International Relations and Diplomacy (ISSN2328-2134) Volume 7, Number 10,2019

International Relations
and Diplomacy
Volume 7, Number 10, October 2019 (Serial Number 73)
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★Fatima Sadiqi (International Institute for Languages and ★Sanjay Singh (Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law
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International Relations
and Diplomacy
Volume 7, Number 10, October 2019 (Serial Number 73)
Contents
Cultural Autonomy
Operationalizing Cultural Autonomy in International Law as a Form of Effective

Participation in Decision-Making 441
János Fiala-Butora
Al Qaeda
Al Qaeda Origins, Ideology, Goals and Future 464

Thomas M. Fitzpatrick
Iranian Foreign Policy
Iranian Foreign Policy During Rouhani Presidency: Perspective on Change and Continuity 472
Enayatollah Yazdani
African Immigrants
Africans and the New Diaspora 485

Stephen O. Eyeh
International Relations and Diplomacy, October 2019, Vol. 7, No. 10, 441-463
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2019.10.001
D
DAVID PUBLISHING
Operationalizing Cultural Autonomy in International Law as a

Form of Effective Participation in Decision-Making
János Fiala-Butora
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary
NUI Galway, Galway, Ireland

According to most commentators, cultural autonomy is not a right recognized by positive international law. This
article argues that the core elements of cultural autonomy can be derived from the right to effective participation
guaranteed by Article 15 of the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM). The
existing standards developed by the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention are rather vague, and fail
to regulate several issues important for effective participation. This is not determined by the wording of the
Convention, but by the Committee’s choice to provide states with a very wide margin of appreciation. To fill in the
gaps in the Committee’s jurisprudence, the article examines the case study of a recently adopted law on support for
minority cultures in Slovakia. By using a qualitative-substantive approach, it specifies the content of cultural
autonomy by defining its purpose, as well as the conditions under which it can be achieved. Applying the
Committee’s general criteria to the specific problems raised by the Slovak law, the article establishes the core
positive law requirements vis-à-vis the right to cultural autonomy. In closing, the article argues that the Committee
should adopt detailed standards, similar to those proposed in the text, in order to enforce the right to effective
participation in practice. Operationalizing effective participation leads in substance to the enforcement of the right
to cultural autonomy, which is a developed form of the former.
Keywords: national minorities, minority rights, minority culture, cultural autonomy, right to participate in public
affairs, Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM)
Introduction
Cultural autonomy is an important aspiration of minority communities. Many recognize it as a good
solution for preservation and development of minority cultures.1 However, according to most commentators, it
is not a right recognized by positive international law (Dinstein, 2011; Shaw, 1997). Scholarly works on
cultural autonomy are either descriptive, analysing cultural autonomy schemes adopted in specific states; or
normative, developing criteria which a certain approach must fulfil in order to be considered cultural autonomy
(Hannum, 1990; Lapidoth, 1997; Suksi, 1998; Ghai, 2000; Tkacik, 2008). They share a central question
János Fiala-Butora, LL.M., S.J.D., research fellow, Institute for Legal Studies, Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy
of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary; lecturer, NUI Galway, Galway, Ireland.
1
Positive experiences of autonomous regions as a source of inspiration for conflict resolution in Europe, Council of Europe
Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1609 (2003), 24 June 2003; commentary on the effective participation of persons
belonging to national minorities, Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities,
adopted on 27 February 2008, ACFC/31DOC(2008)001, para. 6.
442 OPERATIONALIZING CULTURAL AUTONOMY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
defining their analysis: Is there cultural autonomy in a certain state? And if there is, what does it look like?
This article adopts a different approach. It addresses a different question: What features make cultural
autonomy an effective solution to specific problems of minority communities’ cultural reproduction? The goal
of the analysis is not to establish the existence of cultural autonomy in a certain country, but the general criteria
by which its quality can be assessed. Any country can claim to have cultural autonomy by simply formally
declaring any power-sharing mechanism to embody such autonomy. However, granting some minority
representatives a degree of decision-making or consultative powers should not be sufficient to meet the
substantive standards of autonomy. Qualitative criteria are needed to decide whether the approach is an
effective one, or only autonomy in name and form.
A central argument of this article is that the core elements of cultural autonomy already exist in
international law. They can be found in the requirements relating to the right of minorities to participate in
decisions affecting their cultural life (Weller, 2004, 2010; Palermo, 2010; Verstichel, 2009). If the right to
participate is taken seriously, its end result, effective participation, will be a form of cultural autonomy. In turn,
cultural autonomy is only valuable, if it leads to effective participation in decision-making. The article will
therefore assess the relevant articles of the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities (FCNM), in order to establish the core positive law requirements in relation to the right to
participate in decision-making. These core standards will be applied to a case study of Slovakia, a country
which has recently adopted a law on the support for minority cultures. Contrasting the new law and the debate
surrounding its adoption with the approach of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention
highlights further requirements which any effective cultural autonomy must fulfil.
The aim of the article is threefold. Its main goal is to establish the in-depth criteria which an effective
cultural autonomy scheme must meet. Second, it assesses whether these criteria are already part of positive
international law, and whether they can and should be part of it. Lastly, it also provides an assessment of the
Slovak law on the support of minority cultures, to establish in what ways it meets the criteria and where it does
not.
The Object of the Analysis and the Methodology

This article is concerned with concepts, such as cultural autonomy, financing of minority cultures, and
effective participation in decision-making. For the purposes of the analysis, it is important to define these terms
and their relationship.
Scholars define cultural autonomy differently, depending on the forms of autonomy they distinguish. The
approach taken in this article is informed by the 2008 special edition of the International Journal of Minority
and Group Rights on characterizations of the forms of autonomy, and rests on differentiating cultural autonomy
from other related concepts (Légaré& Suksi, 2008).
Personal autonomy can be defined as members of minority communities engaging in common activities in
order to promote their culture by using essentially private law forms of organization (Suksi, 2008). By
establishing associations and other forms of cooperation, they can achieve many of their goals without enjoying
any special rights granted to them on the basis of their community membership (Légaré& Suksi, 2008). This
highlights the key difference between personal and cultural autonomy. The latter involves some public law
recognition of minority communities, and grants decision-making and other powers to individuals based on
membership in a culturally defined community (Tkacik, 2008). Personal autonomy is symmetrical; all citizens
OPERATIONALIZING CULTURAL AUTONOMY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 443
of the state enjoy formally the same rights to associate, regardless of their ethnic or cultural affinity. Cultural
autonomy is asymmetrical: Members of minority communities enjoy different rights vis-à-vis the members of
the majority.2
Territorial autonomy is also asymmetrical, but its key defining feature is not power based on community
membership. Rather it is power based on political control of certain minority-populated territories. While
cultural autonomy results in personal jurisdiction in relation to members of the community, territorial autonomy
results in the community’s political control over all residents of the autonomous territory, including residents
belonging to other communities. The latter allows for a wider scope of powers which can be effectively
exercised only on a territorial basis, such as general law-making powers in economic, social, and other policy
areas, besides cultural and linguistic matters.
Cultural autonomy can be characterised as distinct from the above two concepts. It will be understood in a
general sense as a right of members of a culturally defined minority community to govern themselves in
matters relating to their culture (Yupsanis, 2016). It thus involves decision-making by members of the
community over matters of culture, language, education, and other forms of cultural expressions specific to the
community (Torode, 2008).
For the purposes of this article, the scope of cultural autonomy will be defined more narrowly. The
analysis will follow the case study of the Slovak law on financing minority cultures, and assesses only
decision-making related to cultural activities. Matters related to minority educational policy will not form part
of the analysis, as they are not covered by the domestic law. Similarly, the rules on linguistic rights are
governed by general legislation and with small exceptions the bodies of cultural autonomy have no powers in
this area.
What remains within the scope of the analysis is decision-making in all matters related to culture that are
not governed by general laws. This mainly means allocating financial support for the cultural activities of
minorities, including support for the arts, publications, media, and scientific institutions. In a more general
sense, the newly established cultural autonomy scheme allows minority representatives to make decisions about
their cultural policy: Which areas of culture should be developed? What activities should receive priority over
others? What cultural institutions should be established? And which should cease to operate?
Due to its narrow scope, it is arguable whether the Slovak system can even be analysed as a form of
cultural autonomy. Palermo (2010) defined the term narrowly and argued that only one European country,
Hungary, has such a system in place. Others understand the concept in a wider sense and accept as cultural
autonomies systems with a much narrower scope and limited powers (Yupsanis, 2016; Torode, 2008). Petőcz
(2010) considered the Slovak system “almost … a kind of self-administration in cultural matters” (p. 752).
Notwithstanding the debates over formal classification, the label of cultural autonomy is not decisive for the
analysis. Neither the Slovak legislation, nor the analysed international norms use this term. They are concerned
with participation of minorities in decision-making in the area of culture. The scope of these norms
nevertheless overlaps with cultural autonomy as defined above.
The argument of this article is that ensuring effective participation in decision-making also ensures
cultural autonomy. In other words, cultural autonomy is a form of effective participation in decision-making
2
Not necessarily more rights, as whatever right is granted to minority communities through cultural autonomy, members of the
majority are likely to enjoy the same right through a different, mainstream mechanism. The key is that majorities and minorities
exercise these rights differently, through a different mechanism.
(Weller, 2010). Apart from the formal title, it has no other content than effective participation in
decision-making in the area of culture. It follows that the international standards on participation can be used to
assess the quality of cultural autonomy arrangements and to conceptualize cultural autonomy as a right, as a
requirement of international human rights law. The qualitative criteria developed here are thus applicable to
both, since, on a conceptual level, cultural autonomy is a sub-category of the right to effective participation.
International Human Rights Standards on Cultural Autonomy

The Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities is the only
binding multilateral human rights treaty focusing on minority rights (Vacca, 2010). It recognizes a wide range
of rights, but the right to autonomy is not among them―at least not formally. The Convention does require
states to create the conditions necessary for minorities to maintain and develop their culture (Article 5) and for
effective participation of minorities in cultural life and public affairs, in particular, those affecting them.
Reading these provisions in conjunction, minorities have a right to effectively participate in decision-making on
issues relating to their culture.3
The right to effective participation had been articulated on the international level before the adoption of
the Framework Convention, notably in paragraph 35 of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) Copenhagen Document of the 1990 Conference on the Human Dimension (Weller, 2010), and
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and
Linguistic Minorities.4 These were, however, political documents. The right was recognized as a legally
binding norm only with the adoption of the Framework Convention (Weller, 2004).
According to the Convention’s Explanatory Report, the aim of Article 15 is real equality between
members of minority communities and the majority (Weller, 2004). To achieve this goal, states can use a
number of mechanisms: consultation with minorities; their involvement in preparing and implementing
development plans; undertaking studies to assess the impact of decisions; effective participation of minorities in
the decision-making process; and decentralised forms of government (Weller, 2004).
The Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention, the body responsible for monitoring and
implementing the Convention, clarified the content of effective participation in its country reports and its
second thematic commentary. According to the Committee, the state’s role under Article 5 is to guarantee an
effective right to identity. 5 To achieve this purpose, states have to ensure an effective participation of
minorities in cultural life, which has the following components: If persons belonging to minority communities
are affected by the design or implementation of cultural policies, including the allocation of support for
minority cultures, national minorities must be adequately consulted by the authorities and involved in the
decision-making process in order for their needs to be met effectively. 6 If specific institutions exist for
channelling such support, minorities should be adequately represented in them and should be able to take part
in the corresponding decision-making.7
3
Explanatory Report to the FCNM, H(95) 10, February 1995, para. 80.
4
General Assembly Resolution 47/135, 18 December 1992, Art. 2, para. 3.
5
Commentary on the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities, Adopted on 27 February 2008,
ACFC/31DOC(2008)001, para. 14.
6
Ibid., para. 66.
7
Ibid.
Mere representation in elected bodies may be insufficient to meet the Convention’s demands. Consultative
bodies must be inclusive and representative, with transparent appointment procedures.8 National minorities
must receive capacity-building and resources to enable them to contribute effectively to the decision-making
process.9
The key term of Article 15 is “effectiveness” (Verstichel, 2010, p. 452). The Advisory Committee does not
define it in abstract terms. It nevertheless specifies that effectiveness depends both on the means of
involvement and on the impact on the situation of the persons concerned and society as a whole.10 This impact
has qualitative and quantitative dimensions.11 Minorities must have a “substantial influence” on decisions
taken.12
With regard to decision-making in matters of cultural life, the Committee specifically endorses delegation
of competences to cultural autonomies.13 According to the Committee, cultural autonomies can result in
increased participation of minorities in cultural life,14 and can contribute to the preservation of minority
cultures.15
The above criteria thus represent the core requirements relating to participation in decision-making in
cultural affairs: inclusiveness, representativeness, transparency, adequacy (of consultation), and effective
participation in decision-making, which requires substantial influence over decisions.
Several commentators criticised the Advisory Committee’s approach as offering little legal substance in
operationalizing the right to effective participation in practice. Indeed, the Committee’s general criteria are
rather vague, but they can be specified when reviewing the specific mechanisms of state parties to the
Framework Convention (Weller, 2004). How these rather abstract terms were interpreted by the Advisory
Committee in the case of Slovakia will be analysed below, after the Slovak system of support for minority
cultures is introduced.
The Slovak System of Support for Minority Cultures

The Slovak Republic is a diverse country, where approximately 12.3 per cent of the population declared an
ethnicity different from Slovak in the last census,16 and 13.9 per cent has a mother tongue which is not
Slovak.17 Consequently, many cultural activities take place in minority languages. These include, for example,
newspapers, TV broadcasting, music and arts festivals, and dance ensembles. The state supports cultural
activities through a funding scheme administered by the Ministry of Culture, which has existed in its current
form since 2015.18
8
Ibid., para. 7.
9
Ibid., para. 21.
10
Ibid., para. 18.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid., para. 19.
13
Ibid., para. 67.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid., para. 135.
16
Statistics on the population’s ethnic composition are available from:
https://slovak.statistics.sk/wps/wcm/connect/1f62189f-cc70-454d-9eab-17bdf5e1dc4a/Tab_10_Obyvatelstvo_SR_podla_narodnos
ti_scitanie_2011_2001_1991.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=knLHmhe&CVID=knLHmhe.
17
Statistics on the population’s mother tongue are available from:
https://slovak.statistics.sk/wps/wcm/connect/65804666-cc85-4ac6-bacd-acb0bba52ed8/Tab_11_Obyvatelstvo_SR_podla_materin
skeho_jazyka_SODB_2011_2001.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=knLHmAz&CVID=knLHmAz.
18
Law No. 284/2014 Col. l. on the Fund for the support to arts (Zákon o Fonde na podporu umenia), 12 September 2014.
Despite the ubiquity of national minority cultural activities and organizations, the state does not have a
constitutional obligation to provide support for minority cultures. Article 34(1) of the Constitution only permits
citizens belonging to minority communities to develop their culture and establish cultural institutions.19 This
can be considered a codification of personal autonomy: Members of minority communities can freely establish
their organizations and pursue any goal, including the promotion of their culture, but they are not entitled to
public support to achieve these goals (Suksi, 2008). In Article 34(2), the Constitution also guarantees the right
of members of national minorities to participate in matters affecting them, without specifying culture as a
specific area of concern for minorities, nor requiring the participation to be effective (Petőcz, 2010).20
Notwithstanding the lack of a constitutional obligation, the political practice of the country has been to set
aside a certain amount of funding specifically for minority cultural activities, dividing this sum among the
respective minority communities and supporting activities which representatives of these communities have
chosen.21 This system was established as a political compromise at the time when the Party of the Hungarian
Coalition, representing the largest minority group, the Hungarian community, was part of the government
between 1998 and 2006 (Petőcz, 2010). It has been maintained since then, but without any legal guarantee. The
legal framework on state support has only regulated the general rules for providing state support. Each year, it
was a matter for a political decision how much the state allocated for minority cultural activities, how it was to
be divided among the different communities, and what would be the mechanism for distributing it (Fiala-Butora,
2016). Naturally, the outcomes depended on the bargaining position of minority communities and particularly
on whether representatives of the Hungarian community were part of the government coalition or the
parliamentary opposition (Petőcz, 2010).22 The system was a source of frequent political tensions, not only
between the Slovak majority and the minority communities, but also among different minority communities23
and within specific minority communities as well.24
This unregulated form of cultural proto-autonomy was in effect until 2017, when a new law on financing
minority cultures was adopted by parliament, which formalized some of the existing practices and reformed
others.25 This law will be analysed in detail in Part “Evaluating the Slovak Law on Autonomy”. Before that,
the following analysis looks at how the Slovak system fared when scrutinized from the perspective of
international requirements. More specifically, how the Advisory Committee evaluated its weaknesses under the
Framework Convention.
19
Law No. 460/1992 Col. l. on the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, 1 September 1992.
20
Petőcz (2010, p. 739) considered this provision to codify the principle of effective participation, but the text does not include
the word “effective”, only “the right to participate”.
21
(First) Report submitted by the Slovak Republic pursuant to Article 25, paragraph 1 of the Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities, received 4 May 1999, ACFC/SR(1999)008, p. 12.
22
See Petőcz (2010, p. 749), arguing that it was difficult even for Hungarians when they were part of the influence issues relating
to their identity; it was even more difficult when they were not part of the government coalition, and more difficult for smaller
minorities which were not represented in Parliament.
23
“Dotácie rozhádali menšiny, Maďari nahnevali Poliakov a Čechov” (Minorities argue over grants, Hungarians upset Poles and
Czechs), Sme, 30 January 2013.
24
“A SZMK Koordinációs Bizottságának állásfoglalása a kormányhivatal 2011-es évi nemzeti kisebbségek kultúrájának
támogatásával kapcsolatban és Juhász Lászlóválasza” (Position of the Coordination Committee of the RHS on the Government’s
Office support to minority cultures in 2011 and the response of LászlóJuhász), Press release of the Roundtable of Hungarians in
Slovakia, 16 July 2011.
25
Law No. 138/2017 Col. l. on the Fund to support the culture of national minorities, 10 May 2017.
Slovakia’s Support for Minority Cultures in the Light of International Requirements

