the court below in its order dated failure to prosecute when the plaintiff, being present, is not ready or is unwilling to
February 27, 1976, dismissed the complaint. Two motions for reconsideration were proceed with the scheduled trial. 12 In the instant case, petitioner did not in the least
filed by petitioner but the same were denied by respondent judge, hence, the manifest unwillingness to proceed with the hearing. Upon the call for appearances,
present special civil action. petitioner responded that her counsel was in Manila and that he had not yet
SPECPRO 12
RULE 64 & 65

returned. Unschooled as she is in the vagaries of procedural law, petitioner indeed ACCORDINGLY, the writ of certiorari is hereby granted and the order of the court a
could not have responded otherwise nor done any better. quo of February 27, 1976 dismissing petitioner's complaint, as well as its orders
Considering all the attendant circumstances, the least that the trial court could have dated June 26, 1976 and September 18, 1976 denying petitioner's first and second
done was to afford petitioner a reasonable time, especially considering her handicap, motions for reconsideration, respectively, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
to procure the services of another lawyer and, if necessary, with a stern warning Civil Case No. C-1222 is hereby REINSTATED and the Regional Trial Court which
that any further postponement of the trial shall cause the dismissal of the case. replaced Branch VI of the defunct Court of First Instance and/or in which this action
The counter-argument that petitioner had already moved for postponements in the is now pending is DIRECTED to continue with the trial of petitioner's action and
past should take into account the fact that the circumstances thereof were not of decide the same on the merits in due course.
her making nor intended to be dilatory and that no substantial prejudice has been SO ORDERED.
caused private respondents. Besides, judgments of non-suit are generally disfavored
in the same manner that default judgments are discouraged. Thus, in Padua
vs. Ericta, etc., et al ., 13 we had the occasion to rule that:
Courts should not brook undue delays in the ventilation and determination of causes.
It should be their constant effort to ensure that litigations are prosecuted and
resolved with dispatch. Postponements of trials and hearings should not be allowed
except on meritorious grounds; and the grant or refusal thereof rests entirely in the
sound discretion of the Judge. It goes without saying, however, that discretion must
be reasonably and wisely exercised, in the light of the attendant circumstances.
Some reasonable deferment of the proceedings may be allowed or tolerated to the
end that cases may be adjudged only after full and free presentation of evidence by
all the parties, especially where the deferment would cause no substantial prejudice
to any party. The desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should not, if at all
possible, result in the precipitate loss of a party's right to present evidence and
either in the plaintiffs being non-suited or of the defendant's being pronounced liable
under an ex-parte judgment.
Indeed, after the issues had been duly joined, a plaintiff is entitled to present his
case. Seldom does departure from orderly procedure bring satisfactory results. 14
While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test for
the exercise of such power is whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is
chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable
promptitude. 15 In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the
case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the
part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense with
rather than wield their authority to dismiss.
Further, when a party, without malice, fault, or inexcusable negligence, is not really
prepared for trial, the court would be abusing its discretion if a reasonable
opportunity is denied him for preparing therefor and for obtaining due process of
law. 16
Time and again, we have emphasized that the rules should be liberally construed in
order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining not only speedy but,
more importantly, just and inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding. 17
SPECPRO 13
RULE 64 & 65

G.R. No. 91003, May 23, 1991 of replevin was issued by the trial court; the vehicle was found in the possession of
JESUS MORALES, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND LAZARO and was seized by Deputy Sheriff Rodolfo Tarmida, pursuant to the writ, from one
CALDERON, RESPONDENTS. Bernabe Caguioa on 20 December 1983, who filed on the following day a so-called
notice of Third-Party claim with the Deputy Sheriff.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.: Petitioner filed with the trial court an Answer In Intervention with Counterclaim and
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court for the Crossclaim, dated 28 February 1984, wherein he alleges that he is the owner of the
review of the Decision of 27 March 1989 and the Resolution of 7 November 1989 of vehicle in question having purchased it from defendant Asuncion on 15 February
the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 12087 which, respectively, affirmed in toto 1983 (the purchase price was allegedly P17,000.00); before he purchased it he took
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 136, in Civil Case No. 5459 the necessary precaution to examine the title and/or right over the vehicle of
and denied petitioner's motion to reconsider said 27 March 1989 decision. Asuncion, the registered owner; he is, therefore, a buyer in good faith. He further
claims that plaintiff is not the true owner of the vehicle because he even admitted
The following facts are not disputed: in his complaint that he agreed to register the vehicle in the name of defendant with
On 19 October 1983, Lazaro Calderon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, the LTC, an act which placed plaintiff in estoppel to further claim ownership of said
Metro Manila, a complaint against Angelita Asuncion and one John Doe for the vehicle; Asuncion always asserted her absolute right to the vehicle and she never
recovery of personal property. He alleges therein that he is the owner of a rebuilt mentioned the name of plaintiff; if ever a deed of acknowledgement, dated 2
jeepney with Motor No. C221-316228, Serial No. CMCI-86296, Plate No. NVS-832, September 1982, was signed by Asuncion acknowledging that plaintiff is the owner
which he caused to be rebuilt by "3" Aces Motorworks at Malibay, Pasay City at a of the vehicle, he is not privy to it and the same is designed to defraud, deceive and
total cost of P40,000.00, including labor; it was thereafter registered with the Land fool him so as to deprive him of the ownership and possession of the vehicle for
Transportation Commission in the name of defendant Angelita Asuncion pursuant to which he already spent P70,000.00; the possibility of conspiracy or connivance
an agreement with her to the effect that the vehicle be registered in her name for between plaintiff and defendant Asuncion is very apparent and patent and the filing
the purpose only of having it operated as a public utility vehicle since she is a of the malicious complaint is an unholy scheme between the plaintiff and defendant;
franchise holder; defendant Asuncion acknowledged the ownership of plaintiff by by reason of the filing of the complaint he suffered actual damages in the sum of
signing an Acknowledgement (Annex "A" of the Complaint), and although it was P70,000.00, and he was compelled to hire the services of counsel to whom he bound
registered in her name, plaintiff was in possession thereof; sometime in April of himself to pay P20,000.00 as attorney's fees plus P400.00 per appearance. He
1983 Asuncion requested from plaintiff that she be allowed to use the vehicle for prays for judgment dismissing the complaint and ordering plaintiff and defendant,
one day; plaintiff readily acceded to the request; however, said defendant failed and solidarily, to pay him P70,000.00 as actual damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary
refused to return the vehicle; in August of 1983, due to plaintiff's incessant request, damages, and P20,000.00 as attorney's fees plus P400.00 for every appearance of
Asuncion revealed that she entrusted the physical custody of the vehicle to Jesus his counsel.[2]
Morales who owns a compound at 93 Quirino Ave., Caloocan City; when asked by
plaintiff and his mother how he came to be in possession of the vehicle, Mr. Morales Defendant Asuncion did not file any Answer; so she was declared in default.
merely said that it was a matter between him and Asuncion; and up to the filing of
the complaint the defendant failed and refused to return the vehicle to On 8 May 1984 the spouses Bernabe and Cornelia Caguioa filed a so-called Third-
plaintiff. Plaintiff further alleges that by reason of the failure and refusal of Party Claim wherein they claim that they bought the vehicle in question on 19
defendant to return the vehicle, he was deprived of a net income of not less than October 1983 from Jesus Morales for P70,000.00, subject to the following conditions,
P3,000.00 a month for the operation of the vehicle and a daily income of at least among others:
P40.00 as driver thereof since he personally operated the vehicle; he had been "a) P20,000.00 shall be paid as down-payment, the balance of P50,000,00, which
deprived of the income since April 1983; in filing the complaint he was constrained shall earn interest at 2% per month until fully paid, shall be paid on installment at
to hire the services of counsel to whom he bound himself to pay attorney's fees of the rate of P500.00 per week commencing 19 November 1983;
P5,000.00 in the first instance and P10,000.00 should the case reach the appellate
court.[1] b) The possession and use of the vehicle shall be delivered to vendee upon
execution of the deed of sale; however, ownership thereof shall remain with the
Upon the filing of a replevin bond executed by the Sanpiro Insurance Corp., a writ vendor until the full purchase price plus interest and all charges shall have been
SPECPRO 14
RULE 64 & 65

paid; Plaintiff contends that intervenor “cannot be considered as buyer in good faith for
value”, inviting the Court "to take judicial notice that P17,000.00 could not be the
c) In the event Vendee fails to pay three consecutive daily installments, all prior value of the jeepney that has just been rebuilt for P41,000.00". However, the rule
payments made by vendee shall be forfeited in favor of vendor as liquidated where the price of the sale is grossly inadequate is as stated in the following Codal
damages." precept:
they introduced improvements on the vehicle worth P30,000.00 and they spent Art. 1470. Gross inadequacy of price does not affect a contract of sale, except as it
P4,000.00 as cooperative fees and expenses to make the vehicle run as a passenger may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation
jeepney and P3,600.00 for insurance premiums; by reason of the unlawful seizure or some other act or contract.
of the vehicle they suffered actual damages in the amounts of P3,120.00 a month The above provision of the Code leads us to the next issue: whether the purported
representing the jeepney's monthly income, and P1,300.00 a month as Bernabe's deed of sale executed by defendant in favor of intervenor (Exh. 4) is in reality a
monthly income as driver thereof at the rate of P50.00 per day for 26 days a month; mortgage.
they were not able to pay the weekly amortization of P500.00 beginning 19
November 1983; and they were not aware of any flaw or defect in the certificate of The admission was made by defendant that the vehicle was mortgaged by her to
registration of the vehicle in the name of Morales, hence they were buyers in good intervenor. This, however, is an extrajudicial declaration, not a testimony given in
faith. They ask for an award for moral damages due to the sleepless nights and court in this case and, hence, is not admissible against intervenor. But the Code
embarrassments they suffered by reason of the seizure of the vehicle, exemplary accords significance to the gross inadequacy of the price of the purported sale to
damages, and attorney's fees in the sum of P15,000.00.[3] such extent as to create therefrom the presumption that the transaction is an
equitable mortgage. (Arts. 1602 (2) in relation to Article 1604). This presumption
The Caguioas abandoned, however, their Third-Party Claim, and, upon motion of is reinforced by these undisputed facts: defendant is indebted to intervenor; and the
their counsel, the Court dismissed it.[4] latter allowed seven months to elapse -- presumably the period given defendant to
pay off her debt -- before he finally registered the vehicle in his
After trial, the Regional Trial Court, upon the following findings and conclusion: name. Consequently, the Court holds that the purported sale must be treated as an
"Since the subject vehicle unquestionably belonged to plaintiff when defendant equitable mortgage, which constituted a security for defendant's obligation of
unauthorizedly executed the deed of sale Exhibit 4 in favor of intervenor, the P17,000.00 stated as the price of the purported deed of sale.
transaction is void insofar as plaintiff is concerned -- unless he is barred by estoppel
from questioning its binding effect on him. The obligation secured must be held to have been extinguished though: the income
earned by the jeepney while in the possession of intervenor from February 13, 1983,
The first issue, then, is whether facts or circumstances obtain which operate to estop the date of the deed of sale Exhibit 4, up to December 20, 1983, when plaintiff got
plaintiff from questioning the transaction's validity and efficacy against him. The back the jeepney through replevin was P3,000.00 a month, based on the
Court holds the affirmative view. Plaintiff and defendant, in causing, pursuant to uncontradicted testimony of plaintiff that the operation of the jeepney earns that
their agreement contained in the notarial acknowledgment Exhibit G, the registration much; this gives a total of around P31,500.00; out of this, an amount equal to the
of the subject vehicle in the latter's name as owner, represented to the whole world obligation of P17,000.00 shall be applied to the payment thereof, pursuant to Article
that defendant owned the vehicle, with the concomittant right to perform acts of 2102 in relation to Article 2141 of the Code. There results an excess of P14,500.00,
strict dominion with respect to it, such as selling or mortgaging it. Intervenor, for to which plaintiff, as owner of the jeepney, is entitled to.
his part, avows in his testimony that before he bought the vehicle from defendant,
he checked the records thereof in the Land Transportation Commission. No evidence Plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendant the same amount of P31,500.00 as
exists to show that he knew that the vehicle did not belong to defendant but to unrealized income, minus the above-mentioned P14,500.00 which intervenor is
plaintiff. The situation thus falls within the purview of the below-quoted provisions required to pay to plaintiff. Defendant must also answer for the unrealized income
of the Civil Code: of plaintiff as driver of the vehicle, which he showed, through his testimony as
Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive P1,000.00 a month. Moreover, it is but just and fair, under the circumstances, that
upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person defendant be sentenced to pay plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.00.
relying thereon.
On the issue of whether intervenor did spend P53,000.00 for repairs and
SPECPRO 15
RULE 64 & 65

improvement done on the vehicle, the Court is unable to sustain his claim, absent AMOUNT OF P17,000.00 WHICH IS, HOWEVER, TO BE DEEMED EXTINGUISHED BY
a single receipt to substantiate it. Withal, the Court finds intervenor's claim THE APPLICATION OF PAYMENT OUT OF THE INCOME OF THE VEHICLE WHILE
improbable, considering the undisputed fact that the jeepney was newly rebuilt in OPERATED BY INTERVENOR.
January, 1982, or barely a year before he got possession of it." III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ORDERING THE INTERVENOR TO PAY TO PLAINTIFF
decreed as follows: THE AMOUNT OF P14,500.00, REPRESENTING THE BALANCE OF THE INCOME OF
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: THE VEHICLE AFTER DEDUCTING THE PAYMENT FOR DEFENDANT'S OBLIGATION.
IV
1) Declaring that -- THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT GIVING ATTORNEY'S FEES AND DAMAGES TO
THE INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO BE PAID BY PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE.
-- the ownership and possession of the subject motor vehicle pertain to plaintiff;
The Court of Appeals found the assigned errors to be without merit, and in its
-- the purported deed of sale Exhibit 4 is an equitable mortgage securing an decision of 27 March 1989,[7] it affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial
obligation of defendant to intervenor in the amount of P17,000.00 which is, however, Court. His motion to reconsider the same having been denied in the resolution of
to be deemed extinguished by the application of payment out of the income of the the Court of Appeals of 7 November 1989,[8] petitioner instituted this present petition
vehicle while operated by intervenor; wherein, as admitted by him, he assigns "same errors raised in C. A., but differently
stated:
2) Ordering intervenor to pay to plaintiff the amount of P14,500.00, representing 1. Both the C. A. and the RTC, after correctly finding and concluding that the plaintiff
the balance of the income of the vehicle after deducting the payment for defendant's Lazaro Calderon (respondent herein) is estopped from assailing the validity of the
obligation; and sale of the motor vehicle in question to intervenor Jesus Morales (petitioner), erred
in executing in the same breath a turn-about by "declaring that the ownership and
3) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the following amounts -- possession of the subject motor vehicle pertains to the plaintiffs' (respondent herein)
as against the intervenor Jesus Morales (petitioner).
-- P17,000.00 representing, together with the aforesaid amount of P14,500.00
which intervenor is required to pay plaintiff, unrealized income of the vehicle during 2. Both the C. A. and the RTC erred in declaring respondent Lazaro Calderon as the
the period that he was deprived of it; owner and rightful possessor of the subject motor vehicle although there is no
evidence on record to support the finding, thereby committing a grave abuse of
-- P10,500.00 representing unrealized income as driver of the jeep during the same discussion (sic) amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
period; and
3. The C. A. and the RTC erred in ordering intervenor Jesus Morales to pay damages
-- P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, with costs. to the respondent Lazaro Calderon to compensate the alleged loss of earning of the
latter.
SO ORDERED.”[5]
Not satisfied with the decision, petitioner appealed therefrom to the Court of 4. The C. A. and the RTC erred in declaring that the deed of sale of the motor vehicle
Appeals. The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 12087. in question executed by defendant Angelita Asuncion in favor of the petitioner Jesus
Morales is an equitable mortgage.
In the Brief[6] he submitted in said case petitioner assigned the following errors:
"I 5. The C. A. and the RTC erred in applying Articles 2102 and 2141 of the Civil Code.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION
OF THE SUBJECT VEHICLE PERTAINS TO THE PLAINTIFF. 6. The RTC and the C. A. erred in not making the respondent Lazaro Calderon and
II Sanpiro Insurance Corporation jointly and severally liable for the wrongful issuance
THE COURT A QUO ERRED THAT THE PURPORTED DEED OF SALE IS AN EQUITABLE of the writ of replevin.
MORTGAGE SECURING AN OBLIGATION OF DEFENDANT TO INTERVENOR IN THE
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RULE 64 & 65

7. The C. A. and the RTC erred in not awarding in favor of the petitioner Jesus (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, 101 Phil. 1205
Morales attorney's fees and other damages."[9] (1957)); and
We find no compelling reason to reverse the subject decision of the Court of Appeals. (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues
of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant
The issues raised principally involve questions of fact. The rule is well stated that and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety & Ins. Co., Inc., 103 Phil. 401
findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon this Court. In Paciano (1958)).[***]
Remalante vs. Cornelia Tibe and Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 138, 144-146, We
said: However, in Garcia, supra, the Court considered exception Nos. 7, 8 and 9 as
"The rule in this jurisdiction is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition circumstances that, taken together, compelled it to go into the record of the case in
for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. 'The Jurisdiction of the order to find out whether or not it fell within any of the six established exceptions.
Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to
reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being On the other hand, exception No. 10 may be considered as an illustration of the
conclusive' (Chan v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L-27488, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA fourth exception - that the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts."
737, reiterating a long line of decisions). This Court has emphatically declared that Petitioner miserably failed to show that this case falls under any of the foregoing
'it is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all exceptions.
over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have
been committed by the lower court' (Tiongco v. De la Merced, G. R. No. L-24426, The first assigned error is based on a wrong premise and is the result of a deliberate
July 25, 1974, 58 SCRA 89; Corona v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 62482, April 28, misreading or misapprehension of what the courts below stated. It assumes that
1983, 121 SCRA 865; Baniqued v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L-47531, February the "sale" in favor of petitioner was in fact a "sale". Both courts, however, ruled
20, 1984, 127 SCRA 596). 'Barring, therefore, a showing that the findings that it was merely an equitable mortgage, which also binds the plaintiff. Therefore,
complained of are totally devoid of support in the record, or that they are so glaringly it did not transfer ownership of the vehicle to petitioner.
erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand, for
this Court is not expected or required to examine or contrast the oral and The disquisition of the Court of Appeals on this point is so clear and unequivocal as
documentary evidence submitted by the parties' (Santa Ana, Jr. v. Hernandez, G. to leave no room for a possible misapprehension:
R. No. L-16394, December 17, 1966, 18 SCRA 973). ". . . As between plaintiff and Asuncion, plaintiff remains the owner. He is only
estopped from repudiating transactions that were entered into by Asuncion in
In several decisions of recent vintage (Rizal Cement Co., Inc. v. Villareal, G. R. No. relation to the property (Article 1431, N.C.C.). If Asuncion actually sold the property
L-30272, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 15; Ramos v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L- to the appellant then plaintiff is estopped from questioning the validity of the
25463, April 4, 1975, 63 SCRA 331; Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L-26490, sale. But if as found by the court a quo, the real transaction between defendant
June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 623; Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., G. R. No. L-22533, Asuncion and appellant is a mere equitable mortgage, then plaintiff as real owner
February 9, 1967, 19 SCRA 289), the Court summarized and enumerated the may validly exercise whatever rights Asuncion may have as ostensible owner and
exceptional circumstances that would compel the Supreme Court to review findings redeem the property if in fact it was merely a mortgage before it is foreclosed in
of fact of the Court of Appeals, to wit: accordance with law. Intervenor cannot acquire more than what Asuncion as
(1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises ostensible owner of the vehicle actually gave him."[10]
or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 (1953)); The lament then of petitioner that he is deprived of ownership and possession
(2) when the inference made is manifestly absurd, mistaken or impossible although he is an innocent purchaser for value, and therefore punished, while
(Luna v. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15 (1942)); plaintiff and defendant Asuncion are "handsomely rewarded" is baseless.
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts (Buyco
v. People, 95 Phil. 253 (1954)); In the first place, both courts made no express finding that petitioner was a
purchaser for value in good faith. Having found and concluded that the so-called
(4) when the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts (De la Cruz
deed of sale in favor of petitioner was merely an equitable mortgage, it was no
v. Sosing, 94 Phil. 26 (1953); Castillo v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L-
longer necessary to belabor the point. This conclusion also renders unnecessary
48290, September 29, 1983, 124 SCRA 808);
petitioner's peregrinations into the law and jurisprudence on estoppel.
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sale for P70,000.00, of which P20,000.00 was paid as downpayment and the balance
In the second place, if indeed the deed of sale reflected the true and real intention of P50,000.00, which shall earn interest at 2% per month, was to be paid in
of the parties, We find it rather surprising why petitioner did not present Asuncion installments at the rate of P500.00 weekly, beginning 19 November
as a witness. Instead, in his brief in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 12087, it was the plaintiff 1983. Possession and use of vehicle were transferred to vendee upon the execution
whom he faulted for not presenting Asuncion to testify on the so-called of the sale; however, ownership was to remain with petitioner until full payment of
Acknowledgement she signed.[11] We find it also surprising why, although the so- the purchase price.[16] The vehicle was in fact seized from Caguioa on 20 December
called deed of sale was executed on 15 February 1983 yet, it was registered only in 1983. Surprisingly, despite the fact that he had already allegedly paid the
September 1983. A new certificate of registration, C.R. No. 0911304, was issued to downpayment of P20,000.00, and had interposed in his Third-Party Claim claims
petitioner only on 9 September 1983.[12] against plaintiff, the deputy sheriff and the insurance firm (Sanpiro Insurance Corp.)
for the refund of P20,000.00 which he allegedly paid to herein petitioner, P30,000.00
Finally, it is apparent that as early as August of 1983 intervenor already knew that for alleged major improvements he introduced on the vehicle, and P7,600.00 which
plaintiff claimed ownership of the vehicle. Plaintiff specifically alleged in his he paid to the Cooperative Fees and for insurance premiums, and for payment of
complaint that: P4,420.00 a month as expected income, as well as for moral and exemplary
"9. Sometime in August 1983, due to plaintiff's incessant request, defendant damages, costs, and attorney's fees of P15,000.00, Caguioa, as stated earlier,
revealed that she had entrusted the physical custody of the vehicle to one Mr. Jesus abandoned the Third-Party Claim; it was dismissed on 16 September 1985, upon
Morales who owns the compound at 93 Quirino Avenue, Caloocan City, Metro Manila; motion of his lawyer. We are unable to understand why, if indeed Caguioa also
acted in good faith in entering into the contract of conditional sale over the vehicle,
10. That when pressed why she could not return the vehicle and why Mr. Morales he would not pursue his Third-Party Claim, and why he did not even bother to file
came in possession and custody of the same, defendant was evasive and non- any claim against his vendor, herein petitioner. Moreover, petitioner deliberately
committal but simply fails and refuses to return the same to its rightful owner the failed to disclose in his Answer in Intervention With Counterclaim and Crossclaim
plaintiff herein; that the vehicle was the subject of a conditional sale in favor of Caguioa and that he
(petitioner) was not in possession of the vehicle. On the contrary, he stoutly
11. That plaintiff and his mother inquired from Mr. Morales how he came in maintained that the filing of the complaint "is an unholy scheme designed to
possession of the vehicle in question, but Mr. Morales said that it was a matter deprived (sic) defendant-intervenor of his ownership and possession of the said
between him and Angelita Asuncion, the defendant."[13] jeep, done in concert and conspiracy, designed to deprive possession and ownership
Yet, despite the specific allegation as against him, petitioner, in his Answer in of defendant-intervenor of said motor vehicle."[17]
Intervention with Counterclaim and Crossclaim, answered the aforesaid paragraph
11, and other paragraphs, merely by saying that “he has no knowledge or Finally, although he captioned his Answer in Intervention as one with Counterclaim
information sufficient to form a belief as to its truth." While it may be true that under and Crossclaim, petitioner did not make any specific allegations against defendant
the Rules one could avail of this statement as a means of a specific denial, Asuncion; he only expressed suspicion of possible connivance and conspiracy
nevertheless, if an allegation directly and specifically charges a party to have done, between plaintiff and Asuncion.
performed or committed a particular act but the latter had not in fact done, The foregoing negate petitioner's pretensions of good faith.
performed or committed it, a categorical and express denial must be made. In such
a case, the occurrence or non-occurrence of the facts alleged may be said to be Under the second assigned error petitioner maintains that there is no evidence on
within the party's knowledge. In short, the petitioner herein could have simply record to support the finding of the courts below that plaintiff Lazaro Calderon is the
expressly and in no uncertain terms denied the allegation if it were untrue. It has owner of the vehicle in question. He stressed two vital points, namely, (1) all the
been held that when the matters of which a defendant alleges of having no receipts of payment for the rebuilding of the vehicle marked in evidence show that
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief, are plainly and necessarily all payments were made by plaintiff's father, Guillermo Calderon, and (2) on 6
within his knowledge, his alleged ignorance or lack of information will not be September 1982 plaintiff sold the vehicle to defendant Asuncion per a Deed of Sale
considered as specific denial.[14] His denial lacks the element of sincerity and good of Motor Vehicle duly acknowledged before a notary public (Exh. "2"-Morales, Annex
faith, hence insufficient.[15] Worse, on the very day that the complaint was filed by "P" of Petition; Rollo, 93). The courts below took into account these pieces of
plaintiff Lazaro Calderon in the Regional Trial Court, i.e., 19 October 1983, he "sold" evidence together with the other exhibits offered by plaintiff and his testimony as
the vehicle to Third-Party claimant Bernabe Caguioa under a so-called conditional well as the testimony of his witness, Mr. Pimentel, owner of the motor shop
SPECPRO 18
RULE 64 & 65

contracted to rebuild the vehicle. Petitioner even supplied the best evidence of 13, 1983 to the date of the deed of sale, Exhibit 4, up to December 20, 1983 when
plaintiff's ownership, the so-called Deed of Sale executed by Lazaro in favor of plaintiff got back the vehicle or a total amount of P31,500.00, no error was
Asuncion.[18] committed by the court a quo in ordering Intervenor to pay plaintiff P14,500.00
representing the balance of the income of the vehicle after deducting the payment
However, as against plaintiff, Exh. "2"-Morales would not improve the position of of defendant's obligation.
petitioner. It was evidently executed in connection with the agreement to have the
vehicle registered in the name of the franchisee, defendant Asuncion. Parenthetically, the record discloses that in selling the vehicle to Bernabe Caguioa,
appellant was paid P20,000.00 as down payment which is P3,000.00 more than his
The third, fourth, fifth and seventh assigned errors are as equally baseless as the initial investment. In addition, he was paid P500.00 weekly from November 19,
first and second assigned errors. Respondent Court of Appeals correctly held: 1983 to December 19, 1983 or for four (4) weeks or a total of P2,000.00 plus
"In his second assignment of error, appellant has not dealt in the vital issue of gross P1,000.00 representing interest (p[.] 8 [,] Appellee's Brief).
inadequacy of the price which led the court a quo to the conclusion that his
transaction with defendant Asuncion is a mere equitable mortgage. He has confined No error was likewise committed in ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of
himself to insisting that the transaction is one of sale and that he is a buyer in good P17,000.00 which was deducted from the income of the vehicle that would have
faith. accrued to plaintiff but was applied instead to the satisfaction of defendant's
mortgage obligation to the Intervenor. Plaintiff having in effect paid defendant's
Plaintiff's claim that the jeep was rebuilt on January 1982 at a total cost of obligation the latter should in turn reimburse the plaintiff for such payment.
P41,000.00 is corroborated by the testimony of Cresencio Pimentel, owner of the
motor shop who rebuilt the jeepney and finds added support in the receipts, Exhibit Having found the first three assignment of errors to be unmeritorious, the fourth
A to E, indicating payment of some P39,000.00 for the assembly of a passenger type assignment of error which is merely dependent on the success of the preceding
jeepney. The real value of the jeep may be gleaned from the sale thereof errors must necessarily fail.
purportedly executed by appellant to Caguioa in the sum of P70,000.00 from which
the court a quo drew the conclusion that the price of P17,000.00 in the purported It may, however, be pointed out that in the opening statement under the fourth
sale between defendant and appellant is grossly inadequate thereby giving rise to assignment of error, appellant claims to have spent P53,000.00 in improving the
the presumption that the contract between them is an equitable mortgage (Article jeep, consisting of replacement of injection pump, repairs of transmission, engine
1602, N.C.C.). This belief of the court a quo is reinforced by its observations that overhaul, changing the four tires to new ones, battery, decoration painting of the
Intervenor is indebted to defendant and allowed seven months to elapse - vehicle. These are substantially the same items which Caguioa claims to have
presumably the period given defendant to pay off his debt - before he finally introduced in the same vehicle. The pretense of appellant was totally disbelieved
registered the vehicle in his name (p. 3, Decision). by the court a quo absent a single receipt to substantiate it. "Withal, the court finds
intervenor's claim improbable, considering the undisputed fact that the jeepney was
Except for the statement that "defendant is indebted to the intervenor" is an newly rebuilt in January 1982, or barely a year before he got possession of it[.]"
undisputed fact, as there is no adequate evidence to support such statement, which (page 4[,] Decision).
we do not however find to be decisive, We find no error in the trial court's finding
that the price is grossly inadequate. No effort was made by appellant to dispute the foregoing findings of the court a quo
which has in its favor the presumption of correctness. As aptly put in Corliss v
The rule is now well-settled that a contract appearing on its face to be a definite sale Manila Railroad Company "In the more traditional terminology, the lower court's
like the contract in question, may be interpreted as an equitable mortgage if any of judgment has in its favor the presumption of correctness. It is entitled to great
the circumstances mentioned in Article 1602 of the Civil Code such as gross or respect. After all, the lower court had the opportunity of weighing carefully what
inadequacy of the price is present (Article 1604, N.C.C.). was testified to and apparently did not neglect it. There is no affront to justice then
if its finding be accorded acceptance, subject of course to the contingency of ultimate
The transaction having been correctly found by the court a quo as an equitable reversal if error or errors, substantial in character, be shown in the conclusion thus
mortgage and appellant not having questioned in this appeal, the finding that the arrived at. It is a fair statement of the governing principle to say that the appellate
income earned by the jeepney while in the possession of Intervenor from February
SPECPRO 19
RULE 64 & 65

function is exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the result reached
by the trial court." (27 SCRA 674, Supra).
The sixth assigned error does not merit the slightest consideration. The vehicle in
question was seized pursuant to the writ of replevin from Bernabe Caguioa
supported by the replevin bond executed by Sanpiro Insurance Corp. Caguioa was
in possession of the vehicle by virtue of the so-called conditional sale in his favor
executed by petitioner. The latter, therefore, had no cause of action against plaintiff
and Sanpiro. As a matter of fact, petitioner did not file any claim against Sanpiro. It
was Caguioa who did in his Third-Party Claim.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
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RULE 64 & 65

