doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9299.2012.02068.

RESPONSES TO MANAGERIALISM:
HOW MANAGEMENT PRESSURES AFFECT
MANAGERIAL RELATIONS AND LOYALTIES
IN EDUCATION

MIRKO NOORDEGRAAF AND BAS DE WIT

Management pressures in fields like education force managers to control professionals. This
generates friction. Professionals will not easily comply with control objectives; they feel responsible
for clients and quality. Researchers have studied how professionals are affected and how they resist
managerial interference. How managers themselves are affected by managerialism, whether they
adopt control logics and are ‘driven away’ from work floors, is hardly studied. This paper studies
how school managers relate to managerialism and whether they are primarily loyal to managerial
agendas, or to professional workers and clients. On the basis of a qualitative study, we conclude that
school managers are important mediators of managerialism. They feel loyal to performance pressures,
but also to teachers and pupils. How they act in specific situations depends on how they deal with
this friction within managerial work.

INTRODUCTION
In service sectors like education, governance mechanisms were introduced in order to
decentralize service systems and to grant autonomies to organizations. In addition, service
organizations like schools were ‘managerialized’. They have to focus on efficiency, outputs
and performances in order to produce value for money and account for their actions (e.g.,
Møller 2009). This explains the rise of public and non-profit managers, who must manage
service organizations in reformed service systems.
It is frequently suggested that service managers are ‘detached’ and ‘driven away’
from professionals at work floors, such as teachers (e.g., Sachs 2001; Deal and Peterson
2009). Public management reforms are said to increase friction, conflicts, and ‘clashes’
between managers and professionals. Managers focus on costs, efficiency, and results;
whereas professionals value autonomy, clients, and quality (e.g., Exworthy and Halford
1999; Farrell and Morris 2003; Noordegraaf 2007). We hardly know, however, whether
conflicts between control and client logics are really widespread and worrisome. Although
there are critical reflections upon how professional work, motivations, identities, and
autonomies are affected by a growing efficiency logic (e.g., Exworthy and Halford 1999;
Freidson 2001; Broadbent and Laughlin 2002), we also have empirical evidence that
professionals are able to cope with reforms (e.g., Ackroyd et al. 2007; Waring and Currie
2009). In addition, we have empirical proof of the complexities of manager–professional
relations (e.g., Exworthy and Halford 1999; Gleeson and Shain 1999; Reed 2002; Farrell
and Morris 2003; Noordegraaf 2007). ‘Hybrid’ workers (e.g., Noordegraaf 2007), including
‘managerial professionals’ (e.g., Exworthy and Halford 1999), work in-between managerial
and professional logics. Managers themselves, moreover, might also play hybrid roles.
They might protect professional values, for example by performing ‘custodial’ roles
(Ackroyd et al. 1989).

Mirko Noordegraaf and Bas de Wit are at the Utrecht School of Governance, Utrecht University, The Netherlands.

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MA 02148, USA.
958 MIRKO NOORDEGRAAF AND BAS DE WIT

This emphasis on hybridity relates to well-known insights on the ambiguities of man-

agerial work, especially of middle managers who work in-between organizational levels
(e.g., Floyd and Wooldridge 1994; Currie and Procter 2005). Managerialism, however, rad-
icalizes the ‘in-betweenness’ of all service managers. Managers not only work in-between
higher level executives and lower level staff; they also work in-between organizations and
environments, performance pressures, and professional autonomies, as well as external
demands and internal constraints, such as increasing numbers of clients and declining
resources (e.g., Thomas and Linstead 2002; Dopson and Fitzgerald 2006; Ainsworth et al.
2009). ‘There may be a tendency to understate the difficulty faced by public managers in
transforming professional work practices in a context of rising demands on services and
declining resources’ (Kitchener et al. 2002, p. 229).
It is still largely unclear how managers respond. In this paper, we study how manage-
rialism affects school managers’ relations and analyze whether they feel hybrid and act as
hybrids. By emphasizing the concept of loyalty (e.g., Oglensky 2008) we will not only show
how new relations are ‘forced upon’ school managers, but also which special relations,
which affective and normative allegiances are important. Empirically, we focus on (Dutch)
school managers in secondary education.
First, we analyze reform tendencies in education and we explain why public managers
can be seen as hybrid reform agents. Next, we frame relations between managerialism,
managers, and professionals as a matter of loyalties and loyalty conflicts. After we have
discussed our research set-up, we present our research findings on changing loyalties and
loyalty conflicts in (Dutch) secondary education. Finally, we draw conclusions about the
role of managerial loyalties in shaping responses to managerialism.

GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT: MANAGED GOVERNANCE

Before we focus on school managers and their changing loyalties, we need to explore
which reforms have been initiated and implemented in (Western) countries in order to
improve educational systems. Reforms will affect the webs of obligations and relations
that make up managers’ work.
Since the 1980s, relations between central governments and policy fields have changed.
Instead of a strong government-based policy grip on service delivery, services had to be
governed in more horizontal and interactive ways. Policy-making and service delivery in
fields like education had to be produced by multi-party networks (e.g., Newman 2005).
In countries where schools had become entangled in government-based financial and
policy regimes, they were granted autonomy to provide good education (e.g., Mulford
2003; Ranson 2003). Within schools, shared decision making is emphasized, as different
stakeholders (teaching staff, parents) were introduced in decision processes (Pont et al.
2008). Furthermore, schools are expected to extend their ‘social tasks’, i.e. to focus on
safety and social cohesion, moral development, citizenship, culture, sports, and exercise
(SCP 2008). All the more, schools are stimulated to form stakeholders networks and
establish collaborative services (see Hopkins and Higham 2007; Pont et al. 2008).
At the same time, these new governance regimes have to be managed. Since the 1980s, the
‘new public management’, backed by the ideology of managerialism, left its businesslike
traces. In education, decentralization and autonomy were combined with an emphasis on
accountability for school outcomes and the performance of teachers and students (Møller
2009; see also Gleeson and Husbands 2001; Pont et al. 2008).

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This double movement of managed governance resulted in expanded roles and intensified
responsibilities of school managers (Pont et al. 2008) and produced institutional effects.
Executives and managers have become prominent agents, as they are held responsible
for quality criteria, financial soundness, and transparency. School principals-as-managers
are expected to take on managerial tasks, handle strategic resources, improve teacher
quality, build coalitions with external partners, and engage in quality management and
public reporting (Townsend 2007). Increasingly, these executives and managers are seen
as educational leaders (e.g., Bush, 2003; Hallinger, 2003). Professionals still remain relevant
to provide high-quality services, but their positions have become pressured. Helping
clients is no longer enough, especially as costs, capacities, and (external) connections have
become yardsticks for judging performance.
This means that executives and managers have become important agents, operating
in expanding and changing relational networks. Their roles are intrinsically hybrid,
however (Wallace 2003). It is unclear whether (and why) they serve governance systems or
management control objectives, and it is unclear whether and how they link (management)
systems to organizations, professionals, and clients.

CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONTROL AND CLIENTS?

Backed by classic distinctions, such as between bureaucracy and professionalism (Hall
1968; Benson 1973), researchers have focused on conflicts between organizational con-
trol and professional autonomy, and clashes between managers and professionals (e.g.,
Exworthy and Halford 1999; Farrell and Morris 2003; Kirkpatrick et al. 2005; Noordegraaf
2007, 2011; Diefenbach 2009). Although these conflicts might be clear and worrisome,
for example when researchers show that managers are ‘driven away’ from work floors
and professionals (e.g., Broadbent and Laughlin 2002), many researchers have stressed
the complexities, subtleties, and intricacies of manager–professional relations. Organiza-
tional/professional distinctions might be too dualistic to understand professional services
(cf. Noordegraaf 2011).
Many researchers have focused on professional action within systems of managed gov-
ernance. They have shown how professionals might become ‘managerial professionals’,
i.e. professional workers who also have managerial tasks, such as medical managers
(Exworthy and Halford 1999; Gleeson and Shain 1999; Llewellyn 2001; Reed 2002; Causer
et al. 2003; Farrell and Morris 2003; Noordegraaf 2007). Other researchers have shown
how normal professionals, and especially ‘strong’ professionals like medical doctors, can
apply defence mechanisms to resist or counter outside interference and filter management
reforms (Shain and Gleeson 1999; Kitchener et al. 2002; Kirkpatrick et al. 2005; Thomas and
Davies 2005; Ackroyd et al. 2007). Some researchers have shown how professionals might
use management systems, such as safety systems, to gain competitive advantage vis-à-vis
managers (e.g., Waring and Currie 2009).
Other researchers have focused on what is happening ‘on the other side’; they focus on
how managers are affected by reforms. Building upon more traditional insights on middle
managers, which stress the duality of managerial roles (e.g., Johnson and Frohman 1989;
Floyd and Wooldridge 1994), researchers have highlighted changing roles and increasing
role ambiguities of modern public managers (e.g., Thomas and Dunkerley 1999; Briggs
2005; Currie and Procter 2005; Dopson and Fitzgerald 2006; Pandey and Wright 2006).
They have shown how (middle) managers are not only caught in-between organizational
levels, or centralized supervisory regimes and decentralized professional work spheres

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(e.g., Currie and Procter 2005). They have also shown how managers increasingly perform
hybrid roles, in-between businesslike performance systems and professional autonomies,
commercial and professional values, and organizations and environments (e.g., Spillane
et al. 2002; Ainsworth et al. 2009). Many researchers study whether and how managers take
sides–whether they defend professionals, or not. By performing ‘custodial’ roles (Ackroyd
et al. 1989), they might protect professional values (see also, e.g., Gleeson and Shain 1999;
Ackroyd et al. 2007).
In addition, researchers have highlighted role transitions and the process of acquir-
ing managerial identities (e.g., Thomas and Linstead 2002; Thomas and Davies 2005).
Researchers have shown how managers ‘construct a sense of who they are’ (cf. Cunliffe
2001, p. 351) and how middle managers deal with their increasingly ‘equivocal positions’
(Thomas and Linstead 2002, p. 74). The latter authors have shown how middle managers
rely upon different discourses to cope with the uncertainties and insecurities over their
role and status. Furthermore, researchers have studied managerial motivations and com-
mitment (e.g., Moon 2000; Moynihan and Pandey 2007; Dull 2009) and they showed how
managers make sense of management reform (e.g., Mayrowitz 2008; Pedersen and Hartley
2008). Dull, for instance, sees ‘leadership commitment as a factor shaping organizational
responses to reform’ (p. 255). Instead of showing how managers ‘take sides’, researchers
then show how managers face difficulty in taking sides.
Instead of presupposing conflict between organizational and professional logics, we
must analyze actual relations to managerial pressures and how this generates friction
and conflicts in everyday managerial work. This calls for a more robust account of the
in-betweenness of managers in public professional services.

