International Relations and Diplomacy (ISSN2328-2134) Volume 7, Number 11,2019

International Relations
and Diplomacy
Volume 7, Number 11, November 2019 (Serial Number 74)
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Zealand); ★Peter A. Mattsson (Swedish Defense College, Sweden);
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International Relations
and Diplomacy
Volume 7, Number 11, November 2019 (Serial Number 74)
Contents
Maritime Security
The Role of Third States in the EU Maritime Security Strategy: A Case Study of the
South Atlantic States 501
AndréPanno Beirão
Cold War
Why the Cold War Will Never Return to World Politics 517
Gültekin Sümer
The Belt and Road
Enhance the Influence of China-UK “One Belt and One Road” Cooperation 533
YUAN Xuezhe
Trojan Terrorism
Trojan Terrorism as a Principate of Deception, Or in the Arms of the Terracotta Locust

(Ethymological Wing Cases of Virtus): Part 1 539
Menshikova Elena Rudolfovna
International Relations and Diplomacy, November 2019, Vol. 7, No. 11, 501-516
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2019.11.001
D
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The Role of Third States in the EU Maritime Security Strategy:

A Case Study of the South Atlantic States
AndréPanno Beirão
Brazilian Naval War College, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

The global challenges to maritime security have long outnumbered the classic interstate war. Increasingly, the new
threats have assumed the most real risks, whether human, weapons or drugs traffic, piracy, illegal fishing among
others. Some of these challenges, even if they are not in the European Union’s primary strategic maritime area, they
have relevant impacts on this. The unstable region of the Gulf of Guinea, for example, with its cases of armed
robbery, piracy, or even trafficking (mainly human and drug trafficking) has attracted attention to the several EU
Member States, with individual policies that are often poorly articulated. This paper is the result of field research
with stakeholders from 17 South Atlantic countries (the research delimitation occurred in South Atlantic Peace and
Cooperation Zone [ZOPACAS] members) and concludes that the exogenous (European) point of view of the major
challenges that encourage the collaborative participation of the South Atlantic are, necessarily, the ones that have
most demanded attention and engagement from the EU Members States. For example, the highest local priority in
allocating resources available in the African coast Navies has been to face and control smuggling acts. The African
States are seeing it as the biggest threat to its maritime security. The widespread problem of piracy appears only as
of the third priority of the regional countries. Besides, the perception of the reputation of control centers
coordinated by exogenous members (States and individuals) to the region does not result in joint information
sharing engagement or even in maritime domain awareness. Thus, this paper that starts from the maritime security’s
typological conceptual presentation―as a complex, divergent, and convergent concept―presents empirical
research and identified actions with potential for greater engagement in the South Atlantic region. It seeks to
demonstrate the need for EU analysis of exogenous problems should increase the local point of view problem. It
therefore serves both the reflection on many of the action points of the Action Plan of European Union Maritime
Security Strategy (EUMSS) and on the competences involved by the EU, in particular, as regards the actual role of
the EU and its Member States in relation to the maritime security aspects of EU internal policies and EU external
relations, EU in negotiating, concluding and implementing international agreements in this area. On the other hand,
it also relates to the accountability of EU Member States with other involved actors (the South Atlantic States,
regional organizations, and/or local/multinational private actors).
Keywords: maritime security, South Atlantic, security threats
André Panno Beirão, PHG on International Law at UERJ; MSc on Political Sciences at UFRJ; MSc on Naval Sciences at
Brazilian Naval War College; Law Bachelor at UNIRIO, senior researcher, Brazilian Navy Political and Strategic Studies Centre,
Pro-Defesa IV CAPES-MD (Maritime Policies Observatory), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
502 THE ROLE OF THIRD STATES IN THE EU MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY
The Delimitation of the Security Concept

Security can be considered a macro concept that has given the scope of endo-concepts that inserts it. Many
definitions are discussed. However, they all seem directed to the inclusion of two aspects: a subjective―the
sensation or perception of those who are influenced by that region, and the other objective―by the set of
actions put in practice that mitigate the identified threats.
Nevertheless, both aspects, the subjective and the objective, start from the premise of being approached in
their insert’s context, whether temporal or geographic. That is, it has to be approached under a particular region
and regime. Therefore, they presuppose a certain jurisdiction and territoriality where they inhabit those who are
affected and responsive to the intended security. In this given region, there is a presumed norm of social
interaction of all those involved and the authority of someone to act in favor of the social good. This is not the
case in the maritime scenario where humanity, the main variable of the subjective concept of security, inhabits.
Grotius (1609) said: The sea has no borders! This indivisible liquid mass passed through innumerable
theories and reflections: res communis, res nullius, mare clausum, and mare nostrum among others more
contemporary. Thus, when one intends to analyze the concept of security in this no-land area, one must try to
make associations and lessons that are typical of the terrestrial state territorial sphere for a completely different
environment. That is the challenge! That is why maritime security has been an exciting topic for research and
debate.
Delimiting Maritime Security

The first point to emphasize is the delineating difficulty of the object―maritime security. In the face of
linguistic and therefore conceptual differences in what we mean by maritime security, these distinctions must
be delimited. This may sound trivial, but it is not! In the English and French languages, there is a distinct ethos
that carries different concepts: security and safety, in English and, securité and surreté, in French. In the
Spanish and Portuguese languages, there is only one word that brings together both concepts: segurança, in
Portuguese and Seguridad, in Spanish. It is certain that segurança-safety is distinct from security-safety,
especially in the maritime context. While the former has a strong shipping bias without risk to the physical
integrity of the seamen, the latter has a strong link with the possibility of threats and violent actions that may
occur at sea (Beirão & Pereira, 2014). Therefore, the object of this work is related to the second
bias―segurança-security, although this is not completely exclusive of the first.
Once this delimitation has been made, what maritime security means, and which are the causes of
insecurity, an intriguing topic of the current debate, some contemporary maritimists and internationalists have
focused on their deepening, such as Christian Buerger (2014) from Cardiff University, Geofrey Till (2012),
King’s College London, and James Kraska and Raul Pedrozo (2013), US Naval War College, among others.
However, all of them converge their debate on the difficulty of conceptual delimitation of maritime security.
Faced with this difficulty, this work intends to delimit their understanding with a proposed typology. The
typology is a very useful tool in social sciences when the object of study is influenced by characteristics of
distinction and, therefore, needs delimitation. That is why we have done the choice of the typological
methodology for the concept of maritime security. Maritime security is considered to be a complex, convergent,
and divergent concept.
THE ROLE OF THIRD STATES IN THE EU MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY 503
In the second part of the paper, these three typologies will serve to particularize the concept approach to
the desired region: The South Atlantic.
Complex―because it is approached by several levels, quite different from each other. For example, there
are approaches with universalizing tendencies, when the UN, itself, issues resolutions for broad purposes. Other
initiatives of universal aspiration have also been adopted when the IMO put on the action a lot of resolutions,
such as the Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea (SUA-1988) and when its Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)
includes, among its tasks, attention to maritime security.
The regional level or multilateral international organizations of more restricted arrangements also have
strong initiatives. For example, in 2011, NATO included the theme among its main objectives, through the
Alliance Maritime Strategy (2011), as well as the African Union and the European Union, in 2014.
From the state initiatives point of view, examples can also be cited. The United States of America, in 2004,
among the pioneers, proposed their “National Maritime Security Policy” as well as the United Kingdom, in
2014, in its Maritime Security Strategy.
However, the approach sometimes deserves even greater specificity. Beyond the universal, multilateral,
and state-level ones, it should be emphasized that, in many cases, there is still an intra-state institutional level,
since it is not uncommon for the theme to be a concurrent, complementary, or shared attribution of Navies,
Coast Guards, or even other national institutions. Therefore, given the diversity of levels, the complex approach
can be considered, because it is not possible to gather expectations at all levels, except in ethereal and
consensual terms.
Figure 1. Complex approach of maritime security.

The proposed typology states that in addition to being “complex”, it is considered that the concept of
maritime security would be convergent and divergent.
Convergent―because subjective and difficult concepts are often also inserted, such as “universal peace”,
or more specifically, “good order at sea” or “freedom of navigation”. Which “good order” are we talking about?
This concept is much relativized according to other interests (state, regional, etc.). Convergent, still, because
even thematically thought in the context of safety can also affect the aspect of security, as signaled at this work
beginning. The intersection areas between those issues that allow complementary approaches to safety and
security have been increasingly strengthened. Perhaps, this conceptual enlargement allowing the convergence
of several themes to the concept of maritime security is a trend that aims at filling gaps in international
regulation. Convergence on something of general interest can facilitate agreements based on similar interests
among stakeholders.
Figure 2. Convergent approach to maritime security.
Concluding the typological delimitation proposed for maritime security, it was considered to be divergent.
The term is purposely used here to show that if the center of the theme is, effectively, derived from actions at
sea that affect all regular navigation, there are themes that are distant from this center, but which certainly also
belong to the broad concept of maritime security. Christian Buerger (2014) proposed four quadrants that
influence the theme: national security; human security, the marine environment, and the economic use of the
sea. This mapping in four dimensions is complementary to the proposed typology of maritime security because
it identifies the three major dimensions of sovereignty proposed by Luigi Ferrajoli (2009): the imperative of
internationalization (economic use of the seas), the imperative of human security, and the national dimension.
To these imperatives proposed by Ferrajoli, we could add the imperative of the environmental dimension that,
from the turn of the 20th century to the 21st century, it has become a singular point of interests limiting of the
aspirations and use of the sea―the environmental imperative (environmental security).
Figure 3. Divergent approach for maritime security.
In these four quadrants, there are sub-thematic ones, some of them are closer to the center, others more
peripheral, and it denotes how effectively they are typical issues of maritime security, that is, they would be in
the hardcore and that can undergo changes due to national, international interests, dated or timeless. Some
themes are almost consensual as belonging to the concept of maritime security, such as inter-state conflicts,
piracy (or even armed robbery, when in the territorial sea of states, but this geographical limitation is
controversial and deserves a different approach), Corso War (formally considered as a past problem), the
typical slave trade (dated and finally abolished), and terrorist acts. To these, new threats have been added and
seem to really belong to the concept, such as weapons of mass destruction trafficking, drugs, smuggling, and
human trafficking.
However, at present, it is not possible to discuss maritime security by abandoning new themes that are
increasingly inserted in this debate, such as the exploitation of living resources (fishing and bioprospecting),
exploitation of the seabed, pollution at seas, natural and man-made accidents with serious consequences and
even climate change. These themes, although further away from the center, certainly must also be considered.
Figure 4. Maritime security threats embedded in the divergent approach.
Therefore, the proposed typology was necessary when considering the concept of maritime security as
complex, convergent, and divergent.
So, we have to face this approach to the specific scenario of South Atlantic to try to bring to you how the
local perspective has to be considered to understand the problem. If the EU wants to face maritime security
challenges abroad their region, it has to try to see the problem from an abroad perspective. Why South Atlantic
is a different area from the North Atlantic. At first, that is because of its specific geostrategic and social
differences.
There is an enormous distance of defense budgets of each region, and mainly, there are differences
between the northern maritime traffic and the southern one. While the first one is almost an east-west traffic,
the southern one seems like a wind rose. So, the solutions for each context have to be different.
Using the Proposed Typology

The possibility of multilateral action to guarantee peace and security at sea presupposes some delimitation.
Certainly, actions aimed at combating the exploitation of bioprospecting are quite distinct from actions to avoid
drug trafficking or smuggling. On the other hand, starting from the complex typology of maritime security,
some of the maritime threats are more localized and have repercussions that are often national or even
sub-regional. For example, the problem of illegal fishing in a given area generally affects only the closely
economies, tending to be a local community problem, or even practically affecting the coastal State, which sees
its right vilified. Other threats have a wider influence, but still have limited repercussions. For example,
weapons trafficking, in the Lebanese coast region, is an important geopolitical question to Middle East conflicts,
but it cannot be said to have global influence. However, under the possible consequences to the peace and
security at sea, the UN urged an answer implementing the Marine Task Force (MTF) to the UN Peacekeeping
Mission at Lebanon (UNIFIL) (UN, 2006).
However, some threats are growing to the point of being considered global threats. Some maritime areas
have been seen as particularly worrying in terms of maritime security. The East African coast, initially closest
to the Somali territorial sea, with the increasing pirate attacks, demanded a relevant international response.
More recently, the west coast of Africa, the Gulf of Guinea, has also attracted more attention, mostly due to
armed robbery, but also piracy. Another problem stemming from maritime insecurity, but of a different cause,
has also drawn the attention of international public opinion, which is the question of the flow of migrants and
human trafficking in the waters of the Mediterranean Sea.
It is possible to use the proposed typology for the concept of maritime security to the above examples to
demonstrate multiple points of view to the threats can and are different. This typology shows itself, particularly
when adopted to particularize the understanding of the perceptions and threats of a certain scenario, time, or
region. Some of them, internationally engaged, others with more national responses.
Thus, faced with the original questioning of the present work: What does the South Atlantic see as
challenges to its maritime security?—we can try to delimit the approach from the proposed typology. The first
delimitation is temporal. The first international demonstrations of concern for South Atlantic maritime security
have taken on greater form since 2010 when the situation on the East African coast seemed to respond well to
the multilateral actions undertaken there. Therefore, the time cut is from 2010. The second clipping is the
delimitation of the geographic space that intends to obtain the analysis. For this, it was not based on restricted
geographical delimitation: The South Atlantic would be formed only by coastal countries below the Equator. It
is considered that such a cut would not be acceptable since the very central area that led to the research (the
Gulf of Guinea region) is cut by Parallel Zero and would exclude some relevant actors. How to delimit the
South Atlantic then? One could choose different criteria. For example, by the definition of the International
Maritime Organization (IMO, 1988), the parallel 16oN is the delimitation of areas of responsibility of Search
and Rescue (Safety) of countries of the South, and then it could be considered only the states below this parallel.
Another delimitation could be more geopolitical, for example, since 1996 the treaty establishing the South
Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS) was established by the Brazilian initiative and backed by
the UN. Twenty-four African and American coastal states identify themselves as belonging to the South
Atlantic and at this treaty. Therefore, we have decided to adopt this methodological cut off the regional variable.
It was considered that the Member States of ZOPACAS are identified as South Atlantic ones.
After the preliminary delimitations, we can proceed to analyze the results from the proposed typology.
From the complex approach, we would have to analyze the perceptions of four distinct spheres: universal,
regional, national, and intra-state. As the answer is directed to the elected regional question (South Atlantic), it
would, therefore, be necessary to verify how the other approaches stand concerning the problem. For the sake
of simplification of approaches, it was considered that internal (intra-state) issues could be verified at a later
and individualized time. Therefore, there are two remaining levels of analysis: the universal and the national.
To map the complex approach of maritime security concerns and initiatives, undertaken by global
initiatives, we have elected two international organizations that represent the universal aspiration and their
vocations to maritime issues: the UN and IMO. Considering the UN as the “great guardian of international
peace and security” (and why not at sea, as well), formal demonstrations were mapped out by its main
structural bodies: United Nations Security Council (UNSC) by means of resolutions; letters and specific
thematic meetings; UNSC statements; and the General Assembly of the United Nations (GAUN). To IMO’s
initiatives in the broad spectrum of maritime security, there have been resolutions and conventions from the
General Assembly, as well as documents emanating from the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) of IMO.
From this mapping, Table 1 was observed.
Table 1
Mapping the Complex Approach, at Global Level
International (global) organism (origin of the document)
Subject UN IMO
SCUN SCUN president
GAUN General Assembly MSC
resolution/letter/meetings statements
S/PRST/2012/24
S/RES/2039 (29/02/2012) (19/11/2012)
S/2016/321 (06/04/2016) S/PRST/2013/13
Piracy A/1069 (28) (2013)
S/PV.7016 (14/08/2013) (14/08/2013)
S/PV.6668 (23/11/2011) S/PRST/2016/4
(26/04/2016)
S/2015/600 (15/10/2014) S/PRST/2017/14
S/PV.6668 (23/11/2011) (09/08/2017) SOLAS Conv. (1974)
Human security
S/2010/288 (30/06/2010) S/PRST/2014/24 SUA Conv. (1988)
SC/11602 (15/10/2014) (21/11/2014)
S/2017/198 (07/03/2017)
Human traffic S/PV.8022 (10/08/2017)
SC/11602 (15/10/2014)
S/PRST/2010/6
Weapons S/RES/1467 (18/03/2003)
(19/03/2010)
traffic S/2010/143 (15/03/2010)
-ISPS CODE Conv. 2002
-Additional Protocol SUA
A/2017/104
Terrorism Conv. (2005)
(01/02/2017)
-Amendment Art. 2ºSUA
Conv. (2005)
Assisting
Armed robbery S/2013/359 (18/06/2013) A/1069 (28) (2013) Member States
(2014)
Assisting
Member States
S/2013/728 (5/12/2013) S/PRST/2013/22 A.872(20) (27/11/1997)
Drugs traffic (2014)
S/PV.7090 (18/12/2013) (18/12/2013) A/1069 (28) (2013)
MSC.228(82)
(7/12/2006)
A/63/PV.85
Climate (03/06/2009)
S/RES/1625 (14/09/2015)
changes A/64/350
(11/09/2009)
A/63/PV.85 MARPOL (1973)
Resources (03/06/2009) Amendment Art. 2ºSUA
exploitation A/64/350 Conv. (2005)
(11/09/2009) A/1069 (28) (2013)
Marine
MARPOL (1973)
pollution
From the previous Table 1, it is possible to highlight the most incidental global concerns by the complex
typology of the concept of maritime security.
Transporting the previous mapping to the proposed quadrants and weighting them according to the scope
of the documents emanated, we can build Figure 5 in which subjects are positioned according to the main
approaches of the raised documents, being able to be more permeable in more of one of the quadrants and the
proximity to the center of the quadrants is due to the most recent concerns (temporal approach) and the size of
the tables corresponds to the highest thematic incidence of concerns in relation to international maritime
security, reaching Figure 5.
Figure 5. Scheme resulting from the complex global approach in the quadrants.
The next step would be to carry out the same mapping of the neighboring countries to the South Atlantic.
To do so, considering the chosen delimitation from the countries of ZOPACAS, we would have to choose the
sources of this nationalized perception of each of the 24 countries of ZOPACAS. This could be done by
following the same proposal of global sampling, that is, by mapping the main national documents dealing with
the subjects (which would imply a very extensive survey and trigger among States, since not all of them live the
same institutional and normative maturity).
In July 2016, under the encouragement and support of the IMO in favor of initiatives of regional
collaborative arrangements around maritime security, an academic event titled “Experts Panel
Meeting―Maritime Security in South Atlantic” was done in Brazil. The purpose of the event was to identify
common interests and opportunities for the increase of maritime security in the South Atlantic, as well as to
present proposals for the expansion and modernization of the operational capabilities of maritime traffic (MT)
monitoring by the countries of the South Atlantic strategic environment. At the occasion, lectures and a seminar
game were held, using models of decision-making process simulation (Marinha do Brasil, 2016). The event was
attended by significant international representation, with the presence of delegations from 17 South Atlantic
States, as well as observers from invited countries (United States of America, France, Portugal, and United
Kingdom), from several International Organizations and (IMO), the European Union, the Inter-regional
Coordination Center (ICC), based in Cameroon, the South Atlantic Maritime Area Coordinator (CAMAS), and
representations of national institutions: the National Control Agency, the Federal Police, National Union of
Maritime Shipping Companies (SYNDARMA), and the National Petroleum Agency, among others.
Thus, given the presence of prominent stakeholders from the present states, in spite of it was not the
complete ZOPACAS members (17 of 24 States), a part of the chosen methodological method, a controlled
interview was conducted to gauge the nationalized perceptions regarding maritime security of each of the
present States.
In summary, each stakeholder from each State answered the following questions:
 Which of the following topics are most worrying in terms of maritime security in your area? (Sort from the
most relevant to the least relevant).

