Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-31695 November 26, 1929

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SIA TEB BAN (alias JUAN TONINO, alias JUAN ANTONIO, alias PEDRO ANTONIO), defendant-appellant.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

Found guilty of qualified theft and habitual delinquency, the defendant was sentenced by the municipal court of Manila and on appeal, by the
Court of First Instance of this City, to two years, four months, and one day presidio correccional, with costs, and to the additional penalty of
twenty-one years' imprisonment.

He now contends that he is not guilty of the crime with which he is charged.

But it has been proved that he took the watch described in the information without the owner's consent, having been overtaken a few moments
later by a friend of the offended party, who found the stolen watch on the appellant. It is alleged that animus lucrandi has not been proved. We
find it sufficiently established, as the acts of the accused (one's intention may be gathered from one's deeds) unequivocally show. 1awphil.net

It is a fundamental doctrine of law that the act penalized by the law is presumed to be voluntary unless contrary is shown (art. 1, Penal Code). And
from the appellant's felonious acts, freely and deliberately executed, the moral and legal presumption of a criminal and injurious intent arises
conclusively and indisputably, in the absence of evidence to the contrary (sec. 334, No. 2, Act No. 190).

In view of the fact that we find no merit in this appeal and that the law provides for the imposition of accessory penalties, the appealed judgment is
modified, the appellant being sentenced to the accessory penalties provided in article 58 of the Penal Code, the said judgment being affirmed in all
other respects, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10005 November 9, 1914
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANDRES MANLUCO, ET AL., defendants.
ANDRES MANLUCO, appellant.

MORELAND, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Bataan convicting the accused of the crime of robbery and
sentencing him to three years eight months and one day of presidio correccional, to the accessories provided by law, to the restitution of the
timber stolen or its value, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay half the costs.

The information charges: "That on or about the 16th day of October, 1913, in the municipality of Hermosa, Province of Batan, Philippine Islands,
the accused [Ramon M. Velez and Andres Manluco], together with three other persons unknown, voluntarily, illegally, and criminally, with intent to
gain, and employing force and intimidation, took, stole, carried away, and appropriated to their own use one piece of narra timber about 4 meters
long and 60 centimeters thick, the property of Teodoro David, which timber was in the custody and under the control of Sabas Fonseca, an
employee of said Teodoro David, the value of said stick of timber being P70."

It is claimed in this case that the timber in question belonged to Teodoro David and that the accused committed robbery in removing it from his
possession. We find, however, from all the evidence in the case, that the accused has proved sufficient to deprive his act of criminality. He has
shown that, at the time of taking the timber, he in good faith believed that he was the owner thereof and that he took it openly and avowedly
under the claim. It is law as well as common sense that one who takes property openly and avowedly under claim of title preferred in good faith is
not guilty of robbery or of larceny even though the claim is not guilty of robbery or of larceny even though the claim of ownership is untenable.

Therefore, even if, in the case before us, the accused has not shown himself to be the owner of the timber in question, a question we do not
decide, enough has been presented to demonstrate good faith in his claim of ownership and that the taking was open and avowed. This is sufficient
to deprive the taking of all criminally even though it eventually transpire that Teodoro David and not the accused was the real owner.lawph!1.net

So far, however, as the record shows, it would appear that the accused has established a better right to the timber than the prosecuting witness. It
is not necessary in this case, however, as we have before intimated, to determine that the accused was actually the owner of the property. The
demonstration of good faith and the other elements necessary to deprive his act of criminality afford us sufficient basis for the reversal of the
judgment.

The judgment of conviction is reversed and the accused acquitted; costs de officio.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 127755 April 14, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO y PASCUAL, accused-appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J

ON AUTOMATIC REVIEW is the decision of the court a quo finding accused Joselito del Rosario y Pascual guilty as co-principal in the crime of
Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death, and to pay the heirs of victim Virginia Bernas P550,000.00 as actual damages and
P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages.1

Joselito del Rosario y Pascual, Ernesto Marquez alias "Jun," Virgilio Santos alias "Boy Santos" and John Doe alias "Dodong" were charged with the
special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide for having robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old businesswoman, of P200,000.00 in cash and
jewelry and on the occasion thereof shot and killed her.2

While accused Joselito del Rosario pleaded not guilty, 3 Virgilio "Boy" Santos and John Doe alias "Dodong" remained at large. Ernesto "Jun"
Marquez was killed in a police encounter. Only Joselito del Rosario was tried.

These facts were established by the prosecution from the eyewitness account of tricycle driver Paul Vincent Alonzo: On 13 May 1996 between 6:00
and 6:30 in the evening, Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the side of Nita's Drugstore, General Luna St., Cabanatuan City, when three women flagged
him. Parked at a distance of about one and a-half (1 1/2) meters in front of him was a tricycle driven by accused Joselito del Rosario. At that point,
Alonzo saw two (2) men and a woman grappling for possession of a bag. After taking hold of the bag one of the two men armed with a gun started
chasing a man who was trying to help the woman, while the other snatcher kicked the woman sending her to the ground. Soon after, the armed
man returned and while the woman was still on the ground he shot her on the head. The bag taken by the man was brought to the tricycle of
accused del Rosario where someone inside received the bag. The armed man then sat behind the driver while his companion entered the sidecar.
When the tricycle sped away Alonzo gave chase and was able to get the plate number of the tricycle. He also recognized the driver, after which he
went to the nearest police headquarters and reported the incident.4

Accused Joselito del Rosario gave his own version of the incident: At around 5:30 in the afternoon he was hired for P120.005 by a certain "Boy"
Santos,6 his co-accused. Their original agreement was that he would drive him to a cockpit at the Bias Edward Coliseum.7 However despite their
earlier arrangement Boy Santos directed him to proceed to the market place to fetch "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya. He (del Rosario)
acceded.8 Marquez and Bisaya boarded in front of the parking lot of Merced Drugstore at the public market.9 Subsequently, he was asked to
proceed and stop at the corner of Burgos and General Luna Sts. where Bisaya alighted on the pretext of buying a cigarette. The latter then accosted
the victim Virginia Bernas and grappled with her for the possession of her bag. Jun Marquez alighted from the tricycle to help "Dodong" Bisaya. 10
Accused del Rosario tried to leave and seek help but "Boy Santos" who stayed inside the tricycle prevented him from leaving and threatened in fact
to shoot him.

Meanwhile, "Dodong" Bisaya succeeded in taking the victim's bag, but before boarding the tricycle "Jun" Marquez mercilessly shot the victim on
the head while she was lying prone on the ground. After the shooting, "Dodong" Bisaya boarded the sidecar of the tricycle while "Jun" Marquez
rode behind del Rosario and ordered him to start the engine and drive towards Dicarma. While inside his tricycle, del Rosario overheard his
passengers saying that they would throw the bag at Zulueta St. where there were cogon grasses. 11 Upon arriving at Dicarma, the three (3) men
alighted and warned del Rosario not to inform the police authorities about the incident otherwise he and his family would be harmed. 12 Del
Rosario then went home. 13 Because of the threat, however, he did not report the matter to the owner of the tricycle nor to the barangay captain
and the police. 14

As earlier stated, the court a quo found accused Joselito del Rosario guilty as charged and sentenced him to death. He now contends in this
automatic review that the court a quo erred in: (1) Not finding the presence of threat and irresistible force employed upon him by his co-accused
Virgilio "Boy" Santos, Ernesto "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya; (2) Not considering his defense that he was not part of the conspiracy among
co-accused "Boy" Santos, "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya to commit the crime of Robbery with Homicide; (3) Not considering the violations on
his constitutional rights as an accused; and, (4) Not considering that there was no lawful warrantless arrest within the meaning of Sec. 5, Rule 113,
of the Rules of Court. 15

The conviction of del Rosario must be set aside. His claim for exemption from criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 5, Revised Penal Code as he acted
under the compulsion of an irresistible force must be sustained. He was then unarmed and unable to protect himself when he was prevented at
gunpoint by his co-accused from leaving the crime scene during the perpetration of the robbery and killing, and was only forced to help them
escape after the commission of the crime. 16

But the trial court ruled that his fear was merely speculative, fanciful and remote, hence, could not be considered uncontrollable; and that a gun
pointed at him did not constitute irresistible force because it fell short of the test required by law and jurisprudence. 17

We disagree. A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of
equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act
done by me against my will is not my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not
only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to
induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion
must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. 18

As a rule, it is natural for people to be seized by fear when threatened with weapons, even those less powerful than a gun, such as knives and
clubs. People will normally, usually and probably do what an armed man asks them to do, nothing more, nothing less. In the instant case, del
Rosario was threatened with a gun. He could not therefore be expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger. A person under the same
circumstances would be more concerned with his personal welfare and security rather than the safety of a person whom he only saw for the first
time that day. 19
Corollary with the defense of del Rosario, we hold that the trial court erred when it said that it was "Boy" Santos who left the tricycle to chase the
companion of the victim and then shot the victim on the head, instantly killing her. 20 A careful and meticulous scrutiny of the transcripts and
records of the testimonies of witness Alonzo and del Rosario himself, reveals that it was "Jun" Marquez who ran after the victim's helper and fired
at the victim. Witness Alonzo testified on direct examination —