(MANAGERIAL) LOYALTIES
Below we focus on school managers in order to develop this more robust account
of managerial work in times of managed governance. The ‘in-betweenness’ of school
managers is striking; they are expected to manage and lead schools, and to connect
control, classrooms, and communities (Leithwood 2001; Goldring and Greenfield 2002;
Honig and Hatch 2004; Firestone and Shipps 2005; Moos 2005; Ballet 2007). It is important
to analyze how they relate to managerialized educational systems, i.e. how they relate to
managerial pressures, and how they relate pressures to professionalism. We empirically
analyze how managers enact and adapt relations, how they value these relations, and
how these relations are played out in specific situations. From a relational perspective on
managerial work, we analyze how public managers relate to both organizational (control)
and professional (client) logics.
The question we pose is: How do public managers relate to managerialism, how do they
value (changing) work relations, and what are the consequences for managerial actions?
We use the concept of loyalty, as it stresses social relations, the meaning of relations, and
(potential) loyalty conflicts in specific social situations. Loyalty indicates that individuals
might have multiple ‘objects’ of attachment and stresses the affective and normative
dimensions of such attachments. It clarifies which objects have special meaning and what
this means for behaviour (Kleinig 2008; Oglensky 2008); do they choose sides, or not? Do
managers feel ‘torn apart’, or not?

Attitude, conduct, and conflict

Loyalty is a well known research concept in public administration and organizational
sciences. Loyalty to politics is at the heart of research on ministerial responsibility and

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relations between ministers and officials. Civil servants are supposed to carry out orders
from political superiors, even if they disagree personally. Organizational science scholars
mainly focus on how loyalty affects decisions on leaving or staying in organizations.
However, public administration and organizational sciences perspectives on loyalty
hardly focus on relations between (groups of) agents. Therefore, our research builds upon
loyalty research which shows that individuals are embedded in ‘webs of relationships’
(cf. Baxter et al. 1997; Oglensky 2008).
Oglensky (2008, p. 423) defines loyalty as ‘a mode of attachment – a particular way of
connecting . . . through which desire and a sense of obligation to show allegiance and
stand by one’s role partner grows out of and reinforces commitment and fosters relational
continuity’. Loyalty always manifests itself in a specific context in which an individual
relates to different parties (Fletcher 1993). Although this is about ‘objects’ (individuals,
groups, things), loyalty actually focuses on the association or relations with the objects
that are valued (Kleinig 2008, p. 41). Because individuals relate to a number of parties,
they can have a number of loyalties (e.g., Kleinig 2007). However, it is reasonable that
loyalty is based on exclusiveness (Souryal and McKay 1996). Loyalty concentrates on
‘key relationships and associations’, which bear intrinsic value as they are considered as
‘special’ or ‘meaningful’ (Keller 2007; Kleinig 2008). They gradually evolve over time as
a result of previous experiences, as something one ‘grows into’ (cf. Ewin 1992, p. 408;
Fletcher 1993).
Oglensky’s definition shows that loyalty can manifest itself as an attitude as well
as in behaviour (cf. Kleinig 1996). Individuals with a loyal attitude feel attached
(cf. Hirschman 1970). These feelings bear affective and normative meanings (cf. Oglen-
sky 2008). In an affective sense, loyalty requires emotional attachment and devotion;
loyalty points to an instinctive bond with something or someone (e.g., Ewin 1992;
Jeurissen 1997). Loyalty can also follow from a normative sense of duty (Oglensky
2008), for example when individuals feel obliged to compromise relational expectations
(cf. Pfeiffer 1992).
Even though affective and normative meanings are considered as essential foundations
for loyalty, different authors argue that loyalty manifests itself through conduct (e.g.,
Keller 2007; Oglensky 2008). Affective and normative relationships ‘oblige’ individuals to
act in relation to the object of loyalty in ways that can be expected to maintain or further
the interests of that object (Kleinig 2008, p. 50; cf. Baxter et al. 1997; Oglensky 2008). Loyal
behaviour is expressed in perseverance in commitment to the object of loyalty or in the
fulfilment of responsibilities towards that object, even if such perseverance will be costly
or unfavourable (Kleinig 2007, 2008).
Affective and normative dimensions of relationships can cause loyalty conflicts in specific
situations (Baxter et al. 1997; Oglensky 2008). Individuals can feel ‘torn’ between wanting
‘to do well’ and to ‘respect expectations’ on the one hand, and making choices that might
be perceived as ‘breach’, ‘betrayal’, or ‘treason’ on the other hand (Oglensky 2008, p. 432;
cf. Fletcher 1993). When individuals are confronted with incompatible expectations, the
right thing to do (normatively) is not always the same as the strategic thing to do, nor
are these always compatible with what one (affectively) feels inclined to do (Oglensky
2008, p. 433). In case of school managers, for example, this means we should not only
analyze meaningful relations, but also study whether there are multiple meaningful
relations and how they are dealt with – do managers feel conflicts and if so, how do they
cope?