The Advisory Committee has regularly considered the compatibility of the Slovak system of financing
minority cultures with Article 5 of the Framework Convention since the first reporting period. In its first
opinion on Slovakia, issued in 2000, it did not comment on the allocation of funds and their mechanism,26
although in its report the Slovak government provided extensive information about how the funding scheme
operated.27 At that time, the Minister of Culture determined the allocation of funds on the recommendations of
an expert committee composed of members of six out of 12 minority communities and representatives of state
bodies and scientific institutes.28 The state reported that in 1998 it allocated 44.594 million Slovak crowns,29
approximately 1.14 million euros, for the support of minority cultures. 30 In its opinion, the Advisory
Committee only commended the state for increasing its efforts to promote minority cultures, and recommended
close consultation and cooperation with the Roma community in designing and implementing initiatives aimed
at promoting Roma culture.31
In its second opinion on the Slovak Republic, the Advisory Committee commended the state for raising
the sum allocated for minority culture32 to 80 million Slovak crowns in 2003 (approximately 1.92 million
euros).33 However, it was concerned about the low support allocated to the Roma minority.34 The Roma
community’s share was calculated according to the census results, which did not reflect the actual number of
Roma. The Advisory Committee recommended taking other sources into account when estimating the size of
the Roma community, such as surveys and scientific studies.35 The Advisory Committee also noted with
satisfaction the proposed draft law on the financing of minority cultures, which was to replace the funding
system based on ad hoc governmental resolutions.36 The Committee noted that several minority communities
welcomed the new law, and recommended speeding up the process of its adoption and ensuring proper
participation of their representatives in this process.37
In the third reporting period, by 2009, the government had increased the budget allocated to minority
culture to 100 million Slovak crowns, or 3.34 million euros. 38 Apart from this increase, the Advisory
Committee had little to be satisfied with. It noted the lack of transparency in the funding allocation
mechanisms.39 In particular, it received complaints about how certain representatives of minority communities
were appointed to the grant commissions.40 It also noted with regret that the law on financing of minority
26
(First) Opinion on Slovakia, adopted on 22 September 2000, Advisory Committee on Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2001)001, paras. 22-24.
27
(First) Report submitted by the Slovak Republic, supra note 6, p. 12.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid., p. 15.
30
Historical exchange rates taken from
https://www.nbs.sk/sk/statisticke-udaje/kurzovy-listok/kurzovy-listok/mesacne-kumulativne-a-rocne-prehlady-nbs.
31
(First) Opinion on Slovakia, supra note 26, §22-24.
32
Second Opinion on the Slovak Republic, adopted on 26 May 2005, ACFC/OP/II(2005)004, para. 61.
33
Second report submitted by the Slovak Republic pursuant to Article 25, paragraph 1 of the Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities, received 3 January 2005, ACFC/SR/II(2005)001, p. 21.
34
Second Opinion on the Slovak Republic, supra note 32, para. 63.
35
Ibid., §65.
36
Ibid., §60.
37
Ibid., §64.
38
Third report submitted by the Slovak Republic pursuant to Article 25, paragraph 1 of the Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities, received 22 July 2009, ACFC/SR/III(2009)008, p. 20.
39
Third opinion on the Slovak Republic, adopted on 28 May 2010, ACFC/OP/III(2010)004, para. 65.
40
Ibid.
cultures had not been adopted.41 It criticized the government for amending the rules on language use in cultural
events. According to the new provisions of the State Language Act, all publications in minority languages for
cultural purposes, such as programmes and catalogues, had to be fully translated into Slovak.42 The Committee
recommended that this provision be implemented in a way which would not place an unreasonable burden on
minority organizations, for example, by requiring only the translation of extracts, outlines or summaries.43
The fourth reporting period is particularly informative for the purposes of this analysis, because the
Advisory Committee’s opinion can be compared not only with the state report, but also with a shadow report
prepared by an umbrella association of Hungarian civil society organizations in Slovakia, which was available
to the Committee.44
The support allocated for minority culture decreased in the reported period since 2012, from 4.5 million
euros in 2012 to 4.25 million euros in 2013 and 3.83 million in 2014.45 The Committee noted that several
minority communities, especially smaller ones, consider the funding insufficient to maintain their culture.46
The Committee did not criticize the funding allocation among different minorities. Members of the
Hungarian community account for approximately 70 per cent of the minority population of Slovakia according
to the census. Yet the shadow report shows that the sum allocated to the Hungarian community fell from 55 per
cent in 2012 and 61 per cent in 2013 to 51.7 per cent in 2014.47 In 2014, even the sums allocated to small
minorities were out of balance. The per capita sum allocated to the Jewish minority was 88 euros, for Croats
48.31 euros and for Serbs 39.7 euros.48 At the same time, the Czechs received 6.8 euros per capita, Moravians
8.5 euros and Ukrainians 14.6 euros. In the case of more numerous minorities, the allocation was 4.33 euros for
Hungarians, 6 euros for Roma and 7.9 euros for Ruthenians.49
While it is understandable that less numerous minorities receive a higher per capita allocation than larger
communities, this principle cannot explain the allocated sums. For example, Moravians were three times as
numerous as Croats, but received only half the sum allocated to the latter community. Poles were less numerous
than Moravians, yet they received twice the amount of funding.
The Committee did not find a problem in this allocation system. It only noted that numerically larger
minorities were critical of the per capita amounts, but this can be justified in the Committee’s view given the
smaller minorities’ need for specific assistance.50 The Committee did not comment on the limits of this
principle, nor on the imbalance in the funding allocations to smaller minorities, implicitly accepting these.
The Committee also noted that the allocation process was changed in the sub-committee responsible for
allocating funds among different minority communities. Prior to 2013, numerically larger minorities had more
41
Ibid., §74
42
Law No. 318/2009 Col. l. amending law no. 270/1995 Col. l. on the State language of the Slovak Republic, 30 June 2009,
§5(5).
43
Third opinion on the Slovak Republic, supra note 39, para. 68.
44
Written Comments by the Roundtable of Hungarians in Slovakia (RHS) on the Fourth Report submitted by Slovakia on the
implementation of the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities, 30 July 2014.
45
Fourth report submitted by the Slovak Republic pursuant to Article 25, paragraph 1 of the Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities, received 28 January 2014, ACFC/SR/IV(2014)001, pp. 46-47; Written Comments by the
Roundtable of Hungarians in Slovakia (RHS), supra note 44, paras. 36 and 37.
46
Fourth opinion on the Slovak Republic, adopted on 3 December 2014, ACFC/OP/IV(2014)004, para. 28.
47
Written Comments by the Roundtable of Hungarians in Slovakia (RHS), supra note 44, para. 37.
48
Ibid.
49
Ibid.
50
Fourth opinion on the Slovak Republic, supra note 46, para. 36.
votes in the committee: Hungarians had five votes; the Roma had four, while the Ukrainians, Czech, and
Ruthenians had two. After November 2013, each community had one vote regardless of its size. The Advisory
Committee noted that the new system raised concerns among the larger minorities and recommended that
constructive dialogue be conducted with all communities.51 It recommended the same with regard to the
language requirements relating to publications in connection with cultural events, which continued to create
tensions, despite the change in legislation.52
The Committee did not comment on the continuing absence of the law on financing minority cultures. It
only suggested promotion of the effective participation of national minority representatives in relevant
decision-making in general.53
Overall, the Advisory Committee’s position on the financing of minority cultures in Slovakia can be
evaluated as contradictory. On the level of principles, the Committee stresses effective participation and
transparent decision-making procedures. 54 However, in practice, it applied these principles in a very
questionable way. When compared with the situation on the ground as established from the shadow report, the
Committee’s approach can be characterized as legitimizing unjustified limitations on minority rights. The
Slovak funding disbursement mechanism was characterised with dubious and unexplained allocations of funds
among minority communities, in a non-transparent mechanism where representatives of 70 per cent of the
members of the affected minority communities held 7.7 per cent of the votes.55 The Committee characterised
this state of affairs as a subjective complaint of an aggrieved community, rather than an objective issue of
compliance under the Framework Convention. This sets the level of compliance very low. In the Committee’s
view, the remedy simply requires “constructive dialogue”, rather than, for example, changing the rules.56 It is
hard to understand how an unsatisfactory system becomes acceptable if the affected communities are consulted,
but the problematic practices remain in force.
The Committee could have proposed solutions which would implement the requirements of transparency
and inclusion, but did not do so. In the last reporting period, it even refrained from recommending the adoption
of a law on the financing of minority cultures, which had been a recurrent theme in earlier reporting cycles. The
Committee’s views have thus become less relevant, if not to say irrelevant, with regard to the most debated
questions of minority culture in Slovakia. While the Framework Convention and the principles deriving from it
remain a valuable starting point for establishing a normative framework for operationalizing cultural autonomy,
the Committee’s specific comments about Slovakia are of little help in this regard.
The Committee’s position on Slovakia is in line with its general approach to Article 15. Several
commentators have criticized it as vague and offering little substance (Weller, 2004). The Committee largely
adheres to commenting on existing mechanisms (Verstichel, 2010) and identifying best practices in members
states (Weller, 2004). While this may be a useful approach in the case of states looking for good solutions to
implement, it cannot be considered an effective enforcement of human rights norms in states that are falling
below the Committee’s general standards. For that, the Committee would need to identify specific criteria by
which the quality of specific mechanisms is assessed, and enforce these criteria in states that are not willing to
51
Ibid., para. 32.
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid., para. 33.
54
Commentary on the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities, supra note 5, para. 66.
55
56
Ibid., para. 29.
adopt them. The following sections will analyse the new Slovak Law on support for minority cultures, in order
to identify such criteria that can be adopted by the Committee.
The 2017 Law on the Financing of Minority Cultures

The Law on the Fund to Support the Culture of National Minorities was adopted by the Slovak Parliament
on 10 May 2017.57 Its adoption was not justified with the need to comply with the country’s international or
constitutional obligations. The Law and its explanatory report do not even refer to the Framework
Convention―a visible and telling sign.58 The law is presented as a result of the government’s coalition
agreement, drawing upon the positive experiences with similar funds established for supporting audio-visual
culture in 2009 and a general fund for supporting culture in 2014.59
The law was in fact the result of a long political struggle on the part of the Hungarian community. Several
proposals had been developed since 2012, but they were either withdrawn after the fall of the government in
201260 or rejected by the parliamentary majority in 2015.61 After the elections of 2016, when the Most-Hí d
Party, partly representing the Hungarian community, formed part of the ruling coalition, the adoption of the law
was one of their conditions, which became an element of the coalition agreement and the government’s
programme.62
The new law on the Fund to support minority culture is in many ways simply formalizing the best
practices of previous experiences with participation of minority communities in decision-making affecting them.
It sets up a Fund for the Support of the Culture of National Minorities as a separate legal entity, with its own
budget and powers to distribute it among different communities and applicants.63 The Fund also has some
internal rule-making powers: While it cannot change the legislative environment in which it is operating, it can
adopt its own procedures and substantive rules for allocating funds.64 This is not a mere technicality: “Rules”
can be a very broad term, and by setting rules on preferred and supported activities, the Fund can exert a lot of
influence on how minority cultures will develop, which areas will strive and which will be discontinued.
The Fund is represented by its director, appointed by the Minister of Culture.65 The main decision-making
bodies are the expert councils, three for each minority community and one for inter-cultural activities.66 The
three councils for minority communities are responsible for evaluating funding applications in the three
substantive areas: (a) cultural and educational activities; (b) literature and publishing; and (c) theatre, music,
dance, artistic, and audio-visual activities.67 From their five members, three are elected by representatives of
minority cultural organizations and two are appointed by the Fund’s director.68
57
Law No. 138/2017 Col. l. on the Fund to support the culture of national minorities, 10 May 2017.
58
Explanatory report to Law no. 138/2017 Col. l. on the Fund to support the culture of national minorities, General part, 10 May
2017, p. 1.
59
Ibid., p. 2
60
Legislative proposal from 2011 on the protection and support of preservation and development of the culture of national
minorities, 16 September 2011.
61
Legislative proposal from 2015 on the Fund to support the culture of national minorities, 28 August 2015.
62
Declaration of the Government’s Program for years 2016-2020, 26 April 2016, p. 45.
63
Law on the Fund to support the culture of national minorities, supra note 25, §1.
64
Ibid., §7(3) and especially §13(1).
65
Ibid., §4(5).
66
Ibid., §7(4). Communities that do not find enough experts to establish three councils can decide to establish one council instead
according to §7(10) of the Law.
67
Ibid., §7(9)
68
Ibid., §7(6).
The Act sets the Fund’s budget at “at least” 8 million euros, to be paid from the national budget.69 It also
sets the share allocated to each minority community from this sum.70 The Act thus aims to overcome the toxic
yearly political disputes over allocations of support for the culture of specific communities. Whether it has
chosen an effective method will be evaluated below in Part “Evaluating the Slovak Law on Autonomy”. Before
that, a theoretical discussion will establish the criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of the mechanism
established by the law. Applying these criteria to the new law and the debates concerning its adoption, the
closing part will evaluate the law from a perspective of an ideal cultural autonomy framework, and draw
conclusions for operationalizing the relevant provisions of the Framework Convention on the effective
participation of minorities in matters affecting their culture.
The Need for and the Purpose of Cultural Autonomy

Do minority communities even need a separate mechanism to finance their “own” cultural activities? Can
culture be divided into “majority” and “minority” culture, and what are the criteria for such a division? Should
not the state’s goal be to ensure that all citizens, regardless of their ethnicity, can consume and produce any
cultural goods of their choice? And in that case, is it not more effective to finance all cultural activities through
one funding mechanism, making sure that no one is disadvantaged in the process due to their perceived
ethnicity? These were some of the questions raised during the public debate about the Act on the Fund for the
Support of Minority Cultures.71 To establish the criteria for effective cultural autonomy mechanisms, one
needs to first justify the existence of separate mechanisms; both goals are achieved by identifying the problem
autonomy seeks to solve.
While different criteria could be raised in the abstract regarding what constitutes a separate culture, in the
case of Slovakia the answer is rather simple: Each minority community has its own language, therefore their
culture mostly refers to cultural expressions in their languages. This is a rule of thumb rather than an entirely
satisfactory approach: Some in the arts world tend to use a language other than that of their community, such as
Roma or Jewish poets writing in Slovak or Hungarian. Furthermore, some forms of art are not language-based,
such as dance, music, sculpture, painting, and others. In those cases, the activity can be categorized on the basis
of the performers’ ethnicity. While several objections could be raised on the theoretical level in relation to
classifying certain cultural practices as “belonging” to one community or the other, in practice, this issue has
resonated surprisingly little in Slovakia. Cultural organizations’ self-identification about their belonging to a
certain community is the rule, and it is rarely if ever challenged in practice.72 For the purposes of our analysis,
we can accept that there are separate cultures in Slovakia, with their own cultural organizations.
The existence of separate cultures does not in and of itself justify separate funding mechanisms. If only
one, mainstream funding mechanism existed, would it necessarily lead to unfair treatment of smaller
communities? Perhaps a system without discrimination can be imagined, but not one without contradictory
interests. In the case of Slovakia, communities speak their own languages. While members of the Slovak
majority are certainly not prohibited from participating in a Hungarian theatre show or reading a Romani
newspaper, in the absence of understanding these languages they are very unlikely to do so. They might still
69
Ibid., §21(1).
70
Ibid., §22(1)
71
“Menšiny na Slovensku si zaslúžia viac” (Minorities deserve better), Zora Jaurová, DenníkN, 17 March 2014.
72
Law on the Fund to support the culture of national minorities, supra note 25, §7(8)b.
prefer for these cultural goods to exist for the sake of speakers of these languages, but they do not have
personal preferences among them. Due to language barriers, they are not themselves consumers of these
cultural goods, therefore they are not efficient decision-makers when it comes to deciding what areas of
minority culture should be supported at the expense of others. Only members of the specific communities, with
both expertise and a stake in the question, are in a position to decide what deserves support from cultural
expressions relevant to their specific language and traditions.
It follows from the above that regardless of the form of the mechanism, it is crucial to gather specific input
from the affected communities. Whether this is done in committees or advisory bodies of one general funding
scheme or specific schemes are established for specific communities, the underlying principle is the same:
Affected persons are the best decision-makers when it comes to allocating funds.
A mainstream funding mechanism without any specific provisions for minority involvement cannot satisfy
this principle. By definition, it will be governed mainly by members of the largest, the majority community.
Regardless of their benevolence, they will not be in a position to effectively decide questions of cultural policy
for other communities.
Similarly to the majority culture, minority cultures also need financial support, the setting of priorities and
development policies. For the majority culture, these decisions are made through the ordinary political process:
Citizens elect their representatives in a general parliamentary election, who then constitute and control the
executive responsible for creating and implementing the state’s cultural policy. The role of cultural autonomy is
to provide a similar mechanism for minority communities, to make the same decisions, to devise, and
implement cultural policy for minority cultures. Its goal is achieving substantive equality for minorities in
decision-making over their own matters (Verstichel, 2010). Since members of minority communities do not
constitute separate political communities, they need other mechanisms to select and control their
representatives responsible for cultural policy. In effect, cultural autonomy in this area is the operationalizing of
the principle of effective participation of minority communities in matters affecting them, specifically in
matters affecting their cultural activities.
Effective participation in decision-making cannot simply mean that some persons will make decisions in
the name of a certain community (Palermo, 2010). The decisions must reflect the wishes of the members of the
community. The connection between community and decision-makers is never perfect. It runs into the
well-known principal-agent problem and the collective action problem. The ethnic majority solves these
problems by aggregating individual preferences through the political process. Cultural autonomy is a solution
of these problems for minority communities, whose interests are not adequately reflected in the ordinary
political process.
The principal-agent problem rests on the disconnection between the represented and the representatives,
and the latter’s’ accountability to the former (Weller, 2010). Participation in decision-making is effective only
if members of the community have control over who makes decisions in their name and what decisions are
made (Verstichel, 2010). Ideally, this would require elections of decision-makers and binding their
decision-making authority by clear rules agreed upon by the community.
The collective action problem refers to the inability of individual members of the community to harmonize
their actions and bind other members of the community to their decisions. For example, individual members of
the community have no power to adopt those rules on the priorities of cultural policy which should bind the
decision-makers. The obstacles are practical and also legal. It takes time, effort and resources to coordinate the
creation of a policy document which takes into account the views of all relevant stakeholders. It is in the
interest of all members of the community for such a process to take place, and in all likelihood most would
agree to dedicate a certain sum or effort for that purpose. However, no one is in the position to bind other
members of the community to commit their share. In this situation, everybody is better off not taking any action
on their own. Even if some person or persons would take action, they would not have the legal power to bind
others to the results they reached, undermining the fruits of their enterprise (Petőcz, 2010).
This is exactly the result of minorities’ efforts in Slovakia―Since the establishment of democracy, no
minority community has been able to create a policy document reflecting its members views regarding the
development of their culture. Theoretically, any cultural organization could have produced such a document
and could have organized the process to involve all stakeholders. Perhaps some of them could even muster the
necessary resources, especially organizations from the larger communities. Nevertheless, it did not happen.
Instead of blaming minority organizations, it is important to recognize the underlying structural problem: For
collective action to be effective or even possible, it must be institutionalized in some way, with the necessary
powers and resources. In the case of the majority community, the state implements cultural policy through its
political institutions: parliament, the government, and affiliated bureaucracy. The purpose of cultural autonomy
is, inter alia, to fulfil this collective function for minority communities. Without that, it is much more difficult
for minorities to take collective action than for members of the majority.
The effectiveness of cultural autonomy mechanisms is always relative. The yardstick is how well they
overcome the collective action problem and agency problem embedded in representative decision-making. This
is not different from majority decision-making: The mainstream political process also overcomes these
obstacles only to some extent. Nevertheless, by assessing how a specific solution responds to the obstacles, it is
possible to differentiate effective participatory mechanisms from those that are autonomous in name only.
The Qualitative Indicators of Autonomy