 Observing the chosen themes, assign the percentage of financial commitment and personnel primarily
allocated (but not exclusively) to the combat of the threat.
 Observing the chosen themes, assign what should be (IDEALLY) the percentage of financial commitment
and personnel primarily allocated (but not exclusively) to the threat.
Based on the answers of the interviewees and not allowing the identification of each State (since there was
a commitment of secrecy in the collection of sample data), Table 2 could be constructed:
Table 2
Mapping the Regional Complex Approach (at the National Level) of the South Atlantic Coastal States
Inter-states Resources Smuggli Climate Marine Terroris Weapons Drugs Human
State Piracy Others
conflicts exploitation ng changes pollution m traffic traffic traffic
Priority 2 1 7 3 8 4 6 5 9 10
A % at now 35 15 5 5 5 10 5 5 10 5
% ideal 40 25 0 0 15 10 10 0 0 0
Priority 2 1 7 8 9 4 3 6 5 10
B % at now 30 20 5 0 5 10 10 10 10 0
% ideal 30 30 0 0 0 10 10 10 10 0
Priority 7 5 4 10 1 2 8 6 3 9
C % at now 15 10 15 0 15 15 10 10 10 0
% ideal 15 15 15 5 10 10 15 5 5 5
Priority 7 1 2 10 3 6 4 5 9 8
D % at now 10 40 10 0 15 0 10 10 10 5
% ideal 20 40 10 5 10 5 10 0 0 0
Priority 3 4 2 10 1 9 5 6 7 8 Control
E % at now 10 5 5 0 30 0 15 10 5 5 15
% ideal 10 5 5 0 30 0 15 10 5 5 15
Priority 10 2 7 9 3 8 1 4 5 6
F % at now 10 10 10 0 10 5 15 15 15 10
% ideal 10 10 10 0 10 5 15 15 15 10
Priority 6 8 1 9 7 10 2 3 4 5
G % at now 10 0 35 0 10 10 10 10 10 5
% ideal 10 0 35 0 10 10 10 10 10 5
Priority 9 5 8 10 4 7 6 1 2 3 Control
H % at now 5 10 5 0 10 0 10 20 10 10 20
% ideal 10 10 10 0 20 0 10 10 10 10 10
Priority 8 6 3 9 1 10 2 5 4 7
I % at now 10 10 5 10 20 10 20 5 5 5
% ideal 10 10 5 10 20 10 20 5 5 5
Priority 3 4 2 10 1 9 5 6 7 8
J % at now 20 10 5 0 30 0 15 10 5 5
% ideal 20 10 5 0 30 0 15 10 5 5
Priority 8 1 2 10 4 9 3 5 6 7
K % at now 10 20 20 0 10 0 10 10 10 10
% ideal 10 20 15 0 10 5 10 10 10 10
Priority 3 4 2 10 1 9 5 6 7 8
L % at now 20 10 5 0 30 0 15 10 5 5
% ideal 20 10 5 0 30 0 15 10 5 5
(table 2 continued)
Inter-states Resources Smuggli Climate Marine Terroris Weapons Drugs Human
State Piracy Others
conflicts exploitation ng changes pollution m traffic traffic traffic
Priority 9 8 1 10 3 7 2 4 5 6
M % at now 0 0 25 0 25 5 25 5 5 5
% ideal 0 0 25 0 25 5 25 5 5 5
Priority 7 1 2 10 3 6 4 5 9 8
N % at now 10 40 10 0 15 0 10 10 10 5
% ideal 20 40 10 5 10 5 10 0 0 0
Priority 7 1 2 10 4 9 3 5 6 8
O % at now 5 25 20 0 20 0 20 5 5 0
% ideal 15 20 15 0 15 5 15 10 5 5
Priority 8 6 3 9 1 10 2 5 4 7
P % at now 10 10 5 10 20 10 20 5 5 5
% ideal 10 10 5 10 20 10 20 5 5 5
Priority 9 8 1 10 3 7 2 4 5 6
Q % at now 10 0 25 0 25 5 15 5 5 5
% ideal 10 0 25 0 25 5 15 5 5 5
The previous Table 2 allows some analysis. The first refers to whether or not we can consider the
representative sample of the whole. It would be necessary to ensure that the most disparate shades among states,
whether by size, economic power, location (South American or African), and cultural identities were
represented. These aspects were fully met. Other analyses call for attention, for example, the fact that the vast
majority of states said the low possibility of inter-state conflicts, and therefore, with a lower (current and ideal)
allocation of resources to classic weapons of naval warfare, they highlighted a low priority to this threat.
However, in order to extract the mapping to be used in the divergent typology of insertion in the four
quadrants with the appropriate correspondence of proximity and size, the average priorities for approaching (or
withdrawing from the center) and size of the threat perception frame of a given subject, the average current
percentage of resources allocated in that prevention. From this relation, Table 3 was built.
Table 3
Mapping the Complex, Consolidated Approach at Regional Level
Inter-states Resources Climate Marine Weapons Drugs Human
Average Smuggling Piracy Terrorism Others
conflicts exploitation changes pollution traffic traffic traffics
Priority 6.35 3.76 3.29 9.23 3.35 7.41 3.7 4.76 5.7 7.17
% at now 12.74 13.82 12.35 1.4 17.35 4.7 13.52 9.11 9.01 5 (1.75)
Table 3, taken as summing up of national interests of the region, which in itself may already mean
simplification and generalization that does not accurately reflect regional longings, when understood as an
indivisible whole, already allows for some secondary analysis. The smaller the (relative) number of priorities is,
the greater the priority of the South Atlantic States is. Thus, it is perceived that the highest priority of the States
in terms of maritime security is smuggling, showing the importance given to the economic aspect of the
national relationship with the sea. Soon closer, it comes the concern with piracy, which, in a way, would
converge with the global perception. However, unlike the global perspective, the third major concern is
maritime terrorism (3.7) (due to the inherent risk of exploitation of marine resources, especially hydrocarbons),
which almost coincides with the fourth-highest priority, the sustainable exploitation of ocean resources (3.76).
That is, the character of economic use of the seas is central to the South Atlantic countries and does not
correspond to the second-highest global priority, which would be human trafficking (adding human security to
the effective trafficking of migrants and refugees) and not even trafficking drugs or weapons. These threats
would be even less relevant than interstate conflicts.
Therefore, as it was done to global interests, it is possible to construct the graphic illustration of the
resulting average of national interests in the region, as follows:
Figure 6. Divergent approach: scheme resulting from the complex approach of the sum of national interests (regional)
in the quadrants.
Thus, to achieve the purpose of ensemble analyses from the convergent and complex aspirations of the
maritime security having in mind the regionalized understanding of the South Atlantic, it is possible to overlap
the divergent global perspective at the average of the national approaches, in a single graphic, as follows:
Figure 7. Scheme of coincidence of “global” and “regional” divergent approaches.

From Figure 7, we can deduce a reasonable different point of view between the approaches (global and
regional) and it deserves special analysis to the purpose of the present work. It should be noted that the regional
interests’ framework was represented in italics letters.
It can be deduced from it that the major international concerns with maritime security are not linearly
reflected in the reading of the South Atlantic countries that have a concern related to their realities and local
and regional demands.
What would be the relevance of the proposed typology?
The greatest commitment to co-operating and co-operative assistance from states is certainly greater when
one fills it’s aware of the problem. So, that is the relevance of observing the problem under the point of view of
who lives it. Thus, we can achieve greater engagement in the points of convergence of perceptions, as can be
seen from the intersection scheme of South Atlantic interests.
Figure 8. Intersections of major South Atlantic concerns in terms of maritime security.
In other words, demanding aid and cooperation from the South Atlantic States to climate changes,
resulting from maritime actions, may not lead to a great deal of engagement from them. But, not everything is
dissonant; the issue of concern about piracy is certainly a coincident point, but it is not the only one or the
greater, South Atlantic countries demands are more related to the risks inherent to ocean resources (fishing and,
especially, exploitation of hydrocarbons) and well reflected with fears of attacks on its sustainable exploitation
of resources and possible terrorist action on these offshore platforms.
What would be the validity of this work? It is addressed to Identify convergent points of interest that allow
closer actions and political will to engage in collaborative and joint actions that, in the end, would also
converge to the demands for greater maritime security in the South Atlantic―a regional maritime security
policy.
South Atlantic Maritime Security Cooperation Initiatives

To see if the proposed typology is adequate, it would be necessary to verify whether if there are initiatives
(in all shades) to increase South Atlantic maritime security. Two evaluations are possible: The first one, to
verify whether or not initiatives have already been adopted and implemented, and the second one, the
possibility of new initiatives resulting from the regional identity evaluation of their problems.
From the “complex approach”, we can see both initiatives: top-down and bottom-up. There are identifiable
global cooperation initiatives, for example, by the mobilization of the UN at its highest level in terms of
ensuring international peace and security, namely its UN Security Council, which has repeatedly called on
States to cooperate in combating maritime threats in the so-called region of the Gulf of Guinea. Another
example of a global initiative is the engagement of the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) Safety
Committee to stimulate private and state actions to increase maritime security control methods to the maritime
traffic in the region.
From the regional point of view, initiatives can also be checked by grouping interests. However, perhaps,
this is the biggest challenge to be faced. The two Atlantic shores, in terms of regional arrangements, have not
had effective interlocking and cooperative actions. On the African side of the South Atlantic, there are
initiatives, such as the formation of the “Yaoundé Forum” created by the Gulf of Guinea Commission (August
10, 2013); or by the African Union in developing the “2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy”, which has
been in action since January 2014 and has already led to effective actions such as the signing of the “Lomé
Charter” (October 15, 2016) with indicators and specific actions to the Gulf of Guinea. It put together 32
African Member States. On the other side of the Atlantic, the major concerns do not arise from the perspective
of piracy, since the South American Coast can be considered almost unaffected by this maritime threat. Thus,
most of the South American regional initiatives in terms of maritime security have been constituted to “control
and monitoring of maritime traffic” and in the sharing of information that increases maritime situational
awareness.
From national initiatives, the mapping of bilateral or plurilateral agreements (which differs from
multilateral ones because they do not have the open bias of the latter, with the possibility of increasing
participation by interested parties) allows seeing existing partnerships and mutual trust measures. There is clear
identification of the African States that are constantly together, as well as the reverse. From the South
American point of view also, most of the initiatives are plurilateral (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay),
but there are also cross-initiatives, such as the South African partnerships with Argentina and Uruguay. It is
also possible to mention several bilateral Brazilian actions, such as Namibia―by assisting the institutional
construction of its Navy―or Angola―in terms of interests related to oil exploitation, or even, to São Toméand
Príncipe (resulting from Portuguese Speaking Countries Community―known as CPLP).
However, none of these actions were of great effectiveness to the strict object of the present study, that is,
the increase of maritime security in the South Atlantic. In this sense, the most effective actions have been
adopted by the lowest level of the complex approach, which is the interstate or institutional initiative. It is
possible to see some examples of partnerships that have been consolidating in Africa since the Maritime
Exercise Operation of Control of Restricted Maritime Area, called OBANGAME, or even of initiatives of
technology exchange and Brazilian Navy training operations in some African Navies1.
However, it is not possible to identify bigger initiatives, by the complex approach, to face their main
concerns of maritime security. There is not a strong link between the actions and the higher expectations in
1
As examples of these partnerships between Brazilian Navy and African Navies, it is possible to point the information sharing
from SIMMAP―System for Tracking Oil Activity, PRENAV―System for Tracking Inland Water Boats, or the PREPS―System
for Tracking Fishing Boats.
terms of threats considered as priorities. There is, therefore, a relative distance from the initiatives carried out
and the actual local and regional demands.
Final Remarks
Guided by the initial purpose of the present work in seeking to address the issue of delimitation of
maritime security in the South Atlantic region, an attempt has been made to demonstrate how difficult this
delimitation can be. The presented proposal was the use of a specific typology to aid the identification of the
regional perceptions, derived from the national perceptions, focused on the main factors that are considered as
an increase of the insecurity sensation at South Atlantic Ocean.
It was tried to demonstrate that there is a significant extra-regional worldwide effort in encouraging
actions to increase maritime security, often this effort starts from premises of exogenous observations with
insipient dialogue with the relevant factors involved in the process. Thus, in spite of various cooperation
initiatives at a global, extra-regional and regional level (both from regional and international organizations,
such as ZOPACAS and CPLP), national and even intra-national (by institutions and even non-governmental), it
cannot be said that the South Atlantic has been perceived as safer post-initiatives. So, what would be the motive?
Actions poorly planned or poorly executed? Certainly, such findings can be evidenced in another research,
however, what has been tried to demonstrate from the national to the regional identification, is that the main
factors of destabilization of the feeling of security at sea have not been the most affected by the actions
implemented under development extra-regional.
Thus, rather than presenting conclusive solutions, the present research raises the reflection of the
continuous need (institutional and individual) for stripping bias arising from reality other than that of the focus
of the problem and that, this exercise, in addition to the actions, carried out always reinforce identities and
reputations.
References
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http://cggrps.org/wp-content/uploads/2050-AIM-Strategy_EN.pdf
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Ferrajoli, L. (2009). A Soberania no mundo moderno. São Paulo: Martins Fontes.
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Ralph Van Deman Magoffin). Ver. 1916. New York: Oxford University Press.
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of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention). Retrieved 20th September, 2017, from
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Marinha do Brasil. (2016). Experts panel meeting―Maritime security in South Atlantic. Retrieved 10th August, 2017, from
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doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2019.11.002
D
DAVID PUBLISHING
Why the Cold War Will Never Return to World Politics
Gültekin Sümer
Beykent University, Istanbul, Turkey