G.R. No. 74454 September 3, 1998 Companies") are domestic corporations organized and existing under Philippine
ALFRED PEARSON, for himself and as the attorney-in-fact of his co- laws.
heirs/co-successors-in-interest, namely: ELSIE PEARSON-FUENTES, The public respondents are the Director of Mines, the Minister of Natural Resources,
HENRY PEARSON, WILLIAM PEARSON, JR., ROBERT PEARSON, EDUARD the Presidential Executive Assistant, the Court of First Instance (CFI), and the
PEARSON, CHARLES PEARSON, FREDRIECH PEARSON and HARRY F. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC). 7 Each of them had ruled in favor of the Mining
GASSER, petitioners, Companies.
vs. The facts as found by the respondent Minister of Natural Resources and confirmed
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, Hon. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch by the respondents Presidential Executive Assistant and the IAC are as follows:
155, Pasig, Metro Manila, Hon. Presidential Executive Assistant; Hon. From the records and the documentary evidence at hand, it appears that the Tambis
Minister of Natural Resources; Hon. Director of Mines; DIAMOND MINING Gold Dredging Co., Inc. filed in 1919, under the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
CORPORATION, ROSARIO MINING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and A. declarations of location covering the "BAROBO-1" to "BAROBO-5" placer claims
SORIANO CORPORATION, respondents. located at the barrio of Bahi, municipality of Lianga, province of Surigao del Sur.
QUISUMBING, J.: These declarations of location were destroyed or lost during the war.
This Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction In 1948, the Tambis Gold Dredging Co., Inc. filed with the Bureau of Mines affidavits
and Prayer for a Restraining Order seeks to annul the following: to reconstitute the declarations of location for the "BAROBO" placer claims. The
1. Decision dated September 30, 1983 of respondent Intermediate Appellate Court affidavits were recorded with the mining recorder on January 19, 1949.
(now Court of Appeals) in AC-G.R. No. 15439 which in effect upheld herein private On February 29, 1960, the Tambis Gold Dredging Co., Inc. was dissolved. Appellants
respondents' mining claims and directed respondent Regional Trial Court to resolve (herein petitioners) were at that time stockholders of the corporation.
the motion to dismiss in Civil Case From May 10 to June 11, 1970, appellee (now respondent) Rosario Mining, through
No. 45053. 1 its agent Marcelino Manabat, discovered and located the, "MARTIN-1", "MARTIN-2",
2. Order dated July 31, 1984 of the Court of First Instance, Branch X (now Regional "MARTIN-5", "MARTIN-6" and "MARTIN-27" placer claims in the barrio of Bahi,
Trial Court, Branch 155), Pasig Metro Manila, dismissing Civil Case No. 45053 on the municipality of Barobo, province of Surigao del Sur. On June 25, 1970, the
basis of an earlier decision of the Court of Appeals upholding the findings of fact of declarations of location therefor, and the Special Power and (sic) Attorney appointing
the Minister of Natural Resources; 2 Marcelino Manabat as attorney-in-fact, were registered with the Mining Recorder of
3. Decision dated August 31, 1981 of the Office of the President, Minister that Surigao del Sur.
petitioners had abandoned their "BAROBO" mining claims and accordingly dismissed On August 31, 1970, the applications for the survey of the "MARTIN" claims were
their appeal; 3 filed, and, on March 13, 1973 and December 18, 1973, the corresponding orders for
4. Decision dated October 29, 1979 of the Minister of Natural Resources, affirming survey were issued.
the decision of the Director of Mines; 4 On June 22, 1973, appellee (now respondent) Rosario Mining filed the lease
5. Consolidated Decision dated May 12, 1976 of the Director of Mines in Mines application covering the "MARTIN" placer claims. After the survey returns of said
Administrative Case Nos. V-817 and V-818, upholding the preferential rights of placer claims were approved on January 3, 1975, the notice of lease was published
private respondents to lease, possess, explore and develop their respective in February 20 and 27, 1975 issues of the "Mindanao Times" and in the February 25
"DIAMOND" and "MARTIN" mining claims in question; 5 and March 4, 1975 issues of the "Times Journal".
The petitioners also pray that their mining claims be declared valid and that private Meanwhile, from February 24 to March 5, 1974, appellee (now also respondent)
respondents' mining claims be declared null and void. Diamond Mining, through its agent Justiniano Deloso, discovered and located the
The petitioners Alfred Pearson, et al. (hereinafter "Pearsons") claim to have "DIAMOND-1" to "DIAMOND-7" placer claims in the barrio of Bahi, municipality of
inherited the beneficial interest of the Tambis Gold Dredging Co., Inc. (hereinafter Barobo, province of Surigao del Sur. On March 25, 1974, the declarations of location
"Tambis Gold") upon its dissolution, owing to the fact that the biggest stockholder therefor, including the Special Power of Attorney in favor of Justiniano Deloso, were
of said company and the sole owner of the claims was their ancestor, William F. registered with the Mining Recorder of Surigao del Sur.
Pearson, Sr. 6 On April 17, 1973, the application for survey of the "DIAMOND" placer claims were
Private respondents Diamond Mining Corporation, Rosario Mining Development filed, and, on May 21, 1974, the order for survey was issued.
Corporation and their assignee A. Soriano Corporation (hereinafter "Mining On April 22, 1974, appellee Diamond Mining filed the lease applications covering the
"DIAMOND" placer claims. Subsequently, after the survey returns of said claims
SPECPRO 21
RULE 64 & 65

were approved on December 24, 1974 and January 3, 1975, the notice of lease . . . We agree with the findings of the Ministry of Natural Resources that Appellant's
application was published in the February 25 and March 4, 1975 issues of the "Times mining claims are abandoned, if not null and void. Evidence on record clearly
Journal" and in the February 27 and March 6, 1975 issues of the "Mindanao Times". establishes the fact that appellants failed to conduct the necessary works on their
On 10 March 1975, appellants (petitioners herein) filed the adverse claims against claim, to file the affidavits of annual work obligations, and to pay the real estate
appellees (now private respondents). taxes. These ommissions (sic) by appellants constitute abandonment of their claims.
After the case was heard by the Panel of Investigators of the Bureau of Mines, the Executive Order No. 141 dated August 1, 1968, explicitly states that unpatented
Director of Mines rendred (sic) the decision appealed from. mining claims which were located more than thirty years ago under the provisions
In his decision, the Director held that appellants (petitioners) failed to establish the of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as amended, and which have not complied with the
existence of the conflict among the placer claims involved; that the "BAROBO" placer annual assessment requirement are considered abandoned and their declaration of
claims are null and void because their tie points, as described in the affidavits to location cancelled. On this score, this Office finds no legal justification to modify,
reconstitute the declarations of location therefor, are not the natural objects of much less reverse, the appealed decision."
permanent monuments prescribed under the law and their geographical positions On January 18, 1982, the Office of the President issued a Resolution denying the
cannot be accurately determined; that, even if said "BAROBO" claims were validly Pearsons' motion for reconsideration. 16
located, the same have been abandoned due to the failure of the original locators After said denial, the Pearsons filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
thereof to perform assessment works therein, to file the corresponding affidavits of mandamus, with a writ of preliminary injunction, before Branch X of the CFI of Pasig
annual work obligations, and to pay the real estate taxes thereon; and that to annul the aforementioned decisions of public respondents and to restrain private
appellants (petitioners) are not the successors-in-interest of the Tambis Gold respondents from entering and developing the mining claims involved. 17 This was
Dredging Co., Inc., hence they have no legal personality to institute the adverse docketed as Civil Case No. 45053. The Mining Companies filed their joint motion to
claims. 8 dismiss and opposition to the preliminary injunction alleging, among others, that the
On appeal, the Minister of Natural Resources in a Decision dated October 29, 1979, Decision dated August 31, 1981 of the Office of the President is already final and
affirmed the judgment of the Director of Mines. 9 He agreed with the Director's executory pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 463, Section 50 which states that:
finding on the issue of abandonment. Appeals — Any party not satisfied with the decision or order of the Director, may,
Not satisfied with the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources, the Pearsons within five (5) days from receipt thereof, appeal to the Secretary. Decisions of the
appealed to the Office of the President. They filed a Manifestation requesting the Secretary are likewise appealable within five (5) days from receipt thereof by the
Office to require the Mining Companies to file a bond in such amount as may be affected party to the President of the Philippines whose decision shall be final and
necessary to protect the interests of the Pearsons during the pendency of the case executory.
before it. Also, they prayed for an order for immediate ocular inspection of the area xxx xxx xxx
to determine the fundamental issue of the correct tie point of the controverted Instead of expressly resolving the said motion to dismiss, the CFI ordered on
mining claims. 10 October 15, 1982 the creation of an Ad Hoc Ocular Inspection Committee "to
In an Order dated June 23, 1981, the Office of the President granted the motion determine the correct tie-point of private respondents' mineral claim". Both the
concerning the bond but denied the request for ocular inspection. In the order, it public and private respondents moved for reconsideration of said order. 18 The CFI
was stated that "the investigation conducted by the Presidential Investigating denied both motions and issued the Order dated December 21, 1982 scheduling the
Committee of the Bureau of Mines has already considered and determined the issue ocular inspection for January 3, 1983.
which require no more (sic) further verification and clarification." 11 The Pearsons In view of this last order, the Mining Companies filed with the IAC their Petition
and the Mining Companies separately moved for reconsideration. 12 for Certiorari and Prohibition, assailing the abovementioned orders dated October
Subsequently, the Office of the President granted the motion for ocular inspection, 15, 1982 and December 21, 1982 allowing the creation of and setting the schedule
and ordered the creation of an Ad Hoc Ocular Inspection Committee on June 23, for ocular inspection by the Ad Hoc Committee, and praying that the latter court be
1989. 13 The Mining Companies moved for reconsideration of this order. 14 prohibited from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 45053. The Mining Companies
In a Decision dated August 31, 1981, the Office of the President revoked the order argued that when P.D. Nos. 99-A, 309, and 463 were promulgated, it became
allowing ocular inspection, dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, and released all unquestionable that the procedure of adjudicating mining claims was made
monies that might have been deposited by the Mining Companies. The pertinent completely administrative with the President as the final authority. 19 In their
grounds of its dismissal are hereunder quoted: 15 Answer, the Pearsons assailed the propriety of the petition since its subjects are two
interlocutory orders. 20
SPECPRO 22
RULE 64 & 65

The IAC issued a Restraining Order dated January 31, 1983, restraining the CFI xxx xxx xxx
judge from implementing his order directing the Ad Hoc Committee to conduct an The Supreme Court shall further have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise,
ocular inspection. 21 Later on, the IAC granted the writ of certiorari, set aside the reverse, modify or affirm on certiorari as the law or rules of court may provide, final
orders of the CFI with regard to the Ad Hoc Committee and ocular inspection, and judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided in —
directed the CFI "to resolve the joint motion to dismiss filed by the private xxx xxx xxx
respondents in said case in light of what has been stated in this decision." The (2) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court in issue.
decision of the IAC was promulgated on September 30, 1983, and the same became xxx xxx xxx
final and executory with an entry of judgment issued by the said IAC on February Consequently, they argue that the IAC Decision dated September 30, 1983 is a
17, 1984. patent nullity for utter want of jurisdiction.
As directed by the IAC, the CFI issued an Order on July 31, 1984 dismissing the They further argue that the questioned orders of the CFI dated October 15, 1982
petition of the Pearsons before it. and December 21, 1982 allowing the creation of and setting the schedule for ocular
Hence, the petitioners now come before this Court raising in their petition the inspection by the Ad Hoc Committee were merely interlocutory, and therefore,
following issues: 22 cannot be subject of a petition for certiorari in the IAC. 24
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF RESPONDENT INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE Lastly, they claim that the IAC, in its September 30, 1984 decision sustaining the
COURT IN CA-G.R. NO. 15439 IS NULL AND VOID FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION Decision dated August 31, 1981 of the Office of the President dismissing the appeal
OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE; of petitioners, has no factual and legal bases. They stress that they have lived in
II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT IT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, WHETHER their ancestral home in the mining area up to the filing of this petition; they
OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO continued performing the assessment work on their mineral claims up to 1975 when
LACK OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT GAVE DUE COURSE TO AND DECIDED SAID this case arose, and they were enjoined to stop their operations by respondent
PETITION DESPITE THE CLEAR SHOWING BY HEREIN PETITIONER THAT THE Bureau of Mines; that they have performed assessment work continuously up to
ORDERS IN QUESTION ARE MERELY INTERLOCUTORY AND ARE, THEREFORE, NOT 1975; that they filed religiously their affidavits of assessment work; and that they
PROPER SUBJECT MATTER OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARIUNDER RULE 65 OF THE paid their realty taxes due, although they admitted that certain affidavits were filed
RULES OF COURT; AND and certain taxes were also paid in later years. 25
III. ASSUMING AGAIN ARGUENDO THAT THE QUESTIONED INTERLOCUTORY Private respondents, in their Comment dated June 26, 1986, allege that the IAC has
ORDERS ARE PROPER SUBJECT OF CERTIORARI, WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION jurisdiction to entertain the original petition for certiorari filed by them against
DATED SEPTEMBER 30, 1983 OF RESPONDENT INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT respondents CFI and the Pearsons under Rule 65 of the New Rules of Court. They
IS A PATENT NULLITY FOR BEING DEVOID OF ANY FACTUAL OR LEGAL BASIS. argue that under P.D. Nos. 99-A, 309 and 463 governing the procedures of
Petitioners maintain that the Supreme Court has the exclusive jurisdiction over all adjudicating conflicting mining claims which were made completely administrative,
cases where the jurisdiction of a lower court is in issue, as well as all cases decided the decision of the President on appeal to his Office is final and executory, and
by lower courts involving pure questions of law, 23 pursuant to paragraph 2(c), therefore, not subject to judicial review. 26
Section 5, Art X of the present Constitution which states that: The different issues raised in the instant petition may be subsumed in two principal
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: issues:
xxx xxx xxx 1. Whether or not respondent IAC committed reversible error in assuming
(2) Review and revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law jurisdiction over the private respondents' petition for certiorari assailing the trial
or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in court's interlocutory orders?
— 2. Assuming the IAC had validly assumed jurisdiction, whether or not it committed
xxx xxx xxx reversible errors of law in its decision now before us?
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue. We find the petition entirely devoid of merit. Thus we see, in regard to the first
xxx xxx xxx principal issue, no reversible error committed by the IAC when it assumed
Likewise, they assert that the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. No. 296), as amended, jurisdiction over private respondents' petition for certiorari involving interlocutory
also clearly provides that the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the case, orders of the trial court.
pursuant to Paragraph (3), Sec. 17 thereof, to wit: The petitioners launch a two-pronged attack against the jurisdiction of the
Sec. 17. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. — respondent appellate court, to wit: first, the IAC could not adjudicate cases where
SPECPRO 23
RULE 64 & 65

the jurisdiction of the trial court is in issue; and second, the orders of the CFI, being order until the appeal from the decision of the main case would not afford the party
merely interlocutory, could not be the subject of a petition for certiorari in the IAC. adversely affected by the said order a speedy, plain and adequate remedy. 29
The petitioners err on both counts. In Marcelo vs. De Guzman, 30 we held that although, as a general rule, an
Firstly, the IAC correctly invoked the ruling of this Court in Uytiepo vs. Aggabao 27, interlocutory order is not appealable until after the rendition of the judgment on the
to wit: merits, an exception is made where the remedy of appeal cannot afford an adequate
As regards the claim that the issues raised by Aggabao in her action filed with the and expeditious relief. In such exception, certiorari can be allowed as a mode of
respondent Court of Appeals involve only questions of law and are therefore redress to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party. We further held that
exclusively reviewable by this Court, the petitioners apparently confuse the remedy where the order complained of is a patent nullity, a petition for certiorari and
of special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in relation to mandamus may properly be entertained despite the existence of the remedy of
section 30 of the Judiciary Act as amended and an appeal by certiorari under Rule appeal. 31This we reiterated in Salcedo-Ortañez vs. Court of Appeals. 32
42 also of the Rules of Court in relation to the fourth paragraph of section 17 of the Does the controversy at hand fall under the exception where interlocutory orders
same Act. The first is a remedy available in the Court of Appeals, in aid of its may be the subject of a petition for certiorari in the IAC? In our view, it does. For
appellate jurisdiction, essentially to correct errors of jurisdiction or abuse of the trial court clearly acted outside of its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The second lies within the competence orders creating the Ad Hoc Committee and scheduling the ocular inspection.
of this Court for the review of errors of inferior courts involving only questions of To begin with the lower court did not have jurisdiction over the mining dispute. With
law. . . . the issuance of Presidential Decree Nos. 99-A, 309, and 463, 33 the procedure of
What private respondents availed of was the first remedy, placing in issue the adjudicating conflicting mining claims has been made completely administrative in
jurisdiction of the trial court to create an Ad Hoc Committee and schedule an ocular character, with the President as the final appeal authority. 34 Section 50 of P.D. 463,
inspection. providing for a modernized system of administration and disposition of mineral
Considered in relation to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization lands, to promote and encourage the development and exploitation thereof,
Act of 1980), now incorporated in Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil mandates on the matter of "Protests, Adverse Claims and Appeals," the following
Procedure, which vested the then IAC with original jurisdiction to issue writs procedure:
of certiorari and prohibition, among other auxiliary, writs, "whether or not in aid of Appeals — Any party not satisfied with the decision or order of the Director may,
its appellate jurisdiction", we find that respondent appellate court correctly assumed within five (5) days from receipt there of appeal to the Secretary. Decisions of the
jurisdiction over CA-G.R. No. 15439. Secretary are likewise appealable within five (5) days from receipt thereof by the
It has also been emphasized in a number of cases 28 that while this Court has affected party to the President of the Philippines whose decision shall be final and
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts (for executory.
writs enforceable within their respective regions), to issue writs of mandamus, It should be noted that before its amendment, the Mining Law (C.A. No. 137)
prohibition or certiorari, the litigants are well advised against taking a direct required that after the filing of adverse claim with the Bureau of Mines, the adverse
recourse to this Court. Instead, they should initially seek the proper relief from the claimant had to go to a court of competent jurisdiction for the settlement of the
lower courts. As a court of last resort, this Court should not be burdened with the claim. With the amendment seeking to expedite the resolution of mining conflicts,
task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Where the issuance of an the Director of Mines became the mandatory adjudicator of adverse claims, instead
extraordinary writ is concurrently within the competence of the CA or RTC, litigants of the Court of First instance. 35 Thus, it cannot escape notice that under Section 61
must observe the principle of hierarchy of courts. This Court's original jurisdiction to of the Mining Law, as amended by Republic Act Nos. 746 and 4388, appeals from
issue extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary, or the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (then Minister of
where serious and important reasons therefor exist. Natural Resources) on conflicts and disputes arising out of mining locations may be
Secondly, petitioner's contention that the lower court's orders of October 15, 1982 made to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court as the case may be. In contrast,
and December 21, 1982, being merely interlocutory, are not correctible under the decrees issued at the onset of martial law, it has been expressly provided
by certiorari, ignores this Court's consistent ruling, to wit: that the decisions of the same Secretary in mining cases are appealable to the
On the procedural issues raised, we hold that where an interlocutory order was President of the Philippines under Section 50 of the Mineral Resources Development
allegedly issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of Decree of 1974 (P.D. No. 463) and Section 7 of P.D. No. 1281 in relation to P.D. No.
jurisdiction, such order may be questioned before the Court on a petition 309. 36
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. To delay the review of the
SPECPRO 24
RULE 64 & 65

The trend at present is to make the adjudication of mining cases a purely with the annual assessment works. So, at the time the "DIAMOND" and "MARTIN"
administrative matter. 37 This does not mean that administrative bodies have placer claims were located and registered, the "BAROBO" claims had already been
complete rein over mining disputes. The very terms of Section 73 of the Mining Law, deemed abandoned and the areas covered thereby open to relocation."
as amended by R.A. No. 4388, in requiring that the adverse claim must "state in full Said decision also took into account Executive Order No. 141, dated August 1, 1968,
detail the nature, boundaries and extent of the adverse claim" show that the conflicts which provides:
to be decided by reason of such adverse claim refer primarily to questions of fact. NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue
The controversies to be submitted and resolved by the Director of Mines under the of the vested in me by law, do hereby declare unpatented mining claims which were
sections referred only to the overlapping of claims and administrative matters located more than thirty years ago under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902,
incidental thereto. 38 Questions and controversies that are judicial, not as amended, and which had not complied with the annual assessment requirement,
administrative, in nature can be resolved only by the regular courts in whom is as abandoned and their declaration of location cancelled. 44
vested the judicial power to resolve and adjudicate such civil disputes and Well established is the rule that findings of fact made in the decision of the Minister
controversies between litigants in accordance with the established norms of law and of Natural Resources (then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources) appealed
justice. 39 Decisions of the Supreme Court on mining disputes have recognized a from will not be reviewed by this Court unless there has been a grave abuse of
distinction between (1) the primary powers granted by pertinent provisions of law discretion in making said findings by reason of the total absence of competent
to the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (and the bureau evidence in support thereof. 45 As shown above, the public officials' judgments are
directors) of an executive or administrative nature, such as "granting of license, well supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, by the Pearsons' own admission,
permits, lease and contracts, or approving, rejecting, reinstating or cancelling they failed to file the affidavit of annual assessment works and to pay the real estate
applications, or deciding conflicting applications," and (2) controversies or taxes from 1957-1974, which were filed and paid only later in 1974. 46
disagreements of civil or contractual nature between litigants which are questions In Santa Rosa Mining Co. vs. Hon Minister of Natural Resources Jose Leido, Jr. and
of a judicial nature that may be adjudicated only by the courts of justice. 40 Director of Mines Juanito Fernandez 47, this Court held that while it is recognized
This distinction is carried on even under the present law. 41 Findings of fact by the that the right of a locator of a mining claim is a property right, such right is not
Mines Adjudication Board, which exercises appellate jurisdiction over decisions or absolute. It is merely a possessory right, more so where petitioner's claims are still
orders of the panel of arbitrators, shall be conclusive and binding on the parties, and unpatented. Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the affected land
its decision or order shall be final and executory. 42 But resort to the appropriate or located claim. It merely segregates the located land or area from the public
court, through a petition for review by certiorari, involving questions of law, may be domain by barring other would-be locators from locating the same and appropriating
made within thirty days from the receipt of the order or decision of the Mines for themselves the minerals found therein. To rule otherwise would imply the
Adjudication Board. 43 location is all that is needed to acquire and maintain rights over a located mining
With regard to the second issue, the query boils down to whether the IAC committed claim. This cannot be approved or sanctioned because it is contrary to the intention
reversible error in concluding that petitioners had abandoned their mining claims. of the lawmaker that the locator should faithfully and consistently comply with the
As found by the IAC: requirement for annual works and improvements in the located mining claims. 48 Not
It will not be amiss to state here that the basis of abandonment of the Pearsons of only should there be a valid and subsisting location of the mineral land but also there
their mining claims is well established by the evidence already presented to the should be, thereafter, continuous compliance with all the requirements of law such
Bureau of Mines and to the Ministry of Natural Resources. We need only to refer to as the performance of annual assessment works and payment of real estate taxes. 49
the following reasons found in the decision of the Ministry of Natural Resources, While it is understandable that petitioners would want this Court to reassess the
dated October 29, 1975, to wit: evidence presented before the mining officials to support their plea of not having
. . . assuming, in gratia argumentis, that the "BAROBO" placer claims were validly abandoned the mining claim involved, this cannot be done now in this proceeding,
located, said claims have been abandoned for failure of the claim owners thereof to for this Court is not a trier of facts. Moreover, we find no cogent, much less
conduct works therein, to file the affidavits of annual work obligations, and to pay compelling, reason to depart from established practice and precedents. For where,
the real estate taxes. as in the case at bar, there is no showing that there was fraud, collusion,
The evidence indicate that affidavits of annual assessment works have been filed for arbitrariness, illegality, imposition or mistake on the part of the Office of the
the "BAROBO-2" to "BAROBO-5" placer claims from 1946 to 1951. However, the President or a department head in rendering a questioned decision; nor a total lack
affidavits for the years 1957 to 1974, respectively were all filed only on April 8, of substantial evidence to support their administrative decisions, their factual
1975. Thus, during the latter years, no proof was submitted to show compliance
SPECPRO 25
RULE 64 & 65

findings and conclusions are entitled to great weight and respect, and will not be
interfered with. 50
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the assailed Orders and Decisions,
particularly the Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. 15439,
including the Order of dismissal of Civil Case No. 45053, are hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SPECPRO 26
RULE 64 & 65

G.R. Nos. 89898-99 October 1, 1990 the amount in petitioner's account which was garnished by respondent sheriff. In
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, petitioner, compliance with this order, PSB filed a manifestation informing the court that it had
vs. consolidated its ownership over the property as mortgagee/purchaser at an
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SALVADOR P. DE GUZMAN, JR., extrajudicial foreclosure sale held on April 20, 1987. After several conferences, PSB
as Judge RTC of Makati, Branch CXLII ADMIRAL FINANCE CREDITORS and private respondent entered into a compromise agreement whereby they agreed
CONSORTIUM, INC., and SHERIFF SILVINO R. PASTRANA, respondents. to divide between themselves the compensation due from the expropriation
RESOLUTION proceedings.
CORTÉS, J.: Respondent trial judge subsequently issued an order dated September 8, 1988
The present petition for review is an off-shoot of expropriation proceedings initiated which: (1) approved the compromise agreement; (2) ordered PNB Buendia Branch
by petitioner Municipality of Makati against private respondent Admiral Finance to immediately release to PSB the sum of P4,953,506.45 which corresponds to the
Creditors Consortium, Inc., Home Building System & Realty Corporation and one balance of the appraised value of the subject property under the RTC decision dated
Arceli P. Jo, involving a parcel of land and improvements thereon located at Mayapis June 4, 1987, from the garnished account of petitioner; and, (3) ordered PSB and
St., San Antonio Village, Makati and registered in the name of Arceli P. Jo under TCT private respondent to execute the necessary deed of conveyance over the subject
No. S-5499. property in favor of petitioner. Petitioner's motion to lift the garnishment was denied.
It appears that the action for eminent domain was filed on May 20, 1986, docketed Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was duly opposed by private
as Civil Case No. 13699. Attached to petitioner's complaint was a certification that respondent. On the other hand, for failure of the manager of the PNB Buendia Branch
a bank account (Account No. S/A 265-537154-3) had been opened with the PNB to comply with the order dated September 8, 1988, private respondent filed two
Buendia Branch under petitioner's name containing the sum of P417,510.00, made succeeding motions to require the bank manager to show cause why he should not
pursuant to the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 42. After due hearing where the be held in contempt of court. During the hearings conducted for the above motions,
parties presented their respective appraisal reports regarding the value of the the general manager of the PNB Buendia Branch, a Mr. Antonio Bautista, informed
property, respondent RTC judge rendered a decision on June 4, 1987, fixing the the court that he was still waiting for proper authorization from the PNB head office
appraised value of the property at P5,291,666.00, and ordering petitioner to pay enabling him to make a disbursement for the amount so ordered. For its part,
this amount minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00 which was earlier released petitioner contended that its funds at the PNB Buendia Branch could neither be
to private respondent. garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement
After this decision became final and executory, private respondent moved for the of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law, citing the
issuance of a writ of execution. This motion was granted by respondent RTC judge. case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio [G.R. No. L-20322, May 29, 1968, 23
After issuance of the writ of execution, a Notice of Garnishment dated January 14, SCRA 899].
1988 was served by respondent sheriff Silvino R. Pastrana upon the manager of the Respondent trial judge issued an order dated December 21, 1988 denying
PNB Buendia Branch. However, respondent sheriff was informed that a "hold code" petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the ground that the doctrine enunciated
was placed on the account of petitioner. As a result of this, private respondent filed in Republic v. Palacio did not apply to the case because petitioner's PNB Account No.
a motion dated January 27, 1988 praying that an order be issued directing the bank S/A 265-537154-3 was an account specifically opened for the expropriation
to deliver to respondent sheriff the amount equivalent to the unpaid balance due proceedings of the subject property pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 42. Respondent
under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987. RTC judge likewise declared Mr. Antonio Bautista guilty of contempt of court for his
Petitioner filed a motion to lift the garnishment, on the ground that the manner of inexcusable refusal to obey the order dated September 8, 1988, and thus ordered
payment of the expropriation amount should be done in installments which the his arrest and detention until his compliance with the said order.
respondent RTC judge failed to state in his decision. Private respondent filed its Petitioner and the bank manager of PNB Buendia Branch then filed separate petitions
opposition to the motion. for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which were eventually consolidated. In a
Pending resolution of the above motions, petitioner filed on July 20, 1988 a decision promulgated on June 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals dismissed both
"Manifestation" informing the court that private respondent was no longer the true petitions for lack of merit, sustained the jurisdiction of respondent RTC judge over
and lawful owner of the subject property because a new title over the property had the funds contained in petitioner's PNB Account No. 265-537154-3, and affirmed his
been registered in the name of Philippine Savings Bank, Inc. (PSB) Respondent RTC authority to levy on such funds.
judge issued an order requiring PSB to make available the documents pertaining to Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals, petitioner
its transactions over the subject property, and the PNB Buendia Branch to reveal now files the present petition for review with prayer for preliminary injunction.
SPECPRO 27
RULE 64 & 65

