Principle of Sustainable Development

1 Sustainable Development
in International Environmental Law
Principle of Sustainable Development

Aggarin Viriyo*
Recently there has been a growing concern for the environment. A number of
International Conventions and bodies like the International Organisations, the Non-
Governmental Organisation (NGOs) have emphasised significantly that environment
needs to be protected. Similarly the States have reflected this in the domestic
legislations. This concern over the environment can also be seen in case of
Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Projects (Hungary v Slovakia)1, which was the international
dispute brought before the International Court of Justice (the court). The case
involved the issues surrounding the international environmental law and
international watercourse law were considered. The court was presented with the
opportunity to consider the legal status of principles of sustainable development,
the precautionary principles and the environmental impact assessment.
Unfortunately, the majority of the court declined to do so. However, there was a
separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry, who gave a considerable weight to these
issues.
There will be three parts for discussion; the sustainable development,
the precautionary principle and the environmental impact assessment. This is
because the sustainable development is considered as a major principle in the
international environmental law. Other two principles, which are the precautionary
principle and the environmental impact assessment, are considered as the means of
contribution on the sustainable development. In each of these, the legal status of
each principle under the international law will be examined. The analysis will also be
made from the opinion of the court and the separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry
about the impacts on the development of each principle, which these opinions may
have on.
*
LL.B, Monash University, LL.M. (International and Comparative Law), Monash University, Australia,
Legal Officer, International Trade and Intellectual Property Law Bureau, Office of Council of
State: E-mail: i_needu2@hotmail.com
1 37 International Legal materials 161.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2133771

1. Sustainable development
The sustainable development implies two main objectives, which are
environmental protection and economic development. The economic development
can also be referred as a mean of the poverty alleviation.2 Although the poverty
alleviation was not mentioned in the opinion of the court, it is understood that
alleviation could be achieved through the economic development but should be
reconciled with the environmental protection.
While the objectives are regarded as non-hierarchical, they are interdependent
and mutually reinforcing. As the result, it is important to understand the two
practical implications embracing these objectives of sustainable development. Firstly,
in the economic development, there should be a priority to the needs of the people,
especially those who are in poverty.3 Secondly, the implication is based on the
principle of inter-generational equity. It is said that while the present generation is
pursuing the economic development and poverty alleviation, this should not cause
harm to the environment which the future generations will depend upon in order to
meet their needs.4 In other word, although the sustainable development recognizes
the economic development as a mean of achieving poverty alleviation, it limits such
development on the ground of environmental protection for the needs of the
present and future generations.
However, the implications do not mean that the economic development
must be unreasonably restricted as this may cause poverty, especially in the
developing countries. While there is an interest in preserving the environment
because of importance of natural resources for economic development and life on
the earth, there is also an interest in alleviating the poverty through the economic
development. As the result, the sustainable development provides a new way of
development, which assists to achieve both interests.5
The paper will firstly examine the legal status of the sustainable
development by referring to a number of international conventions. Unfortunately,
its status was not discussed by the court. Secondly, it will point to the court’s
complete ignorance to the sustainable development and it will analyse the judicial
2 M. B.M. Alhaji., “From Rio to Johannesburg: Reflections on the Role of International Legal Norms in
Sustainable development” (2003), 16 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review Fall, 31.
3 Ibid 32.
4 Ibid 33.
5 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future 46 (1987) 4.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2133771

reasoning behind this and the impact upon which the court’s decision may have on
the international environmental law. Thirdly, the paper will analyse the dissenting
opinion from Judge Weeramantry on the development of sustainable development.
Finally, the focus will be on other principles namely the precautionary principle and
the environmental impact assessment, which can contribute to sustainable
development. Each will be discussed in a separate heading.
1.1 Legal Status of sustainable development