Every serious confrontation between the United States and Russia evokes new cold war debates. The Cold War
found its true meaning because it had achieved to create its own momentum within time. This question is a great
test in terms of measuring the level that today’s international relations has reached: Is cold war still relevant in a
global politics? The answer to be given to this question depends on whether any cold war can be maintained against
all the pluralistic tendencies of international relations. It will be a negative one because the dynamics unleashed by
globalization are likely to marginalize new cold war regardless of the will to wage and sustain it. For, beyond the
will to wage and sustain it, the concept of cold war is a technical issue that can only exist provided that it can
achieve to subordinate all the dynamics of the global politics to itself.
Keywords: cold war, power, great power, regional power, international system, geopolitics, globalization, United
States, Russia
Introduction
The Cold War has ended but its shadow still remains. Every outbreak of confrontation between the United
States and Russia evokes new cold war debates and they are not likely to cease as long as bilateral relations
keep their conflictual character. By the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in March 2014, the question
“Is the new cold war coming?” has become a question that has been seriously occupying the agenda of world
politics. Ultimately, the Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev described the current situation between
Russia and the West as a new cold war (Sanchez, Robertson, & Melvin, 2016).
This paper intends to give a response to new cold war debates that erupt in almost every serious tension
between the United States and Russia. Besides, the eruption of tensions or crises in international politics
signifies a lot in terms of testing the state of the current international order comparatively with the past ones.
Therefore, I believe that it has been a good opportunity to test the outbreak of a new cold war within the
realities of international relations discipline and determine its position in today’s global politics. Besides, new
cold war debates are also useful in order to see the capabilities of great powers given the facts of today’s global
politics since a true cold war would be meaningless without the participation of the great powers. How free and
strong are the great powers to wage a cold war apart from their willingness to do it? Beyond that, how capable
are they to hold the reins of global politics?
In this article, the author intends to demonstrate why it is not possible to reawaken a cold war of any kind
as it is a question beyond the wills of the protagonists of such a confrontation. Thus, the author argues that the
cold war is a question of sustainability and the concept of cold war remains alien to the facts of global politics
which renders a new cold war technically impossible to sustain.
Gültekin Sümer, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Beykent University, Istanbul, Turkey.
518 WHY THE COLD WAR WILL NEVER RETURN TO WORLD POLITICS
Perfect Cold War

When George Orwell first coined the term in 1945 to describe the undeclared state of war between the
United States and the Soviet Union, he chose name that would suit perfectly to such a distinct period in the
diplomatic history (Westad, 2014). The Cold War was indeed a perfect cold war even if it did not have
precedent in the diplomatic history. It had two antagonists who achieved to monopolize world politics by their
supremacies on behalf of size, ideology, and arms technology not to allow any other power to upset it. It was
perfect because every power increases on behalf of one side meant a direct threat for the other. The formation
of the mirror images was full. Each side regarded herself peace loving while regarding the other side as
imperialistic and deceptive. Each side believed to represent what was correct for the whole mankind. Each side
had to spread their ideological values in order to maintain in order to exist, because the bankruptcy of their
political philosophies signified extinction for both sides. There was a perfect polarization which had the
potential to escalate to a hot confrontation. The extent that the nuclear weapons increased the polarization was
unprecedented of its kind in the entire diplomatic history.
The author believes that any study that initiates to handle new cold war debates must first define the
concept of cold war in order to demonstrate its distinctiveness from the other types of conflict. The author
defines cold war as the highest stage of polarized conflict between two antagonists (or more) whose foreign
policy interests must signify a matter of existence for the other. That is to say, in the cold war, logic even a
legitimate foreign policy interest may signify a serious threat for the other side. At the regional or systemic
level, the gains of one side must absolutely clash with the gains of the other side. No matter how much it was
perfect, “The Cold War” was not the only cold war model that international order and the system would see.
The Cold War can demonstrate itself with various models. It does not have to contain necessarily an ideological
dimension. It can take on a nationalistic or just a hegemonic character. For a cold war to exist, the confrontation
between the sides must be strong enough to bring both sides to the brink of war and risky enough to distance
them from a hot conflict. The confrontation between Great Britain and Imperial Germany prior the outbreak of
First World War exhibited a cold war that was based on hegemonic concerns.1 For today, the polarized type of
behavior between South and North Korea or Armenia and Azerbaijan exhibits examples close to cold war type
confrontation. Without any doubt, the ideological dimension gave the Cold War the will to make the war a
raison d’être on behalf of both sides. Without such an ideological dimension, the Cold War would not have
aroused fear and terror on behalf of the whole mankind. It was perfect because the rival ideologies granted the
perfect environment any cold war would aspire and miss.
It is important to clarify the concept as the term is often used incorrectly. No matter not every cold war
model can suit to the Cold War, the Cold War has a guiding position of underlining the prerequisites that must
be in every cold war confrontation. We cannot name every serious conflict as a cold war since the term
signifies a distinct case among confrontations. Even long standing conflict or tensions may not be adequate to
name any long standing tension as a cold war. Therefore, it would not be correct to define Turkish-Greek
conflict as a type of cold war. Even if the two countries had tense relations due to the Aegean Sea issues and
Cyprus, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership of both countries had exerted a continuous
check on the bilateral relations. As long as both countries were US allies, tensions could not reach to such a
1
Although the concept of cold war has connoted two sides, a three-sided cold war model also possible; but hard to maintain since
three-sided confrontations are open to the emergence of a balance of power model.
WHY THE COLD WAR WILL NEVER RETURN TO WORLD POLITICS 519
level of a cold war. The exertion of pressure the United States on either of them deprived them of the freedom
of action required to maintain a cold war type confrontation. Besides, there has to be symmetric in terms of
military power between two countries which cannot be seen in Turkish-Greek relationship. On the other hand, a
tense relationship might also be result of a personal hostility between any two leaders which can alleviate as
soon as one of the leaders loses power. Even a high level of conflict cannot take on a cold war character unless
certain conditions are not met. A cold war must able to find an environment to exist and create its own rational
regardless of the policy and the perceptions of the leaders. The Cold War could emerge and exist since the
causes encouraging and justifying it were strong enough to nullify other possible international orders. If we
take all these into account, a true cold war must meet the following basic prerequisites:
 There has to be symmetric between the two sides involved in terms of political, economic, and military
power so that a true cold war can become the name of an era or a period.
 In a cold war, attitudes and perceptions must take on a petrified form that even a small move by one side
must be evaluated by the other side as a direct threat to its own existence. The relationship type must always be
open to crises that must have the potential of leading to a hot confrontation.
 Any cold war must always carry the risk of escalating to an all-out war between the antagonists. But there
must be a certain checks on the relations between the sides so that the erupting crises do not escalate easily to
an all-out war.
 There must be a consensus within the societies of both sides that there exists an enemy that poses a fatal
threat to the nation’s very existence. Therefore, the maintenance of a cold war must not be dependent on the
policies of the individuals, because no individual can risk any rapprochement initiative against the will of the
public consensus in such a type of confrontation.
 All the foreign policy objectives of a state must serve to the maintenance of the cold war. In other words,
the foreign policy towards the other side must monopolize the foreign relations of both sides. This objective
must be strong enough to subordinate other agendas of foreign policy to itself.
When it comes to system level, the realization of a cold war international order would demand additional
criterions:
 The international system must be able to subject all the major actors of international relations to itself and
to hinder centrifugal forces that would upset the sustainability of the system.
 The Cold War involves an international order that encourages a geopolitical contest encompassing almost
all the major political geographies. We know that the Cold War could take root in Europe due to the emerging
power vacuum. But any confrontation between the two protagonists would not turn out to a cold war without
the existence of a geopolitics that encouraged it. Thus, geopolitics accelerated the pre-Cold War process since
making strategic investments had a crucial significance for the Soviet Union. Therefore, it was not completely
random that the Cold War began in the Eastern Europe, because Eastern Europe functioned as a pivotal region
for the protection of Russian strategic interests against the West.
An International System Alien to Itself