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TABLE 1 Operationalization of loyalty

Loyalty dimensions Specification Illustration

Loyal attitude Affective Emotional attachment, ‘I feel a strong sense of belonging to . . .’

commitment, devotion,
instinctive bond
Normative Felt obligation, sense of duty
Loyal conduct Furthering interests,
perseverance, self-sacrifice
Loyalty conflict Experiences of ‘relationship
breach’, ‘betrayal’, and
‘treason’
‘I have a sense of obligation to. . .’
‘I stick together with . . . , even if other
stakeholders do not agree with me’
‘I frequently worry about the potential
effect of my workplace decisions on. . .’

RESEARCH DESIGN
Our literature study of the concept of loyalty reveals three research themes: loyalty as an
affective and/or normative attitude towards meaningful relationships; loyalty conflicts;
and (dis)loyal behaviour. As these themes have hardly been subjected to empirical
research so far, especially in the face of reforms, an explorative research design was
used to study managerial perceptions of reform and managerial loyalties ‘from within’,
studied by means of qualitative methodology. In order to translate these theoretical
themes into interview topics, which address day-to-day experiences of school managers,
attitude, conduct, and conflict have been operationalized (see table 1 for an overview).
This operationalization was used not only to structure interviews, but also to analyze
research results.
During our empirical phase, 23 school managers in Dutch secondary education were
interviewed. We conducted individual semi-structured interviews with nine school man-
agers; 14 school managers have been interviewed in five group interviews. As we expected
differences between school managers on different management levels, interviewees were
selected through purposive sampling (cf. Patton 2002). We selected school managers on
the basis of their formal position in school organizations. As it proved to be difficult to
reach potential respondents through a general call by the Secondary Education Council
(VO-Raad), we chose to select the remaining school managers by means of the so-called
‘snowball method’ (Miles and Huberman 1994). Eventually, 19 school managers were
willing to participate.
We held interviews with section and team heads, location directors, school heads, as
well as school board members and chairmen of executive boards. The interviews took
between 1 1/2 and 2 hours. All of the interviewed school managers had a lot of experience
in education; more than half of the respondents (61 per cent) have been – or in some
cases still are – teaching. In order to guarantee the representativeness of research results,
i.e. generalizing to management processes (instead of populations; cf. Yin 1989), we tried
to stress variety. We also accounted for certain differences, most specifically distribution
over school types; see table 2 for a rough overview.
In order to compare statements of school managers, we structured interviews by relying
upon interview topics that were derived from our literature study. We focused on two
broad research themes, namely managerialism and loyalty, which we subdivided into
specific interview topics. School managers were asked questions about their relations to
managerial pressures, and about their (changing) relationships with teachers and other
stakeholders. In addition, they were asked questions about specific situations in which

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TABLE 2 Overview of respondents

Type of school Region Total

VMBO HAVO/VWO Combination City Country
VMBO–HAVO–VWO

Executives – – 7 2 5 7
School directors – 7 4 5 6 11
Middle managers 1 1 3 1 4 5
Total 1 8 14 8 15 23

affective and normative relationships were involved, as well as situations in which they
experienced loyalty conflicts. The qualitative research approach enabled us to ask school
managers about ‘the extent to which’ they have experienced changes in relationships.
All interviews were digitally recorded and integrally transcribed. The operationalization
of loyalty in terms of an affective and normative attitude and conduct has been used
to compare differences and similarities between interview statements. Additionally,
statements about the position of school managers and their loyalty conflicts have been
analyzed as separate variables. We tried to reconstruct patterns in interview statements
for each cluster. We addressed possible differences between school managers at different
management levels only in an explorative way.
In the results section of this paper we include citations that express school managers’
opinions. Interviewed middle managers, school leaders, and executives will be referred
to as numbers varying from (r1) to (r23).

RESEARCH RESULTS
We present the outcomes of our explorative study along the lines of our conceptual
argument and the aforementioned research (and interview) topics. First, we will explore
whether and how school managers are affected by managerial pressures and man-
agerialism. Next, we will analyze (changing) loyalties, loyalty conflicts, and coping
behaviour.

