RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

2nd Semester 2018-2019

Atty. Amando V. Ligutan

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

A. Remedial Law

1. Bustos v. Lucero (GR No. L-2068; October 20, 1948)

FACTS:
Petitioner Dominador Bustos, accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga after he had been bound to that court for trial, praying that the records of the case be remanded to
the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine
the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the strength of which a warrant was
issued for his arrest. The motion was denied and the same is the subject matter of this proceeding.

The accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation. In that investigation, the justice of
the peace informed him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered
the plea of not guilty. "Then his counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her
witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the
private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. "In view thereof,
the accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to present evidence," and the justice of the
peace forwarded the case to the court of first instance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant can compel the complainant and his witness to repeat in his presence what was
said at the preliminary examination.

RULING:
NO!!!!
In Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336, recently promulgated, in which case the respondent
justice of the peace had allowed the accused, over the complaint's objection, to recall the complainant and her
witnesses at the preliminary investigation so that they might be cross-examined, we sustained the justice of the
peace's order. We said that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound discretion of the justice of the
peace on the matter. We said that "while section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of the defendant's right in
the preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court
of justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to bring out the truth. Defendant cannot, as a
matter of right, compel the complaint and his witness to repeat in his presence what they had said at the
preliminary examination before the issuance of the order of arrest. “We called attention to the fact that "the
constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary
hearings' nor will the absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to confront
witnesses." As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the
constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial.

2. Primacias v. Ocampo (GR No. L-6120; 6/30/53)

FACTS:
This is a petition which seeks to prohibit respondent Judge from proceeding with the trial of two criminal cases
which were then pending against petitioner without the assistance of assessors in accordance with the
provisions of section 49 of Republic Act No. 409 in relation to section 154 of Act No. 190, and as an auxiliary
remedy, to have a writ of preliminary injunction issued so that the trial may be held pending until further orders
of this court.

Petitioner was charged with violation of Commonwealth Act 606 for chartering a vessel of Philippine Registry to
an alien without the approval of the President and violation of Administrative Code Sec 129 for failing to submit
to the Collector of Customs the manifests and authenticated documents of the vessel.

Before Trial, Petitioner filed a motion praying that assessors be appointed in considering the facts involved in
the case pursuant to RA 409 which provides that "the aid of assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal action
in the Municipal Court, or the Court of First Instance, within the City, may be invoked in the manner provided in
the Code of Civil Procedure."

The court issued an order denying the motion holding in effect that promulgation of the Rules of Court by the
Supreme Court, which became effective on July 1, 1940, all rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure
in all courts of the Philippines previously existing were not only superseded but expressly repealed, that the
Supreme Court, having been vested with the rule-making power, expressly omitted the portions of the Code of
Civil Procedure regarding assessors in said Rules of Court, and that the reference to said statute by section 49
of Republic Act No. 409 on the provisions regarding assessors should be deemed as a mere surplusage. Believing
that this order is erroneous, petitioner now comes to this court imputing abuse of discretion to the respondent
Judge. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
- Whether or not the right of the petitioner to a trial with the aid of assessors is an absolute substantive
right, and the duty of the court to provide assessors is mandatory.
- Whether or not the right to trial with the aid of assessors, being a substantive right, cannot be impaired
by this court in the exercise of its rule-making power.

- Whether or not Section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 2477 of the Old Charter of Manila,
creating the right to trial with the aid of assessors, are substantive law and were not repealed by Rules of
Court

RULING:
YES, IT IS MANDATORY, If we are to be guided merely by these provisions, the right to trial with the aid of
assessor would seem to be beyond dispute. These provision are simple and clear and appear to be mandatory.

AVL- We have first to identify if it is a SUBSTANTIVE LAW OR A PROCEDURAL LAW

"Rules of procedure should be distinguished from substantive law.

A substantive law creates, defines or regulates rights concerning life, liberty or property, or the powers of
agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of public affairs,

Whereas rules of procedure are provisions prescribing the method by which substantive rights may be
enforced in courts of justice."

In Bustos vs. Lucero, this Court cited with approval the following definitions of substantive law:
"Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous.
Substantive rights in a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the
disturbance of normal relations. (60 C. J. 980.)

"Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the right
and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer;
as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for
their invasions.

The trial with the aid of assessors as granted by section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 2477 of
the old Charter of Manila are parts of substantive law and as such are not embraced by the rule-making power
of the Supreme Court. This is so because in said section 154 this matter is referred to as a right given by law to
a party litigant. Section 2477 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is couched in such a manner that a similar right
is implied when invoked by a party litigant. It says that the aid may be invoked in the manner provided in the
Code of Civil Procedure. And this right has been declared absolute and substantial by this Court in several cases
where the aid of assessors had been invoked (Berbari vs. Concepcion, et al., 40 Phil.,

(THE COURT CITED THE CASE OF COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE VS. SISON)
Thus, it was there said that these provisions "necessarily lead to the conclusion that the intervention of the
assessors is not an empty formality which may be disregarded without violating either the letter or the spirit of
the law. It is another security given by the law to the litigants, and as such, it is a substantial right of which they
cannot be deprived without vitiating all the proceedings. Were we to agree that for one reason or another the
trial by assessors, may be done away with, the same line of reasoning would force us to admit that the parties
litigant may be deprived of their right to be represented by counsel, to appear and be present at the hearings,
and so on, to the extent of omitting the trial in a civil case, and thus set at naught the essential rights granted
by the law to the parties, with consequent nullity of the proceedings."

There is a point in the claim that the provisions concerning trial by assessors embodied in the Code of Civil
Procedure are not wholly substantive but portions thereof are remedial such as those which refer to the method
of summoning assessors, enforcing their attendance, excusing them from attendance, their compensation, oath,
duties and effect of dissent from the opinion of the judge, as to which no cogent reason is seen for their non-
incorporation if the intent is not to eliminate them from the Rules of Court.

This is true; but it is likewise true that because said remedial provisions are inextricably interwoven with the
substantive part, it must have been deemed wise and proper to leave them as they were for reasons of
coordination and expediency, it being a truism that the one cannot be detached from the other. Remedial
measures are but implementary in character and they must be appended to the portion of the law to which
they belong.

3. Neypes v. Court of Appeals (GR No. 141524; 10/14/05)

FACTS:
Petitioners Domingo Neypes et al. filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land with preliminary
injunction before he RTC, Branch 43 against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank and
the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo.

Petitioner filed a motion to declare respondents heirs, Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forestry in default. The
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss.
In an order dated May 16, 1997, The trial court presided by Judge Rosales granted the petitioner’s motion to
declare respondents in default and Land Banks motion to dismiss was denied and the motion to dismiss filed by
the heirs was likewise denied based on prescription.

The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss on the
ground that the trial court could very well resolve the issue of prescription from the bare allegations of the
complaint itself without waiting for the trial proper.

In an order dated Feb. 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground that the action
had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on
the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court
issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998.

Five days later on July 27, 1998 petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This
was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was
denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.

In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued
that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they
received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice
of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for
appeal.

The CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15 day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March
3, 1998 or the day they received the Feb 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate
court, the order was the final order appealable under the rules. Petitioners filed a motion for recon but was
denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal was filed on time.

RULING:
YES.
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may
be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of
the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of
the right to appeal.

An appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final
judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect
to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares
categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses
an action.
The final order which is the basis of the 15 day reglementary period is the receipt of the order dismissing the
Motion for Reconsideration as it was what ended the issues raised in the case. The court sustains that the order
dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated by the rules.

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal
or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases.
In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows
extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These
extensions may consist of 15 days or more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their
cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal
in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration

4. Alvero v. de la Rosa (GR No. L-286; 03/29/1946)

FACTS:
Complaint
On June 25, 1945, respondent Jose R. Victoriano had filed a complaint, in the CFI of Manila, against petitioner
Fredesvindo S. Alvero and one Margarita Villarica, alleging two causes of action, to wit,

(1) To enforce the contract of sale made by Victoriano and Villarica of two parcel of land in Caloocan which was
subsequently sold by Villarca to the petitioner Alvero.

(2) To declare the subsequent sale null and void

Answer of Villarica

She expressly admitted that she sold the land to Alvero for P100,000 due to imperative necessity of raising funds
to provide for her family, and offering to repurchase said land from Alvero in the sum of P5,000 but the latter
refused to accept the offer.

Answer of Alvero

He denied the allegations and claimed exclusive ownership of the land in question and at the same time set up
a counterclaim and cross claim in his answer demanding from Victoriano a P200 monthly rent on the property
plus damages.

The case went to trial and the respondent Judge de la Rosa rendered his decision in favor of Victoriano
adjudging to him the title over the property in question, including all the improvements existing thereon and
dismissed the counterclaim.

Petition for reconsideration and new trial, which was denied on January 3, 1946; and of said order he was
notified on January 7, 1946. On January 8, 1946, Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed his notice of appeal and record on
appeal simultaneously in the lower court, without filing the P60-appeal bond. On January 14, 1946, Jose R.
Victoriano filed a petition to dismiss the appeal, and at the same time, asked for the execution of the judgment
On January 15, 1946, Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss, alleging that on the
very same day, January 15, 1946, said appeal bond for P60 had been actually filed, and allege as an excuse, for
not filing the said appeal bond, in due time, the illness of his lawyer's wife, who died on January 10, 1946, and
buried the following day.

On January 17, 1946, the respondent judge, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, ordered the dismissal of the appeal,
declaring that, although the notice of appeal and record on appeal had been filed in due time, the P60-appeal
bond was filed too late.

On January 23, 1946, Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed a petition for the reconsideration of the said order dated
January 17, 1946, dismissing his appeal; and said petition for reconsideration was denied on January 29, 1946.
Hence, this petition for certiorari

ISSUE:
Whether or not the notice of appeal were filed on time

RULING:
NO!
According to the computation erroneously made by the court, the last day for filing and perfecting the
appeal, in this case, was January 8, 1946, or which date, Fredesvindo S. Alvero should have filed his (1) notice of
appeal, (2) record on appeal, and (3) appeal bond. But the P60-appeal bond was filed only on January 15, 1946.
Failure to perfect the appeal, within the time prescribed by the rules of court, will cause the judgment to become
final, and the certification of the record on appeal thereafter, cannot restore the jurisdiction which has been
lost. (Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao vs. Director of Lands, 34 Phil., 623; Estate of Cordoba and Zarate vs.
Alabado, 34 Phil., 920; and Bermudez vs. Director of Lands, 36 Phil., 774.)

The period within which the record on appeal and appeal bond should be perfected and filed may, however, be
extended by order of the court, upon application made, prior to the expiration of the original period. (Layda
vs.Legaspi, 39 Phil., 83.)

Rules of courts, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect of law; and rules of court prescribing
the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.
(Shioji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil., 333.)

Strict compliance with the rules of court has been held mandatory and imperative, so that failure to pay the
docket fee in the Supreme Court, within the period fixed for that purpose, will cause the dismissal of the appeal.
(Salaveria vs. Albindo, 39Phil., 922.) In the same manner, on failure of the appellant in a civil case to serve his
brief, within the time prescribed by said rules, on motion of the appellee and notice to the appellant, or on its
own motion, the court may dismiss the appeal. (Shioji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil., 333.)

Counsel for the petitioner Fredesvindo Alvero alleges as an excuse, for his failure to perfect and file his appeal,
in due time, the illness of his wife, which ended in her death on January 10, 1946, and by which he was greatly
affected.

Unfortunately, counsel for petitioner has created a difficult situation. In his motion for reconsideration and new
trial, dated December 27, 1945, he did not point out specifically the findings or conclusions in the judgment, are
not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making express reference to the pertinent evidence
or legal provisions, as expressly required by Rule 37, section 2, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court. Motions of
that kind have been considered as motions pro forma intended merely to delay the proceeding, and, as such,
they cannot and will not interrupt or suspend the period of time for the perfection of the appeal. (Valdez vs.
Jugo, 74 Phil., 49, and Reyes vs. Court of Appeals and Bautista, 74 Phil., 235.)

Hence, the period for perfecting herein petitioner's appeal commenced from November 28, 1945, when he was
notified of the judgment rendered in the case, and expired on December 28, 1945; and, therefore, his notice of
appeal and record on appeal filed on January 8, 1946, were filed out of time, and much more so his appeal bond,
which was only filed on January 15, 1946.

BASIC CONCEPTS

i. Meaning of Procedural Law

5. Jose v. Javellana (GR No 158239; 01/25/12)

Principle:
The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the defending partys motion to dismiss is not an
interlocutory but a final order because it puts an end to the particular matter involved, or settles definitely the
matter therein disposed of, as to leave nothing for the trial court to do other than to execute the order.
Accordingly, the claiming party has a fresh period of 15 days from notice of the denial within which to appeal
the denial.

FACTS:
Alma Jose sold two parcels of land to respondent Ramon Javellana under a deed of conditional sale.

Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking to cause the registration of the properties under the Torrens and
began dumping filling materials to the property

Javellana prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain
Priscilla from dumping filling materials in the parcels of land; and that Priscilla be ordered to institute registration
proceedings and then to execute a final deed of sale in his favor.

Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred by prescription; and that the
complaint did not state a cause of action. The RTC denied Priscilla’s motion to dismiss on Feb 4, 1998 however
upon motion for recon the RTC reversed its decision on June 24, 1999. Respondent Javellana moved for
reconsideration,

However on its June 21, 2000 order, the RTC denied the motion for recon for lack of any reason to disturb the
order of June 14, 1999. Accordingly, Javellana filed a notice of appeal from the June 21, 2000 order, which the
RTC gave due course to, and the records were elevated to the Court of Appeals (CA).

It appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to assail the June 24,
1999 and June 21, 2000 orders dismissing his complaint (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455).

On August 6, 2001, however, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, finding that the RTC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders, and holding that it only committed, at most, an error of judgment
correctible by appeal in issuing the challenged orders.
On November 20, 2002, the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259, reversing and setting aside
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97, and remanding the records to the RTC for further proceedings in
accordance with law.

On May 9, 2003, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration, stating that it decided to give due course
to the appeal even if filed out of time because Javellana had no intention to delay the proceedings, as in fact he
did not even seek an extension of time to file his appellants brief. Hence this petition.

Contention of Petitioner
Priscilla countered that the June 2000 order was not appealable; that the appeal was not perfected on time;
and that Javellana was guilty of forum shopping.

ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the RTC Order was not appealable?
II. Whether or not the appeal was made on time?
III. Whether or not Javella is guilty of forum shopping?

RULING:
I. APPEALABLE

Priscilla submits that the order of June 21, 2000 was not the proper subject of an appeal considering that Section
1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that no appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion for
reconsideration.

Priscillas submission is erroneous and cannot be sustained. First of all, the denial of Javellanas motion for
reconsideration left nothing more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-
M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one.

The Court has distinguished between final and interlocutory orders in (Pahila- Garrido v. Tortogo),

The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject
matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except
to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case
but leaves something else to be decided upon.

An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the
judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does
the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it
does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.

And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or
not. A final order is appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court to the effect that appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes
of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable;[23] but the remedy
from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari. The explanation for the
differentiation of remedies given in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo is apt:
Appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during
the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the
case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one
of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are
interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an
appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in
the appeal of the judgment itself.

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under
Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.

Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration of a final order
or judgment is effectively an appeal from the final order or judgment itself; and has expressly clarified that the
prohibition against appealing an order denying a motion for reconsideration referred only to a denial of a motion
for reconsideration of an interlocutory order.

II. The appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes vs. CA

Court meanwhile adopted the fresh period rule in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[25] by which an aggrieved party
desirous of appealing an adverse judgment or final order is allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to
file the notice of appeal in the RTC reckoned from receipt of the order denying a motion for a new trial or motion
for reconsideration,

The fresh period rule may be applied to this case, for the Court has already retroactively extended the fresh
period rule to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right
of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there are no vested rights in rules of
procedure. According to De los Santos v. Vda. De Mangubat:

Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that courts
may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law,
or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statues ― they may be given retroactive effect on actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may
feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure. The fresh period
rule is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which an appeal may be made in the
event that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court.

Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be applied to pending
actions, such as the present case. Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the fresh period rule will amount
to injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment and final order were issued two years later or
in the year 2000, as compared to the notice of judgment and final order in Neypes which were issued in 1998.
It will be incongruous and illogical that parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders issued in the year
1998 will enjoy the benefit of the fresh period rule while those later rulings of the lower courts such as in the
instant case, will not.

Consequently, we rule that Javellanas notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to the fresh period rule.

III. No Forum shopping was committed

Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum
seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action
of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause or supposition
that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping happens when, in the two or
more pending cases, there is identity of parties, identity of rights or causes of action, and identity of reliefs
sought.

Where the elements of litis pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the other, there is forum shopping. For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action,
there must be:

(a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts;
(c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.