Q: What was that unusual incident that transpired in that place at that time?
A: I saw two men and a lady grappling for the possession of a bag,
sir . . . .
Q: What happened after the bag of the lady was grabbed by the two men?
A: One helper of the lady was chased by the other man, sir.
Q: Who was that man who chased the helper of the lady?
A: He was the one holding the gun, sir . . . .
Q: What happened when the bag of the woman was already taken by the two men who grappled the same from her?
A: The man who chased the helper of the lady returned to the scene while the other man was then kicking the lady who in turn fell to the ground,
sir.
Q: What happened to the lady who fell to the ground?
A: The man who chased the helper of the lady returned and then shot the woman who was then lying on the ground, sir . . . .
Q: What about the bag, what happened to the bag?
A: The bag was taken to a motorcycle, sir.
Q: Will you please state before the the Court what you noticed from the tricycle which was at a distance of about one and a half meter?
A: There was a passenger inside the tricycle, sir . . . .
Q: What happened to that woman that was shot by the man who grappled for the possession of the bag?
A: She was no longer moving and lying down, sir.
Q: After the shooting by one of the two men of the woman what else happened?
A: They went away, sir . . . .
Q: Will you please tell the Court in what portion of the tricycle did these men sit in the tricycle?
A: The man who was holding the gun sat himself behind the driver while the other man entered the sidecar, sir.21

On the continuation of his direct examination, after an ocular inspection on the crime scene conducted by the trial court, witness Alonzo
categorically
stated —

Q: Will you please tell us where in particular did you see the accused who was then holding the gun fired at the victim?
A: At the time one man was kicking the victim it was then his other companion holding a gun chased the helper of the deceased going towards
Burgos Avenue, sir
Q: What happen (sic) afterwards?
A: The man with the gun returned and then while the victim was lying down in this spot the man holding a gun shot the victim, sir. 22

On cross-examination, the same witness further clarified —

Q: So, you saw the two other accused returned back to the tricycle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And one of their companion was already inside the tricycle?

xxx xxx xxx

Court: There was somebody inside the tricycle where the handbag was given.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And the one who sat at the back of the tricycle driver was the person with the gun?
A: Yes, sir. 23

On the other hand, accused Del Rosario declared during the direct examination that —
Q: . . . . On the evening of May 13, 1996 you were the driver of the tricycle as testified to by Eduardo Nalagon?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, you also heard that there was a shoot out near the Cathedral and the Nita's Drugstore at Gen. Tinio St.?
A: Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Court: At that time you were seated at the tricycle, which tricycle was used by the assailants?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Then what did you do?
A: I tried to escape, sir, but I was stopped by them.
Q: When you said "they" to whom are you referring?
A: Boy Santos and Jun Marquez, sir.
Q: And at that time where was Boy Santos?
A: He was inside the tricycle, sir.
Q: And what about Jun Marquez?
A: He alighted from the tricycle and helped him grabbed (sic) the bag of the victim.
Q: And was the bag grabbed and by whom?
A: Yes, sir, by Dodong Visaya was able to grab the bag.
Q: And after that what happened?
A: Both of them rode inside my tricycle, sir.
Court: Did you not see any shooting?
A: There was, sir.
Q: Who was shot?
A: Jun Marquez shot the woman, sir . . . .
Q: When the bag of the woman was being grabbed you know that what was transpiring was wrong and illegal?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But you did not try to leave?
A: I tried to leave but Boy Santos who was inside my tricycle prevented me.
Q: During that time before you leave (sic) how many firearms did you see?
A: Two firearms, sir, one in the possession of Boy (Jun?) Marquez and one in the possession of Boy Santos . . . .
Q: And at the time when the shooting took place where was Boy Santos?
A: He was still inside my tricycle, sir.
Q: And during the shooting when Boy Santos was inside the tricycle and when you tried to escape that was the time when Boy Santos threatened
you if you will escape something will happen to your family?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After the shooting who first boarded the tricycle, Boy (Jun?) Marquez or Dodong Visaya?
A: Dodong Visaya, sir.
Q: And immediately thereafter Jun Marquez boarded your tricycle sitting at your back?
A: Yes, sir. 24

On cross-examination, accused further stated —

Q: After stopping in that place for one minute what else happened?
A: I saw Dodong Bisaya grabbing the bag of the woman, sir.
Q: How about your two companions, what are (sic) they doing while Dodong Bisaya was grabbing the bag of the woman?
A: Jun Marquez was helping Dodong Bisaya, sir.
Q: What happened after Jun Marquez helped Dodong Bisaya?
A: I heard a gunshot and I saw the woman lying down . . . .
Q: You could have ran away to seek the help of the police or any private persons?
A: I was not able to ask for help because Boy Santos pointed his gun to me, sir.
Q: Was the gun being carried by Boy Santos, is the one that is used in shooting the old woman?
A: No, sir . . . .
Q: Where was Boy Santos when Dodong Bisaya and Jun Marquez were grappling for the possession of the handbag?
A: He was then inside the tricycle, sir . . . . 25
Q: Mr. Witness, you testified that the reason why you just cannot leave the area where the incident occurred is because a gun was pointed to you
by Boy Santos and he was telling you that you should not do anything against their will, they will kill you and your family will be killed also, is that
correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, is it not a fact that at the time you stop (sic) your tricycle which was loaded by your other three co-accused in this case, all of them alighted
and that Boy Santos ran after a helper of the victim going towards the public market along Burgos Street?
A: He did not alight from the tricycle, sir.

Court: Are you quite sure of that?

A: Yes, sir. 26

Del Rosario maintains that "Boy" Santos never left the tricycle and that the latter pointed his gun at him and threatened to shoot if he tried to
escape. He also asserts that it was "Jun" Marquez who shot the victim and sat behind him in the tricycle.

From the narration of witness Alonzo, these events stood out: that after the bag of the victim was grabbed, her male helper was chased by a man
holding a gun; that the gunwielder returned and shot the victim and then sat behind the driver of the tricycle; and, that the bag was given to a
person who was inside the tricycle. Taking the testimony of witness Alonzo in juxtaposition with the testimony of del Rosario, it can be deduced
that "Jun" Marquez was the person witness Alonzo was referring to when he mentioned that a helper of the lady was chased "by the other man,"
and that this "other man" could not be "Boy" Santos who stayed inside the tricycle and to whom the bag was handed over. This conclusion gives
credence to the claim of del Rosario that "Boy" Santos never left the tricycle, and to his allegation that "Boy" Santos stayed inside the tricycle
precisely to threaten him with violence and to prevent him from fleeing; that there could have been no other plausible reason for "Boy" Santos to
stay in the tricycle if the accused was indeed a conspirator; that "Boy" Santos could have just left the tricycle and helped in the commission of the
crime, particularly when he saw the victim grappling with "Dodong" Bisaya and resisting the attempts to grab her bag; and, that "Boy" Santos opted
to remain inside the tricycle to fulfill his preordained role of threatening del Rosario and insuring that he would not escape and leave them behind.
27

Even if the tricycle of del Rosario was only parked one meter and a half (1-1/2) in front of the tricycle of witness Alonzo, the latter still could not
have totally seen and was not privy to events that were transpiring inside the vehicle, i.e., the pointing of the gun by "Boy" Santos at del Rosario
simultaneously with the robbing and shooting of the victim. From the exhibits submitted by the prosecution panel the back of the sidecar of del
Rosario tricycle was not transparent. 28

There is no doubt that the fear entertained by del Rosario because of the gun directly pointed at him was real and imminent. Such fear rendered
him immobile and subject to the will of Boy Santos, making him for the moment an automaton without a will of his own. In other words, in effect,
he could not be any more than a mere instrument acting involuntarily and against his will. He is therefore exempt from criminal liability since by
reason of fear of bodily harm he was compelled against his will to transport his co-accused away from the crime scene.