Managerial pressures
Many school managers experience profound pressures on their position within school
organizations. They have to lead schools ‘with many issues on their plate’ (r12). Instead
of ‘executing of policy rules from above’, schools have become ‘policy makers’ and ‘key
players’. School managers indicate that they are responsible for important aspects of
school policies and for employer affairs which used to be regulated by laws. School
managers’ positions are not only under pressure as a result of extensive responsibilities
and decision making powers. As a result of multiple ‘social tasks’ that are transferred to
schools, school managers feel forced to ‘(re)position themselves towards complex issues
from time to time’ (r23). School managers frequently mention changes that affect teachers
and their work, such as the introduction of social training for pupils, the obligation to
realize 1040 teaching hours, or extra support in order to reduce drop-out rates.
In our school there is a tendency to restrict the agenda. Simultaneously, however, we are the gateway
through which wishes or pressures enter the school. We are expected to do something with it. We cannot
say: ‘we do not do it’ or ‘we do not pay attention to it’. We have to define our position. And that position
must be translated internally. (r22)

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In other words, school managers are expected to make judgements about the nature
and limits of policy measures and whether measures are legitimate.
Pressures on positions of school managers are accompanied by pressures on teacher-
school manager relationships.
Certainly, it is new that school leaders are blamed for determining teaching periods, for example, while in
former days the Ministry was blamed for it. Heavy demands are placed on school managers. (r4)

Furthermore, fulfilling a so-called ‘social task’ leads to ‘strong internal resistance’ on the
side of teachers, who are convinced that safety and social cohesion, moral development,
citizenship, culture, sports, and exercise for instance are ‘not a task of schools’ (r22).
Teachers blame school managers for ‘taking sides with national politics (r17), while school
managers at the same time complain about government policies which ‘preserve societal
images of powerful educational managers’ (r16) and ‘do not fit school reality’ (r18).

School managers’ loyalties

Affective and normative relations
During their daily work school managers relate to various groups and persons to whom
they would like to behave loyally. School managers indicate that loyalty is ‘inherent’ in
their work (r12) and that they have ‘to deal with several loyalties’ (r6), loyalties that ‘catch
them in-between’ (r16). An analysis of the interviews shows that teachers, pupils, and
parents in particular can be seen as the most ‘relevant others’. Various school managers
state that they have a ‘feeling of loyalty’ towards these parties: ‘My strongest feelings of
loyalty are towards these groups’ (r6). ‘I think my strongest loyalties are towards teachers
and pupils. I spend most of my time with both groups’ (r3).
The nature of loyalty might vary. When school managers talk in an affective way about
a party (teachers for example), they ‘feel attached’ to this party. It refers to a ‘sense
of belonging to something or someone, and being loyal to it’ (r16), and to feelings of
‘devotion’ and ‘allegiance’ (r22). An affective orientation usually involves feelings of
‘warmth’, ‘appreciation’, and ‘pride’, with regard to the school organization and its
personnel (r16), for example. One school manager indicates that he is ‘concerned about
pupils and teachers’; another school manager argues he is ‘committed’ to the ‘ups and
downs’ of those he is loyal to (r22). Some school managers say they have a ‘special bond’
with teachers, sections, or pupils. This bond originates from the times they were teachers
themselves, or were part of sections (r8, r12).
Some school managers speak about loyalty from a normative perspective on their
relationship with other stakeholders. These school managers are loyal because they feel
an obligation or see it as a matter of principle.
School managers should be loyal to the decision making group. An executive board member shows loyalty
when he disagrees with a majority of board members but implements the decision. (r17)

Loyalty based on normative beliefs is not necessarily connected with positive or

affective feelings. School managers can be loyal without being committed. One of the
school managers expressed this feeling:
I know our board does good things for our school, so I think that must reasonably deal with it. I do not
identify with our board, but I do feel loyal. (r12)

Opinions about the ‘right’ or ‘appropriate’ thing to do can sometimes collide with
affective loyalty:

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I am loyal to decisions the board made; sometimes this leads to a loyalty conflict with interests of schools
and loyalty towards teachers. (r12)

Tensions and loyalty conflicts

More than ever, school managers at different management levels feel themselves ‘key
figures in webs of relationships’ amidst many stakeholders in school environments.
In order to illustrate their pivotal role and their feeling to ‘stand between parties’,
school managers make use of different metaphors. School heads tell about their ‘sandwich
position’ (r3), in between school executives and their own school; they act as ‘heat
shields’ (r13). Various lower level managers (such as section heads) argue they operate
in the ‘firing line’ or ‘frontline’, ‘are standing in front of the troops’, (r16) or are ‘in a
split’ (r14). Because lower level managers participate in management teams or executive
boards, they regularly have to translate policies to classrooms, policies which are not
always welcomed by (former) colleagues in departments. As a result, they often ‘feel
torn between’ management and teachers, attempting to equally ‘accommodate’ both
management and teachers. Respondents indicate that they are ‘caught between two
fires’, ‘are wearing two heads’, ‘stand at the crossroads’ between teachers, their schools,
executive boards, and school environments (r22). In short, school managers are placed in
between reforms and educational change on the one hand, and teachers’ views on the
other hand. School managers have to make a judgement whether external and internal
demands can be aligned and how these two could eventually be balanced.
It seems that the added value of reforms for teachers is an important criterion for
assessing managerial influences and initiatives. School managers want to do justice to
teachers and pupils. When managerialism affects this in a negative way, it might result in
conflicting loyalties. When they consider their work, school managers particularly refer
to loyalty in their descriptions of dilemmatic situations. The feeling to be confronted
with multiple loyalty claims increases pressures on school managers, for example when
school managers feel they have to meet contradictory expectations. For some school
managers these situations result in a feeling of ignoring relations and even ‘failure’.
Some school managers interpret this feeling as ‘letting teachers down’ or ‘doing pupils
wrong’.
Sometimes there are struggles between school managers who say ‘we just don’t do it’, while the executive
board want it to happen. I also witness a struggle between politics and my own school. In these cases, I am
wearing two hats: I do feel like a director, but I do also see the heavy demands being placed upon some
teachers. (r20)