From the above theoretical framework we can derive the criteria for establishing whether a cultural
autonomy arrangement promotes the effective participation of minorities in decision-making related to the
development of their own culture.
The system needs a clear mechanism guaranteeing a fair share of minority communities in the public funds
dedicated to culture. The respective communities should receive a yearly amount proportionate to their share of
the population. The Advisory Committee commends the positive discrimination of less numerous minorities in
this regard, which seems to be a reasonable rule.73 It is important, however, that the respective shares or the
mechanism by which they are determined are settled and formalized, so that the distribution of funds ceases to
be an annual political decision―One in which the national majority has the decisive word. Effective control
over the funds required for promoting a community’s own culture requires that the decision concerning how
much each community receives is not taken unilaterally by the majority.
The next criterion relates to how decisions are made about allocating funds to specific goals identified by
each community. It is important that the decision-makers represent the respective community. This can be
achieved through some form of direct or indirect election. The second aspect relates to the nature of the
decisions: They must be final, not simply recommendations or advisory opinions that can be overruled by other
73
decision-makers. The communities’ representatives must exercise effective decision-making powers. The state
might have a legitimate reason for interfering with decisions in this area, such as upholding the general laws on
corruption and conflicts of interest. Nevertheless, the basis for interference should not be a wide, general
authorization, but a narrow one, based on clear criteria. The former could lead to frequent and unjustifiable
overturning of the community’s decisions, which undermines effective decision-making and leads to injustice.
Elected decision-makers must not act arbitrarily. Their decisions about the allocation of funds must follow
some public evaluation criteria, reflecting the goals of the specific community in the area of promoting its
culture. This not only ensures accountability, but allows the community to formulate priorities, to decide what
share of funds should be allocated to different activities, and how activities in specific areas should be
compared to each other, what should be valued more and what less. Such a document on cultural policy can
have different degrees of precision, depending on the volume of funded activities, which relates to the
community’s size, its needs and experience with self-government. But some form of publicly accessible criteria
regarding cultural priorities is necessary for giving guidance to decision-makers and eventually for reviewing
their decisions.
The fund allocation system must have the necessary legal guarantees against outside interference.74
Ideally, this means a constitutional guarantee, with detailed legislative rules implementing the constitutional
provisions. This provides the system with the necessary stability and protects minority communities from the
overruling of their decisions by state actors. The legislative framework should be mindful of the specific needs
of minority communities. The general rules on cultural policy applicable to mainstream or majority institutions
might not always be appropriate for minority institutions.
Transparency is very important not only for countering corruption, but also to ensure that the community’s
stated cultural policy goals are being followed. The criteria for decisions, individual decisions themselves, the
evaluation of projects and overall data about the system’s functioning should be easily accessible for the public.
Related to transparency, any kind of decision must be made with the involvement of the respective
community at large. This seems to be such an elusive condition that it is questionable whether it can become a
legal requirement. It is hard to define who constitutes the relevant community, when it is sufficiently involved,
or what happens if its members are not interested in taking part in the process, despite having the opportunity.
Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine the autonomy of minority communities without some involvement of the
wider community in the decision-making process.
Evaluating the Slovak Law on Autonomy

The above criteria measuring the effectiveness of participation are quite general. They can be specified by
applying them to a specific context: the new Slovak system of financing minority cultures. The goal of this
exercise is twofold: It will highlight some of the difficulties and solutions to operationalizing the criteria in a
specific context, and will also assess how the Slovak mechanism fares under the criteria.
A Guaranteed Fair Share for Minority Cultures
While seemingly an easy arithmetic exercise, a fair share for minority cultures is in fact a very elusive
concept. What culture and minority culture are and how funds spent on them should be counted all need
defining, as does how the size of communities needs to be taken into account.
74
Commentary on the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities, supra note 5, para. 107.
Culture can be defined very widely, but for the purposes of cultural autonomy the analysis can be
restricted to cultural activities financed by the state. Presumably, if one identified the whole sum spent on all
such activities from public funds, a share proportionate to each minority community’s size could be considered
fair. However, even “cultural activities financed by the state” might not be that easy to determine. Should, for
example, national television or public museums be included? Should these count only as part of the majority
culture? If they broadcast in minority languages, or have signs in minority languages, should they also be
considered part of minority culture(s)?
An earlier Slovak legislative proposal from 2011 considered the budget of the Slovak Ministry of Culture
as the reference point from which the contribution to minority communities should be determined, excluding
from the baseline separately funded public broadcasting, museums, theatres and other major cultural
establishments.75 During discussion of the 2017 law, minority communities proposed to tie the financing of
minority cultures to the budget of the Fund for Arts and Culture, which has a similar purpose and finances
similar activities as the Fund for the Support of Culture of National Minorities.76
The mechanism finally chosen in 2017, however, is much simpler. The law declares that at least 8 million
euros must be dedicated to minority culture from the state budget every year.77 This sum is almost double the
sums allocated in previous years; therefore, it can appease the minority communities in the short term.
Nevertheless, it cannot be considered a satisfactory systemic solution. It leaves raising the yearly allocation in
the hands of the government. It will be essentially the national majority which decides whether to increase
allocations to minority culture to keep up with inflation, or with higher sums eventually allocated to the
majority culture. It will also be possible to decrease the sum in the future if it does not fall below the guaranteed
8 million euros. Minority communities thus do not have a guarantee of financial stability for their cultures.
Tying the sum in some way to the amount allocated to the majority culture, so that they increase or decrease in
the same way, would have been a more difficult legislative exercise, but certainly a solution ensuring more
effective minority self-government in financing.
The second difficulty lies in how to divide the allocated sum among the specific minority communities.
Less numerous communities need to receive some positive discrimination so that they can cover the fixed costs
necessary to run cultural establishments. But what should be the rate of this positive discrimination? Should all
minority communities be the beneficiaries of such discrimination compared to the majority culture, or should
more numerous minorities cover the costs of positive discrimination of smaller minorities? How should even
the size of the communities be established, by declarations of ethnicity or mother tongue, or a combination of
both? Should persons who did not declare any ethnicity be discounted, or counted as part of the majority?
The 2017 law chose to define the share of each minority community in specific percentages.78 The
explanatory report explains that these percentages are based on the 2011 census declarations on ethnicity and
mother tongue, and are modified to take into account the interests of smaller communities.79 The outcome was
75
minorities, supra note 39, §14(1).
76
Comments of the Hungarian community on the proposed Law on the Fund to support the culture of national minorities, 10
August 2016, p. 12.
77
Law on the Fund to support the culture of national minorities, supra note 25, §21(1).
78
Ibid., 22(1).
79
Explanatory report to Law No. 138/2017 Col. l. on the Fund to support the culture of national minorities, Specific part, 10 May
2017, p. 7.
eventually the result of a political decision, with no detailed calculations being put forward. As negotiations on
the draft bill were ongoing, the share of smaller communities was rising at the expense of the largest, the
Hungarian community. Hungarians, who constitute approximately 70 per cent of all minorities according to
ethnicity, were allocated 59.6 per cent according to earlier drafts,80 and 53 per cent according to the final law.81
A specific problem relates to the Roma community, whose members are notoriously underrepresented in
the censuses. Their share in an earlier draft law was set at 14.4 per cent, on the basis of ethnicity figures from
the last census.82 This was raised to 22.4 per cent in the final law,83 taking into account figures from the Atlas
of Roma communities.84 This approach raises two major problems.
First, the Roma atlas was created for a different purpose than the allocation of cultural funds.85 It maps the
number of Roma based on social exclusion (poverty, residence in a segregated Roma community) and
identification as Roma by others based on external characteristics (who “looks” Roma).86 It basically defines
Roma as a racial/social category. In the 1990s, the Roma in Slovakia were indeed officially considered an
“ethnic group”, a different category than other national minorities, but this differentiation was eliminated
because it had no legal relevance (Petőcz, 2010). It is likely that the number of persons identifying with Roma
culture is significantly lower. While other commentators have suggested that the different uses of the term
Roma cause confusion and have suggested a unified approach, this does not seem to be warranted in the case of
cultural autonomy (Pap, 2015). The purpose of this institution is very different than, for example, that of
anti-discrimination laws that rely on external markers of ethnicity, or of social-economic measures that take
social exclusion and social status into account. For the purposes of cultural autonomy, the relevant number is
that of Roma identifying with Roma culture, which is not what the Slovak law has chosen.
Second, while it is true that censuses underreport the number of Roma, the same is also true for other and
perhaps all minority communities. For example, the number of Hungarians based on cultural characteristics is
estimated at 610,000, while those declaring Hungarian ethnicity numbered 456,000 in the last census (Ravasz,
2012). If the number of Roma is increased for funding purposes on the basis of incorrect census figures, the
same should be done with all communities in a similar situation. Conversely, if the census results are used as
the only objective figures instead of unreliable estimates for the other communities, the same approach could be
used for the Roma as well.
Despite the above objections, the differential treatment of Roma can be perhaps explained with the
argument that the share of Roma underreported on the censuses is higher than the share of other minorities.
Whether this is true remains doubtful in the absence of reliable estimates, but it would justify the preference
given to Roma only. However, even in this case the figures from the Roma Atlas should not have been used as
a benchmark. A different estimate for the specific purpose of participating in Roma cultural life should have
been created by the legislators.
Since the law was not able to establish an exact method of determining the size of communities for
funding purposes, it was also not able to design a mechanism for reallocating the shares of communities when
80
59.6 per cent was specified in the first five drafts; see Draft law No. 5 from 17 October 2016, §23.
81
82
Draft law No. 5 from 17 October 2016, §23.
83
84
Explanatory report, Specific part, supra note 79, p. 7.
85
Atlas of Roma communities in Slovakia 2013, UNDP (2014).
86
Ibid., pp. 6-7.
new census results became available. If the proportion of communities significantly changes, the law needs to
be amended, which again leads to uncertainty in the absence of a clear method. It would have been more
satisfactory to establish a clear methodology for determining the size of the communities and design a
mechanism for automatically adjusting the shares in light of future censuses.
Who Makes the Decisions?
A positive feature of the 2017 Law is that the expert councils of minority communities are making final,
binding decisions on funding individual projects.87 The Fund’s director does not have discretionary powers to
change or set aside their decisions.88 This is a welcome change from past practice, when similar expert
committees’ decisions were only treated as recommendations and frequently changed by political figures
overseeing the funding of minority cultures.89 It should be mentioned that earlier drafts of the 2017 Law also
gave expert councils only the power to make recommendations to the Fund’s director, who was making all final
decisions.90 This was changed due to the frequently raised suggestions of the minority communities.91
How Are Decision-Makers Elected?
The law is less satisfactory when it comes to selecting members of the expert councils, the Fund’s main
decision-making bodies. The councils have five members, “over half” of whom are elected by the minority
communities, the rest being appointed by the Fund’s director.92 The director is appointed by the Minister of
Culture.93 In practice, three members of the councils are elected by the communities and two are political
appointees.
The law or the explanatory report gives no reason as to why only three members of the councils are
elected.94 While the director might have a legitimate interest in balancing the council’s composition, for
example, to give equal weight to different geographical regions or artistic professions, the law specifies no such
criteria. The director has very wide discretion in whom to appoint. Despite proposals to the contrary,95 the law
does not even establish that members of the councils must belong to or must be experts of the culture of the
respective minority on whose council they sit.96
The chosen system gives a lot of weight to the director and indirectly the Minister of Culture to influence
the composition of the expert councils and consequently their decisions. While currently the system is not
abused and the appointed members are all experts from the relevant communities, the law does not prevent any
future political appointees from becoming members of the councils. The appointment procedure is therefore
one of the major weaknesses of the law, undermining its effectiveness.
The elected members are also not elected by the communities at large. Slovakia has no general law on
minorities, defining the communities and establishing special voting registers. Nor were such electoral lists
87
88
Ibid., §15(7).
89
“A SZMK Koordinációs Bizottságának állásfoglalása a kormányhivatal 2011-es évi nemzeti kisebbségek kultúrájának
támogatásával kapcsolatban és Juhász Lászlóválasza” (Position of the Coordination Committee of the RHS on the Government’s
Office support to minority cultures in 2011 and the response of LászlóJuhász), Press release of the Roundtable of Hungarians in
Slovakia, 16 July 2011.
90
Draft law No. 5 from 17 October 2016, §4(2).
91
Comments of the Hungarian community, supra note 76, p. 2.
92
93
Ibid, §4(5).
94
Explanatory report, Specific part, supra note 79, p. 2.
95
Comments of the Hungarian community, supra note76, 4.
96
proposed for the purposes of the 2017 Law. The members are therefore elected by cultural organizations of the
respective minority communities.97 This approach has its tradition in Slovakia and is considered to work
reasonably well. It stresses the professional features of the decision-making process over the populist ones.
Nevertheless, it risks losing the involvement of communities at large in the discussion about cultural policy,
turning it instead into an expert discussion.
What is the Substantive Basis for Decisions?
The Law on the Fund to Support the Culture of National Minorities does not specify any substantive
criteria for supporting cultural activities.98 The Fund itself and the minority communities’ expert councils can
adopt documents specifying their internal rules, but it is not an obligation.99 In the absence of clear criteria, it is
up to the discretion of expert councils and their members to evaluate the worthiness of each individual funding
application subjectively. While their expertise is useful in this task, it is not a substitute for public cultural
policy. Experts will have to make difficult decisions, evaluating proposals from different disciplines. Whatever
criteria they might use to compare proposals from different regions, disciplines, and municipalities with
different sizes and proportions of minority communities, these should be discussed publicly. This would ensure
that the minority community can affect the development of its culture by setting priorities, by changing the
weight of different criteria. Whether the community values printed newspapers over websites, a larger number
of amateur theatres over a few professional ones, scattered small local cultural festivals over a few national or
regional ones, or the other way round, it can only make a decision if the criteria are public. If they are not, the
decision will be made by a few select experts in a haphazard and often arbitrary way. Public criteria also ensure
that applicants for funds know in advance what to expect, what kind of activities they should develop.
The substantive funding criteria form the core of the community’s cultural policy by setting the priorities
of cultural development. As discussed above, presumably any organization or expert can draw up such a
document, but no one has done so in Slovakia, not even members of the largest, the Hungarian community.
Although attempts have been made, this is a serious piece of work, which requires a lot of resources and much
consultation so that the final document reflects the views and is acceptable to all the community’s relevant
stakeholders. No private organization in itself is in a position to create such a document.
During the drafting of the bill it was proposed that the Fund, and respectively the individual expert
committees, should be obliged to prepare public cultural policy documents for each minority community.100
The Fund certainly has the credibility and the resources for such a task; therefore, it could have overcome the
collective action problem for all communities. However, this proposal was not accepted. The law as accepted
does not require the adoption of public funding criteria. As a result, the funding decisions can only remotely
and imperfectly reflect the communities’ actual preferences.
One example which highlights the importance of minority cultural policy documents involves the
definition of minority cultures. In the previous part it was argued that in the circumstances of Slovakia it is not
difficult to separate cultures of respective communities from each other. However, it can be much more
complicated to define which parts of a community’s culture are performed in Slovakia, for example, which
parts are genuinely connected to Hungarians in Slovakia compared to Hungarians living elsewhere. Hungarians
97
Ibid., §7(9).
98
Ibid., §7(1).
99
Ibid., §7(3) and §13(1).
100
Comments of the Hungarian community, supra note 76, p. 5.
in Slovakia are part of a larger cultural market that transcends borders. Should Slovak funds be used to support
the publications of Hungarian writers from Slovakia, to publish books which are then sold in Hungary? Should
the Slovak system support the publication of books by Hungarian authors from Hungary to be published by
publishers in Slovakia and then partly sold in Hungary? What about dance, music and theatre performances? In
some cases, it is very hard to separate Hungarian culture in Slovakia from Hungarian culture in general.
Nevertheless, the expert councils must know which activities can be supported and which cannot be. The Act
does not define what approach should be used. Whether this should cover activities outside Slovakia, and which
ones, is left to the decision of the expert councils. In the absence of a public cultural policy reflecting the
wishes of the community about what should be supported from Slovak public funds, it is left to the individual
preferences of members of the expert councils to back activities as they see fit.
Legislative Guarantees
The Law on the Fund to Support the Culture of National Minorities represents a major improvement from
the perspective of legal guarantees. Until its adoption, no law regulated the funds allocated to the support of
minority cultures. All such decisions were at the discretion of the government and were made annually.
On the other hand, cultural autonomy still lacks a constitutional guarantee. The adopted law can be
modified or even repealed by any future parliamentary majority.
Accommodating the Minority Communities’ Needs
The Law on the Fund to Support the Culture of National Minorities only deals with minority-specific
aspects of the financing of culture. The law is implemented in the legislative framework concerning state
support that was developed for the majority communities.101 In some respects, the general framework was not
sufficiently modified to meet the needs of minority communities.
One problem lies in the short-term nature of grants and the costs that can be covered from them. The
general legislative framework does not permit multi-annual funding schemes, nor does it allow covering
administrative and other institutional fixed costs. 102 It is thus not appropriate for maintaining larger,
professional organizations, which require long-term financial stability and support for their professional
administrative staff. For the majority community, such funding is available outside the cultural grant scheme:
larger national organizations, such as folk ensembles, theatres, or national broadcasting are financed separately,
under separate rules. The minority communities have very few such separately financed organizations.103 Their
professional organizations are thus relying on the minority culture grant scheme, which is not appropriate for
their needs.
An earlier proposal prepared in 2011 aimed to solve this problem by allowing the accreditation of
professional organizations, which would lead to covering administrative costs in a multi-annual framework for
the selected organizations.104 Although similar proposals were presented in the discussions in 2017,105 they
were not adopted in the law’s final version. Minority cultural organizations must therefore operate in a funding
101
Law No. 524/2010 Col. l. on providing grants in the competence of the Government Office of the Slovak Republic, 8
December 2010.
102
Ibid., §2(1).
103
Although they do have some, such as the Ifjú Szívek folk ensemble, the Danubian Museum and the theatres financed from
budgets of regional governments.
104
minorities, supra note 39, §26(1).
105
Comments of the Hungarian community, supra note 76, 7.
framework which does not meet their needs and which represents an obstacle to the professionalization and
development of cultural organizations.
The 2017 Law adopted an interesting expansion of the supported activities compared to the general
framework. In addition to all the usual activities found in the law on the mainstream cultural grants, the
minority Fund also allows for the support of activities developing the use of minority languages.106 The
majority community does not need such specific grants, as the majority language is supported in the relevant
sense by all mainstream state institutions, which use, develop and give preference to the Slovak language as the
state language, in accordance with the State Language Act. On the other hand, while minority languages can be
used in some specific instances, there is no support provided to prospective users in terms of information about
when and where minority languages can be used, translations of specific documents and terms, etc. These must
be supplied by civil society, but at least the 2017 Law allows for the costs of such activities to be covered from
the Fund on minority culture.
The 2017 Law also does not bring new changes or competences in the area of linguistic rights. The general
legal regime, regulated mainly by the State Language Act and the Act on the Use of Minority Languages,
remains unmodified. The Fund or its expert councils have no power to make rules about language use even
internally. Several proposals were made during the legislative debate that would have allowed the fund to
advertise its activities and calls for proposals in the respective minority languages, and the acceptance of
applications and documents in these languages, but they were not adopted by the legislators.107 Ironically, the
Fund, the minority cultural autonomy’s main institution, will communicate with the minority communities and
their cultural organizations in the state language only.
Transparency
In the past, support for minority culture in Slovakia was frequently criticized for corruption and nepotism.
To ensure accountability and to gain the public’s confidence, it was proposed during the discussions on the
draft bill that all major steps in the funding allocation process be public: The criteria for evaluation of the
applications, the expert councils’ decisions and their reasoning, the individual grant contracts, and each
project’s final financial and narrative report would be accessible online.108 An early draft indeed included such
a provision concerning transparency.109 However, for unknown reasons this provision was not adopted in the
final law. The legislators only explained that the general rules on transparency would apply to the Fund as well.
However, those only require the publicity of grant contracts, not of each individual decision and the final
reports. It is hard to see any legitimate reason in limiting public accountability in this way. Given the difficult
history of support for minority cultures, the lack of transparency could undermine public trust in the institution
before it can properly start to operate.
Involvement of the Community at Large
The 2017 Law does not contain any obligations concerning consulting the respective communities at large
about the funding scheme, its improvement, or the priorities of cultural policy. While such consultation might
happen, it lacks a legislative guarantee. This is unfortunate in light of the obstacles of wider consultation: There
106
Law on the Fund to support the culture of national minorities, supra note 25, §15(1)m).
107
Comments of the Hungarian community, supra note 76, 3.
108
Ibid., p. 8.
109
Draft law No. 4 from 5 August 2016, §23.
is probably no stakeholder who would be opposed to it in principle; however, organizing consultation is work-
and resource- intensive, especially in the case of larger minorities. The same collective action problem,
explained above, applies to the consultation process as well: While every (or most) member(s) of the
community would be in favour of such consultation and would benefit from it, no one is willing to sacrifice
themselves to organize it for the benefit of the others. It is the Fund which has the necessary capacity and
financial resources to take action to break this deadlock. It also has the motivation: consultation primarily
improves the expert councils’ work and credibility. But at the same time the Fund is less likely to dedicate
resources to this activity if it does not have an obligation to do so.
Experience to date is not promising. Minority communities were involved in the discussion of the draft bill,
but they received no support, were often asked for their opinion with very short deadlines, and their proposals
were often rejected without any explanation.110 The practice of stakeholder involvement certainly needs to
improve and the adopted law could have done more to promote a culture of inclusion.
Concluding Evaluation of the 2017 Law
As the above analysis suggests, the 2017 Slovak Law on the Fund to Support the Culture of National
Minorities is far from ideal. On the positive side, it provides for long-needed legislative guarantees for a
minimal support to minority culture and its allocation among the communities, and allows the respective expert
committees to make final decisions. On the other hand, it evades the difficult question of tying support for
minority culture to the support provided for the majority culture, the allocation among communities is
questionable and will have to be renegotiated after the next census, and the composition of the expert
committees can be unduly influenced by the unfettered discretion of the Fund’s director to nominate two of
their members. Most importantly, the Fund lacks the necessary transparency rules and it is not required to make
decisions under public substantive criteria negotiated and adopted with the involvement of the respective
communities, reflecting their priorities.
While many of these deficiencies could theoretically be overcome by the Fund’s actual practice, adopting
a law which would make it an obligation is a missed opportunity. The most positive feature of the Fund is that
it started to operate, and it represents an improvement compared to the heated political arguments of previous
years. As the Fund develops its best and not so good practices, it will be in order in a few years to revise the
Law to steer the system in the required direction.
Evaluating the International Standards