1.1.1 International instruments
Recently there has been an increasing concern on the
sustainable development in the international environmental law. There are several
international conventions, which emphasis on the importance of sustainable
development. For example, the Stockholm Declaration6, which refers to the balance
between the environmental protection and the economic development, says that in
order to provide the maximum benefit to the people, the States should integrate
economic development with protection of the environment.7 While the States have
a sovereign right to use their own natural resources, they must ensure that such use
does not adversely affect the environment of neighbourhood States.8
Furthermore, the World Charter for Nature9 mentions about the
importance of environmental protection in the economic development. It however
emphasises on the specific principles of environmental protection, which are
designed to guide the economic development. Finally, the Rio Declaration 10
emphasises on the principles in the Stockholm Declaration. It states that States must
apply the precautionary principle in balancing between the economic development
and the environmental protection.11
1.1.2 The opinion of the court

In spite of the international recognition, however the court
did not clearly define the principle of ‘sustainable development’. The court also left
6 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (1972) (Stockholm
Declaration)
7 Principle 13 of the Stockholm Declaration
8 Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration
9 World Charter for Nature (1982)
10 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992) (Rio Declaration)
11 Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration
many questions unanswered on this issue. Firstly, while the court acknowledged that
sustainable development is important to reconcile the economic development with
the environmental protection, the court did not clearly examine its legal status
under the international law. Instead the court referred the sustainable development
as the basis of obligation and concept. 12 For example, the court regarded the
sustainable development as a basis for obligating the future conduct of Hungary and
Slovakia in relation to the construction of the dams.13 The aim was to re-shape the
manners, which were previously harmful to the environment. Moreover, the court
regarded the sustainable development a concept to reconcile environmental
protection and economic development. The concept does not however sufficiently
place the great importance on the environmental protection. Therefore it can be
said that as the court expressly considered the sustainable development as the
obligatory basis and concept, the court implicitly rejected the sustainable
development to become part of customary international law.
Secondly, the court did not clearly identify the normative
content of obligations, which the States should take to achieve the sustainable
development. This means that the States need to develop their own practices until
they can reach the degree of certainty to formulate the normative content of these
obligations. Unless such a degree was reached, otherwise there would be an
uncertainty in future approach to sustainable development.14 Finally, the court did
not consider the relationship between sustainable development and other principles
of international environmental law namely the precautionary principle and the
environmental impact assessment.15 The academic works extensively suggest of such
a relationship though. For instance, it is said that the precautionary principle is a
supporting value for the sustainable development.16
12 A-K Afshin and R. R. Donald., “The ICJ and the Danube Dame Case: a missed opportunity for
international environmental law?” (1998), 22 Melbourne University Law Review 519-520.
13 Ibid 527.
14 H. Günther, “Sustainable Development: General Rules versus Specific Obligations” in L. Winfried (ed),
Sustainable Development and International Law (1995) 35.
international environmental law?” (1998), 22 Melbourne University Law Review 527.
16 S. Philippe, “International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development: Emerging Legal Principles”
in L. Winfried (ed), Sustainable Development and International Law (1995), 53, 62.
1.1.3 The separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry

On the contrary, Judge Weeramantry gave a considerable weight
to the sustainable development and he examined the legal status of sustainable
development. When he stated that the sustainable development is a principle of law
with normative status, he assumed that it has attained the status of customary
international law. Prior to analysing his opinion, it is foremost important to
understand the requirement for the formation of the customary status. According to
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases17, there are two elements of state practice and
opinio juris. Firstly there must be extensive and uniform practice by the states.
Secondly the practice must have been based on the psychological element that
such practice is required by a rule of law, and not by merely morality, courtesy or
ceremony. Therefore, while there is a state practice, there must be a belief that the
sustainable development is the law, with which the States must comply.
Judge Weeramantry inferred the state practice from the treaties
and international conventions, which concerned over the sustainable development.
Accordingly, while giving effect to the requirement of the treaties, the States have
adopted their domestic practices on the sustainable development.18 Also when he
referred to international organisations and financial institutions, which have adopted
the sustainable development as pre-requisite before the assistance will be given to
the States, he inferred the state practice from the States’ compliance with these
organisations.19 However it is obvious that he failed to discuss another element of
customary international law, which is opinio juris. In other words, while he could
show the significant state practice, he failed to show that it is based on the belief
that it is required by the law. Therefore the sustainable development could not
attain the status of customary international law.
Furthermore, in spite of these, Judge Weeramantry still argued
that sustainable development is the principle of international law with some
normative value. He stated that the right for development and the right for
environmental protection are incompatible with each other. As the principles
operate into a conflict, the sustainable development is needed as the principle to
17 North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. Rep. of Germany v. Denmark; Fed. Rep. of Germany v. Netherlands)
(1969) ICJ 3.
19 Ibid 49.
reconcile such conflict. As a result, the sustainable development in this aspect refers
to an ‘intervening principle’, which mediates between the application of the right for
development and the right for environmental protection.20
1.2 Legitimate Expectation