On the issue of conspiracy, the trial court anchored del Rosario's conviction on his participation in the orchestrated acts of "Boy" Santos, "Jun"
Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya. According to the trial court, del Rosario facilitated the escape of the other malefactors from the crime scene and
conspiracy between accused and his passengers was evident because "while the grappling of the bag, the chasing of the helper of the victim and
the shooting that led to the death of Virginia Bernas were happening, accused Joselito del Rosario was riding on his tricycle and the engine of the
motor was running;" 29 that the "accused did not deny that the tricycle driven by him and under his control was hired and used by his co-accused
in the commission of the crime; neither did he deny his failure to report to the authorities the incident of robbery, killing and fleeing away from the
scene of the crime." 30

We disagree with the trial court. A conspiracy in the statutory language exists when two or more concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it. The objective of the conspirators is to perform an act or omission punishable by law. That must be their intent. There is need for
"concurrence of wills" or "unity of action and purpose" or for "common and joint purpose and design." Its manifestation could be shown by "united
and concerted action." 31
Admittedly, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy. Since by its nature conspiracy is planned in utmost secrecy, it can rarely be proved
by direct evidence. Consequently, the presence of the concurrence of minds which is involved in conspiracy may be inferred from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or more
persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a
conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. That would be termed an implied conspiracy. 32
Nevertheless, mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to
constitute one a party to a conspiracy, but that there must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. In fact, the same degree
of proof necessary to establish the crime is required to support a finding of the presence of a criminal conspiracy, which is, proof beyond
reasonable doubt. 33

In the instant case, while del Rosario admits that he was at the locus criminis as he was the driver of the getaway vehicle, he nonetheless rebuts the
imputation of guilt against him by asserting that he had no inkling of the malevolent design of his co-accused to rob and kill since he was not given
any briefing thereof. He was merely hired by Boy Santos to drive to an agreed destination and he was prevented at gunpoint from leaving the scene
of the crime since he was ordered to help them escape.

In this case, the trial court stated that "there is no evidence that the accused came to an agreement concerning the commission of the felony and
decided to commit the same." 34 Therefore, in order to convict the accused, the presence of an implied conspiracy is required to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. However, the fact that del Rosario was with the other accused when the crime was committed is insufficient proof to show
cabal. Mere companionship does not establish conspiracy. 35 The only incriminating evidence against del Rosario is that he was at the scene of the
crime but he has amply explained the reason for his presence and the same has not been successfully refuted by the prosecution. As stated earlier,
he feared for his safety and security because of the threat made by his co-accused that he would be killed should he shout for help. No complicity
can be deduced where there is absolutely no showing that the accused directly participated in the overt act of robbing and shooting although he
was with the persons who robbed and killed the victim. 36

That del Rosario did not disclose what he knew about the incident to the authorities, to his employer or to the barangay captain does not affect his
credibility. The natural hesitance of most people to get involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice. 37 It must be recalled that del Rosario was
merely a tricycle driver with a family to look after. Given his quite limited means, del Rosario understandably did not want to get involved in the
case so he chose to keep his silence. Besides, he was threatened with physical harm should he squeal.

Del Rosario further contends that there was violation of his right to remain silent, right to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice, and right to be informed of these rights as enshrined and guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. 38 As testified to by SPO4 Geronimo de
Leon, the prosecution witness who was the team leader of the policemen who investigated the 13 May incident, during his cross-examination —

Upon finding the name of the owner of the tricycle, they proceeded to Bakod Bayan in the house of the barangay captain where the owner of the
tricycle was summoned and who in turn revealed the driver's name and was invited for interview. The driver was accused Joselito del Rosario who
volunteered to name his passengers on May 13, 1996. On the way to the police station, accused informed them of the bag and lunch kit's location
and the place where the hold-uppers may be found and they reported these findings to their officers, Capt. Biag and Capt. Cruz. After lunch, they
proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma composed of 15 armed men where a shoot-out transpired that lasted from 1:00 to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. After
a brief encounter, they went inside the house where they found Marquez dead holding a magazine and a gun. While all of these were happening,
accused del Rosario was at the back of the school, after which they went back to the police station. The investigator took the statement of the
accused on May 14, 1996, and was only subscribed on May 22, 1996. All the while, he was detained in the police station as ordered by the Fiscal.
His statements were only signed on May 16, 1996. He also executed a waiver of his detention. His Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the
assistance of Ex-Judge Talavera. 39

A further perusal of the transcript reveals that during the encounter at Brgy. Dicarma, del Rosario was handcuffed by the police because allegedly
they had already gathered enough evidence against him and they were afraid that he might attempt to escape. 40

Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is
well-settled that it encompasses any question initiated by law enforces after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprive of his
freedom of action in any significant way. 41 This concept of custodial investigation has been broadened by RA 7438 42 to include "the practice of
issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed." Section 2 of the same Act
further provides that —

. . . . Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or in his place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the
commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known and understood by him, of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or
under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and
independent counsel by the investigating officer.

From the foregoing, it is clear that del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial investigation. From the time he was "invited" for
questioning at the house of the baranggay captain, he was already under effective custodial investigation, but he was not apprised nor made aware
thereof by the investigating officers. The police already knew the name of the tricycle driver and the latter was already a suspect in the robbing and
senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since the prosecution failed to establish that del Rosario had waived his right to remain silent, his verbal
admissions on his participation in the crime even before his actual arrest were inadmissible against him, as the same transgressed the safeguards
provided by law and the Bill of Rights.

Del Rosario also avers that his arrest was unlawful since there was no warrant therefor. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of provides: 43

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact
been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
It must be recalled that del Rosario was arrested by SPO4 De Leon during the police raid at the place of "Jun" Marquez at Brgy. Dicarma on 14 May
1996. In People vs. Sucro 44 we held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby,
and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, since the offense is
deemed committed in his presence or within his view. In essence, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the accused be caught in flagrante delicto
or caught immediately after the consummation of the act. The arrest of del Rosario is obviously outside the purview of the aforequoted rule since
he was arrested on the day following the commission of the robbery with homicide.

On the other hand, Sec. 5, par. (b), Rule 113, necessitates two (2) stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense
has just been committed; and, (2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had
committed it. Hence, there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed and the time of the arrest, and if
there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured. Aside from the
sense of immediacy, it is also mandatory that the person making the arrest must have personal knowledge of certain facts indicating that the
person to be taken into custody has committed the crime. 45 Again, the arrest of del Rosario does not comply with these requirements since, as
earlier explained, the arrest came a day after the consummation of the crime and not immediately thereafter. As such, the crime had not been
"just committed" at the time the accused was arrested. Likewise, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested had committed the offense since they were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime, and they became
aware of his identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.

However, the conspicuous illegality of del Rosario's arrest cannot affect the jurisdiction of the court a quo because even in instances not allowed by
law, a warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect and any objection thereto is waived when the person arrested submits to arraignment
without any objection, as in this case. 46

A transgression of the law has occurred. Unfortunately, an innocent person lost her life and property in the process. Someone therefore must be
held accountable, but it will not be accused Joselito del Rosario; we must acquit him. Like victim Virginia Bernas, he too was a hapless victim who
was forcibly used by other persons with nefarious designs to perpetrate a dastardly act. Del Rosario's defense of "irresistible force" has been
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. On the other hand, conspiracy between him and his co-accused was not proved beyond a whimper
of a doubt by the prosecution, thus clearing del Rosario of any complicity in the crime charged.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City convicting accused JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO Y PASCUAL of Robbery with
Homicide and sentencing him to death, is REVISED and SET ASIDE, and the accused is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. His immediate RELEASE
from confinement is ordered unless held for some other lawful cause. In this regard, the Director of Prisons is directed to report to the Court his
compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-
Santiago, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G. R. No. 139230 - April 24, 2003
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MANUEL DANIELA alias MANUEL DE LA CRUZ @ TAGALOG and JOSE BAYLOSIS y BAISAC,
appellants.

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision1 dated March 31, 1997 of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, in Criminal Case
No. CBU-42044, convicting appellants Manuel Daniela and Jose Baylosis of robbery with homicide, sentencing them to death and directing them to
pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of the victim Ronito Enero, the sum of P50,000 and to restitute to said heirs the cash and pieces of jewelry
taken by them.

The Antecedents

Ronito Enero and his common-law wife Maria Fe Balo and their three children: May, 4 years old, Joan, 3 years old, and Ronito, Jr., 1 year old,
resided in Sawang, Calero, Pasil, Cebu City. The couple eked out a living vending fish at the Pasil public market near their house. They employed Leo
Quilongquilong, the cousin of Maria Fe, as helper in their business and Julifer Barrera, a "tomboy" as their house help. Both lived with the couple.
Manuel Daniela had been a "barkada"; of Ronito in Dansalam, Davao City years back, while Imelda, Manuels wife, was Maria Fes friend and former
classmate.

On March 28, 1996, Manuel and Jose Baylosis arrived in Cebu City and stayed in the house of Joel Colejara in Pardo. Manuel and Jose went to the
market and met Maria Fe. The latter informed Manuel where she and Ronito lived. Since then, Manuel and Jose had been to the house of the
couple and Manuel was able to borrow money from them in the amount of P800.