For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transaction, same essential facts and
circumstances and must raise identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does not exist
where different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives
were sought.

ii. Nature and Purpose of Procedural Law

6. Samahan v. Hon. Magsalin (GR No. 172303; 6/6/11)

FACTS:
Petitioner Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-APL is a duly registered union and the certified
bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of Hyatt Regency Manila. The General Manager of
Hyatt issued a Memorandum[5] informing all hotel employees that hotel security have been instructed to
conduct a thorough bag inspection and body frisking in every entrance and exit of the hotel. He enjoined
employees to comply therewith. Copies of the Memorandum were furnished petitioner.

Angelito Caragdag, A waiter of the hotel refused to be frisked. The incident was reported to the HRD. Caragdag
was held liable for offenses subject to disciplinary action for threatening, coercing and provoking to fight his
superior for reasons directly connected with his discharge of official duty. Caragdag committed another
infraction in which he left his work assignment during official hours without prior permission.

Because of the series of infractions, he was penalized with three suspensions during a 12 month period.
Caragdags dismissal was questioned by petitioner, and the dispute was referred to voluntary arbitration upon
agreement of the parties. On May 6, 2002, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision which affirms the three
separate suspensions of Mr. Caragdag.
Petitioner sought for reconsideration of the decision while respondent filed a motion for a partial
reconsideration. However the Voluntary Arbitrator denied both motions
On August 1, 2003, petitioner assailed the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator before the CA in a petition for
certiorari.
The CA dismissed the petition outright for being the wrong remedy. The CA explained that:
 Rule 43, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provides that the proper mode of appeal
from judgments, final orders or resolution of voluntary arbitrators is through a Petition for Review which
should be filed within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of notice of judgment, order or resolution of the
voluntary arbitrator.
Considering that petitioner intends this petition to be a Petition for Certiorari, the Court hereby resolves
to dismiss the petition outright for being an improper mode of appeal.
Even if this Court treats the instant petition as a Petition for Review, still the Court has no alternative
but to dismiss the same for having been filed out of time. As admitted by the petitioner it received the
Order dated 26 May 2003 denying their motion for reconsideration on 02 June 2003. The fifteen (15) day
period within which to appeal through a Petition for Review is until June 17, 2003. The petitioner filed the
present petition on August 1, 2003, way beyond the reglementary period provided for by the Rules.

Contention of Petitioner
Petitoner argues that because decisions rendered by voluntary arbtirators are issued under the Labor Code,
they are not covered by Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner points out that Rule 43 shall not
apply to judgments or final orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines. Hence, a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy for questioning the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator, and
petitioner having availed of such remedy, the CA erred in declaring that the petition was filed out of time since
the petition was filed within the sixty (60)-day reglementary period.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RULE 43 is the Proper Remedy and whether or not the Appeal was filed on time.

RULING:
RULE 43 is the proper Remedy and not Rule 65. The appeal was not filed on time.
Hence, upon receipt on May 26, 2003 of the Voluntary Arbitrators Resolution denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration, petitioner should have filed with the CA, within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period, a
petition for review, not a petition for certiorari.

In the case of Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-APL v. Bacungan, we repeated the well-
settled rule that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is appealable to the CA via petition for review
under Rule 43. We held that:
The question on the proper recourse to assail a decision of a voluntary arbitrator has already been
settled in Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees, where the Court
held that the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be
appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular
No. 1-95 (now embodied in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), just like those of the quasi-judicial
agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein, and consistent with the original purpose to
provide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities.
Subsequently, in Alcantara, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, and Nippon Paint Employees Union-Olalia v. Court of
Appeals, the Court reiterated the aforequoted ruling.
In Alcantara, the Court held that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 43, the ruling in Luzon Development
Bank still stands. The Court explained, thus:

The provisions may be new to the Rules of Court but it is far from being a new law. Section 2, Rules 42
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as presently worded, is nothing more but a reiteration of the exception
to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, as provided for in Section 9, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902:
 (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or
awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees Compensation
Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act and of subparagraph (1) of the
third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act
of 1948.

The Court took into account this exception in Luzon Development Bank but, nevertheless, held that the
decisions of voluntary arbitrators issued pursuant to the Labor Code do not come within its ambit x x x

Petitioner insists on a liberal interpretation of the rules but we find no cogent reason in this case to deviate from
the general rule. Verily, rules of procedure exist for a noble purpose, and to disregard such rules in the guise of
liberal construction would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere
technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law ensures the effective
enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice.
Rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation. But they help provide for a vital system of
justice where suitors may be heard following judicial procedure and in the correct forum. Public order and our
system of justice are well served by a conscientious observance by the parties of the procedural rules.

7. Jose v. Javellana (Supra)

Principle:
The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the defending partys motion to dismiss is
not an interlocutory but a final order because it puts an end to the particular matter involved, or settles
definitely the matter therein disposed of, as to leave nothing for the trial court to do other than to execute the
order. Accordingly, the claiming party has a fresh period of 15 days from notice of the denial within which to
appeal the denial.

FACTS:
Alma Jose sold two parcels of land to respondent Ramon Javellana under a deed of conditional sale.

Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking to cause the registration of the properties under the Torrens and
began dumping filling materials to the property

Javellana prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain
Priscilla from dumping filling materials in the parcels of land; and that Priscilla be ordered to institute registration
proceedings and then to execute a final deed of sale in his favor.

Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred by prescription; and that the
complaint did not state a cause of action. The RTC denied Priscilla’s motion to dismiss on Feb 4, 1998 however
upon motion for recon the RTC reversed its decision on June 24, 1999. Respondent Javellana moved for
reconsideration,
However on its June 21, 2000 order, the RTC denied the motion for recon for lack of any reason to disturb the
order of June 14, 1999. Accordingly, Javellana filed a notice of appeal from the June 21, 2000 order, which the
RTC gave due course to, and the records were elevated to the Court of Appeals (CA).

It appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to assail the June 24,
1999 and June 21, 2000 orders dismissing his complaint (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455).

On August 6, 2001, however, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, finding that the RTC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders, and holding that it only committed, at most, an error of judgment
correctible by appeal in issuing the challenged orders.

On November 20, 2002, the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259, reversing and setting aside
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97, and remanding the records to the RTC for further proceedings in
accordance with law.

On May 9, 2003, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration, stating that it decided to give due course to the
appeal even if filed out of time because Javellana had no intention to delay the proceedings, as in fact he did
not even seek an extension of time to file his appellants brief. Hence this petition

Contention of Petitioner
Priscilla countered that the June 2000 order was not appealable; that the appeal was not perfected on time;
and that Javellana was guilty of forum shopping.

ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the RTC Order was not appealable?
II. Whether or not the appeal was made on time?
III. Whether or not Javella is guilty of forum shopping?

RULING:
I. APPEALABLE

Priscilla submits that the order of June 21, 2000 was not the proper subject of an appeal considering that Section
1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that no appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion for
reconsideration.

Priscillas submission is erroneous and cannot be sustained. First of all, the denial of Javellanas motion for
reconsideration left nothing more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-
M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one.

The Court has distinguished between final and interlocutory orders in (Pahila- Garrido v. Tortogo),

The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject
matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except
to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case
but leaves something else to be decided upon.
An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the
judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does
the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it
does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.

And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or
not. A final order is appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court to the effect that appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes
of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable;[23] but the remedy
from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari. The explanation for the
differentiation of remedies given in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo is apt:

Appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during
the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the
case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one
of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are
interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an
appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in
the appeal of the judgment itself.

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under
Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.

Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration of a final order
or judgment is effectively an appeal from the final order or judgment itself; and has expressly clarified that the
prohibition against appealing an order denying a motion for reconsideration referred only to a denial of a motion
for reconsideration of an interlocutory order.

II. The appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes vs. CA

Court meanwhile adopted the fresh period rule in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[25] by which an aggrieved party
desirous of appealing an adverse judgment or final order is allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to
file the notice of appeal in the RTC reckoned from receipt of the order denying a motion for a new trial or motion
for reconsideration,

The fresh period rule may be applied to this case, for the Court has already retroactively extended the fresh
period rule to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right
of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there are no vested rights in rules of
procedure. According to De los Santos v. Vda. De Mangubat:

Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that courts
may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law,
or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statues ― they may be given retroactive effect on actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may
feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure. The fresh period
rule is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which an appeal may be made in the
event that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court.
 Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be applied to pending
actions, such as the present case. Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the fresh period rule will amount
to injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment and final order were issued two years later or
in the year 2000, as compared to the notice of judgment and final order in Neypes which were issued in 1998.
It will be incongruous and illogical that parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders issued in the year
1998 will enjoy the benefit of the fresh period rule while those later rulings of the lower courts such as in the
instant case, will not.

Consequently, we rule that Javellanas notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to the fresh period rule.

III. No Forum shopping was committed

Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum
seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action
of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause or supposition
that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping happens when, in the two or
more pending cases, there is identity of parties, identity of rights or causes of action, and identity of reliefs
sought.

Where the elements of litis pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the other, there is forum shopping. For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action,
there must be:

(a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts;
(c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in
one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.

For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transaction, same essential facts and
circumstances and must raise identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does not exist
where different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives
were sought.

iii. Retroactive application of procedural rules

8. Light Railway Transit Authority v. Salvaña (GR No. 192074; 6/10/14)

PRINCIPLE:
Thus, procedural laws may operate retroactively as to pending proceedings even without express
provision to that effect. Accordingly, rules of procedure can apply to cases pending at the time of their
enactment. In fact, statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be applied on actions undetermined at
the time of their effectivity. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.

FACTS:
This is an administrative case being filed by the Light Railway Transit Authority (TRLA) against Atyy.
Aurora A. Salvana being dishonest, falsifying the official documents, grave misconduct, gross insubordination,
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service and appealing to the Court for the concept of the “party
adversely affected” by the decision by the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

It was stated that the respondent was the officer in charge of TRLA Administrative Department which
directed her to handle special projects, perform and handle functions as an administrator. She was revoked
from the position and was replaced by Atty. Stephen P. Triste. She questioned such order with the Office of the
President. After which, she applied for a sick leave absence which was supported by a medical certificate but
was falsified.

The Administrator, Melquiades Robles, issued a notice of preliminary investigation and asking her to
explain that why should there be no disciplinary action should be taken against her and submitting a falsified
medical certificate. Atty. Salvana explained and alleged that she is a board member which she used to invoking
not to sign a resolution of a particular bidder.

The TRLA Fact Finding Committee found her explanation unsatisfactory and issues the charges against
her which lead her to tender and file an irrevocable resignation. However, she was found guilty for the charges
against her which lead her to appeal to the CSC. CSC modified the decision into simple dishonesty which TRLA
appealed for such decision.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the Civil Service Commission’s finding that
Salvaña was only guilty of simple dishonesty. The appellate court also ruled that Administrator Robles had no
standing to file a motion for reconsideration before the Civil Service Commission because that right only
belonged to respondent in an administrative case. LRTA moved for reconsideration of this decision but was
denied. Hence, LRTA filed this present petition. Petitioner argues that it has the legal personality to appeal the
decision of the Civil Service Commission before the Court of Appeals. It cites Philippine National Bank v. Garcia as
basis for its argument that it can be considered a "person adversely affected" under the pertinent rules and
regulations on the appeal of administrative cases. It also argues that respondent’s falsification of the medical
certificate accompanying her application for sick leave was not merely simple but serious dishonesty.

Respondent agrees with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that petitioner had no legal personality to file
the appeal since it was not the "person adversely affected" by the decision. She counters that Administrator
Robles had no authority to file the appeal since he was unable to present a resolution from the Board of
Directors authorizing him to do so. She also agrees with the Civil Service Commission’s finding that she was
merely guilty of simple dishonesty.

ISSUE:
Whether or not LTRA has the standing to appeal the modification by the CSC as it is only the “partly
adverse affected” party can appeal such decision

RULING:
The Court held that the parties adversely affected by the decision in an administrative case who may appeal
shall include the disciplining authority whose decision dismissing the employee was either overturned or
modified by the Civil Service Commission.

PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in an administrative case has
been rendered or to the disciplining authority in an appeal from a decision reversing or modifying the original
decision. (Emphasis supplied)
Procedural laws have retroactive application. In Zulueta v. Asia Brewery:
As a general rule, laws have no retroactive effect. But there are certain recognized exceptions, such as when
they are remedial or procedural in nature. This Court explained this exception in the following language:

It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary
is provided. But there are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or
REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.

On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure,
which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within
the general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes.

Thus, procedural laws may operate retroactively as to pending proceedings even without express provision to
that effect. Accordingly, rules of procedure can apply to cases pending at the time of their enactment. In fact,
statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be applied on actions undetermined at the time of their
effectivity. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. (Emphasis supplied).

Remedial rights are those rights granted by remedial or procedural laws. These are rights that only operate to
further the rules of procedure or to confirm vested rights. As such, the retroactive application of remedial rights
will not adversely affect the vested rights of any person. Considering that the right to appeal is a right remedial
in nature, we find that Section 4, paragraph (k), Rule I of the RACCS applies in this case. Petitioner, therefore,
had the right to appeal the decision of the Civil Service Commission that modified its original decision of
dismissal.

Recent decisions implied the retroactive application of this rule. While the right of government parties to appeal
was not an issue, this court gave due course to the appeals filed by government agencies before the
promulgation of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

In Civil Service Commission v. Clave, the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) found one of its
employees, Aurora M. Clave, guilty of simple neglect of duty. The Civil Service Commission affirmed the GSIS’s
findings. The Court of Appeals, however, while affirming the Civil Service Commission, reduced the penalty. Both
the GSIS and the Civil Service Commission were given standing to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals.

In GSIS v. Chua, the GSIS dismissed Heidi R. Chua for grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of service. The Civil Service Commission affirmed the GSIS, but the Court of Appeals, while
affirming the findings of the Commission, modified the penalty to simple misconduct. The GSIS was then allowed
to bring an appeal of the modification of the penalty with this court.

Thus, we now hold that the parties adversely affected by a decision in an administrative case who may appeal
shall include the disciplining authority whose decision dismissing the employee was either overturned or
modified by the Civil Service Commission.

9. Panay Railways, Inc. v. Heva Management (GR No. 154061; 1/25/2012

PRINCIPLE:
Procedure of courts are considered applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.
Procedural Laws are retroactive up to that extent.
FACTS:
The present Petition stems from the dismissal by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City of a Notice
of Appeal for petitioners failure to pay the corresponding docket fees.

Petitioner Panay Railways Inc, a government-owned and controlled corporation, executed a Real Estate
Mortgage Contract covering several parcels of lands, including Lot No. 6153, in favor of Traders Royal Bank (TRB)
to secure ₱20 million worth of loan and credit accommodations.

Petitioner excluded certain portions of Lot No. 6153: that already sold to Shell Co., Inc. referred to as
6153-B, a road referred to as 6153-C, and a squatter area known as 6153-D.
Petitioner failed to pay its obligations to TRB, prompting the bank to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgaged
properties including Lot No. 6153. On 20 January 1986, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of the bank as
the highest bidder and purchaser. Consequently, the sale of Lot No. 6153 was registered with the Register of
Deeds on 28 January 1986 and annotated at the back of the transfer certificates of title (TCT) covering the
mortgaged properties.

Petitioner filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract to Sell and Absolute Sale. Respondent then filed
a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that there was a waiver, an abandonment and an extinguishment of
petitioners claim or demand.

The RTC issued an order granting the Motion to Dismiss of Respondents ruling that the manifestation
was executed by petitioners duly authorized representative with the assistance of counsel. This admission thus
operated as a waiver barring petitioner from claiming otherwise.

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal without paying the necessary docket fees. Immediately thereafter,
respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground of nonpayment of docket fees.

Petitioner alleged that its counsel was not yet familiar with the revisions of the Rules of Court that
became effective only on 1 July 1997. Its representative was likewise not informed by the court personnel that
docket fees needed to be paid upon the filing of the Notice of Appeal. Furthermore, it contended that the
requirement for the payment of docket fees was not mandatory. It therefore asked the RTC for a liberal
interpretation of the procedural rules on appeals.
The RTC issued an Order dismissing the appeal citing Sec. 4 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner thereafter moved for a reconsideration of the Order alleging that the trial court lost
jurisdiction over the case after the former had filed the Notice of Appeal. Petitioner also alleged that the court
erred in failing to relax procedural rules for the sake of substantial justice.

The RTC denied the Motion.

On 28 January 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus under Rule 65 alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction to dismiss the Notice of Appeal, and that the
trial court had acted with grave abuse of discretion when it strictly applied procedural rules.

On 29 November 2000, the CA rendered its Decision on the Petition. It held that while the failure of
petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period was a ground for the dismissal
of the appeal pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court, the jurisdiction to do so belonged to
the CA and not the trial court. Thus, appellate court ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the appeal and set aside the latters assailed Order dated 29 September 1997.

VERY IMPORTANT PART!!!

It appears that prior to the promulgation of the CAs Decision, this Court issued Administrative Matter (A.M.) No.
00-2-10-SC which took effect on 1 May 2000, amending Rule 4, Sec. 7 and Sec. 13 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Court. The circular expressly provided that trial courts may, motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss an
appeal for being filed out of time or for nonpayment of docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary
period. Subsequently, Circular No. 48-2000[13] was issued on 29 August 2000 and was addressed to all lower
courts.