As we can see, although the sustainable development is not
a principle of customary international law, Judge Weeramantry may be right in
holding that it is a principle of law with normative status on the following grounds.
Firstly, the international conventions and the international organisation suggested the
state practice. Secondly, the sustainable development is the intervening principle.
Arguably, there is also “a legitimate international expectation” that the States should
perform their activities in accordance with the objective of sustainable development,
even though this expectation is not a binding legal obligation.21
1.3 The relationship with the precautionary principle and the environmental
impact assessment
The discussion will move away from the legal status of sustainable
development. It is worthy of considering the normative development of other
principles, which relate to the sustainable development. It is understood that there is
a set of principles, which can contribute to the objectives of the sustainable
development through the legal regimes and the decision-making procedures at the
domestic level. These are the precautionary principle and environmental impact
assessment, which will be discussed respectively.
2. Precautionary principle
The court did not take account of the precautionary principle in valuing
the scientific evidence, which showed the risk on the environment. Because it was
unclear that the principle has attained the status of customary international law, the
court implicitly rejected it as the principle of international law. Instead the court
relied upon the other principle particularly the ecological necessity, under which the
strict test of certainty on the scientific evidence was applied. This paper will argue
that firstly the test of ecological necessity adopted by the court is inappropriate and
20 Ibid 45.
21 Ibid 56-57.
the precautionary principle should replace. Secondly, it will examine the status of
precautionary principle in the international law with the supporting opinion from
Judge Weeramantry. Finally, it will argue that States have shown their practice in
accordance with the precautionary principle and this would contribute to the
achievement of sustainable development.
2.1 Ecological necessity

2.1.1 High test
Under the test of ‘imminence’, it requires a high degree of
certainty for an environmental risk to invoke ecological necessity. In other words,
it denies long-term and uncertain nature of the risk.22 This means that while the
decision whether or not to continue the development projects is pending on the
scientific certainty of the risk, the environmental consequence may have been
serious and irreversible. It may take years for environmental risk to become certain
and satisfy the imminence requirement and it may be too late to begin the
environmental protection. If this is the case, future generations may have already
been prevented from meeting their own needs until the danger would become
imminent and there would be this dispute before the court again. Therefore it can
be said that as the court imposed the unsatisfactory test for imminent risk, the court
did not indicate the full respect of the sustainable development.
2.1.2 Scientific evidence

In purporting this test, the court failed to appreciate the nature
of the environment which is unique and irreplaceable. It is important to understand
that the environmental consequence is irreversible. 23 Also the environment
is fundamental to economic development and human life and these would be
affected as a result of environmental consequence.24 Furthermore, in stating that
scientific uncertainty was not sufficient under the test, the court did not actually
consider any scientific evidence. It is doubtful about the extent of the scientific
certainty, for example, how certain of scientific evidence need to be. This is
22 K. Adrianna., “Damming the Danube: The International I.L.C. of Justice and the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
Project (Hungary v Slovakia)” (1998), 20 Sydney Law Review 616-7.
23 D. Daniel., “The necessity of precaution: The future of ecological necessity and the precautionary
principle” (2002), 13 Fordham Environmental Law Journal Spring, 395.
24 Ibid 395.
particularly important because the scientific evidence will never be 100% certain.25
Also the court did not specify the category of evidence, which satisfied the test.
We have seen that reliance upon the scientific certainty does not
give the satisfactory result. On the contrary, the application of precautionary principle
can mitigate the high threshold test of scientific certainty for environmental risk. The
precautionary principle concerns more on the graveness of the risk and not its
certainty. 26 The rational is that the graver risk can be perceived and the more
probable consequences on the environment would result. 27 The precautionary
measures to prevent the consequences therefore depend upon the graveness of the
risk. This means that if the risk is sufficiently grave, the scientific uncertainty cannot
allow the development to be implemented or continued.
While the court preferred the imminence requirement for
environmental risk, which could only be satisfied by scientific certainty, the
precautionary principle should have been adopted to resolve the scientific
uncertainty. As the result, it is important to examine the legal status of precautionary
principle.
2.2 Legal status of the precautionary principle