At about 7:00 p.m. on March 30, 1996, Maria Fe was at the public market when she was asked by Roland Pedrejas alias "Potot" whether Manuel
was already in their house. She replied that she did not know. Later that evening, Maria Fe, Ronito, Leo and Julifer had just taken their dinner when
Manuel and Jose arrived. Manuel told Ronito that he wanted to borrow money from him and Maria Fe. The latter refused to lend Manuel the
money but she was prevailed upon by Ronito. Manuel, Jose and Ronito then had a drinking spree in the sala. Maria Fe and Julifer went to sleep in
the formers bedroom while Leo slept in the sala.

At about midnight, Maria Fe woke up and told Ronito, Manuel and Jose to sleep because she had to leave at one oclock early that morning. By
then, Ronito was already inebriated. She then spread mat in the sala for Manuel and Jose to sleep on. She and Ronito then went to their room and
slept.

At around 2:00 a.m. of March 31, 1996, Manuel, armed with a .38 caliber gun and holding a flourescent lamp, entered the bedroom of Ronito and
Maria Fe. He poked the said gun on Maria Fe. She woke up and attempted to stand up but Manuel ordered her to lie down. Jose, armed with a
knife followed Manuel to the bedroom. The latter ordered Jose to tie the hands of Maria Fe behind her back and put a tape on her mouth. Jose
complied. On orders of Manuel, Jose woke up Leo and brought him to the room. Jose tied the hands of Leo behind his back. Jose and Manuel then
divested Maria Fe of her necklace, rings and earrings. Manuel demanded that she give them her money but Maria Fe told them that she had used
her money to pay her partners in the fish vending business. Manuel and Jose did not believe Maria Fe. They ransacked the room but failed to find
money. Julifer woke up but Manuel and Jose threatened to kill her if she shouted. The two tied Julifers hands at her back. Manuel then threatened
to explode the grenade tucked under his shirt and kill Maria Fe, her family and their househelps if she refused to surrender her money. Petrified,
Maria Fe took the money from her waist pouch and gave the same to Manuel and Jose. Manuel took a blanket and ordered Jose to kill Ronito with
it. Jose went to the kitchen, got a knife, covered Ronito with the blanket and sat on top of him then stabbed the latter several times. Manuel also
stabbed Ronito on different parts of his body. Ronito could only groan like a dying pig. Manuel hit Ronito with the butt of his gun. Jose slit the
throat of Ronito and took the latters wristwatch and ring. Manuel then untied Julifer, removed her clothes and panties and then raped her. She
could do nothing but cry. Manuel and Jose stayed in the house until 4:00 a.m. Before they left, Manuel and Jose told Maria Fe that they were acting
on orders of Rolando Pedrejas, Joel Colejara, Grace Pabulacion and Juliet Capuno. They also warned her and Leo not to report the incident to the
police authorities, otherwise they will kill them and their family. Leo and Maria Fe managed to untie themselves and reported the incident to
Barangay Chairman Sergio Ocaña who conducted an on-the-spot investigation of the incident.

Dr. Jesus P. Cerna performed an autopsy on the cadaver and submitted his Necropsy Report:

POSTMORTEM FINDINGS

Normally developed, fairly nourished, male cadaver, in the state of rigor mortis. Pallor, marked, generalized; pupils, dilated. Livor [sic] mortis,
brownish most prominent at the neck, shoulder blades, buttocks and calves.

Abrasions, brownish; chin, mid-anterior aspect, 1.0 x 1.0 cm.; face, right, 1.0 x 0.2 cm.; face, left, 1.5 x 1.0 cm.

Incised wound, gaping, mid-frontal area, 2.0 x 0.3 cm.

Lacerated wounds; forehead, right, 3.0 x 1.5 cm.; face, left, 1.0 x 0.3 cm.

Stab wound:

Triangular in shaped [sic] 2.0 x 1.0 x 1.cm; extremities sharp, edges, clean-cut; forehead, left, just above eyebrow; directed backward, downward
and medially, involving the skin and the underlying soft tissues, making a punch-in fracture on the left frontal bone, attaining a depth of 3.0 cm.
(fracture on the left frontal bone is 2.0 cm. in length and not triangular in shaped [sic], and did not involved [sic] the whole thickness of the bone).

Stab wounds:

Six in number[s], all elliptical in shaped [sic] and of varying sizes, three with a length of 1.0 cm. and the other three with a length of 0.7, 0.6 and 0.4
cm.; one extremity of the six stab wounds, rounded, while the other extremities were sharp, and all edges clean-cut; located at the neck, anterior
aspect closed [sic] to each other; all were directed backward, downward and then either laterally or medially, involving the skin and the underlying
soft tissues, 3 stab wounds perforated the trachea and the other 3 stab wounds, incised the blood vessels, attaining depthness ranging from 1.5,
4.0, 4.5, 5.0 and 8.0 cms.
Stab wound:

Triangular in shaped [sic], 2.0 x 1.8 x 2.0 cm.. extremities sharp, edges clean-cut; right supra clavicular area, directed backward, downward and
medially, involving the skin and the underlying soft tissues, perforating the oarta [sic], attaining an approximated depth of 11.0 cm.

Stab wounds:

Three in number[s], all elliptical in shaped [sic], of varying sizes ranging from 2.5, 2.0 and 1.2 cm., one extremity rounded, other extremities sharp,
edges clean-cut; thoracic area, anterior aspect; one was directed backward, upward and laterally penetrating thoracic cavity, and perforating the
heart, with a depth of 8.0 cm.; other stab wound was directed backward, upward and medially, penetrating thoracic cavity, perforating the heart,
with a depth of 9.5 cm.; other stab wound was directed backward downward and medially, penetrating thoracic cavity, perforating the heart, with
a depth of 11.0 cm.

Stab wound

Elliptical, 1.8 cm. one extremity contused, other extremity sharp, edges clean-cut; arm, deltoid area; directed backward, upward and to the right,
involving the skin and the underlying soft tissues, attaining a depth of 4.5 cm.

Stab wound

Two in number[s], both elliptical in shaped [sic], with sizes of 2.0 and 1.0 cm.; one extremity contused, other extremity sharp, edges clean-cut;
thoracic area, right anterior aspect; one was directed backward, downward and medially, penetrating thoracic cavity, incising the upper lobe of the
right lung, attaining a depth of 10.0 cm.; other stab wound was directed backward then upwards and medially, involving the skin and the
underlying soft tissues, penetrating thoracic cavity, perforating the heart, attaining an approximated depth of 12.0 cm.

Stab wound

Four in number[s], all elliptical in shaped [sic], of varying sizes, ranging from 1.5, 1.7, 1.5 and 2.0 cm.; one of the extremities were [sic] sharp, the
others were contused, edges clean-cut; located at the thoraco-abdominal area, anterior aspect; directed backward, then either downward and
upwards and medially or laterally; one penetrated abdominal cavity and perforated the stomach, with a depth of 9.0 cm.; the other three incised
the sternum, and non-perforating with depthness ranging from 5.0, 2.0 and 1.5 cms.

Stab wound

Elliptical, 1.3 cm. long, one extremity contused, other extremity, sharp, edges clean-cut; abdomen, left anterior aspect; directed backward,
upwards and medially, penetrating abdominal cavity, perforating small intestine, attaining an approximated depth of 9.0 cm.

Stab wound

Elliptical, 1.5 cm. long, one extremity contused, other extremity sharp, edges clean-cut; abdomen, left antero-lateral aspect; directed backward,
upward and medially, involving the skin and the underlying soft tissues only, attaining a depth of 3.5 cm., non-perforating.

Stab wounds

Elliptical, 2.0 cm. long, one extremity contused, other extremity sharp, edges clean-cut; back, thoracic area, mid-posterior aspect; directed forward,
downwards and to the left, penetrating left thoracic cavity, perforating the heart, attaining a depth of 15.0 cm.

Stab wound

Elliptical, 3.2 cm. long, one extremity contused, other extremity sharp, edges clean-cut; back, left scapular area; directed forward, downward and
lateral, involving the skin and the underlying soft tissues only, attaining a depth of 4.0 cm.

Brain and other visceral organs, pale;

Hemothorax, approximately 2000 cc.

Hemoperitoneum, approximately 500 cc.

Stomach, full of food particles (positive for alcoholic odor).