On November 20, 1989, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution [See Viuda De Tan
enjoining respondent RTC judge, respondent sheriff, and their representatives, from Toco v. The Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52 (1926): The Municipality of Paoay,
enforcing and/or carrying out the RTC order dated December 21, 1988 and the writ Ilocos Norte v. Manaois, 86 Phil. 629 (1950); Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan v.
of garnishment issued pursuant thereto. Private respondent then filed its comment Fernandez, G.R. No. 61744, June 25, 1984, 130 SCRA 56]. The foregoing rule finds
to the petition, while petitioner filed its reply. application in the case at bar. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati
Petitioner not only reiterates the arguments adduced in its petition before the Court has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount
of Appeals, but also alleges for the first time that it has actually two accounts with corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987, less
the PNB Buendia Branch, to wit: the sum of P99,743.94 deposited in Account No. S/A 265-537154-3, no levy under
xxx xxx xxx execution may be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner deposited in
(1) Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 — exclusively for the expropriation of the subject Account No. S/A 263-530850-7.
property, with an outstanding balance of P99,743.94. Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no
(2) Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 — for statutory obligations and other purposes legal recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to
of the municipal government, with a balance of P170,098,421.72, as of July 12, effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may
1989. avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of
xxx xxx xxx the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of
[Petition, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 11-12.] municipal funds therefor [See Viuda De Tan Toco v. The Municipal Council of
Because the petitioner has belatedly alleged only in this Court the existence of two Iloilo, supra; Baldivia v. Lota, 107 Phil. 1099 (1960); Yuviengco v. Gonzales, 108
bank accounts, it may fairly be asked whether the second account was opened only Phil. 247 (1960)].
for the purpose of undermining the legal basis of the assailed orders of respondent In the case at bar, the validity of the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987 is not disputed
RTC judge and the decision of the Court of Appeals, and strengthening its reliance by petitioner. No appeal was taken therefrom. For three years now, petitioner has
on the doctrine that public funds are exempted from garnishment or execution as enjoyed possession and use of the subject property notwithstanding its inexcusable
enunciated in Republic v. Palacio [supra.] At any rate, the Court will give petitioner failure to comply with its legal obligation to pay just compensation. Petitioner has
the benefit of the doubt, and proceed to resolve the principal issues presented based benefited from its possession of the property since the same has been the site of
on the factual circumstances thus alleged by petitioner. Makati West High School since the school year 1986-1987. This Court will not
Admitting that its PNB Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 was specifically opened for condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from
expropriation proceedings it had initiated over the subject property, petitioner poses expropriation proceedings it had in fact initiated. It cannot be over-emphasized that,
no objection to the garnishment or the levy under execution of the funds deposited within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain,
therein amounting to P99,743.94. However, it is petitioner's main contention that . . . [j]ust compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to
inasmuch as the assailed orders of respondent RTC judge involved the net amount be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable
of P4,965,506.45, the funds garnished by respondent sheriff in excess of time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered
P99,743.94, which are public funds earmarked for the municipal government's other "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately
statutory obligations, are exempted from execution without the proper appropriation deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually
required under the law. receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss [Cosculluela v. The Honorable
There is merit in this contention. The funds deposited in the second PNB Account Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77765, August 15, 1988, 164 SCRA 393, 400. See also
No. S/A 263-530850-7 are public funds of the municipal government. In this Provincial Government of Sorsogon v. Vda. de Villaroya, G.R. No. 64037, August 27,
jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and 1987, 153 SCRA 291].
execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute [Republic v. Palacio, supra.; The The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair
Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, G.R. No. L-30098, February 18, play and justice. In the case at bar, considering that valuable property has been
1970, 31 SCRA 616]. More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether taken, the compensation to be paid fixed and the municipality is in full possession
real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at and utilizing the property for public purpose, for three (3) years, the Court finds that
execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality. Municipal the municipality has had more than reasonable time to pay full compensation.
revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to ORDER petitioner Municipality of Makati to
primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities immediately pay Philippine Savings Bank, Inc. and private respondent the amount
SPECPRO 28
RULE 64 & 65

of P4,953,506.45. Petitioner is hereby required to submit to this Court a report of


its compliance with the foregoing order within a non-extendible period of SIXTY (60)
DAYS from the date of receipt of this resolution.
The order of respondent RTC judge dated December 21, 1988, which was rendered
in Civil Case No. 13699, is SET ASIDE and the temporary restraining order issued
by the Court on November 20, 1989 is MADE PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
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RULE 64 & 65

G.R. No. 102667, February 23, 2000


AMADO J. LANSANG, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, GENERAL On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction
ASSEMBLY OF THE BLIND, INC., AND JOSE IGLESIAS, RESPONDENTS. in the Regional Trial Court against petitioner, Villanueva, and "all persons acting on
their behalf".[5] The trial court issued a temporary restraining order on the same
DECISION day.[6]
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV The TRO expired on March 28, 1988. The following day, GABI was finally evicted by
No. 27244, which set aside the ruling of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 8, NPDC.
in Civil Case No. 88-43887, and ordered petitioner Amado J. Lansang to pay private
respondent Jose Iglesias P50,000.00 in moral damages, P10,000.00 in exemplary GABI’s action for damages and injunction was subsequently dismissed by the RTC,
damages and P5,000.00 in attorney’s fees. ruling that the complaint was actually directed against the State which could not be
sued without its consent. Moreover, the trial court ruled that GABI could not claim
Like public streets, public parks are beyond the commerce of man. However, private damages under the alleged oral lease agreement since GABI was a mere
respondents were allegedly awarded a "verbal contract of lease" in 1970 by the accommodation concessionaire. As such, it could only recover damages upon proof
National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), a government initiated civic body of the profits it could realize from the concession. The trial court noted that no such
engaged in the development of national parks, including Rizal Park, [1] but actually proof was presented.
administered by high profile civic leaders and journalists. Whoever in NPDC gave
such "verbal" accommodation to private respondents was unclear, for indeed no On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.
document or instrument appears on record to show the grantor of the verbal license
to private respondents to occupy a portion of the government park dedicated to the The Court of Appeals ruled that the mere allegation that a government official is
national hero’s memory. being sued in his official capacity is not enough to protect such official from liability
for acts done without or in excess of his authority.[7] Granting that petitioner had
Private respondents were allegedly given office and library space as well as kiosks the authority to evict GABI from Rizal Park, "the abusive and capricious manner in
area selling food and drinks. One such kiosk was located along T.M. Kalaw St., in which that authority was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which he must
front of the Army and Navy Club. Private respondent General Assembly of the Blind, now be held liable for damages"[8] according to the Court of Appeals.
Inc. (GABI) was to remit to NPDC, 40 percent of the profits derived from operating
the kiosks,[2] without again anything shown in the record who received the share of The Court of Appeals noted that, as the trial court observed, the eviction of GABI
the profits or how they were used or spent. came at the heels of two significant incidents. First, after private respondent Iglesias
extended monetary support to striking workers of the NPDC, and second, after
With the change of government after the EDSA Revolution, the new Chairman of the Iglesias sent the Tanodbayan, a letter on November 26, 1987, denouncing alleged
NPDC, herein petitioner, sought to clean up Rizal Park. In a written notice dated graft and corruption in the NPDC.[9] These, according to the Court of Appeals, should
February 23, 1988 and received by private respondents on February 29, 1988, not have been taken against GABI, which had been occupying Rizal Park for nearly
petitioner terminated the so-called verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that 20 years. GABI was evicted purportedly for violating its verbal agreement with
the latter vacate the premises and the kiosks it ran privately within the public park.[3] NPDC.[10] However, the Court of Appeals pointed out that NPDC failed to present
In another notice dated March 5, 1988, respondents were given until March 8, 1988 proof of such violation.[11]
to vacate.[4]
The Court of Appeals found petitioner liable for damages under Articles 19, 21, and
The latter notice was signed by private respondent Iglesias, GABI president, 24 of the Civil Code.[12]
allegedly to indicate his conformity to its contents. However, Iglesias, who is totally
blind, claims that he was deceived into signing the notice. He was allegedly told by The Court of Appeals absolved from liability all other persons impleaded in GABI’s
Ricardo Villanueva, then chief warden of Rizal Park, that he was merely complaint since it appeared that they were merely acting under the orders of
acknowledging receipt of the notice. Although blind, Iglesias as president was petitioner. The new officers of NPDC, additionally impleaded by GABI, were likewise
knowledgeable enough to run GABI as well as its business. absolved from liability, absent any showing that they participated in the acts
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RULE 64 & 65

complained of. Petitioner was ordered to pay private respondent Iglesias moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. While private respondents recognize the authority of petitioner to terminate the
agreement with GABI "if [the contract] is prejudicial to the interest of the NPDC,"[15]
Hence, this petition, in which petitioner raises the following issues: they maintain that petitioner’s personal interest, and not that of the NPDC, was the
I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT root cause of GABI’s ejectment.
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ COMPLAINT AGAINST PETITIONER, AS CHAIRMAN
OF NPDC, AND HIS CO-DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 88-43887, IS IN The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public
EFFECT A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE WHICH CANNOT BE SUED WITHOUT officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit
ITS CONSENT. must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment
II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT against the public official concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive
PETITIONER’S ACT OF TERMINATING RESPONDENT GABI’S CONCESSION IS act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to
VALID AND DONE IN THE LAWFUL PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY.[13] the plaintiff.[16]
Petitioner insists that the complaint filed against him is in reality a complaint against
the State, which could not prosper without the latter’s consent. He anchors his The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for
argument on the fact that NPDC is a government agency, and that when he ordered acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others.[17] Public officials are not
the eviction of GABI, he was acting in his capacity as chairman of NPDC. Petitioner exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad
avers that the mere allegation that he was being sued in his personal capacity did faith.[18]
not remove the case from the coverage of the law of public officers and the doctrine
of state immunity. Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official
capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have
Petitioner points out that Iglesias signed the notice of eviction to indicate his been committed while he occupied a public position.
conformity thereto. He contends that as evidence of private respondents’ bad faith,
they sued petitioner instead of complying with their undertaking to vacate their We are convinced that petitioner is being sued not in his capacity as NPDC chairman
library and kiosk at Rizal Park. but in his personal capacity. The complaint filed by private respondents in the RTC
merely identified petitioner as chairman of the NPDC, but did not categorically state
Petitioner adds that during the actual eviction, no untoward incident occurred. that he is being sued in that capacity.[19] Also, it is evident from paragraph 4 of said
GABI’s properties were properly inventoried and stored. complaint that petitioner was sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering
the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park.
According to petitioner, the Court of Appeals’ observation that the eviction was "4. Defendant AMADO J. LANSANG, JR., the Chairman of the National Parks
prompted by Iglesias’ support for striking NPDC workers and the letter-complaint Development Committee, acting under the spirit of revenge, ill-will, evil motive and
sent to the Tanodbayan is merely conjectural. personal resentment against plaintiff JOSE IGLESIAS, served on the plaintiff
corporation a letter, dated February 23, 1988 terminating plaintiff’s lease agreement
Finally, petitioner avers that the move to evict GABI and award the spaces it with a demand for the plaintiff corporation to vacate its office premises…"[20] (Italics
occupied to another group was an executive policy decision within the discretion of supplied.)
NPDC. GABI’s possession of the kiosks as concessionaire was by mere tolerance of The parties do not dispute that it was petitioner who ordered the ejectment of GABI
NPDC and, thus, such possession may be withdrawn at any time, with or without from their office and kiosk at Rizal Park. There is also no dispute that petitioner, as
cause. chairman of the NPDC which was the agency tasked to administer Rizal Park, had
the authority to terminate the agreement with GABI[21] and order the organization’s
On the other hand, private respondents aver that petitioner acted beyond the scope ejectment. The question now is whether or not petitioner abused his authority in
of his authority when he showed malice and bad faith in ordering GABI’s ejectment ordering the ejectment of private respondents.
from Rizal Park. Quoting from the decision of the Court of Appeals, private
respondents argue that petitioner is liable for damages for performing acts "to injure We find, however, no evidence of such abuse of authority on record. As earlier
an individual rather than to discharge a public duty."[14] stated, Rizal Park is beyond the commerce of man and, thus, could not be the subject
SPECPRO 31
RULE 64 & 65

of a lease contract. Admittedly, there was no written contract. That private


respondents were allowed to occupy office and kiosk spaces in the park was only a
matter of accommodation by the previous administrator. This being so, also
admittedly, petitioner may validly discontinue the accommodation extended to
private respondents, who may be ejected from the park when necessary. Private
respondents cannot and does not claim a vested right to continue to occupy Rizal
Park.

The Court of Appeals awarded private respondent Iglesias moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees. However, we find no evidence on record to support
Iglesias’ claim that he suffered moral injury as a result of GABI’s ejectment from
Rizal Park. Absent any satisfactory proof upon which the Court may base the amount
of damages suffered, the award of moral damages cannot be sustained. [22]

Neither can we sustain the award of exemplary damages, which may only be
awarded in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages.[23]
We also disallow the award for attorney’s fees, which can only be recovered per
stipulation of the parties, which is absent in this case. There is no showing that any
of the exceptions justifying the award of attorney’s fees absent a stipulation is
present in this case.[24]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 27244 is hereby SET ASIDE, and the DISMISSAL of the complaint
for damages by the trial court for want of merit is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
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RULE 64 & 65

G.R. No. 129132, July 08, 1998 dated August 9, 1988. In that Resolution, the Commission made the following
ISABELITA VITAL-GOZON, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE COURT OF conclusion and disposition, to wit:
APPEALS AND ALEJANDRO DE LA FUENTE, RESPONDENTS.
“xxx (The Commission) declares the demotion/transfer of appellant dela Fuente, Jr.
DECISION from Chief of Clinics to Medical Specialist II as null and void: hence, illegal.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:* Considering further that since the National Children's Hospital was not abolished and
This is a sequel to our decision[1] of 5 August 1992 in G.R. No. 101428, entitled the positions therein remained intact although the title or the position of Chief of
Isabelita Vital-Gozon v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., which held that the Clinics was changed to 'Chief of Medical Professional Staff' with substantially the
Court of Appeals had jurisdiction, in a special civil action for mandamus against a same functions and responsibilities, the Commission hereby orders that:
public officer (docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 16438 and entitled Dr. Alejandro
S. de la Fuente v. Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, et al.), to take cognizance of the claim 1. Appellant dela Fuente, Jr. be retained or considered as never having
for damages against respondent public officer. relinquished his position of Chief of Clinics (now Chief of Medical Professional Staff)
without loss of seniority rights; and
Specifically, the instant petition seeks to reverse the Resolution of 7 May 1997[2] of
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 16438 awarding to petitioner below, 2. He be paid back salaries, transportation, representation and housing
now private respondent, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees after allowances and such other benefits withheld from him from the date of his illegal
hearing the evidence thereon sometime after this Court’s decision in G.R. No. demotion/transfer.”
101428 became final.
No motion for reconsideration of this Resolution was ever submitted nor appeal
The factual antecedents then, as found by us in G.R. No. 101428, must be restated, therefrom essayed to the Supreme Court, within the thirty-day period prescribed
thus: therefor by the Constitution. Consequently, the resolution became final, on
In the early months of 1987 -- and pursuant to Executive Order No. 119 issued on September 21, 1988.
January 30, 1987 by President Corazon C. Aquino -- reorganization of the various
offices of the Ministry of Health commenced; existing offices were abolished, De la Fuente thereupon sent two (2) letters to Dr. Vital-Gozon, the Medical Center
transfers of personnel effected. Chief of the National Children’s Hospital, demanding implementation of the
Commission's decision. Dr. Vital-Gozon referred “de la Fuente’s claims to the
At the time of the reorganization, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente was the Chief of Department of Health Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs for appropriate advice
Clinics of the National Children's Hospital, having been appointed to that position on and/or action xxx (She did this allegedly because, according to the Solicitor General,
December 20, 1978. Prior thereto, he occupied the post of Medical Specialist II, a she was) unaware when and how a CSC Resolution becomes final and executory,
position to which he was promoted in 1977 after serving as Medical Specialist I of whether such Resolution had in fact become final and executory and whether the
the same hospital for six (6) years (since 1971). DOH Legal Department would officially assail the mentioned Resolution.” But she did
not answer Dr. de la Fuente’s letters, not even to inform him of the referral thereof
On February 4, 1988 Dr. de la Fuente received notice from the Department of Health to the Assistant Secretary. She chose simply to await “legal guidance from the DOH
that he would be re-appointed “Medical Specialist II.” Considering this to be a Legal Department.” On the other hand, no one in the DOH Legal Department
demotion by no less than two ranks from his post as Chief of Clinics, Dr. de la Fuente bothered to reply to Dr. de la Fuente, or to take steps to comply or otherwise advise
filed a protest with the DOH Reorganization Board. When his protest was ignored, compliance, with the final and executory Resolution of the Civil Service Commission.
he brought his case to the Civil Service Commission where it was docketed as CSC In fact, de la Fuente claims that Vital-Gozon had “actually threatened to stop paying
Case No. 4. In the meantime “the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the xxx (his) salary and allowances on the pretext that he has as yet no 'approved'
position of Chief of Clinics were turned over to and were allowed to be exercised by appointment even as ‘Medical Specialist II’ x x x.”
Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr.”
Three months having elapsed without any word from Vital-Gozon or anyone in her
Dr. de la Fuente’s case was decided by the Civil Service Commission in a Resolution behalf, or any indication whatever that the CSC Resolution of August 9, 1988 would
be obeyed, and apprehensive that the funds to cover the salaries and allowances
SPECPRO 33
RULE 64 & 65

otherwise due him would revert to the General Fund, Dr. de la Fuente repaired to “Supplemental/Amended Petition” dated February 2, 1989. The second petition
the Civil Service Commission and asked it to enforce its judgment. He was however described as one for “quo warranto” aside from “mandamus”, added three
“told to file in court a petition for mandamus because of the belief that the respondents including Dr. Jose Merencilla, Jr.; and alleged inter alia that he (de la
Commission had no coercive powers -- unlike a court -- to enforce its final Fuente) had “clear title” to the position in question [by] virtue of the final and
decisions/resolutions.” executory judgment of the Civil Service Commission; that even after the
Commission's judgment had become final and executory and been communicated
So he instituted in the Court of Appeals on December 28, 1988 an action of to Vital-Gozon, the latter allowed “Dr. Merencilla, Jr. as ‘OIC Professional Service’ to
“mandamus and damages with preliminary injunction” to compel Vital-Gozon, and further usurp, intrude into and unlawfully hold and exercise the public office/position
the Administrative Officer, Budget Officer and Cashier of the NCH to comply with the of petitioner (under a duly approved permanent appointment as ‘Chief of Clinics’
final and executory resolution of the Civil Service Commission. He prayed for the since 1978). De la Fuente thus prayed, additionally, for judgment:
following specific reliefs:
“(a) Declaring that principal respondent Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr. is not legally
“(1) (That) xxx a temporary restraining order be issued immediately, ordering the entitled to the office of ‘Chief of Clinics’ (now retitled/known as ‘Chief of Medical
principal and other respondents to revert the funds of the NCH corresponding to the Professional Staff,’ NCH), ousting him therefrom and ordering said respondent to
amounts necessary to implement the final resolution of the CSC in CSC Case No. 4 immediately cease and desist from further performing as ‘OIC Professional Service’
in favor of herein petitioner, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente, Jr., and to pay such sums any and all duties and responsibilities of the said office; (and)
which have accrued and due and payable as of the date of said order;
(b) Declaring that the petitioner, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente, Jr., is the lawful
(2) After hearing on the prayer for preliminary injunction, that the restraining or de jure Chief of Clinics (now known as ‘Chief of the Medical Professional Staff’ and
order be converted to a writ of preliminary injunction; and that a writ of preliminary placing him in the possession of said office/position, without the need of
mandatory injunction be issued ordering principal respondent and the other reappointment or new appointment as held by the Civil Service Commission in its
respondents to implement in full the said final resolution; and resolution of August 9, 1988, in CSC Case No. 4.

(3) That, after hearing on the merits of the petition, that judgment be rendered xxx."
seeking (sic) permanent writs issued and that principal respondent be ordered and
commanded to comply with and implement the said final resolution without further Copy of the “Supplemental/Amended Petition” was sent to “Atty. Jose A. Favia,
delay; and, furthermore, that the principal respondent be ordered to pay to the Counsel for Respondents c/o Dr. Ma. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, etc., National Children's
petitioner the sums of P100,000.00 and P20,000.00 as moral and exemplary Hospital, E. Rodriguez Ave., Quezon City (Atty. Fabia's address not being indicated
damages, and P10,000.00 for litigation expenses and attorney's fees. or mentioned in his motion for Extension of Time).”

x x x Again the Court of Appeals required answer of the respondents. Again, none was
filed. The petitions were consequently “resolved on the basis of their allegations and
The Court of Appeals required the respondents to answer. It also issued a temporary the annexes.” The Appellate Court promulgated its judgment on June 9, 1989. It
restraining order as prayed for, and required the respondents to show cause why it held that --
should not be converted to a writ of preliminary injunction. The record shows that
the respondents prayed for and were granted an extension of fifteen (15) days to “The question of whether petitioner may be divested of his position as Chief of Clinics
file their answer “through counsel, who,” as the Court of Appeals was later to point by the expedient of having him appointed to another, lower position is no longer an
out, “did not bother to indicate his address, thus notice was sent to him through the issue. It ceased to be such when the resolution in CSC Case No. 4 became final. The
individual respondents xxx (However, no) answer was filed; neither was there any said resolution is explicit in its mandate; petitioner was declared the lawful and de
show cause [sic] against a writ of preliminary injunction.” It was a certain Atty. Jose jure Chief of Clinics (Chief of the Medical Professional Staff) of the National Children’s
Fabia who appeared in Vital-Gozon's behalf. Hospital, and by this token, respondent Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr. is not legally
entitled to the office. Respondents, particularly Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, had no
About a month afterwards, de la Fuente filed with the same Court a discretion or choice on the matter; the resolution had to be complied with. It was
SPECPRO 34
RULE 64 & 65

ill-advised of principal respondent, and violative of the rule of law, that the resolution “The decision of June 9, 1989 having become final and executory, as prayed for, let
has not been obeyed or implemented.” the writ of execution issue forthwith.”

and accordingly ordered – The corresponding writ of execution issued on July 13, 1989, on the invoked
authority of Section 9, Rule 39. The writ quoted the dispositive portion of the
“xxx respondents, particularly Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, xxx to forthwith comply judgment of June 9, 1989, including, as the Solicitor General’s Office points out, the
with, obey and implement the resolution in CSC Case No. 4 (and) xxx Dr. Jose D. second paragraph to the effect that the petitions “are not the vehicle nor is the Court
Merencilla, Jr., who is not entitled to the office, xx to immediately cease and desist the forum for the claim of damages; (hence,) the prayer therefor is denied.”
from further performing and acting as OIC Professional Service.”
The writ of execution notwithstanding, compliance with the June 9, 1989 judgment
But de la Fuente's prayer for damages -- founded essentially on the refusal of Gozon, was not effected. Consequently, de la Fuente filed, on July 20, 1989, an “Urgent Ex
et al. to obey the final and executory judgment of the Civil Service Commission, Parte Manifestation with Prayer to Cite Respondents for Contempt,” complaining that
which thus compelled him to litigate anew in a different forum -- was denied by the although Gozon and her co-parties had been served with the writ of execution on
Court of Appeals on the ground that the “petitions (for mandamus) are not the July 14, they had not complied therewith. By Resolution dated July 26, 1989, the
vehicle nor is the Court the forum for xxx (said) claim of damages.” Court required Gozon and Merencilla to appear before it on August 3, 1989 to answer
the charge and show cause “why they should not be adjudged in contempt for
Gozon acknowledged in writing that she received a copy of the Appellate Tribunal's disobeying and/or resisting the judgment.”
Decision of June 9, 1989 on June 15, 1989. Respondent de la Fuente acknowledged
receipt of his own copy on June 15, 1989. Neither Vital-Gozon nor her co-party, Dr. At the hearing Gozon and Merencilla duly presented themselves, accompanied by
Merencilla, Jr., moved for reconsideration of, or attempted to appeal the decision. their individual private lawyers -- one for Gozon (Felipe Hidalgo, Jr.), two for
Merencilla (Bernardo S. Nera and Moises S. Rimando). One other lawyer appeared
It was de la Fuente who sought reconsideration of the judgment, by motion filed in their behalf, from the Health Department, Artemio Manalo, who stated that he
through new counsel, Atty. Ceferino Gaddi. He insisted that the Appellate Court had was there “in behalf of Jose A. Fabia.” They explained that they had no intention to
competence to award damages in a mandamus action. He argued that while such a defy the Court, they had simply referred the matter to their superiors in good faith;
claim for damages might not have been proper in a mandamus proceeding in the and they were perfectly willing to comply with the judgment, undertaking to do so
Appellate Court “before the enactment of B.P. Blg. 129 because the Court of Appeals “even in the afternoon” of that same day. The Court consequently ordered them "to
had authority to issue such writs only ‘in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,’ ” the comply with their undertaking xxx without any further delay,” and report the action
situation was changed by said BP 129 in virtue of which three levels of courts -- the taken towards this end, within five (5) days.
Supreme Court, the Regional Trial Court, and the Court of Appeals -- were conferred
concurrent original jurisdiction to issue said writs, and the Court of Appeals was On August 9, 1989, Gozon, as “Medical Center Chief,” sent a letter to Associate
given power to conduct hearings and receive evidence to resolve factual issues. To Justice Pedro A. Ramirez, advising that under Hospital Special Order No. 31 dated
require him to separately litigate the matter of damages, he continued, would lead August 3, 1989, de la Fuente had been directed to assume the position of Chief of
to that multiplicity of suits which is abhorred by the law. the Medical Professional Staff, and that a voucher for the payment of his allowances
had been prepared and was being processed.
While his motion for reconsideration was pending, de la Fuente sought to enforce
the judgment of the Court of Appeals of June 9, 1989 -- directing his reinstatement More than a month later, or more precisely on September 27, 1989, the Court of
pursuant to the Civil Service Commission’s Resolution of August 9, 1988, supra. He Appeals promulgated another Resolution, this time resolving de la Fuente's motion
filed on July 4, 1989 a “Motion for Execution,” alleging that the judgment of June 9, for reconsideration of June 29, 1989. It modified the Decision of June 9, 1989 by (a)
1989 had become final and executory for failure of Gozon, et al. -- served with notice deleting its last paragraph (disallowing the claim of damages, supra), (b)
thereof on June 16, 1989 -- to move for its reconsideration or elevate the same to consequently describing and treating it as a “PARTIAL DECISION,” and (c)
the Supreme Court. His motion was granted by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution scheduling “further proceedings for the purpose of receiving evidence (of
dated July 7, 1989, reading as follows: damages),” since said question “cannot be resolved by mere reference to the
pleadings.” This was done in reliance on Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
SPECPRO 35
RULE 64 & 65

invoked by de la Fuente, which reads as follows: Notice of this Resolution of January 11, 1991 was served on the Solicitor General’s
Office on January 18, 1991. Again the Solicitor General sought reconsideration, by
“SEC. 3. Mandamus. -- When any tribunal, corporation, board, or person unlawfully motion dated January 25, 1991 and filed on January 30, 1991. Again it was rebuffed.
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty In a Resolution rendered on August 7, 1991, served on the Solicitor General’s Office
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the on August 20, 1991, the Court of Appeals denied the motion. It ruled that the
use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is “question of the authority of the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the respondent Gozon xxx (had already) been extensively discussed,” and that its
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the “jurisdiction xxx to hear and determine issues on damages proceeds from Sec. 9,
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the Batas Pambansa 129 as amended.”
defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to
be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained In an attempt to nullify the adverse dispositions of the Court of Appeals -- and obtain
by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.” “the ultimate and corollary relief of dismissing respondent de la Fuente’s claim for
damages” - the Solicitor General’s Office has instituted the special civil action of
At about this time, yet another lawyer, Atty. Pedro F. Martinez entered his certiorari at bar. It contends that the Court of Appeals is not legally competent to
appearance for Isabelita Gozon. At his instance, the Court gave him an “opportunity take cognizance of and decide the question of damages in a mandamus suit. xxx[3]
to xxx file a motion for reconsideration” of the Resolution of September 27, 1989. On 5 May 1993, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution[4] which noted that our
That motion he filed by registered mail on November 10, 1989. His basic contentions decision in G.R. No. 101428 had become final and left the option to reopen the case
were (a) that the decision of June 9, 1989 could no longer be altered, having become to de la Fuente.
final and executory and having in fact been executed, and (b) that under BP 129,
the Appellate Court had no jurisdiction over the question of damages in a mandamus In its resolution of 26 October 1995,[5] the Court of Appeals, inter alia, set the
action. hearing for reception of evidence on the matter of damages on 7 December 1995.