The above analysis shows what criteria can be used to measure the effectiveness of participation of
minorities in decision-making relating to their cultural life. They can be used for comparative purposes,
evaluating the effectiveness of different models; and they can also serve as a basis of international oversight of
approaches adopted on the national level. Only a certain quality of decision-making can be characterised as
autonomy. However, the label is of little importance: regardless of what it is called, effective participation is a
right guaranteed by the Framework Convention. It is in the power of the Advisory Committee to review
whether state parties to the Convention meet these or similar criteria.
110
Interview with K. Sz., representative of the Hungarian community in the working group commenting on the legislative
proposal, 18 March 2018.
The criteria described here are much more detailed than the ones currently used by the Advisory
Committee. In fact, the Advisory Committee gave very wide discretion to Slovakia in financing minority
cultures, which is in line with its general approach. The Committee’s approach is ineffective in terms of
operationalizing its basic principles related to effective participation: as shown above, the Slovak system is far
from effective, yet the Committee found little deficiencies with it. While states enjoy a certain margin of
appreciation in implementing the right to effective participation (Weller, 2004), such a wide discretion serves
no useful purpose. It legitimizes inefficient mechanisms and allows states to undermine the Framework
Convention’s guarantees. It also runs the risk of the Framework Convention becoming irrelevant. In fact, the
Convention played no role in adopting the 2017 Law in Slovakia. Adoption of the law was dropped as a
requirement in the last monitoring cycle by the Advisory Committee, and the Law does not reference the
Framework Convention even in a tokenistic way.
The Advisory Committee formulated some useful principles for implementing the right to effective
participation. The criteria proposed in this article are in line with these principles; they are operationalizing
them in practice. Adopting them or similar ones as its own would allow the Advisory Committee to review the
implementation of the right to participate in decision-making. In the absence of detailed standards, the
principles will be of little relevance. If the country takes some steps to guarantee effective participation and the
minorities are still dissatisfied with the result, it will be impossible for the Advisory Committee to say whether
the Framework Convention’s requirements were met. General principles only allow a limited form of oversight.
In the absence of detailed standards, their operationalization is left to the discretion of the state, abandoning the
possibility of meaningful international oversight.
For that reason, this article argues that the Advisory Committee should develop more detailed standards
concerning what the development of minority culture and the participation of minority communities in this
process requires. Otherwise, the Framework Convention will become an empty promise, one which is of little
use to minority communities.
Conclusion
This article argues that the main question relating to cultural autonomy is not whether it exists or not, but
of what quality it is. It is still a meaningful approach to define a threshold point at which the autonomy begins
to exist, but that threshold is not so clear and is also of little importance. It is not so clear because autonomy, as
shown above, is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. Simplifying its existence to a yes/no inquiry would not do
justice to situations where some features are highly developed, while others are unsatisfactory. It is also of little
importance because a minority community can hardly be satisfied with an autonomy that barely exists. The
more important question is: What is the quality of the given model and in which ways could it be improved to
reach a desired level?
This article proposed that a right to cultural autonomy already exists in international law, although not by
that name. Autonomy can be characterised as a decision-making mechanism, allowing the minority community
to make decisions regarding its cultural life in a manner similar to the way the majority does through the
general political process. Autonomy is one form, a developed form of the right of communities and its members
to effectively participate in decisions regarding their cultural life, protected by Articles 15 and 5 of the
Framework Convention on National Minorities.
Taking the international requirements on effective participation as the starting point, the article proposed
criteria that can serve to measure the implementation of these principles. They can ensure effective
implementation by states and oversight by international bodies. These criteria simultaneously address two
questions, concerning how to ensure the effective participation of minorities in decision-making affecting their
cultural life and how to design an effective system of cultural autonomy for minorities. These two questions
have the same answers, because these two institutions in fact overlap, the latter is a developed form of the
former.
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doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2019.10.002
D
DAVID PUBLISHING
Al Qaeda Origins, Ideology, Goals and Future
Thomas M. Fitzpatrick
Husson University, Maine, United States

The purpose of this paper is to explore the origins, objectives, ideology, motivation, leadership structure, targets,
strategies, tactics, and future of Al Qaeda. The past nearly two decades have seen the degrading, destruction, and
dispersing of Al Qaeda across the Middle East and Africa but it still exists. Since 9/11 and the demise of Osama
Bin Laden Al Qaeda has quietly worked at rebuilding itself across the globe using a franchising or licensing of
affiliates across dozens of nations. So, it is essential that the study and analysis of this organization continue, so that
it is finally destroyed and its ideas discredited and dismissed.
Keywords: Al Qaeda, jihadism, terrorism, Bin Laden, al Zawahiri, Salafism, Wahabism, licensing, branding
Al Qaeda Origins
The history of Al Qaeda to some degree can trace its roots to the Salafist and Wahabist movement that
became more active in the 20th century that wished for a return to a perceived more traditional and pure form
of Islam.
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab claimed that the decline of the Muslim world was caused by pernicious foreign innovations
(bida’)―including European modernism…. He counseled the purging of these influences in an Islamic Revival. He also
gave jihad an unusual prominence in his teachings. (Stanley, 2005, p. 1)
From a 20th century historical perspective, it is the creation of the mujahedeen in Afghanistan to wage jihad
against the Soviet Union that occupied that nation for a decade in the 1980’s that is the precursor to Al Qaeda.
“Al Qaeda has its origins in the uprising against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan…. Thousands of
volunteers from around the Middle East came to Afghanistan as mujahideen, warriors fighting to defend fellow
Muslims” (Hayes, Borgna, & Rowen, 2016, p. 1). Once the Soviets withdrew the mujahedeen mission was over
and they needed to find another role some went to other hot spots, like Bosnia and others returned home and it
is the advent of Sadamn Hussien’s invasion of Kuwait and the resulting western response of Operation Desert
Storm that gives the jihadists a new enemy which would be the United States and European nations involved in
the war. The establishment of military bases in the sacred homeland of Islam, Saudi Arabia becomes a focal
point of contention and Al Qaeda is born and has a new mission. Through a confluence of events, the founders
of Al Qaeda find themselves in Afghanistan at the same time with similar views of the Western world and the
relationship of fundamentalist Islam to modernity and global integration. The three prime movers behind the
creation of Al Qaeda are Osama Bin Laden, Ahmen al Zawahiri, and Dr. Fadl; each has their unique role to
play; Bin Laden is the wealthy financier, Zawahiri is the operational/military strategist/tactician based on his
experience in Egypt with Al Jihad terrorist organization, and Dr. Fadl is the spiritual and philosophic guide for
Thomas M. Fitzpatrick, Ph.D., Professor, DBA Director, School of Business and Management, College of Business, Husson
University, Maine, United States.
AL QAEDA ORIGINS, IDEOLOGY, GOALS AND FUTURE 465
Al Qaeda. “Al Qaeda has its roots in an organization that grew out of the ‘mekhtab al khidemat’ (the ‘Services
Office’) organization and from 1989 their name became Al Qaeda or in English the Base or Foundation” (PBS
Frontline, n.d., p. 1). This new Jihadist terrorist organization focuses its attention on driving the “infidels” from
the holiest lands of Islam and the 1990’s are witness to ever increasing levels of terrorist violence with its first
bombing attack at the “Gold Mihor hotel in Aden 1990, World Trade Center attack 1993, massacre at Luxor
1997, USS Cole and culminating in the second WTC attack on 9/11/2001” (PBS Frontline, n.d., p. 1).
Ideology and Motivations

Al Qaeda has made its fundamentalist Islamic Jihadist ideology quite clear its mission is to
The principal stated aims of Al Qaeda are to drive Americans and American influence out of all Muslim nations,
especially Saudi Arabia; destroy Israel; and topple pro-Western dictatorships around the Middle East. Bin Laden also said
that he wishes to unite all Muslims and establish, by force if necessary, an Islamic nation adhering to the rule of the first
Caliphs. (PBS Frontline, n.d., p. 1)
In Bin Laden’s first fatwah, he clearly states his intentions and who the enemy of Al Qaeda is
In February 1998, Usama Bin Laden endorsed a fatwah under the banner of the "International Islamic Front for Jihad
on the Jews and Crusaders. This fatwah, published in the publication Al-Quds al-‘Arabi on February 23, 1998, stated that
Muslims should kill Americans―including civilians―anywhere in the world where they can be found. (PBS Frontline,
n.d., p. 1)
“In an address in or about 1998, Usama Bin Laden cited American aggression against Islam and
encouraged a jihad that would eliminate the Americans from the Arabian Peninsula” (PBS Frontline, n.d., p. 1)
The focus of Al Qaeda has remained constant for the past 25+ years with a history of attacks in North America,
Europe, Middle East, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia. To that extent, the ideologies and
motivations of this organization provide insight into who, what, and where their terrorist activities may be
anticipated.
Aim and Ambitions

The aims and ambitions of Al Qaeda are clearly articulated and calls for its affiliates to adopt Salafist
reforms of Sharia Law, wage jihad against Western encroachment in the Islamic world, attack the far enemy,
removal of apostate regimes, wage economic warfare on the West, and attacks on non-Sunni Muslim religious
groups. Over the past decades, Al Qaeda has launched attacks in each of these target groups listed above. “Bin
Laden and Al Qaeda violently opposed the United States for several reasons” (PBS Frontline, n.d., p. 1).
1. The United States was regarded as an “infidel” because it was not governed in a manner consistent with the group’s
extremist interpretation of Islam.
2. The United States was viewed as providing essential support for other “infidel” governments and institutions,
particularly the governments of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the nation of Israel, and the United Nations organization, which
were regarded as enemies of the group.
3. Al Qaeda opposed the involvement of the United States armed forces in the Gulf War in 1991 and in Operation
Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992 and 1993. In particular, Al Qaeda opposed the continued presence of American military
forces in Saudi Arabia (and elsewhere on the Saudi Arabian peninsula) following the Gulf War.
4. Al Qaeda opposed the United States Government because of the arrest, conviction and imprisonment of persons
belonging to Al Qaeda or its affiliated terrorist groups or those with whom it worked. For these and other reasons, Bin
Laden declared a jihad, or holy war, against the United States, which he has carried out through Al Qaeda and its affiliated
organizations. (PBS Frontline, n.d., p. 1)
466 AL QAEDA ORIGINS, IDEOLOGY, GOALS AND FUTURE
So, the aims and ambitions of Al Qaeda have been clearly articulated since its earliest formation and have
served as its guide posts in the launching of numerous high casualty terrorist attacks over the decades.
Leadership
The founders of Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, and Dr. Fadl provided the leadership of
the organization. Bin Laden became the iconic public relations figure until going underground post 9/11 and
even during this phase he continued to direct the organization and serve as a recruitment tool. With Bin Laden
death the torch passed to al Zawahiri who had served principally as the military strategy and tactics planner for
the organization under Bin Laden. In 2008, Dr. Fadl broke from Al Qaeda renouncing the use of violence in the
pursuit of Jihad, it is important to note that Dr. Fadl was the spiritual and philosophic scholar of Al Qaeda. Dr.
Fadl, in his new book published from Tora prison in Egypt, states “We are prohibited from committing
aggression, even if the enemies of Islam do that” (Wright, 2008, p. 1).
Post Bin Laden, there has been a tendency to view Al Qaeda as a franchise with regional affiliates in
places, like Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, and Tunisia having leaders emerge with successful and unsuccessful terrorist
plots.
Since 2001 Al Qaeda has continued to exist organizationally mainly as a series of local franchises. In Iraq, for
instance, Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia was led by a Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who had previously opposed Osama
Bin Laden in Afghanistan. Expanding rapidly among the defeated Iraqi Sunni after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in
2003. (Cockburn, 2011)
Structure
The organizational structure has evolved from a hierarchical based structure with the master visionary in
the person of Osama Bin Laden to a more decentralized franchise affiliate structure with local leaders in
countries, like Iraq, Somalia, and Yemen to name a few.
Al Qaeda began as a hierarchical movement but began to decentralize after the American-led invasion of Afghanistan
overthrew the Taliban, eliminating Al Qaeda’s sanctuary in that country.
Affiliate groups, many of which had existed in some form prior to 9/11 but without formal ties to other groups,
gradually began to formally align with Al Qaeda. Despite these alliances, most affiliates continued to focus primarily on
local grievances and did not adopt Al Qaeda’s call for global jihad against the West as an immediate priority.
In a 2014 interview, Zawahiri appeared to acknowledge a degree of decentralization, stating that Al Qaeda is a
message before it is an organization. While many analysts use the metaphor of marketing to describe Al Qaeda as a
“brand”, and its offshoots as “franchises”, others describe the decentralization phenomenon in terms of a core group of
professionals surrounded by new membership in “grassroots” affiliates. (Congressional Report, 2014)
The literature appears to reach some degree of consensus that Al Qaeda since 9/11 has become to some
extent more a brand that its decentralized affiliates can attach themselves to and the analogy is made to an Al
Qaeda franchise.
Al Qaeda has been moving towards decentralization ever since the invasion of Afghanistan, with isolated cells and
loosely affiliated groups that have only a tenuous connection to the greater Al Qaeda hierarchy tapping into Bin Laden’s
“franchise”, appropriating its ideological “brand name” for their actions. (Elkus, 2007, p. 5)
Below is a diagram that shows the leadership and command structure of Al Qaeda “Al Qaeda had a
command and control structure which included a majlis al shura (or consultation council) which discussed and
approved major undertakings, including terrorist operations. Al Qaeda also had a ‘military committee’ which
considered and approved ‘military’ matters” (PBS Frontline, n.d. p. 1).
Figure 1. Seattle times. (Source: http://old.seattletimes.com/news/nation-world/crisis/terrorism/binladen_18.html).
The structure represents the three elements of Al Qaeda, the master visionary/financier in Bin Laden, the
strategic/tactical military dimension in al Zawahiri, and finally the religious and philosophic guide in Dr. Fadl’s
Seattle Times.
Al Qaeda has been forced over the years to adapt to the loss of a geographical operational based in
Afghanistan, the loss of its leader Osama Bin Laden and the continued pursuit of the destruction of its
command structure by western nations. Ayman al Zawahiri has assumed the leadership of Al Qaeda with the
death of Bin Laden but likely finds himself in the same position with the continuous western pressure to
eliminate him as well. So, the decentralized structure of Al Qaeda is likely to continue in the foreseeable future.
Targets
Al Qaeda has an indiscriminate list of potential targets as its ideological foundation allows for the killing
of infidels anywhere on the globe and the concept of tafkir allows for attacks on Muslim governments/countries
citizens as well. The history of Al Qaeda attacks indicates that they select targets that will garner maximum
attention from media and their enemy; examples being embassies, hotels, public transportation (airlines, cargo
shipping, trains, buses, and subways) tourist locations, military installations, apartment buildings, and a variety
of other targets. Al Qaeda also likes targets that have secondary or tertiary impacts economically and
psychologically the largest example being the WTC 9/11 attack as well as the Kenyan and Tanzanian US
Embassies. “Bin Laden and Zawahiri urged followers to attack economic targets to weaken both the West and
local regimes” (Congressional Report, 2014, p. 4).
Recently, a message attributed to Al Qaeda announced dramatic terrorist attacks to come in the future.
The message, translated by The Washington Times, says the attacks will be strong, serious, alarming, earth-shattering,
shocking and terrifying. The coming strikes by Al Qaeda, with God’s Might, will be in the heart of the land of nonbelief,
America, and in France, Denmark, other countries in Europe, in the countries that helped and are helping France, and in
other places that shall be named by Al Qaeda at other times. The message, posted on the Ansar al Mujahideen network on
Sunday, carried the headline: “Map of Al Qaeda and its future strikes”, April 23, 2015. (Gerz, 2013, p. 1)
Only time and Al Qaeda actions will demonstrate whether this announcement is the hyperbole of psychological
warfare or are such boasts supported by terrorists’ attacks.
Strategies and Tactics