The Petitioner filed a Motion for Recon contending:

Contention of Petitioner
Petitioner alleges that SC Circular No. 48-2000 should not be given retroactive effect. It also alleged that the CA
should consider the case as exceptionally meritorious. Petitioners counsel, Atty. Rexes V. Alejano, explained that
he was yet to familiarize himself with the Revised Rules of Court, which became effective a little over a month
before he filed the Notice of Appeal. He was thus not aware that the nonpayment of docket fees might lead to
the dismissal of the case.
The CA denied the Petitioner’s Motion for Recon. Hence this petition

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the RTC Dismissal of the Notice of Appeal and that SC Circular No. 48-
2000 should be given retroactive effect?

RULING:
Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are considered applicable to actions pending and
unresolved at the time of their passage. Procedural laws and rules are retroactive in that sense and to that
extent. The effect of procedural statutes and rules on the rights of a litigant may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. This retroactive application does not violate any right of a person adversely
affected. Neither is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule, no vested right may
attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules. It has been held that a person has no vested right in any
particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal,
of any other than the existing rules of procedure. More so when, as in this case, petitioner admits that it was
not able to pay the docket fees on time. Clearly, there were no substantive rights to speak of when the RTC
dismissed the Notice of Appeal.
The argument that the CA had the exclusive jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal has no merit. When this Court
accordingly amended Sec. 13 of Rule 41 through A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, the RTCs dismissal of the action may be
considered to have had the imprimatur of the Court. Thus, the CA committed no reversible error when it
sustained the dismissal of the appeal, taking note of its directive on the matter prior to the promulgation of its
Decision.
As early as 1932, in Lazaro v. Endencia, we have held that the payment of the full amount of the docket fees is
an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fees.
 Side Comments:
Moreover, the right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is merely a statutory
privilege, which may be exercised only in accordance with the law.
We have repeatedly stated that the term substantial justice is not a magic wand that would automatically
compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply
because their non-observance may result in prejudice to a partys substantive rights. Like all other rules, they
are required to be followed, except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve
litigants of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of their thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed.

iv. Exceptions to the retroactive application of procedural rules

10. Tan v. Court of Appeals (GR No. 136368; 1/16/2002)

FACTS:
On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a consideration of P59,200 executed a deed of absolute sale over the
property in question in favor of spouses Jose Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal. Simultaneous with the
execution of this deed, the same contracting parties entered into another agreement whereunder Tan was given
one (1) year within which to redeem or repurchase the property. Tan failed to redeem the property until his
death on January 4, 1988.

On May 2, 1988, Tan's heirs filed before the RTC at Davao City a suit against the Magdangals for reformation
of instrument alleging that while Tan and the Magdangals denominated their agreement as deed of absolute
sale, their real intention was to conclude an equitable mortgage.

RTC rendered judgment finding for Tan, portion of which reads:

1) The Deed of Absolute Sale is, in accordance with the true intention of the parties, hereby declared and
reformed an equitable mortgage;

2) The plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendants within 120 days after the finality of this decision P59,200 plus
interest at the rate of 12% per annum from May 2, 1988, the date the complaint was filed, until paid;

3)xxx.

On Sept. 28, 1995, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Both parties received the decision of the
appellate court on Oct. 5, 1995. On March 13, 1996, the clerk of court of the appellate court entered in the
Book of Entries of Judgement the decision xxx and issued the corresponding Entry of Judgment which, on its
face, stated that the said decision has on Oct. 21, 1995 become final and executory.

Magdangals filed in the RTC a Motion for Consolidation and Writ of Possession alleging that the 120-day
period of redemption of the petitioner has expired.

On June 10, 1996, the RTC allowed the petitioner to redeem the lot in question. It ruled that the 120-day
redemption period should be reckoned from the date of Entry of Judgment in the CA or from March 13, 1996.
The redemption price was deposited on April 17, 1996.
ISSUE:
What rule should govern the finality of judgment favorably obtained in the trial court by the petitioner?

RULING:
From 1991-1996, the years relevant to the case at bar, the rule that governs finality of judgment is Rule 51 of
the Revised Rules of Court. Its sections 10 and 11 provide:

SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. If no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is
filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith be entered by
the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date when the judgments or final resolution becomes
executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the
judgment or final resolution and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final
resolution has become final and executory.

SEC.11. Execution of judgment. Except where the judgment or final order or resolution, or a portion thereof, is
ordered to be immediately executory, the motion for its execution may only be filed in the proper court after
its entry.

The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, amended the rule on finality of judgment by providing in
section 1, Rule 39 as follows:

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion,
upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to
appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the
court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment
or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the
adverse party.

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court
of origin to issue the writ of execution.

SC hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given retroactive effect in
this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner. Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to redeem
the subject lot and this right is a substantive right. Petitioner followed the procedural rule then existing as well
as the decisions of this Court governing the reckoning date of the period of redemption when he redeemed
the subject lot. Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure
which if applied retroactively would result in his losing the right to redeem the subject lot. It is difficult to
reconcile the retroactive application of this procedural rule with the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be
penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he faithfully followed the laws and the rule on the period of
redemption when he made the redemption.

v. Fresh-Period Rule
11. Neypes v. Court of Appeals (Supra)

FACTS:
Petitioners Domingo Neypes, et.al, filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, of Roxas,
Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and
the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.

In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and respondents) filed various motions
with the trial court. Among these were: (1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the respondent heirs, the
Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in default and (2) the motions to dismiss filed by the
respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines, respectively.

In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent Judge Antonio N. Rosales,
resolved the foregoing motions as follows:

(1) the petitioners motion to declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development
in default was granted for their failure to file an answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs
of del Mundo because the substituted service of summons on them was improper;
(2) the Land Banks motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied because there were
hypothetical admissions and matters that could be determined only after trial, and
(3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied
because there were factual matters that could be determined only after trial.

The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss on the
ground that the trial court could very well resolve the issue of prescription from the bare allegations of the
complaint itself without waiting for the trial proper.

In an order dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioner’s complaint on the ground that the
action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998
and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the
trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22,
1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3,
1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days
late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this
too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.

On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to
appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order
dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the final order appealable under the
Rules.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision. This was denied by the Court
of Appeals on January 6, 2000 prompting the petitioners to file before the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the
Rues of Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the instant petition was filed out of time or has been prescribe.
Whether or not July 1, 2018 is to be construed as the last and final order under Section 3, Rule 41 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

RULING:
Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to appeal the
decision of the trial court. On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file
a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR
only interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period. It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR on the
last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon
receipt of the notice of denial of their MR.

We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days,
counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This
pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be
taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word or
signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the
sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of or in the above provision supposes that the notice of
appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final order,
which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or
reconsideration.

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the
Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the final order) denying his
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if
either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal
period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.

Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying
their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal
period of 15 days, as already discussed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
12. Yu v. Hon. Samson-Tatad (GR No. 170979; 2/9/2011)

FACTS:
Based on the complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina Casaclang, an information for estafa against the
petitioner Judith Yu was filed with the RTC.

In a May 26, 2005 decision, the RTC convicted the petitioner as charged. Fourteen (14) days later, or on
June 9, 2005, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the RTC, alleging that she discovered new and
material evidence that would exculpate her of the crime for which she was convicted.

In an October 17, 2005 order, respondent Judge denied the petitioners motion for new trial for lack of merit.

On November 16, 2005, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that pursuant to our
ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, she had a fresh period of 15 days from November 3, 2005, the receipt of
the denial of her motion for new trial, or up to November 18, 2005, within which to file a notice of appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the fresh period rule as enunciated in Neypes applies to criminal cass.

RULING:
The petition is with merits.
The raison dtre for the fresh period rule is to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules and do
away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to
appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration; litigants
today need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day
period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration
or any final order or resolution.

While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement of a fresh period
to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:

1. BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no distinction
between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states
that [t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all
cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or
decision appealed from.
2. The provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no
substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are concerned the appeal period stops
running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the
order denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration.
 3. While the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under Section
6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule
45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to
appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In light of these legal realities, we hold that the petitioner seasonably filed her notice of appeal
on November 16, 2005, within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from November 3, 2005, the date of receipt
of notice denying her motion for new trial.

WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is hereby GRANTED.

13. San Lorenzo Builders v. Bayang (GR No. 194702; 4/20/2015)

FACTS:
On April 15, 2000, petitioner SLR Builders (then known as Violago Builders, Inc), as seller, and respondent
Ma. Cristina F. Bayang (Cristina), as buyer, entered into a "contract to sell" of a sixty (60)-square meter lot in
Violago Homes Parkwoods Subdivision, located in Barangay Payatas, Quezon City.

Upon full payment of the monthly amortizations on the purchased lot, Cristina demanded from SLR
Builders the execution of the deed of absolute sale and the lot's certificate of title but the latter failed to deliver,
prompting Cristina to file a complaint for specific performance and damages against SLR Builders and its
President, Oscar Violago (petitioners) before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

In a decision dated February 16, 2004, Housing and Land Use Arbiter Atty. Joselito F. Melchor ruled in
Cristina's favor.

The petitioners appealed Arbiter Melchor's decision to the HLURB Board of Commissioners. The Board
dismissed and denied, respectively, the petitioners' appeal and subsequent motion for reconsideration. The
petitioners then brought their case to the Office of the President (OP) and the same has been denied for having
the appeal filed out of time.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies to administrative appeals, such as an appeal filed
from a decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Office to the President..

RULING:
The "fresh period rule" in Neypes declares:
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal
their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration.
 As reflected in the portion of the decision in Neypes, the "fresh period rule" shall apply to:
1. Rule 40_(appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts);
2. Rule 41 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court);
3. Rule 42 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals);
4. Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals); and
5. Rule 45 (appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court).

Obviously, these Rules cover judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

In this case, the subject appeal from a decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the OP, is not
judicial but administrative in nature; thus, the "fresh period rule" in Neypes does not apply.

As aptly pointed out by the OP, the rules and regulations governing appeals from decisions of the HLURB
Board of Commissioners to the OP are Section 2, Rule XXI of HLURB Resolution No. 765, series of 2004, in relation
to Paragraph 2, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987:

Section 2, Rule XXI of the HLURB Resolution No. 765, series of 2004, prescribing the rules and
regulations governing appeals from decisions of the Board of Commissioners to the Office of the President,
pertinently reads:
Section 2. Appeal. - Any party may, upon notice to the Board and the other party, appeal a decision
rendered by the Board of Commissioners to the Office of the President within fifteen (15) days from receipt
thereof, in accordance with P.D. No. 1344 and A.O. No. 18 Series of 1987.

The pendency of the motion for reconsideration shall suspend the running of the period of appeal to the
Office of the President.

Corollary thereto, paragraph 2, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987, provides that in
case the aggrieved party files a motion for reconsideration from an adverse decision of any agency/office, the
said party has the only remaining balance of the prescriptive period within which to appeal, reckoned from
receipt of notice of the decision denying his/her motion for reconsideration.12 (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, in applying the above-mentioned rules to the present case, we find that the CA correctly affirmed the
OP in dismissing the petitioners' appeal for having been filed out of time.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the present petition for review on certiorari and AFFIRM the decision dated July 23,
2010 and resolution dated December 2, 2010 of the Court of Appeals.

14. Fortune Life v. Commission on Audit (GR No. 213525; 01/27/2015)

FACTS:
Respondent Provincial Government of Antique (LGU) and the petitioner Fortune Life Insurance Company
executed a memorandum of agreement concerning the life insurance coverage of qualified barangay
secretaries, treasurers and tanod, the former obligating P4,393,593.60 for the premium payment, and
subsequently submitting the corresponding disbursement voucher to COA-Antique for pre-audit. The latter
office disallowed the payment for lack of legal basis under Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).
Respondent LGU appealed but its appeal was denied.

Consequently, the petitioner filed its petition for money claim in the COA. The COA issued its decision
denying the petition, holding that under Section 447 and Section 458 of the Local Government Code only
municipal or city governments are expressly vested with the power to secure group insurance coverage for
barangay workers; and noting the LGU's failure to comply with the requirement of publication under Section 21
of Republic Act No. 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act).

The petitioner received a copy of the COA decision on December 14, 2012, and filed its motion for
reconsideration on January 14, 2013. However, the COA denied the motion, the denial being received by the
petitioner on July 14, 2014

Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 on August 12, 2014, but the petition for
certiorari was dismissed as earlier stated through the resolution promulgated on August 19, 2014 for (a) the late
filing of the petition; (b) the non-submission of the proof of service and verified declaration; and (c) the failure
to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 within the reglementary period
following the fresh period rule enunciated in Neypes v. Court of Appeals.

RULING:
The petitioner's position cannot be sustained.
There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and the petition for certiorari under Rule
64.

As to the nature of the procedures, Rule 42 governs an appeal from the judgment or final order rendered
by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Such appeal is on a question of fact, or of
law, or of mixed question of fact and law, and is given due course only upon a prima facie showing that the
Regional Trial Court committed an error of fact or law warranting the reversal or modification of the challenged
judgment or final order. In contrast, the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 is similar to the petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, and assails a judgment or final order of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), or
the Commission on Audit (COA). The petition is not designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
judgment. Questions of fact cannot be raised except to determine whether the COMELEC or the COA were guilty
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the aggrieved party is
allowed 15 days to file the petition for review from receipt of the assailed decision or final order, or from receipt
of the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. In the latter, the petition is filed within 30 days from
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, interrupts the period;
hence, should the motion be denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period,
which shall not be less than five days in any event, reckoned from the notice of denial.

The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013, which was 31 days after receiving
the assailed decision of the COA on December 14, 2012. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 64, it had only five days
from receipt of the denial of its motion for reconsideration to file the petition. Considering that it received the
notice of the denial on July 14, 2014, it had only until July 19, 2014 to file the petition. However, it filed the
petition on August 13, 2014, which was 25 days too late.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration for its lack of merit

15. Jocson v. San Miguel (GR No. 206941; 3/9/2016)

FACTS:
On September 10, 2008, Milagrosa C. Jocson (Jocson) filed with the DARAB-PARAD, Region III of San
Fernando City, Pampanga, a Complaint for ejectment with damages against respondent Nelson San Miguel and
all persons claiming rights under him.

She asserted that 56,000 sq m thereof became the subject of an Agricultural Leasehold Contract (Contract)
between her and San Miguel, with the latter as tenant-lessee. As part of the contract, they agreed that the
subject landholding shall be devoted to sugar and rice production.

According to Jocson, San Miguel, however, occupied the entire landholding and refused to vacate the
portion not covered by their Contract despite repeated demands. On December 15, 2009, Jocson filed a
Supplemental Complaint alleging that, during the pendency of the present suit, San Miguel commenced to plant
corn on the subject landholding which violated their Contract. In his Answer, San Miguel maintained that he had
religiously complied with all the terms and conditions of their Contract and that Jocson has no valid ground to
eject him from the disputed landholding.

On January 26, 2011, PARAD Provincial Adjudicator Vicente Aselo S. Sicat (PA Sicat) rendered a Decision:
1. TERMINATING the existing leasehold contract of the parties as well as their tenancy relationship;
2. ORDERING [San Miguel] and all persons claiming rights under him to peacefully vacate and surrender the
land to Jocson;
3. DISMISSING all other claims for want of evidence.

San Miguel filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied and thus San Miguel filed his notice of
appeal to the CA. The CA granted the petition applying the Neypes rule and remanding the case to the DARAB-
PARAD for further proceedings. Jocson filed her MR but it was denied hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the application of the FRESH PERIOD RULE provided under the
2009 DARAB rules of procedure which took effect during the pendency of this suit before the PARAD.
RULING:
Section 1, Rule XXIV of the 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure explicitly states that:

Sec. 1. Transitory Provisions. These Rules shall govern all cases filed on or after its effectivity. All cases
pending with the Board and the Adjudicators, prior to the date of effectivity of these Rules, shall be
governed by the DARAB Rules prevailing at the time of their filing.

In the present case, the Complaint was filed on September 10, 2008 prior to the date of effectivity of the
2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure on September 1, 2009. Thus, pursuant to the above-cited rule, the applicable
rule in the counting of the period for filing a Notice of Appeal with the Board is governed by Section 12, Rule X
of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, which states that:

The filing of the Motion for Reconsideration shall interrupt the period to perfect an appeal. If the
motion is denied, the aggrieved party shall have the remaining period within which to perfect his appeal.
Said period shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from the receipt of the notice of denial.

This Court likewise finds no merit to San Miguel's contention that the "fresh period rule" laid down in
Neypes is applicable in the instant case.

The "fresh period rule" shall apply to Rule 40 (appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts); Rule 41 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the [CA] or Supreme Court); Rule 42 (appeals from
the Regional Trial Courts to the [CA]); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the [CA]); and Rule 45
(appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court). Obviously, these Rules cover judicial proceedings under the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Petitioner's present case is administrative in nature involving an appeal from the decision or order of the
DENR regional office to the DENR Secretary. Such appeal is indeed governed by Section 1 of Administrative
Order No. 87, Series of 1990. As earlier quoted, Section 1 clearly provides that if the motion for reconsideration
is denied, the movant shall perfect his appeal "during the remainder of the period of appeal, reckoned from
receipt of the resolution of denial;" whereas if the decision is reversed, the adverse party has a fresh 15-day
period to perfect his appeal.