The Office of the Solicitor General also put in an appearance in Gozon's behalf at After de la Fuente presented his evidence, the Court of Appeals set reception of
this juncture, saying that the case had been referred to it only on November 14, Vital-Gozon’s evidence on 16 and 17 January 1996.[6]
1989. It, too, sought reconsideration of the Resolution of September 27, 1989. It
filed on November 16, 1989 an “Omnibus Motion: I. For Reconsideration of At the scheduled hearing on 16 January 1996, Conrado M. Dela Fuente sought to
Resolution dated September 27, 1989; and II. To defer hearing on petitioner's claims block the presentation of Vital-Gozon’s evidence on the ground that the former had
for damages.” not filed an answer, which the latter refuted. The hearing was then reset to other
dates for the parties to prove their respective claims. Vital-Gozon submitted, on 18
Both motions were denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated January 11, January 1996, copies of a “Manifestation and Motion” dated 10 September 1992 to
1991. In that Resolution, the Court – which was attached an Answer likewise dated 10 September 1992. It was claimed
in the Manifestation that the answer to the claim for damages could not have been
1) declared that the amended decision had already become final and could filed earlier as the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over de la Fuente’s claim for
no longer be re-opened because, although “a copy of the amendatory resolution was damages had been questioned before the Supreme Court. Vital-Gozon likewise
received by counsel who was representing Gozon on October 3, 1989,” the first claimed that copies of the Manifestation and Motion were received by the Court of
motion for reconsideration was not mailed until November 10, 1989 and the Solicitor Appeals on 18 September 1992 at 3:40 p.m. and sent by registered mail to counsel
General’s “Omnibus Motion” was not filed until November 16, 1989; and for dela Fuente.[7] The filing of the Manifestation and Motion with the Court of
Appeals was confirmed by Remigio M. Escalada, Jr., Division Clerk of Court of the
2) prohibited the Solicitor General from representing Gozon in connection Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals in an undated Report.[8] He further disclosed
with xx (de la Fuente’s) claim for damages,” on the authority of this Court’s ruling that the pleading was transmitted to the Archives Section on 19 September 1992.
promulgated on March 19, 1990 in G.R. No. 87977 (Urbano, et al. v. Chavez, et al.)
and G.R. No. 88578 (Co v. Regional Trial Court of Pasig). The Court of Appeals then ordered the parties to submit their respective
memoranda,[9] after which, the Court of Appeals promulgated, on 20 March 1997, a
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resolution denying petitioner’s motion to admit her Answer to the petition and On 7 May 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution[14] finding petitioner
supplemental/amended petition for mandamus with damages, on the ground that liable for damages and ordered her to pay private respondent P50,000.00 as moral
the period to file the answer had long prescribed, thus: damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees. In
It was too late that the answer was filed in this Court on September 18, 1992, after support thereof, respondent court quoted our finding in G.R. No. 101428,[15] to wit:
promulgation on August 5, 1992, of the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. The record demonstrates that Vital-Gozon was fully aware of the following acts and
101428. The prescribed period to file such answer as well as the extended period events:
had long expired on January 24, 1989 (pp. 35, 37, 55, Rollo) by the time
respondent’s answer was filed in this Court on September 18, 1992. She had another 1) the proceeding commenced by de la Fuente in the Civil Service Commission
opportunity to answer when petitioner filed a supplemental/amended petition. (pp. in protest against his demotion;
57, 72, Rollo). Still, she filed none. It is evident respondent just ignored the case
filed against her or gave no importance to the petitions and the notices sent to her 2) the Commission’s Resolution of August 9, 1988 as well, particularly, as the
by this Court. The delay in filing her answer is inexcusable. direction therein that de la Fuente be reinstated and paid all his back salaries and
other monetary benefits otherwise due him, this being couched in fairly simple
After promulgation and upon finality of this Court’s decision granting the principal language obviously understandable to persons of ordinary or normal intelligence;
relief sought by the petitioner, the instant case for mandamus was virtually disposed
of with the exception of the incidental damages that petitioner has claimed. It was 3) no less than two (2) written demands of de la Fuente for implementation of
uncontested in view of respondent’s failure to answer the petition setting up her the CSC’s aforesaid Resolution of August 9, 1988;
defenses. Consequently, the allegations in the petition and supplemental petition
were deemed admitted; unpleaded defenses were deemed waived and any 4) the petition filed by de la Fuente in the Court of Appeals for enforcement of
counterclaim not set up, barred (Sections 1, 2 and 4, Rule 9, Revised Rules of Court). the CSC Resolution of August 9, 1988;
Such procedural rules would become meaningless unless strictly complied with by
litigants. As clearly indicated in the proposed answer, respondent’s purpose is to set 5) the extension granted by said Court of Appeals within which to file answer,
up a counterclaim already barred and to plead defenses already waived. notice thereof having been sent directly to her and her co-respondents since the
attorney who sought the extension in their behalf (Atty. Fabia) did not set out his
Besides, the parties as well as this Court are bound by the comprehensive findings address in his motion for extension;
and conclusions of the Supreme Court in its final decision in G.R. No. 101428, based
on the uncontroverted allegations of the verified petitions. So are they bound 6) the “supplemental/amended petition” subsequently presented by de la
thereby in this proceeding which deals with the lone issue of incidental damages Fuente, copy of which was sent to Atty. Fabia, c/o Dr. Vital-Gozon; and
claimed by petitioner. What remains to be done by this Court is but the
determination of whether respondent’s wrongful act or refusal/failure to perform an 7) the Decision and Amendatory Decision sent to her counsel on October 3, 1989.
official duty caused injury to the claimant and the amount of the damages that may
be awarded in his favor.[10] To all these, her reaction, and that of the officials of the Department of Health
Respondent court then set the hearing of the case on 22-23 April 1997 “for the concerned, was a regrettably cavalier one, to say the least. Neither she nor the
presentation of [Vital-Gozon’s] evidence to controvert or rebut that of [de la Fuente] Health officials concerned accorded said acts and events any importance. She never
which he has adduced in support of his claim for damages.” bothered to find out what was being done to contest or negate de la Fuente’s
petitions and actions, notwithstanding that as time went by, de la Fuente’s efforts
In its resolution[11] of 21 April 1997, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion were being met with success.
to reconsider[12] the 20 March 1997 resolution.
Nothing in the record even remotely suggests that Vital-Gozon merits relief from the
Petitioner then opted not to present her evidence, as she intended to file a petition final and executory Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. This Court will not
with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the 20 March 1997 resolution disturb that Resolution. It is satisfied that no procedural or substantive errors taint
and 21 April 1997 order of the Court of Appeals.[13] that Resolution, or its becoming final and executory.
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The Court of Appeals then considered the evidence for private respondent and the Unsatisfied, petitioner forthwith filed the instant petition for review on certiorari
applicable law, thus: under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. She prays that we reverse and set aside the
Upon respondent’s continued refusal without justifiable cause to implement the final challenged Resolution on the following grounds:
resolution of the Civil Service Commission upholding petitioner’s right to the position 1. There is absolutely no ground for the award of moral and exemplary damages,
he has been claiming with back salaries, transportation, representation and housing as well as attorney’s fees.
allowances and other benefits withheld from him, petitioner is entitled to the
damages he claims. Testifying in his own behalf petitioner declared that he was 2. Petitioner’s right to due process was violated.
greatly disturbed, shocked and frustrated during the three months preceding the Anent the first ground, petitioner asserts there is no factual basis for the award of
filing of his petition; that he had sleepless nights and suffered from mental anxiety, moral damages for, concretely, private respondent was unable to show any causal
mental anguish, worry, tension and humiliation when respondent ignored and connection between his supposed injury and petitioner’s alleged actionable wrong.
disregarded the final resolution of the Civil Service Commission; that he felt Petitioner argues that while testifying, private respondent simply made generalized
harassed by her refusal because he had to go to court to obtain relief and had to statements that he had sleepless nights and suffered mental anxiety, mental
incur additional expenses for litigation which he could hardly afford; and that he had anguish, worry, tension and humiliation. Petitioner next reiterates her stand that
to spend no less than P5,000 for court fees and incidental expenses and to pay his she had nothing to do with the Civil Service case relative to respondent’s original
counsel P10,000 at the end of the litigation (pp. 6, 7, 12, 13, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1995). position, as she was not yet connected with the NCH when said case was filed.
All these respondents has not successfully rebutted by her evidence since she Moreover, the failure to immediately reinstate private respondent was caused by the
adduced none in her behalf. directive of the Legal Department of the Department of Health, to which office she
forwarded the decision of the Civil Service Commission for guidance, pursuant to
Petitioner, therefore, is entitled to recover moral damages from respondent for her standard procedure. Petitioner, therefore, acted in good faith. She likewise faults
refusal and neglect without just cause to perform her official duty to reinstate the Court of Appeals for considering our observations in G.R. No. 101428 as factual
petitioner to the position he was entitled, as ordered by the Civil Service Commission findings which bound respondent court.
in its decision. While he was reinstated to his position, petitioner had to seek the aid
of the courts for that purpose. In point is the case of San Luis vs. Court of Appeals, As to exemplary damages, petitioner asserts that she did not act with vindictiveness
decided by the Supreme Court on June 26, 1989 (174 SCRA 258, 276), which nor wantonness, hence the award of said damages was unwarranted, [17] as such,
involves the unlawful suspension and dismissal by a Provincial Governor of a quarry there could likewise be no basis for the award of attorney’s fees.[18]
superintendent and the Governor’s obstinate refusal to comply with the final
decisions of the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President which Anent the second ground, petitioner contends that she was sued in her official
declared said suspension and dismissal unlawful or without just cause. The Supreme capacity, hence could not be held liable for damages, and to hold otherwise would
Court held that the Governor (who was sued both in his official and private violate her right to due process as a private individual, citing Cariño v. Agricultural
capacities) was personally liable for the damages claimed and awarded in favor of Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration[19] and Animos v. Philippine
the offended party P50,000 as moral damages and P20,000 for attorney’s fees and Veterans Affairs Office.[20]
litigation expenses. Tan Kapoe vs. Masa, decided January 21, 1985 (134 SCRA 231),
is also pertinent. There the Supreme Court upheld the award of moral damages Petitioner further argues that the Court of Appeals denied her due process by
although it was “made on the basis of documentary evidence x x x without refusing to admit her answer, considering that: (a) she personally attended each
supporting oral testimonies.” And the award of exemplary damages, in addition to and every hearing of the mandamus case; (b) in its decision of 9 June 1989, the
moral damages, was also deemed proper “even if not expressly pleaded in the Court of Appeals explicitly declared that it was not the proper forum for the claim
complaint nor proved.” Such award of exemplary damages is by way of example or for damages, at which point then the necessity of an answer had become moot; (c)
correction for the public good, in addition to moral damages (Article 2229, Civil it was only on 27 September 1989 that the Court of Appeals reconsidered its decision
Code). Inasmuch as petitioner is entitled to exemplary damages, he should be of 9 June 1989 thereby upholding its jurisdiction to hear the claims for damages;
awarded attorney’s fees. The award in favor of petitioner of moral and exemplary (d) but then, consistent with her stand that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction
damages are attorney’s fees in the amounts of P50,000, P20,000 and P10,000, over the claims for damages, she assailed such ruling before this Court, hence she
respectively, is but fair and just and not excessive.[16] could not have been expected to file an answer; (e) nonetheless, upon receipt of
the adverse decision of this Court of 4 August 1992 in G.R. No. 101428, she
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immediately filed her answer with a corresponding motion for its admission; and (f) Court of Appeals promulgated a resolution[29] granting the motion for reconsideration
while her motion for admission of the answer had been pending since 18 October by deleting therefrom the challenged portion of its decision of 9 June 1989.
1992, the Court of Appeals did not act on it until it was already her turn to present Respondent court then set reception of evidence on the claims for damages on 9
her evidence on the claim for damages. and 11 of October 1989.

In his comment on the petition submitted in compliance with the Resolution of 21 Respondents below, represented by new counsel, Atty. Pedro Martinez, and the rest
July 1997, private respondent contends that: (a) petitioner’s incomplete and slanted by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed motions to reconsider the resolution of
version of the facts of the case cannot be relied upon; (b) the factual findings of this 27 September 1989, primarily on the ground that the Court of Appeals had no
Court in G.R. No. 101428 are conclusive and binding, hence the Court of Appeals jurisdiction over the claim for damages in the petition for mandamus. The incidental
did not err nor abuse its discretion in relying on said findings; (c) petitioner’s issue of the authority of the Solicitor General to appear for herein petitioner in
invocation of state immunity is untenable as she was sued not in her official capacity, respect of the claim for damages against her in her personal capacity was also
and assuming otherwise, petitioner could nevertheless be held liable for damages raised. These matters became the subject of various pleadings.
under Articles 20, 27 and 2176 of the Civil Code and Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court; (d) the Court of Appeals did not err in denying petitioner’s motion to admit Eventually, on 11 January 1991, the Court of Appeals promulgated a resolution[30]
her answer; and (e) the Court of Appeals’ awards of moral and exemplary damages which gave rise to G.R. No. 101428, after the Court of Appeals denied herein
and attorney’s fees were proper, fair, reasonable, justified and in accord with the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
law and precedent.
Clearly, therefore, petitioner’s failure to file the answer to the petition was due to
Two principal issues thus confront us, viz: (a) whether petitioner was denied due her fault or negligence. She was, by formal resolutions of the Court of Appeals,
process when her answer to the petition was not admitted; and (b) whether the required to file answers to both the original petition and the Supplemental/Amended
awards of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees were proper. These Petition; yet, she failed to heed both resolutions. As regards the resolution to answer
will be resolved in seriatim. the Supplemental/Amended Petition, herein petitioner totally disregarded the same.
I And if only to further evince that herein petitioner had no one to blame but herself
We do not hesitate to rule that petitioner was not denied due process. The record of for her plight, as regards the resolution to answer the original petition, this she
CA-G.R. SP No. 16438 shows that in the resolution of 29 December 1998, the Court spurned despite the fact that she asked for and was granted an extension of 15 days
of Appeals gave due course to private respondent’s petition and required herein within which to do so. That she questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
petitioner and the other respondents to answer the petition within 10 days from over the claims for damages is entirely irrelevant, considering that she did so only
notice of the resolution.[21] On 9 January 1988, petitioner and the other respondents, after the Court of Appeals promulgated its Resolution of 27 September 1989. Up to
represented by Atty. Jose Fabia, filed a motion for an extension of 15 days from said that time, petitioner had absolutely no responsive pleading setting forth her defense.
date within which to file their answer, which respondent court granted in its
resolution of 17 January 1989.[22] Likewise, on 17 January 1989, private respondent, It may likewise be stressed that under Section 2.c.(4) of the Revised Internal Rules
as petitioner below, was granted leave to file a supplemental/amended petition. [23] of the Court of Appeals then in force, after the expiration of the period for filing the
answer or the reply in special civil actions, a case is deemed submitted for resolution.
The Supplemental/Amended Petition was filed on 3 February 1989,[24] and in the Thus, after the expiration of the 10-day period granted to herein petitioner to file
resolution of 9 February 1989,[25] the Court of Appeals required petitioner herein and her Answer to the Supplemental/Amended Petition, and in light of her failure to file
her co-respondents in CA-G.R. SP No. 16438 to file their answer thereto within 10 her answer to the original petition despite the grant of her motion for extension of
days from notice. However, no such answer was filed, and on 9 June 1989, the Court time to file it, then the case was automatically deemed submitted for decision. After
of Appeals rendered its decision.[26] De la Fuente seasonably filed a motion for the decision was rendered, she could then no longer be heard to raise a defense
reconsideration,[27] principally as regards the holding that “the petitions are not the which, by her inaction, she indubitably expressed no desire to raise.
vehicle nor is the Court the forum for the claim of damages.” A copy of this motion
was furnished counsel for respondents. Respondents therein were then required, in It cannot then be successfully maintained that the Court of Appeals committed
the resolution of 5 July 1989,[28] to comment within 10 days from notice. However, reversible error, much less, grave abuse of discretion, when it denied admission to
respondents below once more failed to comply. Thus, on 27 September 1989, the an answer that was filed only after this Court’s decision in G.R. No. 101428 had long
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become final and immutable. It is thus evident that under Article 27, in relation to Articles 2219 and 2217 of the
Civil Code, a public officer, like petitioner herein, may be liable for moral damages
What further militates against petitioner’s advocacy is that the Court of Appeals, for as long as the moral damages suffered by private respondent were the proximate
aside from affording petitioner an opportunity to be heard through the filing of result of petitioner’s wrongful act or omission, i.e., refusal to perform an official duty
pleadings, likewise sustained petitioner’s right to due process at the hearing. What or neglect in the performance thereof. In fact, if only to underscore the vulnerability
petitioner neglects to mention is that respondent court did not deprive her the right of public officials and employees to suits for damages to answer for any form or
to cross-examine private respondent when the latter testified as to the matter of degree of misfeasance, malfeasance or nonfeasance, this Court has had occasion to
damages. Through the exercise of the right, petitioner could have negated private rule that under Articles 19 and 27 of the Civil Code, a public official may be made to
respondent’s claims by showing the absence of legal or factual basis therefor. pay damages for performing a perfectly legal act, albeit with bad faith or in violation
Moreover, the Court of Appeals explicitly allowed petitioner to present her evidence of the “abuse of right” doctrine embodied in the preliminary articles of the Civil Code
against the claim for damages. However, petitioner again failed to take the concerning Human Relations.[36]
opportunity to have herself heard.
Exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public
It may be pointed out that in her Answer,[31] she interposed the following defenses good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.[37]
against the claim for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees, namely:
(1) the claim was effectively and exclusively a suit against the State, but without its Attorney’s fees and other expenses of litigation may be recovered as actual or
consent; (2) she had not committed any actionable wrong as she acted in good faith compensatory damages when, inter alia, exemplary damages are awarded; when
and without malice or negligence; and (3) whatever injury private respondent may the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's
have suffered were mere consequences of his indiscretion, negligence and/or plainly valid, just and demandable claim, and in any other case where the court
ignorance of the law which, at best, constituted damnum absque injuria. From the deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be
nature of these defenses, they could very well have been taken up, even indirectly, recovered.[38]
on cross-examination of private respondent or in the course of petitioner’s testimony
had she chosen to present her evidence. All told, the above discussion should readily There can be no question that private respondent was entitled to be restored to his
refute petitioner’s claim of a denial of due process. position as Chief of Clinics by virtue of the final and executory decision of the Civil
II Service Commission. Petitioner, as head or chief of the National Children’s Hospital,
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, then had the duty to see to it that the decision be obeyed and implemented. This
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and she failed to do and private respondent’s two official demands for compliance with
similar injury. They may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the the Civil Service Commission’s decision were merely referred by petitioner to the
defendant’s wrongful act or omission.[32] The instances when moral damages may Legal Department of the Department of Health; and as further noted by this Court
be recovered are, inter alia, “acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, in its decision in G.R. No. 101428, “she did not answer [private respondent’s] letters
29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 of the Civil Code,”[33] which, in turn, are found in the Chapter not even to inform him of the referral thereof to the Assistant Secretary [for Legal
on Human Relations of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code. Relevant to the instant Affairs]. She chose simply to await ‘legal guidance from the DOH Legal
case, which involves public officers, is Article 27,[34] which provides: Department.’” This Court further noted:
ART. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or To all these, [petitioner’s] reaction, and that of the officials of the Department of
employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may Health concerned, was a regrettably cavalier one, to say the least. Neither she nor
file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to the Health Department officials concerned accorded said acts and events any
any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken. importance. She never bothered to find out what was being done to contest or
Article 27 must then be read in conjunction with Section 1 of Article XI negate [private respondent’s] petitions and actions, notwithstanding that as time
(Accountability of Public Officers) of the Constitution,[35] which provides: went by, [private respondent’s] efforts were being met with success.
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all That petitioner then committed an actionable wrong for unjustifiably refusing or
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, neglecting to perform an official duty is undeniable. Private respondent testified on
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. the moral damages which he suffered by reason of such misfeasance or malfeasance
of petitioner, and the attorney’s fees and litigation expenses he incurred to vindicate
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RULE 64 & 65

his rights and protect his interests. The Court of Appeals which heard him gave full control.
faith and credit to his testimony. Private respondent declared that by reason of the
“unjust action” or “refusal” of petitioner when she did not recognize, ignored and Petitioner’s contention that she cannot be liable for damages since she was sued in
disregarded the final and executory Civil Service Resolution, he: her official capacity is without merit. Whether petitioner was impleaded as
[W]as actually greatly disturbed, shocked and frustrated during those three ... respondent in an official capacity, i.e., solely in her capacity as Chief of the National
months. [He] had sleepless nights and ... suffered from mental anxiety, worry, Children’s Hospital, is best determined from the Petition as well as the
tension and humiliation...[39] Supplemental/Amended Petition. For one, in the captions in both, she is named as
Private respondent’s anguish even continued during the 5-month period while the one of the respondents without any express mention that she was so sued in her
case was pending with the Court of Appeals, thus: “capacity, as Chief of the National Children’s Hospital.” For another, the allegations
During this period my sleepless nights and my moral sufferings continued. As a in the body of the Petition clearly show that she was sued in both her official and
matter of fact, even worsened. I just could not understand, actually I could not private capacities. As to the former, paragraphs 1 and 7 respectively allege
understand the action here of Dr. Gozon for having not followed the decision of the petitioner’s position as a public official, and specifically as “Head of the Children’s
Court of Appeals. And that is why I felt very much aggrieved during this period. I Hospital;” her duty to restore private respondent to his position by virtue of the final
could not sleep at all and this has weakened me.[40] decision of the Civil Service Commission; and her refusal to allow private respondent
Private respondent further testified that he “spent not less than P5,000.00 for court to perform and discharge his duties and responsibilities as Chief of Clinics. As to the
fees and as incidental expenses” and had committed himself to pay “P10,000.00 to latter, paragraph 16 of the Petition explicitly speaks of petitioner’s personal liability,
his counsel at the end of the case.”[41] thus:
16. For causing such mental suffering and anguish, etc.,[42] principal respondent
While private respondent did not quantify the extent of his moral damages, the Court [herein petitioner] ought to and must be, in accordance with the Civil Code, held
of Appeals fixed the same at P50,000.00. Since moral damages are, in the language personally answerable and liable to the petitioner in the sum of not less than
of Article 2217 of the Civil Code, “incapable of pecuniary estimation,” courts have P100,000.00 as moral damages, and another sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary
the discretion to fix the corresponding amount, not being bound by any self-serving damages, by way of example or correction for the public good.[43] (emphasis
assessment by the claimants. On the other hand, a claimant’s failure to state the supplied)
monetary value of moral damages suffered presents no legal obstacle to a court’s In maintaining then that she was sued merely in her official capacity, petitioner has
determination thereof, as long as there is factual basis for the award such as the either overlooked paragraph 16 or sought to deliberately mislead this Court.
claimant’s testimony as to his sufferings. As a matter of fact, it is not unusual for
claimants to leave the determination of the amount of the award to the discretion WHEREFORE, for utter failure to show that respondent Court of Appeals committed
of the court. reversible error in the challenged resolutions, the instant petition is denied.

Under Article 2233 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a Costs against petitioner.
matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. In
the instant case, the Court of Appeals awarded exemplary damages in the amount SO ORDERED.
of P20,000.00. Considering that a public official is the culprit here, the propriety of
such an award cannot be questioned. It serve as an example or deterrent so that
other public officials be always reminded that they are public servants bound to
adhere faithfully to the constitutional injunction that a public office is a public trust.
That the aggrieved party happened to be another public official will not serve to
mitigate the effects of petitioner’s having failed to observe the required degree of
accountability and responsibility.