CAUSE OF DEATH:

Hemorrhage, acute, severe, secondary to multiple stab wounds, forehead, neck, chest, abdomen and back.2

Dr. Cerna signed the Certificate of Death of Ronito.3

On July 17, 1996, an Information was filed against Manuel and Jose in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, which reads:

That on or about the 31st of March, 1996, about 2:00 a.m., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping each other, armed with bladed weapons and handguns, with deliberate
intent and with intent to kill, did then and there attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Ronito Enero by stabbing him on the vital parts
of his body with said bladed weapons, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries thus causing his instantaneous death, and with intent of gain,
did then and there take and carry away therefrom the following:

a) 1 gold necklace worth

P 7,000.00
b) 1 pair of gold earrings

1,100.00

c) 2 gold rings worth

3,800.00

d) cash amounting to

30,000.00

e) 1 Seiko wristwatch

900.00

f) 1 Seiko wristwatch

1,800.00

g) 1 gold ring worth

900.00

valued in all at P45,500.00, belonging to Ronito Enero and Maria Fe Balo, to the damage and prejudice of the owners in the amount of P45,500.00,
Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

When arraigned on October 17, 1996, both accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty.5

Thereafter trial ensued. The prosecution presented Dr. Cerna as its first witness. It then presented Maria Fe as its second witness. During the trial
on February 4, 1997, Manuel and Jose offered to withdraw their plea of not guilty, and to enter a plea of guilty to the crime charged in the
information. The prosecution agreed. They were then rearraigned and pleaded guilty to the crime charged in the information.6

Nevertheless, the prosecution continued presenting its evidence. It presented Barangay Captain Ocaña, who testified that when he talked to Maria
Fe and Julifer in their house, Maria Fe told him that Manuel and Jose had divested her money and personal belongings and killed her husband
Ronito. Julifer also told him that she had been raped by two of the malefactors. After Sergios testimony, the prosecution manifested that Leo
Quilongquilong, one of the victims, had already left for Davao City after the incident, and that Julifer Barrera had refused to take the witness stand
for fear for her life, and for that reason, it will no longer present them as witnesses. The prosecution thereafter rested its case.

The Defenses and Evidence of Both Accused

When he testified, Manuel admitted having killed Ronito. He however claimed that he stabbed Ronito in self-defense and in defense of Jose. He
also said that he, Potot, Ronito and Jojo, the younger brother of Maria Fe, had been engaged in robberies in Davao City. Sometime in September
1995, the four robbed a person of P50,000. However, Manuel failed to get his share of the loot while Ronito, Jojo and Potot got theirs. Manuel was
bitter. He later learned in December 1995 that Ronito and Maria Fe had left Davao City and settled in Cebu City. On March 26, 1996, Manuel and
Jose arrived in Cebu City to contact Ronito and to get his share of the loot. Manuel met Ronito on March 29, 1996 at the jai-alai. Ronito told Manuel
to visit him where they can talk. Manuel agreed. In the evening on March 30, 1996, Manuel and Jose arrived in the house of Ronito. Manuel
wanted to get his share of the loot from Ronito. Manuel, Jose and Ronito had a drinking spree. However, at about two oclock at dawn, the next
morning, Manuel and Ronito had an altercation when Manuel demanded that Ronito give him his share of the loot. Ronito was peeved and told
Manuel that he had long given him his share through a friend. Ronito whipped out a knife and stabbed Manuel. The latter tried to wrest the knife
from Ronito but failed. However, Jose grappled with Ronito and managed to wrest possession of the knife. Jose then gave the knife to Manuel who
stabbed Ronito with it.

Manuel denied raping Julifer, and divesting Ronito and Maria Fe of their valuables. Jose did not anymore testify. His counsel informed the trial
court that the testimony of Jose would only corroborate the testimony of Manuel.

On March 31, 1997, the trial court rendered a Decision, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, accused Manuel Daniela alias Manuel de la Cruz @ Tagalog and Jose Baisac Baylosis are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of
DEATH to be carried out in the manner prescribed by law. The accused are further directed to pay jointly and severally, to the heirs of the victim
the sum of P50,000.00 and to restitute to the heirs the cash & pieces of jewelry taken by them as aforementioned and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.7

The trial court declared that Manuel and Jose having pleaded guilty to the crime charged in the information, the prosecution was deemed to have
proven their guilt of the crime charged, the remaining matter still to be ascertained was the presence of any modifying circumstances.

Accused Manuel and Jose, now appellants, assail the decision of the trial court and insist that:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH WHEN THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FOR THE CRIME OF
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH WHEN THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF NIGHTTIME AND
DWELLING WERE NOT DULY PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTION.

III

RULE 110, SECTIONS 8 AND 9, OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, AS AMENDED, DECEMBER 1, 2000, SHOULD BE GIVEN
RETROACTIVE EFFECT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE.8

Anent the first assigned error, the appellants contend that their plea of guilty to the crime charged in the information was improvidently made.
When they pleaded guilty, they did so only for homicide but not for robbery. Neither did appellant Manuel plead guilty to rape. They assert that
their plea of guilty to the crime charged in the information should be set aside. The trial court erred in convicting them of the charge on the basis
solely on their improvident plea of guilty. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agrees with the contention of the appellants that their plea of
guilty to the crime charged in the information was improvidently made. Nevertheless, it contends that there is no more need for the Court to still
remand the case to the trial court as their conviction for the crime charged is warranted by the evidence adduced by the prosecution independent
of their plea of guilty.

We agree with the appellants that their plea of guilty to the crime charged was improvidently made. Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure reads:

SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequence of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and
the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence on his behalf.

The felony of robbery with homicide is a capital offense, the imposable penalty therefor being reclusion perpetua to death.

The raison detre behind the rule is that courts must proceed with caution where the punishable penalty is death for the reason that the execution
of such a sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. Improvident plea of guilty on the
part of the accused when capital crimes are involved should be avoided since he might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeit his
life and liberty without having fully comprehended the meaning and import and consequences of his plea.9 Under this rule, three things are
enjoined upon the trial court, namely:

(1) the court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea, and the accuseds full comprehension of the consequences
thereof; (2) the court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability;
and (3) the court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.10

As explained by the Court in People v. Alicando,11 the searching questions must focus on (1) the voluntariness of the plea; and (b) the full
comprehension of the accused of the consequences of the plea. As elaborated on by the Court in People v. Nadera,12 the trial court -

The warnings given by the trial court in this case fall short of the requirement that it must make a searching inquiry to determine whether accused-
appellant understood fully the import of his guilty plea. As has been said, a mere warning that the accused faces the supreme penalty of death is
insufficient. For more often than not, an accused pleads guilty upon bad advice or because he hopes for a lenient treatment or a lighter penalty.
The trial judge must erase such mistaken impressions. He must be completely convinced that the guilty plea made by the accused was not made
under duress or promise of reward. The judge must ask the accused the manner the latter was arrested or detained, and whether he was assisted
by counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigation. In addition, the defense counsel should also be asked whether he conferred with the
accused and completely explained to him the meaning and the consequences of a plea of guilt. Furthermore, since the age, educational attainment
and socio-economic status of the accused may reveal insights for a proper verdict in the case, the trial court must ask questions concerning them.
13

In this case, the certificate of arraignment on record states that when the case was called for trial on February 4, 1997, the appellants were called
by the trial court and were informed of the nature of the charge against them. The trial court propounded questions on the appellants and the
latter answered the questions. Forthwith, the appellants changed their former plea of not guilty to that of guilty.14 However, there is no record of
what questions were asked by the trial court, and what answers were given by them, or whether the court explained to the appellants the nature
of the crime with which they were charged, and that they may be sentenced to death. It cannot be determined whether the questions of the trial
court were searching. The records do not even show if the trial court explained to the appellants the meaning and legal effect of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, or if the appellants were asked why they were changing their plea from not guilty to
guilty. Clearly then, the plea of guilty of the appellants was improvident; hence, inefficacious. Their conviction for the crime charged cannot be
based solely on their plea of guilty to said crime.

The trial court convicted the appellants of robbery with homicide on the basis of their plea of guilty during their rearraignment.15 Ordinarily, the
case should be remanded to the trial court for the prosecution and the appellants to adduce their respective evidences. However, the records show
that despite the plea of guilty of the appellants, the prosecution adduced its evidence. The appellants likewise adduced their evidence to prove
their defenses. The Court will resolve the case on its merits independent of the plea of guilty of the appellants rather than remand the case to the
trial court.16

The Crime Committed by the Appellants

The appellants aver that the prosecution failed to prove the crime of robbery with homicide with which they were charged. Maria Fe was not a
credible witness; her testimony is barren of probative weight. They contend that as claimed by Maria Fe, the principal witness for the prosecution,
the intention of the appellants in going to the house of Ronito and Maria Fe was merely to borrow money from them and not to rob them of their
personal belongings. The prosecution even failed to prove that the appellants robbed Maria Fe of money and jewelry. Even if it is assumed that
they robbed Maria Fe of money and jewelry, however, they are not liable for robbery with homicide. That the appellants robbed the couple of their
belongings after borrowing money from Ronito and Maria Fe, is not determinative of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

On the other hand, the OSG contends that the prosecutor mustered the required quantum of evidence to prove the constitutive elements of
robbery with homicide. Maria Fe is credible and her testimony entitled to probative weight. Although the inceptual intention of the appellants in
going to the house of Ronito and Maria Fe was to borrow money, however, it is equally true that they intended to rob the victims of their money
and personal belongings and kill Ronito in the process. The evidence on record shows that the object of the appellants was to rob the victim of
their money and personal properties and kill Ronito on the occasion of the robbery. The OSG cites the ruling of this Court in United States vs.
Villorente.17

We agree with the OSG. Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659 reads:

ART. 294. - Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons Penalties. Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or
intimidation of any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or
when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.