As correctly observed by PA Sicat, San Miguel should perfect his appeal during the remainder of the period
of appeal, but not less than five (5) days, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial of his MR or until
June 7, 2011.

B. Philippine Courts

1. Judicial Power
Article VIII, Sec. 1, Secs. 1, 5 par. 5, 1987 Constitution

2. Nature
16. Phil. Carpet Manufacturing v. Tagyamon (GR No. 191475; 12/11/13)

FACTS:
Respondents are employees of petitioner who were affected by petitioner’s retrenchment and voluntary
retirement programs. The employees filed a complaint for illegal dismissal invoking the SC ruling in Philippine
Carpet Employees Association (PHILCEA) v. Hon. Sto. Tomas (Philcea case), as to the validity of the company’s
retrenchment program. The LA upheld the dismissal and so did the NLRC on appeal holding that the employees
voluntarily retired and the complaint is mere afterthought and that the principle of laches applies. The CA
however reversed the LA and NLRC and refused to apply the principle of laches, because the case was instituted
prior to the expiration of the prescriptive period set by law which is four years. It stressed that said principle
cannot be invoked earlier than the expiration of the prescriptive period. The CA ordered reinstatement with full
backwages. Hence the instant case. Peitioner contends that the Philcea case decided by this Court and relied
upon by the CA in the assailed decision was based on erroneous factual findings, inapplicable financial
statement, as well as erroneous analysis of such financial statements. They, thus, implore the Court to revisit
the cited case in order to dispense with substantial justice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the principle of laches apply
Whether or not there is stare decisis

RULING:
NO.

Laches

Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained lenth of time to do that
which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus, giving rise to a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. It has been repeatedly held by
the Court that:

xxx Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law. Our courts are basically courts of law
not courts of equity. Thus, laches cannot be invoked to resist the enforcement of an existing legal right. x x x
Courts exercising equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion to disregard them.
In Zabat Jr. v. Court of Appeals x x x, this Court was more emphatic in upholding the rules of procedure. We said
therein:
As for equity which has been aptly described as a “justice outside legality,” this is applied only in
the absence of, and never against, statutory law or, as in this case, judicial rules of procedure. Aequetas
nunguam contravenit legis. The pertinent positive rules being present here, they should pre-empt and prevail
over all abstract arguments based only on equity.

Thus, where the claim was filed within the [four-year] statutory period, recovery therefore cannot be barred
by laches. Courts should never apply the doctrine of laches earlier than the expiration of time limited for the
commencement of actions at law.

An action for reinstatement by reason of illegal dismissal is one based on an injury to the complainants’
rights which should be brought within four years from the time of their dismissal pursuant to Article 114633 of
the Civil Code. Respondents’ complaint filed almost 3 years after their alleged illegal dismissal was still well
within the prescriptive period. Laches cannot, therefore, be invoked yet.34 To be sure, laches may be applied
only upon the most convincing evidence of deliberate inaction, for the rights of laborers are protected under
the social justice provisions of the Constitution and under the Civil Code.

Stare Decisis

Under the doctrine of stare decisis, when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a
certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be different.36 Where the facts are essentially different,
however, stare decisis does not apply, for a perfectly sound principle as applied to one set of facts might be
entirely inappropriate when a factual variant is introduced.

The question, therefore, is whether the factual circumstances of this present case are substantially the
same as the Philcea case.

We answer in the affirmative.

This case and the Philcea case involve the same period which is March to April 2004; the issuance of
Memorandum to employees informing them of the implementation of the cost reduction program; the
implementation of the voluntary retirement program and retrenchment program, except that this case involves
different employees; the execution of deeds of release, waiver, and quitclaim, and the acceptance of separation
pay by the affected employees.

We find no reason to depart from the above conclusions which are based on the Court’s examination of
the evidence presented by the parties therein. As the respondents here were similarly situated as the union
members in the Philcea case, and considering that the questioned dismissal from the service was based on the
same grounds under the same circumstances, there is no need to relitigate the issues
presented herein. In short, we adopt the Court’s earlier findings that there was no valid ground to terminate
the employees.

A closer look at petitioners’ arguments would show that they want the Court to re-examine our decision
in the Philcea case allegedly on the ground that the conclusions therein were based on erroneous interpretation
of the evidence presented.

Indeed, in Abaria v. National Labor Relations Commission, although the Court was confronted with the same
issue of the legality of a strike that has already been determined in a previous case, the Court refused to apply
the doctrine of stare decisis insofar as the award of backwages was concerned because of the clear erroneous
application of the law. We held therein that the Court abandons or overrules precedents whenever it realizes
that it erred in the prior decision. The Court’s pronouncement in that case is instructive:

The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant in a particular
case override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is
justified in setting it aside. For the Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled
by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular
decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification

Waivers, Releases and Quitclaims

"As a rule, deeds of release and quitclaim cannot bar employees from demanding benefits to which they
are legally entitled or from contesting the legality of their dismissal. The acceptance of those benefits would not
amount to estoppel.” To excuse respondents from complying with the terms of their waivers, they must locate
their case within any of three narrow grounds: (1) the employer used fraud or deceit in obtaining the waivers;
(2) the consideration the employer paid is incredible and unreasonable; or (3) the terms of the waiver are
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law. instant case falls under the first situation.

As the ground for termination of employment was illegal, the quitclaims are deemed illegal as the
employees’ consent had been vitiated by mistake or fraud. The law looks with disfavor upon quitclaims and
releases by employees pressured into signing by unscrupulous employers minded to evade legal responsibilities.
The circumstances show that petitioner’s misrepresentation led its employees, specifically respondents herein,
to believe that the company was suffering losses which necessitated the implementation of the voluntary
retirement and retrenchment programs, and eventually the execution of the deeds of release, waiver and
quitclaim.
17. U.S. v. Tamparong (31 Phil 321 [1915])

FACTS:

The defendants were convicted by the justice of the peace of Baguio for having played the game of
chance called "monte" in violation of Ordinance No. 35. They appealed to the Court of First Instance, where
they were again tried and convicted upon the same charge. An appeal was allowed to this court because the
validity of Ordinance No, 35 was drawn in question during the trial of the cause in the court below.

ISSUE:
- Whether or not Ordinance No. 35 is valid.
- Whether or not the Supreme Court is required under the law to examine the evidence forthe purpose of
determining the guilt or innocence of the defendants

RULING:
- Yes, Ordinance No. 35 is valid.

For the issue at hand, the SC merely wrote, “The first question is answered in the affirmative by this court in
the case of the United States vs. Joson (26 Phil. 01). The cases are on all fours, and a further discussion of this
branch of the case is unnecessary.” Nothing more.

- No. Although the SC wrote that Act No. 1627 does not explicitly limit their powers from examining issues of
facts, it likewise does not expressly authorize them to do so. The SC, nevertheless, interpreted that the law
was NOT framed to confer them the said power.

The SC has revisited prior laws to ascertain the intention of the framers of the amended section of Act No.
1627; the latter being ambiguous in the sense that it did not explicitly allow nor prohibit SC to examine issues
of facts on appeals. The SC found, in light of former practices and from further understanding the circumstances
in which the framers of the amended law were subject to, that the amendment was not meant to confer in them
the jurisdiction of reviewing questions of fact.

The SC further distinguished their holding from Loeb vs. Columbia Township Trustees, and Boise Artesian Hot
and Cold Water Co., Ltd. vs. Boise City . These two latter cases were taken to the US SC directly from the circuit
courts as writs of error, (not as appeals) where the US SC does not only have jurisdiction to review constitutional
questions but also every other question properly arising.
 In at least fourteen other cases, the SC has showed that the ruling for this issue in the last 10 years has
remained uniform. And that the court, since its organization, never held that it had the power to review facts
touching guilt of an accused person, ONLY as to when the appeal involved the validity or constitutionality of a
statute or the constitutionality of a municipal or township ordinance.

PRINCIPLE:

It is urged that as the civil-law term "appeal" is used in section 43 (supra), we must apply the same rule
of construction that the courts in England and the United States have ,almost uniformly applied to the same
term and thus derive an unqualified review of both the law and the facts. This doubtless would be a correct
position in some jurisdictions in the American Union, as there the technical civil-law meaning of the term
"appeal" is followed. The reason for so doing is set forth in the case of Nashville Ry. & Light Co. v. Bunn (168
Fed. Rep., 862), wherein the court said:

"The distinction between a ’writ of error,’ which brings up the record in an action of law for a review of
questions of law only, and an ’appeal,’ which involves a rehearing upon both the facts and the law, is vital. These
remedies have their origin and functions in the inherent difference between courts of law and courts of equity,
differences which are recognized in the Constitution of the United States and the laws of Congress. The ’writ of
error’ is a common law writ, and searches the record for errors of law in the final judgment of a common-law
court. If error is found, the judgment awards a venire facias de novo. The ’appeal’ is a procedure which comes to
us from the civil law along with the fundamentals which go to make up the jurisprudence of a court of equity. Its
office is to remove the entire cause, and it subjects the transcript to a scrutiny of fact and law and is in substance
a new trial."

Under the system of procedure which obtains in the Philippine Islands, both legal and equitable relief is
dispensed in the same tribunal. We have no courts of law and courts of equity as they are known and
distinguished in England and the United States. All cases (law and equity) are presented and tried in the same
manner, including their final disposition in the Supreme Court. Therefore, the word "appeal," as used in section
43 (supra), does not necessarily imply the removal of the cause from one tribunal to another in its entirety,
subjecting the facts, as well as the law, to a review or a retrial, but it is to be interpreted by the ordinary rules
of construction.

The intention of the framers of General Orders No. 58 is the law. In order to ascertain that intention the
provisions of the order must be construed in the light of existing law and the circumstances at the time
of its promulgation.

3. Classification
a.) Constitutional and Statutory
b.) Civil and Criminal
c.) Inferior and Superior

4. Hierarchy of Courts

18. Rayos v. City of Manila (GR No. 196063; 12/14/11)

PRINCIPLE:
A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition
FACTS:
This is a case on petition for review on certiorari and declaratory relief on the RTC – Manila’s decision on
denying the motion for reconsideration being filed Orlando A. Rayos, Fe A. Rayos – Dela Paz, and Manuel A.
Rayos for questioning the constitutionality of a city ordinance and stare decisis.

It started when the City of Manila passed Ordinance No. 7949 which authorize the city mayor to acquire
by expropriation, negotiation or any legal means the parcel of land owned by Manuel A Rayos’s parent, Laureano
M. Reyes, with the amount of P1, 000.00 per sq. m. However, Rayos do not agree such price and wanted the
fair market value, P50,000.00.

Due no agreement can be reached, Rayos filed a motion to dismiss that the ordnance was
unconstitutional and stare decisis but the court dismiss it. They appealed but still got denied. Hence, this
present petition. (Rule 45 vs 65)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the motion to dismiss is appealable directly to the Supreme Court.

RULING:
The court held that the petition to appeal should not be directly to the Supreme Court because an order
denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable. An order denying a motion to dismiss does not
finally dispose of the case, and in effect, allows the case to proceed until the final adjudication thereof by the
court. It is merely interlocutory and thus not appealable (Section 1, Rule 41 of Rules of Court).

Since the trial courts order denying the motion to dismiss is not appealable, petitioners should have filed
a petitioner for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and not a review on certiorari under Rule 45. Thus,
the petition deserves outright dismissal. And even if they file under Rule 65, the same must be dismissed for
violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts. This well-settled principle dictates that petitioners should file
the petition for certiorari with the CA, and not directly with the SC. It is true that the SC, CA and the RTC exercise
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction but such concurrent jurisdiction does not give petitioners unbridled freedom of choice of court forum.
“This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with
Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not; however, to be taken
as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to
which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme
Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy
necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s docket.” (Heirs
of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, citing People v. Cuaresma)
Petitioners merely rehashed the arguments in their motion to dismiss, which consist mainly of
unsubstantiated allegations. Likewise, assuming the present petition is one for declaratory relief, as can be
gleaned from the caption of the petition, this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction over such a
petition.

19. United Claimants Assoc. v. NEA (GR No. 187107; 1/31/12)

PRINCIPLE:
A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those
against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to
issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition.

FACTS:
This is a case on action for injunction to restraint or prevents the resolution on the termination Pay Plan
issued by NEA (National Electrification Administration) Board 59. The respondent, NEA, being a government –
owned and/or controlled corporation was empowered to organize or reorganize the NEA staffing structure
which stipulated in PD 269, Sec. 5 (a)(5). Later on, another law, RA 9136 (Electric Power Industry Reform Act of
2011) imposed another restructuring of the organization in order to be competitive and provide proper services.
Due to such implementations, this led to the termination of several employees and be given separation
pays. The petitioners filed a case but got dismissed in the lower court which led them to file directly to the
Supreme Court upon appeal. Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:
The Court held that it should not be in its jurisdiction but due to special and important reason, it can take
it. The respondents essentially argue that petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts, pursuant to
which the instant petition should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court first rather than with this Court
directly.

The court explained the principle of hierarchy of courts in Mendoza v. Villas, stating:

In Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, a petition for
certiorari filed under Rule 65 was dismissed for having been filed directly with the Court, violating the principle
of hierarchy of courts, to wit:

“Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of
choice of court forum. In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, citing People v. Cuaresma, this Court
made the following pronouncements:

This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with
Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken
as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to
which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme
Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy
necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s docket. (Emphasis
supplied.)”

Evidently, the instant petition should have been filed with the RTC. However, as an exception to this general
rule, the principle of hierarchy of courts may be set aside for special and important reasons. Such reason exists
in the instant case involving as it does the employment of the entire plantilla of NEA, more than 700 employees
all told, who were effectively dismissed from employment in one swift stroke. This to the mind of the Court
entails its attention.

20. Ernesto Dy v. Hon. Palamos (GR No. 196200; 9/11/13)

PRINCIPLE:
The invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari has been allowed
in certain instances on the ground of special and important reasons clearly stated in the petition, such as,(1)
when dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of public policy; (2) when demanded by the broader
interest of justice; (3) when the challenged orders were patent nullities; or (4) when analogous exceptional and
compelling circumstances called for and justified the immediate and direct handling of the case.

FACTS:
This is a petition of certiorari under Rule 65 questioning the order of the RTC – Makati in granting the
motion for execution of the petitioner but denying his prayer for the return of his cargo vessel in same condition
when it was in his possession and then seized due to a mortgage.

The petitioner, Ernesto Dy and his wife, Lourdes Dy were the proprietors of Limchia Enterprises which
was engaged in the shipping business. In 1990, Limchia Enterprises obtained a loan from Orix Metro Leasing and
Finance Corporation, the respondent, to fund its acquisition of M/V Pilar-I, a cargo vessel. A chattel mortgage
was thereafter executed over M/V Pilar-1 due to financial losses suffered when M/V Pilar-I was attacked by
pirates. Spouses Dy failed to make the scheduled payments as required in their promissory note.
After receiving several demand letters from respondent, Spouses Dy applied for the restructuring of their
loan. However, the checks they issued were dishonored which urged the respondent filed a complaint and
Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Preferred Ship Mortgage under Presidential Decree No. 1521 with
Urgent Prayer for Attachment at the RTC – Makati which granted it. M/V Pilar-I was then sold and transferred
to Colorado Shipyard Corporation. This made the Spouses Dy to file a case.
In 1997, the RTC then rendered a decision in favor of Spouses Dy, ruling that they had not yet defaulted
on their loan because respondent agreed to a restructured schedule of payment. There being no default, the
foreclosure of the chattel mortgage on M/V Pilar-I was premature and the vessel should be returned to Spouses
Dy. The decision was also affirmed by CA and SC.
 On August 17, 2010 (20 years after), petitioner filed a motion for execution of judgment with the RTC. In
the intervening period, Colorado informed the RTC that M/V Pilar - I sank. It also claims that since the vessel
sank, it asked the court to have the parts cut into pieces and sold. The proceeds of which are to be given to
petitioner, however, the petitioner insisted that he had the right to require that the vessel be returned to him
in the same condition that it had been at the time it was wrongfully seized by respondent or should it no longer
be possible, that another vessel of the same tonnage, length and beam similar to that of M/V Pilar-1 be
delivered. The respondent responded that recovering the vessel would be impossible and if petitioner still insists
on doing so, petitioner should bear the costs.
RTC claimed that it had no right to change the decision in a motion for execution since the judgement
had already become final. It claimed that the SC has not decided that petitioner had the right to insist on its
claim to have the original vessel be returned or new one with a same specification be given. Also, the
deterioration and eventual sinking of the vessel did not happen overnight, respondents should have been raised
the issue while it is being tried by the SC. The petitioner filed a motion of reconsideration but was dented so
they directly went to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the rule on hierarchy of courts is applicable to the instant petition

RULING:
The Court finds the petition to be partly meritorious.