As to attorney’s fees as actual damages, the Court of Appeals’ determination of its


propriety in this case and the extent thereof were well within its discretion. The
agreement between private respondent and his counsel as to the amount does not
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RULE 64 & 65

G.R. No. L-60150 December 11, 1987 in certiorari. The petitioner does not allege, nor does he set out to prove, that the
PFC ROGELIO R. CASTILLO, petitioner, respondent board acted without jurisdiction, or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
vs. grave abuse of discretion in rendering the questioned decision and resolutions. Even
NAPOLCOM ADJUDICATION BOARD NO. I Composed of: HON. ARTURO R. on this basis alone, this petition compels a dismissal.
ADAMOS, HON. WENCELITO R. ANDANAR, HON. GAUDIOSO A. SOLOMON, The errors alleged by the petitioner to have been committed by the respondent
HON. ROMEO R. ROBISO HON. ROMEO C. CRUZ, NAPOLCOM HEARING board pertain mainly to its findings of fact based on its appreciation of the evidence
OFFICER RICARDO T. SANICO, and MR. JESSIE TEOVISIO respondents. adduced by the opposing parties. It is, however, a well-recognized principle that
SARMIENTO, J.: findings of fact by an administrative board or officials, like the respondent board,
This case arose in 1979 from the affidavit-complaint for Grave Misconduct (Arbitrary following a hearing, are binding and conclusive upon the courts so long as they are
Detention and Slander by Deed) filed by private respondent Jessie Teovisio against supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant. The
petitioner Pfc. Rogelio Castillo with the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM). reviewing courts cannot substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency
The petitioner was accused of arresting without legal cause, on May 10, 1979, the on the sufficiency of the evidence. Only where it clearly appears that there was no
private respondent and two others, all waiters at the Ang Tunay na Pansit Malabon proof before the administrative board reasonable enough to support its conclusion
Restaurant situated at Timog Avenue, Quezon City; of handcuffing, slapping, and would this court be justified in interfering with the board's decision.
boxing on the chest the private respondent and forcing him and his two fellow We hold that the findings and conclusion of the respondent board are substantially
waiters into the police car; and of detaining them in the police precinct for eight supported by the record.
hours without charges. The petitioner, a public officer, arrested without a warrant on May 10, 1979 the
The petitioner and his witnesses denied these imputations and gave their version of private respondent and his companions and detained them on the mere suspicion
the incident, as follows: that on the above date, the petitioner along with two other that they had committed "qualified theft" and "oral defamation" in February and
police officers, went to the said restaurant, owned by Mrs. Estrelita del Rosario, to April 1979. The fact, however, is that the illegal arrest wasperpetrated after the
make a follow-up of her complaint for Qualified Theft and Oral Defamation filed on petitioner with two other policemen had taken their snacks and after talking to the
May 4, 1979; that the petitioner merely invited the private respondent and the two cashier of the restaurant. The fact that the petitioner and his two other policemen
other waiters to go with him to the police station without forcing them or placing companions did not effect the arrest immediately upon or soon after entering the
any handcuffs on them; that the trio were released at past eleven o'clock in the restaurant strongly indicates that the complained subsequent action of the
evening of the same day on the order of the inquest fiscal to whom the case. was policemen was to accommodate or please the restaurant owner, a certain Mrs. del
duly referred. Rosario.
After conducting normal hearings, NAPOLCOM hearing officer Ricardo Sanico found xxx xxx xxx
the petitioner "probably guilty" of a grave offense and consequently recommended ... [M]oreover, that the respondent had the intention to arrest complainant and
his preventive suspension from the service during the pendency of the those against whom Mrs. Del Rosario had a complaint is also manifested by the prior
administrative case. Thereafter, the petitioner was preventively suspended effective agreement that policemen will go to the place on May 10th, according to
June 23, 1979 but was subsequently reinstated on November 12, 1979 by reason of respondent's witness, Trinidad de Guzman. The said Trinidad de Guzman further
exigency of the service. After reviewing this report of the hearing officer, testified that her aunt, the restaurant's owner, did not like the existence of the labor
Adjudication Board No. I of the NAPOLCOM rendered a decision dated October 21, union in her restaurant. The President, Vice-President and Sergeant-at-Arms of the
1980 finding the petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct (Arbitrary Detention and said newly organized labor union happened to be complainant and his two
Illegal Arrest), and ordering his suspension from the service without pay for ten companions, Rodolfo Ramirez and Israel Boranque respectively. 1
months, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future xxx xxx xxx
will be dealt with severely. On petitioner's second motion for reconsideration of this Upon these findings, the respondent board correctly declared the petitioner guilty of
decision, his first motion having been denied, the respondent board, for "illegal arrest and "arbitrary detention" constitutive of the offense of grave
humanitarian considerations, lowered the penalty to five months. Petitioner filed a misconduct. It is immaterial that "illegal arrest" was not one of the charges filed by
third motion for reconsideration; the same was likewise denied. As a last resort, the the private respondent against the petitioner, because the facts themselves, as
petitioner comes to us by way of this special civil action for certiorari. established by the evidence presented at the hearings, satisfactorily proved the
It is immediately noticeable that this petition suffers from a fatal defect in that commission of the same. Besides, proceedings before administrative bodies are
nowhere does it raise a question of jurisdiction, which is the only question involved governed by their own rules of procedure which are to be construed liberally in order
SPECPRO 42
RULE 64 & 65

to effect the just, speedy, and inexpensive settlement and disposition of disputes
between the parties. Since from the start the detention was without legal grounds,
the arrest having been made without a warrant, an subsequent proceedings were
consequently tainted with illegality; hence, the question as to how many hours may
the police complete its investigation and release the suspect under investigation
without violating the law is obviously irrelevant.
In fine, there is no sufficient showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the
respondent board in rendering and issuing the assailed decision and resolutions.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on April 30, 1982 is accordingly
lifted, and the questioned decision and resolutions of the respondent board are
hereby AFFIRMED. This Decision is immediately executory.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SPECPRO 43
RULE 64 & 65

G.R. No. L-67706 January 29, 1988 The Court, in its resolution of January 23, 1985, gave due course to the petition and
ILIGAN CONCRETE PRODUCTS, and/or THE MANAGER, petitioner, required the parties to submit simultaneous memoranda within thirty (30) days from
vs. notice. In compliance with said resolution, the petitioner submitted its memorandum
ANASTACIO MAGADAN respondents. on May 3, 1985, while private respondent filed his memorandum on April 23, 1985.
YAP, J.: The Solicitor General submitted a manifestation on May 2, 1985, adopting as his
This petition, denominated as "Brief for the Petitioner," seeks to annul the order of memorandum the comment filed on December 20, 1984.
the Ministry of Labor, dated February 28, 1984, the text of which is quoted in frill in We agree with the Solicitor General's contention that the petition is fatally defective
the petition, as follows: for failure to comply with the provisions of Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Finding no merit in respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of this Petitioner failed to allege the facts with certainty by not clearly stating in the petition
Office dated May 13, 1983, the same is hereby denied and the Order sought to be the orders sought to be annulled, nor attaching certified true copies of said orders
reconsidered stands. and pertinent documents. Instead of remedying the omission, petitioner sought to
No further motion of similar nature shall be entertained. justify the same by claiming that the reproduction of the order dated February 28,
Manila, Philippines, February 28, 1984. 1984, on the first page of the petition was "substantial compliance in lieu of attaching
The petition alleges that petitioner, being engaged in the business of hauling and the order of the Minister of Labor sought to be reviewed." Said order, however,
delivery of sand and gravel in the City of Iligan, hired private respondent Anastacio merely stated that the petitioner's motion for reconsideration was being denied for
Magadan as Collector in February, 1971 until his voluntary resignation, effective at lack of merit and that the order dated May 13, 1983 sought to be reconsidered was
the close of office hours on September 15, 1973; that on July 22, 1981, private maintained. While the Court may consider substantial compliance with the Rules of
respondent filed a claim against petitioner with the District Office, Ministry of Labor Court as sufficient, in the instant case, it cannot be claimed by petitioner that there
and Employment, Iligan City, for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and was such substantial compliance. Without the text of the orders sought to be
underpayment of emergency cost of living allowance; that the Hearing Officer of annulled, the Court cannot be expected to act on the petition. As we held in Canete
Iligan District Office, Ministry of Labor and Employment issued an order (date vs. Wislizenus 36 Phil. 428, the Court 'is not obliged ... to know what the plaintiff s
unspecified) granting private respondent's claim, which order was affirmed in toto cause of action ... and select what the court presumes the pleader intended to
by the Ministry of Labor; that the Ministry of Labor erred in holding that there existed alleged.
an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private respondent from Accordingly, we recall our resolution dated July 23, 1984 giving due course to the
September 15, 1973 to July 15, 1981. petition and DISMISS the same for being insufficient in form and substance. Costs
Required to comment on the petition (not to file a motion a dismiss), the Solicitor against petitioner.
General, representing public respondent, maintained that the petition was fatally SO ORDERED.
defective for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 1, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court in that the petition did not allege the facts with certainty
and did not attach certified copies of the pertinent orders sought to be reviewed;
and that the public respondent did not err, much less act with grave abuse of
discretion in affirming the order of the hearing officer finding that existence of an
employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private respondent, which
finding was supported by substantial evidence.
In his comment, private respondent alleged that petitioner has been accorded full
opportunity to present his evidence; that despite private respondent's claim that his
name appeared on the payrolls for September 30, 1973 to July 15, 1981, petitioner
failed to produce records to refute said allegation; that although he resigned in 1973,
he was subsequently re-employed by petitioner, Nap Lluch, the owner-proprietor;
that clearly, his dismissal by petitioner was illegal; no clearance for such dismissal
having been secured from the Ministry of Labor; that while he was entitled to
reinstatement, considering that he opted to receive separation pay, he should be
paid such pay as awarded in the order of the Ministry of Labor.
SPECPRO 44
RULE 64 & 65

G.R. No. L-63612 January 31, 1985 the exclusive and original jurisdiction to pass upon the issues raised in petitioners'
SERAFIN DELA CRUZ, ELADIO MACENAS and RODRIGO DIAZ, petitioners, vs. complaint;
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, EDEN
(i) That the private respondents in due time filed their opposition;
GUEVARA DE BARADI and JOSE BARADI, respondents.
RELOVA, J.: (j) That on January 14, 1983, the Honorable Respondent Judge, issued an 'Order'
denying the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration which order was received by
Petitioners seek to set aside the orders, dated October 20, 1982, of respondent
petitioners' counsel on January 31, 1983. (pp. 88-89, Rollo)
judge dismissing their complaint, as well as the order, dated January 14, 1983,
denying the motion for reconsideration, and the decision of respondent Intermediate Petitioners filed with respondent Intermediate Appellate Court a petition for
Appellate Court, dated February 22, 1983, denying this petition for certiorari for lack certiorari, prohibition and mandamus instead of appealing from the order dismissing
of merit; and, pray that We order respondent judge to hear Civil Case No. Q-34657, the complaint for annulment of titles. The appellate court, on February 22, 1983,
for annulment of titles with damages. promulgated a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Respondent appellate court rendered its decision on the basis of the following WHEREFORE, finding the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to be
statement of facts: without merit, the same is hereby DENIED any further due course and DISMISSED.
(p. 93, Rollo)
(a) That sometime on March 11, 1982 the herein petitioners filed a complaint for
'Annulment and cancellation of T.C.T. Nos. 274534, 274535, 274537 and 274539 This petition for certiorari filed before Us rests on the allegation that the respondent
with damages' in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVI. Said judge had abused his discretion in issuing the order of October 20, 1982, and the
case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-34657 and was assigned to the respondent subsequent order of January 14, 1983; and that respondent appellate court did
Judge, Hon. Antonio P. Solano; abuse its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed the petition
"without even a comment from the respondents." (p. 22, Rollo)
(b) That after summons was served, private respondents herein immediately filed
their Motion to Dismiss on the sole ground of 'lack of jurisdiction' of the court below Required to comment on this petition respondents averred that "petitioners' remedy
to take cognizance of the said case; was an appeal from the Order of dismissal of the Hon. Judge Antonio P. Solano and
not a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, (and) it would be an empty
(c) That herein petitioners in due time filed their' Opposition to Motion to Dismiss,'
gesture to require the private respondents to comment on the petition. The
Annex B, invoking in support thereof paragraph [b] of Section 44 of the Judiciary
Intermediate Appellate Court could validly render a decision, as it did, and avoid
Act of 1948 as amended;
delay in the administration of justice." (p. 116, Rollo)
(d) That on July 26, 1982, respondent Judge issued an 'Order' denying the private
Indeed, We consider instant petition to be without merit. Time and again We have
respondents' motion to dismiss for lack of merit; (Annex C, Petition)
dismissed petitions for certiorari to annul decisions or orders which could have, but
(e) That on August 13, 1982, the private respondents filed their 'Motion for have not, been appealed. Where the Court has jurisdiction, over the subject matter,
Reconsideration' contending among other things that the respondent Court has no as respondent judge has in this case, the orders or decision upon all questions
jurisdiction over the case; pertaining to the cause are orders or decision within its jurisdiction, and however
erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari. This special civil
(f) That herein petitioner filed their pleading in 'Opposition' thereto;
action does not lie where the remedy by appeal has been lost because said remedy
(g) That on October 20, 1982, the Honorable respondent Judge, issued the cannot take the place of an appeal.
challenged 'Order' in favor of the private respondents in this case and therein
ACCORDINGLY, this petition must be denied, as it is hereby denied.
granted the Motion for Reconsideration (Annex E, Petition) thereby revoking his
previous order dated July 26, 1982 (Annex D, Petition). As a consequence, SO ORDERED.
petitioners' complaint was dismissed.
(h) That on November 24, 1982 petitioners filed their own 'Motion for
Reconsideration' wherein they submitted and insisted that the respondent Court has
SPECPRO 45
RULE 64 & 65

G.R. No. L-19631 January 31, 1964 39990 of the "Manila Court". This motion was, likewise, denied because it had not
PASTOR D. AGO, petitioner, been served on the opposing counsel, and the Orcullos and their counsel were ready
vs. for trial, they "having come all the way from Lianga to Tandag, thru rough seas, and
HON. TEOFILO B. BUSLON, District Judge of the Court of First Instance of their counsel, also, having come all the way from (the municipality of) Surigao to
Surigao, (that of) Tandag, a distance of 186 kms."
MONICA URBIZTONDO and PEDRO ORCULLO, respondents. Thereupon, respondent court proceeded to receive respondents, evidence, but it did
CONCEPCION, J.: not render judgment until over eight (8) months later, or on June 13, 1961, after
Original action for certiorari. noting that petitioner had meanwhile "done nothing in the premises." On the date
On or about April 11, 1960, respondent spouses Urbiztondo and Pedro Orcullo, last mentioned, decision was rendered sentencing petitioner to pay to the Orcullos:
instituted, against petitioner Pastor D. Ago, civil case No. 1349 of the Court of First (a) P220 as damages for trees cut by petitioner; (b) P2,250 as rentals from
Instance of Surigao, to recover the rentals allegedly due for the use, as a private February, 1957 to October, 1960; (c) P50 a month from November, 1960, until the
road, for his logging petitions in the municipality of Lianga, Province of Surigao, of disputed land shall have been vacated by petitioner; (d) P500 as attorney's fees;
portion of a land, allegedly belonging to said respondents in the aforementioned (e) P90 as incidental expenses; and (f) the costs.
municipality and province. In the complaint filed in said case respondents prayed On or about July 11, 1961, petitioner filed a motion to set this decision aside and to
judgment in their favor: dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, which motion was denied on November 24,
... (a) requiring the defendant to pay rentals for the passage of his private road 1961. Notice of the order to this effect was received by petitioner on January 6,
across the land of the plaintiffs at the rate of P50.00 a month; 1962, who instituted the present action for certiorari on April 6, 1962, upon the
b. ordering defendant to pay the accrued rentals since February, 1957 up to the theory that respondent court had no jurisdiction to hear and decide said case; that
filing of this complaint in the total sum of P1,950.00; the decision therein rendered is, accordingly, null and void; and that petitioner has
c. requiring defendant to pay P200.00 for the destroy coconut trees and nipa palms; "no appeal, nor other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
d. ordering the closing of the road, if the defends fail to pay the rentals; and law."
e. requiring defendant to pay attorney's fees in the of P500.00 and to pay the Being a party in said case No. 1349 and having been duly notified, not only of the
costs.1äwphï1.ñët decision therein rendered, but, also, of the order of November 24, 1961, denying
In his answer to the complaint, petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the aforesaid road his motion of July 11, 1961, it is obvious that petitioner could have appealed from
traverses, not the land of Orcullos, but that of one Olimpia C. Jalandoni, and that said decision, and from the aforementioned order of November 24, 1961, and that
respondent court had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. Petitioner, likewise, such an appeal would have been a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
set up a counterclaim, for alleged damages, aggregating P37,000.00. After the filing ordinary course of law. Yet, he did not avail of such remedy. What is more, it would
of respondents answer to this counterclaim, the case was set for hearing on October appear that the present action has been resorted to in order to offset petitioner's
11, 1960. Petitioner's counsel moved for the postponement of said hearing, for the failure to appeal from the decision and order adverted to above. Indeed, although
reason that he had, on the same date, another hearing in the Court of First Instance notice of the order of November 24, 1961, denying his motion of July 11, 1961, had
of Manila. On October 1, 1960, this motion was denied upon the ground: (1) that been received on January 6, 1962, petitioner took no step whatsoever to seek any
the notice sent to petitioner's counsel, advising him that the case would be heard relief from said decision and order until April 6, 1962, or long after the expiration of
on October 11, 1960, is dated August 13, 1960, whereas the notice of hearing of the reglementary period to interpose said appeal. It is well settled that the writ
the Court of First Instance of Manila had been sent to him on September 3, 1960; of certiorari may not be availed of to make up for the loss, through omission or
and (2) that the date of hearing appearing in the latter notice was originally October oversight, of the right to appeal (Casilan, et al. vs. Hon. Filomeno B. Ibañez, et al.,
4, 1960, but the typewritten digit "4" thereon was exposed out and number "11" L-19968-69, October 31, 1962; Santos vs. Vda. de Cerdenola, et al., L-18412, July
hand written in lieu thereof, in ordinary ink, without any initial to indicate the identity 31, 1962; Francisco, et al. vs. Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, et al., L-15365, December
of the person who had made the correction. 26, 1961; City of Manila vs. Hon. Higino B. Macadaeg, et al., L-15134, November
Ten (10) days later, respondent court received a telegram of petitioner herein, dated 29, 1961; Paringit vs. Honorato Masakayan, et al., L-16578, July 31, 1961; Hon.
October 10, 1960, once more requesting postponement of the hearing alleging this Francisco Jose, et al. vs. Zulueta, et al., L-16598, May 31, 1961; Profeta, et al. vs.
time that he had "just" been informed of the aforementioned order of October 1, Gutierrez David, et al., 71. Phil. 582, see also, Grospe, et al. vs. Court of Appeals,
1960, and that he had no time to appear before respondent court, in the Province et al., L-11443, September 30, 1959; Ong Sit vs. Piccio, 79 Phil. 785; Castro vs.
of Surigao, he having gone to Manila to attend the hearings in cases Nos. 36770 and Peña, 80 Phil. 488; Gil vs. Gil III, 80 Phil. 791; Gov't. of U.S. vs. Judge of CFI of
SPECPRO 46
RULE 64 & 65

Pampanga, 50 Phil. 975, 979; Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 49 Phil. 398; Ello vs.
Judge of First Instance of Antique, 49 Phil. 152; Gonzales vs. Salas, 49 Phil. 1; De
los Santos vs. Mapa, 16 Phil. 791).
Moreover, although an action for the recovery of not more than P5,000 falls within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of justice of the peace courts, the Orcullos
premised their right of action upon their alleged title to the land described in the
complaint and petitioner contested such allegation, thus putting the title to said land
in issue, the determination of which is within the exclusive original competence of
Courts of First Instance. Then, too, petitioner's counterclaim for P37,000.00 was,
also, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the latter courts, and there are
ample precedents to the effect that "although the original claim involves less than
the jurisdictional amount, ... jurisdiction can be sustained if the counterclaim (of the
compulsory type)" — such as the one set up by petitioner herein, based upon the
damages allegedly suffered by him in consequence of the filing of said complaint —
"exceeds the jurisdictional amount". (Moore Federal Practice, 2nd ed. [1948], Vol.
3, p. 41; Ginsburg vs. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. of California, 69 Fed. [2d] 97;
Home Life Ins. Co. vs. Sipp. 11 Fed. [2d] 474; American Sheet & Tin Plate Co. vs.
Winzeler [D.C.], 227 Fed. 321, 324; Brix vs. People's Mutual Life Ins. Co. 41, P. 2d.
537, 2 Cal. 2d. 446; Emery vs. Pacific Employees Ins. Co., 67 P. 2d. 1046, 8 Cal.
2d. 663.)
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby denied and the case dismissed, with cost against
the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes,
Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
SPECPRO 47
RULE 64 & 65

G.R. No. L-31812, March 17, 1978 demolish his wall, to pay P2,520 as accrued rentals and P420 as rental per year,
JUAN COJUANGCO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. PIO R. MARCOS, IN HIS plus P1,000 as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed that decision.
CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BAGUIO, AND In the other case, the trial court affirmed the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture
ENRIQUE J. L. RUIZ, RESPONDENTS. and Natural Resources but the Court of Appeals reversed it and ordered that the
amount paid by Cojuangco for the excess of 179 square meters be refunded to him.
DECISION Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that there was no gap or no
AQUINO, J.: public land between the lot of Ruiz and Cojuangco's lot. (CA-G.R. Nos. 26590-R and
Juan Cojuangco filed this mandamus action to compel the Court of First Instance of 27811-R, November 24, 1964).
Baguio to order the execution of the judgment rendered by Judge Jesus de Veyra The petition of Ruiz for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals was denied
on April 28, 1959. In that judgment Enrique J. L. Ruiz is required to demolish the in this Court's resolution of July 16, 1965 (L-24451 and L-24552, Ruiz vs.
wall, which he had constructed on Cojuangco's lot, and to pay rentals and attorney's Cojuangco).
fees. The facts are as follows: During the pendency of the two cases in the Court of Appeals, or specifically on
In 1934 Cojuangco purchased from the Bureau of Lands Lot 19 of the Kisad October 28, 1959, Atty. Antonio C. Masaquel, as counsel of Cojuangco, requested
Subdivision, Residence Section A, Baguio, with an area of 3,127 square meters the Director of Lands to issue a patent for the uncontested portion of Lot 19 without
fronting 68th Street. After full payment of the price, or on August 2, 1952, the prejudice to his claim for the disputed portion with an area of 85 (84) square meters
Director of Lands ordered the issuance of a patent to Cojuangco. (pp. 129-130, Rollo).
Due to the loss of the records during the war, the lot was resurveyed. After the Acting favorably on that request, the Director of Lands issued to Cojuangco on
resurvey, Lot 19 was found to contain 3,306 square meters, or an increase of 179 September 16, 1960 a patent for Lot 19-A with an area of 3,040 (instead of the
square meters. The increased area was attributable to the fact that the surveyor, original area of 3,127 square meters or a difference of 87 square meters). Based on
instead of giving the street the mandatory width of fifteen meters, assumed that its that patent, Original Certificate of Title No. P-249 was issued to Cojuangco on
width was only ten meters. November 4, 1960. The contested area not included in the title came to be known
On the western side of Lot 19 is Lot 85-B-4, with an area of 848 square meters as Lot 19-C.
fronting Legarda Road. Ruiz bought that lot in 1952 from Mariano V. Gaerlan. After On January 6, 1966 Cojuangco, through another lawyer, Antonio N. Lucero, Jr., filed
Cojuangco had rejected the offer of Ruiz to buy a portion of Lot 19 to be used as his a motion in the lower court for the execution of its final judgment against Ruiz.
(Ruiz's) driveway, Ruiz filed a sales application with the Bureau of Lands for the Judge Pio R. Marcos, who had succeeded Judge De Veyra, granted the motion.
purchase of the excess area of 179 square meters. Cojuangco opposed that However, the execution was not implemented because the lower court, in an order
application. He applied for the purchase of the same excess area. dated July 30, 1966, gave Ruiz ninety days from that date within which to pay the
While those two sales applications were pending, or in 1953, Ruiz constructed a money judgment. In a subsequent order Ruiz was given an additional sixty days to
retaining wall and driveway on the southwestern portion of Lot 19. He ignored the satisfy the judgment.
warning of the land authorities not to introduce any improvement in that area. As Ruiz did not make any payment, an alias writ of execution was issued and a levy
The Director of Lands in 1954 upheld Cojuangco's preemptive right to purchase the was made on one of his lots. The levy was not pushed through. In an order dated
excess of 179 square meters. He directed Ruiz to remove his improvement on the September 26, 1967 the lower court granted Ruiz, who appeared in the Judge's
contested portion of Lot 19. Cojuangco paid the price of the excess area. chambers on that date, sixty days to prepare a sketch plan of the contested area
Ruiz appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who in 1957 and to file the proper pleading.
ruled that Ruiz should be allowed to purchase 49 square meters for his driveway. On November 27, 1967 the lower court granted Ruiz's ex parte motion that the
Not satisfied with that administrative decision, Cojuangco filed an action in the Court district land officer be authorized to make a resurvey of the lots of Ruiz and
of First Instance of Baguio against Ruiz and the Secretary. He prayed that the Cojuangco. On January 24, 1968 Cojuangco filed a motion for a second alias writ of
Secretary's decision be set aside (Civil Case No. 705). execution. It was not acted upon.
In the same court Cojuangco sued Ruiz for damages, for the recovery of the excess On April 2, 1969, the lower court granted the motion of Ruiz (filed on that day
area of 179 square meters, and for the demolition of the stonewall constructed by without notice to Cojuangco) to set aside the alias writ of execution. The lower court
Ruiz (Civil Case No. 478). said that it appears from the record that the contested area of 85 square meters is
The trial court found that Ruiz had encroached upon Cojuangco's lot to the extent public land and is not a part of Cojuangco's lot. Thus, by means of that order, the
of 84 square meters. As already noted, it ordered Ruiz, as a builder in bad faith, to lower court nullified its judgment as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
SPECPRO 48
RULE 64 & 65

Cojuangco's motion of May 6, 1969 for the reconsideration of that order was his vested right thereto. The lower court erred in characterizing Lot 19-C as public
resolved by the lower court three months later in its order of August 22, 1969, a land and in not implementing the writ of execution.
copy of which was sent by registered mail to Cojuangco's counsel seven months The lower court's erroneous assumption that Lot 19-C is public land means that it
thereafter, or on March 9, 1970 and received by him on March 17, 1970. proceeded on the wrong premise when it voided its 1959 judgment. In truth,
In that belated order, the lower court held that its 1959 decision was invalid because Cojuangco may be entitled to a supplemental patent or an amended patent in order
it was based on the "erroneous" assumption that the contested area of 85 square that the contested portion may be included in his Torrens title.
meters is a part of Cojuangco's lot, when, according to the resurvey plan, it is public It results that it is ministerial and mandatory for the trial court to enforce its
land. The lower court noted that to enforce that decision would prejudice the State judgment. This case does not fall within any of the exceptions where a stay of
and unjustly enrich Cojuangco. execution is justified (City of Cebu vs. Mendoza, L-26321, August 19, 1975, 66 SCRA
On March 30, 1970 Cojuangco filed the instant mandamus action to compel the 174). Cojuangco is entitled as a matter of right to the execution of the judgment in
lower court to execute its 1959 judgment. He claimed damages amounting to his favor. The execution is compellable by mandamus (San Diego vs. Montesa, 116
P10,000 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses. His petition may be treated also Phil. 512).
as a petition for review under Republic Act No. 5440 of the lower court's orders of The trial court did not have supervisory jurisdiction to interpret or reverse the
April 2 and August 22, 1969 which rendered nugatory its 1959 judgment. decision of the appellate court affirming its judgment (Shioji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil.
Ruiz in his answer invoked the rule that a final judgment cannot be enforced "as to 333). Its 1959 decision is the law of the case and is res judicata. (See Arnedo vs.
matters and things which have arisen after the final judgment was rendered and Llorente and Liongson, 18 Phil. 257, 263).
which would be a valid defense to the judgment" (Philippine Trust Company vs. Considering that Ruiz resorted to tactics designed to frustrate the judgment against
Santamaria, 53 Phil. 463). He cited the doctrine that a trial court cannot be him and that he constrained Cojuangco to file this mandamus action, he should be
compelled by mandamus to execute a judgment, where there is evidence of an held liable for damages in the form of attorney's fees in the sum of one thousand
event or circumstance which would affect or change the rights of the parties, and pesos (Sec. 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court; 3 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court,
the holding that a final judgment may be modified to harmonize it with justice and 1970 ed., p. 207; Art. 2208, Civil Code).
the facts if its execution becomes impossible or unjust (Abellana vs. Dosdos, L- WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of April 2 and August 22, 1969 are set aside.
19498, February 26, 1965, 13 SCRA 244; City of Butuan vs. Ortiz, 113 Phil. 636, The petition for mandamus is granted. The lower court is directed to issue an alias
639). writ of execution to enforce its judgment in Civil Case No. 478. Respondent Ruiz is
Ruiz pleaded as a supervening fact his discovery that Cojuangco's lot (Lot 19-A, ordered to pay the petitioner the sum of P1,000 as attorney's fees and the costs.
formerly Lot 19) has an area of only 3,040 square meters as shown in his 1960 SO ORDERED.
Torrens title, instead of 3,127 square meters, the area which he claimed to have
originally purchased from the Bureau of Lands in 1934, and that the contested area,
identified now as Lot 19-C, lying between the lots of Ruiz and Cojuangco, could not
be a part of Cojuangco's lot if its area is 3,040 square meters.
The petition for mandamus is meritorious. The lower court's orders abrogating its
long final and executory judgment were issued with grave abuse of discretion and
without due process of law and they are devoid of factual and legal justification.
Although Lot 19-C is not included in Cojuangco's title, it is no longer public land
because it is really a part of Lot 19, with an area of 3,127 square meters, which was
covered by Cojuangco's duly approved sales application and by the 1952 order of
the Director of Lands for the issuance of a patent to him. He has an existing vested
right in that contested portion. The rule is that the order for the issuance of a patent
for public land is tantamount to the issuance of the patent itself. (Tinio vs. Frances,
98 Phil. 32. See Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498 and Gold Creek Mining Corporation
vs. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259).
The issuance of the Torrens title to Cojuangco for the reduced area of 3,040 square
meters was without prejudice to his claim for the contested area. He did not waive
SPECPRO 49
RULE 64 & 65

G.R. No. L-17323 June 23, 1965 Section 4 of Republic Act No. 557, in providing for the suspension of a member of a
CLAUDIO GABUTAS, petitioner-appellant, vs. GUIDO D. CASTELLANES, in his city or municipal police force who is accused in court of any felony or any violation
capacity as Municipal Mayor of Calatrava, Negros Occidental, respondent- of law and for his right to the payment of his entire salary during the period of his
appellee. suspension, in case of acquittal, does not require, as a condition, that such member
DIZON, J.: of the city or municipal police force should have civil service eligibility and should
This is an appeal taken by Claudio Gabutas from the decision of the Court of First have been permanently appointed as such. We cannot read into the law this
Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 4893 dismissing his petition for condition that the lawmaker did not deem it wise to include therein, especially if it
reinstatement and recovery of back salaries filed against Guido D. Castellanes, in is for the purpose of denying a member of the city or municipal police force the right
his capacity as Municipal Mayor of Calatrava, Negros Occidental. to receive back salary in case of acquittal.
It is not disputed that on May 2, 1951 appellant was extended a temporary On the other hand, it is true that appellant no longer seeks his reinstatement, but
appointment as member of the Municipal Police Force of Calatrava, Negros this is no justification in law to deny him payment of the entire salary he failed to
Occidental; that on May 10, 1955 he was suspended from the service as a result of receive during his suspension if the only condition imposed in that connection — his
the filing of Criminal Cases Nos. 4536 and 4537 against him in the Court of First acquittal — has been fulfilled. In this case, appellant having been acquitted of the
Instance of said Province; that on June 1, 1955, during the period of his suspension, charges which had given rise to his suspension, we are of the opinion that he is
he was given a promotional appointment at the rate of P780.00 per annum, with entitled to the payment of his entire salary corresponding to the period during which
retroactive effect on July 1, 1954; that on September 12, 1957, while said criminal he was suspended. This period, however, must necessarily end on the date when he
cases were still pending, appellee notified appellant of his separation from the was separated from the service. His appointment being temporary, the same was
service effective September 15, 1957, and that on the 27th of the same month, terminable at the pleasure of the appointing authority and such termination naturally
judgment was rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. 4536 and 4537 acquitting appellant. ends appellant's right to the emoluments appertaining to his office. In the present
Thereafter, appellee having refused to reinstate him to his position as member of case, appellant precisely seeks nothing more than the payment of his entire salary
the Police Force of Calatrava, Negros Occidental, and to pay his back salary covering corresponding to the period from the date of his suspension to the date of his final
the period of his suspension from May 10, 1955 to September 15, 1957, appellant separation from office.
instituted the present action for Mandamus. After appellee had filed his answer Concerning the last point raised by appellee, namely, that mandamus is not the
disputing appellant's right to the relief prayed for in his petition, the court, on proper remedy to enforce appellant's right to his back salaries, We have this to say.
September 27, 1958, rendered the appealed judgment. The legal provision mentioned heretofore provides that, in case of acquittal, "the
In this appeal appellant seeks nothing more than the recovery of his back salary accused shall be entitled to payment of the entire salary he failed to receive during
covering the period from May 10, 1955, the date of his suspension, up to September his suspension." We believe that, in the light of the facts of this case, this provision
15, 1957, the date when he was separated from the service. He invokes in his favor gives appellant a clear legal right demandable from the proper authorities who, in
the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 557 which read as follows: turn, have an imperative legal duty to respect the same. The present action was
SEC. 4. When a member of the provincial guards, city police or municipal police is instituted against Guido D. Castellanes, not personally but in his capacity as
accused in court of any felony or violation of law by the provincial fiscal or city fiscals municipal mayor of Calatrava, Negros Occidental, and he appeared and defended
as the case may be, the provincial governor, the city mayor or municipal mayor shall the action in such capacity. It is, therefore, clear that the real party in duty bound
immediately suspend the accused from office pending the final decision of the case to pay the back salaries of appellant, namely, the Municipality of Calatrava, had its
by the court and, in case of acquittal, the accused shall be entitled to payment of full day in court and the decision rendered herein must be deemed binding upon it.
the entire salary he failed to receive during his suspension. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed and another is hereby rendered
On the other hand, appellee denies appellant's right to the relief sought on the ordering the Municipality, of Calatrava, Negros Occidental, to pay the entire salary
following grounds: firstly, that the law relied upon does not apply to one who does of appellant from the date of his suspension, May 10, 1955, up to the date of his
not possess any civil service eligibility and whose appointment is temporary in final separation from office, September 15, 1957, at the rate of P780.00 per annum.
character; secondly, that appellant having abandoned his claim to reinstatement, With costs.
he cannot now demand payment of the salary corresponding to the period of his
suspension because the right to it is merely incidental to his right to reinstatement;
and lastly, that mandamus is not the proper remedy to enforce appellant's right to
the payment of the salary corresponding to his period of suspension.
SPECPRO 50
RULE 64 & 65