As it is noted above that the court completely ignored to consider the
precautionary principle, its legal status under the international law was not
determined. In contrast, Judge Weeramantry gave considerable weight to the
precautionary principle in his judgement. Therefore it is important to examine its
legal status in the international law. The precautionary principle is considered as an
important component of environmental law. The precautionary principle states that
the measures, such as regulatory actions must be taken to protect the environment
prior to implement the development projects, even though there is scientific
uncertainty about environmental harm.28 It provides the anticipatory and prudential
measures to achieve the objectives of sustainable development.29 Foremost it is
important to consider the basis on which the precautionary approach operates. The
25 Ibid 397.
26 Ibid 398.
27 Ibid 399.
28 The principle 15 of the Rio Declaration.
principle is based on the belief that scientific study in predicting the environmental
consequences can be uncertain.30 However, the uncertainty does not mean that
there are consequences on the environment. As a result, the precautionary principle
provides the basis to deal with this uncertainty.
Notwithstanding that the court failed to address the legal status of
precautionary principle, it is suggested that the principle can be qualified as a general
principle of international environmental law. A number of international conventions
have been incorporated with the precautionary principle, under which the States are
obligated to give weighty consideration in evaluating the environmental
consequences arising out of the development projects.31 The state practice may
therefore be inferred. While the States have generated uniform practice in pursuit of
the precautionary principle, there is still need of evidence for opinio juris – the belief
that States are required by the law to do so. Therefore although the precautionary
principle has not become customary international, it has some normative value for
being the principle of international law.
2.3 The relationship with sustainable development

As we can see, there is a state practice in support for the
precautionary principle. By performing their practices in accordance with the
precautionary principle, the States have implicitly accepted it as a practical norm.32
This would contribute to the achievement of sustainable development. Under the
principle, the States would take the anticipatory measures such as regulatory actions
on the development projects, where there is potentiality of environmental
consequences and there is no need for scientific certainty. As a result this would
assist the States in making decision to balance between the economic development
and the environmental protection. Therefore, the principle can be a basis for the
States to obtain the sustainable development.
30 Ibid 65.
31 B.L. Ida., “Flushing the Danube: the World Court’s decision concerning the Gabcikovo Dam” (1998), 9
Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 401, 424-425.
3. Environmental Impact Assessment

Generally, an environmental impact assessment (EIA) can be described as
a study of the adverse consequence, which a planned projects may have on the
environment. There are two main important functions on which EIA process operate
to achieve its objective. Firstly, the findings of EIA can be seen as the report, which
affects the decision whether the development projects should be implemented.33 It
also suggests whether the projects should be modified to minimise the
consequences on the environment. Secondly, EIA process encourages the public
participation. In addition to a public group of people who may be affected by the
implementation of the projects, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have
important roles in contributing to the EIA process.34
At the beginning, the paper will discuss the legal status of EIA in the
international law, in order to appreciate that EIA is widely accepted. However, the
court was unwilling to give consideration of EIA while it had a few opportunities
arising from the case. This clearly indicates that the court implicitly rejected the
recognition of EIA. On the contrary, this paper will also look at the dissenting opinion
from Judge Weeramantry, who gave considerable weight to EIA. Finally, it is argued
that in pursuing the use of EIA, the objectives of sustainable development could be
achieved.
3.1 Legal status of environmental impact assessment

3.1.1 International instruments
Foremost, it is important to examine the status of EIA. A number
of international conventions have incorporated the requirement of EIA. Since there is
a widespread acceptance of the EIA requirement, it is suggested that EIA is an
emerging principle of international law.35 However this is not accepted by the court.
Therefore it is important to analyse the court’s opinion.
33 Ibid 72.
34 Ibid 72.
35 P.L. Erika., “The international obligation to conduct an environmental impact assessment: The ICJ
case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project” (1999), 7 New York University Environmental Law
Journal 317-323.
3.1.2 The opinion of the court