Petitioner argues that his situation calls for the direct invocation of the Court’s jurisdiction in the interest
of justice. Moreover, as pointed out by the RTC, what is involved is a judgment of the Court which the lower
courts cannot modify. Hence, petitioner deemed it proper to bring this case immediately to the attention of the
Court. Lastly, petitioner claims that the present case involves a novel issue of law – that is, whether in an action
to recover, a defendant in wrongful possession of the subject matter in litigation may be allowed to return the
same in a deteriorated condition without any liability.

Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the petition should have been filed with the CA, following
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. It pointed out that petitioner failed to state any special or important reason
or any exceptional and compelling circumstance which would warrant a direct recourse to the Court.

Under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct recourse to the Court is improper because the Supreme
Court is a court of last resort and must remain to be so in order for it to satisfactorily perform its constitutional
functions, thereby allowing it to devote its time and attention to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and
preventing the overcrowding of its docket. Nonetheless, the invocation of the Court’s original jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari has been allowed in certain instances on the ground of special and important reasons
clearly stated in the petition, such as, (1) when dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of public
policy; (2) when demanded by the broader interest of justice; (3) when the challenged orders were patent
nullities; or (4) when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and justified the immediate
and direct handling of the case.

This case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of hierarchy of courts. Justice demands that this
Court take cognizance of this case to put an end to the controversy and resolve the matter which has been
dragging on for more than twenty (20) years. Moreover, in light of the fact that what is involved is a final
judgment promulgated by the Court, it is but proper for petitioner to call upon its original jurisdiction and seek
final clarification.
21. Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC (GR No. 205728; 1/21/15)

PRINCIPLE:
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the
policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield the
Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within the competence of the lower courts, and thus
leave time to the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has
assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
only when absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to the
policy.

FACTS:
This is an election case involving limiting the expressions made by the citizen who are not political
candidates during election campaign period. It started when the Diocese of Bacolod posted two tarpaulins
within a private compound housing of the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately
six feet (6) by ten feet (10) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The
first tarpaulin contains the message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or
Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the
heading "Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RFI) Team Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro-
RI-I) Team Patay" with an "X" mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the
adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the
law were classified by the diocese as comprising "Team Patay," while those who voted against it form "Team
Buhay".
The Election Officer of Bacolod ordered the removal of the second tarpaulin because it is claiming to be
election propaganda. The COMELEC issued an order prompting for the removal of the tarpaulin for being
oversized and the Diocese assailed the said order of the COMELEC for being violative of their constitutional right
to freedom of expression and that it is a violation of the separation of the state and the church. The Diocese
likewise assails that the tarpaulins are beyond the regulatory powers of the COMELEC regarding election
materials since they are neither candidates nor belonging to any political party.
The Diocese, concerned of their rights, initiated the case through petition of certiorari and prohibition
with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. They prayed that the petition be
given due course and the TRO or writ of preliminary injunction issued restraining the COMELEC from further
enforcing the removal of the election materials. The COMELEC responded that the petition of certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is not the proper remedy to question such act. Hence, this
present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners violated the hierarchy of courts doctrine.

RULING:
The Court held that it did not violate the doctrine of hierarchy of courts as it falls under the exceptions
of such doctrine.

In such case, the respondents contend that petitioners’ failure to file the proper suit with a lower court
of concurrent jurisdiction is sufficient ground for the dismissal of their petition. They add that observation of
the hierarchy of courts is compulsory, citing Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor. While respondents claim that
while there are exceptions to the general rule on hierarchy of courts, none of these are present in this case.
 On the other hand, petitioners cite Fortich v. Corona on this court’s discretionary power to take
cognizance of a petition filed directly to it if warranted by "compelling reasons, or [by] the nature and
importance of the issues raised. . . ." Petitioners submit that there are "exceptional and compelling reasons to
justify a direct resort [with] this Court."
In Bañez, Jr. v. Concepcion, we explained the necessity of the application of the hierarchy of courts:

The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms
that the policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed
to shield the Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within the competence of the lower
courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks
that the Constitution has assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious and important
reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy.

In Bañez, we also elaborated on the reasons why lower courts are allowed to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus, citing Vergara v. Suelto:

The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be
burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called
extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important
reasons exist therefore. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings
before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some
reason or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is
also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that
the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in
this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe. (Emphasis omitted).

The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that
every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not
only determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them. They are likewise
competent to determine issues of law which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an
executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they are territorially
organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries.
Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these are
physically presented before them. In many instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which
properly present the ‘actual case’ that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The
consequences, of course, would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases where resort to courts at
their level would not be practical considering their decisions could still be appealed before the higher courts,
such as the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the determination of facts
and law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more standpoints in the review
of the actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most special civil
actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide scope. It is competent to determine facts and,
ideally, should act on constitutional issues that may not necessarily be novel unless there are factual questions
to determine.
 This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further reiterating — in the
light of new circumstances or in the light of some confusion of bench or bar — existing precedents. Rather than
a court of first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals, this court promulgates these
doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role.

In other words, the Supreme Court’s role to interpret the Constitution and act in order to protect
constitutional rights when these become exigent should not be emasculated by the doctrine in respect of the
hierarchy of courts. That has never been the purpose of such doctrine.

Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has "full discretionary power
to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari . . . filed directly with it for
exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the
petition." As correctly pointed out by petitioners, we have provided exceptions to this doctrine:

First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must
be addressed at the most immediate time. A direct resort to this court includes availing of the remedies of
certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of actions of both legislative and executive branches of
the government.

In this case, the assailed issuances of respondents prejudice not only petitioners’ right to freedom of
expression in the present case, but also of others in future similar cases. The case before this court involves an
active effort on the part of the electorate to reform the political landscape. This has become a rare occasion
when private citizens actively engage the public in political discourse. To quote an eminent political theorist:

[T]he theory of freedom of expression involves more than a technique for arriving at better social
judgments through democratic procedures. It comprehends a vision of society, a faith and a whole way of life.
The theory grew out of an age that was awakened and invigorated by the idea of new society in which man's
mind was free, his fate determined by his own powers of reason, and his prospects of creating a rational and
enlightened civilization virtually unlimited. It is put forward as a prescription for attaining a creative, progressive,
exciting and intellectually robust community. It contemplates a mode of life that, through encouraging
toleration, skepticism, reason and initiative, will allow man to realize his full potentialities. It spurns the
alternative of a society that is tyrannical, conformist, irrational and stagnant.

In a democracy, the citizen’s right to freely participate in the exchange of ideas in furtherance of political
decision-making is recognized. It deserves the highest protection the courts may provide, as public participation
in nation-building is a fundamental principle in our Constitution. As such, their right to engage in free expression
of ideas must be given immediate protection by this court.

A second exception is when the issues involved are of transcendental importance. In these cases, the
imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for prudence.
The doctrine relating to constitutional issues of transcendental importance prevents courts from the paralysis
of procedural niceties when clearly faced with the need for substantial protection.
In the case before this court, there is a clear threat to the paramount right of freedom of speech and freedom
of expression which warrants invocation of relief from this court. The principles laid down in this decision will
likely influence the discourse of freedom of speech in the future, especially in the context of elections. The right
to suffrage not only includes the right to vote for one’s chosen candidate, but also the right to vocalize that
choice to the public in general, in the hope of influencing their votes. It may be said that in an election year, the
right to vote necessarily includes the right to free speech and expression. The protection of these fundamental
constitutional rights, therefore, allows for the immediate resort to this court.
Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of first impression, no jurisprudence
yet exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter. In Government of the United States v. Purganan, this
court took cognizance of the case as a matter of first impression that may guide the lower courts:

In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we
deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression
over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
This court finds that this is indeed a case of first impression involving as it does the issue of whether the right of
suffrage includes the right of freedom of expression. This is a question which this court has yet to provide
substantial answers to, through jurisprudence. Thus, direct resort to this court is allowed.

Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court. In Drilon v. Lim, this court held that:
. . . it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this
Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate
body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its discussion. (Citation omitted)

In this case, it is this court, with its constitutionally enshrined judicial power, that can rule with finality on
whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion or performed acts contrary to the Constitution through
the assailed issuances.
Fifth, the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored. This case was filed during the 2013 election
period. Although the elections have already been concluded, future cases may be filed that necessitate urgency
in its resolution. Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an exception for direct resort to this court.

Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ. COMELEC is a constitutional body. In Albano v.
Arranz, cited by petitioners, this court held that "[i]t is easy to realize the chaos that would ensue if the Court of
First Instance ofeach and every province were [to] arrogate itself the power to disregard, suspend, or contradict
any order of the Commission on Elections: that constitutional body would be speedily reduced to impotence."

In this case, if petitioners sought to annul the actions of COMELEC through pursuing remedies with the lower
courts, any ruling on their part would not have been binding for other citizens whom respondents may place in
the same situation. Besides, this court affords great respect to the Constitution and the powers and duties
imposed upon COMELEC. Hence, a ruling by this court would be in the best interest of respondents, in order
that their actions may be guided accordingly in the future.

Seventh, petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents’ acts in violation of their right to
freedom of expression.

In this case, the repercussions of the assailed issuances on this basic right constitute an exceptionally compelling
reason to justify the direct resort to this court. The lack of other sufficient remedies in the course of law alone
is sufficient ground to allow direct resort to this court.

Eighth, the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public
policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent
nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy." In the past, questions similar to
these which this court ruled on immediately despite the doctrine of hierarchy of courts included citizens’ right
to bear arms, government contracts involving modernization of voters’ registration lists, and the status and
existence of a public office.
This case also poses a question of similar, if not greater import. Hence, a direct action to this court is permitted.

It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must occur at the same time to justify a direct resort
to this court. While generally, the hierarchy of courts is respected, the present case falls under the recognized
exceptions and, as such, may be resolved by this court directly.

C. Jurisdiction of Different Courts

A. Key Principles

i. Jurisdiction – Definition

22. Home Guaranty Corp. v. R-11 Builders (GR No. 192649; 3/9/2011)

PRINCIPLE:
Amendment is not allowed where the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the
purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Hence, with jurisdiction over the case yet to
properly attach, CA erred in upholding respondent RTC's admission of respondent's R-II Builder's Second
Amended Complaint despite nonpayment of the docket fees for its alcohol complaint and Amended and
Supplemental Complaint as well as the clear Intent to evade payment thereof

FACTS:
March 19. 1993, a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) was entered into between respondents National
Housing Authority (NHA), and R-11 Builders for the implementation of the Smokey Mountain Development and
Reclamation Project (SMDRP) which was amended and restated after 11 months. On August 11, 1994, JVA was
aimed at implementing a two-phase conversion of the Smokey Mountain Dumpsite into a “habitable housing
project inclusive of the reclamation” of the area across Radial Road 10 (R-10) R-11 Builders, as developer, was
entitled to own 79 hectares of reclaimed land and the 2.3 hectare commercial area at the Smokey Mountain.
NHA, as landowner or implementing agency, was entitled to own temporary housing units agreed to be built in
the premises, the cleared and fenced incinerator site consisting of five hectares and some units of permanent
housing to be awarded to qualified on site residents, the industrial area consisting of 3.2 hectares and the open
spaces, roads and facilities within the Smokey Mountain Area.

On September 26, 1994, NHA and R-11 Builders, alongside petitioner, Housing Guaranty Corporation
(HGC) as guarantor and the PNB as trustee, entered into an Asset Pool Formation Trust Agreement which
provided the mechanics for the implementation of the project. On January 29, 2001, subsequent to R-11
Builders' infusion of P300M into the project, the issuance of the SMPPCs and the termination of PNB's services,
NHA, R-II Builders and HGC agreed on the institution of Planters Development Bank (PDB) as trustee.

On October 24, 2002, all the Regular SMPPCs issued had reached maturity and unredeemed, already
amounted to an aggregate face value of P2.513 Billion. The lack of liquid assets with which to effect redemption
of the regular SMPPCs prompted PDB to make a call on HGC's guaranty and to execute in the latter's favor a
Deed of Assignment and Conveyance (DAC) of the entire Asset Pool.
The RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction sought by MI Builders. In the meantime, HGC, having
filed its answer to the complaint, went on before the Supreme Court to move for the conduct of a preliminary
hearing on its affirmative defenses which included such grounds as lack of jurisdiction, improper venue and the
then pendency entitled Francisco Chavez vs. National Housing Authority, a case which challenged, among other
matters, the validity of the JVA and its subsequent amendments. R-11 Builders filed a motion to admit its
Amended and Supplemental Complaint Sikh deleted the prayer for resolution of the DAC initially prayed for in
its original complaint. RTC - Manila issued a clarificatory order holding that R-11 Builders' complaint was an
ordinary civil action and not an infra-corporate controversy and that it did not have the authority to hear the
case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC - Manila has jurisdiction over the case and second amendment is proper

RULING:
The Court dismissed the case and held that a court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the
payment of the prescribed filing and docket fees. In this case, R-11 Builders' original complaint was initially
docketed before RTC Manila, a designated Special Commercial Court. With HGC's filing of a motion for a
preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses asserted in its answer and R-II Builders' filing of its Amended
and Supplemental Complaint, said court issued an order ordering the re-raffle of the case upon the finding that
the same is not an intra-corporate dispute. With its acknowledged lack of jurisdiction over the case, RTC Manila
should have ordered the dismissal of the complaint, since a court without subject matter jurisdiction cannot
Warder the case to another court.

At the time of its surrender of jurisdiction, RTC - Manila had already acted on the case and had in fact
issued the writ of preliminary injunction sought by herein respondent R-11 Builders. At that point, there was
absolutely no reason which could justify a re-raffle of the case considering that the order that was supposed to
have caused the re-raffle was not an inhibition of the judge but a declaration of absence of jurisdiction. A re-
rattle which causes a transfer of the case involves courts with the same subject matter jurisdiction; it cannot
involve courts which have different jurisdictions exclusive of the other. More apt in this case, a re-raffle of a
case cannot cure a jurisdictional defect.

The jurisdictionally flawed transfer of the case from the RTC - Manila Br. 24, the SCC to Branch 22, the
regular court, is topped by another jurisdictional defect which is the non-payment of the correct docket fees.
Granted that R-11 Builders is not claiming ownership of the Asset Pod because its continuing stake is, in the first
place, limited only to the residual value thereof, the conveyance or transfer of possession of the same properties
sought in the original complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint both presuppose a real action for
which appropriate docket fees computed on the basis of the assessed or estimated value of said properties
should have been assessed and paid.

For failure of R-11 Builders to pay the correct docket fees for its original complaint or, for that matter,
its Amended and Supplemental Complaint as directed in respondent RTC's 19 May 2008 order. It stands to
reason that jurisdiction over the case had yet to properly attach.

Although the policy in this jurisdiction is to the effect that amendments to pleadings are favored and liberally
allowed in the interest of justice, amendment is not allowed where the court has no jurisdiction over the original
complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Hence, with jurisdiction
over the case yet to property attach, CA erred in upholding respondent RTC's admission of R-11 Builders' Second
Amended Complaint despite non-payment of the docket fees for its original complaint and Amended and
Supplemental Complaint as well as the clear intent to evade payment thereof.
In view of respondent RTC's non-acquisition of jurisdiction over the case, it clearly had no authority to
grant the receivership sought by R-11 Builders. It needs pointing out though that the prayer for receivership
clearly indicates that the R-11 Builders sought the transfer of possession of property consisting of the assets of
the JVA from HGC to the formers named receiver. As already noted, said transfer of possession was sought by
respondent R-11 Builders since the very start, overtly at the first two attempts, covertly in the last, the
successive amendments betraying the deft maneuverings to evade payment of the correct docket fees.

ii. Jurisdiction v. Venue

23. Davao Light v. Court of Appeals (GR No. 111685; 8/20/2001)

FACTS:
Petitioner Davao Light & Power Co., originally filed a complaint for damages in the amount of 11M
against private respondent, Francisco Tesorero before the RTC Branch 11 of Cebu City. Private respondent
Tesorero for his part filed a motion to dismiss claiming, among others, that the venue was improperly laid. It is
private respondent's contention that the proper venue is Davao City, and not Cebu City where petitioner filed
Civil Case. Private respondent argues that petitioner is estopped from claiming that its residence is in Cebu City,
in view of contradictory statements made by petitioner prior to the filing of the action for damages.

The RTC of Cebu City dismissed petitioner’s complaint on the ground of improper venue stating that
although the plaintiff claims that its principal place of business is in Banilad, Cebu City, the defendant submitted
copies of contract of lease between plaintiff and NAPOCOR which indicated 163-165 P. Reyes St., Davao City as
plaintiff’s principal office. The representation made by the plaintiff in the 2 aforementioned Lease Contracts
stating that its principal office is at "163-165 P. Reyes Street, Davao City" bars the plaintiff from denying the
same. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.

Petitioner immediately filed in the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari but the latter
referred the case to the Court of Appeals for Resolution. Hence, a petition was docket in the appellate court.

The Court of Appeals denied and eventually dismissed the petition. The Counsel for petitioner, without
filing a motion for reconsideration in the CA, filed this instant petition assailing the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Cebu City is the proper venue of the case.