G.R. No. L-46845 April 27, 1990 (P464,700.00) Pesos while the assessor determined it to be One Hundred Twenty
Hon. PEDRO T. SANTIAGO, Judge, Court of First Instance, Branch 2, Three Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty One Pesos and Ninety Six Centavos
Bataan, petitioner, (P123,981.96). Sold for One Million Three Hundred Ninety Five Thousand, Nine
vs. Hundred Sixty Eight (P1,395,968.00) Pesos was Lot No. 293 as contained in the
COURT OF APPEALS, LUZMINIA T. BAGALAWIS, AMADO SAMSON, JULIETA second deed of sale. The declared market value for this lot was Twenty Nine
T. BAGALAWIS, CESAR SICAT, CARLOS T. BAGALAWIS, FIDES ARMENGOL Thousand, Nine Hundred Thirteen Pesos and Sixty Centavos (P29,913.60) while the
and the EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, * respondents. assessor placed it at Twenty Seven Thousand Four Hundred Twenty Pesos and Eighty
Centavos (P27,420.80). Accordingly, in an order dated October 29, 1975, petitioner
MEDIALDEA, J.:
judge rejected the "amicable settlement," declared it invalid and set the case for
This is a petition for review brought by a trial judge seeking the reinstatement of his further proceeding. The parties' motion for reconsideration having been denied, they
order which was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals. elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which, as aforementioned, set aside the
order of petitioner rejecting the amicable settlement and instead declared it valid.
Petitioner was the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch
Petitioner judge, evidently motivated in protecting the government from what he
2, where the petition of the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) for
perceived as a manifestly inequitous and illegal contract, filed this present petition
expropriation was raffled. The subject of the expropriation was two parcels of land,
for review.
Lot Nos. 190 and 293 covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 22484 and 22485
respectively, owned by private respondents who were, therefore, named as While the issue in the Court of Appeals and that raised by petitioner now is whether
defendants in the proceeding. The power of EPZA to initiate expropriation the latter abused his discretion in nullifying the deeds of sale and in proceeding with
proceedings was not an issue. The controversy was focused on the just the expropriation proceeding, that question is eclipsed by the concern of whether
compensation EPZA should pay the private respondents for their land. For the Judge Pedro T. Santiago may file this petition at all.
purpose, three (3) commissioners were appointed by the petitioner judge who later
And the answer must be in the negative, Section 1 of Rule 45 allows a party to
submitted their findings. But before a judgment could be rendered the parties
appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals by filing with this Court
arrived at an agreement as to the amount of compensation and the further sale to
a petition for review on certiorari. But petitioner judge was not a party either in the
EPZA of another parcel of land covered by TCT No. 22493. Consequently, new TCT's
expropriation proceeding or in the certiorari proceeding in the Court of Appeals. His
were issued in EPZA's name. In view of this development, the parties moved for the
being named as respondent in the Court of Appeals was merely to comply with the
dismissal of the case but was denied by the petitioner who ordered the submission
rule that in original petitions for certiorari, the court or the judge, in his capacity as
to him of the deeds of sale.
such, should be named as party respondent because the question in such a
Petitioner judge is of the opinion that having acquired jurisdiction over the case, he proceeding is the jurisdiction of the court itself (See Mayol vs. Blanco, 61 Phil. 547
retains such authority and, considering that the amicable settlement was reached [19351, cited in Comments on the Rules of Court, Moran, Vol. II, 1979 ed., p. 471).
during the pendency of the proceeding, he has the power to determine whether the "In special proceedings, the judge whose order is under attack is merely a nominal
agreement was contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and policy. party; wherefore, a judge in his official capacity, should not be made to appear as
a party seeking reversal of a decision that is unfavorable to the action taken by him.
Examining the deeds of sale, the petitioner judge found that the compensations
A decent regard for the judicial hierarchy bars a judge from suing against the
agreed upon by the parties were grossly above both the market value as declared
adverse opinion of a higher court,. . . ." (Alcasid v. Samson, 102 Phil. 785, 740
by the private respondents and as determined by the Provincial Assessor, and are,
[19571)
therefore, contrary to Presidential Decree No. 76 which provides that just
compensation, in cases of expropriation, shall be the current and fair market value ACCORDINGLY, this petition is DENIED for lack of legal capacity to sue by the
as declared by the owner or the market value as determined by the assessor petitioner.
whichever is lower.
SO ORDERED.
The first deed of sale concerns Lot No. 190 and the other parcel of land covered by
TCT No. 22483 not subject of the expropriation proceeding which were both sold for
Three Hundred Forty Nine Thousand, Six (P349,006.00) Pesos. The declared market
value for Lot 190 was Four Hundred Sixty Four Thousand, Seven Hundred
SPECPRO 51
RULE 64 & 65

G.R. Nos. 103752-53 November 25, 1992 to the Ministry of Justice Circular No. 36 dated September 1, 1981. 2 But on August
HON. AMADO M. CALDERON in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, 23, 1991, petitioner denied the motion and directed the issuance of the warrant of
Branch 11, Malolos, Bulacan, petitioner, arrest against private respondent. 3
vs.
On August 27, 1991, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL and MAURO DIONISIO, respondents.
for certiorari and prohibition with an urgent prayer for preliminary injunction to
ROMERO, J.:
nullify and set aside the orders dated April 29, 1991 and August 23, 1991 issued by
This is a joint petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 103753) and mandamus (G.R. No. the petitioner, reiterating that the recommended bail bonds were accordance with
103752). the guidelines on bail bonds issued by the then Ministry of Justice and that the
increase of the bail bond was violative of his constitutional rights against excessive
In G.R. No. 103753, petitioner seek the review of the decision dated December 17,
bail. 4
1991 and the resolution dated January 28, 1992 of the Court of Appeals declaring
null and void petitioner's orders dated April 29, 1991 and April 23, 1991 which motu On September 4, 1991, the Court of Appeals required the Solicitor General
propio increased the bail bonds posted by private respondent who was accused representing the People of the Philippines to comment on the petition and show
violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (CA-G.R. SP No. 25801), without citing justifiable cause why a preliminary injunction should not be issued within ten days from
reason therefor. receipt. 5
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 103752, petitioner prays for judgment commanding On December 17, 1991, the Appellate Court nullified the questioned orders issued
respondent Solicitor General to forthwith represent him by filing a petition before by petitioner for failure to show the reasons for the increase of the bail bonds as
this Court by way of appeal from the decision of the Appellate Court in CA-G.R. SP required by Section 17 of Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
No. 25801. amended. Moreover, the Court of Appeals added that the unwarranted increase of
amount violated private respondent's constitutional right against excessive bail. 6
The undisputed facts are as follows:
On January 13, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration after he was
On January 29, 1990, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor filed three separate
refused representation by the Office of the Solicitor General. 7 On January 28, 1992,
informations for violations Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 with the Regional Trial Court
the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
of Bulacan (Malolos) against accused-private respondent involving the following
amounts: P114,902.00 (Criminal Case 240-M-90), P141,710.00 (Criminal Case 241- Hence, this joint special civil action for certiorari and mandamus.
M-90) and P110,923.00 (Criminal Case 242-M-90). These three informations were
The two issues to be resolved in this case are whether or not petitioner has standing
assigned to different salas.
to file this instant petition for certiorari and whether or not a writ of mandamus may
Subsequently, the Provincial Prosecutor recomended bail of P1,000.00 for each case, issue commanding the Solicitor General to appear in behalf of petitioner.
and conformably with the recommendations, private respondent filed three separate
This joint petition for certiorari and mandamus must fail. We see no necessity in
bail bonds of P1,000.00 for his provisional liberty.
discussing the merits of petitioner's order dated April 29, 1991 which motu
On petition of private respondent, the aforementioned cases were consolidated in proprio increased the bail bond or private respondent because this joint petition
the sala of petitioner. for certiorari and mandamus suffers from a procedural infirmity.
On April 29, 1991, "after noting from the records that the bonds posted by the To recall, this case originally started as "People of the Philippines v. Mauro Dionisio,"
private respondent was only P1,000.00 for each of the three case" petitioner issued in three separate informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. After
an order increasing the bail bond to P25,000.00 (Criminal Case No. 240-M-90); petitioner raised the bail bonds of accused, the latter elevated his case before the
P35,000.00 (Criminal Case No. 241-M-90) and P25,000.00 (Criminal Case No. 242- Appellate Court entitled; "Mauro Dionisio v. Hon. Amado Calderon, Presiding Judge,
M-90). 1 RTC, Malolos, Bulacan Branch II." Subsequently, petitioner believing that he was a
real party in interest filed this instant petition for certiorari and mandamus against
On May 9, 1991, private respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of
the Solicitor General and the accused Mauro Dionisio.
said order contending that the recommended bail in the amount of P1,000.00 was
in accordance with the Bail Bond Guide for the National Prosecution Service pursuant
SPECPRO 52
RULE 64 & 65

Petitioner, with his years in experience in the judiciary, should have known that he action and special proceedings in which the government or any officer thereof in his
has no standing to file this instant petition because he is merely a nominal party as official capacity is a party." To buttress his contention, he cites our recent
gleaned from Section 5 of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court which states that: case Ramon A. Gonzales v. Fransisco Chavez. 12
Defendants and the costs in certain case. — When the petition filed relates to the Petitioner has not read carefully our decision. In the Gonzales case, we held that the
acts or omissions of a court or judge, the petitioner shall joint, as parties defendant Solicitor General may not just drop a case without any legal and valid reason
with such court or judge, the person or persons interested in sustaining the because his discretion is not unlimited. To quote, "(L)ike the Attorney General who
proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty to such person or persons to appear has absolute discretion in choosing to prosecute or to abandon a prosecution already
and defend, both in his or their own behalf or in behalf of the court or judge affected started, our own Solicitor General may even dismiss, abandon, discontinue or
by the proceedings, and cost awarded in such proceedings in favor of the compromise suits either with or without stipulation with the other party." We added
petitioner shall be against the person or persons in interest only and not against the that, "upon receipt of a case certified to him, the Solicitor General exercises his
court or judge. (Emphasis supplied). discretion in the management of the case. He may start the prosecution of the case
by filing the appropriate action in court or he may opt not to file a case at all. He
Accordingly, a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal
may do everything within his legal authority but always conformably with the
party. In such capacity, therefore, he should not appear as a party seeking the
national interest and the policy of the government on the matter at hand."
reversal of the decision that is unfavorable to the action taken by him. 9
On the basis of the aforequoted jurisprudence, it is evident that since the Solicitor
In the case at bar, private complainant being the real party interested in upholding
General has the right to decide when and how to defend or prosecute a case, his
petitioner's questioned orders increasing the bail bonds, had the legal personality to
duty, therefore, is discretionary and not ministerial. A duty is ministerial when the
file the instant case. Since he did not even bother to assail the decision of the Court
discharged of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
of Appeals holding petitioner's actuations as having been issued with grave abuse
judgment. 13
of discretion, then much less should petitioner go out of his way to file this joint
petition for certiorari and mandamus. What would be the consequence if the Solicitor General were compelled to appear
and defend petitioner's act of increasing private respondent's bail? Obviously, he
Judge Calderon should be reminded of the well-known doctrine that a judge should
would acting contrary to the bail bond guidelines of the Executive Department,
detach himself from case where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review.
specifically the Department of Justice. Taking up the cudgels for the petitioner would
The raison d'etre for such doctrine is the fact so the judge is not an active combatant
place him at cross purpose with the avowed policies of the Executive Department of
in such proceeding and must leave the opposing parties to contend their individual
which he is undeniably a part, as expressed in the different circulars issued by said
positions and the appellate court to decide the issues without his active participation.
agency.
By filing this case, petitioner in a way ceased to be judicial and has become
adversarial instead. 10 Clearly, the pleadings show that petitioner is not entitled to the mandamus he seeks
from this Court, for he has neither shown a clear legal right to the thing demanded
Considering that petitioner has no standing to file this certiorari proceeding, then
nor demonstrated that it is the Solicitor General's imperative duty to defend him on
logically his petition for mandamus also deserves scant consideration. Nonetheless,
the sole ground that he is public officer.
we feel that we would be making a significant contribution to jurisprudence if we
definitely settled the question of whether mandamus will lie to compel the Solicitor WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the writ
General to represent a judge whose decision has been nullified by the Court of of mandamus applied for is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED.
Appeals. It is our considered opinion that petitioner cannot compel the Solicitor
General to defend his unwarranted act of increasing the private respondent's bail.
As a special civil action, mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty but not to compel the performance of the discretionary duty. 11
In the case at bar, petitioner contends that pursuant to paragraph (1) of Section 35,
Chapter 12, of Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, it is the specific legal
duty of the Solicitor General "to represent the government and its officers before
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and other courts and tribunals in all civil
SPECPRO 53
RULE 64 & 65

EN BANC collectively resolved the Court in a 23 January 1995 consolidated decision


G.R. No. 172556 June 9, 2006 entitled Republic v. Sandiganbayan.[2] The Court resolved to maintain the TRO it
issued enjoining the implementation of the 1991 orders of the Sandiganbayan,
TRANS MIDDLE EAST (PHILS.) EQUITIES, INC. (TMEE) decreeing as follows:
v. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
SANDIGANBAYAN (5th DIVISION, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD xxxx
GOVERNMENT (PCGG), THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF EQUITABLE PCI BANK,
B. CONFIRMING AND MAINTAINING the temporary restraining orders issued
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN CORAZON DELA PAZ AND SABINO ACUT, JR. (IN
HIS CAPACITY AS CORPORATE SECRETARY OF EQUITABLE PCI BANK)
in G.R. Nos. 104883, 105170, 105206, 105808, 105809, 107233, and
107908, which shall continue in force and effect during the continuation of
DECISION the proceedings in the corresponding civil actions in
TINGA, J. the Sandiganbayan, subject to the latters power to modify or
The integrity of the judicial system is founded on the soundness and rationality of terminate the same in the exercise of its sound discretion in light of
the judgments emanating from it. Decisions which are blatantly erroneous or such evidence as may subsequently be adduced.[3] (Emphasis supplied)
founded on oblique reasoning inevitably foment doubt within the dispirited public as In a subsequent Resolution dated 22 July 1997, concerning pending motions for
to the impartiality and judiciousness of the magistrates concerned. A critical eye contempt against PCI Bank and TMEE, the Court found it necessary to render the
must especially be cast on rulings which are not only wrong, haphazardly grounded following rulings:
and obtusely one-sided, but fortuitously timed to engender the most advantage to WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved:
the victor and damage to the loser. xxxx
This Petition for Certiorari was filed by petitioner Trans Middle East (Phil.) Equities II. To DIRECT the Sandiganbayan, in reiteration of this Courts
Inc. (TMEE), the registered owners of erstwhile sequestered shares in Equitable-PCI prior directives, promptly to adjudicate after due trial and proper
Bank (EPCIB) assailing a Resolution[1] promulgated by the Sandiganbayan on 22 proceedings the ultimate factual issue of whether or not the movants are the
May 2006. The Resolution declared that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) legitimate, bona fide owners of the sequestered shares of stock (or the same
initially issued 14 years ago by this Court in cases that were closed and terminated constitute ill-gotten wealth which should revert to and be forefeited in favor
ten years ago, remained in effect, thus disqualifying TMEE from voting on its shares. of the Republic, represented by the PCGG); and pending such adjudication,
The annual stockholders meeting of EPCIB was scheduled on 23 May 2006, or the resolve, with all deliberate dispatch but not later than sixty (60) days from
day after the Resolution was promulgated, leaving questions as to the timing of the notice of this Resolution, the preliminary questions of whether there is prima
promulgation. In any event, the Resolution is rooted in dubious and erroneous legal facie factual foundation for the sequestration of said stock, and for
premises. The writ of certiorari lies. reasonable ground for apprehension of dissipation, loss or wastage of assets
A narration of the relevant antecedents ensues. if the holders of the sequestered stock are permitted to vote them;
TMEE is the registered owner of 6,119,067 common shares of stock in the III. To COMMAND TMEE and the PCGG forthwith to formally
then PCBank, now Equitable-PCI Bank. On 15 April 1986, these shares were request the Sandiganbayan to set Civil Case No. 0035 for hearing so that the
sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) on the issues set out in the immediately preceding paragraph hereof may be
theory that as they actually belong to Benjamin Romualdez they constitute illegally determined with all deliberate dispatch; and
acquired wealth. Thereafter, a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 0035, was filed IV. To PROHIBIT from this date and until completion by
against Romualdez by the PCGG before the Sandiganbayan for the recovery of these the Sandiganbayan of its determination of the preliminary questions set out
shares. Upon motion, TMEE was allowed to intervene by the Sandiganbayan, and it in paragraph II hereof, the exercise of the right to vote pertaining to the
sought to enjoin the PCGG from voting these shares. sequestered PCIB shares of stock in question by either the PCGG or TMEE at
In 1991, the Sandiganbayan, upon motion of TMEE, issued resolutions that enjoined any meeting of the PCIB.[4]
the PCGG from voting the shares of TMEE and authorized TMEE in exercising its Meanwhile, in January and February of 1997, TMEE filed two motions before
voting rights. These resolutions were challenged before the Supreme Court, through the Sandiganbayan, both urging the nullification or lifting of the writ of
petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 105808 and 105809. The Court then issued a TRO sequestration. It contended that no valid writ of sequestration was ever issued, the
enjoining the implementation of the Sandiganbayan resolutions. Subsequently, G.R. sequestration having been effected through a letter dated 15 April 1986 addressed
Nos. 105808 and 105809 were consolidated with several other cases, which were to EPCIB signed by only one PCGG commissioner, in violation of the PCGG Rules and
SPECPRO 54
RULE 64 & 65

Regulations promulgated on 11 April 1986 that required writs of sequestration to be ruled that a writ of sequestration signed by only one PCGG commissioner was an
issued by at least two commissioners. While TMEE argued that it was entitled to the obvious transgression of the PCGG rules.[7] At the same time, based
actual custody and control of the shares, it nonetheless manifested that it was willing on TMEEs manifestation that it was willing to deposit the subject shares in escrow
to deposit these shares in escrow to allay any fear of dissipation, loss or wastage of to allay any fear of dissipation, loss or wastage of the subject shares,
the subject shares, as well as on all future cash and stock dividends to be declared the Sandiganbayan ordered that the shares be deposited in escrow with the Land
on the said shares. Bank of the Philippines.
In April of 1998, PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion for Issuance of The Resolution decreed:
Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin the holding of the EPCIB stockholders meeting WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing:
on 30 April 1998, on the ground that since the 1997 Supreme Court Resolution 1) The URGENT MOTION TO NULLIFY WRIT OF SEQUESTRATION
enjoined both the PCGG and TMEE from voting the sequestered stocks, these shares dated January 28, 1997 filed by movant Trans Middle East (Phils.) Equities,
stood to be diluted considering a proposal in the agenda to increase the authorized Inc., is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, Sequestration Order No. 86-
capital stock of EPCIB, among others. 0056 dated April 15, 1986 is hereby declared null and void for having
In a Resolution dated 29 April 1998, the Sandiganbayan dismissed these fears of been issued by one PCGG Commissioner only in direct contravention
the PCGG as unfounded. Moreover, in the same Resolution the Sandiganbayan of Section 3 of the PCGGs own Rules and Regulations. Conformably,
acknowledged that this Court had granted it the power to modify or terminate this however, with the manifestation of the movant trans Middle East (Phils.)
Courts temporary restraining order in the exercise of its sound discretion in the light Equities, Inc. itself, the Court will not order the return of its shares of stocks
of subsequent evidence. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan proceeded to recognize sequestered per Sequestration Order No. 86-0056 dated April 15, 1986, but
the right of TMEE to vote the shares of stock registered in its name, and to allow it orders that the same, including the interests earned thereon, to
to vote at the stockholders meeting of 30 April 1998. The Sandiganbayan justified be deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines in escrow for the
such recognition based on the following premises: (a) that the PCGG which bore the persons, natural or judicial, who shall eventually be adjudged
burden of proof to show prima facie foundation for the sequestration of TMEE shares lawfully entitled thereto.[8] (emphasis supplied)
had failed to timely do so; (b) that no damage or dissipation of the sequestered PCGG filed motions for the reconsideration of both the 1998 and 2003 resolutions
shares would result should TMEE be allowed to vote them; and (c) that on its face, of the Sandiganbayan. These motions have not yet been resolved to date. In the
the writ of sequestration was issued only by one PCGG Commissioner, in violation meantime, TMEE alleged that it has voted the subject shares from 1998 up to
of the PCGGs rules and regulations promulgated on 11 April 1986. Thus, 2005.[9]
the Sandiganbayan ruled: On 2 May 2006, the PCGG filed a Motion for Execution of this Courts Decision in G.R.
UNDER THE PREMISES: Nos. 105808 and 105809, which was promulgated on 23 January 1995, or more
(2) Philippine Commercial and Industrial Banks (PCIB) Chairman of the than ten (10) years earlier. It was argued therein that the 1995 Decision became
meeting and the secretary thereof are directed to acknowledge the right final and executory by virtue of an entry of judgment dated 2 April 1996 which was
of intervenor Trans Middle East (Phil.) Equities, Inc. (TMEE) to vote allegedly received by the PCGG only on 2 March 2006.[10] The purported receipt then
the shares of stocks registered in its name and allow it to vote at the only of the entry of judgment came one (1) day after the EPCIBs proxy validation
Stockholders Meeting scheduled on April 30, 1998 at 9:00 oclock in the deadline with closure of the Record Book of EPCIB. Desiring to exercise its voting
morning or at any other time to which said stockholders meeting may be rights as upheld by the Supreme Court, the PCGG prayed of the Sandiganbayan to
continued or reset. TMEE shall post a bond of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY issue the appropriate order permitting it to vote the sequestered shares or, in the
THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS to answer for any undue damage that the alternative, to order re-enforced and/or reissued the TRO affirmed by the Supreme
plaintiff PCGG or the PCIB shall suffer by reason of the sequestered shares Court in the 1995 Decision, which enjoined TMEE from voting the sequestered
of stock having been voted by and for said intervenor.[5] shares.
The pending motion for nullification of the writ of sequestration was left unresolved
then. On 10 January 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on the motions The Motion for Execution was heard on 5 May 2006, with TMEE making no
filed by TMEE in 1997 assailing the sequestration order. The Sandiganbayan granted appearance therein. The Sandiganbayan ordered TMEE to comment on the said
the motion to nullify the writ of sequestration of TMEE shares, ruling that the motion within ten (10) days.
sequestration order null and void as it was issued only by one PCGG Commissioner. Then on May 9, 2006, the PCGG filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Reinforce/Re-
It cited the decision of this Court in Republic v. Sandiganbayan[6] wherein it was issue TRO, praying that the Sandiganbayan issue an order re-enforcing and/or re-
SPECPRO 55
RULE 64 & 65

issuing the TRO issued by this Court in G.R. Nos. 105808 and 105809 and to execute the maintenance of the status quo prior to the disputed election of directors;
the TRO under the Decision of the Supreme Court dated January 13, 1995. The restraining the new Board and the officers elected by them from further performing
PCGG argued that due to the fact that the stockholders meeting of EPCIB was their functions; and directing the Chairman and Corporate Secretary to recognize
scheduled on 23 May 2006, there was an urgent need for the re-enforcement and allow the old Board and officers to serve in a hold-over capacity until further
or reissuance of the TRO affirmed by the Supreme Court in its 1995 Decision. The orders from this Court.[13]
PCGG also alleged that they had received reports that the Romualdezes are bent on In the course of deliberating the matter of provisional relief sought by TMEE, the
disposing of their shares in EPCIB, and that should they gain control of the bank of self-evident nature of the correct resolution on the points of law emerged, and a
(sic) electing themselves and/or their dummies/nominees to the helm of the bank, consensus developed within the Court that the petition be resolved immediately.
there is a danger that the sequestered Equitable-PCI Bank shares might dissipate or The challenged Resolution is ostensibly grounded on an earlier decision of this Court,
be disposed of.[11] yet is ultimately oblivious to the full import of that decision and other juridical
On 22 May 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued the Resolution now assailed before the precedents as well. The Sandiganbayan in its Resolution
Court. The Sandiganbayan acknowledged that the 1998 and 2003 Resolutions it likewise sub silencio contradicts earlier rulings it had previously rendered
earlier issued had indeed modified the TRO issued by this Court, and that it had the in connection with the same issues, yet takes refuge from its inconsistency on
authority, as granted by the Court, to modify or terminate such TRO. Nevertheless, its very own inaction on two still pending motions for reconsideration filed eight and
the Sandiganbayan ruled that both resolutions had not yet attained finality since it three years ago, respectively.
itself still had to resolve the motions for reconsideration respectively related thereto Considering that all the respondents have duly filed their respective comments,
filed by the PCGG in 1998 and 2003. The Sandiganbayan opined that it could not re- there is no impediment to the immediate resolution of the case on the merits. We
issue the TRO since it was this Court which issued the same. Still, are compelled to act promptly in light of the highly disturbing circumstances
the Sandiganbayan ruled that it could state that the two resolutions modifying this attending this case. This Court cannot countenance unabashed trifling with the
Courts TRO have not attained finality as the motions for reconsiderations thereto judicial process, turn a blind eye on a patent simulacrum of judicial adjudication and
have not been resolved by [the Sandiganbayan]. The dispositiveportion of the allow a glaring travesty of justice to go unchecked in time.
Resolution read: The assailed Resolution in this case, promulgated by the Sandiganbayan on 22 May
WHEREFORE, pertinent to the instant motion, this Court hereby declares that 2006, has been used to maximum benefit by the respondents, all connected with
considering that two resolutions modifying the Supreme Courts TRO have EPCIB, in an obvious corporate squabble which saw its apotheosis in the long
not attained finality as the motions for reconsiderations filed thereto have scheduled annual stockholders meeting on 23 May 2006 wherein TMEE was
not been resolved by this Court, the TRO, which was issued by the Supreme deprived of its right to vote its shares despite the fact that it would have been able
Court disqualifying both the PCGG nominees, TMEE, PAH and PAR, from to elect at least one (1) seat on the Board of Directors. The Court is also impelled
voting the sequestered shares in the Equitable PCI Bank by the recognition that the annulment of the Sandiganbayan resolution would have
and Benguet Corporation, respectively is still existing and in full force and a pronounced consequent effect on the financial community, if not the banking public
effect.[12] at large. Hence, the need to resolve this matter promptly.
On the following day, 23 May 2003, TMEE filed the instant petition with this Court, We now accordingly adjudicate.
with a prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or a Writ of The Court first dispenses with procedural issues raised that are ultimately minor.
Preliminary Injunction to preserve and maintain the status quo wherein TMEE [was] The petition is denominated as one for certiorari with prayer preliminary injunction
allowed to vote the shares registered in its name and restraining the respondents and/or temporary restraining order, under the ambit of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
from enforcing the [22 May 2003 Sandiganbayan] Resolution granting the motion to Respondent Board of Directors of EPCIB argue that the failure of TMEE to file a
re-enforce/re-issue TRO, until the final resolution of this Court. motion for reconsideration with the Sandiganbayan precluded the immediate resort
In the absence of an injunctive order restraining the holding of the stockholders to the special civil action of certiorari. As a general rule, certiorari as a special civil
meeting on 23 May 2006, the meeting was held. Over the objections of TMEE, the action does not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the
election of a new Board of Directors of EPCIB was held. Since TMEE was not allowed respondent court. However, this rule does not apply when special circumstances
to vote its shares, it was unable to elect any representative to the Board of Directors warrant immediate or more direct action.[14] It is well-settled that the availability of
despite the fact that it maintained enough shares to be entitled to at least one board appeal does not foreclose recourse to the extraordinary remedies of certiorari
seat. Thus, in its Supplemental Petition attached to a Motion for Leave of Court to or prohibition where appeal is not adequate, orequally beneficial, speedy and
File Supplemental Petition, TMEE prayed for the issuance of a resolution directing sufficient.[15] Where the exigencies of the case are such that the ordinary methods
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RULE 64 & 65