If one looks at the history of Al Qaeda attacks or inspired attacks, they have a common consistency and
they tend to favor mass casualty attacks on foreign targets. As Al Qaeda has devolved from a centralized
command structure to a more decentralized affiliate based organization, many of the more recent attacks have
come from its Yemen affiliate and the Somali organization Al Shabbat. “Al Qaeda today is not a traditional
hierarchical terrorist organization, with a pyramid-style organizational structure, and it does not exercise full
command and control over its branch and franchises” (Congressional Report, 2014, p. 1)
Its core philosophy allows for the more indiscriminate killing of “infidels” where you find them and of
non-Sunni Muslims or the takfirist. The signature of previous attacks confirm that Al Qaeda prefers suicide
bombings that generate significant media exposure creating fear/anxiety in their enemies and creating a
propaganda victory to attract new membership and affiliates.
Analysis of Success
Determining whether or not Al Qaeda has been successful will depend on the metrics that are employed. If
luring the “far enemy” into a decade long war in Iraq and Afghanistan is a metric then one would have to say
on that score certainly they have been successful. “Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s number two and chief
strategist, wrote at the time of 9/11 that the aim of the group was to lure the US into an over-reaction in which it
would wage battle against the Muslims” (Cockburn, 2011, p. 1). If replicating their “success” with the World
Trade Center attacks of 9/11 with other attacks of similar scale then they have not been successful. The attacks
on transit systems in England, Spain, and tourist locations, like Bali certainly have been brutal and scores were
killed and harmed in these attacks but they genuinely pale in comparison to the audacity and scale of 9/11. One
could argue that untoward effect of the 9/11 attack placed Al Qaeda squarely in the cross hairs of every
intelligence, law enforcement, and military forces of modern nations. This notoriety led to the decades long
pursuit of Bin Laden and eventual assassination in 2011 and in some sense the end of a centralized Al Qaeda
organization. Some view the current state of Middle East turmoil as a result of Al Qaeda’s efforts to engage the
west in a war fought in the Middle East.
Al Qaeda is the most successful terrorist organization in history. By destroying the World Trade Centre in New York
on 9/11 it provoked the US into launching wars damaging to itself in Afghanistan and Iraq. Al Qaeda aimed to destroy the
status quo in the Middle East and it succeeded beyond its wildest dreams. (Cockburn, 2011, p. 1)
History when viewing Al Qaeda is less likely to take this inflated role of Al Qaeda in the unraveling of Middle
East governments from Libya, Egypt, to Syria as seriously as the quote above…but certainly Al Qaeda has
been one of the toxic ingredients of the regions destabilization.
Future of Al Qaeda
With the defeat of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, Al Qaeda rises as the preeminent Islamist jihadist terrorist
organization globally. Al Qaeda has what some analysts refer to as franchises in Afghanistan, Kashmir, Syria,
Yemen, Libya, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Russia, Myanmar, and Somalia. Bruce Hoffman offers a startling
assessment of Al Qaeda growth and reaches in his 2018 article Al Qaeda’s Resurrection the map below is his
estimate of Al Qaeda’s affiliates or franchises globally (Bruce Hoffman, 2018). At the time of 9/11 Al Qaeda’s
membership would have been counted in the 100’s and as you can see from Hoffman’s estimates it is now in
the tens of thousands.
Figure 2. Al Qaeda map council on foreign relations.
It appears that there are two schools of thought on the status and future of Al Qaeda, some policy-makers
see the successful assassination of Osama Bin Laden as a “watershed” event signaling the decline of the
centralized command structure of Al Qaeda. While others view Al Qaeda in ascendance with the decentralized
affiliate franchise structure providing for greater geographic engagement across some sixty nations thought to
have Al Qaeda cells or members.
Those who view Al Qaeda as weakened generally reference the decline of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and
treat affiliates largely as a separate threat. Those who view Al Qaeda as growing in strength tend to focus on the rise of Al
Qaeda affiliate groups, which they view in conjunction with Al Qaeda senior leadership as a single global network.
In early 2014, DNI James Clapper responded in the negative to a question on whether Al Qaeda was on the path to
defeat, noting that the group was instead, “morphing and franchising itself.” 75 Retired Marine Corps general James Mattis
in late 2013 described predictions of Al Qaeda’s demise as “premature” and “discredited”. (Congressional Report, 2014 p.
24)
There is debate about how Al Qaeda should be defined as…is it the “base” as it names denotes, “is it a
revolutionary vanguard, a global insurgency, a decentralized network or franchise of affiliates” as Anne
Stenersen discusses in her article Understanding Al Qaeda Threat to the West (2018, p. 1). Clearly, Osama Bin
Laden’s Al Qaeda has survived and actually prospered after his demise and needs to be understood within the
context of its ambitions, structural changes, and geographic scope. Al Qaeda is in fact all of these descriptors
and has become a transnational licensor of Islamist terrorism for its affiliates from Africa to the Middle East,
and Southwest Asia. The leadership of Al Qaeda has been decentralized and dispersed across nations like Syria,
Iran, Turkey, Libya, and Yemen “Accordingly, its leaders have been dispersed to Syria, Iran, Turkey, Libya,
and Yemen, with only a hard-core remnant of top commanders still in Afghanistan and Pakistan” (Bruce
Hoffman, 2018, p. 4). These affiliates have adopted the brand Al Qaeda but have their own unique
ambitions for spreading Islamism and jihad in their country or region.
Only 400 strong when the Twin Towers fell, damaged by the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and then overshadowed by
ISIS, Al Qaeda has quietly rebuilt itself to the point of being able to draw on tens of thousands of foot-soldiers. (Levy &
Scott-Clark, 2017, p. 7)
This decentralization is a consequence of strategy, not accident, according to analyst Adam Elkus. In 2007,
he wrote that:
Al Qaeda has been moving towards decentralization ever since the invasion of Afghanistan, with isolated cells and
loosely affiliated groups that have only a tenuous connection to the greater Al Qaeda hierarchy tapping into Some of these
“knock-off” groups spring from pre-existing militant groups committed to some version of Islamist transformation of their
society. (Zalman, 2019, p. 1)
It is important to recognize how Al Qaeda has changed over the past two decades since 9/11 and
adapt our views and strategies accordingly. Nathan Sales a counter-terrorism expert at the State
Department says:
Al Qaeda has been relatively quiet. This is a strategic pause not a surrender…. Al Qaeda is not stagnant. It is
rebuilding and it continues to threaten the United States and its allies…. Make no mistake, Al Qaeda retains both its
capability and intent to hit us. (Hjelmgaard, 2019, p. 1)
Conclusion
So, in conclusion, Al Qaeda is likely here for the foreseeable future and with its decentralized structure
and geographic dispersement, it will be more difficult to monitor and eradicate. The wild card for the world
ISIS has been decimated and its horrific leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi killed, in a masterfully planned and
executed attack on his compound by American Special Forces. ISIS and its leader were in discussions with
other jihadist groups regarding collaboration and mergers so al- Baghdadi’s elimination is highly disruptive for
ISIS and its vision of their future. It is possible the ISIS adherents will turn to Al Qaeda and it will likely absorb
its remnants and other jihadist terrorist organizations as its critical mass continues grows and its brand spreads.
References
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Qaeda-and-the-war-on-terrorism/7718
Cockburn, P. (2011). The most successful terrorist organization in history. Retrieved from
https://attackthesystem.com/2011/05/03/the-most-successful-terrorist-organization-in-history/
Congressional Report. (2014). Al Qaeda―Affiliated groups in the Middle East and Africa. Retrieved from
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=758620
Elkus, A. (2007). Future war: The war on terror after Iraq. Athena Paper, 2(1). Retrieved from
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/47224/Vol2%20No%201%20Art%202.pdf
Farrall, L. (2011). How Al Qaeda works. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from
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Qaeda-leader/3025709002/
Hoffman Bruce. (2018). Al Qaeda’s resurrection. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/Al Qaedas-resurrection
Levy, A., & Scott-Clark, C. (2017). Al Qaeda has rebuilt itself with Iran’s help. The Atlantic Monthly. Retrieved from
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/11/Al Qaeda-iran-cia/545576/
PBS Frontline. (n.d.). Inside the terror network. Retrieved from
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Stanley, T. (2015). Understanding the origins of Salafism and Wahhabism. Terrorism Monitor. Retrieved from
https://jamestown.org/program/understanding-the-origins-of-wahhabism-and-salafism/
Stenersen, A. (2018). Thirty years after its foundation―Where is al-Qaida going? Retrieved from
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/653/html
Uriya, S. (2006). Al Qaeda’s Saudi origins. Middle East Quarterly. Retrieved from http://www.meforum.org/999/Al
Qaedas-saudi-origins
Wander, A. (2008). A history of terror 1988-2008. The Guardian. Retrieved from
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/13/history.alqaida
Wright, L (2008). The rebellion within. The New Yorker. Retrieved from https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/06/02
Zalman, A. (2019). Al Qaeda network―A guide to Al Qaeda network structure. Retrieved from
http://terrorism.about.com/od/groupsleader1/a/Al_Qaeda.htm
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2019.10.003
D
DAVID PUBLISHING
Iranian Foreign Policy During Rouhani Presidency: Perspective

on Change and Continuity
Enayatollah Yazdani
School of International Studied, Sun Yat-sen University, Zhuhai, China

When Hassan Rouhani as 11th president of Iran was elected, there was a great expectation of changing the Iranian
foreign policy. As it was great hope for recovering Iran’s economy. Following his election victory in 2013,
President Hassan Rouhani spoke of his desire to construct Iran’s foreign policy with the objective of enhancing
mutual trust between Iran and other countries, avoid extremism, and build trust over Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
Direct talks with the US soon followed, paving the way for a succession of interim deals and confidence building
measures that finally led to the JCPOA. However, despite the euphoria in the Western academic circles on Rouhani
who would rapidly change Iran’s foreign policy, there remain constraints in his ability to radically alter the
foundations of post-1979 Iranian foreign policy. In fact, the Rouhani administration has pursued a very cautious
foreign policy and has maintained the general geopolitical objectives underlying Iran’s external orientation ever
since the 1979 Islamic revolution. National interests and state survival have always triumphed over idealistic
revolutionary impulses in Iran’s wider foreign policy. This has remained a feature of Rouhani’s foreign policy as
well.
Keywords: Iran, foreign policy, Rouhani, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), national interests
Introduction
When Hassan Rouhani came to power in 2013, he told the Iranians that he would guarantee a better future
for everyone. Many commentators and mass media have portrayed the Rouhani administration amenable in
bringing about significant changes in Iran’s foreign policy. However, a careful examination of Rouhani
administration’s foreign policy initiatives reveals that there has been remarkable continuity in Tehran’s
foreign policy objectives even after the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) over Iran’s nuclear
program and after US withdrawal from the JCPOA. The Rouhani administration’s foreign policy goals strive to
secure Iran’s national sovereignty and protect the Islamic system of government setup after the Islamic
Revolution of 1979. Regionally, Iran has continued to protect its national interests as it had done during the
administration of Rouhani’s predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In fact, Tehran’s ties with the
Western-backed the Persian Gulf Arab states led by Saudi Arabia have deteriorated significantly on account
of Saudi Arabia’s active support for anti-Iran opposition groups as well. Saudi regime is sponsoring anti-Shi’a
Enayatollah Yazdani, Ph.D., associate professor, School of International Studies, Sun Yat-sen University, Zhuhai Campus,
Guangdong, China. Email: yazdani@mail.sysu.edu.cn.
IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING ROUHANI PRESIDENCY 473
Takfiri-Salafist1 forces in the region. However, Iran’s JCPOA agreed upon with five permanent members of
the UN Security Council and Germany (P5 +1) had facilitated Iran’s active engagement with the US on certain
specific issue. Yet, when US, under presidency of Donald Trump, decided to withdraw from the JCPOA in
May 2015, the situation rapidly changed. A major factor governing the pragmatic approach of the Rouhani
administration is the fact that it is linked to Iran’s business classes who favour the development of free market
economy.
This paper aims to evaluate whether Iran under the Rouhani administration has deviated from the
“independent” foreign policy goals as envisaged during the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979 or Tehran’s
current orientation reflects a continuity in its approach towards international relations as has been the norm
since the overthrow of the Shah. The paper addresses the changes if any, which have taken place during the
Rouhani presidentially in Iranian foreign policy.
The Structure of Iran’s Foreign Policy-Making Apparatus

The political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based on the concept of Wilayat-e-Faqih which is a
unique structure of governance in the region and let say in the world. The Iranian constitution grants the Wali
Faqih or the Supreme Jurist power (supreme leader) to lead and monitor the functioning of the entire political
system (Amid Zanjani, 2012). The concept is based on the interpretation of Twelve Imams Shiite Islam as
developed by the founder of the Islamic Republic Ayatollah (Imam) Khomeini in his Book Hokumat-e-Islami
(Islamic Government). This book argues that government should be run in accordance with Islamic law
(sharia), and for this to happen a leading Islamic jurist (faqih) must provide political “guardianship” (wilayat or
velayat) over the people and nation (Khomeini, 1970). A modified form of this doctrine was incorporated into
the 1979 Constitution with the doctrine’s author, Ayatollah (Imam) Khomeini, as the first faqih “guardian” or
supreme leader of Iran. As successor to Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei is the second
supreme leader of Iran since 1989. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Constitution is responsible for the
delineation and supervision of “the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran”, which means that he sets
the tone and direction of Iran’s domestic and foreign policies (The Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution, 1989).
Thus, one can assume that President Rouhani’s ability to make significant changes in foreign policy is limited
by the Islamic Republic Constitutional structure.
In addition to the Foreign Ministry, foreign policy in Iran is conceived through inputs from some other
organs of the Iranian state. The foremost personality in outlining the general outline of the country’s foreign
policy remains the supreme leader. The supreme leader influences the main foreign policy-making organ,
Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) (Moghaddasi & Akbari, 2018). The SNSC presence makes the
Foreign Ministry and the president as one of the influences on foreign policy formulation, but not the main
1
Takfiri brand of extreme Sunni Islam is an off-shoot of the so-called Wahhabi Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia. The Takfir’s
Islam’s main supporters in the Arab world are now grouped in the entity known as the so-called Islamic State based in northern
Iraq and Western Syria. The IS type of Islam also has adherent in Al Qaeda as el as many other smaller groups operating in Syria,
Iraq and the wider south-western Asian region. A Takfiri is a Sunni Muslim who accuses another Muslim (or an adherent of
another Abrahamic faith) of apostasy. The accusation itself is called Takfiri, derived from the word kafir (unbeliever), and is
described as when one who is, or claims to be, a Muslim is declared impure. Takfirism is, in fact, a perversion of the Sunni
Islamic doctrine. However, it has been is used in the modern era for sanctioning violence against leaders of Islamic states who are
deemed insufficiently religious. It has become a central ideology of militant groups such as those in Egypt, which reflect the ideas
of Seyed Qutb, Mawdudi, Ibn Taymiyyah, and Ibn Kathir. Mainstream Sunni and Shi’a Muslims and Islamist groups reject the
concept as a doctrinal deviation from true Islam.
474 IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING ROUHANI PRESIDENCY
formulators of the country’s external orientation.

Concerning the role of the supreme leader in Iran’s foreign policy means that despite the change of
government attitude under Rouhani administration, there has been a considerable degree of continuity in
Tehran foreign policy. Indeed, ever since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the primary objective of Iran’s foreign
policy has been to secure it national sovereignty and independence, while at the same time, safeguarding the
security of the post-1979 Islamic political order. Thus, the following have been the main objectives of Iran’s
foreign policy:
 Safeguarding the country’s national sovereignty and independence;
 Security of Iran’s borders;
 Protecting the political establishment and system of governance of the country;
 Maintain Iran’s national interests;
 Safe guarding the Islamic World interests (Khanei & Sirat, 2018).
The above goals have remained a consistent objective of the country’s foreign policy. Often these goals
have overridden the ideological objectives of the government based on revolutionary Islam and
anti-imperialism attitude. It should be remembered that Ayatollah Khamenei himself called for “heroic
flexibility” in the nuclear negotiations with West prior to the JCPOA, while maintaining certain “red lines” that
should not be crossed in the process.2
The Nuclear Issue and Rouhani Policy

The Rouhani administration’s concessions to the West on the nuclear program were, to some extent,
questioned by the supreme leader and some other officials. Even the JCPOA with the West agreed upon by the
Rouhani administration on Iranian nuclear program in July 2015 was implemented in order to protect the Iran’s
government and economy from the debilitating influence of the sanctions (Khabiri & Mohammad, 2017). The
pre JCPOA sanctions imposed by the US-led Western bloc on Iran were severely undermining the country’s
economy.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreed upon with five permanent members of the UN Security
Council and Germany (P5 +1) had facilitated Iran’s active engagement with the US on certain specific issues.
Similarly, the Rouhani administration’s ties with European Union and Britain had also been partially
normalised. Hence, after US withdrawal from the JCPOA, the trend that totally changed the situation and Iran’s
relations with the West particularly America became from bad to much, much worse. To a certain extent,
internal economic factors dictated the Rouhani administration’s eagerness sign the JCPOA despite many terms
of the agreement being detrimental to Iran’s sovereignty particularly the inspection regime established by this
agreement which, according to the US president, is one of the most intrusive nuclear inspection’s regime ever
imposed on a country. The US president had noted that:
international inspectors are on the ground, and Iran is being subjected to the most comprehensive, intrusive inspection
regime ever negotiated to monitor a nuclear program. Inspectors will monitor Iran’s key nuclear facilities 24 hours a day,
365 days a year. For decades to come, inspectors will have access to Iran’s entire nuclear supply chain. In other words, if
Iran tries to cheat―if they try to build a bomb covertly―we will catch them. (White House, 2016)
2
“Heroic flexibility” was repeated in many Ayatollah Khamenei speeches in different times including: 1375, 1392, and 1393 in
Tehran.
Consensual Nature of Rouhani Foreign Policy

Owing to the unique nature of Iran’s foreign policy-making structure, President Rouhani’s external
policies have largely emerged from a consensus on key issue within Iran’s power elites. These policies are not
made in isolation. Since Rouhani came to power, Iran’s chief strategic concern is to secure its order in
increasingly anarchic region with the exponential rise in Sunni Takfiri inspired militancy. The rise of so-called
Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria as well continued hostility of the Saudi regime to the Iranian government
has led Iran to pursue a defensive strategy of securing its Western flank bordering Iraq. The general principle
behind Iran’s current foreign policy was quite clearly outlined by Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif in a
paper in the US Council on Foreign Relations journal Foreign Affairs in June 2014. Zarif (2014) had noted that:
The post-revolutionary foreign policy of Iran has been based on a number of cherished ideals and objectives
embedded in the country’s constitution. These include the preservation of Iran’s independence, territorial integrity, and
national security and the achievement of long-term, sustainable national development. Beyond its borders, Iran seeks to
enhance its regional and global stature; to promote its ideals, including Islamic democracy; to expand its bilateral and
multilateral relations, particularly with neighboring Muslim-majority countries and nonaligned states; to reduce tensions
and manage disagreements with other states; to foster peace and security at both the regional and the international levels
through positive engagement; and to promote international understanding through dialogue and cultural interaction. (p. 16)
Under President Rouhani, one can say that Iran has more or less intensified in indirect cooperation with
the US in some issue affecting the Middle East. Even this cooperation was not new, Rouhani had simply
continued in the steps of his predecessors. The previous governments led by the “reformist” Mohammad
Khatami (1997-2005) and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013) had continued to some extend to support
certain Anglo-American policies in Iraq and to Afghanistan as well. Under both these administrations, Tehran
supported the post-Saddam regime of Baghdad and post-Taliban regime of Kabul. Such a stance was not so
much a signal to back the US policy in the region, but was based on geostrategic objectives and Iran’s desire to
secure its borders in the West and as well as in the east. By cooperating with regimes in Kabul and Baghdad,
Tehran perceived that it may be in a more suitable position to secure it political and security objective and
national interests as well (Sohrabi, 2017; Shafie, Attaie, & Pahlavani, 2013). This was particularly true in the
case of Iraq. The key members of the Iraqi government had in the past been members of the Supreme Council
for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). SCIRI was founded in Iran in 1982 during the Iraq imposed war
against Iran after the leading Islamist insurgent group, Islamic Dawa Party, was severely weakened by an Iraqi
government crackdown following Dawa’s unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the then Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein. Even the Iraq Prime Minister Haider al Abadi was a former member of Dawa. Thus, in Iraq, Rouhani
like his predecessor Ahmadinejad, has persisted to back Shi’a dominated regime in Baghdad for ideological as
well as strategic imperatives.
Iran’s Regional Policy: An Overview