For some school managers this is accompanied by negative feelings, such as ‘discomfort’,
‘friction’, or ‘inner conflict’ (r8, r12). These negative feelings especially seem to occur
when loyalty towards teachers is at stake. Some school managers argue that it has become
‘difficult to remain loyal to teachers than before’ (r15) and that their loyalty towards their
school personnel ‘is pressurized’ (r4). Previously, school managers could remain loyal
to their colleagues, as they were ‘victims’ of the same, ‘failing’ government policies (r4).
Nowadays, school managers are expected to take decisions about reform initiatives and
take a stance.
Interview fragments show how some school managers experience reforms as a ‘bur-
den’ whilst other see reforms as ‘opportunities’. Due to changed expectations, school
managers experience ‘difficulties’. Some school managers state that some policy mea-
sures exert disproportionate pressure on schools and their teachers, which makes school

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managers angry, because they feel their agendas are imposed by government, poli-
tics, or society (r16). Individual school managers can feel ‘torn’ between wanting ‘to
do well’ for pupils and teachers or ‘respect understandings’ they felt they had estab-
lished on the one hand, and their anxiety about making choices about reforms that
might be perceived as ‘breach’, ‘betrayal’, or ‘treason’ on the other hand. Some respon-
dents face dilemmas, when they are confronted with external demands on the hand,
and loyalty towards their teachers and school on the other hand. In order to illus-
trate this, one school manager mentioned the 1040 hours standard in Dutch secondary
education:
Government has chosen democratically. As an organization responsible for implementing policy, one might
say ‘we accept these decisions’. At the same time, however, it has negative consequences, especially for my
team. Parents and pupils hardly face negative consequences. It does bother me, because I am forced take
measures which hinder professionals and their work. I feel very uncomfortable about it. (r6)

Another school manager stresses consequences of decentralization, which would

increase loyalty conflicts at lower management levels:
Sections and departments within our school have been made responsible for developing the Second Phase
[Tweede Fase in Dutch; an educational reform implemented in The Netherlands, at secondary schools]. It was
striking to witness dominant reactions in these sections, such as ‘what are the frameworks to work with?’,
‘how do we have to realize it?’. At lower management levels, one is afraid of making choices colleagues
could disagree with; they would like to pass the buck to someone else. This has to do with a loyalty conflict:
‘who am I to say something about other people’s subject? School managers should do this!’ (r4)

This respondent also stated that he ‘usually tries to not to become involved in conflicts
between teachers and section heads, because he does not want to abandon anybody’ (r4).
Nevertheless, other school managers rather see managerialism in terms of ‘new opportu-
nities’. In general, they try to connect their school and education with school environments
and societal stakeholders. Because they personally believe that schools need to cooperate
with other stakeholders in order to provide better services or because they feel obligated
to take on societal commitments to develop children optimally, school managers take ini-
tiatives to cooperate with Regional Training Centres, youth welfare work organizations,
etc and to maintain constructive relations with these stakeholders (r16). Another example
is provided by a school manager who considers horizontal accountability an ‘enormous
possibility’ to reduce teacher shortages (r2).

Coping behaviour
Although this research does not study school managers’ actual behaviour, interviews
show that loyalty also involves ‘doing things’. For example, one of the interviewed school
managers (r16) argues that loyalty is about ‘serving’ and ‘taking the plunge’ when he
is balancing interests. Another respondent argues that he ‘particularly takes interests of
teachers and pupils into account’ in case of conflicts of interests, and ‘these interests
carry more weight’ than the interests of other parties (r18). One of the interviewed school
managers states:
When I think of loyalty, I think my loyalty is primarily with teachers and pupils. Most of the time I deal with
both groups. If something would happen which threatens one of these groups, I have a very strong feeling
about it. When parents come with a very unjust complaint about a teacher, I feel I have to stand up for him
or her. (r3).

Some statements of school managers clearly show perseverance in commitment to

teachers.

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 RESPONSES TO MANAGERIALISM 967

Of course, there will always be small conflicts between parents and teachers, or between teachers and pupils,
conflicts which necessitate taking sides. My loyalty is to be found in my desire to explain my decisions to
teachers at any time. (r13)

Another school manager links loyalty to perseverance in the fulfilment of responsibilities

towards the teachers in her school:
I think my loyalty towards teachers is manifested in . . . in my association with them, and in the way teachers
are being developed, complying with their requests, sympathizing with them. Teachers must be able to rely
on me in all circumstances. (r12)

Another school manager states:

I am part of the school management team, so I have to keep an eye on the whole school. I cannot merely
think for a sole section, not even for a group of sections. I have to weigh interests against each other very
clearly. Some things demanded by a number of teachers are not possible, I admit. However, I think, and
that’s my loyalty towards teachers, it must be communicated well. (r8)