The opportunities for the court to examine the legal status of
EIA in the international environmental law arose from three occasions namely
Hungary’s suspension of the original projects, Slovakia’s provisional solution of
Variant C and the continuing obligations of both parties in the management of the
river. However the court failed to make reference to EIA in determining the issues in
each of these occasions. Instead it heavily relied upon the principle of Treaty Law.
The failure of the court to examine the EIA has a great impact on the development
of EIA in the international environmental law.
The analysis can be made from the conclusion of the court on
these three occasions as follows. Firstly, while the court found that the obligations of
the parties in respect of environmental protection arose from the Treaty, it implicitly
rejected EIA as the norm of the international law, which would be applicable
notwithstanding lack of these obligations under the Treaty.36 Secondly the court
undermined the precautionary principle by requiring that the environmental
consequences must be grave and imminent before the States could suspense the
projects.37 The court implied that the warnings of environmental consequences are
not sufficient. However, by the time of the scientific studies, which show these grave
and imminent consequences, the environment may have been largely damaged.
Thirdly, although the court relied upon the Treaty in determining
the obligations for environmental protection, it failed to provide the manner,
in which the States should comply with these obligations. The court did not express
the requirement for the States to conduct the study of the projects, which may have
the consequences on the environment. 38 Finally it opened the possibility that
the States may disregard in maintaining the environmental protection unless
the Treaty incorporated with these obligations.39
3.1.3 The separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry\

In contrast with the opinion of the court, Judge Weeramantry
directly addressed the issues about the role of EIA and the status of EIA under the
international law. His opinion could be analysed as follows. Firstly, Judge
Weeramantry confirmed that EIA is a principle of international law. He emphasised
36 Ibid 345-346.
37 Ibid 336.
38 Ibid 338-339.
39 Ibid 340-342.
the importance of EIA by stating that EIA is a specific application of the larger general
principle of caution.40 As a result, the States are required to undertake EIA prior to
the implementation of projects.
Secondly, since he accepted EIA as the principle of international
law, he implicitly rejected the Articles 15 and 19 of the Treaty as a ground for his
decision.41 Instead he stated that it is a requirement under the international law that
the States undertake EIA for the projects, which may have the adverse consequences
on the environment. This means that regardless of the existence of the obligations
under the Treaty, the States are required to conduct EIA under the principle of
international law.
Thirdly, Judge Weeramantry also stated that the obligations to
conduct EIA must apply to all projects, which may have the adverse consequences
on the environment. These include the projects, which were initiated before these
obligations emerged under the international law. 42 Finally he stated that the
obligations of undertaking EIA as “continual”. He clearly defined that EIA is a
continuing assessment and evaluation until the projects will be completed.43 He
emphasised that the environmental consequences should be given a careful
attention to the ongoing projects. There is a need for a continuous EIA in order to
prevent unexpected consequences on the environment. The EIA, which is completed
prior to the commencement of the projects, may not be sufficient for long-term
evaluation for future on environmental impacts. Therefore the continuous EIA can be
seen as the best safeguard way on the environmental protection.
3.2 The relationship with sustainable development

It is also important to consider the importance of EIA in the context of
sustainable development as to how they are connected. EIA provides a valuable
process to the sustainable development. Before the development projects
commences or during its operations, the EIA ensures that the environmental
41 P.L. Erika., “The international obligation to conduct an environmental impact assessment: The ICJ
case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project” (1999), 7 New York University Environmental Law
Journal 348.
42 Ibid 348-349.
consequences will be considered. Therefore it provides a mechanism through which