The Rouhani administration has been seeking to fashion an image of Iran adhering to an “independent”
foreign policy but giving Iran a moderate image. This is being done without changing the general parameters of
Iran’s over external orientation (Bittner, 2013). Rouhani is most likely to retain the overall foreign policy
orientation but with subtle changes so as to improve Iran’s international image particularly in the West. Indeed,
instead of exporting the Islamic revolution, now Iran portrays itself as responsible state confronting extremism
and terrorism which can be regarded as part of its general responsibility in the Islamic World. To this, Iran has
well contributed to combating ISIS and other terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria as well (Qasemi, 2016).
As stated earlier Rouhani administration’s goal as has been of his predecessors to maximise Tehran’s
influence in the region―a core foreign policy goal of the Islamic Republic’s since its inception (Shanahan,
2015). However, Rouhani and Zarif are not the sole formulators of Iran’s foreign policy they have seek
consensus from other key actors in Iran’s complex foreign policy-making structures. Rouhani’s activities in
Iran’s foreign relations, according the Iranian Constitution, are circumscribed by the supreme leader’s authority,
as well as the significant influence wielded by some other Iranian organizations (Shanahan, 2015).
The pragmatic approach of the Rouhani administration is associated with the social base of his
government. From the economic point of view, Rouhani administration more or less is based on market
economy. The Rouhani administration has close links with Iranian business elites and merchants and as a
consequence, one can say he has more powerful financial backers than the previous administration of President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Indeed, much of the improvement in Iran’s economic situation, such as currency
stabilisation, a reduction in inflation, and a partial restoration of business confidence during the Rouhani
presidency years before US withdrawal of JCPOA in May 2018 had been due to the merchant elite’s support
for his government.
According to some Iranian economic commentators
President Rouhani’s economic policy package is devoid of specific development plans or industrialization projects
because the president and most of his economic advisors subscribe to an economic doctrine that frowns upon government
intervention in economic affairs—unless such interventions help “pave the way” for unfettered market operations. (Bittner,
2013)
Due to this reason, there is a belief that Rouhani may be able to change the autarkic nature of post-1979 Iranian
economy and enable foreign corporations to invest in Iran’s economy. Indeed, in this context, Rouhani
administration had been more open to allow European Companies access to Iran’s hitherto nationalised oil and
gas and industrial sectors, yet since May 2018 such policy faced a major challenge (Market Pulse, 2016). Thus,
this is one of the reasons that Rouhani and his cabinet’s support for market economic system. The former
British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw has described Rouhani as a “warm and engaging” person but a “strong
Iranian patriot” (Black & Dehghan, 2013)
Rouhani Foreign Policy and the United States

The nuclear negotiations and the subsequent JCPOA represented an important improvement in
Washington-Tehran relations in that the two sides have been in deep and prolonged negotiations for the first
time since 1979. Yet, even after the negotiations succeeded, there is still little prospect of relations between the
two countries normalising quickly given the deep historical mistrust (Shanahan, 2015). Despite the nuclear deal,
the United States continues to see many Iranian policies in the Middle East as undermining its interests, thereby
rendering cooperation, let alone rapprochement, problematic. Although from Iranian side Tehran policy
towards the Middle East is totally different from US policy in the region, this has been declared by Ayatollah
Khamenei as he emphasized: “America’s goals (policies) in the region [the Middle East] differ 180 degrees
from the goals (policies) of the Islamic Republic”.3 One can assume that it was expected that the nuclear deal
would remove a major source of tension in US-Iran relations. As Iran did its duties regarding its nuclear
3
Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, Speech, IRNA, (Iran, Tehran), 1 November 2015.
projects in Arak, Qom, and Natanz, but the United States avoided to do its duties, and accordingly, Tehran was
accusing the US of not fulfilling it part of the bargain as Washington had been hesitant to lift all the economic
and financial sanctions imposed on Iran since the 1990s. Nevertheless, US withdrawal from JCPOA and more
importantly major differences on contemporary regional affairs, such as Syria, Yemen, Hezbollah, and Israel
tend to make an Us-Iran normalisation more difficult endeavour. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew declared on 11
April 2016 that the US would keep its part of the bargain of providing sanctions relief to Iran in return for curbs
on its nuclear program―but that the Obama administration would not allow even limited access to the US
financial system (Jenkins & Osborne, 2016). This failure, together with a failure to devise some form of
immunity from fines for European banks, threatens the deal. Moreover, the US Congress recently even blocked
the sale of civilian boing aircraft to Iran on 12 July 2016 (AFP, 2016). In fact, American sanctions against Iran
have undermined the development of European countries trade ties with Tehran. In addition, the US Congress
is making it impossible for Iran to access its overseas oil revenues worth tens of billions of dollars. Iranian
foreign currency deposits total at least $50 billion. Iranians were hoping for the rapid retrieval of these funds to
improve an internal economy that underwent four years of enforced austerity as a result of the United States
and EU nuclear-related sanctions (Jenkins & Osborne, 2016).
However, Iran seems to have been more amenable in fulfilling its obligations under the JCPOA. Since
then Iran has cut back its nuclear program as required, notably by reducing its capacity to enrich uranium and
by redesigning its nuclear reactor at Arak. Iran is also cooperating well with International Atomic Energy
Agency inspectors, to whom it has granted unprecedented access, and is honouring its Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty commitment to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons.
After escalating the Islamic State terrorist attacks in Iraq the potential for Tehran and Washington to work
together in order to secure Iraq might have increased. However, both sides approach to the crisis in Syria still
remains diametrically opposed. The US wants the ouster of the current Syrian government, while Iran supports
the Assad’s government in Damascus.
The possibility of overt cooperation with the United States even in Iraq has been rejected by the supreme
leader’s public statement that Iran did not “support any foreign interference in Iraq and (was) strongly opposed
to US interference there” (Rezaian, 2014). There is a belief that it is still possible that Washington might have
negotiation over Afghanistan crisis with Tehran. In both countries, Iran has permanent interests based on
geographical realities and deep historical and religious links of long standing. Its interest in the stability of these
countries is immense. However, the Rouhani administration’s approach towards both Iraq and Afghanistan has
shown remarkable clarity as well as continuity. Even during the administration of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Iran
tried to bolster the regimes in Kabul and Baghdad. Iran is one of the largest non-NATO aid providers to
Afghanistan. Therefore, Iranian influence in Afghanistan following the drawdown of international forces need
not necessarily be a cause of concern for the United States. Iran wants to see a stable Afghanistan with a
government free of Taliban control, and Tehran seeks to stem the tide of Sunni extremism backed by pro-Saudi
Pakistan in the Afghan theatre. Pakistan remains a key US-backed external player in the domestic affairs of
Afghanistan with its backing of the Afghan Taliban group led by Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzadeh. Pakistan is
known to have strong ties to the Pashtuns, while Iran favours the Tajik and Hazara (Nader, Scotten, Rahmani,
Stewart, & Mahnad, 2014). For sure, Iran dose have interests in ensuring that both Afghanistan and Iraq
become stable and functioning nations.
Rouhani Policy After US Withdrawal From JPCOA

On May 8, 2018, following a brief talk on the Iran nuclear deal in the White House, Donald Trump signed
a presidential memorandum, declaring US withdrawal from JPCOA. President Trump’s decision to withdraw
from the JCPOA and openly violate the provisions of the agreement In a reaction to Trump announcement,
Rouhani said Iran would stick by the terms of the agreement if the other signatories―the UK, France, Germany,
China, Russia, and the EU―could prove they would meet their commitments. Later he stated that his
government (Cunningham & Sabbagh, 2018) is ready to resume uranium enrichment should the accord no
longer offer benefits. Indeed, President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA jeopardized the Obama
administration’s and five more countries’ landmark nuclear deal with Iran. In the time of announcing the
decision, Trump labelled Iran’s regime as “the leading state sponsor of terror” and argued that Tehran “exports
dangerous missiles, fuels conflicts across the Middle East, and supports terrorist proxies and militias such as
Hezbollah, Hamas, the Taliban, and al Qaeda” (Trump, May 8, 2018). He also called the JCPOA as “defective
at its core” since to him, it would have allowed Iran to eventually acquire nuclear weapon (an issue which has
been repeatedly denied by the Iranian officials particularly the Supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei) capability
even if Tehran were to fully comply with its provisions. However, developments since the US withdrawal from
JCPOA have created serious doubts about its sustainability and have escalated tensions between the two nations.
In addition, by US exit let say “Amexit” from the JCPOA, a clear violation of UNSC resolution 2231, which
the US had sponsored, Trump administration isolated itself. He failed to convince the other signatories to
abandon the nuclear deal and rejected international consensus that endorsed the JCPOA, leading to US
isolation.
In Iran, Trump decision damaged several years of Rouhani administration policy. In fact, to some extent,
this movement divided America from its European allies, all of whom have been more or less deeply opposed
to this move. As a result, it created an opening for Rouhani government to collaborate more closely with
Europe, and particularly, Russia, and China in arrangements that would exclude the United States.
In the post-JCPOA Rouhani administration has faced another problem in the region which pushed by
Saudi Arabia and Israel, that led to more pressure on Iran by the US government. In fact, that was a creation of
a new line―“US-Israel-Saudi Arabia” in the region. Following encouragement by Israel and Saudi Arabia, the
United States resorted to illegal, unilateral pressures: barring Iranian civilian’s access to humanitarian goods
including food, life-saving medicine, and civil aviation equipment. Sanctions were also re-imposed on Iranian
carpets, pistachios, handicrafts, and other goods (Abdollahi, 2019).
Rouhani Foreign Policy in the West Asian Region

The stated basis for the Rouhani’s foreign policy has been the strengthening of bilateral relations with all
countries—especially Iran’s neighbours—as he stated at his first post-election news conference: “We have to
enhance mutual trust between Iran and other countries”, adding, “We have to build trust” (QUDS Online, 2013).
In addition, couched in terms of peaceful co-existence; support of the United Nations and world peace; and
stress on national integrity and inviolability of the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other countries.
Rouhani’s foreign policy approach in the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula and vis-a`-vis Iran’s Arab
neighbours in general would remain cautious and continue to strive to improve ties in the Arab world, and
possibly elsewhere. Iran, despite it selective support for Shi’a groups in the region, still maintains a cardinal
foreign policy guideline of supporting state sovereignty. It would continue to reject the Western-crafted
ideologies of “humanitarian intervention” and “democracy promotion”. Iran has generally supported the
regional status quo and rejected the perceived Western attempts to change the geopolitical map of West Asia.
In this context, Iran as consistently opposed US-led effort to create Kurdistan and in this endeavour it has been
backed by Turkey (Fereidoon & Ghavam, 2018). Thus, Rouhani administration has persisted in emphasising
the sanctity of the state system in the region created after First World War. In this sense Iran has become, as in
the pre-revolutionary era, a status quo power.
Iran’s backing for Shi’a groups in the region have been based on ideological basis and enhancing its
security as well. Although, Tehran’s backing for the Syrian Government, which is not Shi’a, deals with
resistance-axe for supporting Palestinians at the same time is carefully calibrated to enhance its regional
influence, and retaining the state structures in Syria from collapsing as a result of civil war. Moreover, Iran and
Syria have been strategic allies for over three decades. Iran has tried to assist the Damascus government to
resist the various Sunni, Wahhabi-Salafist groups backed by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the US. In
Yemen, Iran’s support for the Zaydi Shi’a Ansarullah movement fighting the deposed Hadi Mansour regime
backed by (the Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council ([P]GCC) has been limited. Nonetheless, Iran has persisted
in giving moral support to the Shi’a of Yemen who constitute nearly half of the population of that country and
are dominant in the north. Similarly, in Iraq, Iran has consistently backed regime in Baghdad in order to bolster
the new Iraqi state created after the Anglo-American invasion of that country in 2003.
President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, to some extent have been, able to direct
Iran international relations and buttressed their domestic support. Ultimately, however, any further
rapprochement has to gain the support of the Supreme Leader. Ayatollah Khamenei priority is, and always will
be, the survival of the Islamic revolutionary system of governance (Shanahan, 2015). Nonetheless, lack of
progress regarding lifting of sanctions may weaken the Rouhani administration’s smaller financial institutions,
and the Western banks remain prohibited from doing business with Iran, mainly, because of unilateral US
reimposing sanctions in the post-JCPOA era.
Rouhani Policy Towards the Arab World

Iran has not shown any signs of changing its fundamental policy objectives in the Persian Gulf sub-region.
Iran continues to support the Assad regime, it continues to rely on Hezbollah as an important proxy force, and it
has not changed and would not change its rhetoric in opposition to Israel regime. Perceptions of, and relations
with, Iran vary amongst the Persian Gulf States. Oman for instance has good relations with Iran and has acted
as an intermediary between Washington and Tehran in the past. It played in key role is site for the US-Iran
covert negotiations before the official Iranian interaction with the US on the nuclear program.
However, under the Rouhani administration, Iran’s ties with Saudi Arabia have rapidly deteriorated. The
Saudis have been staunch opponents of the US-Iran understanding on the nuclear issue probably even more so
than Israel. It is unlikely that Saudi Arabia will ever trust Iranian intentions in the region. The relationship
between Wahhabi-ruled Saudi Arabia and Shiite Iran has always been characterized by tension and mistrust.
Despite the Rouhani administration’s proactive policy of improving ties with Saudis, Riyadh has not been
receptive to this. The Saudis resent the US-Iran nuclear deal as in their perception this may reduce the
Kingdom’s importance as the key US client in the region.
The Saudis have been proactive in countering Iran influence in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and else
wherein the wider Islamic World. The factors impelling the Saudis to oppose Iran revolve around the following:
(1) Historical sectarian divisions between the Wahhabi rulers of Saudi Arabia and the Shi’ite dominated Iran; (2)
economic factors specifically with regard to oil and divergent policies in the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC); and (3) aspirations for the Persian Gulf power and esteem. The overthrow of the
Shah in early 1979 led to an about-face in Saudi-Iranian relations. The success of the Islamic revolution
represented everything that the al-Saud family and the former Iranian Shah had been united against. For over
10 years following the 1979 Islamic revolution, the Saudi-Iranian relationship continued to disintegrate. Saudi
Arabia viewed Iran as a destabilizing force in the region due to its “repeated attempts to export its revolution”
to other Persian Gulf States. Conversely, Iran viewed Saudi Arabia as unfit to protect the holy places of Islam. 4
In addition, Iran’s ideology and its vehemently anti-monarchical orientation was an anathema for Saudi
Kingdom.
In the post “Islamic Awakening” or “Arab Spring” era, Saudi-Iranian ties deteriorated rapidly due to the
almost opposite and contrasting policies pursued by the two powers. Iran backed anti-Saudi governments in
Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, while Saudis and their allies in the Saudi-dominated (P)GCC had spent considerable
finances to overthrow these regimes.
As noted earlier, the US-Iran JCPOA made Saudi Arabian ruling elites even more nervous about US role
in the region and possibility of downgrading of their country’s importance. Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s killing of
a pro-Iran Shi’a cleric, Sheikh Nemer Baqher-elnemer, and killings of a large number of Iranians during Hajj in
2015 further exacerbated the ties between the Saudis and Iran. This was despite the fact that Iranian foreign
minister M. J. Zarif repeatedly conveyed to Riyadh, the Rouhani administration’s desire to reach a modus
vivendi on regional issues. The Saudis failed to respond to Zarif’s overtures.
In the beginning Rouhani government had made, more or less, efforts to reduce differences between Iran
and Saudi Arabia over some of the regional issues. For example, Iran’s former Deputy Foreign Minister
Hussein Amir-Abdullahian visited the Kingdom in August 2014, and Foreign Minister Zarif personally offered
his condolences in Riyadh following the death of King Abdullah in January 2015. The appointment of Ali
Shamkhani as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council also sent a message. Shamkhani is a former
Iranian Defence Minister who was awarded Saudi Arabia’s highest decoration, the Order of Abdulaziz al-Saud,
by King Fahd in 2000 for fostering Saudi-Iranian ties. However, Saudi concerns over possible Iranian support
for Zaydi Houthi rebels in Yemen, the Syrian government and Iraq have made any Saudi-Iranian understanding
very difficult (Shanahan, 2015).
In January 2016, the Saudis executed a prominent Shiite dissident for allegedly supporting terrorism. A
number of Iranians attacked the Saudi embassy in Tehran and then the Saudis broke diplomatic relations. Since
then, Riyadh has encouraged its allies to follow suit. Iranian pilgrims will not attend this year’s Hajj. Saudi
concerns about real or imagined Iranian conspiracies are reaching new heights and Riyadh is actively trying to
undermine the Iranian government. In July 2016, former Saudi intelligence chief and Ambassador to the United
States Prince Turki al Faysal attended a large demonstration in France sponsored by the anti-Iranian
Government Mujahideen e Khalq (MeK) (Monafeqeen) group based in Paris and called for the regime to be
4
“Saudi Arabia and Iran-international Affairs Review”, accessed 12 June 2019
www.iarwu.org/sites/default/file/articlepdfs/Saudi%20Arabia %20and%Iran.pdf.
overthrown. Turki’s backing for the MeK and his open call for regime change escalates the rivalry even further
(Riedel, 2016). This is in spite of the efforts of the Rouhani team to improve ties with Riyadh even after these
acts by the Saudis. The Iranian government even pressured the Iranian judiciary to try the individuals arrested
in burning the Saudi embassy in Tehran in January 2016. This is a message to Riyadh that Iranian government
or at least the Rouhani regime is open to a dialogue (Iran Press TV, 2016a), it has even tried to distance itself
from the Shi’a led opposition confronting the rather brutal Saudi-backed regime in Bahrain despite criticising
the Bahraini regime.
Most of Saudi and Iranian animosity is more or less related to their respective perceptions of themselves as
the leaders of the Islamic world. Tehran regards itself as a more independent country and a more advanced
society than Saudi Arabia. It is also at times dismissive of what it perceives to be Saudi relatively
unsophisticated view of regional dynamics (Shanahan, 2015). Yet, the Rouhani administration has gone some
way to improving relations between Iran and a number of the Persian Gulf countries. Kuwait’s Emir visited
Tehran for the first time in June 2014 and met with Ayatollah Khamenei.
While there are some concerns among the Persian Gulf States that the United States is pulling back from
the region, all of the Persian Gulf States still look to the United States as their ultimate security guarantor. The
US has also tried to assure its (P)GCC allies that their stability and importance is vital to US national interests
and Washington will defend them in the event of any attack (Dawn [Karachi], 2015). Hence, as long as there is
a strong US military presence in the region, the (P)GCC leaders calculate that they will not have to deal with
Iran.
The Rouhani Administration Approach Towards Turkey and Israel

In Iran’s regional policy, Turkey and Israel have place, too, yet, in a different way. As for Israel, an
anti-Israeli foundation of Iran’s foreign policy behaviour has remained solid and very consistent at the regional
and international levels (Golmohammadi, 2019). Such notion would never be ignored in any administration
including Rouhani administration. Since this notion is rooted in religious and political nature of the Islamic
revolution, Tehran’s foreign policy in regards with Israel will be continued as in the past. By and large, the
Rouhani administration has continued Iran’s long-held policy of not recognizing Israel.
Turkey, on the other hand, has increasingly good relations with Iran although it is very much a pragmatic
relationship. Ankara is diametrically opposed to Tehran on the issue of Syria and they are also commercial
rivals in Central Asia, but this has not stopped the two countries from finding common cause with each other
on a range of issues (Shanahan, 2015). The right-wing, Islamist regime of Turkish President R. T. Erdogan has
been a prime supporter of Wahhabi and Sunni groups fighting the Syrian government. Iran has been happy to
overlook disagreements over Syria and to concentrate on areas of common interest, such as economic ties.
Despite having differences with the Erdogan regime over it backing for Wahhabi Islamists opposed to the
Syrian government, Iran was one of the first states in the region to denounce an attempted coup against the
Erdogan regime on 15-16 July 2016. SNSC Secretary stated “We support Turkey’s legal government and
oppose any type of coup―either [initiated] domestically or supported by foreign sides” (Iran Press TV, 2016b),
Iran looks to Turkey as a potential partner given its problematic relations with many of its Arab neighbours.
Turkey, meanwhile, sees Iran as a potentially lucrative export market for its goods and services. Both of these
reasons can form the basis for pragmatic cooperative relationships in the future as well.
Conclusion
Although it was expected that Rouhani would provide a great degree of changes in Iranian foreign policy,
as this paper had tried to show, he has pursued a very cautious foreign policy and has retained the general
geopolitical objectives underlying Iran’s foreign policy ever since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. There has been
no radical departure from Iran’s past foreign policy stances which have indicated remarkable pragmatism
within the facade of an Islamic revolutionary foreign policy agenda. All in all, national interests and state
survival have always been real objective of Iran’s wider foreign policy. This remains a feature of Rouhani’s
foreign policy as well as the external policy orientations of his predecessors.
The successful conclusion of a nuclear deal, albeit at cost to the progress of Iran’s nuclear program.
However, to date, the JCPOA has not delivered the benefits as expected by the Iranian government and people.
In this context, the US establishment remains opposed to lifting many aspects of the financial sanctions
imposed on Iran and this factor has more or less the capacity to undermine the Rouhani administration’s
popularity domestically. However, it would be too much to expect that Iran would completely realign its
policies towards the West in pursuance of economic benefits alone.
Therefore, under Rouhani administration, there has been no radical departure from Iran’s past foreign
policy trends which have been based on remarkable pragmatism within the parameters of an Iran’s
revolutionary foreign policy agenda. In other words, despite the change of president and administration in Iran,
there has been a considerable degree of continuity in Tehran’s foreign policy.
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D
DAVID PUBLISHING
Africans and the New Diaspora
Stephen O. Eyeh
Redeemer’s University, Osun State, Nigeria