Throughout the diplomatic history, a new international order could effectively predominate, because
emerging dynamics was strong enough to replace the existing one. If any kind of a cold war is ever to dominate
international order, it has to be strong enough to transform the current international order and subordinate the
dynamics of global politics to itself. When the question becomes “Is the new cold war coming?”, what must
focus on is whether the international system will allow any such change after more than 25 had passed since the
end of the Cold War.
The post-Cold War world era marked its distinctiveness by showing symptoms that would distance itself
from the state centric functioning of international politics. It was the very pluralism itself that had undermined
the rationality underlying the Cold War. The triumph of liberalism has accelerated globalization. Globalization
has weakened power politics based logic of the traditional international politics by the new global standards
that have impelled every actor to re-evaluate its position globally. The seismic effect of the globalization on
world politics functioned as a test how the emerging international order could distance itself from the
geopolitical codes of classical world politics. Instead of geopolitical value, human capital together with
democracy and human rights standards would determine a state’s position. The consequences of globalization
have indeed achieved to marginalize the “rankings and ratings” of the Cold War inviting transparency and
comparison by human development indexes, transparency indexes, freedom indexes, gender equality indexes,
etc. Yet it would not be easy to wipe geopolitics off the map of global politics. Geopolitics could well
demonstrate that it could stay many long years on the world map. That is to say, regardless of how much
technological and economic dynamics of globalization distanced international politics from its traditional
principles like the significance of the military power, the current international order did not signify a total break
from the previous one. The question was whether the emerging map of globalization would manage to replace
the map of the Cold War geopolitics.
Yet the emerging international system would never eliminate the relics of the previous international
system that it has inherited. And it would evolve with the constants and constraints of the previous international
order. Russia playing the role close to an imperial power would continue to seek a prestigious position in the
international order. As a product of the Cold War national security state, Pentagon with a budget over 600
billion dollars would continue to have a great say on US foreign policy. NATO would remain as the preeminent
alliance of the West having formed its own raison d’etre throughout the Cold War years. This has signified that
the emerging international order would never realize a sharp break from the previous international order. It
would be a hybrid one in which the dynamics of the old and new would coexist.
The international system is one of the most dynamic systems ever invented or designed because it is
always open to the participation of new variables and units. The most striking aspect among all these definitely
is the current state of the hegemonic powers that instead of holding the power to punish medium and small
powers, they have come to the position of being punished by the on-going dynamics of the international system.
This evokes the other, most determinative aspect of the current international order: The increasing velocity as a
consequence of the increasing interaction capacity of the system. The agenda setting capability of the current
international system is much higher than previous one which has diminished dramatically the polar capability
of the international system. Although the current international system has a considerable extent polar potential,
the current international system is far from acquiring a full polar capability which would give the system its
essence.
Without any doubt, the end bipolar international order has ushered in the toughest test that the modern
international system has ever been exposed to. Following the end of the bipolar system, the international system
could not achieve to take on a polar capability as opposed to the expectations of a considerable number of
realists. As a matter of fact, the systemic decay was a fact stemming from the pluralist pressures on the state
centric international relations (Rosenau, 1990).
The decline of the Western hegemonic system has unleashed how the international system had inhered
weakness within itself. The weakness of the system has been understood by the “regional awakenings”. The
so-called Arab awakening has revealed how political geographies with no Westphalian process behind could
not integrate itself to a system by deepening “the anarchy level” that any current international system could
tolerate. The rise of regional powers, like Turkey, has distorted systemic stability and adaptation. The rise of
China in the Far East is rendering Far Eastern sub-system much more self-sufficient system. The system was by
no means accustomed to seek and give effective responses towards the reactions from the non-Western world.
Today’s international system is a hybrid international system residing in itself both old and the new
dynamics of international system. As we have not witnessed any seismic transformation regarding both ones,
neither of them could achieve to oust the other. The bipolar system has ended without dissolving its entire
infrastructure. The remnants of the bipolar system had to coexist with the dynamics of the post-Cold War
international system. The system is extremely open to create its own contradictions. While the system has
evolved towards a global one from a pure international one, its flaws have become much more apparent. The
technology phenomenon may have enabled the international system a stronger systemic character, but on the
other hand, it has also become the main factor in weakening its effectiveness. It has strengthened the centrifugal
forces in the international system, such as the terrorist elements and emergence of transnational issue, such as
environment and immigration. September 11 was a manifest of this. The result of this on the international
system has been increasing interaction capacity at the expense of decreasing ability to evolve coherently. The
technology variable has reduced the probability of global hegemonic wars (or at least its frequency) ever seen
in the history of international relations. It is obvious enough that international politics has owed its system
character to the regulative function of the hegemonic wars. The hegemonic wars had a function reducing the
number of players and deleting the remnants of the previous international order as much as it can. When
hegemonic wars have lost their regulative function, the international system has turned into a system in which a
variety of actors indifferently have to coexist and tolerate each other. This definitely increases the uncertainties
for the future of the international system. Since the international system becomes much more unwieldy, it loses
its ability to undergo a rapid evolution. Systems become much more sectorized with overlapping. The system
begins to demonstrate a new version of anarchy: Great powers feel much more helpless than ever. They have
learned to live in an issue based international relations. Even the strongest military alliances do not show the
same effect on all of the issues. Non-state non-legitimate formations feel themselves much freer. While the
probability of hegemonic wars has fallen, global or regional ambitions to rise as a hegemonic power have not.
Individuals could challenge the international order when they have obtained the power and the opportunity to
do so. State actors both have the community and selfishness identities. International relations have never been
accustomed to pursuing such an unchecked course that such a dynamic can never be harmonized with a system
dynamic. The scholars working on system concept had never imagined such unchecked and randomized
development of international relations. It is very hard to maintain the regularity in international relations. While
new actors moving with the dynamics of the system, it makes system much harder to keep its inner coherence
as a system. The participation of new actors in the international system increases the velocity in the
international system and such a velocity is not such that any international system can bear. This means that
units begin to interact with each other so randomly that does not recognize any kind of structure any chance to
survive. The problem of international relations is that the system has no constant units as that of human body or
a computer.
The hegemonic wars had a function reducing the number of players and deleting the remnants of the
previous international order as much as it can. When hegemonic wars have lost their regulative function, the
international system has turned into a system in which a variety of actors indifferently have to coexist and
tolerate each other. This definitely increases the uncertainties for the future of the international system. Since
the international system becomes much more unwieldy, it loses its ability to undergo a rapid evolution. Systems
become much more sectorized with overlapping. The system begins to demonstrate a new version of anarchy:
Great powers feel much more helpless than ever. They have learned to live in an issue based international
relations. Even the strongest military alliances do not show the same effect on all of the issues. Non-state
non-legitimate formations feel themselves much freer. While the probability of hegemonic wars has fallen,
global or regional ambitions to rise as a hegemonic power have not. Individuals could challenge the
international order when they have obtained the power and the opportunity to do so. State actors both have the
community and selfishness identities. It is very hard to maintain the regularity in international relations. While
new actors moving with the dynamics of the system, it makes system much harder to keep its inner coherence
as a system. The participation of new actors in the international system increases the velocity in the
international system and such a velocity is not such that any international system can bear. This means that
units begin to interact with each other so randomly that does not recognize any kind of structure any chance to
survive. The problem of international relations is that the system has no constant units as that of human body or
a computer. The technology phenomenon advances the system while at the same time questioning its existence.
One of the main problems of the system is that it has lost the mechanism to end the effects or the previous
system (or to reduce to a minimum) so as to allow a healthy transformation into a new one. The system does
not demonstrate a sharpness which is essential for a mechanical functioning.
We all know that an international order consolidates itself when circumstances favor an international order
model against other alternatives. If an international order evoking any previous order or system is to replace an
existing international order, it must be strong enough to dominate and assimilate the dynamics of that order.
The Cold War could shape the international order because it not only suited but also it rationalized the
emerging distrust between the West and the Soviet Union. It has converted into an international system that
soon both benefited from. In the emerging political vacuum following the Second World War, the United States
and the Soviet Union could achieve to hold and mold the international system with the emerging bipolar
international system. The bipolar international system created as the product of US-USSR confrontation was
strong enough not to allow any centrifugal forces that would upset its functioning. In other words, it was strong
enough to determine the limits of interaction between all types of actors. As much as the current international
system has departed from a state-based system, it has become much more open to irregular functioning. In
System and Process in International Politics, Morton Kaplan (Kaplan, 1957) had argued: “Some systems are so
structured that they permit the release and utilization of more energy than other systems” (p. 74). Certainly, the
international system prior to the First World War was such kind of a system. And the current international
system is such an international system that releases more energy than other systems. The utilization of this
energy belongs to small and medium powers rather than hegemonic powers. Because the energy unleashed in
the aftermath of the bipolar system grants them much more rationality as well as legitimacy. Micro actors have
found much more rationality in penetrating into the system with the boost of technology dynamics. The
technological advances have made unleashing of micro actors that have distinct agendas from each other. Since
the interaction capabilities among all kinds of actors have intensified, the system got into trouble in terms of
giving coherent responds to these challenges. States can never escape the effects of an issue world but
contribute its intensification with every move they make. The velocity of the interactions unleashes and spreads
an enormous energy potential that are used by micro actors. The case of Assange and Snowden has much more
relevance here. While they exist and move, they interact and unleash an energy that is ready to be used as
non-hegemonic actors. When non-state actors have got the capability to demonstrate their reactions against the
international order, it damages the behavioural rules on behalf of the international system. Is the state actor’s
main concentration the state, the terrorist organization, or the masses? What is the criterion that regulates a
state’s relations with state and the non-state actors? To what extent state actors become eager to cooperate
against non-state actors? When answers to these questions remain vague, the system cannot keep its identity.
This is the unchecked energy which endangers the systemic identity of the international relations. When the
system becomes open to multiplying effects of the interactions among all kinds of actors, the system starts to
create its own anti-thesis. In other words, international system is the most apt system to create its own
anti-thesis in so far as it orients itself towards a global system. The system has no filtering capability as
opposed to the heyday of the “great games”. An attack by Islamic fundamentalists against US targets can
radically change the course of US foreign policy. A mass movement in a regional ally evaluated as a
geopolitical asset could well trigger the wave of revisionism in the whole region. Inner regional conflicts can
well have the dynamism to decrease the influence of the hegemonic powers. The energy that comes out of these
interactions determines the unit participation into the system and so on. When imitation and learning becomes
fundamental feature of the system, it makes such a fragmentation inevitable. Randall Schweller (2014)
explained this phenomenon with the term “entropy” which indicates randomizing elements that do not allow
international order to return to its original form.
Cause-and effect is not unidirectional, however; it runs both ways. Rising entropy at the structural level causes
entropy to rise within the system’s processes. Specifically, the more influential actors that emerge on the international
scene, the more connections among them will increase. Consequently, global processes become thicker and more complex,
resulting in the rise of entropy at the level of system process. (p. 43)
While bipolarity not meant a novelty for the international system, its distinctive character was that it also
meant a bipolarity of the values beyond the military might of its main antagonists. Yet with the indifference of
unchecked dynamics, the international system was drifted to a point of no return. Whoever the winner is, the
state centric character of the international system would be eroded. When the Cold War was living its last years,
James Rosenau (1990) had summarized this phenomenon as follows:
Actors on the global scene today lack the capacity to create the political environment of monopolistic and
oligopolistic environments. For a host of reasons, the world is too complex and too dynamic to lend itself to effective
control and a meaningful reduction of its interconnectedness and variability. Even the superpowers are often at the mercy
of events and trends that they would like to redirect, terminate or otherwise influence but cannot. (p. 63)
Cold War Alien to Global Politics and Economy