HELD:
YES. According to the Supreme Court, venue is to be distinguished from jurisdiction:

Venue and jurisdiction are entirely distinct matters. Jurisdiction may not be conferred by
consent or waiver upon a court which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject-
matter of an action; but the venue of an action as fixed by statute may be changed by the consent
of the parties and an objection that the plaintiff brought his suit in the wrong county may be
waived by the failure of the defendant to make a timely objection. In either case, the court may
render a valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or agreement of
the parties, whether or not a prohibition exists against their alteration.
 In Young Auto Supply Co. v. CA, CA reversed the decision of the RTC and dismissed the case stating that
the venue was improperly laid since multiple documents indicate a Pasay address even though the plaintiff’s
articles of incorporated stated Cebu City as its principal office. However, the Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the CA stating that:
A corporation has no residence in the same sense in which this term is applied to a
natural person. But for practical purposes, a corporation is in a metaphysical sense a resident of
the place where its principal office is located as stated in the articles of incorporation (Cohen v.
Benguet Commercial Co., Ltd., 34 Phil. 526 [1916] Clavecilla Radio System v. Antillo, 19 SCRA 379
[1967]). The Corporation Code precisely requires each corporation to specify in its articles of
incorporation the "place where the principal office of the corporation is to be located which must
be within the Philippines" (Sec. 14[3]). The purpose of this requirement is to fix the residence of
a corporation in a definite place, instead of allowing it to be ambulatory.

In Clavecilla Radio System v. Antillon, the Supreme Court explained why actions cannot be filed against a
corporation in any place where the corporation maintains its branch offices. The Supreme Court ruled that to
allow an action to be instituted in any place where the corporation has branch offices, would create confusion
and work untold inconvenience to said entity. By the same token, a corporation cannot be allowed to file
personal actions in a place other than its principal place of business unless such a place is also the residence of
a co-plaintiff or a defendant.

The same considerations apply to the instant case. It cannot be disputed that petitioner's principal office
is in Cebu City, per its amended articles of incorporation and by-laws. An action for damages being a personal
action, venue is determined pursuant to Rule 4, section 2 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Venue of personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced and tied where the plaintiff
or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

24. Nocum v. Lucio Tan (GR No. 145022, 9/23/2005)

FACTS:
Respondent Lucio Tan originally filed a complaint for damages against petitioners reporter Armand
Nocum the Philippine Daily Inquirer, Florendo Umali and ALPAP for the alleged malicious and defamatory
imputations against him in two (2) articles of the Inquirer.

Petitioners, herein, filed a joint answer alleging, among others, that the venue was improperly laid. It
appeared that the complaint failed to state the residence of the complainant at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense and the place where the libelous article was printed and first published. The RTC of
Makati dismissed the complaint of Tan without prejudice on the ground of improper venue.

Aggrieved by the dismissal of the complaint, respondent Lucio Tan filed an Omnibus Motion seeking
reconsideration of the dismissal and admission of the amended complaint. The complaint now contains
allegations that “This article was printed and first published in the City of Makati” and “This caricature was
printed and first published in the City of Makati”. The lower court admitted the amended complaint and deemed
set aside the previous order of dismissal. Petitioners appealed with the decision of the RTC to the Court of
Appeals but was denied. Their motions for reconsiderations were also denied by the Court of appeals, hence
this petition for review on certiorari.
 Petitioners state that Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code vests jurisdiction over all civil and criminal
complaints for libel on the RTC of the place: (1) where the libelous article was printed and first published; or (2)
where the complainant, if a private person, resides; or (3) where the complainant, if a public official, holds office.
They argue that since the original complaint only contained the office address of respondent and not the latters
actual residence or the place where the allegedly offending news reports were printed and first published, the
original complaint, by reason of the deficiencies in its allegations, failed to confer jurisdiction on the lower court.

ISSUE:
Did the lower court acquire jurisdiction over the civil case upon the filing of the original complaint for
damages.

HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.
It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the
latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. In the case
at bar, after examining the original complaint, the Supreme Court found that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over
the case when the case was filed before it. From the allegations thereof, respondent’s cause of action is for
damages arising from libel, the jurisdiction of which is vested with the RTC. Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that it is a Court of First Instance that is specifically designated to try a libel case.
Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. Hon. Florenz D. Regalado, differentiated jurisdiction
and venue as follows:
a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the place where the case
is to be heard or tried
b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law;
c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter; venue, a relation
between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and
d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by
the act or agreement of the parties.

In the case at bar, the additional allegations in the Amended Complaint that the article and the caricature
were printed and first published in the City of Makati referred only to the question of venue and not jurisdiction.
These additional allegations would neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would respondent’s failure to
include the same in the original complaint divest the lower court of its jurisdiction over the case. Respondent’s
failure to allege these allegations gave the lower court the power, upon motion by a party, to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that venue was not properly laid.

In Laquian v. Baltazar, this Court construed the term jurisdiction in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code
as referring to the place where actions for libel shall be filed or venue.

In Escribano v. Avila, pursuant to Republic Act No. 4363, we laid down the following rules on the venue
of the criminal and civil actions in written defamations.
 1. General rule: The action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where
the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense.

2. If the offended party is a public officer with office in Manila at the time the offense was
committed, the venue is Manila or the city or province where the libelous article is printed and
first published.

3. Where an offended party is a public official with office outside of Manila, the venue is the
province or the city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where
the libelous article is printed and first published.

4. If an offended party is a private person, the venue is his place of residence at the time of the
commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published.

The common feature of the foregoing rules is that whether the offended party is a public officer
or a private person, he has always the option to file the action in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where the libelous article is printed or first published.

We further restated the rules on venue in Article 360 as follows:

1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be
filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and
first published.

2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the
offense.

3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of
the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed
in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the
commission of the offense.

It is elementary that objections to venue in CIVIL ACTIONS arising from libel may be waived since they
do not involve a question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as it
does to jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Venue relates to trial and not
to jurisdiction. It is a procedural, not a jurisdictional, matter. It relates to the place of trial or geographical
location in which an action or proceeding should be brought and not to the jurisdiction of the court. It is meant
to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of
trial. In contrast, in CRIMINAL ACTIONS, it is fundamental that venue is jurisdictional it being an essential
element of jurisdiction.

Petitioners argument that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the case because respondent failed
to allege the place where the libelous articles were printed and first published would have been tenable if the
case filed were a criminal case. The failure of the original complaint to contain such information would be fatal
because this fact involves the issue of venue which goes into the territorial jurisdiction of the court. This is not
to be because the case before us is a civil action where venue is not jurisdictional.

iii. Determined by the allegations in the complaint

25. Padlan v. Dinglasan (GR No. 180321; 3/20/2013)

FACTS:
Petitioner Elenita Dinglasan was an owner of a parcel of land as evidenced by a TCT title with an
aggregate area of 82,972 sqm. However, due to fraud, a certain Maura Passion was able to subdivide the
property into several lots and ultimately sold such to different buyers through a falsified deed of sale bearing
forged signatures of respondents, Elenita and Felicisimo Dinglasan. Among such buyers, one Lorna Ong further
sold a lot herein petitioner, Editha Padlan for Php4,000.00. A TCT was issued in the name of herein petitioner.

After learning what had happened, respondents demanded petitioner to surrender possession of the
lot, but the latter refused. Respondents were then forced to file a case before the RTC of Balanga, Bataan for
the cancellation of the TCT. Summons were served to petitioner through her mother, Anita Padlan as herein
petitioner permanently resides in Japan. Respondents moved to declare petitioner in default but the latter,
through counsel, filed an opposition to declare her in default with motion to dismiss case for lack of jurisdiction
over the person of defendant. However, the RTC issued an Order denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss and
declared her in default. Thereafter, trial ensued.

On July 1, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision7 finding petitioner to be a buyer in good faith and,
consequently, dismissed the complaint. Respondents then sought recourse before the Court of Appeals. The CA
rendered a decision in favor of the respondent which reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC stating that
although a purchaser is not expected to go beyond the title, based on the circumstances surrounding the sale,
petitioner should have conducted further inquiry before buying the disputed property.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and argued that not only did the complaint lacks merit, the
lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and the person of the petitioner.
However, CA denied the motion. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the honorable court has jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner and over the
subject of matter of the case.
HELD:
Petition is meritorious.
Respondents filed the complaint in 1999, at the time Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, was already amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7691, provides that the RTC shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction on the following actions:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where
the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) or for civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00), except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; x x x

Respondents filed their Complaint with the RTC; hence, before proceeding any further with any other
issues raised by the petitioner, it is essential to ascertain whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of this case based on the above-quoted provisions.

However, in order to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action, an examination of the
complaint is essential. Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body
has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested
by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff
is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.

What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted.

In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege the assessed value of the
real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over
the action. In the case at bar, the only basis of valuation of the subject property is the value alleged in the
complaint that the lot was sold by Lorna to petitioner in the amount of ₱4,000.00. No tax declaration was even
presented that would show the valuation of the subject property. In fact, in one of the hearings, respondents’
counsel informed the court that they will present the tax declaration of the property in the next hearing since
they have not yet obtained a copy from the Provincial Assessor’s Office. However, they did not present such
copy.

To reiterate, where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should be
filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof. Since the
amount alleged in the Complaint by respondents for the disputed lot is only ₱4,000.00, the MTC and not the
RTC has jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void.

iv. Residual power / jurisdiction

26. Gonzales v. Quirico Pe (GR No. 167398; 8/9/2011)

FACTS:
Petitioners spouses Rodriguez are into the construction business and were awarded two contracts by
the DPWH. Respondent Quirico Pe is their cement supplier. Petitioner spouses availed of the pre-payment
program offered by DPWH for cement requirement. Petitioner spouses issued a blank LBP check to respondent
to guarantee the payment of the cement, then valued at Php1.5M. However, a year later, respondent filled up
the blank check with the amount of Php2.06M

Petitioner spouses filed an amended complaint for Declaration of Payment, Cancellation of Documents
and Damages against respondent with the RTC, Branch 31, Iloilo City, stating that petitioner spouses entrusted
blank LBP Check No. 6563066 to respondent so as to facilitate the approval of the pre-payment application of
petitioner Nestor Rodriguez with the DPWH and that after payment of the original amount, respondent would
return the blank check.

Respondent on the other hand filed an answer averring that petitioners paid Php2.3M but still has an
outstanding amount of Php2.062M. The LBP check was dishonoured for being DAIF and respondent sought
recovery of the said outstanding balance with interest at 24%.

The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner spouses stating that the subsequent filling up of the LBP check
was not made strictly in accordance the with authority given to the respondent by the petitioner, that one year
had already lapsed and the attempt to recover was not done within a reasonable time and that the court ruled
that respondent has already been fully paid and considered a settled issue.

Respondent filed a notice of appeal and the trial court gave due course to respondent's appeal, and
directed the Branch Clerk of Court to transmit the entire records of the case to the CA. However, petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration stating that respondents appeal should be dismissed as the same was not
perfected due to non-payment of docket and other lawful fees as required under Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court. The trial court dismissed respondent's appeal and directed the issuance of a writ of execution to
implement the RTC Decision.

Respondent a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals seeking to set aside the
RTC Order and the appealate court approved respondent’s injunction bond. Petitioner spouses filed a motion
for reconsideration but was denied by the CA. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the decision of the lower court and allowing respondent to
belatedly pay the required appellate docket and other legal fees.

HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners.
 In cases of ordinary appeal, Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that the appeal to the CA
in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal
with the RTC (the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from) and serving a copy thereof
upon the adverse party. Section 3 thereof states that the appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.Concomitant with the filing of a notice of appeal is the
payment of the required appeal fees within the 15-day reglementary period set forth in Section 4 of the said
Rule. Thus,

SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Within the period for taking an appeal, the
appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of
said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the
record on appeal.

The CA cited Yambao v. Court of Appeal as justification for giving due course to respondents petition and
ordering the belated payment of docket and other legal fees. In Yambao, the CA dismissed therein petitioners
appeal from the RTC decision for failure to pay the full amount of the required docket fee. Upon elevation of
the case, the Court, however, ordered the CA to give due course to their appeal, and ruled that their subsequent
payment of the P20.00 deficiency, even before the CA had passed upon their motion for reconsideration, was
indicative of their good faith and willingness to comply with the Rules. The ruling in Yambao is not applicable to
the present case as herein respondent never made any payment of the docket and other lawful fees, not even
an attempt to do so, simultaneous with his filing of the Notice of Appeal. This procedural lapse on the part of
the respondent rendered his appeal with the CA to be dismissible and, therefore, the RTC Decision, dated June
28, 2002, to be final and executory.

In Far Corporation v. Magdaluyo, as with other subsequent cases of the same ruling, the Court explained
that the procedural requirement under Section 4 of Rule 41 is not merely directory, as the payment of the docket
and other legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. It bears stressing that an
appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege. Without such payment, the appeal is not perfected.The
appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the Decision sought to
be appealed from becomes final and executory.

Since respondents appeal was not perfected within the 15-day reglementary period, it was as if no
appeal was actually taken. Therefore, the RTC retains jurisdiction to rule on pending incidents lodged before it,
such as the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, to Dismiss Appeal, and for Issuance of Writ of Execution,
filed on August 26, 2002, which sought to set aside its Order dated August 5, 2002 that gave due course to
respondents Notice of Appeal, and directed the issuance of a writ of execution. Having no jurisdiction over the
case, the prudent thing that the CA should have done was to dismiss the respondents appeal for failure to pay
the appeal fees, and declare that the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002 has now become final and executory.

v. Doctrine of primary jurisdiction

27. Bagunu v. Spouses Aggabao (GR No. 186487; 8/15/2011)

FACTS:
Bagunu is an applicant for a free patent over a parcel of unregistered land which respondent spouses
Aggabao dispute claiming ownership over the same. The DENR ruled that Bagunu wrongfully included the
respondent’s land in his application. The CA upheld the DENR’s ruling, hence the instant case of petition for
review under Rule 45.

The petitioner argues that the DENR effectively reformed contracts and determined claims of ownership
over a real property – matters beyond the DENR’s competence to determine. The petitioner faults the CA for
applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction since the issue of who has a better right over Lot 322 does not
involve the “specialized technical expertise” of the DENR. On the contrary, the issue involves interpretation of
contracts, appreciation of evidence and the application of the pertinent Civil Code provisions, which are matters
within the competence of the courts.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the DENR had jurisdiction and whether or not the CA correctly applied the doctrine of
primary Jurisdiction.

RULING:
YES. Petition is denied.

Questions of fact generally barred under Rule 45

The petitioner correctly recognized the settled rule that questions of fact are generally barred under a
Rule 45 petition. In the present case, the identity of Lots 258 and 322 is a central factual issue. The determination
of the identity of these lots involves the task of delineating their actual boundaries in accordance with the
parties’ respective deeds of sale and survey plan, among others. While there are instances where the Court
departs from the general rule on the reviewable issues under Rule 45, the petitioner did not even attempt to
show that his case falls within the recognized exceptions. On top of this legal reality, the findings and decision
of the Director of Lands on questions of fact, when approved by the DENR Secretary, are generally conclusive
on the courts, and even on this Court, when these factual findings are affirmed by the appellate court. We shall
consequently confine our discussions to the petitioner’s twin legal issues.

The determination of the identity of a public land is within the DENR’s exclusive jurisdiction to manage and
dispose of lands of the public domain

The petitioner insists that under the law actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, to which a suit for
reformation of contracts belong, and those involving ownership of real property fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Since these actions are already pending before the RTC, the DENR
Secretary overstepped his authority in excluding Lot 322 from the petitioner’s free patent
application and ordering the respondents to apply for a free patent over the same lot.

In an action for reformation of contract, the court determines whether the parties’ written agreement
reflects their true intention. In the present case, this intention refers to the identity of the land covered by the
second and third sale. On the other had, in a reinvindicatory action, the court resolves the issue of ownership
of real property and the plaintiff’s entitlement to recover its full possession. In this action, the plaintiff is
required to prove not only his ownership, but also the identity of the real property he seeks to recover.
 While these actions ordinarily fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, the court’s jurisdiction to
resolve controversies involving ownership of real property extends only to private lands. In the present case,
neither party has asserted private ownership over Lot 322. The respondents acknowledged the public character
of Lot 322 by mainly relying on the administrative findings of the DENR in their complaint-in-intervention,
instead of asserting their own private ownership of the property. For his part, the petitioner’s act of applying
for a free patent with the Bureau of Lands is an acknowledgment that the land covered by his application is a
public land whose management and disposition belong to the DENR Secretary, with the assistance of the Bureau
of Lands.

After the DENR assumed jurisdiction over Lot 322, pursuant to its mandate, the RTC must defer the
exercise of its jurisdiction on related issues on the same matter properly within its jurisdiction, such as the
distinct cause of action for reformation of contracts involving the same property. Note that the contracts refer
to the same property, identified as “Lot 322,” - which the DENR Regional Office, DENR
Secretary and the CA found to actually pertain to Lot 258. When an administrative agency or body is conferred
quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are
deemed to be included within its jurisdiction since the law does not sanction a split of jurisdiction.