This paper examines the life of Africans, using literature to discuss movements from Africa to other parts of the
world as Diasporas. Such movements begin with slavery, to political asylum being sought and now self-initiated
movements for trade, education, and labour for the facilitation of both information and industrial development.
Relevant literatures are reviewed and analysed for their symbolic implications beyond the texts in order to establish
the dialectic of facts and fiction. The relevant literatures include: Olaudah Equaino’s (1789) Equaino’s Travels,
Joseph Conrad’s (1995) Heart of Darkness and Other Stories, and Akachi Adimora-Ezeigbo’s (2008) Trafficked.
This paper posits that prior to the 15th century, Africans were free in their natural milieu with either no threat to
their lives or being alienated from their ancestral homes until the period of slavery. Sequel to the attainment of
independence by most African countries with the hope for self-governance and development, corruption, civil wars,
foreign debts, economic depression, famine, and poverty truncate the people’s hope for better living. African
citizens therefore seek refuge abroad in countries with viable economy. With globalization, not only education and
culture play significant roles, but also modern technology especially information and communication technology
(ICT) play key roles in population drift in trade. There lies an absurdity that Africans now flee their once free
homeland or countries to foreign lands which are perceived as “heaven on earth” because of their functional
systems through effective governance. Thus, this paper concludes that new movements and new Africans in the
Diaspora are self-initiated, imposed, and motivated irrespective of their being alienated from home and the risks
involved since the end will justify the means.
Keywords: Africans, Diaspora, myths, images, fiction
Introduction
The myth about African immigrants to Europe and America as Diasporas is not premised against the
ontological myth, or any socio-cultural and religious myth such as that of the Greek tradition in the belief in
man’s relationship with the external world, but the myth which emphasises the genesis or the origin of an idea.
This then establishes a reality, a historical reality which is epistemological.
Other myths exist as the form of beliefs to be causative factors for slave trade from Africa by Inikori
(1978), which include that: (1) those sold into slavery were those found guilty of crimes that warrant the
penalty of sale into slavery; (2) the victims were found to be involved in witchcraft; and (3) the sale was owing
to the fact that the proceeds were used by their families as a result of economic distress. However, these three
reasons adduced, debunked by Inikori that
while very little is known about the history of crime in African societies before the twentieth century, it can be safely
said, on the basis of social theory, that in the pre-industrial society of Africa, with abundant means of subsistence in the
Stephen O. Eyeh, Ph.D., senior lecturer, Department of English, Redeemer’s University, Osun State, Nigeria.
486 AFRICANS AND THE NEW DIASPORA
form of agricultural land, the incidence of crimes carrying a death penalty could not have been high enough, in normal
circumstances, to produce a large flow of slaves for the external trade. (Inikori, 1978, p. 8)
In the case of the second reason for slavery witchcraft, Inikori (1978) opined that the quantitative
importance of this source of slave trade tended to depend on the deliberate manipulation of the processes
involved by those in charge of the religious institutions, under the influence of the slave trade itself (p. 9). In
respect of the third myth, sale of relatives in the time of economic distress,
For one thing, the low ratio of population to cultivate land must have made such situations very rare, probably
restricted to drought zone[…], the institution of extended family, which has always functioned in African societies as a
kind of social welfare institution, must have sufficiently alleviated the consequent hardship to make the sale of relatives
uncommon. (Inikori, 1978, p. 9)
This paper utilises the medium of creative works, the novel, as it alludes to history as reality to trace the
first set of Africans outside their geographical and social milieus in the Diaspora to slaves. These immigrants
were forced to leave their once free homes and environments against their wishes. An exemplification of this is
found in Olaudah Equaino’s Equiano’s Travels.
Following closely the era of slave trade and towards one or two decades at the end of the 19th century and
the beginning of the 20th century came colonialism and its attendant issues of religion, commerce, and trade in
Africa by the whites. Much of these were in vogue for economic resources to be exploited and exported to
European countries that were germane to their industrial revolution. In Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness and
Other Stories, the European company, Eldorado Exploring Expedition represented by Kurtz, explores ivories in
the tropics (specifically the Congo), “heart of darkness”, a misconception leading to the idea that Europe
brought civilization to Africa. There now came a large number of European migrants and their companies to
Africa. Thus, Europe and America exploited both human resources and economic resources of Africans.
Majority of African countries were under the yoke of colonialism before their independence. With
political sovereignty, economic, socio-cultural, and technological developments ought to be fiduciary. Africans
are now to manage their own affairs in order to bring new lease of life to the “wretched of the earth”. Ayi Kwei
Armah, in his novel The Beautiful One’s Are Not Yet Born casts aspersion on the “new” African leaders that
have taken over from the whites through the image of the commercial building of AG Leventis, UAC, among
others and emphasise corruption. Again, in this work, we shall first chase away the fox, before reprimanding
the chicken (A Yoruba proverb, ejekia ale kolokolojina, ki a to baediewi). These questions “who is a fox?” and
“who is the chicken?” will be answered in this chapter.
At this juncture, the blame game will be stopped and the heat will be turned on the causative factors for
African immigrants from their countries in these present times. The socio-economic and scientific development
policies by various African governments have not yielded any desired or effective lifting of their economies
from the doldrums thereby constituting inflation, unemployment, starvation, poverty, high mortality rates,
diseases, and wars inform the “flight” of Africans from their homes. They then constitute the new Diaspora.
Akachi Adimora-Ezeigbo’s Trafficked gives us the symbolic picture.
Conceptual and Theoretical Frame work

This section sets out to review the recurrence and relevance of the images of space and those of objects in
the selected novels, especially Ayi Kwei Armah’s novels. As the evaluation of images of space and objects
AFRICANS AND THE NEW DIASPORA 487
belongs to the field of communication/signification, the theoretical approach will draw heavily from semiotics.
So many critical works have been written on Armah that it may be a tedious academic exercise to give a
statistical detail of them here. But one can make a conjecture which is that most of the critical materials on him
have emphasised the sociological, historical, structural, mythic, and thematic aspects of his fictional world.
Bernth Lindfors in his “Armah’s Histories” (1980) made a review of Armah’s works from an historical
perspective. He acknowledges the fact that Armah’s first three novels are written to record corruption in the
society. Again, his review of the last novels reveals that the society has been corrupt even from the period of
the Ashante Empire and the presence of Europeans complements the popular themes of colonialism in African
novels.
In Margaret Folarin’s research on The Beautiful Ones Are Not Yet Born, she identifies alienation as a
human predicament. According to her, man moves into isolation or cage because of some active forces against
him. These active oppressive forces make the victim seek refuge (Folarin, 1971). Similarly, Nnolim (1979)
approached Armah’s fictional world from a sociological standpoint. He discusses perjorism in Armah’s first
three novels. Also, he defines perjorism as decadence, retrogression and decay in the life of man, objects, and
society, and goes further to discuss the theme of nihilism and pessimism in the first three novels. His discussion
like that of others mentioned above is sociologically based. Moreover, it does not encompass the last two
novels―Two Thousand Seasons and The Healers.
In this endeavour, the well-trodden roads have been avoided and much contribution will be made to the
on-going discourse in the domain of semiotics in Armah’s works. By studying the images of space and objects
in the novels of Ayi Kwei Armah, one is on the side of medium. This work is more interested in the artistic
devices used by the novelist to create his fictive world; the message here therefore appears secondary but not
insignificant.
It should be pointed out that whatever goes in a work of art is not really the message. Human experiences
have fundamental primordial qualities that are recurrent all over the ages, since the existence of man on earth.
There is nothing new in terms of human actions. Issues raised in literatures have both specific and general
implications that cut across temporal and spatial boundaries. Only medium gives them new faces. Therefore,
the recreative artistry of the writer in putting across his messages is the stimulating aspect of academic exercise.
One will endeavour to highlight not only the committed ideologist, but also the artist in Armah. The
exceptional artist turns the ordinary into extraordinary, the banal to the unique, the local to the universal, and
the transient to the eternal. He achieves this feat through artistry. He is at once visible and audible but through
imagery, he distances the authorial presence and enriches art, giving it eternal values. Armah has achieved this
through his manipulation of the artistic medium.
Roland Barthes is one of the rare critics who do not utilize a “popular” langue. Although Barthes
recognizes a distinction between the bourgeoisie and the petit-bourgeoisie in his community, he uses signs to
communicate this into a “universal culture”. These ideas of Barthes are contained in his essays, Mythologies
and Image-Music-Text. Besides, Barthes (1972) illustrated through a wrestling contest the use of language; he
transcended the ordinary use of language to represent some other messages. He says: “Each moment in
wrestling is therefore like an algebra which instantaneously unveils the relationship between a cause and its
represented effect” (p. 19).
Barthes uses a wrestling contest to represent an algebra. Acknowledging the scholarship of Barthes, Wole
Soyinka (1998, p. 155) said:
I confess that I also have watched wrestling, both in the flesh and on the television screen. I have never seen more
than two over-sized, consciously theatrical monstrosities earning fair wages in return for sending a matinee audience
hysterical with vicarious sadism. Nothing I saw at any time recalled any scholastic disputation or brought regrets to my
failings in school career as an algebraic hope. Nevertheless, Monsieur Barthes’s purpose is manifest; wrestling is mere
input into the structuralist-semiotic computer programme which then emits a Barthes-specific langue.
Again, Wole Soyinka (1988) stressed that language is not just a medium of communication but used as
sign. He says: “For language does not operate simply as communication but as matrices of discrete activities
including those of articulation and meaning” (p. 144).
In fact, as it will soon become manifest that Armah’s artistic delicacy is as prominent as his ideological
vociferation. For sharper focus, this paper has deliberately limited its focus to the study of images of space and
those of objects.
The methodology will be based on identifying major images, their recurrence, and the semantic echoes
they establish with one another within each novel and across all the novels selected. An attempt will be made to
make a conjecture whether there is a constant which has something to do with the philosophy/vision of life of
the novelist. This approach becomes necessary because images are meaningless when examined independently
of the society in which they are used.
One needs to state here that the claims of formalist schools that the work of art has no meaning outside the
text are inadequate for this kind of endeavour. And one would agree with the Anglo-American New Critic’s
view that a work of art has meaning both within and outside the text. The element of subjectivity cannot be
side-tracked. Every writer recreates external impressions through his own eyes. In other words, “I” and “eye”
are interchangeable. No individual sees subjectivity as the eye of the other would see. The subjective “I” here
evokes all the human faculties with which man apprehends the world around him.
Jonathan Culler (1983, p. 51) in Lexican Universal Encyclopedia defined “image” and imagery in literary
criticism as: “The representations produced in the mind by verbal descriptions and for the descriptions or
characterizations themselves, since the mental picture or images may be thought of either as separate from
words or as integral features of verbal characterizations”.
Furthermore, he says: “Images can be classified according to the sense to which they appeal-visual,
auditory, gustatory, tactile, or olfactory and by the sphere of influence from which they are drawn such as
religious, agricultural, scientific or domestic” (Culler, 1983, p. 51).
There are three features that can be seen from the above definition and which seem basic to images. They
are:
(a) Sense perception;
(b) Words employed to create images;
(c) Perception of images via concrete object within contexts.
Moreover, these features are also present in the definition of images by Mordi (1979, p. 3). In Image
Formation and Cognition, he says: “any thought representation that has a sensory quality we call an image”.
Also, “a person can describe an image in many ways, including information about contents, vividness,
clarity, colour, shapes, movement, foreground and background characteristics and other spatial relations”
(Mordi, 1979, p. 3).
Moreover, Mordi (1979, p. 3) went further to categorise images into four places as follows:
(a) Images categorized by vividness, e.g., thought;
(b) Images categorized by content, e.g., dream;

(c) Images categorized by interaction with perception, e.g., illusion;
(d) Images categorized by context.
One can note that before images can be classified, they must have similar natures. Also, they should be
illustrative of the same ideas or with little differences. Mordi stresses that images are subject to various
interpretations based on individual experiences. It is the various interpretations to which an image can be put
that Susan M. Keane (1996, p. 11) had stressed in her definition of images in Images and Theme: Studies in
Modern French Fiction.
She defines images generally as: “an analogical statement transmitting a sense impression: but in practice
the use of materials elements in figurative language present as many variations as there are writers”.
With the categorization of images into several places, the following few sections shall be limited to the
realm of space and objects. This choice is determined by the fact that space and objects in Armah’s fictive
world and other works seem to give internal fabric to each novel and also to convey vividly the main message.
In the Beginning
In the beginning, nature with all its other resources was created, such as human, animals, plants, and
material and mineral resources inclusive. Different people all over the world were situated in their divers homes
which became their indigenous and socio-cultural milieu. The blacks, whites, Asians, and Arabs, all lived in
their domains. However, the natural instinct or intuitive force by human beings propels them to hunt for food,
better shelter and means of survival. This is the muse for migration. Each people were endowed with
sustainable means that when explored and fully utilised, will produce wealth by way of exchange through trade
and culture. This informed the trans-Sahara trade and cause for migration. As much as human beings desire to
sustain themselves both for the present and the future, what truly is their intent for expedition and exploration?
Is it humanitarian, capitalism, religious, economic, war, occupation, and fame, such as Beowulf in the
Anglo-Saxon literature, or what?
Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, the name of his master which he adopted at the beginning of his
slavery ordeal in his autobiography, Equiano’s Travels (The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah
Equiano or Gustavus Vassa the African) first gives us an account of his socio-cultural, religious, and economic
milieu.
Our land is uncommonly rich and fruitful, and produces all kinds of vegetables in great abundance. We have plenty of
Indian corn, and vast quantities of cotton and tobacco. Our pineapples grow without culture; they about the same size of
the largest sugar-loaf and finely flavoured. We have also spices of different kinds, particularly pepper, and a variety of
delicious fruits which I have never seen in Europe, together with the gums of various kinds and honey in abundance. All
our industry is exerted to improve those blessings of nature. Agriculture is our chief employment, and everyone, even
children and women, are engaged in it. (Equiano, 1789, p. 7)
In order to buttress Olaudah Equaino’s claim, Walter Rodney asserts that, The United Nations Survey of
Economic Conditions in Africa up to 1964 had this to say about the continent’s natural resources:
Africa is well endowed with mineral and primary energy resources. With an estimated 9 percent of the world’s
population, the region accounts for approximately 28 percent of the total value of world mineral production and 6 percent
of its crude petroleum output. In recent years, its share of the latter is increasing. Of sixteen important metallic and
non-metallic minerals the share of Africa in ten varies from 22 to 95 percent of the world population. (Equiano, 1789, p. 20)
Symbolically, the land is blessed with milk and honey1 and has both food crops and cash crops, such as
cotton and tobacco. Quite sadly, Olaudah Equaino with his sister was kidnapped. He was kidnapped at the age
of eleven and his sister at the age of eight. He reminisces thus,
One day, when only I and my sister were left to mind the house, two men and a woman got over our walls, and in a
moment seized us both, and without giving us time to cry out or make resistance they stopped our mouths and ran off with
us into the nearest wood. (Equiano, 1789, p. 16)
In this first instance of kidnapping, who were the kidnappers? They are fellow black acting as agents for
the whites after being induced with gifts of fire arms, alcoholic drinks, and few other articles of trade.
Moreover, Eyeh (1995, p. 48) observed in Two Thousand Seasons, the white destroyers who come through the
sea come in ships. The ships are so large that they are used for conveying articles of commercial value. The
ships therefore symbolise the exploitation of the blacks and the exportation of the economic materials from the
land of the blacks to the country of the whites. In addition, inside these are store houses where gun powders are
kept and also, large guns and chains to destroy the black slaves or the blacks who are yielding to the authority
of the whites or their agents. Here, the ship is a symbol of destruction. But the boats in the ship which are used
to convey the captured black slaves from the ship to land are all symbols of freedom and escape from the
torture of the whites.
The various means by which the Arab predators, the white destroyers in Two Thousand Seasons and the
blacks make their movements to cover long distances depict a difference in the experiences of the three races.
The Arabs might have journeyed across the desert on horses or on camels. Meanwhile, the white destroyers
journey over the sea in ships and the blacks have to walk on their feet. Both the Arabs horses or camels and the
white destroyers’ ships can move faster from their lands to the land of the black men to rob the blacks of their
wealth and destroy them psychologically through the use of religion and of physical violence (Eyeh, 1995, pp.
48-49).
In the earlier part of the novel, the blacks have to escape from the predatory activities of the Arabs in the
desert by walking towards the land of the rising sun. Walking will no doubt be torturous, but it marks the
genesis of the escape from the parasitic way of living. In the beginning of chapter three titled, “The Slave Ship”,
in the novel Equaino gives us the vivid picture of another form of human degradation.
The first object which saluted my eyes when I arrived on the coast as the sea, and a slave ship which was then riding
at anchor and waiting for its cargo (emphasis mine). These filled me with astonishment, which was soon converted into
terror when I was carried on board. I was immediately handled and tossed up to see if I were sound bysome of the crew,
and I was now persuaded that I had gotten into a world of bad spirits and that they were going to kill me. (Equiano, 1789, p.
25)
What is the cargo referred to, humans as slaves to be packed as indicated in Figures l and 2 and not goods.
1
See Exodus 3:8, The Holy Bible where God promised to use Moses to bring the children of Israel to the Promised Land that has
abundant resources, that is, milk and honey.
Figure 1. A slave caravan en route to be transported (Source: Inikori, 1978, p. 6).
Figure 2. Slaves close-packed on a ship taking them (Source: Inikori, 1978, p. 7).
Regrettably too, Inikori notes that, there is scarcely any evidence with which to estimate the number of
people killed when slaves were acquired through military actions or raids. Nor is there at present any evidence
on the basis of which the numbers of people lost in the tedious journey to the final export markets can be
estimated (Inikori, 1978, p. 6).
Equaino (1789) further asserted that some of the captives were shipped to North America, while he and
some others to Europe. In his words, we understand his first port of call in Europe.
We were landed up a river a good way from the sea, about Virginia County, where we saw few or none of our native
Africans and not one soul who could talk to me. I was a few weeks weeding grass and gathering stones in a plantation, and
at last my companions were distributed (emphasis mine) different ways and only small was left. (p. 33)
Why the use of the diction distributed, as if they were goods, or cargo as earlier referred to and not posted
or deployed which will be in tune with human resource management? Ofonagoro (1978, p. 62) further gave the
image of African slave in North America. According to him,
Virginia was the first English-speaking North American colony to import African labour. In the 1630s, planters in
Maryland began to import African slave labour. In 1669, the constitution of Carolina conferred on every free man of that
colony ‘absolute power and authority over his negro-slaves,’ and in 1750, Georgia adopted the use of slave labour as the
principal means of developing agriculture in that colony. Slavery was thus well established in the North American South
by 1750.
There now exists an absurdity. The slaves captured from their endowed environments, who work on their
own fields, now work in foreign fields in order to boost the economic and agricultural development of those
countries: Europe and America. Further to this, Europe became interested in ivories which are symptomatic of
other mineral resources in Africa. Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness and Other Stories is a lucid example of
the expedition to Africa and the commissioning of agents to make their mission possible. First, Marlow, one of
the main characters and who is the alter ego of the author as narrator, tells us about both the land and the
people.
Land in a swamp, much through the woods, and in some inland post feel the savagery, the utter savagery, had closed
round him all that mysterious life of the wilderness that stirs in the forest, in the jungles, in the heart of wild men. (Conrad,
1995, p. 6)
This claim by Conrad has been in witting manner through creative writing as counter discourse opposed
by Chinua Achebe in Things Fall Apart (1958) that Africans are not savages. At one of the out stations, Marlow
is told that Mr. Kurtz is the chief provider or agent of ivory.
“In the interior you will no doubt meet Mr. Kurtz.” On my asking who Mr. Kurtz was, he said he was a first-class
agent; [...] “He is a very remarkable person.” Further questions elicited from him that Mr. Kurtz was at present in charge of
a trading post, a very important one, in the true ivory country, at “the very bottom of there. Sends in as much ivory as all
others put together…” (Conrad, 1995, p. 18)
Meanwhile, the European company that has employed Marlow and commissioned him to go into the forest
to take ivories has made him to sign an undertaking not “to disclose any trade secrets” (Conrad, 1995, p. 10).
He puts it succinctly thus,
This devoted band called itself the Eldorado Exploring Expedition, and I believe they were sworn to secrecy. Their
talk, however, was the talk of sordid buccaneers: it was reckless without hardihood, greedy without audacity, and cruel
without courage; there was not an atom of foresight or of serious intention in the whole batch of them, and they did not
seem aware these things are wanted for the work of the world. (Conrad, 1995, p. 30)
Charles Nnolim (2005, as cited in Arthol Fugard, 1973) buttressed this point about Marlow’s initiation
into the company’s secretes in this manner;
In rites de passage, after initiation comes transformation of the hero. With Marlow’s initiations into the mysteries of
the jungle over which Kurtz presided comes knowledge. He finds Kurtz in the African jungle but at the point of discovery
two things happen: Kurtz looks within his depraved soul and discovers himself, while Marlow, in discovering Kurtz,
achieves a self-knowledge that proves to be an awareness of the blackness within the human heart coupled with the
discovery of the universality of evil in the world. (p. 86)
It has become expedient to allow some of the characters in the books examined to speak in order to reveal
objectivity, and reality, rather than bandied words by the author. If one must ask, what is it about the company
or agent? Again, what is it about the plurality of these trading companies in their outer posts, especially Africa?
The raid on Benin Kingdom in 1879 led to the carting away of the artefacts in the King’s palace.
Ayi Kwei Armah, in one of his novels The Beautiful Ones Are Not Yet Born, delineates the transition from
colonialism to post-colonialism or post-independent periods in Africa, and in particular, Ghana when he talked
about the various European companies. Armah narrates how the Man, a faceless character and a victim of
poverty and suppression perceives some of the companies as he walks along the road to his place of work at the
railway station.
He passed by the U.T.C., the G.N.T.C., the U.A.C., and the French C.F.A.O. The shops had been there all the time, as
far back as he could remember. The G.N.T.C., of course, was regarded as a new thing, but only the name had really
changed with Independence. The shop had always been there, and in the old days it had belonged to a rich Greek and was
known by his name, A. G. Leventis. So in a way the thing was new. Yet the stories that were sometimes heard about it
were not stories of something young and vigorous, but the same old stories of money changing hands and throats getting
moistened and palms getting greased. Only this time if the stories aroused any anger, there was nowhere for it to go. The
sons of the nation were now in charge, after all. How completely the new thing took after the old. (Armah, 1968, pp. 9-10)
Armah hinges on corruption, “money changing hands and throats getting moistened and palms getting
greased”. Besides, he gives us the ironical scenario of African leaders, “The sons of the nation” who are not
different from the colonial masters.
African Migrants or Immigrants in the Contemporary Times