Any Cold War Cannot Survive in an Issue-Led World
The question that we are handling is not only a question of a cold war but the fact that current international
system is alien to the formation of permanent alliances let alone cold war type polarizations. The structure of
the bipolar international system had the capacity to restrain the features of the actors. It was overwhelmingly
statist international order. Yet as of today the international order has lost much of its statist character. There
exists no structure in the current international system that will imprison international relations to a bloc
behavior. The international system functions much more randomly which is exposed to the indifference of the
transnational issues. The system of today has lost its function of in global politics, when transnational issues
have reached to a level of changing the agenda of global politics so rapidly, they do not leave much chance to
polarized relations among states. Because the Cold War is no such a thing that you can give five minutes break
and then simply say “Where were we?” Due to the intensity of the transnational issues, any two rival states may
feel compelled to cooperate in a field while they remain rivals in another field because foreign policies of today
have become much more open to the emergence of new issues. And this fact will definitely decrease the
concentration of a power to demonstrate polarized or bloc behavior.
In today’s global politics, hegemonic powers are open to the unforeseen dynamics with the intense
participation of the non-state actors in the formation of agendas. They have no longer the luxury of controlling
the agenda of “world politics”. They are exposed to agendas that they were not quite familiar with. Non-state
actors have the capacity to change the agendas of the hegemonic powers. While 9/11 was the extreme example
of this dynamic, ISIS was one of the best examples of this. The dynamics unleashed by multiple centers have
accelerated at an enormous speed. This has eroded the traditional core concept of international politics. There
has remained no fixed threat or terror center just as an economic crisis center. Anywhere in the world has the
capacity to become a centre or just one of the centers depending on the issue. The cover of the one of recent
issues of The Economist was the “Terror’s New HQ” pointing out the ISIS threat in Iraq and Syria (The
Economist, 14-20 June 2014). No one can make a true estimation on how long it will remain so or resist the
emergence of new HQs. Any cold war type will not find any chance to survive in the emerging international
system because economic goals will keep its distinct value apart from political goals. States’ foreign policy
rationality is directly affected from this. Any anticipated foreign behavior policy might be followed by agenda
shifting authority crises, financial crises, or legitimacy crises in any country concerned. When a global power
focuses on an issue, this can well signify an invitation to uncertainties in her foreign policy. Every move of a
great power whether it be a balancing act or a military intervention will suffice to invite new problems. For the
interaction capacity among all the actors of international relations is much stronger and the stronger the
interaction capacity among the actors, the more foreign policies become open to unexpected outcomes. The
autonomy of freedom that the non-state actors have gained has imposed a high intensive interaction capacity to
the international system that has left the system to the indifference of the all type of unit-level interactions. The
international system has become so generous in unleashing non-state actor dynamics that the interaction among
them makes powerful effect in drifting the international system to evolve much more randomly than ever. As a
corollary of this fact, the international system has become much more fertile in making multi-issue agendas.
Today’s international system has left being imprisoned to great power struggles and the agenda of great powers
have been intensely subjected to the increasing influences by the actors of non-state entities, the individual and
the people in the street. Non-state actors have the capacity to react to the state behaviour and drift state actors to
unexpected outcomes. The current international system no longer gives great powers the privilege to set their
foreign policy priorities easily as in the past. As a result of these, great powers have lost their liberties to pursue
single path in their foreign policies as opposed to the heydays of geopolitics because they can no longer focus
on a fixed agenda. They have lost their concentration on one path in a world of proliferations, pirates, mobile
HQs, springs and, spying scandals and the leaks. Where should the world’s sole superpower United States
focus on? Is it Ukraine, Iraq, or South China Sea? What does a Taliban-free Afghanistan mean if it can be
replaced by other locations in Asia or in Africa? How about the worsening relations with Germany because of
the NSA incident? Every emerging issue also means an invitation to the participation of new actors. Global
powers have to be prepared for the unexpected results of their foreign polices they pursue. Rapidly changing
agendas of global politics has brought world politics to a state that no great power was accustomed to. In
today’s agenda of world politics, agendas replace one another so rapidly. No security issue can achieve to hold
the monopoly over the others like the Cold War achieved to do. It has even become on the part of states a
luxury to determine their security priorities. States are getting drifted into an agenda that they have to learn to
live simultaneously with multiple threats which neither pose fatal threat nor they can strike a fatal blow to.
Global powers have to deal with multi foreign policy agendas simultaneously that none of which has an
absolute priority over the other. Today’s international system has acquired much more indifference of leaving
states multiple agendas simultaneously. This is the very indifference that cannot allow maintenance of any long
standing confrontations between great powers.
All these refer no other thing than the manifestation of issue-led world. Every new development by the
actors is able to signify an invitation to the emergence of new dynamics. Issues have acquired a capability of
creating their own momentum and thereby impelling states to face unexpected situations. Every issue is
powerful to create its own agenda by drifting states behind itself. While a dispute is underway, WikiLeaks may
be part of the dispute, deaths in protest actions may usher in pressure in alliance relationship, sides involved
may realize how their economies are vulnerable to the consequences of interdependence, a non-governmental
organization may participate in a dispute by rising as a new actor, and so on. By challenging the hegemony of
states, non-state actors could achieve to restrain the freedom of the great powers and thereby serve to shrink the
level of an escalation among great powers.
Heyday of Great Powers is Over
Regardless of how much hybrid it is, the author believes that there is a dynamic that drifts global politics
towards a state that primarily the great powers will not be pleasant with.2 For we need to admit that today’s
international system has been demonstrating unpleasant symptoms on behalf of great powers. Great powers
have entered a problematic era peculiar to themselves just as they possess the most sophisticated arms in their
inventory. Gone are the days when Churchill and Stalin made “Percentages Agreement” in 1944 on a piece of
paper. Great powers are far from cutting out Sykes-Picot type deals in their own spheres of influences. Even if
it might have seemed through the perspective of traditional international politics that the post-Cold War
international system was evolving toward multipolarity, it is not hard to see this is just one of the common
illusions of world politics. Great powers have never been so weak in determining the course of world politics.
The weakening of the agenda setting capability of the great powers has signified a dramatic decline on behalf of
their position in global politics. They have lost their status of being the absolute propelling power of world
politics and they have begun to demonstrate symptoms of demonstrating adaptive behavior to the emerging
facts of global politics. International system functions much more random than ever which leaves great powers
more exposed to face unforeseen agendas in their foreign policies.
2
Although the cold war concept is not in the monopoly of great powers, our focus will be on potential between great powers
since only bigger magnitude cold war make a true impact on the course of global politics. The position of great powers in global
politics deserves a special emphasis on cold war debates, since such a concept cannot be strong enough without great powers as
the primary protagonists. The task of agenda formation in international politics has always been the privilege of the great powers.
The author believes that this is the strongest indicator why power concept has lost much of its traditional
meaning in the absence of a fixed power criterion to measure the positions of great powers in world politics. In
the classical sense of world politics, there has always existed a pivotal area to determine the positions of the
great powers. The United States was regarded as a great power in world politics when her policies began to
make an effect on one of the pivotal areas, like the East Asia, at the beginning with the McKinley presidency.
Within the diplomatic history, world politics was almost identified with pivotal regions, such as Central Europe
in the Concert of Europe settlement. In the post-Napoleonic Europe, the goal of the Concert of Europe was to
keep the international order in status quo and this goal was achieved because there was a full power
concentration. Great power congress diplomacy was adequate for that. Likewise, regardless of its being a global
struggle for power, a cold war also had a pivotal area: The Central and Eastern Europe. That is why the Cold
War began and ended in this pivotal area. In NSC-68 of 1950 which was one of the most important documents
of the Cold War, while describing the background of the current crisis underlined the fact that
the defeat of Germany and Japan and the decline of the British and French Empires have interacted with the
development of the United States and the Soviet Union in such a way that power increasingly gravitated to these two
centres. (NCS-68, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf)
States knew how to climb to the top because its criterion was concentrated on a specific geography. Therefore,
the more power was concentrated, the easier it was to seize and monopolize if possible. Yet today’s global
politics has left no “Heartland” type power capital to be focused on and seized, for power has become a much
more diffused phenomenon. There is no specific pivotal area that would make a seismic effect for a power shift.
We face a global politics in which states whether they are global or regional power have their own interests and
expectations. In the current logic of global politics, power matters only if it has the ability to cope effectively
with an emerging issue and to gather the largest coalition possible within the international community against a
threat. Great power struggles based on territorial acquisitions or forming spheres of influences have vanished in
the traditional sense. In other words, power is measured with what it prevents rather than what it defeats.
Military might does not mean much in global politics if it does not bring concrete returns as a response to the
emerging security issues. Threats that great powers face are not concentrated on a specific region but rather
have become vague and have the capacity to paralyze security policies of the great powers. When the agenda of
global politics change much more rapidly than the classical 20th century world politics, being accepted as a
great power according to size or military power criterions definitely loses its conventional meaning. It is
obvious to see that this phenomenon has been consequence of the decentralization of world politics. The
decentralized character of global politics has stroke the biggest blow to the concept. Globalization has
overwhelmingly been considered to work in favor of hegemonic states and the multinationals. We have to
admit that it has been an undermined fact how regional powers have benefited a lot from the process
globalization in setting their own priorities. Global powers may have been the prime beneficiary of
globalization; but regional powers have also benefited from this process. Therefore, it must be admitted that
one of the consequences of globalization has been the undeniable rise of regional powers. In the absence of a
polar check, quite a significant number of regional powers have achieved to utilize from the benefits of
globalization. Especially a growing economy has given Turkey an opportunity to increase her influence the
Middle East with the boost of her geographical advantage in the region. The increase in regional powers has
also intensified regional interactions between regional powers and other regional actors that strengthened
sub-systemization. As a corollary of this, relations between regional powers and global powers have faced
fluctuations since regional powers have also achieved to set their own foreign policy priorities. The foreign
policy interests of the regional actors have ceased to overlap with those of their traditional great power allies,
because the regions have gained a momentum of their own by clinching the autonomous sub-system character
of the international system. The regional capacity to form its own dynamic and to minimize great power
influences has increased. Small or medium powers do not feel compelled to act in full harmony with the great
powers.
Whereas power was in the monopoly state actors, power has become a concept that has to be shared by
non-state actors which could well drift the agenda of world politics to new uncertainties. In the classical
international politics, the global power or “global power capital” was mainly centred in Europe which referred
total amount of the military political and economic capital of the great powers which enabled them to dominate
world politics. The classical power concept has been eroded as much as actors of globalism could challenge and
weaken power control of the state actors. What has come out of all these is that power has become of a fluid
concept that can pass from the hands of ISIS to the hands of a dictator in Asia to the hands of Assange and then
to the hands of the masses in Cairo (Naim, 2013, pp. 129-158). The more rapid global political economic and
social agenda changes, the more helpless the great powers feel. It has been understood that power does not
mean much if it is not felt strongly enough on the daily lives of all kinds of political units.
Waging a cold war will be a great luxury for the great powers and especially for the United States. We
have to admit that US foreign policy has come to a position that US cannot determine properly where to
concentrate on and to which issue to give priority. No issue has an absolute priority over the other in American
foreign policy and every new issue can be marginalized by other at any time. In strategic terms, it has been
much harder for the United States to determine her center of gravity in global politics compared with say a
decade ago. Therefore, it is not surprising that Walter Russell Mead does not expect that any strategic
consensus to be reached among the foreign policy elites about the international order to be envisioned on behalf
US foreign policy (Mead, 2001, pp. 323-323). While the era of pax-Americana is over, she has also lost her
usual fixed path in her journey as a superpower. One of the striking indicators of this fact has been observed in
the fluctuating relations with her traditional allies, such as Turkey, Israel, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. She can
longer set any fixed foreign policy priority. About the on-going tension between Russia and Ukraine, she
cannot estimate how this tension will end and how long it will continue to occupy her foreign relations. As a
superpower, how can she successfully find an ultimate solution to emerging anarchic situation in Syria and Iraq?
Even if Afghanistan could be reached to stability, it will be far from providing security guarantee for the United
States. The dissolution of Iraq has pushed the United States to cooperate with Iran. How will this affect her
relations with Saudi Arabia and Israel? In the Far East, US-China relations have entered into a new phase that
will be much more open to crises. When these dramatic facts of international politics make the greatest impact
on the United States, that means one of the indispensable protagonists of the Cold War would be absent and
without the participation of the United States any confrontation would not take on a cold war character.
No Geopolitics for a Cold War
The Cold War became a reality since the post-Second World War conditions could create a geopolitics
that the Cold War would find its own rationality. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the European
geography was strong enough to monopolize the emerging international order. The Cold War began and came
to end in Eastern Europe. We have to admit that beyond all the debates about its origins, one of the undeniable
causes of the Cold War was the strategic value of the Eastern Europe in the eyes of the Soviet Union. The
geopolitical dimension in the emergence of the Cold War is so significant that the without the geopolitical
landscape emerging in the aftermath of the Second World War, the Cold War would not have emerged.
Furthermore, within time, the Cold War created such a geopolitical momentum that would not allow any
détente to survive much longer. For, while ideological confrontation conditioned geopolitics, geopolitics
enlarged the ideological confrontation. That is why despite the détente process beginning in the early 1970s, it
did not take too long for the so-called “The Second Cold War” to begin because the Cold War geopolitics had
already gained its own momentum. This momentum had a nature of encouraging geopolitical adventures on the
part of both sides. While the détente process in 1970s was underway, Soviet Union was involved militarily in
the civil war in Angola at the expense of damaging it since Angola was appealing enough for the Soviet Union
in order to get a stronghold in the “African front”. With this very geopolitical conditioning, Soviet Union did
not hesitate to invade Afghanistan in 1979. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan signified how illusory the
détente process had remained. Leonid Brezhnev’s decision to invade Afghanistan was nothing more than
adapting his moves to the momentum of the Cold War when the long term effects of the Iranian Revolution
were felt because the Cold War had already gotten out of the expectations of individual decision-makers. Thus,
the document named Basic Principles of Relations between United States and the Soviet Union signed in 1972
which anticipated that neither side would seek unilateral benefits detrimental to the other side did not change
anything. The Cold War geopolitical game ended when Soviet Union under Gorbachev was convinced that a
supremacy based on geopolitical advantages could no longer be sustained due to the economic and
technological extension of the Western world. A new cold war would definitely necessitate a geopolitics that
the parties of the conflict would prioritize their foreign policy goals. Yet the geopolitics that would suit and
encourage the parties of a potential cold war game does not exist and cannot be re-created. The Cold War
existed because the European geopolitics could restrain a hot conflict as well as did not allow nay reconciliation.
As of today, we cannot talk about any conflict that will be imprisoned to a specific geography. There exists no
specific geopolitics that hegemonic powers would feel compelled to prioritize their foreign policy goals.
Today’s facts of global politics and economy do not allow any revival of a geopolitical great power
struggle. Without a geographical element, prerequisites of a cold war would not be fulfilled, for neither of the
powers would exert great pressure on each other without a geopolitical element. For such a geopolitics to
emerge, there is no regional actor that will be eager to overtake such a function or will feel compelled to do so.
A cold war devoid of an ideological element would make it much harder on behalf of regional actors to make it
their single priority. Even if geopolitics will keep occupying certain energy of world politics, it will not be
determinative enough to impel global powers to chase geopolitical goals on its own.
Getting Richer Over Everything
One of the most striking features of the current international order is the blow that the concept of power in
international relations was exposed to. The impact of globalization has altered the traditional priorities in states’
foreign policies. Maximizing political power has ceased to be the highest priority on behalf of states. In the
traditional power concept, political, economic, military, and technological power has complemented each other,
because a hegemony quest would definitely involve such a harmony. In the traditional sense of international
politics, economic power had to serve absolutely to military and political goals. Yet as of realities global
politics of today such a harmony no longer exists. Economic power has found a rationale to divorce from
political and military power. Persisting in military supremacy can be at the expense of vital economic priorities.
While keeping as well as reaching high standards of living is a goal of its own, states can no longer risk
adventurous foreign policies at the expense of furthering their economic goals. States have reached to a
rationality that they get the highest prestige by the high living standards and the value that they add to the
economic and technological life of today’s world. When the prestige of the states is measured with high living
economic standards, no country can be willing to consent to low economic standards in the name gaining more
military and political prestige. Because no great power of today is exempt from economic crises and has to
avoid taking risky steps. Every great power is well aware that she has to keep her social and economic
indicators over a certain standard. When domestic well-being could not be held apart from foreign policy,
presumed foreign policy agendas can lose their priorities at any time. As Randall Schweller (2014) had
underlined, “Get richer and avoid catastrophic military contests” has been the new motto of great powers (p.
97). As getting richer does not recognize any borders, it does not leave much chance to the formation of
polarized alignments. When no great power is exempt from an economic crisis, no great power will have the
full capability to maintain a cold war. The candidates of the new cold war will not find polarization keep going
at the expense of letting others concentrating on technological advances. No side will have the capability and
the courage to maintain it by depleting its economic resources.
Awakening of the Regional Powers
There is no doubt that regional powers have become one of most beneficial from the system shift by the
end of the Cold War. Regional powers do not feel obliged to play the roles assigned by the hegemonic powers.
A traditional distinction between global and regional powers is more sustainable as it used to be. In the past, the
international systems gave great powers the possibility to drift all the medium or small powers almost behind
themselves. Yet the current international system does not grant any great power such a privilege. The reason
why regional powers has gained self-esteem is that they do not feel compelled to play the roles expected by the
great powers because they could well set their own priorities and interests. An international system devoid of
regulative effects of poles encourages independent behavior of regional powers in particular. International
system’s encouraging independent behavior of medium and small powers has deprived world politics of pivotal
spheres which great powers would find the opportunity to polarize it. When especially regional powers have
achieved to become as the genuine actors of the global economy, power concentration had to shrink and it has
left no global power capital has become a much more diffused phenomenon. The formation of G-20 in 1999
has been directly a response to the necessity that summit organization on the global economy had to include
regional powers in the sense of emerging market economies as well. The dictates of global economy have
brought about shifting relations between global and the regional powers. While the international order has
changed, the homework of all states has also changed. The tasks set by globalization have impelled medium
and small states to reach to new economic standards. Regional powers have no interest in being part of great
power game of geopolitics. They have either no longer interest in tying their foreign polices just to one great
power, for regional powers are well aware that they will not be punished if their foreign policies do not go in
harmony with those of the great powers. There is no chance of emergence of a new international order if actors
cannot adapt to the behavior new international order anticipates from them. Quite different than the Cold War
era, we have serious amount of regional powers that does not fit to the role of regional ally in a cold war. Since
regional powers have their own foreign policy priorities, any cold war does not have much chance to survive.
Regional powers could well manipulate globalization for their own benefits. This fact is most striking in the
Middle East region. It can by no means tie to AKP foreign policy that the US foreign policy elites debate
whether Turkey is an ally or not. The basic reason underlying Turkey’s courageous foreign policy in the region
was the belief that the US no longer possessed the luxury to punish her.
Regions have distanced away from the check of the hegemonic power and the international system could
not achieve to harmonize with the regional dynamics. It is no astonishing that global leadership has become
much more an ambiguous concept. Classical pecking order that we have accustomed to is undermined. The
greatest military and economic power on earth put herself under the burden of “making herself great again”.
Thus, “make America great again” is a systemic problem before all. Qatar’s role in the Arab Spring does not
suit to the accustomed power concept. As the regional systemization processes are not similar to each other, we
have units with different expectations in keeping their interests other than the most basic common denominator.
As the fictionalized international system was could be maintained by hegemonic control, non-Western regions
were connected to the system by their own dynamics.
It is obvious that with the boosting effect of decentralization in world politics, regions have created their
own dynamics that can well ward off global powers who would otherwise never quit pursuing influence
policies towards regions. Great powers can no longer base their foreign policies on long-term relations with
regional allies. Regional powers have departed from being staunch allies of the great powers. An international
crisis can manifest itself in a way that even global power and regional power distinction becomes blurred.
Because any key actor can play a vital role that can bring about setbacks in the policies of great powers. The
dynamics of the regional sub-systems are so strong that even global powers would feel compelled to adapt
themselves. In today’s Middle East given the realities of ISIS, Sunni-Shite confrontation and Iran’s increasing
influence in particular, great powers can only hope to reach their foreign policy goals in the region if they can
achieve to accommodate their foreign policies with those of regional powers. While no global power is a global
power in old sense, no regional power can keep its position in the old sense. For the gap between even great
and small power might not reflect the physical gap. Barrack Obama may have called Russia as a regional power,
but when it comes to Russian-German relations, traditional notion to regional powers does not signify much
(Obama answers critics, dismissing Russia as a regional power, 2014). Germany’s relations with Russia have
risen to key position in the determining the course of EU polices. Likewise, US-Iranian relations have become
much more crucial than say Franco-Anglo relations. Therefore, regional-regional power relationship or
global-regional power relationship in classical sense may outweigh any classical great power relations. Besides,
any regional actor can vanguard the idea, movement, or an initiative and mobilize all types of actors on behalf
of global responsibility. They are well able to change the foreign policy agendas of the great powers. For a
classical regional power does not fit to the regional role, the regional actors have been thought to be played.
Global power-regional power distinction is more likely to depend on the peculiarity of the case in question. If a
great power holding the status of a superpower is not strong enough to assimilate all the sub-systemic dynamics,
that means being world power or global power has lost its traditional meaning. Therefore, it is likely that global
powers can hope to find ultimate solutions to their foreign policy problems in so far as they cooperate with the
regional powers and adapt themselves to the realities of the region concerned.
Furthermore, in global politics of today, regional powers with their own power and foreign policy goals
have reached to a position of diminishing the tension among great powers not to allow the concentration of
world politics on a single sphere or an issue. Thus, it would not be incorrect to argue that regional powers of
today have gained a regulative function in so far as they try to maximize their interests. In other words, regional
powers function as regulators which can well inhibit the emergence of polarized relations between global
powers because the foreign policy goals of regional powers can prevent the agenda of world politics from being
concentrated on a single pivotal region.
Beyond all these, the very Ukrainian Crisis which has flared up the new cold debates has also resided
some answers within itself that justify what we have argued. Any such crisis that would make an impact of
changing radically the position of regional actors even in first years of the Cold War did not happen. Despite
the Munich jargon of Zbigniew Brzezinski, Russia-Ukraine tension could not achieve to monopolize the agenda
of international relations (Zbigniew Brzezinski: After Putin’s aggression in Ukraine, the West must be ready to
respond, 2014). Instead it had to share the agenda with ISIS reality at least for the moment. The reason for this
is directly to do with the potential of the international system that could produce dynamics that has the capacity
to change the agenda of global politics much rapid than we were accustomed to. While the West and especially
the United States focused on Ukraine, ISIS emerged as a distinct new actor in the Middle East, NSA spy
scandal has damaged the Western alliance. That is a strong evidence a geopolitical landscape that any cold war
would hope to see cannot exist. Turkey has not joined the trade embargo imposed against Russia and, on the
contrary, has heeded to strengthen her economic ties with Russia. Despite the outbreak of “jet crisis” on 24
November 2015, Turkey chose to improve her ties with Russia. Because the Erdoğan administration grasped
the fact that it could never sacrifice Russia’s economic attraction to Turkey’s claims on the downing of the
Russian SU-24. The Sisi administration in Egypt did not hesitate to make nuclear plant deal with Russia. While
the EU could not achieve to speak with one voice against Russia with opponent states, like Greece and Czech
Republic, Hungary, it has demonstrated that it can play as an independent actor given its determinative role in
the signing of cease-fire in Minsk. Whereas in the Cold War, Western Europe owed its security completely to
the United States, today the EU has demonstrated that it can well hammer out a settlement with Russia
independently from the United States. Besides, Syria is just one example that Russia and the United States may
feel compelled to cooperate on the future of the country. It is clear that actor behavior cannot be returned to a
cold war behavior when interdependence is strong enough to regulate actor behavior. When there is no ally that
will strictly adhere to a cold war behavior, a cold war project has no chance to survive.
States Are not Domestically Fit
As we have stated at the beginning, the maintenance of a cold war involves a consensus in a society which
is well above the wills of the leaders in power. As long as the existence of the sides are not in danger like
US-Soviet Union or Anglo-German relationship prior to the First World War, no fixed cold war behavior can
be imposed to societies and plural Western societies in particular. Therefore, there is no reason any NGO, like
Gates Foundation, must behave in harmony with the US foreign policy or adapt itself to the circumstances of
such a confrontation. We must keep in mind that the Cold War takes on significance only and only if
maintaining it equals to protecting the basic foreign policy interests of a state. As long as conflicts do not take
on a holistic character just like capitalism vs. communism during the Cold War, it would be extremely hard to
exert ideological control on societies. That is to say, there is no sufficient domestic strong base in terms of
rationalizing cold war foreign policies.
Conclusion
It is a fact that every new debate on world politics will have an illusory aspect of encouraging analogies
with the past and new cold war debates have not been an exception of this. While making an evaluation about
an on-going international order, it must not be forgotten that every succeeding international order resides
dynamics in itself that would not allow it to return to the previous one. Thus, it is obvious enough that the
question has become well beyond the emergence of a new cold war but rather the question of how far great
powers can move in terms of their foreign policy autonomies. In the international system of today, there is
everything to restrain the freedoms of great powers on the international system as well as on the foreign policy
freedoms of the small and medium powers. Such a dynamism of unprecedented of its kind makes it almost
impossible the survival of a core agenda in global politics. As mentioned above, due to the interaction capacity
among all varieties of actors, today’s international system has the capacity of to creating multi-issues
simultaneously. As a corollary of this, it must be well understood that a cold war is a question of maintenance
rather than making the first moves. Even if there is a willingness to start a cold war, it will be seen in a short
time that maintaining a cold war will not depend on the willingness of the sides concerned. Even if the first
moves of a cold war are made, it will not mean much since the protagonists will feel alienated and therefore it
would not be possible technically to render it sustainable. As long as the current international system is not in
the state of affairs to care about any cold war, it will keep executing its own agenda as distinct from the states.
While international system will always be under the pressure of Russia as one of the constants of world politics,
the topic will continue to occupy the global political agenda. Yet, given the interaction capacity of the current
international system, the best that could be hoped would be nothing more than reviving the old memories of the
Cold War.
References
Kaplan, M. A. (1957). System and Process in International Politics. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Mead, W. R. (2001). Special providence: American foreign policy and how it changed the world. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Naim, M. (2013). The end of power. New York: Basic Books.
Obama answers critics, dismissing Russia as a regional power. (2014). Retrieved July 14, 2014, from
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/26/world/europe/hague-summit-focuses-on-‘preventing-trafficking-of-nuclear-materials.ht
ml
Rosenau, J. N. (1990). Turbulance in world politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sanchez, R., Robertson, N., & Melvin, D. (2016). Russian PM equates relations with the West to “a new Cold War”. Retrieved
March 3, 2018, from http://edition.cnn.com/2016/02/13/europe/russia-medvedev-new-cold-war
Schweller, R. L. (2014). Maxwell’s demon and the golden apple. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Westad, O. A. (2014). The Cold War and the history of the 20th century. In M. P. Leffler and O. A. Westad (Eds.), The
Cambridge history of the Cold War, Volume I: Origins (pp. 1-20). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zbigniew Brzezinski: After Putin’s aggression in Ukraine, the West must be ready to respond. (2014). Retrieved from
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/zbigniew-brzezinski-after-putins-aggression-in-ukraine-the-west-must-be-ready-to
-respond/2014/03/03/25b3f928-a2f5-11e3-84d4-e59b1709222c_story.html
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2019.11.003
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Enhance the Influence of China-UK “One Belt and One Road”