the consideration of environmental protection will have an influence on the
economic development. 44 Therefore the EIA can contribute to the achievement
of EIA.
4. Conclusion
As we have seen, the sustainable development can be set as the standard
of balancing between the environmental protection and the economic development.
The precautionary principle and the environmental impact assessment can be the
valuable principles, which assist in achieving the sustainable development. Because
these three principles have inter-play roles, they are equally important in the
international environmental law. However, the International Court of Justice in
Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Projects (Hungary v Slovakia) disagreed with this importance.
The court did not consider these principles fully in making its decision, although
there are a number of international conventions and extensive academic writings,
which make reference directly to these principles. The court, therefore, missed an
opportunity to develop the law in this area.
Furthermore, the court foreshadows the future application of these
principles. The court heavily relied on the principle of treaty law instead. It expressed
its unwillingness to suspend the treaty obligations on the ground of environmental
protection because it feared that this may otherwise undermine the sanctity of treaty
law. However, the court’s failure to adequately deal with these principles more
greatly undermined the development of international environmental law.
Nevertheless, there is a dissenting opinion from Judge Weeramantry, who
gave more valuable consideration to these principles. While his opinion may be
criticised, it responded to the recent concern over the environment, which has been
expressed in the international conventions and academic works. Finally, although
these principles have not attained the status of customary law, they have been
developed through the practice of the states. They have been attached with an
element of state practice and have the wide acceptance from the international
community. As a result, they have some normative value in the international law.
Through the practice of the States, the manner at which these principles are
performed would be more certain from time to time. Importantly, as the States have
indicated their significant practice, the element of opinio juris may be also developed
so that these principles would have the customary status. This largely depends on
the future decision of the court, the international conventions, the international
organisations, academic writings and the international community as the whole.
References
1. International Cases
Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Projects (Hungary v Slovakia) 37 International Legal
materials 61.
North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. Rep. of Germany v. Denmark; Fed. Rep.
of Germany v. Netherlands) 1969 ICJ 3.
2. International Documentations
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
(1972).
World Charter for Nature (1982).
World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future

46 (1987).
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992).
3. Text Materials
Günther Handl, “Sustainable Development: General Rules versus Specific
Obligations” in Winfried Lang (ed), Sustainable Development and International Law
(1995).
Philippe Sands, “International Law in the Field of Sustainable

Development: Emerging Legal Principles” in Winfried Lang (ed), Sustainable
Development and International Law (1995).
4. Journals and Articles

Adrianna Koe., “Damming the Danube: The International I.L.C. of Justice
and the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia)” (1998), 20 Syd L Rev.
Afshin A-Khavari and Donald R. Rothwell., “The ICJ and the Danube Dame
Case: a missed opportunity for international environmental law? (1998), Melb Univ L
Rev 22.
Alhaji B.M. Marong., “From Rio to Johannesburg: Reflections on the Role of

International Legal Norms in Sustainable development” (2003), Fall Geo Int’l Envtl L
Rev 16.
Daniel Dobos., “The necessity of precaution: The future of ecological

necessity and the precautionary principle” (2002), 13 Fordham Envtl Law J. Spring.
Erika L. Preiss., “The international obligation to conduct an environmental

impact assessment: The ICJ case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project”
(1999), 7 NYUELJ.
Ida L. Bostian., “Flushing the Danube: the World Court’s decision

concerning the Gabcikovo Dam” (1998), 9 COJIELP 401.

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1 Sustainable Development

in International Environmental Law

Principle of Sustainable Development

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2133771

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2133771

1.1 Legal Status of sustainable development

1.1.2 The opinion of the court

1.1.3 The separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry

1.2 Legitimate Expectation

2.1 Ecological necessity

2.1.2 Scientific evidence

2.2 Legal status of the precautionary principle

2.3 The relationship with sustainable development

3. Environmental Impact Assessment

3.1 Legal status of environmental impact assessment

3.1.2 The opinion of the court

3.1.3 The separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry\

3.2 The relationship with sustainable development

consequences will be considered. Therefore it provides a mechanism through which

World Charter for Nature (1982).

World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future

Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992).

Philippe Sands, “International Law in the Field of Sustainable

4. Journals and Articles

Alhaji B.M. Marong., “From Rio to Johannesburg: Reflections on the Role of

Daniel Dobos., “The necessity of precaution: The future of ecological

Erika L. Preiss., “The international obligation to conduct an environmental

Ida L. Bostian., “Flushing the Danube: the World Court’s decision

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