For the purpose of clarity in order to avoid ambiguity in this work, contemporary epoch is not
synonymous with modern period which dates back to the beginning of the 20th century, 1901 (after the death of
Queen Victoria), but means any period following the independence of African States (majority from 1950s and
1960s). With most African countries attaining independence, it behooves them the responsibility to ensure
self-governance politically, economically, culturally, and scientifically thereby improving the lot of their
citizens. Ayi Kwei Armah therefore sets a good tone but satirical, when he titled his novel, The Beautiful Ones
are Not Yet Born as an indictment of the “new” but poor leadership by those who steer the ship of governance.
Armah, beside using the image of companies to satirise corruption, uses money which is the bane of
insincerity on the part of African leaders for good governance and development. Since corruption has taken
over the day, the gains from each country’s mineral and material resources end up in few private pockets and
conducive economic environment is not being put in place for the establishment of industries that can arrest
unemployment, poverty, robberies, kidnapping, and other heinous crimes. Moreover, since African
governments have neither provided for conducive environment for businesses to thrive (in terms of availability
of water, electricity, good roads, and security), nor been able to harness their natural resources for production
purposes and explore for examples, human capital development through education, prevention of illegal mining,
smuggling, pollution, deforestation, inflation, and underdevelopment set in.
Human beings are then faced with survival instincts. Abject poverty, starvation, and safety therefore drive
migration, especially illegal migrants. War and lack of peace also drive migrants to find a safe haven
somewhere else. Figure 3 shows illegal migrants into Europe off Libyan coast.
Figure 3. Breaking The Aquarius@SOSMedIntl@MSF_Sea successfully rescued two boats in distress in international
waters off Libya this morning: first an overloaded wooden boat carrying many women and children, then a rubber boat
rescued in cooperation (Source:
https://www.google.com.ng/search?q=sos+mediterranee&rlz=1C1RLNS_enNG806NG806&source=lnms&tbm=isch&
sa=X&ved=).
In addition, migrants are ready to risk their lives with the hope for a better future in Europe and America
where there are functional systems of governance. Survival instinct make migrants to swallow pride, throw
away self-consciousness just as Buntu (a character) in Arthol Fugard’s Sizwe Bansi is Dead, a South African
Play, who impersonates a dead man, and uses his work permit to earn a living because he has to fend for his
family back at home. Are migrants not involved in impersonation and the employment of fake documents in
their desperate bids to escape from despicable conditions in their countries to Europe and America?
In Akachi Adimora-Ezeigbo’s Trafficked (2008), Nneoma, a female character and the heroine of the novel,
narrates (by telling her friends, Efe) how she left home (in Nigeria).
For personal reasons, I fled from home one Friday morning without telling my family. A friend and classmate had
told me some weeks before that that some people had helped her secure a teaching appointment in the United Kingdom
and she would introduce me to them and I could come with her. (Adimora-Ezeigbo, 2008, p. 126)
Most migrants are often lured with the promises of heaven on earth in European countries, but little did
they know that they would be enslaved by a cartel as accomplices in crime against humanity, especially, the
women into prostitution. Furthermore, Nneoma gives us her experience, “We were six young women between
the ages of seventeen and twenty. They tell us we will have plenty of time to pay back our debts to the agency
when we start earning money” (Adimora-Ezeigbo, 2008, p. 127).
Nneoma goes on to give her experience about sex trafficking.
In Italy, I discovered I am trafficked. I have no say in the matter. There’s a woman called madam Dollar-nothing
comes between her and money. She owns us and the man, whom we learn to call Captain, is her bodyguard. She keeps us
prisoner in her flat. Life is hell in Rome―we are always walking the night, selling sex to Italian men and foreigners. I hate
Madam Dollar. As soon as we arrive, she sells my friend. I have not set eyes on her since. (Adimora-Ezeigbo, 2008, pp.
128-129)
The unfortunate situation about the victims of trafficking is that their dreams never get realized and added
to the sad situations is the complicity between parties to unleash inhumanity against their fellow blacks. How
legal is the stay of these migrants in Europe? Migration will be legal if it is conducted through official
procedures of application for stay, through visa, naturalisation, educational pursuits, and employment of
technical and skilled labour.
The Arab predators in Two Thousand Seasons regard sex as food to be consumed always. It is the usual
thing for them to scream and shout about during the period of their orgies. Some of them like Hussein, twin
brother of Hassan, and the syphilitic would have more than one black woman at a time. To the Arab predators,
sex is an object of conquest and pleasure. If sex is the object of conquest and pleasure to the Arabs, it is a
symbol of revolt to the black women with whom the Arabs have sex. For example, Azania uses a spear to kill
Faisal, an Arab predator while he is in the throes of his sexual ecstasy. We can see that sex is pleasurable to
certain categories of people, usually those of the higher class (Eyeh, 1995, pp. 63-64).
Table 1 shows African immigrants’ (US) in the 2000-2010 American community survey (from more than
1,000 people).
Table 1
African Immigrants’ (US) Ancestries in the 2000-2010 American Community Survey (From More Than 1,000
People)
2000 (% of US 2010 (% of US
Ancestry 2000 2010
population) population)
Nigerian 162,938 negligible (no data) 264,550 negligible (no data)
Egyptian 142,832 negligible (no data) 197,000 negligible (no data)
Cape Verdean 77,103 negligible (no data) 95,003 negligible (no data)
Ethiopian 68,001 negligible (no data) 202,715 negligible (no data)
Ghanaian 49,944 negligible (no data) 91,322 negligible (no data)
South African 44,991 negligible (no data) 57,491 negligible (no data)
Moroccan 38,923 negligible (no data) 82,073 negligible (no data)
Somali 36,313 negligible (no data) 120,102 negligible (no data)
Eritrean 18,917 negligible (no data) negligible (no data)
Kenyan 17,336 negligible (no data) 51,749 negligible (no data)
Sudanese 14,458 negligible (no data) 42,249 negligible (no data)
Sierra Leonean 12,410 negligible (no data) 16,929 negligible (no data)
Algerian 8,752 negligible (no data) 14,716 negligible (no data)
Cameroonian 8,099 negligible (no data) 16,894 negligible (no data)
Senegalese 6,124 negligible (no data) 11,369 negligible (no data)
Congolese More than 5,488 negligible (no data) 11,009 negligible (no data)
Tunisian 4,735 negligible (no data) negligible (no data)
Ugandan 4,707 negligible (no data) 12,549 negligible (no data)
Zimbabwean 4,521 negligible (no data) 7,323 negligible (no data)
Ivorian 3,110 negligible (no data) negligible (no data)
Gambian 3,035 negligible (no data) negligible (no data)
Guinea 3,016 negligible (no data) negligible (no data)
Libyan 2,979 negligible (no data) negligible (no data)
Tanzanian 2,921 negligible (no data) negligible (no data)
Malian 1,790 negligible (no data) negligible (no data)
Togolese 1,716 negligible (no data) negligible (no data)
Angolan 1,642 negligible (no data) negligible (no data)
(table 1 continued)
2000 (% of US 2010 (% of US
Ancestry 2000 2010
population) population)
Zambian 1,500 negligible (no data) negligible (no data)
Rwandan 1,480 negligible (no data) negligible (no data)
African 1,183,316 negligible (no data) 1,676,413 negligible (no data)
Western African 6,810 negligible (no data) negligible (no data)
4,544 (“North Africans”:
North African/Berber negligible (no data) negligible (no data)
3,217; “Berbers”: 1,327)
negligible (no data) negligible (no data)
Total 940,000 0.2% NA NA
Note. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African_immigration_to_the_United_States.
It is easy to compute immigrants who are legitimately inhabited in the US since they have legal stay, but,
illegal immigrants would avoid the legal authorities except when camped as refugees. This set of legitimate
immigrants as Diaspora according to Makumi Mwagiru, left voluntarily for education, and later in search of
greener pastures (2012, p. 78). This paper considers the illegal immigrants who would take all the risks to get to
their destinations because they believe that the end will justify the means and some of the reasons for their
migration. Diasporas’ movement is now self-initiated an absurdity.
Who Is or Are the Fox or Foxes?

This question was earlier posed in this chapter. The concept of an African philosophy of the fox or foxes
to be chased away before reprimanding the chicken emanates from a Yoruba proverbial saying. But who is the
fox or who are the foxes? The fox or foxes can be explained as whosoever has or those with the intent and
purpose of harming, exploiting, and enslaving humanity. The foxes are found not only among the whites, who
enslaved the blacks, but the blacks who equally exploit their citizens while in government and those who
collude to enslave their fellow blacks. The innocent chickens are the victims of enslavement and those who
promote humanity. They are also found among both blacks and whites.
For example, in Figure 3, the SOS Mediterranean team of Europe rescues migrants on humanitarian
grounds, while African immigrants in the US have been made possible on humanitarian grounds through the
Diversity Immigrant Visa or the green card lottery. Thus, Africa should not continue to drum the drum of blame
since their countries’ mismanagement has led to the predicament of migration after independence.
From Fiction to Facts

According to James Tar Tsaaior, since a carnival of voices exists outside the centre of the textual narrative
incarnating in turn, a carnival of meanings or significations and has multiple centres, there is necessarily a
mergedness of fiction with fact and fact with fiction (2005, p. 12). Since Ayi Kwei Armah (1979) alluded to the
contact between blacks and the Arabs, especially the black women in Two Thousand Season of note are the sex
game or pleasures involved in this contact. Since literature alludes to history, the title of Chapter “From Fiction
to Facts” establishes realism. Hunwick (1978, p. 27) observed that
Slaves of different ethnic groups acquired reputations from different qualities. The Zanj and the “Sudan” were
regarded as best for the more physical demanding tasks and the women were good wet-nurses. They were less appreciated
as concubines, though in North Africa in particular they must have played this role extensively. Nubian men (from the
central Nile valley) were regarded as very trustworthy and were used as doormen, guards and financial assistants. Their
women were highly esteemed as concubines. The twelfth-century geographer al-Idrisi writes rapturously of them:
Their women are of surpassing beauty. They are circumcised and fragrant smelling... their lips are thin, their mouths
small and their hair flowing. Of all black women they are best for the pleasures of the bed... It is an account of these
qualities of theirs that the rulers of Egypt were so desirous of them and outbid others to purchase them, afterwards
fathering children from them.
Similar virtues are attributed to Abyssinian women who, in spite of their weak constitutions, were greatly
sought after in Egypt, Arabia, and the Levant, for in addition to their beauty, their bodies were “cool” and they
were excellent housekeepers (Hunwick, 1978, p. 27).
Sex then becomes an article of trade. Sometimes, the women may not have derived pleasures themselves
initially, but as time went on, the initiative to market their bodies grow as a result of poverty and lack of care in
their homes and home countries. In Nigeria,
According to the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Nigeria was claimed to
be one of the leading African countries in human trafficking with cross-border and internal trafficking. Human trafficking
is a way to exploit women and children for cheap labour and prostitution as an opportunity to help themselves out of
poverty. (https.//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_trafficking-in-Nigeria)
Through one of its several crime prevention agencies, Nigeria combats illegal migration in persons and
trafficking by ensuring that this agency, National Agency for Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP)
collaborates extensively with the countries of destination of traffickers in order to stem the tide of movements.
However, the influx of Nigerian traffickers and other Africans has not been permanently curtailed. Perhaps, one
could ask, why?
Again, Nigeria is used as an example.
Nigeria has one of the world’s highest economic growth rates, averaging 7.4% according to the Nigeria economic
report released in July 2014 by the World Bank. Poverty still remains significant at 33.1% in Africa’s biggest economy.
For a country with massive wealth and a huge population to support commence, a well developed economy, and plenty of
natural resources such as oil, the level of poverty remains unacceptable. (“Poverty in Nigeria” From Wikipedia, the free
encyclopaedia)
The image created by both the economic growth rate and poverty index is ironical, quite absurd. A country
with massive wealth walloping in abject poverty is a monstrosity. Her citizens, whose living standards are at a
very low ebb, will definitely seek refuge and succour somewhere else. Furthermore, the implication of the
Nigeria situation vis a vis other African countries whose economic growth rate and wealth cannot be compared
with that of Nigeria, will also have their citizens migrating to Europe and America.
Conclusion
This paper concludes that migration is a natural phenomenon. However, its legitimacy should be
established through diplomatic means between nations for educational purposes, skill development, networking,
security, trade and commerce, information technology (IT), cultural exchanges, among others for the sake of
promoting humanity. Furthermore, in this paper, it has been observed that from the origin of migration till the
present time, there are myriads of absurdities. These absurdities include Africans leaving their once free natural
and endowed environments to do the same farming or menial jobs in their Diaspora, getting on ships which in
the genesis were used to take them as slaves by all means, risking their lives against the vagaries of weather on
high seas and desert to get to Europe and America and no positive impact of self-governance upon the
attainment of independence. However, there is a dramatic turn in events, as the one time slave masters, now
give humanitarian services to war refugees, migrants, aids, and grants to the home countries of migrants. The
examination of the different texts from pre-colonial to colonial, post-colonial and contemporary times portrays
political criticism and realism as literary theories. This paper also adopts images/symbolism as a theoretical
base for the understanding and interpretation of meaning in the selected works.
In addition to the suggestion made for good diplomatic ties between nations, whatever can promote
humanity should be embarked upon by several Non-governmental organizations, such as The Red Cross, SOS
Mediterranean, United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), UK-Aid, United States
Agency for International Development (USAID), United Nations Industrial Development Organization
(UNIDO), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), World Bank, among others in order to stem the tide
of immigrants. The Security Council should help to strengthen peace treaties between groups and among
nations. The home countries of migrants and the African Union should have collaborative efforts towards skill
development programmes, develop economic policies for nation building, and establish agencies to stem the
tide of migrants.
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International Relations

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Aims and Scope:

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David Publishing Company

Editorial Board Members of International Relations and Diplomacy:

Operationalizing Cultural Autonomy in International Law as a Form of Effective

Al Qaeda Origins, Ideology, Goals and Future 464

Iranian Foreign Policy

Africans and the New Diaspora 485

Operationalizing Cultural Autonomy in International Law as a

The Object of the Analysis and the Methodology

International Human Rights Standards on Cultural Autonomy

The Slovak System of Support for Minority Cultures

Slovakia’s Support for Minority Cultures in the Light of International Requirements

The 2017 Law on the Financing of Minority Cultures

The Need for and the Purpose of Cultural Autonomy

The Qualitative Indicators of Autonomy

Evaluating the Slovak Law on Autonomy

Evaluating the International Standards

Al Qaeda Origins, Ideology, Goals and Future

Ideology and Motivations

Aim and Ambitions

considered and approved ‘military’ matters” (PBS Frontline, n.d. p. 1).

Figure 1. Seattle times. (Source: http://old.seattletimes.com/news/nation-world/crisis/terrorism/binladen_18.html).

Strategies and Tactics

the tens of thousands.

Figure 2. Al Qaeda map council on foreign relations.

Iranian Foreign Policy During Rouhani Presidency: Perspective

The Structure of Iran’s Foreign Policy-Making Apparatus

formulators of the country’s external orientation.

The Nuclear Issue and Rouhani Policy

Consensual Nature of Rouhani Foreign Policy

Iran’s Regional Policy: An Overview

Rouhani Foreign Policy and the United States

Rouhani Policy After US Withdrawal From JPCOA

Rouhani Foreign Policy in the West Asian Region

Rouhani Policy Towards the Arab World

The Rouhani Administration Approach Towards Turkey and Israel

Africans and the New Diaspora

Keywords: Africans, Diaspora, myths, images, fiction

Conceptual and Theoretical Frame work

(b) Images categorized by content, e.g., dream;

Figure 1. A slave caravan en route to be transported (Source: Inikori, 1978, p. 6).

African Migrants or Immigrants in the Contemporary Times

Who Is or Are the Fox or Foxes?

From Fiction to Facts

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