Cooperation
YUAN Xuezhe
Sichuan University of Science and Engineering, Sichuan, China
Manchester Metropolitan University, England, UK

The Belt and Road Initiative is a new concept of opening-up put forward by Chinese leader Xi Jinping after he took
office. It is the most influential international initiative since China’s reform and opening up. Its implementation has
achieved remarkable results in the past few years, with more than expected results. More and more countries in the
world have supported and responded to the Belt and Road Initiative. China and the UK are countries with important
influence in the world. The Belt and Road Initiative has great potential and far-reaching impact between two
countries. This paper analyzes the theory of influence of the Belt and Road and discusses the practical problems
existing in the China-UK Belt and Road Cooperation. By applying the research method of matching theory with
reality, the author puts forward some measures to enhance the influence of the Belt and Road Cooperation between
the two countries. It is of great academic and practical significance to study the Belt and Road Theory and the
international relations between China and Britain.
Keywords: The Belt and Road, the influence of foreign affairs, the pattern of problem areas, the international
organization mode, the mode of production, common people, the international mechanism
Theory Analysis of “One Belt and One Road” Influence

Connotation of “One Belt and One Road” Influence
“One Belt and One Road” is a new concept of China’s foreign policy under the new situation of China’s
new leadership since 2013. It is open to all countries along the belt and road, and helps the “One Belt and One
Road” countries achieve development by exporting China’s capital, technology, and production capacity to
countries along the belt and road. The “One Belt and One Road” is the most extensive and comprehensive
international economic cooperation initiative launched by China since the reform and opening up.
“Influence is generally referred to as the ability to change the thoughts and actions of others in a way that
is acceptable to others” (Song & Chen, 2000, p. 102). Diplomatic influence as an important variable in national
influence has always been an important factor for international political scholars to determine the success or
failure of a country’s foreign policy.
“One Belt and One Road” influence is as agent in China, along with the country to carry out diplomatic
activities, and use peaceful means and economic way influence related behavior main body behavior ability of

Acknowledgement: Fund: China Scholarship Council Project in 2018, Project No. 201808515154.
YUAN Xuezhe, Doctor of law, Associate Professor, School of Marxism, Sichuan University of Science and Engineering,
Sichuan, China; visiting scholar, Manchester Metropolitan University, England, UK.
534 CHINA-UK “ONE BELT AND ONE ROAD” COOPERATION
countries along the “One Belt and One Road”. It is advantageous positive effect to the China and along the
countries, a kind of ability of China’s national interests; the ultimate goal is to realize of China and the common
development of countries along the “One Belt and One Road”, and to build political mutual trust, economic
integration, and culture include the interests of the community, fate community, and community responsibility.
China and countries along the “One Belt and One Road” route are normal relations of sovereign states.
China’s diplomatic nature of peaceful anti-hegemonism determines that China’s relations with countries along
the “One Belt and One Road” route are peaceful and mutually beneficial, and there is no control relationship.
Through asymmetric possession of resources and information in problem areas, such as capital, technology, and
production capacity with countries along the belt and road, China gains influence in problem areas and thus
exerts influence on policy formulation of countries along the belt and road. Since China’s accession to the
WTO, it has participated in economic globalization on a wider and deeper scale. China has fully integrated into
the international community
The “One Belt and One Road” adheres to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and the five
principles of peaceful coexistence, openness and cooperation, harmony and inclusiveness, market operation,
and mutual benefit. Relying on the existing bilateral and multilateral mechanisms between China and relevant
countries, it will form an economic integration covering southeast Asia and northeast Asia, which will
eventually lead to Europe.
Since the “One Belt and One Road” Initiative was put forward, China has reached broad consensus in
policy communication with countries along the belt and road. China’s senior leaders have promoted pragmatic
cooperation with countries along the belt and road, and achieved remarkable diplomatic influence. In terms of
its effect, the implementation of “One Belt and One Road” has exceeded expectations for several years. The
vision and action document for the “One Belt and One Road” construction has been formulated and
implemented. Substantive progress has been made in the establishment of the Asian infrastructure investment
bank. The Silk Road Fund has been successfully launched. “One Belt and One Road” countries along the route
have a stronger sense of identity with China.
Analysis Model of “One Belt and One Road” Influence
In Power and Interdependence, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, masters of international relations theory,
propose three models of influence: the contact strategy, the problem domain model, and the international
organization model.
The linkage strategy refers to the fact that “countries with strong economic or military power link their
policies on certain issues to those of other countries on other issues, thus gaining the position of dominant
organizations and problems” (Zhang, 2005, p. 8). The linkage strategy model emphasizes that violence is the
main feature of influence, that is, the influence of countries with strong economic or military strength to
dominate various organizations and problems, and that the most powerful countries use their overall dominant
position to gain the dominant power in the problems of weak countries.
The problem domain model states: “it is difficult for problem domains to connect effectively as usual, and
in this case, power resources cannot easily be transferred” (Zhang, 2005, p. 9). Problem domain model
emphasizes the influence of interdependence; the party may through the asymmetry problem of resources and
information in the field of the possession, gain influence in the problem domain; this influence is not contact
strategy through violence forced to implement, but the resources and information imbalance, non-violent is a
CHINA-UK “ONE BELT AND ONE ROAD” COOPERATION 535
major characteristic influence.

As for the international organization model, “international organization can refer to broad network rules
and institutions, including norms associated with specific international mechanisms. It is a broader conceptual
category than international mechanism, because it includes various types of elite networks and related systems”
(Zhang, 2005, p. 10). The model of international organization emphasizes the influence of rules and systems of
influence on national interests and the realization of influence.
The Characteristics of Influence of China-UK “One Belt and One Road” Cooperation
The influence analysis model of China-UK “One Belt and One Road” Cooperation is a problem domain
model and an international organization model. First of all, the contact strategy model is characterized by
violence, which is suitable for analyzing inter-state relations under the background of confrontation. China and
UK are normal relations between sovereign states, and the relationship between China and UK is peaceful and
mutually beneficial, and there is no control relationship. Second, China can gain influence in problem areas
through asymmetric possession of resources and information in problem areas, such as capital, technology, and
production capacity, so as to exert influence on British policy-making. “One Belt and One Road” provides a
very good platform for the two countries to align their strategies and cooperation. Finally, the international
organization model is suitable for analyzing the influence of China-UK “One Belt and One Road” Cooperation.
Since China’s accession to the WTO, it has participated in economic globalization on a larger scale and to a
deeper extent. China has fully integrated into the international community.
China and UK synergize their strategies for win-win cooperation. The “One Belt and One Road” adheres
to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and the five principles of peaceful coexistence, openness and
cooperation, harmony and inclusiveness, market operation, and mutual benefit. “One Belt and One Road”
related countries are based on but not limited to the scope of the ancient Silk Road. Countries with different
systems, religions and civilizations, and international and regional organizations can participate. China and
Britain are equal masters of the relationship. Relying on the existing bilateral and multilateral mechanism of
China and Britain, economic integration is formed and finally integrated into the Eurasian continental economic
integration leading to Europe.
China-UK “One Belt and One Road” Cooperation Prospects

The British government has repeatedly expressed support for the “One Belt and One Road” Initiative. In
2017, Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Hammond came to Beijing as the special envoy of the prime minister
to attend the “One Belt and One Road” Summit for international cooperation. During his visit to China in 2018,
Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt held key discussions with China on the “One Belt and One Road” Cooperation.
The two sides discussed the signing of “One Belt and One Road” cooperation documents and third-party
market cooperation documents (Xinhua, 2018). William Flint, special envoy of the British government, gave a
detailed plan in an interview. “‘One Belt and One Road’ is a real opportunity”, Flint said, adding that
strengthening the cooperation between China and the UK in the next 20-30 years can be divided into three
stages. In the first stage, a “One Belt and One Road” expert committee will be established. In the second stage,
“One Belt and One Road” Fund will be established. The third stage is to establish a platform for cooperation
through the infrastructure financing exchange.1
Analysis of China-UK “One Belt and One Road” Cooperation

The Production Capacity Cooperation Model Has Boosted the Economic Growth of the Two Countries
The so-called production capacity cooperation means the transfer of China’s high-quality spare capacity,
such as steel, cement, plate glass, and power plants, so as to reduce domestic surplus capacity and at the same
time benefit the development of the recipient countries. The UK needs China’s excess capacity to develop its
infrastructure, and China has a strong equipment manufacturing capacity. Chinese companies can promote
infrastructure development in the UK to achieve mutual benefit and win-win results.
International cooperation on production capacity has brought China and UK closer together and injected
strong impetus into our vision of a prosperous world. At present, China and UK have carried out production
capacity cooperation to bring convenience to the Chinese and British people. Through international production
capacity cooperation, we will combine the cost-effective advantages of China’s manufacturing industry with
the high-end technologies of the UK, and provide UK with “quality and good price” equipment to promote
economic growth through supply and innovation.
Since the “One Belt and One Road” Initiative was put forward, China and UK have reached broad
consensus in national policy communication, and China’s senior leaders have promoted pragmatic cooperation
with the UK, with remarkable results.
China-UK “One Belt and One Road” Cooperation Faces New Opportunities
“One Belt and One Road” has become an important “experimental field” for international cooperation
between China and UK. Its significance and role as a benchmark are both very significant. Britain’s “brexit”
has become a big picture. Its financial strengths, such as market, personnel, and technology, will be affected
and even challenged to some extent. Trade frictions have occurred between China and the United States.
Financial internationalization cooperation is in a headwind period. The process of globalization will not stop,
and China-UK cooperation faces new opportunities.
The first opportunity is rule-making. Britain has played a leading role in the establishment and
management of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. In BRI development, Britain could have a big role to
play in ensuring that the projects are of higher quality, at a higher standard, with higher return.
The second opportunity is exploration of third-party markets. The UK, with its unique strengths in
professional services, project-management, and financing, could tap into immense potential on third-party
markets.
The third opportunity is green development. China and UK have laid the groundwork for co-operation on
green finance environment.
The “One Belt and One Road” has become a new platform for financial cooperation between China and
UK. The internationalization of the RMB offers “new opportunities” for China-UK financial co-operation.
London has created several “firsts” in the internationalization of the RMB. As the internationalization of the
RMB accelerates, China-UK financial cooperation will embrace more opportunities.
1
Overseas China-UK “One Belt and One Road” cooperation to three steps, the British envoy said, Sohunet,
https://www.sohu.com/a/302391246_731021.
CHINA-UK “ONE BELT AND ONE ROAD” COOPERATION 537
Measures to Enhance the Influence of China-UK “One Belt and One Road” Cooperation
Strengthen people-to-people communication. China and Britain differ greatly in national civilization,
including conflict between different ethnic groups, religions, and ethnicities. The outbreak of a particular event
may have a strong spillover effect on national risks. Secondly, the influence of international public opinion on
“One Belt and One Road” also has a negative effect. The China Threat Theory promoted by the US, Japan, and
other countries often makes some people worry about becoming a dependency of China on raw materials. In
addition, China and UK have very different political systems and ideologies. These factors that affect the
cooperation between the two countries need to strengthen people-to-people communication.
China should actively shape its own image and implement its strategy of going global with various forms,
including expanding the export of books, films, and other cultural products. Set up some websites and media
platforms to publicize various aspects of China’s social situation to the UK.
Expand humanistic cooperation. Cultural exchange is an important way to strengthen cooperation
among countries. Use various forms and means to strengthen cultural exchanges between China and the United
Kingdom, for example, holding a cultural year for the mutual management of Chinese language teaching,
expanding cultural exchanges between the two countries, expanding the export of books, films, and other
cultural products, strengthening and improving publicity work, increasing the effectiveness of publicity, and
creating a friendly environment for international cooperation between China-UK.
Strengthen international rule-making. “The Belt and Road” Initiative put forward by China in 2013 has
been gaining momentum since 2017. It has promoted investment growth and created jobs through infrastructure
construction, provided new drivers for world economic growth and promoted sustainable development of
globalization. The integration of China and Eurasia in many fields, given its scale, has essentially become an
important factor in the reconstruction of the world order.
China is building a new production architecture on the connectivity of all continents. Each part of the
world has its place, so the Belt and Road has the meaning of promoting a new multipolar world order.
In terms of infrastructure, the author thinks infrastructure cooperation of China-UK can achieve win-win
results for both countries in the cooperation of infrastructure; both parties will suffer losses due to the long
construction period, natural environment and irresistible reasons, as well as the impact of international relations.
Therefore, international regulation formulation should be strengthened to reduce losses. In addition, in terms of
opportunities, China and the UK will have much to do in “Belt and Road” Cooperation.
American master of international relations theory Keogh Han believes that the international mechanism
can solve the problem of market failure in international cooperation, and the international mechanism has the
function of punishment. The international system can, or at least to a large extent, shape and change the
behavior of states. The system gathers the expectations of the actors. The system gathers the common
knowledge that guides the actions of the actors (Qin, 2005).
Conclusion
“The Belt and Road” Initiative is a new concept of China’s foreign policy under the new leadership of
China in 2013. It plays an overall leading role in China’s foreign policy. In keeping with the new changes in the
world economic, political, and diplomatic landscape, China and UK have achieved remarkable results since the
implementation of the Belt and Road Cooperation. At the same time, it also faces new opportunities for
cooperation to enter a golden age. Enhancing the influence of the China-UK Belt and Road Cooperation is not
only conducive to the national interests of the two countries, but also conducive to the reconstruction of the
world order. It is a positive factor in promoting world peace and development. In the future, the two countries
should strengthen policy communication, expand people-to-people and cultural exchanges, strengthen
international rule-making and other measures to continuously raise the level of cooperation, continue to exert
important influence in the international arena, promote world economic growth, safeguard world peace and
stability, and build a new order of harmonious and stable international relations.
References
Qin, Y. Q. (2005). Culture power system. Beijing: Peking University Press.
Song, X. N., & Chen, Y. (2000). Introduction to international politics. Beijing: Renmin University Press.
Xinhua. (2018). Xinhua international commentators: Build the “One Belt and One Road” Britain led the west. Retrieved from
http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2018-09/14/c_1123432958.htm
Zhang, D. J. (2005). A preliminary study on China’s diplomatic influence on North Korea: Mode channel resources (Master thesis,
Renmin University of China).
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2019.11.004
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Trojan Terrorism as a Principate of Deception, Or in the