More importantly, interviews show how affective and normative allegiances enable
or constrain reform responses. Some school managers respond strategically, seeking and
developing new allegiances.
In principle my loyalty is towards the quality of education, which is of overriding importance to me. In order
to reach this, schools leaders should play a game with the interests of teachers, executive board, and so on.
Our work is only becoming more interesting when we play this game. (r1)

Some school managers act offensively in order to seize opportunities, but also because
they show fear for being ‘punished’ by governmental authorities.
I want to act according to political agreements. I do not want to maintain a negative relationship with
Inspectorates, and receive fines. I do not deliberately cope with rules, which would be a wrong signal. It’s
not done. (r23)

This opinion is confirmed by another school manager: ‘As a school, we are working
within statutory frameworks and agreements within school boards. One can say ‘I don’t
give a damn’, but that is not how things work’ (r11, cf. r4). A striking difference among
school managers can be witnessed in their interpretation of in their ‘discretionary space’.
While some school managers want take laws and policies literally, other school managers
act rather defensively, by refusing to commit themselves to reform initiatives beforehand,
for instance, ‘because we must await how societal and political demands will develop
before taking action’ (r3). Others indicate they ‘prioritize’ and ‘do not agree with change
beforehand’ (r2, r13, r15).
We do the things which are the best option from the perspective of our local school community. Even if
initiatives from government do not fit with our local beliefs, we will do it anyway. In case we cannot come
to our own standards due to reforms, I do not want to bear responsibility for them. (r2)

Another school manager (r22) adds: ‘Sometimes we do things which are on the verge
of the law. However, when it good for pupils, it is all right with me’.
Another group of school managers resists (strategic) responses, because they have either
too strong affective and/or normative allegiances with work floors or too weak affective
and/or normative allegiances with new stakeholders. These school managers develop
strategies to cope with managerialism without harming their meaningful relationship
with teachers. By interpreting managerial pressures in a ‘minimal’ way, they seek a
balance between reform initiative, feasibility, teachers’ interests, and their own opinions.

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When Parliament had started to get up on its high horse with regard to the 1040 hours standard, we looked
for ways in which we could fulfil meet the standard bureaucratically and procedurally as well as how it
could cause us the least inconvenience as possible. We have counted the time to walk to another classroom
among lesson time and we have reduced time for meetings about student reports. With regard to loyalty, it
is a ‘fifty-fifty’ solution, but with this apparent solution I still partially frustrate my team. (r6)

Another school manager agrees:

The chairman of our executive board ordered me to implement 1040 teaching hours, as he considered it as a
political fact. I, however, did not consider it as a fact. At that moment, I could quite well image that parents
were concerned about the increase of cancellations of lessons. The political call for more teaching hours
induced me to say within my school ‘we have to do something’, but did not try to implement this policy
proposal at the expense of everything. (r13)

Hence, several school managers seem to filter managerial pressures and select specific
aspects of managerialism. School managers adapt managerial demands and use specific
aspects for the development of their own school.
With regard to laws which aim at guaranteeing the quality of education personnel, we have set up our own
procedures for assessing the functioning of personnel. We have given a twist to the law, but we do also meet
the minimal requirements. (r15)

Finally, some school managers (r22, r23) try to balance loyalty expectations from different
stakeholders:
With an enormous increase of the number of lesson hours, I intended to accommodate the pressures of
parents and society. . . . On the contrary, I do not put my personnel to the sword as I used to do. . . .
Nowadays, I undo some things in any way. . . . Rather, I have the idea that I balance external as well as
internal stakeholders simultaneously. (r23)

Partially, this has to do with legitimizing actions:

Sometimes, when I am faced with a loyalty dilemma, I try to find ways to legitimize my actions to all parties
involved. For example, with regard to the 1040 teaching hours, we do our utmost best to meet the 1040 hour
standard, although it is already clear we will fail in some respect. We exemplify why we cannot make it,
although we have the best intentions. (r19)

DISCUSSION
Reform as burden or opportunity?
School managers are forced to realize managed governance. They have leeway to govern
their institutions in changing service sectors, but also obligations to manage their schools
in efficient and accountable ways. Our research accentuates these dual effects on school
managers’ self-reported work practices. They face societal expectations and stakeholder
demands, but also accountability and performance pressures, exerted by Inspectorates,
policy-makers, and parents. School managers can not only be seen as hybrid reform
agents; they feel hybrid. They operate in changing webs of relations, which contain
potential conflicts between organizational control, professional autonomies, and client
wishes.
This study contributes to a better understanding of how school managers are affected
by managerialism, by focusing on how they relate to contexts, managerial pressures, and
(particularly) professional workers and clients. We understand this as a matter of changing
loyalties, because loyalties represent meaningful relations with relevant others and indicate
which affective and normative allegiances actually count. By using this concept, we have
shown that managerial pressures do not operate in a linear and automatic way; they are
not automatically picked up and implemented by school managers in order to control