The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble under the provisions of the Civil
Code is out of step with the fast-changing times. There are hundreds of administrative bodies now performing
this function by virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature. This quasi-judicial function, as it is called, is
exercised by them as an incident of the principal power entrusted to them of regulating certain activities falling
under their particular expertise.

The DENR has primary jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims of title over public lands

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from determining a controversy involving
a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to its resolution by the latter,
where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply [the doctrine of primary jurisdiction] to
cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the
Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also
judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills
and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are
involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by
the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. It applies “where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed
within the special competence of an administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending
referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.”

The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for the dismissal of the
case below. It need only be suspended until after the matters within the competence of [the Lands Management
Bureau] are threshed out and determined. Thereby, the principal purpose behind the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction is salutarily served.

The resolution of conflicting claims of ownership over real property is within the regular court’s area of
competence and, concededly, this issue is judicial in character. However, regular courts would have no power
to conclusively resolve this issue of ownership given the public character of the land, since under C.A. No. 141,
in relation to Executive Order No. 192, the disposition and management of public lands fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Director of Lands, subject to review by the DENR Secretary.

While the powers given to the DENR, through the Bureau of Lands, to alienate and dispose of public land
do not divest regular courts of jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by occupants or applicants (to
protect their respective possessions and occupations), the respondents’ complaint-inintervention does not
simply raise the issue of possession – whether de jure or de facto – but likewise raised the issue of ownership
as basis to recover possession. Particularly, the respondents prayed for declaration of ownership of Lot 322.
Ineluctably, the RTC would have to defer its ruling on the respondents’ reivindicatory action pending final
determination by the DENR, through the Lands
Management Bureau, of the respondents’ entitlement to a free patent, following the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction.

Undoubtedly, the DENR Secretary’s exclusion of Lot 322 from the petitioner’s free patent application
and is consequent directive for the respondents to apply for the same lot are within the DENR Secretary’s
exercise of sound administrative discretion. In the oft-cited case of Vicente Villaflor, etc. v. CA, et al,[42] which
involves the decisions of the Director of Lands and the then Minister of Natural Resources, we stressed that the
rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies to questions on the identity of the disputed
public land since this matter requires a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands. Since this issue
precludes prior judicial determination, the courts must stand aside even when they apparently have statutory
power to proceed, in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of the administrative agency.

28. Omictin v. Court of Appeals (GR No. 148004; 1/22/2007)

FACTS:
Petitioner Omictin, Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag Phils Inc (Saag) filed a complaint for 2 counts
of estafa against private respondent George I. Lagos. He alleged that Lagos, despite repeated demands, refused
to return the two company vehicles entrusted to him when he was still the president of Saag.

Lagos filed a motion to suspend proceedings on the basis of a prejudicial question because of a pending
petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) involving the same parties. Lagos filed the SEC case
for the declaration of nullity of the respective appointments of Alex Y. Tan and Omictin as President Ad Interim
and Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag.

RTC Makati denied Lagos’ motion to suspend proceedings and motion to recuse. MR was also denied.

CA however granted the motion to suspend. Hence this petition.

Incidentally, the SEC case was transferred to the RTC Mandaluyong, pursuant to A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC
implementing the Securities and Regulation Code (RA 8799), vesting in the RTCs jurisdiction over intra-corporate
disputes.

ISSUE:
WON the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction applies.

RULING:
YES, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction may be applied in this case.
 The issues raised by Lagos particularly the status of Saag as well as the question regarding the supposed
authority of the Omictin to make a demand on behalf of the company, are proper subjects for the determination
of the tribunal hearing the intra-corporate case which in this case is the RTC of Mandaluyong.

These issues would have been referred to the expertise of the SEC in accordance with the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction had the case not been transferred to the RTC of Mandaluyong.

Strictly speaking, the objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether
it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some
question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court.

The court cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to resolving the same, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring special knowledge, experience and services in determining technical and
intricate matters of fact.

While the doctrine refers specifically to an administrative tribunal, the Court believes that the circumstances in
the instant case do not proscribe the application of the doctrine, as the role of an administrative tribunal such
as the SEC in determining technical and intricate matters of special competence has been taken on by specially
designated RTCs by virtue of RA 8799.

Hence, the RTC of Mandaluyong where the intra-corporate case is pending has the primary jurisdiction to
determine the issues under contention relating to the status of the domestic corporation, Saag and the authority
of Omictin to act on behalf of the domestic corporation, the determination of which will have a direct bearing
on the criminal case. The law recognizes that, in place of the SEC, the regular courts now have the legal
competence to decide intra-corporate disputes.

On the issue of WON a PQ exists:

YES, a PQ exists.

A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of
the issue involved therein and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.

Here, the case which was lodged originally before the SEC and which is now pending before the RTC by
virtue of RA 8799 involves facts that are intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution is
based.

Ultimately, the resolution of the issues raised in the intra- corporate dispute will determine the guilt or
innocence of Lagos in the crime of estafa before RTC Makati.

Logically, since the alleged offended party is Saag, the validity of the demand for the delivery of the
subject vehicles rests upon the authority of the person making such a demand on the company's behalf. Lagos
is challenging Omictin's authority to act for Saag Phils in the corporate case pending before the RTC of
Mandaluyong. If the supposed authority of Omictin is found to be defective, it is as if no demand was ever made,
hence, the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper.

29. Euro-Med Laboratories v. Province of Batangas (GR No. 148106; 7/17/2006)

FACTS:
This is a case for a sum of money allegedly owned by the Province of Batangas (Province) to the Euro-
Med Lab (Lab) for the purchase of medical products with an unpaid balance of P487,662.80 evidenced by
invoices duly received and signed by the Province's representatives.

Province filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the primary jurisdiction over the
money claim was lodged with the Commission on Audit (COA). They pointed out that Lab's claim was governed
by the Local Government Code (LGC) provisions and COA rules and regulations on supply and property
management in LGUs. They argued that the case called for a determination of whether these provisions and
rules were complied with, and that was within the exclusive domain of COA to make.

RTC dismissed Lab's complaint without prejudice to the filing of the proper money claim with the COA.
MR was also denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether it is the COA or the RTC which has primary jurisdiction to pass upon Lab's money claim.

RULING:
COA.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized training and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative
proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction.

It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the
claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special
competence of an administrative agency.

In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending
referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly
disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.

Here, although Lab's collection suit was w/in the jurisdiction of the RTC, the circumstances surrounding the
claim brought it clearly within the ambit of the COA's jurisdiction.

First, Lab was seeking the enforcement of a claim against a LGU. This brought the case within the COA's domain
to pass upon money claims against the gov’t or any subdivision thereof under Sec. 26 of the Government
Auditing Code of the PH:

The authority and powers of the COA shall extend to and comprehend all matters relating to . . . the examination,
audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities.

However, the scope of the COA's authority is limited only to liquidated claims, or those determined or readily
determinable from vouchers, invoices, and such other papers within reach of accounting officers. Lab's claim
was for a fixed amount which was readily determinable from the receipts, invoices and other documents. Thus,
the claim was well within the COA's jurisdiction.
Second, Lab's money claim was founded on a series of purchases for the medical supplies of the Province's
public hospitals. Both parties agreed that these transactions were governed by the LGC provisions and their
implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the COA.

Lab's claim therefore involved compliance with applicable auditing laws and rules on procurement. Such matters
are not within the usual area of knowledge, experience and expertise of most judges but within the special
competence of COA auditors and accountants. Thus, it was but proper, out of fidelity to the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, for the RTC to dismiss Lab's complaint.
Lab argues, however, that Province could no longer question the RTC's jurisdiction over the matter after it had
filed its answer and participated in the subsequent proceedings. To this, we need only state that the court may
raise the issue of primary jurisdiction sua sponte and its invocation cannot be waived by the failure of the parties
to argue it as the doctrine exists for the proper distribution of power between judicial and administrative bodies
and not for the convenience of the parties.

30. Agra, et al v. COA (GR No. 167807; 12/6/2011)

FACTS:
This case stems from the decision of the COA to deny, disallow, and request for the refund of the grant
of rice allowance to employees (herein petitioners) of the National Electrification Administration (NEA) who
were hired after June 30, 1989.

On July 1, 1989, RA 6758 (the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989) took effect, Section
12 of which provides:
Sec. 12. Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation. — All allowances, except for
representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry allowances; subsistence allowance
of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances
of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional compensation not otherwise
specified herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included in the standardized salary
rates herein prescribed. Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received
by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to
be authorized.

Thereafter, DBM issued the IRR of RA 6758. Pertinent provision is Sec 5.5, to wit:
5.5 The following allowances/fringe benefits authorized to GOCCs/GFIs pursuant to the
aforementioned issuances are not likewise to be integrated into the basic salary and allowed to be
continued only for incumbents of positions as of June 30, 1989 who are authorized and actually
receiving said allowances/benefits as of said date , at the same terms and conditions prescribed in said
issuances(:)
5.5.1 Rice Subsidy

A group of NEA employees who were hired after October 31, 1989 claimed that they did not receive
meal, rice, and children's allowances. Thus, they filed a special civil action for mandamus against NEA and its
Board of Administrators before the RTC.
 RTC favoured the employees. Such judgment became final and executory. RTC issued a Writ of
Garnishment against the funds of NEA with the DBP. NEA appealed to the CA, however CA ordered the
extinguishment of the funds of NEA. SC reversed and set aside the CA decision and described the subsequent
events relating to the case in this manner:

The claims under RA 6758 which the RTC had ordered to be settled cannot be paid because Morales, et
al. are not "incumbents of positions as of July 1, 1989 who are actually receiving and enjoying such benefits.

Moreover, in an Indorsement, COA advised NEA against making further payments in settlement of the
claims. Apparently, COA had already passed upon claims similar to those of Agra, et al. in its earlier Decision
No. 95-074. Portions of the Indorsement read as follows:

The court may have exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the petition for the entitlement of the
after-hired employees which had already been passed upon by this Commission in COA Decision No. 95-074.
There, it was held that: "the adverse action of this Commission sustaining the disallowance made by the Auditor,
NEA, on the payment of fringe benefits granted to NEA employees hired from July 1, 1989 to October 31, 1989
is hereby reconsidered. Accordingly, subject disallowance is lifted."

Thus, employees hired after the extended date of October 31, 1989, pursuant to the above COA decision
cannot defy that decision by filing a petition for mandamus in the lower court. PD No. 1445 and the 1987
Constitution prescribe that the only mode for appeal from decisions of this Commission is on certiorari to the
SC in the manner provided by law and the Rules of Court.

Clearly, the lower court had no jurisdiction when it entertained the subject case of mandamus. And void
decisions of the lower court can never attain finality, much less be executed. Moreover, COA was not made a
party thereto, hence, it cannot be compelled to allow the payment of claims on the basis of the questioned
decision.

The Court ruled that respondents therein could not proceed against the funds of NEA "because the RTC
Decision sought to be satisfied is not a judgment for a specific sum of money susceptible of execution by
garnishment; it is a special judgment requiring petitioners to settle the claims in accordance with existing
regulations of the COA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the immutability of final decision doctrine must prevail over the exclusive jurisdiction
of COA to audit and settle disbursements of funds

RULING:
The immutability rule applies only when the decision is promulgated by a court possessed of jurisdiction
to hear and decide the case. Undoubtedly, the petition in the guise of a case for mandamus is a money claim
falling within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of this Commission.

Noting the propensity of the lower courts in taking cognizance of cases filed by claimants in violation of such
primary jurisdiction, the SC issued Administrative Circular 10-2000 enjoining judges of lower courts to exercise
caution in order to prevent "possible circumvention of the rules and procedures of the Commission on Audit"
and reiterating the basic rule that:
"All money claims against the Government must be filed with the Commission on Audit which shall act upon it
within sixty days. Rejection of the claim will authorize the claimant to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court
on certiorari and in effect sue the State thereby."

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, when an administrative body is clothed with original and exclusive
jurisdiction, courts are utterly without power and authority to exercise concurrently such jurisdiction.
Accordingly, all the proceedings of the court in violation of that doctrine and all orders and decisions reached
thereby are null and void. It will be noted in the cited SC Circular that money claims are cognizable by the COA
and its decision is appealable only to the SC. The lower courts have nothing to do with such genus of transactions.

As petitioners were hired after June 30, 1989, the COA was correct in disallowing the grant of the benefit to
them, as they were clearly not entitled to it.

In National Electrification Administration v. Morales , the order of garnishment against the NEA funds to
implement the RTC Decision was in issue, and we said that the COA had exclusive jurisdiction to decide on the
allowance or disallowance of money claims arising from the implementation of RA 6758. We observed therein
that "the RTC acted prudently in halting implementation of the writ of execution to allow the parties recourse
to the processes of the COA." In fact, "it is not for this Court to preempt the action of the COA on the post-audit
to be conducted by it per its Indorsement”.

Notwithstanding our ruling above, however, we take up as another matter the refund ordered by the COA on
the rice subsidy that petitioners had already received. As regards the refund, we rule in favor of petitioners and
will not require them to return the amounts anymore.

31. Spouses Fajardo v. Flores (GR NO. 167891; 1/15/2010)

FACTS:
Reyes owned a parcel of land which he allowed petitioner Fajardo to lease and cultivate under a
leasehold tenancy. Fajardo was allowed by Reyes to erect a house for his family on the stony part of the land,
which is the subject of controversy.

Anita Flores later inherited the property from Reyes. Flores and Fajardo executed an agreement,
denominated as "KASUNDUAN NG PAGHAHATI NG LUPA AT PAGTATALAGA NG DAAN UKOL SA MAGKABILANG
PANIG." This was followed by another agreement, "KASUNDUAN SA HATIAN SA LUPA, wherein the parties
agreed to allot a portion of the property to Fajardo.

Apparently, there was a conflict of claims in the interpretation of the Kasunduan which was referred to
the DAR and later elevated to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

Meanwhile, a complaint for ejectment was filed by Flores against Fajardo with MTC Bulacan. She alleged
that she inherited a parcel of land consisting of stony land not devoted to agriculture (where Fajardo’s house
is), and land suitable and devoted to agriculture.

The portion of the land where Fajardo’s house is erected is the subject of the instant case for unlawful
detainer. Flores argues that this portion is not included in the deed of partition, while Fajardo insists that it is.
 Fajardo filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the lot in dispute was agricultural land; that the MTC had
no jurisdiction over the case, considering that the dispute between the parties was referred to the DARAB; and
that the assumption by the DARAB of jurisdiction over the controversy involving the lot in question therefore
precluded the MTC from exercising jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE:
Whether it is MTC or the DARAB which has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

DARAB.

The resolution of this case hinges on the correct interpretation of the contracts executed by the parties.
The issue of who has a better right of possession over the subject land cannot be determined without resolving
first the matter as to whom the subject property was allotted. Thus, this is not simply a case for unlawful
detainer, but one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation, definitely beyond the competence of the MTC.

More importantly, the controversy involves an agricultural land. In the Kasunduan, it was admitted that
Fajardo was the tiller of the land. Being agricultural lessees, they have a right to a home lot and a right to
exclusive possession thereof by virtue of Sec 24, RA 3844 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code. Logically,
therefore, the case involves an agrarian dispute, which falls within the contemplation of RA 6657, or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship, or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers'
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.

It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms
and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner to farmworkers, tenants, and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. It relates to any controversy relating to, inter alia, tenancy over
lands devoted to agriculture.

The instant case undeniably involves a controversy involving tenurial arrangements because the
Kasulatan will definitely modify, nay, terminate the same. Even assuming that the tenancy relationship between
the parties had ceased due to the Kasulatan, there still exists an agrarian dispute because the action involves an
incident arising from the landlord and tenant relationship.

Furthermore, the records disclose that the dispute between the parties, regarding the interpretation of
the Kasunduan, was, in fact, raised and referred to the DAR, which in turn referred the case to the DARAB.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which
jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an administrative body of special competence. For agrarian reform
cases, jurisdiction is vested in the DAR; more specifically, in the DARAB.

32. Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction (GR NO. 197592 & 20262; 11/27/2013)

FACTS:
 Province of Aklan (petitioner) and Jody King Construction and Development Corp. (respondent) entered
into a contract for the design and construction of the Caticlan Jetty Port and Terminal (Phase I) in Malay, Aklan.
In the course of construction, petitioner issued variation/change orders for additional works. The scope of work
under these change orders were agreed upon by petitioner and respondent.

Respondent made a demand for the total amount of P22,419,112.96 which petitioner allegedly failed to
settle.

Respondent sued petitioner in the RTC Marikina to collect the amounts which later led to the issuance
of a writ of execution ordering the Sheriff to demand from petitioner the immediate payment of the amount.

On the matter of execution of the trial court's decision, the CA said that it was rendered moot by
respondent's filing of a petition before the COA. The CA also held that petitioner is estopped from invoking the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction as it only raised the issue of COA's primary jurisdiction after its notice of appeal
was denied and a writ of execution was issued against it.

ISSUE:
The applicability of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

RULING:
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized training and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies, relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts even if the matter may well be within their
proper jurisdiction. It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed
within the special competence of an administrative agency. In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought
to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for
its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.