Arms of the Terracotta Locust (Ethymological
Wing Cases of Virtus): Part 1
Menshikova Elena Rudolfovna

New Institute for Cultural Research, Moscow, Russia

“Trojan terrorism” leaped to the place and in time as an exhalation of bewilderment at the terrorist attacks in
London last year, as a challenge to political manipulation, and jumped as the continuation of the topic of migration
(the fundamental problem of modernity), as a creation of an internal conflict that multiplies the external conflict, in
the theme of systemic instability―theoretical reasonableness of deception, which destroys the system of contracts
as a condition of the world order, leaped as a report at the University of London (Birkbeck) on Feb. 9, 2018, which
the relevance of its problems beat real events in because the state of modern “utopianism”―the state of Utopus
(USA), intended from the matrix of the British Empire, its tactics of violence―“occupy” (seizure of the
“alien”)―has never changed. As in the case of Marks’s “capital”, the theory first followed, and then the practice of
sabotage: a system of terrorist attacks, riots, revolutions, world and civil wars, and “Trojan terrorism”: bold attacks
by international terrorists, sweeping away the principles and norms of any social treaty (Rousseau did not even
dream of this sadness), the norms of law, ethics and morality, economic agreements (interstate agreements),
including military demonstration of force, provocation of military conflicts, pirate antics, demarches of intimidation
and blackmail, reviving the myth of the Trojan Horse and giving it the status of an “established order”: The norms
that are accepted by the majority as “natural law”, as the natural course of things, contrary to common sense and
universal human canons of being, legitimize treachery and deceit as the only one of possible and all probable ways
of further development of human society―such are the “difficulties to the stars”: Without star wars, but by
“occupy”, which allows us to conclude that “Trojan terrorism” is the sum of technologies aimed at seizure the land
(habitable) by fraud, panic, and violence.
Keywords: terra, terror, Trojan terrorism, timor, piracy, technology of lies, Myth
Introduction
1
It was on the way to London (to read the second report on terrorism at the School of Birkbeck, the
University of London), during and after the conference, looking for explanations of xenophobia, I paced the
space of the square out, where the Grand Master himself was walking―A. Piatigorsky, comparing the