The law was taken from the Spanish Penal Code which reads:

1. O. Con la pena de reclusion perpetua a muerte, cuando con motivo o con occasion del robo resultare homicidio.

The elements of the crime are as follows:

(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;

(2) the property taken belongs to another;

(3) the taking is done with animo lucrandi; and

(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.18

A conviction for robbery with homicide requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing is
merely incidental to the robbery. The animo lucrandi must proceed the killing. If the original design does not comprehend robbery, but robbery
follows the homicide either as an afterthought or merely as an incident of the homicide, then the malefactor is guilty of two separate crimes, that
of homicide or murder and robbery, and not of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, a single and indivisible offense.19 It is the
intent of the actor to rob which supplies the connection between the homicide and the robbery necessary to constitute the complex crime of
robbery with homicide.20

However, the law does not require that the sole motive of the malefactor is robbery and commits homicide by reason or on the occasion
thereof.21 In People vs. Tidula, et al.,22 this Court ruled that even if the malefactor intends to kill and rob another, it does not preclude his
conviction for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. In People v. Damaso,23 this Court held that the fact that the intent of the felons
was tempered with a desire also to avenge grievances against the victim killed, does not negate the conviction of the accused and punishment for
robbery with homicide.

A conviction for robbery with homicide is proper even if the homicide is committed before, during or after the commission of the robbery. The
homicide may be committed by the actor at the spur of the moment or by mere accident. Even if two or more persons are killed and a woman is
raped and physical injuries are inflicted on another, on the occasion or by reason of robbery, there is only one special complex crime of robbery
with homicide. What is primordial is the result obtained without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, cause, modes or persons
intervening in the commission of the crime.24

Robbery with homicide is committed even if the victim of the robbery is different from the victim of homicide, as long as the homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery.25 It is not even necessary that the victim of the robbery is the very person the malefactor
intended to rob.26 For the conviction of the special complex crime, the robbery itself must be proved as conclusively as any other element of the
crime.27

In this case, the prosecution proved through the testimony of Maria Fe that the appellants threatened to kill her and her family and robbed her of
her money and jewelry and Ronito and Leos pieces of jewelry:

Q At about 2:00 A.M. of the following day March 31, 1996 what happened?
A This Manuel Daniela pushed the door of our room.
Q And what did he do after he pushed the door of your room?
A I was awakened and then I asked him what is it Log. Referring to Manuel Daniela. [sic] alias Tagalog.
Q What did you see in Tagalog when he pushed the door open?
A When Manuel Daniela alias Tagalog entered our room he poked his handgun caliber 38 on me at that time because he was bringing a gun.
Q What is this caliber 38?
A A pistol, caliber 38 weapon.
Q But how did you know it was a 38 caliber if you do not know the weapon?
A Because I ... this caliber 38 he was brining.
Q And you said he was bringing a kerosene lamp?
A Yes.
Q What did he do with the kerosene lamp?
A When he poked his firearm towards me I stood up and then Manuel Daniela told me to go back to lie down. At that time Jose Baylosis
entered the room.
Q Did you lie down following the order of Manuel Daniela?
A Yes, maam. [sic]
Q Your [sic] said that Jose Baylosis entered the room what did Jose Baylosis do while you were already lying down?
A Manuel Daniela order [sic] Jose Baylosis to tie me.
Q How were you tied?
A He extended my two hands but Tagalog said that it is not the way to tie her. So they placed my hands at the back and they put a masking
tape.
Q Aside from your hands what were tied?
A Only my hands were tied but Manuel Daniela ordered Jose Baylosis to let Leo Quilongquilong my cousin to get inside the room.
Q Did Jose Baylosis compky [sic] with the instruction of Manuel Daniela to let your cousin Leo Quilongquilong to get inside the room?
A Yes, maam.
Q Did Leo Quilongquilong get inside your room/
A Yes, maam.
Q What did they do with Leo Quilongquilong at the time Leo Quilongquilong was already inside the room?
A They also tied Leo Quilongquilong by extending his both hands towards them and they also ordered to place his hands at his back.
Q Is that how Leo Quilongquilong was tied?
A Yes, maam.
Q After you and Leo Quilongquilong were tied what did Manuel Daniela do?
A They asked money from me but I did not tell them and so they got my jewelries [sic].
Q What jewelries [sic] were taken from you?
A Necklace.
Q How much was the cost?
A P7,000.00.
Q Was it a gold, silver or what kind of metal?
A Chinese gold.
Q Where was it placed?
A They took it from my neck.
Q Who of the two took your gold necklace from your neck?
A Jose Baylosis.
Q After taking the gold necklace from your neck what else did Jose Baylosis do?
A Jose Baylosis also removed my god ring?
Q How many rings?
A 2.
Q How much is the value of these two rings?
A P3,800.00.
Q From where did Jose Baylosis take these two gold rings?
A From my fingers.
Q While your hand were tied at the back?
A Yes, maam.
Q Aside from the two rings and one necklace what other piece of jewelries [sic] were taken from you by Jose Baylosis?
A My Chinese gold earrings.
Q How much was the value of the Chinese gold earrings?
A P1,100.00.
Q From where did Jose Baylosis get your Chinese gold earrings? from me [sic]
A From my ears.
Q While Jose Baylosis was divesting you these pieces of jewelry what did Manuel Daniela do?
A Manuel Daniela keep on poking his firearm towards me and his left hand holding a hand grenade, and told me not to shout.
Q After the two accused were able to divest you of your pieces of jewelry what else did they do?
A While Manuel Daniela keep on poking his firearm toward me Manuel Daniela insisted that the money [sic] would be given and I told them we
have no money because my money was paid for the fish and also to my partner of fish vending but they did not believe.
Q Since Manuel Daniela did not believe you that you have no money what did Manuel Daniela do?
A They ransacked our room by scattering our clothes looking for money.
Q Was he able to find your money?
A No maam.
Q What did he do as he did not find anything after scattering your clothes?
A Manuel Daniela and Jose Baylosis told me to give money so they will not harm us.
Q What did you do?
A That time my cousin Leo woke you [sic] and gave the money to them but Leo also told [sic] if we will give you the money then we will ha [sic]
no more capital for our business.
Q And what did you do finally?
A Later on, we decided to gather [sic] with my cousin to give the money in order they will not be killed.
Q Did you give the money?
A Yes, maam because my money was inside the box which was placed inside, it was a waist pouch.
Q And what material was your pouch made of which contained the money?
A It was made of cloth.
Q How much was the content of your pouch which you said was placed inside the map.
A P30,000.00 and a wrist watch.
Q And how much is the c[v]alue of the wrist watch?
A P900.00.
Q Who got the pouch under the map?
A I was the one pushing out the pouch from over the map towards Tagalog.
Q During this time when Manuel Daniela and Jose Baylosis were divesting you of pieces of jewelry and money what was your husband Ronito
doing?
A At that time my husband Ronito was sleeping. Manuel Daniela took a blanket and then Manuel Daniela ordered Jose Baylosis to kill my
husband and Jose Baylosis took a blanket and covered the mouth of my husband and placed himself on top of the body of my husband and
stabbed.

COURT:
Q With what weapon?
A Kitchen knife.

COURT:
Proceed.

ATTY. DALAWAPU:
Q Who owned that kitchen knife?
A That was taken from our kitchen.
Q So you owned the knife?
A Yes we owned.
Q And then after Jose Baylosis stabbed your husband several times that did Manuel Daniela do?
A While Jose Baylosis stabbed several times my husband mu [sic] husband shouted, "aray" and then I attempted to stand up and then Manuel
Daniela took over and place himself on top of my husband and he also stabbed my husband several times using a batangas knife. At that time
Manuel Daniela was on top of my husband Jose Baylosis also pulled the legs of my husband and he was stabbed on the lower oar [sic] of the body.

INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to her abdomen.

COURT:
Q So your husband was never able to stand?
A No my husband was never able to stand up because they helped each other in stabbing him several times.

ATTY. DALAWAPU:
Q At the time that Jose Baylosis and Manuel Daniela were stabbing your husband what were you doing?
A While they were stabbing mu [sic] husband I and my cousin could not say anything because they threatened to explode the hand grenade
they were holding. We were just on the side of the room tied and looking them stabbing my husband because they threatened to explode the hand
grenade if we should [sic] for help.
Q How about Juliefer Barrera your helper what was she doing at this time that Jose Baylosis and Manuel Daniela were stabbing your husband?
A Our helper who slept in the bed was awakened and while she was awakened Jose Baylosis and Manuel Daniela approached her and told not
to shout and the her hands were tied.
Q Do you mean to tell this Honorable Court that Manuel Daniela and Jose Baylosis stabbed and killed your husband after they were able to get
your pieces of jewelry from your person and the pouch from under the map which contained the sum of P30,000.00 together with your Seiko
watch?
A Yes, mam [sic].