of appeal may not prove adequateeither in point of promptness or completeness, so of TMEE, and any resulting errors in the petition that are of the non-fatal variety can
that a partial if not a total failure of justice could resulta writ of certiorari may still be overlooked.
be issued.[16] Respondents, particularly the EPCIB Board of Directors, ascribe a few other
It cannot evade notice that the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution was promulgated procedural errors on the part of the petitioner, but these are so minor that they do
one (1) day before the scheduled stockholders meeting of EPCIB. Evidently, TMEE not merit the attention of the Court. Suffice it to say, they do not adduce a
could no longer have relied on the Sandiganbayan to reverse itself literally compulsory rule that would mandate the dismissal of the petition contrary to the
overnight, in time for the meeting. The filing of a motion for reconsideration would discretion of the Court to do otherwise.
not have been an adequate or speedy remedy for TMEE. Hence, resort to the special We now turn to the merits of the case.
civil action of certiorari without filing a motion for reconsideration is justified under The assailed Sandiganbayan resolution was occasioned by an Urgent Ex-
the circumstances. Parte Motion to Reinforce/Re-issue TRO filed by the PCGG, which prayed for the
The more consequential procedural objection lies in the failure of TMEE in its petition issuance of an order re-enforcing and/or re-issuing the TRO issued by this Court in
to pray for the annulment of the 22 May 2006 Sandiganbayan Resolution despite G.R. Nos. 105808 and 105809. The sort of relief sought is unconventional to say the
the denomination of the petition as one for certiorari, and the arguments therein least. No such remedy is provided for under the rules of procedure, although it is
that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the not expressly barred. The uniqueness of the relief sought should nonetheless be
Resolution. On this failure, the respondents in their respective comments argue that cause for skepticism on the part of the court hearing the claim. Procedural rules
the petition, which was accompanied by a prayer for writ of preliminary injunction exist to provide a methodical system that would facilitate the judicious disposition
and/or TRO, is effectively an original action for injunction beyond the jurisdiction of of cases. A recourse that finds no authorization or support under the rules could in
this Court. fact be aimed to subvert orderly procedure, an end that runs contrary to the interest
TMEE, in its Supplemental Petition filed seven (7) days after the filing of the petition, of justice.
did subsequently pray for the nullification of the Sandiganbayan resolution on the The judicial duty, when confronted with such a pleading as the motion for the
ground of grave abuse of discretion. TMEE deserves some blame for failing to include reinforcement/reissuance of the PCGG, is to look beyond the verbiage and ascertain
such prayer in its original petition, yet given the attendant circumstances, it would the real nature of the action on which the prayer is founded. In this case, it is
be an act of triviality to dismiss the petition on that ground alone. For one, even ineluctable that what the PCGG sought through its motion was injunctive relief that
assuming that the petition is indeed an original action for injunction, it was ruled would refrain TMEE from exercising its voting rights in the 2004 EPCIB stockholders
in Del Mar v. Pagcor[17]that this Court has the discretionary power to take meeting, or other meetings for that matter. While the legal basis for such prayer is
cognizance of the petition at bar if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance suggested on the continued recognition of a provisional remedy granted a long time
of the issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction.[18] Indeed, ago, the ultimate goal of the motion is to secure injunctive relief. As such, the rules
such compelling reasons, as adverted to before, are present in this case. on injunction must apply.
The relevant antecedent facts actually point to three successive recourses to
More fundamentally, it is evident from the allegations in the petition, replete with injunctive relief which were availed of in this case. The first was the 1986 order of
imputations of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it sequestration, sequestration being in itself a form of a provisional remedy, an
promulgated its resolution, that the nature of the petition is one for certiorari, with extraordinary measure intended to prevent the destruction, concealment or
injunction sought only as an ancillary relief. The nature of an action, as well as which dissipation of sequestered properties and, thereby, to conserve and preserve them,
court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the material allegations pending the judicial determination in the appropriate proceeding of whether the
contained in the petition.[19] Any doubts as to whether TMEE seeks the annulment property was in truth ill-gotten.[20]
of the Sandiganbayan resolution are cleared by the Supplemental Petition, which The second injunctive relief involved in this case came in the form of the TRO issued
expressly seeks such relief. by this Court in 1992 in G.R. Nos. 105808 and 105809, restraining the
The Court is also inclined to view this defect with liberality, considering that TMEE implementation of the 1992 Sandiganbayan order allowing TMEE to vote its shares.
had only one (1) calendar day to prepare the petition, which sought to vindicate the The right to the TRO is grounded on the subsistence of the sequestration order.
exercise of its voting rights in the EPCIB stockholders meeting, which was enjoined The same TRO issued in G.R. Nos. 105808 and 105809 was reaffirmed in the 1995
by the Sandiganbayan resolution promulgated just the day before such election. The Supreme Court Decision in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, an unusual step in itself
forced haste under which the petition was prepared cannot be attributed to the fault considering that normally, a provisional injunctive order survives only as long as the
case wherein it was issued. But since the said TRO related to pending incidents in
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RULE 64 & 65

Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan, the Court ceded control over the the Sandiganbayan further militates against any recognition that the sequestration
TRO to the anti-graft court, with a specific grant of authority on the latter to to order established a clear legal right that entitled the PCGG to injunctive relief.
modify or terminate the same in the exercise of its sound discretion in light We now examine whether the legal consequences of the 1995 Decision of the Court
of such evidence as may subsequently be adduced. The Sandiganbayan did provide a clear legal right to injunctive relief to the PCGG.
just that through its 1998 and 2003 Resolutions which respectively An examination of the dispositive portion of the 1995 Decision insofar as it pertains
recognized TMEEs rights to vote the shares and nullified the writ of sequestration. to TMEE puts in doubt whether its execution should have resulted in barring TMEE
The third mode of injunctive relief involved herein was the PCGGs motion for the re- from voting its shares in the 2006 stockholders meeting. While the 1995 Decision
enforcement or reissuance of the earlier Supreme Court TRO. Palpably, this motion maintained the earlier TRO barring TMEE from voting its shares, it also authorized
prayed for the reaffirmation of the TRO granted by the Supreme Court in G.R. Nos. the Sandiganbayan to modify or terminate the same in the exercise of its
105808 & 105809, cases which were closed and terminated nearly 10 years ago; sound discretion in light of such evidence as may subsequently be adduced.
but at the same time effectively sought to enjoin the 1998 and In that sense, the 1995 Decision consisted of two (2) phases. The first phase consists
2003 Sandiganbayan Resolutions, praying as the PCGG did that TMEE be denied the of the affirmation of the TRO, a stance that subsisted as a matter of default. The
right to vote its shares notwithstanding the two Sandiganbayan resolutions. second phase, however, consists of either the modification or termination of the TRO
For injunctive relief to avail to the PCGG, it must be able to demonstrate the by the Sandiganbayan in light of the evidence subsequently adduced. Should the
existence of a clear legal right to be entitled to such relief. [21] In the absence of a condition set in the second phase modification or termination by
clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse of the Sandiganbayan then the first phase is ended, and the affirmation of the TRO can
discretion.[22] There could only be two putative sources of such legal right of the no longer be acknowledged as the default action.
PCGG the 1986 sequestration order and the 1995 Decision of this Court which There is no question that the Sandiganbayan did modify the TRO by virtue of its
affirmed the 1992 TRO issued by the Supreme Court. Yet closer scrutiny of either 1998 and 2003 Resolutions. The 1998 Resolution acknowledge[d] the right
reveals no foundational recognition of a clear legal right of the PCGG. of intervenor Trans Middle East (Phil.) Equities, Inc. (TMEE) to vote the
It is settled that as a general rule, the registered owner of the shares of a shares of stocks registered in its name. The 2003 Resolution went even
corporation, even if they are sequestered by the government through the PCGG, further in declaring null and void the 1986 sequestration order. Both
exercises the right and the privilege of voting on them.[23] The PCGG as a mere resolutions thoroughly explained the reasons for granting favorable reliefs to
conservator cannot, as a rule, exercise acts of dominion by voting these TMEE.[27] The 1998 Resolution even specifically invoked the 1995 Decision of this
shares.[24] The registered owner of sequestered shares may only be deprived of Court that categorically declared that the Sandiganbayan had the power to modify
these voting rights, and the PCGG authorized to exercise the same, only if it is able or terminate the restraining order in the exercise of its sound discretion in the light
to establish that (1) there is prima facie evidence showing that the said shares are of such evidence as may be subsequently adduced.[28]
ill-gotten and thus belong to the State; and (2) there is an imminent danger of Respondent Board of Directors contest the argument that the 1998 Resolution either
dissipation, thus necessitating the continued sequestration of the shares and lifted or terminated the 1992 TRO, alleging that the dispositive portion
authority to vote thereupon by the PCGG while the main issue is pending before therein[29] merely allowed TMEE to votes it shares for the stockholders meeting on
the Sandiganbayan.[25] 30 April 1998, and not at other stockholders meetings held in previous years. This
Clearly, the existence of the writ of sequestration alone would not legally justify claim is belied by a close look at the dispositive portion of the 1998 Resolution, which
barring TMEE from voting its shares. Such preclusion may only occur if there is prima directed the then PCI Bank to xxx acknowledge the right of [TMEE] to vote the
facie evidence showing that the said shares are ill-gotten and there is an imminent shares of stocks registered in its name and allow it to vote at the Stockholders
danger of dissipation. The Sandiganbayan or any other court has yet to pronounce Meeting scheduled on April 30, 1998.[30]
any findings to those effects. In fact, the Sandiganbayan, in its 1998 Resolution, As evidenced by the use of the conjunctive and, there were two directives contained
instead declared that TMEE possessed a prima facie right as owner of the registered in that order, namely: that the right of TMEE to vote the shares of stocks registered
owner of the sequestered shares, and that there appeared to be no strong grounds in its name; and to allow TMEE to vote at the 1998 stockholders meeting. The first
for apprehension of dissipation or loss of assets of TMEE. [26] Concerns over directive, mandating the recognition of TMEEs right to vote its shares, is not
dissipation have likewise been assuaged that the shares have been deposited in subjected to any limitation as to time or particular circumstance. Neither did
escrow with the Land Bank of the Philippines on the initiative of TMEE itself. In any the Sandiganbayans discussion in the body of the 1998 Resolution support the view
event, the nullification in 2003 of the very writ of sequestration by that the right of TMEE to vote the shares was limited to the 1998 stockholders
meeting.
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Respondents are generally silent as to the effect of the 2003 Resolution nullifying order as of 2003, execution of the 1995 Decision in 2006 cannot possibly
the writ of sequestration. Yet the import of that ruling is equally important to this contemplate the revival of the TRO.
case. Obviously, the Sandiganbayan failed to consider these points when it rendered the
The 2003 Resolution nullifying the sequestration order over TMEEs shares was based assailed Resolution. It does not even appear that the Sandiganbayan evaluated
on the fact, of which there appears to be no serious contest, that the said order, the PCGGsmotion within the frame of mind that a clear legal right must exist to
dated 15 April 1986, was signed by only one PCGG commissioner in violation of the entitle the PCGGs prayer. Instead, it engaged in a mechanical application of
PCGG Rules and Regulations promulgated on 11 April 1986.[31] The 2003 Resolution technicalities in a manner that failed to consider the more crucial issues at hand.
particularly cited the Courts 1998 Decision in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,[32] penned There is an admitted convenience in simply pronouncing, as the Sandiganbayan did,
by Chief Justice Panganiban, which categorically ruled that the writ [of that since the motions for reconsideration to the 1998 and 2003 Resolutions had not
sequestration] must bear the signatures of two commissioners, because their been resolved, the efficacy of those resolutions cannot yet be recognized. It cannot
signatures are the best evidence of their approval thereof. [33] The Court also noted be denied though that the two resolutions are properly characterized as interlocutory
that the PCGG Rules took effect on 11 April 1986, and that the signing of orders, as they do not finally dispose of Civil Case No. 0035.
sequestration orders by two commissioners had already been encouraged after April In Valarao v. Pascual,[36] the Court contended with the question of whether
11, 1986.[34] respondents therein were bound to respect the authority of a special administrator
The binding effect of the same provision of the PCGG Rules on the PCGG after 11 on the ground that the interlocutory order appointing such administrator was not
April 1986 was also affirmed in the 1996 ruling in Republic yet final and executory because of a pending motion for reconsideration. The Court
v. Sandiganbayan,[35] also penned by Chief Justice Panganiban. Quoting the same held:
provision requiring that the writ of sequestration may be issued upon the authority [R]espondents cannot disobey the reasonable exercise of the authority of a
of at least two commissioners, the Court said that the provision was couched in clear special administrator on the dubious ground that the order appointing
and simple language [and] leaves no room for interpretation. petitioner Valarao as special administratrix had not in the meantime become
The finding of the Sandiganbayan that the writ of sequestration was null and void final and executory because of a pending motion for reconsideration filed by
was material to the determination whether the PCGG had the right to the injunctive them. The fallacy of this reasoning is apparent, for an interlocutory
relief it sought. This point is especially relevant, since if the sequestration order order is not instantly appealable and therefore there is no period nor
against TMEE is declared null and void, the earlier TRO will become functus officio. action to suspend or interrupt by a motion for reconsideration; it is
The TRO cannot continue to exist if the sequestration order is null and void from the even well settled that a special civil action for certiorari does not
beginning. Based on the 2003 Sandiganbayan Resolution, the sequestration order suspend the immediate enforceability of an interlocutory order
against TMEE is deemed void as of 15 April 1986, or more than 20 years ago. Not absent a temporary restraining order or an injunction. In the same
only the clarity, but the very existence of the legal right on which the PCGG grounds manner, the appointment of a special administrator being an
its right to relief became controverted as a result of the 2003 Resolution. interlocutory order is not interrupted by a motion for
These twin resolutions of the Sandiganbayan pose a critical impediment to a reconsideration and thus must be obeyed as the proceedings in the
determination that the PCGG had a clear legal right to protect that would justify probate court progress.[37]
injunctive relief in its favor. At the very least, these resolutions, issued within the The same characteristics of the interlocutory order in Valarao apply in this case.
bounds of authority granted by this Court to the Sandiganbayan, becloud the Since the orders recognizing TMEE to vote its shares and nullifying the writ of
continued efficacy to this day of the 1992 TRO; at most, they confirm that the 1992 sequestration are both unappealable, they can only be assailed through a special
TRO no longer subsists. The Court is inclined towards the latter view. Clearly, it civil action for certiorari, the filing of which however does not ipso facto inhibit
would be proper to assert that the 1998 and 2003 Resolutions of the effectivity of the assailed order unless specifically enjoined. For this reason, it
the Sandiganbayan were issued not only in compliance with but in execution and cannot be said that the 1998 and 2003 Resolutions, interlocutory as they are in
implementation of the 1995 Decision of the Court. Considering that character, are not yet susceptible to enforcement during the motions for
the Sandiganbayan had already modified or terminated the restraining order, reconsideration therefor.
pursuant to the authority granted it by this Court, it may be very well be that there It also bears notice that from the time the 1998 Resolution recognized the right of
is nothing left in the 1995 Decision to execute. At bare minimum, considering TMEE to vote its shares until eight (8) years later, no serious challenges were posed
the accomplished modification and virtual termination of the restraining against the right of TMEE to vote those shares by reason of the pending motion for
reconsideration. There is some dispute as to whether during the last eight years of
SPECPRO 59
RULE 64 & 65

EPCIB stockholder meetings, TMEE was actually able to formally vote its shares[38] or For one, concerning the Motion for Execution of Judgment it had filed on 2 May 2006,
merely consented to a common slate of nominees previously agreed upon to negate it appears highly suspect that the PCGG would await more than ten years before it
the need to conduct an actual meeting.[39] Yet whatever the fact may be, these would move to execute or enforce the 1995 Decision of the Supreme Court. Entry
stockholders meetings and election of the Board of Directors were conducted to the of Judgment on that Decision was dated 2 April 1996. Under Article 1144 of the Civil
satisfaction of TMEE, which was able to successfully elect at least one nominee to Code, an action based upon a judgment must be brought within ten years from the
the Board. Those circumstances do not bear the mark of TMEE being deprived of the time the right of action accrues, or within ten years counted from the time the
right to vote its shares in the stockholders’ meetings from 1998 to 2005, when the judgment became final.[41] Under Section 2, Rule 37, the date of finality of the
contrary should have resulted if the position of the respondents were to be believed. judgment or final order shall be deemed to be the date of its entry.
For all intents and purposes, the 1998 and 2003 Resolutions had been respected Notably, nothing in the rules of procedure provides that the entry of judgment be
prior to the current year by the Sandiganbayan and the parties. Given the pending served on the parties, or reckons the date of finality of the judgment from the
motions for reconsideration, theoretically it is still within the power of moment the entry of judgment is received by the parties. Hence, the fact that PCGG
the Sandiganbayan to reverse or modify the 1998 and 2003 resolutions. Yet if allegedly was served the Entry of Judgment only on 2 March 2006 does not detract
the Sandiganbayan were so minded to modify or reverse the two earlier resolutions, from the fact that any action to execute or enforce the 1995 Decision of the Supreme
it should do so directly and explicitly, not only tangentially or by implication as it Court was barred by prescription after 2 April 2006. The filing of the two motions by
actually did, and at that based on premises which contradict the predicates on which the PCGG before the Sandiganbayan was made only in May of 2006.
its 1998 and 2003 Resolutions are anchored. In other words, it may reverse its In its motion to reinforce/reissue TRO before the Sandiganbayan, the PCGG
earlier rulings only on the evidentiary foundations prescribed by this Court in its adverted to reports that the sequestered shares were in danger of dissipation and
1995 Decision which have to pertain to the existence of a valid basis for diminution as the Romualdezes were bent on disposing their shares in Equitable-PCI
sequestration or the danger of dissipation of the sequestered shares. Bank.[42] The shares of EPCIB, including the interests earned thereon, are deposited
Until and unless it reconsiders the 1998 and 2003 Resolutions in that fashion and in escrow with the Land Bank of the Philippines, on order of the Sandiganbayan in
on that basis, the Sandiganbayan is bound to respect them, moreso because they its 2003 Resolution, at the instance of no less than TMEE. Unless otherwise ordered
are its own rulings. It is thus precluded from performing any act or promulgate any by the Sandiganbayan, these shares would remain in escrow until Civil Case No.
issuance inconsistent with the letter, tenor and disposition of those previous rulings 0035 is finally resolved by the Sandiganbayan. As such, these shares have been
which remain extant. It cannot re-enforce the TRO against TMEE or recognizing the apparently insulated from dissipation and diminution. They cannot be simply be
continued legal effects of the nullified sequestration order, as it did through the disposed of, conveyed or encumbered by TMEE, even if the sequestration order were
challenged resolutions. It can only do so by reconsidering the 1998 and 2003 voided or the TRO lifted.
resolutions. This being the situation, the only way by which these shares under escrow may be
Thus, it can be appreciated why the Sandiganbayan in the challenged Resolution diminished or dissipated would be through radical corporate changes within EPCIB,
merely opted to declare the TRO confirmed in this Courts 1995 Decision is is still such as through the increase of capital stock, or even through the dissolution or
existing and in full force and effect, desisting as it did from ordering the execution merger of the bank itself. However, it remains highly dubious that TMEE could, by
of the 1995 Decision. Such declaration, however, is not wholly correct as it is exercising its right to vote the shares, effect such changes that would diminish or
incomplete. It did not include the fact that the TRO had already been modified by dissipate those stocks that it could not dispose of. The shares of TMEE comprise only
the 1998 and 2003 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, it failed to consider 7.13% of the outstanding capital stock of EPCIB,[43] and would entitle TMEE to only
the well-established doctrine that the registered owner of sequestered shares is one (1) seat in the 15-person Board of Directors.[44] TMEE is very much a minority
generally entitled to vote the shares.[40] stockholder in Equitable-PCI Bank, and on its own, incapable of imposing its will on
The Court thus rules, with considerable ease, that the 22 May 2006 Resolution of the bank.
the Sandiganbayan was issued with grave abuse of discretion, and must be It is not beyond the realm of possibility that these shares of TMEE in EPCIB, minimal
annulled. as they may be, could somehow accord TMEE a significant degree of influence in the
The Court finds the actions of the PCGG in this case distressing. Its actions and policies and decisions of the bank. At the same time, considering the limited number
resort to unconventional modes of relief towards the end of depriving TMEE the right of shares TMEE holds, this prospect should be considered, on its face, highly unlikely.
to vote its shares, notwithstanding two Sandiganbayan rulings recognizing such Yet the PCGG staked its motion before the Sandiganbayan on the claim that the
right are tantamount to abuse of the judicial process. allowance of TMEE to vote its shares could somehow diminish or dissipate those
shares deposited in escrow, a highly facile claim considering the circumstances. Still,
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RULE 64 & 65

the Sandiganbayan refused to subject such claim to any scrutiny at all, and worse, voting its shares and electing its nominee or representative to the Board of
granted the relief sought on the dubious premises. Directors.
Our attention is also called to the letter dated 22 May 2006, written by PCGG Clearly, TMEE is entitled to one seat on the Board of Directors of EPCIB. There is the
Commissioner William Dichoso, and addressed to the Board of Directors of option of annulling the entire election, but such step would be too drastic in light of
EPCIB.[45] The letter, captioned TRO Issued by the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. the fact that only one of the 15 seats should be necessarily affected upon the seating
0035 (Republic of the Philippines v. Benjamin Romualdez), bluntly states that of TMEEs nominee to the Board of Directors. The more prudent step on the part of
the Sandiganbayan has issued a Temporary Restraining Order restraining xxx the Court is to declare that one nominee or representative of TMEE is entitled to be
[TMEE] from voting in the stockholders meeting of [EPCIB], and advises that Copy seated immediately on the Board of Directors, and to direct the respondents EPCIB
of the Temporary Restraining Order will follow.[46] Board and Board Corporate Secretary to admit and recognize said nominee or
No such temporary restraining order was issued by the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, representative of TMEE to the Board of Directors in place of the person who was
the challenged Resolution does not contain any directive for the issuance of a elected to the Board at the 23 May 2006 annual stockholders meeting had TMEE not
separate temporary restraining order. All the challenged Resolution affirms is the been disallowed to vote its shares.
supposed continuing force of the TRO as affirmed by 1995 Decision of the Court. But The Court, as far back as 1998, already admonished the PCGG and
as earlier discussed, while the 1995 Decision affirmed the earlier TRO issued by the the Sandiganbayan to speedily proceed with the hearings and resolutions of the
Court, it also affirmed the right of the Sandiganbayan to modify or terminate such main cases for recovery and reconveyance of alleged
TRO if the evidence so warranted. The Sandiganbayan has exercised such right and ill-gotten wealth.[50] In ordinary times, what the Court should be resolving right now
has chosen not to disavow such exercise. Neither has the modification or termination in the exercise of judicial review should be the final decisions of
of the TRO been reversed or set aside by a higher court. the Sandiganbayan on the recovery of sequestered assets, and not preliminary
The impression left by the PCGG letter to EPCIB was that the bank had no choice matters like those now before us. It is this unconscionable delay that has precisely
outside of violating a judicial order but to disallow TMEE from voting its shares. Yet allowed this unwanted circus to march into this Court. The protracted delay serves
even with the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, such a conclusion is not so no end except to foster mockery of the judicial system.
evident. At the very least, the PCGG letter conveyed the message that WHEREFORE, the PETITION is GRANTED. The Resolution of
the Sandiganbayan had enjoined the voting of TMEE shares in the 23 May the Sandiganbayan dated 22 May 2006 is declared NULL and VOID.
2006 stockholders meeting when in fact the anti-graft court did not provide for an The election at the 23 May 2006 annual stockholders meeting of the person to the
injunctive relief in such manner. seat in the Equitable-PCI Bank Board of Directors to which petitioner Trans Middle
Still, ultimate blame must be foisted on the Sandiganbayan. Wittingly or unwittingly, East (Phils.), Inc. is entitled is likewise declared NULL and VOID.
it became complicit in the denial of justice to TMEE when it issued the assailed PENDING FINALITY OF THIS DECISION AND IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT HEREOF,
Resolution, despite the lack of ample basis to support it. Had it ruled judiciously on respondents Board of Directors of Equitable-PCI Bank and Corporate
the motion, the resultant farce would not have been staged. More to the point, had Secretary Sabino E. Acut, Jr. are DIRECTED NOT TO RECOGNIZE said person whose
it resolved the pending motions for reconsideration in a timely manner, this entire election to the Board of Directors is set aside and nullified herein and TO RECOGNIZE
controversy could have been avoided. the nominee or representative of TMEE as a duly elected member of the Board of
Finally, we consider the consequences of the annulment of the assailed Resolution Directors, with all the rights and privileges appertaining to the position.
on the subsequently held stockholders meeting and election of the Board of Directors SO ORDERED.
of EPCIB. It appears that there is no serious dispute that TMEE would have been
entitled to one seat on the Board had it been able to vote its shares. TMEE asserts
that it has 51,827,640 EPCIB shares,[47] equivalent to 7.13% of the outstanding
capital stock of the bank. Respondent Board of Directors admits that the shares of
TMEE constitute 7.13% of the outstanding capital stock of the bank.[48] Since Section
24 of the Corporation Code allows a stockholder such as TMEE to cumulate all of his
shares in the voting for directors, a 7.13 % stock interest in the outstanding capital
stock is sufficient to elect one seat in the 15-seat EPCIB Board of
Directors.[49] However, relying on the null and void Resolution of the Sandiganbayan,
respondents Board of Directors and Corporate Secretary prevented TMEE from
SPECPRO 61
RULE 64 & 65