This is a translation of an article published in Russian in the Russian Theoretical Journal Credo New, 2018, No. 3 (P. I).
Menshikova Elena Rudolfovna, Candidate of Cultural Research (Diploma of the Ministry of Education of the Russian
Federation (VAK) from 17.12.2004), New Institute for Cultural Research, Moscow, Russia.
1
It was him who first―on the night after the speech―was asked by the “diplomats” for publication in his journal―3.5 months
from the moment of the proposal―and he was published (Rudolfovna, 2018a), and the print version is already flying to the author
in a thunderstorm of “non-diplomatic” relations.
540 ETHYMOLOGICAL WING CASES OF VIRTUS
descending emanos with those that were caught on Pnyx, where, according to legend, simpleton-Socrates was
judged, surprised at the February crocuses giggling in the sun, when there was no defamation or political battles,
but Great Deception hung and melted in the air of The Foggy Albion, and it was precisely about
him―“deception”―that I thought in the plane on the way back, thoughts were in full swing about him―about
a trick that became the value principle of millions, an exemplary guideline for evolution, which turned into
degradation, becoming a symbol of civilizational regression. In scientific work “Myth as a Natural Exchange”
(Menshikova, 2017), we have already talked about the puritans’ hypocritical approach to issues of faith, which
led to significant dissolution in the minds of some, and the sclerotic eclipse of others, loss of trust and the
colonial breakdown of a world map without visible tectonic faults.
Being in a foreign territory (temporarily, on a business trip), nothing interferes us from whispering with
2
the sea or oak wood, memorizing the seagull’s stroke, stumbling in front of a alatyr-stone , fixing over spider’s
meshy window: How thin and graceful the spider’s web, through which we look at the world―is it practically
does not interfere with perception: The pines are green and magnificent―both the color and the forms are
preserved, but our consciousness realizes that the eye looks “through”―through the strained mica of someone
else’s life. So, we get used to “look” through someone else’s interpretation, afraid or lazy to “see” on one’s own
hook, believing that someone has already done it for you, and much better than you, and also eminent and
famous, who also live there―in the far outland of the democratic values. This, my friends, is childishness and
cowardice―to be ashamed of one’s own opinion, to be ashamed to make a declaration of love to a child,
mother, motherland, live by tumbleweed: carelessly like a dragonfly. To increase this lost concern: to patronize
every bump, to appreciate every quantum of air―both our land is rich and the people in it are wonderful―to
cease to exist with such a passing moment or a semicolon’s kiss, it is time to take care of our territory, to work
and use our printed gingerbreads to lay out myth of our time. And if behind each image of the myth (primary
system), there is a system of values (modes of behavior), and behind the image of mythologies―only icons and
labels, then a symbol that can have any meanings, references, allusions, and, therefore, interpretations, reigning
in the mind, operating with them as skeleton keys, and hearing only the voyeur’s call, anticipating the
“separation” of the meaning (phenomenon or object) as undressing, begins to discredit the entire image,
exposing it as a dilapidated house, uncovering it in a pirate way: impertinently and abruptly―with a black
attack, and, thereby, turning off the former picture of the world: destroys walls, breaks glass, etc.―leaves only
the skeleton, offering to live and exist in new realities―on the coals of second meanings. This is how a
“symbolic exchange” takes place―a revolutionary bitbrace―a symphony of performances, absorbed by the
image, becomes a storm and the onslaught of brave tailors, which will pour oolong and give a compliment, and
cross out the questions of faith, revealing flattering gums.
For me, the myth sprouted by nine scientific articles, exposing the storerooms of his mycelium―“Trojan
terrorism” was found there: It turned out to be a caustic smoke mushroom, and it was he who highlighted the
hypocrisy that had eaten like dirt into the plush comfort of the British value system. “Interdisciplinarity” (such
is the coding of the Center for Scientific Research at the University of London) can really turn out to be a
situation of “inter”―“nowhere” and “out”, that is, completely “past” the topic and problem of the declared
conference, the thing is that the university, designed to form newcomers from dissolved colonies running for
the best share, and the university, in which the descendants of prim islanders nurture are raised, differ like the
2
Alatyr-stone is the sacrosanct stone, which contains sacred writing and healing properties (in Russian folklore).
ETHYMOLOGICAL WING CASES OF VIRTUS 541
sun and the moon: natural radiation and artificial―giving heat or escalating anxiety, immersing in surrealism.
If you need to explain the phrase “Troy bastions”, give a link to the names from the bursa’s program, then yes:
migrants are trained in accelerated courses for servicers, but if state men (civil servants), graduates of Eton
College, without embarrassment from their ignorance, are transferred from limousines to galoshes for the
amusement for the whole world, that interdisciplinarity has self-incriminate like a non-commissioned officer is
widow: plywood of education along the Bologna Process flies past culture and knowledge, hanging somewhere
above Wimbledon and splitting in pubs. If teaching classical philosophy, you are predicted to become a broker,
directing you to the sales department, then maybe it is worth closing the Temple or fill up the road to it with
outdated iPhones or those beer cans that one American anthropological museum exhibits as artifacts along with
dinosaur bones and Inca’s stelas, apparently experiencing pride in the achievements of the 20th century.
Labor, receiving its marking―a barcode and a price tag, is often deprived of its value: The priceless gift of
sense becomes “blind”, “deaf”, and “dumb”, as it were walled up by the codex of corporate production relations.
The consciousness that “sees” the goal is ready for tactical maneuvering to accomplish a strategic task (one that
becomes an urgent necessity, according to the conviction of the same consciousness) or the super-task of
individual improvement―not a superman, but a demigod (likening to someone or something), the body begins
to improve as if by itself: It changes, and that capsule, which appeared from the moment of birth, and which
often inspires dreams, immersing in illusions and laziness, suddenly becomes like a “golden casket”, which
allows the consciousness to thrown “golden dream”, and spin “to the fullest”. And if the poet Zabolotsky had
recovered souls, obligated to “work day and night so that beating the air”, and the poet Lomonosov stood,
above all, for “Newtons with quick mind”, that the Russian land should give rise, it might seem that their
manifestos are different but, in fact, they are a single postulate, mutually conditional on each other:
Consciousness, losing its ball-bearings, its hammers and tacks in idleness, aimlessness, getting stuck in the
traps of instincts, loses its spirit of struggle and accomplishment, the soul dies away by itself, and together with
her and time the mind that now has preferred sleep over business, and the body wears out quickly. Generous
Newtons will not be born on their own―they are nurtured by the Consciousness, which begins to realize itself
as significance and value, as myth is that persistent spirit, creating harmony of the world with everyday feats of
arms or routine, turning joy of creation into songs and embroidering the rainbow with the rain of its tears. The
circulation of the mind in the noosphere is possible only in the progressive every second work of all
consciousnesses entering directly or tangentially into this timeless Nous’ horovod (circle dance)―maybe this is
the basis of the General Case, which N. Fedorov bequeathed to descendants carried away by revolutionary
transformations who preferred violence: world wars and revolution―to all creative “general cases”, choosing
terror as an instrument (“we will destroy this world by violence”) of production relations in the name of the
unscrupulousness of the social treaty, which changed the individual man’s total responsibility for the collective,
depersonalizing and likening a person in the flow of cartel bookkeeping and the volatility of death. Is it because
of this fact that modern economic fluctuations are occurring, including migration flows (not forced, but staged),
depriving citizenship, and with it responsibility, is it not because of this that Africa fell under the scalpel of
bank cartels, handing a policy of beggary instead of passports (I note, in the beginning of the 30s the Russian
writer Yu. Olesha wrote about him, lamenting and ironizing over his fate as an “outcast”), immersing himself in
instincts, brushing aside political reflection as an important component of existence, accustoming getting by on
charity, and not work, and without microchip implant, has got the knack of castrating the mind so that children
prefer the punitive belt of a pirate over any business. Alas, it is always easier to slide, but according to the myth,
only a stone slides, and only Sisyphus stubbornly returns upstairs, dragging a loose unreasonable cobblestone
with him―is not that the one that will become an instrument for the proletariat. And by the way, who or what
was the real “cobblestone” of the revolution―“Who stood on whom?”―following Professor Preobrazhensky’s
pun? Are they not anarchists that the Bolsheviks deftly used? Alternatively, these were supports―renegades
and a declassed element, which were many in the cities (as, incidentally, in Ancient Rome―see Dionysius of
Halicarnassus), and were used in organization of revolutionary coups almost every two years. A person who is
deprived of the joy of work and responsibility as an act is an easy prey for robbery―“show him a red
cent―and do what you want with him...”―and this will be so as long as the space of his habitat―“the ship of
fools”―dictates the conditions and send for meaning to “the field for fools”, unless the stove rebels, burning
naive―“I am, I am the one from whom the earth came” (and every, not only Russian, but Olonets, Danish,
Czech...). This is created prayer of being―our consciousness is colored, comes to life, lives, and breathes by it.
But where does the worldview that generation after generation had, why it has disappeared into a consumer
society, like in a cup of Nescafé, who “plays” the matrix of consciousness, “dances” like with a hungry pupil of
vocational school, and why for thousands of years people prefer holy wars “for Empty tomb” to meaningful
battle with Logos? Who benefits from the loss of linguistic identity, who sows the “dragon’s teeth” even where
there is no arable land? But this is how the myth loses its singularity, exchanging Caesar for a legion, so it
becomes a bargaining chip of mythologies, becomes like a red cent, they begin to hide behind them like a fig
leaf (the case with Freud, which gave rise to the “Oedipus incident”), because the principle is: overtake
another!―replaced by another: deceive another!―turning into a vicious practice of everyday life, and even
“esprit de corps” (as the foundation of any corporation), which, I note, is a completely “renegade” strategy that
will not choose between: gift/grace or law/order but will set a flag on the Cape of Chaos and justify the Canon
of “Foolishness”.
False mythologies, born generously in place of the old myth, being the scattered Babylon of premature
babies, dooms the young generation―while not mature, infantile, people whose “childhood” will freeze up to
50 years―to blindness, depriving the present, leaving alone with illusions not only of the past, but of simulacra
and phantoms of the present, without requiring a search for meaning in everything and anything, not teaching to
recognize a mother from a stepmother, but accustoming her to an masquerade of “identity”, to asthenic fun. Are
we adults, who are still conscious and alive in this new “Middle Ages”, entitled to trust own future to them, not
accustomed to “think” and “dream”, but only “desire” and “want”? Oh letters! Oh manners! Milestones of
nature are forgotten: to express thoughts into words ..., so one could exclaim, sprinkling ashes on one’s head,
lamenting with the present, and without releasing the remote control or mouse, but no―both times and manners
are repeated, because the basic question of philosophy has not been resolved (and may never be resolved):
What is primary: being or consciousness? If it was not this existential rebus, that is, deciding by some people
all their lives, and it is not needed for others, they do not need it as “bad advice”, the problem of the progressive
development of mankind would probably be removed by a series of the “Works and Days”, removing the
problem of choice before person himself, imputing comprehension into the attribution of being along with a
chisel, spear, or spindle, obliging to fix oneself in the space of being―extending yourself in it, build its
intention as Noah’s ark for those doomed, cultivating its political reflection as that gene of responsibility,
through which any “Common case” is possible, even immortality is possible, that have been absorbing some
revolutionary romantics, and who fell victim to the terror that was provoked by them, because all violence is
generated by violence, and I also note that it underlies the evolution―and this is a contradiction, which is
perceived as exegesis, preferring “the right of the strongest”, without taking concessions of “non-resistance” as
a manifestation of weakness, puts evolution on an extensive track, offering “artificial intelligence” as the
newest messianic idea, while retaining the golden calf and the subjunctive as magical crystals for those who do
not endorse their thoughts. Where the stone gets―it depends not only on David’s Sling, but also on David
himself―the apple must know its apple tree in order to become ripe apple (and possibly rejuvenating). This is
the case with the myth: It is recognizing in us with a “ripe apple”, presenting the world and time in each (of
course, in different ways, depending on the breastfeeding), it was the one who reflects on us, awakens by
Sphinx and asks questions―uncomfortable, as a rule, and this is the only way we can (and many succeed) to
reflect the world of modern realities, the world of disasters and dishonor, the tiltyard of gain, to understand
ourselves, to be asking yourselves by meaning, to find the answer to the question, to regain the gait and love as
a miracle. Building your life according to the sun (myth) is not an easy strategy, but it is feasible if you hope to
ourselves and, as if “blasphemy was falling on a blasphemy”, would not cover the heavens without resorting to
services of cobblestone (no matter how helpful it is was), not relying on the petition, not waiting for the next
Messiah, you need to tune your own lyre to harmonious sound, saving the fire of the soul, fostering dialogue
with yourself (I will mention in passing, it is not possible to build up the “muscles” of consciousness by
frequent entries into the information field) and pulling the strings of “Socratic dialogue” with noosphere, that is
always in the public domain―just wish, like the “Flora and Fauna” library, from where Diocletian drew
knowledge for his seedling, rejoicing in the stronger cabbage and not wanting to exchange it for any joys of the
world―to achieve such “renunciation”―to know the measure of yourself and everything, as if to enter the
orbit of the theory of relativity (Einstein would surely have fun not only playing chess with the
emperor)―perhaps this is a condition for the future change of mankind―the guarantee of that transformation
that will save a person for his true purpose―disclosure, because the majority will shrivel up in buds. Ah, how
good all these roses would be, smelling sweet to the whole universe! A maxim in the manner of Andersen or
Turgenev, that suddenly broke away, does not change our firm attitude to find out how, despite the universal
desire to flutter as butterfly in a flower-garden, people live in a dense forest with cave dinosaurs, and when a
“terror” arose in the linguistic horizon and by which crossbreeding a monster can be formed by which people
are no longer scared, but covered up the economic and political adventures, which caused a tectonic shift in the
denotation, which led to a jump of “Trojan terrorism” from terra through timor to terror.
Our liberal community, pumped up by the botox of democracy, preferring to peep and gossip from all
activities, preparing to tear the country to shreds again, not sparing its life, blows on the coals of a split,
swinging the bell of Herzen―dissident No. 2, which, unlike dissident No. 1―Andrey Kurbsky, turned his
correspondence “from two angles” into anonymous letters of revolutionary propaganda, which he regularly
threw (plentifully) from the territory of the British monarchy, fraternally enlightening: he carried the virus of
revolution with an apostolic kiss, so the steam locomotive was launched to us, that it stood on the siding of the
French Commune, and now, creaking with the flaps of the firebox, it is guessing at the new Terror, because the
“9th Thermidor” happens, as if on a calendar, with regularity per century, and the dragon’s teeth, sown in the
carnival 20s of the last century, sprouted in the 90s, were not noticed in the early aughts, all sorts of analogies
were perplexing, historical parallels gives a hostile reception when black turned out to be white, and vice
versa―they sang Hosanna. For example, Professor Preobrazhensky’s “blunder” (from “Heart of a Dog”) was
repeated decades later by a carnival gesture of a philology professor, who let the anti-world into his chair
through a renegade-liberal, a lover of Live Journal, a provincial man who took root and soon replaced the entire
teaching staff, as if Little Zaches, and only this way: Through analogies, we understand that “Trojan terrorism”
is always the “interest” of someone else’s place, someone else’s territory, and capture takes place sooner or
later, but under the wing of liberal demagogy. Is not this what happened with the native alma mater, who
sheltered “PR” in the room next to Papa Carlo’s office, consider it as the “hearth” of the faculty, and that
managed to turn it into an advertising bureau for 20 years, tearing down freedom of thought, otherness and
responsibility for all started up word, in a pawnshop. Here they teach now gossip and stove-piping, dissecting
thoughts in the germ, speculation, and speculation, which kicked science out, according to Preobrazhensky, “to
hell with it!” (The P.F.’s words recouped on it: to the profession―“old-time”: knowledgeable, experienced,
curious, attentive, thinking―it was just released on all four sides, like a genie from a movie about
Aladdin)―she was withdrawn, stealing, wearing down at the heels by a thicket of greedy for someone else’s
fame and pleasure, lazy to the science rhetoricians, who fell in love with publicity as a process for which
nuances and dissonances of the close era―native and wounded―were not distinguishable, in contrast to the
distant, lost in the archives. Comprehension is gone―impoverishment of mind has been. So, a trickster
provocateur, a renegade-sponger, cut the Lomonosov’s tree―that tree of knowledge, which gave a grain of
doubt, accustoming in vain not to speak irresponsibly, but to check each letter and correctly interpunctuate.
Modern PR specialists have learned to bypass grammatical thresholds, and they drew the syntax into a scoop
with a twitter tweet―scribbling all the articles into texts of 140 beats not a heart―a sign (according to the
Egon Kisch’s testament?). That is also because they cannot wait for their own thought that its tail so
brief―inexpressibly simple (like your scoundrel!), and yet thought (any) is worthy of respect, should have its
length as the tail of Udav’s grandmother (a series of ten children's cartoons by Soyuzmultfilm), and it is
desirable to have your own color―sensitive, in a flower, be syllabic, self-manifest independence and hardness.
Your terra leaves you, twisting eidos, falls loudly―by a dime-store laugh―at the feet of a “redeemer”―a
stranger (gr. κσενοζ who just liked him because he wants to, just because he always wants to eat , unlike you,
who lost its appetite, whose wick of life went out (by stupidity), and his never calmed down (by
greed)―simply because the remoras-troglodytes are always hungry (so arranged by the fauna), insatiable that
Barathrum, and they pull Consciousness to zero by the bottomlessness of desires (empty, passing, lustful)―and
thought will not be born really there, where one lust lives happily (in various guises). And if it were not the
persistent grip―by the throat―of a trickster-renegade, and the lost ability to read analogies of history to please
“Gorget patches” and order of rank, the consciousness of many (albeit with slipping) would work in the former
“Socratic” mode of doubt (in case of truth liberal values, in which more from the “price” (price tag) than from
the “values” (freedom, law, and justice), which are already deaf and alienated to impulses and patience from the
depths of the Siberian ores), then the faculty, called to be the focus of the mind and civilian mouthpiece of the
state, would continue (of course, not 100 percent) to produce “Newtons with quick mind”, but no, literate
people who do not speak their native language, speak in English Surzhik of the British colonies, do not know
how to express their political reflection (for its complete absence), are ashamed and despise their homeland (for
the complete ignorance of its cultural tables), steal out from here. This is an axiological failure, which led to the
cheer-patriotism of the mankurts (manipulated person) who bleat democratically correctly: scolding his own
mother, and laughing at his father, exposing his loins. This is a clear “self-mutilation” on the part of children
that have entered adolescence, and from which they intend to leave only by the retirement date, that is,
physically decayed. A prolonged leap into immaturity and aggression (teenage), in the absence of respect (and
knowledge) for the native language―the same ignorance of the Minor―snobby and snotty, is fraught with one
thing: not the ability for political reflection, not the readiness for a “Socratic dialogue”, that is, maturity as such.
But this is our present―standing askew, sliding smoothly, this is plankton―the Terracotta Army of the future
(the upcoming “Trojan terrorism”)―those who are so important-needed someone else’s territory, those who are
still (behind the scenes, in the kitchens, under the protection of Nonprofit organization) gossip, chewing that
they will throw in a value bag―hatred of surrounding rickety penates, dislike of its―perfectly dissimilar―so
resistant to “foreignness” that bourgeois teeth grind, as in the distant 20s―Kibalchish is not given.
In the process of evolution, “otherness” is alive and strong in every organism, it is a given and not a whim
of natural selection according to Darwin. This “friend” helps to survive and withstand even when locust is
eating harvest, when demons of virus fever are in the process of devastating other people’s lands under the
Puritan banners, not cultivating, but de-energizing peoples. To this day, piracy is not obsolete―it rules and
dictates fashion: neglects, uses marking the deck, scatters the seed that springs up with the dragon’s teeth,
tearing apart countries and continents, hypocritically pretending grin is hospitality―by the lies of salvation that
encircled the whole planet by Christian dogma. Do not believe your enemies―keep your “friend” in the purity
of its borders! Fear not differences, but similarities―to be an “analog” and notice all analogies―are different
mental operations, and here the confusion with terms and definitions harms the mind, which is non-independent
and relies on someone else’s interpretation, a different opinion is the very elegantly tailored “web” (a little
thing with a meaning, alien, distant). The “occupy” movement, launched in a liberal environment for liberal
recruits immediately after the Vietnam catastrophe, is based on the banal principle of seizure―occupation―as
a way and reason of redistribution of property, peace, in other words, terra―it is pure piracy. Now, this
Occupy’s tactic is spreading everywhere like a virus, the same “revolutionary” method of improvement
(extensive, emergency), occupy and rule! It starts the instability system in an emergency way, in
Samurai―with the “self-destruction” mode: by turning the key―la revolte, pulling the cord. This is some kind
of clockwork, rather vicious―like broken flowers that some leave on the graves, so as not to be dragged away
for resale, are bold, cold scraps. Any occupation―the capture of someone else’s―is not moral, painfully
dangerous: putting vice in valor by irresponsibility―it is the same anti-world―and this world with a negative
sign is alive and overwhelming with fundamental unscrupulousness, by a thousandfold charge of superstition,
ignorance and laziness. Idleness and pleasure at all costs instead of labor and joy―that is the surrogate
happiness of the modern Homo Sapiens, still upright, but unreasonable. So, the problem of the outsider, raised
by Camus to the existential shaft, as the problem of “its/alien”, that be provided a very topical, is solved by
deliberate erasing of borders under the flag of “tolerance”. Mixing is just washing out an identity with its
ethnicity and ethics. And this is the lawlessness of some before the lawlessness of many.
The modern interpretation of “terrorism” as twix: we write one―carry two―like a black cat with a white
mark: terra nova―after all, the aliens’ reluctance to adopt someone else’s culture, laws alien to them (language,
etc.)―is the order that equals, formatting, them in a cohort of invaders, united by one chain of “fundamental
gain”, ousting and clear the territory that let you in (out of ignorance, out of naivety, out of fear, in view of
death). The Trojans lost the policy (Ilion), but transferred their culture to the Apennines in a small detachment,
displacing the Etruscans―the law of conservation of energy or evolution worked out, whose natural selection
rests on the “natural” law of the strongest, that is, on the violence and benefit of the one who is right, because
“the stronger always blames the weaker”. Thus, the myth of the Trojan Horse was transformed into “Trojan
terrorism”―a strategy of a military expedition to compensate for damage that occurred due to failed economic
3
cooperation , Otherwise, failure in potential transactions or failure in the possibility of obtaining economic
benefits. And what, we ask after, twisted the noses of cruise missiles of Uncle Sam’s army, causing far from a
sandstorm in Libya, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Syria and further along the latitudes, which are rich in
“usefulness” or “patency” of the sales market? Myth is not a fable, it is a rule of combat.
The “Iliad” ends with an episode with a humpbacked horse that blew up the city from the inside, dispelling
panic and horror―not death, no, every Achaean or Pelasgian is ready for death from birth as Spartan―but the
horror that swaddles members like a retiarius’ network, when the awareness, that you are being deceived, is
4
covered with fog and darkness , and since King Priam was reputed to be the standard of decency (according to
Homer), he gave the son’s bride (another else’s wife) the title (although as a stranger Elena could rely on a
slave collar) and his goodwill (just because that he loved his son with unconditional love), thereby exposing
mechanism of influence: deception-panic-fear-violence, which is triggered by fireball. The deliberate
rapprochement with the meaning of “horror”, “fear” (timor), which happened gradually (due to a wide range of
synonyms and synonymous constructions), played into the hands of those who launched the word “terrorism”
into public space―and much later than Caesar who’s got only three cases of the use of the word “terror” (and
in different connotations) in “Commentaries”, by those fearless Republicans of the First French who first
unfurled the terror banner over compatriots who were on the other side of the barricades and resisted the
roaring Thermidor, and then they got there in like brotherhood thanks to execution by “Scottish Maiden”. And
since “terror” is genocide against one’s own people, originating, as we see it, in the myth of the Minotaur, the
very method: the stone thrown by Theseus is an army fighting among themselves, like an ethnos destroying
itself (for some beliefs and considerations) or the elimination of an ethnos by its own forces (not external, but
internal), the ingeniously falling “apple of discord”―this is the fire that burned down nations in a matter of
years.
Who took place on the political Olympus after France licked its wounds? The Puritans carried out two
revolutionary attacks―Absolutism faded into the shackles of parliamentarism and the independent states have
arisen―and, at the same time, interest in the colonies flared up (Note between the case: In Britain, the abolition
of the slave trade was proclaimed only in 1807, while in the colonies it continued to go at full speed―such
offshore points of the time―and longer than a century, that is, even after the formal abolition of slavery in
America [1865], moreover, one of the reasons for the Caucasian War of 1817-1864 was the desire of the
Russian emperor to stop the slave trade traffic through the Tersky and Sancharsky passes, closing the slave
market legally existing from the time of the Ottoman Empire, supported by tolerant European diplomacy). It is
important to consider that the “policy of elimination”, that is, terror itself, is carried out by one who has an
understanding: that there is a “established order” (disciplina) and that there is a “mess” (perturbatio, magna
rerum), who has an established understanding of “compensation of damage”―that lidless vein of The Merchant
of Venice that will not forget his piece of liver from the debtor, that is, an established system (partly fiscal) of
imposing fines and indemnities, that guided by “summum jus-summa injuria” (literally: “the right brought to
extreme formalism leads to lawlessness”)5 , represents the legislative framework of “Trojan terrorism” as
3
So, we literally quote the Sir Thomas More’s “Utopia” (see the previous article in Credo New, 2018, No. 2).
4
Cf.: “Timore ... oppressi.”―Meaning: fear deprived them of the opportunity to swim - according to a non-adapted text: Gaius
Julius Caesar. Commentaries on the Gallic War. The second, third and fourth volumes. With an introduction and comments by S. I.
Sobolevsky. M.: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1946/M.: Russian Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Science,
2011, p. 67.
5
A Concise Dictionary of Latin Words, Abbreviations and Terms/V. Kupreyanova, N. Umnova. M.: TERRA, 1999, p. 86.
violence, while serving as a strategic part of state planning and economic management (those the levers without
which the state’s ship goes to one, but with which it can be likened to the Flying Dutchman).
References
Losev, A. F. (1990). Dialectics of the myth. London: Routledge.
Menshikova, E. R. (2017). The Myth as Natural Exchange (epistemological aspects of practical lie). Credo New, Vol. 1(89),
181-200; Vol. 2(90), 201-221; Vol. 3(91), 197-220.
Menshikova, E. R. (2018a). The Troyan Terrorism as an Established Order (disciplina), or the nomadic colonatus (mission of
myth in the space of Sir Thomas More’s “Utopia”). International Relation and Diplomacy, 6(2), 129-141.
Menshikova, E. R. (2018b). The Natural Landscape of Philosophy (The political reflection of Heraclitus and Aristotle).
Philosophy Study, 8(1), 34-48.

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International Relations

David Publishing Company

Aims and Scope:

David Publishing Company

David Publishing Company

Editorial Board Members of International Relations and Diplomacy:

The Belt and Road

Trojan Terrorism as a Principate of Deception, Or in the Arms of the Terracotta Locust

The Role of Third States in the EU Maritime Security Strategy:

Keywords: maritime security, South Atlantic, security threats

The Delimitation of the Security Concept

Delimiting Maritime Security

Figure 1. Complex approach of maritime security.

Figure 2. Convergent approach to maritime security.

Figure 3. Divergent approach for maritime security.

Figure 4. Maritime security threats embedded in the divergent approach.

Using the Proposed Typology

most relevant to the least relevant).

Figure 7. Scheme of coincidence of “global” and “regional” divergent approaches.

Figure 8. Intersections of major South Atlantic concerns in terms of maritime security.

South Atlantic Maritime Security Cooperation Initiatives

Till, G. (2012). The rise of naval power in Asia-Pacific. London: Routledge.

Why the Cold War Will Never Return to World Politics

Perfect Cold War

An International System Alien to Itself

Cold War Alien to Global Politics and Economy

Enhance the Influence of China-UK “One Belt and One Road”

Theory Analysis of “One Belt and One Road” Influence

major characteristic influence.

China-UK “One Belt and One Road” Cooperation Prospects

through the infrastructure financing exchange.1

Analysis of China-UK “One Belt and One Road” Cooperation

Trojan Terrorism as a Principate of Deception, Or in the

Menshikova Elena Rudolfovna

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