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professionals. Managerialism is mediated by managers. Managerial loyalties mediate

responses and affect how they cope.
First and foremost, reforms do not only affect relations between stakeholders in and
around schools; relations affect public management pressures. Most importantly, school
managers perceive the nature and quality of their relationship with teachers as highly
important. Indeed, most school managers feel that relations with teachers are at stake.
School managers want to ‘do justice’ to teachers in order to guarantee their well-being.
Contrary to public and scholarly opinion, managers are not detached from teachers and
shop floors; they try to stay close to educational practices. This affects managerialism:
school managers are critical of managerial aspects when they are seen of felt to be ‘unjust’.
This especially holds for middle managers, but high ranking executives also value their
relations with work floors.
Consequently, school managers do not cause manager–professional conflicts; they try
to cope with managerial pressures in order to reduce (potential) conflicts. Whether this
succeeds, seems to depend on how they redefine their work, and this is where differences
come in. Managerialism has different meanings for different school managers, depending
on the normative and affective meanings they attach to relations, irrespective of the levels
they work at. Depending on the actual affective and normative meanings of multiple
relations, some school managers experience reforms as a burden, whilst some see it as an
opportunity. School managers are not simply subjected to managerial pressures, but actively
cope with pressures, in order to maintain or (re)establish meaningful relationships. School
managers might buffer and resist pressures that they view as unbeneficial for teachers,
pupils, or educational processes, while they might back and implement pressures that
they perceive as valuable.

Multiple loyalties
Although this seems to come close to Ackroyd’s ‘custodial management’, our findings
go further. Even when managers play custodial roles and protect professionals, they
might also value relations with relevant others elsewhere, outside professional domains.
Depending on specific circumstances, moreover, they might even ‘work against’ teachers,
despite their buffering behaviour. Apparently, school managers develop multiple loyalties
and their managerial behaviour vis-à-vis teachers is contingent. These contingencies are
not merely determined by sectoral and organizational conditions. Instead of stressing
and comparing different service sectors, like health care, education, and welfare, our
study shows the importance of opening-up sectors and organizations in order to trace
variety. Within one and the same sector, such as education, and within one and the same
organization, such as a school, there are numerous relations, attachments, valuations,
situations, and acts, which make general images of ‘management’ rather problematic.
Indeed, the redefinition of managerial work and work relations must be seen as an
ambiguous affair. First, educational and social tasks that are affected by managerial
pressures are not clear, but malleable. What they mean exactly, how they are valued, and
how they are translated to shop floors, strongly depends on managerial attitudes and
acts. Second, managers might value managerial (control) ambitions, and they might value
client logics, at the same time. Instead of either sticking to control logics, or siding with
teachers and pupils, managers might be loyal to different parties at the same time. Third,
managers might establish new relations, also outside organizations, but still feel loyal to
organizational groups and professionals at work floors.

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970 MIRKO NOORDEGRAAF AND BAS DE WIT

CONCLUSION
Instead of stressing unavoidable conflicts between control and client logics, we have
shown how organizational and professionals fields might be related and interconnected
in daily practices. We also showed that managers are crucial for this; managers like school
managers mediate managerialism, by valuing certain relations and by coping with loyalty
conflicts in specific situations. Instead of taking sides, managers might value different
sides, and seek actions – decisions, statements, and the like – that bring these sides
together. Even when they do take sides, for example when they make decisions against
the will of professionals, they might highly value relations with professionals. There are
conflicts within managerial work; in times of managed governance, many managers will
feel torn apart.
This means that service managers develop different responses to managerialism.
Loyalties affect the effects of pressures and thus effects on pressures. Because school
managers feel and find different things, these responses differ, even when managers have
comparable managerial positions. School leaders in comparable schools and at comparable
levels respond differently to comparable pressures; some might see pressures as a burden,
others as opportunity; some might act defensively, others more offensively.
In terms of further research, this calls for more in-depth insights into the real nature
of managerial work and relations. This has to include a more systematic analysis of
differences, such as between different types of managers, as well as more explanatory
understanding. What factors influence what managers feel and find (and thus responses)?
How do situations affect responses to managerialism – do defensive and offensive
responses fit different sorts of situations? It also calls for political and critical perspectives.
Although managers are blamed for controlling professionals, or applauded because of
their custodial roles, most managers will try to act meaningfully. What they feel and find
is helpful for this. But what meaningfulness actually means, however, will be contested,
also in a political sense. When school leaders refuse to extend school tasks and refuse to
implement certain projects, because they feel bad about it (for example, because their staff
must be protected), there might be no formal or legal objections, but there might be other
objections. Other relevant parties, such as parents or municipalities or other stakeholders,
might be disadvantaged. In other words, the affective and normative allegiances of school
managers have political dimensions; what they find and feel becomes politically relevant.
More practically, this calls for (renewed) professionalization. Managers like school
managers will have to strengthen managerial capacities to act in times of managed
governance. First, they should strengthen the capacity to relate to managerialism, in
complex organizational contexts, with demanding professional domains and clients. This
means they should develop and broaden their normative and affective allegiances, and
find ways to cope with contradictory allegiances in specific situations. Second, they
should strengthen the capacity to legitimate their allegiances and acts, especially when
their loyalties have (political) implications. Third, managers should find capacities to deal
with frictions within managerial work, i.e. with how relational forces affect themselves.
In addition to coping with difficult situations, they must find ways to cope with the
difficulties of being a manager.
Responses to managerialism, then, are more than responses to managerialism. They
are responses that shape and reshape pressures, as well as effects. This only increases the
importance of managers. Managers are not necessarily responsive; they might actively
respond.

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