G.R. No. 153537 May 5, 2006 for the issuance of a writ of execution. In support of his petition for certiorari,
YOLANDA R. BALAYAN, Assisted by her husband JUAN UNARI, and respondent claimed that he had no knowledge of the November 9, 1998 Decision in
FLORDELIZA JIMENEZ, Petitioners, Civil Case Nos. 757-96 and 758-96 until January 22, 1999. Respondent claimed that
vs. he forthwith filed a notice of appeal in both civil cases, which petitioners countered
MIGUEL ACORDA, Respondent. by filing a motion to dismiss the notice of appeal. According to respondent, without
DECISION first ruling on his notice of appeal or on petitioners’ motion to dismiss, MCTC Judge
TINGA, J.: Angerico B. Ramirez issued the assailed order directing the issuance of a writ of
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil execution. Respondent further alleged that despite the issuance of the writ of
Procedure assailing the May 16, 2002 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), execution on October 19, 2000 and its implementation on December 16, 2000, no
Branch 18, Ilagan, Isabela in Civil Case No. 1168. The assailed Order denied sheriff’s return was issued and could be found in the case records.
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the RTC’s Order dated November 22, 2001, Petitioners filed an answer to the petition for certiorari, arguing, among others, that
which gave due course to respondent’s petition for certiorari. the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period of sixty (60) days from the
The instant petition originated from two separate complaints for accion receipt of the assailed order. On this score, the RTC dismissed respondent’s petition
publiciana filed by petitioners Yolanda R. Balayan and Flordeliza Jimenez with the in an Order issued on July 6, 2001. The RTC, however, indicated in the same Order
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Gamu-Burgos. Petitioner Balayan’s complaint that the failure of MCTC Judge Ramirez to resolve respondent’s notices of appeal
was docketed as Civil Case No. 757-96 while that of petitioner Jimenez was docketed and petitioners’ motion to dismiss the notices of appeal constituted a "patent and
as Civil Case No. 758-96. Named as defendant in both complaints was respondent gross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to virtual
Miguel Acorda. Subject of Civil Case No. 757-96 was a parcel of land situated at refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law."1
Barangay Upi, Gamu, Isabela, known as Lot 1 of subdivision plan Psd-2-02-017333 Relying upon said pronouncement, respondent moved for the reconsideration of the
and registered as TCT No. T-233887 in the name of Spouses Yolanda Balayan and July 6, 2001 Order on the ground that the May 25, 2005 Order may be assailed
Juan Urani. Subject of Civil Case No. 758-96 was a parcel of land adjacent to Lot 1, anytime as it was void for being issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
known as Lot 2 of subdivision plan Psd-2-02-017333 and registered as TCT No. T- lack or excess of jurisdiction. Respondent also argued that the petition
151149 in the name of petitioner Jimenez. Both complaints alleged that respondent for certiorari was filed within the reglementary sixty (60)-day period reckoned from
entered into the subject parcels of land sometime in January 1996 and planted the implementation of the writ of execution on December 16, 2000.
agricultural crops thereon. Respondent allegedly refused to heed petitioners’ In an Order issued on November 22, 2001, the RTC granted respondent’s motion for
demand to vacate, prompting the latter to file the aforementioned civil cases. reconsideration and nullified the May 25, 2000 Order of MCTC Judge Ramirez and
Respondent denied the allegations and claimed that he was the actual owner of the all processes issued pursuant thereto. Thereafter, petitioners sought the
lots, having been in possession thereof as early as 1987 when he bought the same reconsideration of the November 22, 2001 Order but the RTC denied the same for
from a certain Lucia Rosete. Respondent alleged that petitioners’ titles were spurious lack of merit when it issued the assailed Order dated May 16, 2002.
and, thus, sued for quieting of title by way of a counterclaim. Hence, the instant petition, mainly raising the issue of whether the RTC correctly
After joinder of issues and the completion of a relocation survey, petitioners moved gave due course to respondent’s petition for certiorari, which sought to nullify the
for a summary judgment, which the MCTC granted. May 25, 2000 Order of MCTC Judge Ramirez. Citing Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997
On November 9, 1998, the MCTC rendered separate judgments in Civil Cases Nos. Rules of Civil Procedure,2 petitioners contend that the RTC erred in giving due course
757-96 and 758-96 in favor of both petitioners by ordering respondent to vacate the to respondent’s petition for certiorari which was filed out of time.
properties in question. The petition is meritorious.
On January 25, 1999, petitioners jointly moved for the issuance of execution orders It bears emphasis that the special civil action for certiorari is a limited form of review
in the two civil cases as the period of appeal had elapsed without respondent filing and is a remedy of last recourse. The Court has often reminded members of the
an appeal. On May 25, 2000, the MCTC issued an order directing the issuance of a bench and bar that this extraordinary action lies only where there is no appeal nor
writ of execution. On October 19, 2000, the MCTC issued the writ of execution in plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It cannot be
both civil cases. allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of
On February 12, 2001, respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the that remedy, certiorari not being a substitute for a lapsed or lost appeal.3 Where an
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the RTC, Ilagan, Isabela. The petition, docketed appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave
as Civil Case No. 1168, prayed for the annulment of the May 25, 2000 MCTC order abuse of discretion.4 Also, generally, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed
SPECPRO 62
RULE 64 & 65

with the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary writ of certiorari since a
motion for reconsideration is still considered an adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. The rationale for the filing of a motion for reconsideration is to give
an opportunity to the lower court to correct its imputed errors. Generally, only when
a motion for reconsideration has been filed and subsequently denied can petitioner
avail of the remedy of the writ of certiorari.5
In the instant case, respondent filed a petition for certiorari to annul the May 25,
2000 Order directing the issuance of a writ of execution subsequently issued on
October 19, 2000. While it is true that no appeal may be taken from an order of
execution,6 certiorari, however, is not the only available remedy to respondent. He
could have easily filed with the MCTC a motion to quash said order and the writ of
execution on grounds stated in the petition for certiorari, to allow the MCTC the
opportunity to correct its imputed errors. Before invoking the certiorari jurisdiction
of the RTC, respondent should have waited for the MCTC to resolve the matters
raised in the motion to quash the writ of execution and to deny said motion. This
respondent failed to do. The records do not indicate that respondent was barred
from filing a motion to quash the order and writ of execution for reasons other than
his own omission. Respondent has only himself to blame for immediately resorting
to the filing of a petition for certiorari without first availing of the other reliefs
provided by law. Thus, the petition for certiorari filed with the RTC should have been
dismissed outright for being an inappropriate remedy.1avvphil.net
Assuming without conceding that the petition for certiorari is the only available
recourse to respondent, the petition should be dismissed just the same for having
been filed out of time. Respondent filed the petition for certiorari on February 12,
2001, or more than three months after the writ of execution was issued.
Undoubtedly, the belated filing of the petition for certiorari was fatal to respondent’s
cause.
Certiorari being an extraordinary remedy, the party who seeks to avail of the same
must strictly observe the rule laid down by law.7 The New Rules on Civil Procedure,
in Section 4, Rule 65 thereof, prescribes a period of 60 days within which to file a
petition for certiorari. The 60-day period is deemed reasonable and sufficient time
for a party to mull over and prepare a petition asserting grave abuse of discretion
by a lower court. The period was specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay
that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their
case. For these reasons, the 60-day period ought to be considered inextendible.8
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The November 22,
2001 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Ilagan, Isabela in Civil Case No.
1168 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and its Order dated July 6, 2001 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
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RULE 64 & 65

G.R. No. 167726 July 20, 2006 The House Disciplinary Board, after hearing, found Villanueva guilty as charged and
ROBERTO M. VILLANUEVA, petitioner, suspended him for one (1) year without pay with a stern warning that any infraction
vs. in the future will be dealt with more severely.11 However, acting on Villanueva's
COURT OF APPEALS and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Represented by motion for reconsideration, the House Disciplinary Board increased the penalty to
ROBERTO P. AZCUNA, NAZARENO, in his capacity as Secretary dismissal with forfeiture of all benefits.12
General, respondents. Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. affirmed the latter Decision of the House Disciplinary
DECISION Board in a Resolution13 dated 5 October 2000. Villanueva moved for a
TINGA, J.: reconsideration of the Decision but this was denied by Speaker Feliciano Belmonte,
Assailed in this Rule 45 Petition for Review1 is the Decision2 dated 27 August 2003 Jr., in a Resolution14 dated 28 May 2001.15
of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 75002, and its Resolution3 dated 29 Villanueva then interposed an appeal before the Civil Service Commission (the
March 2005 denying herein petitioner Roberto M. Villanueva's (Villanueva) Motion Commission) which, on 12 April 2002, modified the penalty to suspension. The
for Reconsideration.4 The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads as dispositive portion of the Commission's Resolution No. 02053616reads as follows:
follows: WHEREFORE, the appeal of Robert[o] M. Villanueva is hereby partly GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the The Commission holds that Villanueva is guilty of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct
Civil Service Commission is (sic) hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the said for which he is meted the penalty of one (1) year suspension. In all other respects,
respondent ORDERED to CEASE AND DESIST from implementing the same. The the decisions appealed from are affirmed.
Decision of the House of Representatives Disciplinary Board dated 07 June 2000 is Considering that Villanueva has been out of the service for more than the imposed
hereby REINSTATED, and respondent Villanueva is ORDERED DISMISSED from suspension, he should now be reinstated to his former position. It is understood that
the service with forfeiture of all benefits. this reinstatement shall not carry with it the payment of back salaries and other
No Costs. entitlements, for he is not totally exonerated.17
SO ORDERED.5 In its motion for reconsideration, the House prayed for the re-imposition of the
The antecedents are as follows: penalty of dismissal on Villanueva. For his part, Villanueva moved for partial
On 24 November 1997, Villanueva, married man and the Legislative Assistant II of reconsideration, seeking that he be awarded his benefits for the period of January
the Cashiering and Administrative Records Division of the House of Representatives 1999 to February 2001. The Commission denied both motions in Resolution No.
(the House), was charged with Grave Misconduct, Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct 02149218 dated 18 November 2002, a copy of which the House received on 21
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service before the House Disciplinary Board. November 2002.19
The charges were based on an entry in the Official Log Book as well as a Spot In a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure filed
Inspection Report accomplished, respectively, by Frederick Maramba (Maramba) on 20 January 2003 before the Court of Appeals, the House ascribed grave abuse of
and Orencio Castillo (Castillo), both security officers of the House who were on discretion to the Commission for reducing the penalty to a mere suspension.
regular roving patrol duty on the night of 16 October 1997. Their routine inspection In its challenged Decision, the Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari
tour included Room 305, Northwing Building, Office of Representative Constantino and sustained the Decision of the House Disciplinary Board dismissing Villanueva.
H. Navarro, Jr., of the First District of Surigao Del Norte.6 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court of Appeals emphasized the similarity of the
Maramba and Castillo narrated that when they came upon said office at around 9:30 factual circumstances of the case at bar with Dicdican v. Fernan, Jr.,20 wherein the
of that night, they saw Villanueva, a married man7 and a female asleep on the couch, Court dismissed the court personnel found guilty of disgraceful and immoral
both naked, with the woman's arm resting on Villanueva's body. The female was conduct.21 The appellate court stated that adherence to case law dictates the
later identified as Elizabeth Navarro-Arguelles (Navarro-Arguelles), Representative imposition of a similar penalty for the similar offense in the case at bar. Otherwise,
Navarro's daughter and confidential assistant, herself a married woman.8 the Court would be imposing on judicial employees more stringent standards than
Villanueva's immediate supervisor, Jose Ma. Antonio B. Tuano, Chief of the employees of the Legislature or the Executive.22
Cashiering and Administrative Records Division, lodged the complaint against the The appellate court likewise pointed out that the Commission gravely erred in failing
former.9 Incidentally, no charges were filed against Navarro-Arguelles as the House to recognize the gravity of Villanueva's misconduct, stressing that Villanueva not
Disciplinary Board has no jurisdiction over confidential assistants of only disregarded his marriage vows but also exhibited total disrespect of the marital
Representatives.10 status of Elizabeth Navarro-Arguelles.23
SPECPRO 64
RULE 64 & 65

Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that Villanueva's offense relates to his official According to the Rules, the House had fifteen (15) days, or until 6 December 2002,
functions as it was made possible precisely by his official functions. By virtue of his to perfect an appeal which apparently, it did not do. Instead, it filed a petition for
position, Villanueva had free rein inside the building even after office hours. Clearly, certiorari under Rule 65 to make up for the lost remedy of appeal.38
therefore, Villanueva used his office to commit the misconduct for which he was The Court finds merit in the petition.
charged,24 it concluded. At the outset, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to the
Finally, the appellate court disclosed its desire to improve the public regard of the House's petition for certiorari as it was filed in lieu of an appeal which is the
government sector by safeguarding morality in the ranks.25 prescribed remedy. Section 5, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states
The Court of Appeals likewise denied Villanueva's Motion for that final orders or resolutions of the Commission are appealable to the Court of
Reconsideration.26 Thus, Villanueva filed the instant petition. Appeals through a petition for review. However, instead of availing of the remedy of
In the instant petition, Villanueva insists that the appellate court did not have appeal, the House resorted to the wrong remedy of certiorari.
jurisdiction over the House's petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules Notably, the House received the assailed resolution of the Commission on 21
of Civil Procedure as it was a substitute for lost appeal. 27 Villanueva also maintains November 2002, and thus it had until 6 December 2002 or fifteen (15) days after,
that the Commission acted well within the confines of its jurisdiction when it imposed to file an appeal. Despite the sufficient time, the House allowed the period to elapse
the penalty prescribed by law for disgraceful and immoral conduct.28 Villanueva and instead filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on 20 January 2003, close to
likewise contends that the Dicdican adjudication finds no application in the instant two (2) months after its receipt of the resolution. Failing to undertake an appeal,
case as it was arrived at in the Court's exercise of its administrative jurisdiction over the House interposed a special civil action of certiorari. Evidently, the House
its personnel.29 Further, Villanueva points out that his misconduct is in no way intended to make up for the lost remedy of appeal and substituted it with a petition
connected with his official functions and it cannot thus be equated with grave for certiorari under Rule 65.
misconduct as defined by law.30 Settled is the rule that a special civil action of certiorari is not a substitute for a lost
In its Comment,31 the House contends that an appeal from the decision of the or lapsed remedy of appeal.39 As the Court aptly held in David v. Cordova,40 to wit:
Commission would not constitute a speedy and adequate remedy thus necessitating x x x x Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will
the resort to the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65. The House reasons that the not be entertained. The remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and
decision of the Commission was immediately executory and its execution would not certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is
have been stayed by an ordinary appeal.32 The House also maintains that the ruling not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one's own negligence or
of the appellate court is in accordance with law and jurisprudence, particularly error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites
the Dicdican case. The House argues that employees of the legislature, just like of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
employees of the judiciary, should be subject to the same exacting standards of remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground
morality and decency in their professional and private conduct.33 therefor[e] is grave abuse of discretion.41
Lastly, the House posits that since Villanueva was found guilty of Grave Misconduct, That appeals to the Court of Appeals do not stop the execution of decisions of the
Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Commission is not sufficient justification for resorting to the remedy of certiorari. As
Service, dismissal indeed is the appropriate penalty.34 correctly pointed out by Villanueva, the execution of the decision of the Commission
In his Reply,35 Villanueva maintains, among other things, that even if an appeal may be stayed if the House applies for and the appellate court so issues a restraining
before the Court of Appeals does not stop the execution of the Commission's order or an injunction.42 This thus enunciates the reality that, under the
Decision the House could have applied for a restraining order or injunction to stay circumstances, an appeal from the decision of the Commission was an adequate and
it,36 noting that Section 82, Rule VI of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in speedy remedy foreclosing the need for a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.
the Civil Service37 provides, thus: As the House failed to file a timely appeal, the Court of Appeals should have denied
Section 82. Effect of Pendency of Petition for Review/Certiorari with the outright its petition for certiorari. Moreover, even if such petition was not
Court. — The filing and pendency of a petition for review with the Court of Appeals procedurally flawed, still and all, it was bereft of merit and the appellate court erred
or certiorari with the Supreme Court shall not stop the execution of the final decision in granting it.
of the Commission unless the Court issues a restraining order or an injunction. First, the appellate court erred when it concurred with the House's contention that
Moreover, Villanueva points out that the House could have easily availed of the Villanueva's offense should be classified as grave misconduct.
remedy of appeal under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The House Following a string of precedents, Amosco v. Magro43 defines misconduct in this wise:
received a copy of the assailed resolution of the Commission on 21 November 2002.
SPECPRO 65
RULE 64 & 65

Misconduct in office has a definite and well understood legal meaning. By uniform accordance with law and no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed to it contrary
legal definition, it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as to the appellate court's finding.
an officer and not such only as affects his character as a private individual…. It is Moreover, we do not agree with the appellate court's ruling that Dicdican should be
settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal from the controlling precedent such that the penalty of dismissal should be imposed in
office of an officer, must have direct relation to and be connected with the the instant case.
performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, As correctly pointed out by Villanueva, when the Supreme Court acts on complaints
intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office.44 against judges or any of the personnel under its supervision and control, it acts as
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or personnel administrator imposing discipline and not as a court judging justiciable
standard of behavior, especially by a government official. To constitute an controversies.49
administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the In Dicdican, the Court sanctioned its errant personnel according to what it believed
performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave to be the commensurate punishment. We deemed it wise to impose more stringent
misconduct as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, standards primarily to show that we are serious in policing our ranks. We imposed
clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be punishment in Dicdican as we deemed it proper, according to our own policies, but
manifest. Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an not without the guidance of the rules in the civil service. In this case, however, we
official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or are not acting as a personnel administrator but rather as the adjudicative appellate
character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty tribunal of last resort reviewing the decisions of lower courts. It is our responsibility
and the rights of others. 45 to confirm whether the lower courts upheld the law. The law in this case clearly
In the present case, Villanueva's offense was in no way connected with the states that the proper penalty is suspension and not dismissal as held by the
performance of his functions and duties as a public officer. Sure, his office was used appellate court, hence, suspension it must be.
as a venue for the commission of the offense and definitely, his offense speaks WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 27 August 2003 of the
despicably of his character as a man but it in no way evinced any failure on his part Court of Appeals in C.A.- G.R. SP No. 75002 and its Resolution dated 29 March 2005
to discharge his duties as a public officer. Yes, Villanueva's offense is gravely denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
immoral and reprehensible but it falls short of grave misconduct as defined by law. Resolution No. 020536 dated 12 April 2002 and Resolution No. 021492 dated 18
To determine whether a public officer committed misconduct, it is necessary to November 2002 of the Civil Service Commission are AFFIRMED and REINSTATED.
separate the character of the man from the character of the officer. 46 Here, SO ORDERED.
Villanueva's transgression laid bare the values of his inner being but did not expose
any of his shortcoming as a public officer. Who Villanueva is and what he believes
in are inconsequential in concluding whether his misdemeanor amounts to
misconduct. Rather, what is material is whether Villanueva properly discharged his
public functions which we believe in no way was compromised or affected by the
commission of his offense.
However, as correctly found by the Commission, we believe that Villanueva is guilty
of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct for having engaged in an illicit affair. In a catena
of cases, the Court has ruled that government employees engaged in illicit relations
are guilty of "disgraceful and immoral conduct" for which he/she may be held
administratively liable.47
According to Section 22 (o), Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V
of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Section 52 A (15) of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,48 the first offense of Disgraceful and
Immoral Conduct is punishable by suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to
one (1) year. A second offense is punishable by dismissal.
As Villanueva is a first-time offender, the proper penalty is suspension. The
Commission therefore correctly meted out said penalty. It clearly acted in
SPECPRO 66
RULE 64 & 65

G.R. No. 157075 July 17, 2006 Nonetheless, the auction sale pushed through on 29 November 1985, with Ramcar
RAMCAR, INCORPORATED, petitioner, emerging as the highest bidder.11 After the period to redeem the property had
vs. expired, Ramcar caused the transfer of the certificate of title to its name. Thus, on
HI-POWER MARKETING, LEONIDAS D. BOHOL, and RHODORA A. 11 February 1987, TCT No. 354635 was issued in favor of Ramcar in place of the
BOHOL, respondents. old certificate of title in the name of Bohol.12 On 4 May 1987, Ramcar filed a Petition
DECISION for a Writ of Possession with the RTC of Quezon City, docketed as LRC Case No. Q-
TINGA, J.: 3696.13
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari filed by Ramcar, Incorporated (Ramcar), Almost one year later, the decision on the appeal by the spouses Bohol in CA-G.R.
raising the same questions of fact passed upon by both the lower court1 and the CV No. 11496 was promulgated on 8 March 1988. The CA declared that the main
Court of Appeals. issue to be threshed out was whether there was indeed default in payment on the
The antecedents are as follows: part of the spouses Bohol.14 This issue was not thoroughly passed upon by the trial
Respondent Leonidas Bohol (Bohol) is a distributor of Ramcar products in Quezon court. Thus, the CA found the need to remand the case for further hearing on the
City and San Pablo City using the business name Hi-Power Marketing. question of default. It held:
On 4 March 1982, Ramcar and Bohol entered into a loan agreement whereby Ramcar Since default was the principal ground relied upon for the foreclosure of mortgage,
allotted P300,000.00 as a trade credit line for the batteries to be distributed by RAMCAR was called upon to prove it and it was absolutely necessary to make a
Bohol, and released another P300,000.00 as a straight loan to the latter.2 To secure finding that there was in fact a default. While the parties opted to submit the case
the payment of the loan, Bohol executed a Real Estate Mortgage3 over a parcel of upon position papers, the latter unfortunately did not provide any clarification. On
land and its improvements covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. the contrary, the parties presented positions seriously at odds with each other, and
285976.4 Bohol also signed an undated promissory note5 stipulating the schedule of the issue remained as murky as it was before the submission of the papers.
payments and the breakdown of the principal amount and the interest to be paid. RAMCAR's brief is not of any assistance either; it merely reiterates the amount
Subsequently, on the premise that Bohol had defaulted on his loan, Ramcar stated in its application for foreclosure and contains no explanation of the issues.
petitioned the sheriff of Quezon City to foreclose the mortgage to satisfy an There was therefore urgent need to receive evidence, from the Bohols, that they
indebtedness of P370,429.42 plus interest. The auction sale was set on 6 July 1984.6 might prove their claim of overpayment, from RAMCAR, that it might establish not
On 3 July 1984, Bohol and his wife (spouses Bohol) filed a Petition for Prohibition only the fact of default but also the particular loan availment it sought to satisfy with
with Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, the aborted foreclosure. The decision was clearly premature.15
Branch 101, docketed as Special Civil Action No. Q-42032, to prevent the sheriff As both Civil Case No. Q-46683 (verified complaint for the extinguishment of Bohol's
from conducting the auction sale. The RTC issued a status quo order on 4 July 1984, obligation) and LRC Case No. Q-3697 (for ex-parte issuance of a writ of possession
thereby temporarily averting the scheduled sale.7 in favor of Ramcar) were pending at the time Special Civil Action No. Q-42032 was
After trial, finding that Bohol had defaulted in the performance of his obligation, the ordered remanded to the trial court, and there being interrelated issues, the three
RTC rendered its decision dismissing the petition for prohibition. The spouses Bohol cases were consolidated before RTC Branch 101, Quezon City.16
filed a Motion for Reconsideration and For New Trial8which was denied by the RTC After trial and reception of the parties' respective evidence, the RTC in a
on 4 November 1985.9 They then appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), with the Decision17 dated 19 January 1999 ruled in favor of Ramcar, finding that Bohol had
appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 11496. an outstanding unpaid obligation in the amount of P370,959.62. It also declared the
While the case was pending before the CA, Ramcar requested the Office of the Sheriff extrajudicial foreclosure valid and consequently affirmed the validity of the transfer
of Quezon City to proceed with the implementation of the extrajudicial foreclosure of Bohol's property to Ramcar.18
in view of the dismissal of the petition for prohibition of the spouses Bohol. A notice Bohol went up to the CA with the appeal docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52593. The
of sheriff's sale was issued and published for three consecutive weeks in a CA reversed the RTC decision, declared the obligation of the spouses Bohol to
newspaper of general circulation. Ramcar extinguished by payment, and the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
On 28 November 1985, or the day before the scheduled auction sale, the spouses mortgage null and void. The appellate court also set aside the writ of possession
Bohol and Hi-Power Marketing filed a case against Ramcar before the RTC, docketed issued in favor of Ramcar, cancelled the latter's TCT No. 354635, and reinstated
as Civil Case No. Q-46683, praying that their obligation be declared extinguished Bohol's TCT No. 285976. The CA ruled:
and their property released from the mortgage on the ground that they have already
overpaid their account.10
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RULE 64 & 65

The pivotal question in these cases is whether the Bohols were in default in the In this case, although Ramcar alleged in its Petition that the CA committed grave
payment of their loan obligation to Ramcar at the time Ramcar foreclosed the abuse of discretion, it did not in any manner show how the appellate court committed
mortgage on the Bohol['s] property. x x x such abuse. It is an empty allegation bereft of any substantiation.
xxxx The original action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of
From comparison of the two sets of computations, it appears the Bohols had paid to the court prior to appeal from the judgment or where there is no appeal or any other
Ramcar more than the amount that Ramcar is seeking to collect from them. The plain, speedy or adequate remedy.23 There was a plain, speedy or adequate remedy
reason for this is that the Bohols had shown payments and deliveries that were not available to Ramcar. It could and should have filed an appeal assailing the Decision
taken into consideration by Ramcar when it computed the account of the Bohols. of the CA.
Ramcar failed to prove that the amounts paid by the Bohols, as reflected by the It is worth mentioning that Ramcar received the Resolution of the CA denying its
Exhibits C to G, were already credited to them in the statement of account Exhibit Motion for Reconsideration on 23 December 2002.24 Ramcar filed its Petition for
18, which in turn was the basis for the extrajudicial foreclosure. Resultantly, the Certiorari on 21 February 2003 or sixty (60) days after receipt of the Resolution.
Bohols had overpaid the mortgaged obligation and may not, therefore, be Since Ramcar failed to appeal within fifteen (15) days from its receipt of the
considered in default. The extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings instituted against Resolution, the decision of the CA had become final and executory. It is well-settled
them lacks legal basis and its consequences must be rectified accordingly in the that the filing of the petition for certiorari cannot serve as a substitute for the lost
interest of justice.19 remedy of appeal.25 Where the issue or question involves or affects the wisdom or
Ramcar filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the CA in its legal soundness of the decision—not the jurisdiction of the court to render said
Resolution dated 22 November 2002.20 decision—the same is beyond the province of a petition for certiorari.26
On 21 February 2003, Ramcar filed this Petition for Certiorari against the spouses The fact that this Petition for Certiorari raises questions of fact further militates
Bohol and Hi-Power Marketing alleging that the CA committed grave abuse of against it. In Day v. RTC of Zamboanga City, Br. XIII,27 the Court held that in an
discretion: (1) in refusing to consider the evidence of Ramcar showing that Bohol original action for certiorari, questions of fact cannot be raised much less passed
still has an outstanding balance on his loan; and (2) in reversing the final order of upon by the respondent court. Only established or admitted facts can be
the RTC granting the writ of possession in favor of Ramcar. considered.28
Ramcar contends that Bohol, by means of double crediting and wrong posting, made In any case, even if we dispense with the technicalities and reevaluate the questions
it appear that he has already fully paid the obligation. Ramcar also questions the of fact raised by Ramcar as an exception29 to the general rule that such questions
nullification of the extrajudicial sale, contending that the legal requirements were cannot be reviewed by this Court, the petition should still be dismissed.
observed by the sheriff in proceeding with the sale. The CA, in ruling for the spouses Bohol, held that:
The spouses Bohol, in their Comment,21 assert that the instant petition is not the The Bohols on the other hand, sought to establish overpayment with figures
proper remedy as the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in rendering the contained in: (1) their summaries, Exhibit C, D, E of deliveries of wooden crates to
assailed Decision. They also refute the allegation of Ramcar that they have not fully Ramcar with supporting delivery receipts, (2) list of credit memos, Exhibit F, issued
paid the loaned amount. After a lengthy discussion of the facts of the case and the by Ramcar to Bohol showing discounts and price adjustments given to the Bohols,
computations made by the CA, they posit that the documents on record clearly show with supporting credit memos; and (3) cash payments, Exhibit G., with official
that they have already fulfilled their obligation to Ramcar. Further, they submit that receipts showing remittances to Ramcar. In the hearing on August 11, 1995, as
the documents which Ramcar attached to its petition have not been presented before appearing on page 17 of the transcript, the trial court directed the petitioners to
the RTC, are utterly self-serving, and should not be accorded any probative value. underline the entries in their records of payments and deliveries which were not
Ultimately, the issue to be decided in this case is whether Bohol has already satisfied credited to them by Ramcar. In compliance, they made undelinings in Exhibit C, D,
his obligation to Ramcar in full. E, F and G. They also presented two more statements, Exhibit H and I, which were
The present petition must be dismissed for failure of Ramcar to prove that the CA supposed to reflect additional credit memos and payments to Ramcar, but because
committed grave abuse of discretion. A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the these were not supported by evidence, unlike the previous statements, we chose to
correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or ignore them. x x x x30
excess of jurisdiction. The writ cannot be used for any other purpose as its function It is significant to note that the CA closely analyzed and discussed the merits of the
is limited to keeping the inferior courts within the bounds of its jurisdiction. 22 case, taking into consideration the alleged double crediting and wrong posting of
Bohol. It concluded, after weighing the respective evidence adduced by the parties,
that Bohol has fully satisfied his obligation to Ramcar. In fact, according to the CA,
SPECPRO 68
RULE 64 & 65

Bohol even made excess payments to Ramcar. The CA extensively computed the
statements of account and the receipts presented and found that Bohol should
prevail in the present dispute.
In contrast, the trial court's decision is bereft of any meaningful evaluation of the
evidence choosing instead merely to replicate the allegations of the various parties
particularly the calculations offered by Ramcar.
It should also be stressed that in the instant petition, Ramcar neither denied the
veracity of the receipts and credit memos Bohol presented to the lower court nor
effectively repudiated these documents. Ramcar merely claims wrong posting on the
part of Bohol in arriving at a conclusion of overpayment. While Ramcar questions
the CA's finding of overpayment by Bohol, it did not focus its petition on this issue
but gave a protracted and irrelevant discussion regarding the redemption of a
mortgaged property.
Ramcar also presented to this Court annexes "F", "G" and "H" showing the
breakdown of purchases Bohol had made from January 1982 to August 1983, the
alleged payments made by Bohol from February 1982 to October 1983, and the
credit memos issued by Ramcar thru offsetting from February 1982 to February
1984, respectively. These documents tend to prove that Bohol still has an
outstanding balance. However, as correctly pointed out by Bohol, the annexes were
not presented before the RTC in Ramcar's Formal Offer of Evidence31
and the person who prepared the documents did not authenticate the documents in
court. The Court cannot even determine the identity of the person who prepared the
documents as only the signature was affixed to the lower right hand corner of each
page of the documents.
Our rule on evidence provides the procedure on how to present documentary
evidence before the court, as follows: firstly, the documents should be authenticated
and proved in the manner provided in the rules of court; secondly, the documents
should be identified and marked; and thirdly, it should be formally offered to the
court and shown to the opposing party so that the latter may have the opportunity
to object thereto.32
We have carefully examined the documentary evidence presented by the parties in
the RTC and the CA and found that the documents now being presented by Ramcar,
i.e. the purchases of Hi-Power Marketing, payments of battery account, and credit
memos issued by Ramcar applied to Hi-Power Market thru offsetting were not part
of the records in the lower court or the appellate court. They were submitted for the
first time to this Court. This being the case, we shall not take them into account.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the Court of Appeals committed neither grave
abuse of discretion nor any error in judgment in rendering the assailed Decision.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated 28 June 2002 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

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