The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether it should
refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or
some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court.

As can be gleaned, respondent seeks to enforce a claim for sums of money allegedly owed by petitioner,
a local government unit.

Under CA 327, as amended by Sec 26 of PD 1445, it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction over money
claims against government agencies and instrumentalities.
Section 26. General jurisdiction. — The authority and powers of the Commission shall extend to and comprehend
all matters relating to… settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or
any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities.

Pursuant to its rule-making authority and existing laws, the COA promulgated the 2009 Revised Rules of
Procedure of the COA. Rule II, Section 1 specifically enumerated those matters falling under COA's exclusive
jurisdiction, which include money claims due from or owing to any government agency.

Respondent's collection suit being directed against a local government unit, such money claim should
have been first brought to the COA. Hence, the RTC should have suspended the proceedings and refer the filing
of the claim before the COA. Moreover, petitioner is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction even
after the denial of its notice of appeal and before the CA.

There are established exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, such as:
(a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
(b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
(c) where here is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant;
(d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;
(e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice;
(f) where judicial intervention is urgent;
(g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage;
(h) where the controverted acts violate due process;
(i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;
(j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
(k) when strong public interest is involved; and,
(l) in quo warranto proceedings.

However, none of the foregoing circumstances is applicable in the present case.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. All
the proceedings of the court in violation of the doctrine and all orders and decisions rendered thereby are null
and void.

vi. Adherence of jurisdiction

33. Aruego v. Court of Appeals (GR No. 112193; 3/13/1996)

PRINCIPLES:
The principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once attached cannot be ousted
by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from
attaching in the first instance, and it retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case.

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence
as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173 [during the lifetime of the
child], except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the
presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before
the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;

FACTS:
On March 7, 1983, a Complaint for Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of Successional Rights was
filed before Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila by the minors, private respondent Antonia F. Aruego
and her alleged sister Evelyn F. Aruego, represented by their mother and natural guardian, Luz M. Fabian.
Named defendants therein were Jose E. Aruego, Jr. and the five (5) minor children of the deceased Gloria A.
Torres, represented by their father and natural guardian, Justo P. Torres, Jr., now the petitioners herein.
The complaint prayed for an Order praying that herein private respondent and Evelyn be declared the
illegitimate children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego, Sr.; that herein petitioners be compelled to recognize and
acknowledge them as the compulsory heirs of the deceased Jose M. Aruego; that their share and participation
in the estate of their deceased father be determined and ordered delivered to them.
The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged "open and continuous possession of the
status of illegitimate children.
The lower court renders judgement, declaring Antonia Aruego as illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego
and Luz Fabian; Evelyn Fabian is not an illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz Fabian;

Declaring that the estates of deceased Jose Aruego are the following:

Antonia Aruego is entitled to a share equal to 1/2 portion of share of the legitimate children of Jose
Aruego.

Defendants are hereby ordered to recognize Antonia Aruego as the illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego
with Luz Fabian;

Defendants are hereby ordered to deliver to Antonia Aruego (her) share in the estate of Jose Aruego,
Sr.;
Defendants to play plaintiffs (Antonia Aruego) counsel the sum of P10, 000.00 as atty's fee;

Cost against the defendants.

Herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the decision alleging loss of jurisdiction on the
part of the trial court over the complaint by virtue of the passage of Executive Order No. 209 (as amended by
Executive Order No. 227), otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August
3, 1988. This motion was denied by the lower court in the Order, dated January 14, 1993.
Petitioners interposed an appeal but the lower court refused to give it due course on the ground that it was filed
out of time.
A Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was filed by herein
petitioners before respondent Court of Appeals, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit in a decision
promulgated on August 31, 1993. A Motion for Reconsideration when filed was denied by the respondent court
in a minute resolution, dated October 13, 1993.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court lost jurisdiction over the complaint of private respondent on the ground
of prescription?
RULING:
No. In Tayag vs. Court of Appeals, a case which involves a similar complaint denominated as "Claim for
Inheritance" but treated by this court as one to compel recognition as an illegitimate child brought prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code by the mother of the minor child, and based also on the "open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child," we had occasion to rule that:

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the minor child has
been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code. We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals, et. al. where we held that the fact of filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right
to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time,
and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.

Tayag applies four-square with the case at bench. The action brought by private respondent Antonia Aruego
for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the
Family Code, must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code. The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its
application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case decided under Article 285 of
the Civil Code. The right was vested to her by the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil
Code. Prescinding from this, the conclusion then ought to be that the action was not yet barred, notwithstanding
the fact that it was brought when the putative father was already deceased, since private respondent was then
still a minor when it was filed, an exception to the general rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code.
Hence, the trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint, never lost
jurisdiction over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of the Philippines.

34. Barrameda v. Rural Bank of Canaman (GR No. 176260; 11/24/2010)

PRINCIPLE:
This Court is neither unmindful nor unaware of the doctrine on the adherence of jurisdiction. However,
the rule on adherence of jurisdiction is not absolute and has exceptions. One of the exceptions is that when the
change in jurisdiction is curative in character.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, modifying
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 36 (RTC-Iriga), in Civil Case No. IR-3128, by ordering
the consolidation of the said civil case with Special Proceeding Case No. M-5290 (liquidation case) before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 59 (RTC-Makati).

It appears from the records that on March 17, 2000, petitioner Lucia Barrameda Vda. De Ballesteros
(Lucia) filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, Deed of Mortgage and Damages with
prayer for Preliminary Injunction against her children, Roy, Rito, Amy, Arabel, Rico, Abe, Ponce Rex and Adden,
all surnamed Ballesteros, and the Rural Bank of Canaman, Inc., Baao Branch (RBCI) before the RTC-Iriga.

The case was then set for pre-trial conference. During the pre-trial, RBCI’s counsel filed a motion to
withdraw after being informed that Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) would handle the case as
RBCI had already been closed and placed under the receivership of the PDIC. Consequently, on February 4, 2002,
the lawyers of PDIC took over the case of RBCI.

On May 9, 2003, RBCI, through PDIC, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC-Iriga has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. RBCI stated that pursuant to Section 30, Republic Act No. 7653
(RA No. 7653), otherwise known as the "New Central Bank Act," the RTC-Makati, already constituted itself, per
its Order dated August 10, 2001, as the liquidation court to assist PDIC in undertaking the liquidation of RBCI.
Thus, the subject matter of Civil Case No. IR-3128 fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of such liquidation court.

Hence, Lucia opposed the motion. Lucia’s argument, that the RTC-Iriga is vested with jurisdiction to
continue trying Civil Case No. IR-3128 until its final disposition. She contends that, since the RTC-Iriga has already
obtained jurisdiction over the case it should continue exercising such jurisdiction until the final termination of
the case. The jurisdiction of a court once attached cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events,
although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and the
Court retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case (Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 711).

When a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to
proceed to final determination of the case is not affected by a new legislation transferring jurisdiction over such
proceedings to another tribunal. (Alindao v. Joson, 264 SCRA 211). Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is
retained up to the end of the litigation (Bernate v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 323).

ISSUE:
The court of appeals erred in not finding that the regional trial court of iriga city, branch 36 is vested with
jurisdiction to continue trying and ultimately decide civil case no. ir-3128 under the rule on adherence of
jurisdiction.

RULING:
No. PDIC, as liquidator of RBCI, counters that the consolidation of Civil Case No. 3128 with the liquidation
proceeding is proper. It posits that the liquidation court of RBCI, having been established, shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over all claims against the said bank.
The afore-quoted cases, cited by Lucia to bolster the plea for the continuance of her case, find no application in
the case at bench.
Indeed, the Court recognizes the doctrine on adherence of jurisdiction. Lucia, however, must be reminded that
such principle is not without exceptions. It is well to quote the ruling of the CA on this matter, thus:
This Court is neither unmindful nor unaware of the doctrine on the adherence of jurisdiction. However, the rule
on adherence of jurisdiction is not absolute and has exceptions. One of the exceptions is that when the change
in jurisdiction is curative in character.
Section 30, R.A. 7653 is curative in character when it declared that the liquidation court shall have jurisdiction
in the same proceedings to assist in the adjudication of the disputed claims against the Bank. The interpretation
of this Section (formerly Section 29, R.A. 265) becomes more obvious in the light of its intent.
The cited Morfe case held that "after the Monetary Board has declared that a bank is insolvent and has ordered
it to cease operations; the Board becomes the trustee of its assets for the equal benefit of all the creditors,
including depositors. The assets of the insolvent banking institution are held in trust for the equal benefit of all
creditors, and after its insolvency, one cannot obtain an advantage or a preference over another by an
attachment, execution or otherwise."
Thus, to allow Lucia’s case to proceed independently of the liquidation case, a possibility of favorable judgment
and execution thereof against the assets of RBCI would not only prejudice the other creditors and depositors
but would defeat the very purpose for which a liquidation court was constituted as well.
 vii. Doctrine of non-interference or judicial stability

35. Tan v. Cinco et al (GR No. 213054; 6/15/2016)

FACTS:
In 2001, respondents Simon Lori Holdings, Inc. (SLHI), Fortunato G. Pe, Raymundo G. Pe, Jovencio F.
Cinco, and Jose Revilla Reyes, Jr. (individual lenders) extended a loan to one Dante Tan (Dante) in the amount
of P50,000,000.00. The loan was facilitated by Penta Capital Investment Corporation (Penta Capital) and was
secured by Dante's shares in Best World Resources Corporation (BWRC). When Dante failed to pay the loan
upon maturity and despite demands, he proposed to settle the same by selling his shares in BWRC and assigning
the proceeds to SLHI, the individual lenders, and Penta Capital (respondents).

However, when he was due to execute the corresponding deeds of assignment; Dante disappeared,
leaving his obligations unpaid. Hence, respondents filed an action for sum of money against him before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146 (Makati RTC).

Subsequently, the court rendered judgement in favor of the complainant and issued a writ of execution
against the defendant.

Hence, the sheriff executes the writ and levied on the property of the defendant. Finally, the Makati RTC
held that attachment and levy on the subject property had been validly done.

On May 2, 2007, Teresita - Dante's wife - filed before the Parañaque RTC a complaint against
respondents, respondent Sheriff Ignacio, and the Register of Deeds of Parañaque City, docketed as Civil Case
No. 07-0134, for the nullification of the auction sale and the cancellation of the certificate of sale issued in favor
of respondents (nullification case).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Parañaque RTC violated the doctrine of judicial stability when it took cognizance of
the nullification case filed by Teresita?

RULING:
YES. In this case, the Court finds that the Parañaque RTC violated the doctrine of judicial stability when
it took cognizance of Teresita's nullification case despite the fact that the collection case from which it emanated
falls within the jurisdiction of the Makati RTC.

Verily, the nullification case ought to have been dismissed at the outset for lack of jurisdiction, as the
Parañaque RTC is bereft of authority to nullify the levy and sale of the subject property that was legitimately
ordered by the Makati RTC, a coordinate and co-equal court.

In fact, the Parañaque RTC was already on the right track when it initially dismissed the nullification case
in its Decision dated July 8, 2010. However, it changed its stance and reconsidered its disposition upon Teresita's
motion for reconsideration, thereby committing reversible error.

To reiterate, the determination of whether or not the levy and sale of a property in the execution of a
judgment was valid properly falls within the jurisdiction of the court that rendered the judgment and issued the
writ of execution.anrobleslaw
 Thus, Teresita's nullification case filed before the Parañaque RTC was improper and in glaring violation
of the doctrine of judicial stability. The judgment rendered by the Makati RTC in the collection case, as well as
the execution thereof, and all other incidents arising there from, may not be interfered with by the Parañaque
RTC, a court of concurrent jurisdiction, for the simple reason that the power to open, modify, or vacate the said
judgment or order is not only possessed but is restricted to the court in which the judgment or order is rendered
or issued.

Consequently, the Parañaque RTC lacked jurisdiction over the same, rendering all the proceedings therein,
as well as the Decision and other orders issued thereon, void for lack of jurisdiction.

36. Del Rosario v. Ocampo-Ferrer (GR No. 215348; 6/20/2016)

FACTS:
The levy on and sale of the real property owned by respondent Cristina Ocampo-Ferrer was procedurally
defective, thereby nullifying the Certificate of Sale in favor of petitioner Eldefonso G. Del Rosario, the
annotation thereof on Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 30480, and the Officer's Deed of Final Sale.

Sometime in February 2001, Ocampo-Ferrer obtained a loan in the amount of P850, 000.00 from Del
Rosario, secured by a parcel of land situated in Calauan, Laguna and covered by TCT No. T-165897. After
Ocampo-Ferrer defaulted on said loan, Del Rosario filed a complaint for sum of money against her before the
Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City, Branch 275.

Ocampo-Ferrer and Del Rosario entered into a Compromise Agreement.

Despite the foregoing, Ocampo-Ferrer still failed to comply with her obligation, thus, compelling Del
Rosario to move for execution, which was granted by the RTC-Las Pinas Br. 275 in an Order dated December 16,
2005.

After the issuance of the Writ of Execution, petitioner Sheriff Josefino Ortiz of RTC-Las Pinas Br. 275
issued a Demand/Notice to Pay to Ocampo-Ferrer, which the latter failed to act upon.

This prompted Sheriff Ortiz to levy Ocampo-Ferrer's parcel of land located in Las Pinas, covered by TCT
No. 30480, and to schedule the public auction of said land.
At the auction sale, Del Rosario came out as the sole and highest bidder, and consequently, a Certificate of Sale
dated February 20, 2006 was issued in his favor. In view of the foregoing,

Ocampo-Ferrer filed a complaint before the RTC-Las Pinas, Branch 198 seeking the annulment of the
sheriff’s sale, as well as payment of damages.

In her complaint, Ocampo-Ferrer claimed that Del Rosario and Sheriff Ortiz committed unlawful acts in
enforcing the writ of execution in Civil Case.

ISSUE:
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly held that the levy and consequent
sale of the property covered by TCT No. 30480 is null and void?

RULING:
Yes. At the outset, the Court emphasizes that under the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference
in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court, the various trial courts of a province or city, having the
same equal authority, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much:
less with their orders or judgments.

Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution order has been issued is considered as
still pending, so that all proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit. A court which issued a
writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial
officers and to control its own processes. To hold otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of the
appropriate1 forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is
obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.

In the case at bar, the Court notes that in performing a levy on and subsequent auction sale of the property
covered by TCT No. 30480, Sheriff Ortiz was merely enforcing the writ of execution issued by the RTC-Las Pinas
Br. 275 pursuant to its ruling in Civil Case No. LP-03-0088. Since said writ of execution emanated from the RTC-
Las Pinas Br. 275, its enforcement cannot be assailed in a co-equal court such as the RTC-Las Pinas Br. 198, as it
would violate the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-
equal court.

37. Cabili v. Hon. Balindong (AM NO. RTJ-10-22252; 9/6/2011)

PRINCIPLE:
The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court
is an elementary principle in the administration of justice. No court can interfere by injunction with the judgments
or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction.
The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case
and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts,
for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial
officers acting in connection with this judgment.

FACTS:
Civil Case No. 06-29542 is an action for damages in Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC against the Mindanao
State University (MSU), et al., arising from a vehicular accident that caused the death of Jesus Ledesma and
physical injuries to several others.

On November 29, 1997, the Iligan City RTC rendered a Decision, holding the MSU liable for damages
amounting to ₱2,726,189.90. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the Iligan City RTC decision and the CA decision
subsequently lapsed to finality.

On March 10, 2009, the Iligan City RTC issued a writ of execution. The MSU, however, failed to comply
with the writ; thus, on March 24, 2009, Sheriff Gerard Peter Gaje served a Notice of Garnishment on the MSU’s
depository bank, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Marawi City Branch.

The MSU responded to the denial by filing on April 1, 2009 a petition with the Marawi City RTC, for
prohibition and mandamus with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
preliminary injunction against the LBP and Sheriff Gaje. The petition of MSU was raffled to the RTC, Marawi City,
and Branch 8, presided by respondent Judge.
 The respondent Judge set the hearing for the application for the issuance of a TRO on April 8, 2009. After
this hearing, the respondent Judge issued a TRO restraining Sheriff Gaje from garnishing ₱2,726,189.90 from
MSU’s LBP-Marawi City Branch account.

Subsequently, complainant Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili, counsel of the private plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 06-
2954, filed the complaint charging the respondent Judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of
Authority, Abuse of Discretion, and/or Grave Misconduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Judicial Service for
interfering with the order of a co-equal court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law for violating the elementary
rule of non-interference with the proceedings of a court of co-equal jurisdiction?

RULING:
YES, as we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution order has been issued is considered as
still pending, so that all the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit.

A court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to
correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes. To hold otherwise would be to divide
the jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution proceedings. Splitting
of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.
Jurisprudence shows that a violation of this rule warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions.

In the present case, the respondent Judge clearly ignored the principle of judicial stability by issuing a TRO
to temporarily restrain Sheriff Gaje from enforcing the writ of execution issued by a co-equal court, Branch 6 of
the Iligan City RTC.