COURT:
Q What time was it at the time your husband was stabbed several times by both Daniel and Jose?
A About 2:00 oclock dawn the following day.

ATTY. DALAWAPU:
Q Ma. Fe after Jose Baylosis and Manuel Daniela stabbed Ronito what else did they do?
A After Jose Baylosis and Manuel Daniela killed my husband Manuel Daniela told me that there was somebody who ordered them to kill my
husband and then I told them if you will killed [sic] me what will happened [sic] to my three small children who will support them and also who will
support [sic] my parents because they depend for my support.
Q What did Manuel Daniela say after you told them this?
A Manuel Daniela said that I would be killed. When Manuel Daniela was about to stab me my husband also groaned three times like a dying pig
and then this Jose Baylosis and Manuel Daniela immediately went back to my husband and they stabbed my husband again several times and then
Manuel Daniela strucked [sic] the head of my husband with the bat of the firearm while Jose Baylosis stabbed my husband in the neck, made a slit
on the neck with the use of the knife to ensure that he would be deed [sic]. In fact, the forehead of my husband was broken as a result of the
striking of the bat of the firearm.

ATTY. DALAWAMPU:
I would like to make it of record from the very start that the witness related here how both accused divested her of the pieces of jewelry and
money and killed dead [sic] her husband she keep on crying.

COURT:
Before this Honorable Courts question.
Q Can you still go on your testimony despite your feelings?
A Yes, Your Honor.

COURT:
So, lets proceed.

ATTY. DALAWAMPU:
Q After they stabbed your husband again what did they do?
A They stabbed again my husband and strucked [sic] the head of my husband and they went back to me and saying let us kill them Bay because
they are very noisy.28

It may be true that the original intent of appellant Manuel was to borrow again money from Ronito and Maria Fe but later on conspired with Jose
and robbed the couple of their money and pieces of jewelry, and on the occasion thereof, killed Ronito. Nonetheless, the appellants are guilty of
robbery with homicide. In People v. Tidong,29 this Court held that the appellant was guilty of robbery with homicide even if his original intention
was to demand for separation pay from his employer and ended up killing his employer in the process:

The defense argues that appellant never had the original design to rob when he went to the Co compound. That may be so. The compound of the
Cos is fenced and the only entrance is through the gate with a security guard. It was only 7:00 oclock in the evening and a number of people were
still awake, hardly the proper occasion for staging a successful robbery. Notable too is the fact that the amount recovered from appellant was only
in the amount of the separation pay which he demanded, leading to the inference that perhaps appellant had no original intent to rob the Cos.

Nonetheless, even if there was no original design to commit robbery, appellant is still liable for robbery if at the time of the taking of the personal
property of another with violence or intimidation there was intent to gain. Although the Court gives considerable weight to the theory of the
prosecution, we are not inclined to entirely do away with the version of the defense, especially with regard to his claim that he went to the Co
compound to demand his separation pay. Although disputed by the Cos, it is possible that appellant believed, rightly or wrongly, that he had the
right to a separation pay.

The Proper Penalty of Appellants

The trial court sentenced both appellants to death on its finding that the robbery with homicide was aggravated by nighttime and dwelling. It
appreciated the plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance in favor of the appellants.

The trial court correctly appreciated dwelling as an aggravating circumstance against the appellants. There was no provocation on the part of
Ronito and Maria Fe. The crime was committed in their dwelling. This Court held that dwelling is aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy the
law accords to human abode. He who goes to anothers house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere.30
However, dwelling is not aggravating in this case as it was not alleged in the amended information. Under Section 9, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of
Court, aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the information31 and proved otherwise, even if proved but not alleged in the information,
the same shall not be considered by the Court in the imposition of the proper penalty on the accused. Although the rule took effect only on
December 1, 2000, however, the same may be applied retroactively.32 The crime was committed at nighttime. However, there is no evidence that
the appellants took advantage of the darkness of the night in committing the crime or that nighttime facilitates the commission of the crime.
Indeed, the evidence on record shows that when appellant Manuel barged into the room of Maria Fe and Ronito, he was holding a kerosene
lamp.33 The appellants are not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty34 on the finding of the Court that the plea of guilty of the
appellants was improvidently made. Besides, when the appellants changed their plea, the prosecution had already commenced presenting its
evidence.

The Civil Liabilities of Appellants

The trial court ordered the appellants to pay in solidum to the heirs of Ronito the amount of P50,000. However, although Maria Fe testified, the
trial court did not award moral damages to said heirs. Neither did the trial court award exemplary damages. The trial court ordered the appellants
to return to said heirs the pieces of jewelry taken by them but the trial court failed to specify or describe in its decision the said pieces of jewelry.
Maria Fe testified that the appellants took her chinese gold necklace worth P7,000; two gold rings worth P3,000; chinese gold earring worth
P1,000; wristwatch worth P900; and cash money in the amount of P30,000 and that the appellants took the gold ring of Ronito worth P900, and his
wristwatch worth P1,800. However, the prosecution failed to adduce documentary evidence to prove the acquisition cost of the pieces of jewelry
taken from Maria Fe and Ronito. Neither is there any documentary evidence to prove that Maria Fe had P30,000 inside her pouch. Nevertheless,
the Court has to modify the decision of the trial court.

Conformably with current jurisprudence, the heirs of Ronito Enero are entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,00035 and exemplary
damages in the amount of P25,000.36 Under Article 105 of the Revised Penal Code,37 the appellants are obliged to return to Maria Fe the pieces of
jewelry they stole from her and to the heirs of Ronito the wristwatch and ring the appellants took from Ronito, whenever possible, with allowance
for any deterioration or diminution of value as determined by the trial court. Under Article 10638 of the Revised Penal Code, if the appellants can
no longer return the articles, they are obliged to make reparation for the price of the pieces of jewelry if they can no longer return the same taking
into account the price and the special sentimental value thereof to the victims. Under Article 126839 of the New Civil Code, the appellants are not
exempted from the payments of the price of the stolen articles even if the same are lost, whatever be the cause of the loss, unless the things
having been offered to the owners thereof, the former refused to receive the same without any valid cause.

The Verdict of the Court

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. CBU-42044, is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Manuel Daniela and Jose Baylosis are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide
defined in Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. They are ordered to return to
Maria Fe her chinese gold necklace, two rings, chinese gold earrings and wristwatch, and to return to the heirs of Ronito Enero his gold ring and
wristwatch and if they fail to return the said pieces of jewelry to Maria Fe and the heirs of Ronito Enero, respectively, they are ordered to pay in
solidum to Maria Fe and said heirs the value of the said pieces of jewelry to be determined by the trial court. The appellants are ordered to pay in
solidum to the heirs of Ronito Enero P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages in line with current jurisprudence.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Azcuna,
JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., in the result.
Quisumbing, J., on official leave.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 94311 September 14, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. NORBERTO VILLAGRACIA, ELMER PAGLINAWAN, ALFONSO PASTORAL, NELSON LEDESMA,
NIXON LEDESMA, and WILFREDO V. GAMPA, Accused-Appellants.

QUIASON, J.:

This is an appeal from the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Calauag, Quezon in Criminal Case No. 1518-C, finding
Norberto Villagracia, Elmer Paglinawan, Alfonso Pastoral, Nixon Ledesma, Nelson Ledesma, and Wilfredo V. Gampa guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Robbery with Rape and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify, jointly and severally, the offended spouses,
Cenon Villasanta and Thelma Villasanta in the amount of P14,700.00 and Thelma Villasanta in the amount of P20,000.00, and to pay the costs of
the suit (Decision, p. 16; Rollo, p. 40).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In said criminal case, the five accused were charged with Robbery with Rape, committed as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of September 1987, at Barangay Pamampangin, Municipality of Lopez, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with short firearms of unknown caliber and a fan knife and forming a
band, with intent to gain and with force upon things, by means of force, intimidation and violence and taking advantage of nighttime, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of spouses
Thelma Villasanta and Cenon Villasanta, and once inside, take, steal and carry away therefrom the following personal properties, to wit:

Cash money P 8,000.00

one (1) wristwatch Citizen 1,200.00
one (1) lady wristwatch 1,000.00
two (2) wristwatch (old model) 3,000.00
two (2) wedding ring 200.00
one (1) pair of earrings 1,300.00

-----

TOTAL P 14,700.00

with a total value of FOURTEEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED (14,700.00) PESOS, Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of the said
owners in the aforesaid sum; that on the occasion thereof said accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
by means of force, threats, violence and intimidation and with lewd design, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take turn in
having carnal knowledge of said Thelma Villasanta, against the latter's will (Rollo, pp. 8-9).

Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty and trial ensued.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On April 3, 1990 and before the judgment was promulgated, accused Elmer Paglinawan died.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

The trial court found that on September 23, 1987, Thelma Villasanta arrived in Lopez, Quezon, from Manila at about 8:00 a.m. Instead of
proceeding to her house in Barrio Pamanpangin, she stayed at the poblacion to attend to some business. She returned home at 8:00 p.m., bringing
with her raw materials for her basket-weaving business. At that time, her husband, Cenon, was sick and resting on the second floor of the house
while two basket-weavers, Eliseo Gacelo and Rodrigo Llaneta, were working overtime at the ground floor, which was lighted by a Coleman gas
lamp. Shortly after Thelma entered the house, six men, with their faces half-covered by handkerchiefs barged inside. Three of the intruders
brandished firearms and the other three carried knives. One poked a gun at her head and another pointed a knife to her neck. The two basket-
weavers were told to lie down on the floor and were then hog-tied. One of the accused put off the gas lamp. Two of the accused went upstairs and
hog-tied Cenon, after maltreating him. They also divested Cenon of his watch and ransacked the house (Decision, pp. 5-8; Rollo, pp. 29-
32).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The accused were able to take P8,000.00 in cash, a pair of earrings, a wristwatch and two rings with a total value of
P14,700.00.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

When the accused left the house, they dragged Thelma along with them. Once on the street, the accused removed their masks. They brought
Thelma to a grassy place, where she was ordered to undress. She was able to run away but was chased and caught by her captors, who again
pointed their guns and knives at her. Two of the accused held her hands and two other held her legs. After Nelson Ledesma removed her panty and
half-slip, he raped her. The other six followed suit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In the trial court, appellants interposed their respective alibis and denials. They claimed that they were in their respective houses when the incident
happened. They also claimed that they were maltreated by the police authorities and forced to confess their participation in the crime charged.
Furthermore, they alleged that they were not apprised of their constitutional rights before their statements were
taken.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On the basis of the evidence presented, the trial court convicted the accused of the crime charged. Likewise, the trial court considered the
presence of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and band. In their brief, appellants fault the trial court in finding:

Ichanrobles virtual law library

. . . THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS' IDENTITIES AS

THE PERPETRATORS OF THE CRIME CHARGED WERE ESTABLISHED WITH CERTAINTY.

IIchanrobles virtual law library

. . . THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH RAPE (Appellants' Brief, p. 7).
Appellants now claim that Thelma Villasanta failed to identify them with certainty as the perpetrators of the crime charged. They contend that: (1)
it was unnatural on their part to have removed their masks outside the house, when they did not remove them while they were inside the house,
where it was pitch black; (2) it was improbable for her to have recognized the appellants because the place where she was brought was dark and
covered with bushes and coconut trees; and (3) appellants were not placed in a police line-up but were merely presented by the police
investigators to the complainants (Appellant's Brief,
pp. 7-9).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Contrary to their claim, appellants' removing of their masks once they left the house of Villasantas was a natural behavior. As explained by the trial
court:

. . . The Court is also convinced that when the robbers left the house of the Villasanta (sic) they removed their masks. This the Court finds
convincing for indeed, it would appear awkward for the robbers to be still wearing masks while they were walking along the street (Decision, p. 13;
Rollo, p. 37).

Bereft of the merit is the contention of the appellants that they were merely presented by the investigators to the complainants. There is no rule
requiring that before a suspect can be identified as the culprit, he should first be placed in a police line-up and then pinpointed by the victim. What
is important is the positiveness of the victim that the persons charged were the malefactors. Such identification goes to the credibility of the
witness which was tested at the trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

This positive identification of the victim was bolstered when appellants removed their masks while walking on the street, for the place was
illuminated by moonlight. In People v. Gamboa, 145 SCRA 289 [1986], this Court ruled that the light of the moon is sufficient for a person to identify
another. Suffice it to say, "if identification of persons is possible even by the light of the stars, with more reason that one could identify persons by
moonlight" (People v. Pueblos, 127 SCRA 746 [1984]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Appellants defense of alibi cannot be given weight in view of the clear identification made by the victim that they were perpetrators of the crime.
Alibi is one of the weakest defenses that can be resorted to for it can easily be fabricated (People v. Carcedo, 198 SCRA 503
[1991]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Appellants also failed to support their claim that they were tortured into admitting the crime. Their allegation, except for Norberto Villagracia, was
not supported by any medical certificate. However, the medical certificate submitted by Villagracia cannot be admitted as evidence in the absence
of the corroborating testimony of the physician who examined him (People v. Marcedonio, 192 SCRA 579
[1991]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The plaint that the police investigators did not provide appellants with a counsel while their statements were taken, is mooted because the trial
court disregarded said statements for failure of the police investigators to inform them of their right to counsel. The trial court also disregarded the
counter-affidavit of Pastoral because the same was prepared by the police. However, even in the absence of the extrajudicial confessions obtained
from the appellants, there is sufficient evidence which points to them as the perpetrators of the crime.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

We have repeatedly ruled that factual findings of the lower court, including the assessment of the testimonies of the witnesses, are entitled to
great weight on appeal when supported by the evidence (People v. de Guzman, 199 SCRA 35 [1991]; People v. Placido, Jr., 199 SCRA 410
[1991]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

We agree with the trial court that the crime committed by the appellants is Robbery with Rape defined and penalized under Article 294 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code, which reads:

Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:chanrobles virtual law library

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or
intentional mutilation, or if by reason or on occasion of such robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 1 of Article 263 shall have
been inflicted; Provided, however, that when the robbery accompanied with rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death (As Amended by PD No. 767).

The law uses the phrase "when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape" which means that the offender must have the intent to take the
personal property belonging to another with intent to gain, and such intent must precede the rape (Reyes, II Revised Penal Code, p. 612, 1987
ed).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In this case, appellants employed violence against and intimidation of persons when they divested the Villasanta spouses of cash and other
valuables. Three of the appellants were armed with short firearms and the other three carried fan knives.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

That appellants conspired to commit the detestable acts can be inferred from their behaviors, which revealed their common purpose and their
unity in its execution (Siton v. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 473 [1991]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

However, the trial court erred in finding the presence of the aggravating circumstance of band. The circumstance that the crime was committed
with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons was already taken into account when the law imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death for such offense.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

An appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review and this includes the review of the penalty and indemnity (People v. Godines, 196
SCRA 765 [1991]). Every circumstance in favor of the accused should be considered (Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593
[1986]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In this case, the trial court failed to consider the age of appellant Nixon Ledesma when the crime was committed. At the time he testified on May
17, 1989, he stated that he was only 15 years old (TSN, May 17, 1989, p. 31). No contradictory evidence was presented by the prosecution. So,
when the crime was committed on September 23, 1987, or more than a year before he was presented as a witness, Nixon Ledesma was less than
15 years old.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In People v. Lugto, 190 SCRA 754 [1990], we held that the accused has the burden of proof that he was a minor at the time of the commission of
the crime. However, in People v. Tismo, 204 SCRA 535 [1991], we upheld appellants claim that he was 17 years old at the time the crime was
committed even without any proof to corroborate his testimony. Considering that the prosecution failed to present contradictory evidence, we
applied to appellant therein the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under the second paragraph of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

Lugto appears to be an aberration from the long line of decisions antedating it. From U.S. v. Bergantino, 3 Phil. 118 [1903] to People v. Ebora, 141
SCRA 282 [1986], we have consistently ruled that, although the accused did not offer any evidence to support his claim of minority, this fact will
remain as such, until disproved by the prosecution (See also U.S. v. Barbicho, 13 Phil. 616 [1909]; U.S. v. Agadas, 36 Phil. 246 [1917]; People v.
Ebora, 141 SCRA 282 [1986]; People v. Bernalde, 139 SCRA 426 [1985]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

We, therefore, rule that in view of his minority, appellant Nixon Ledesma is entitled to a two-degree reduction of his penalty as provided for in
Article 68 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Inasmuch as Nixon Ledesma is now more than nineteen years old, he is no longer entitled to a suspended sentence under Article 192 of the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, (P.D. 603, as amended by P.D. No. 1179 and P.D.
No. 1210).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The penalty for Robbery with Rape under Article 294(2) of the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion perpetua to death. However, the 1987 Constitution,
proscribed the imposition of the death penalty, so the trial court was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to the appellants, other
than appellant Ledesma.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

With regard to Nixon Ledesma, the reduction of his penalty by two degrees should be counted from the penalty provided by law for the offense,
which is reclusion perpetua to death. The penalty next lower to the said penalty imposed by law is reclusion temporal and the penalty two degrees
lower thereto is prision mayor (People v. Espejo, 36 SCRA 400 [1970]; People v. Jose, 71 SCRA 273 [1976]; Padilla, Criminal Law, Book I, 1988 ed., p.
89).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Considering the presence of the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, the penalty should be in its maximum period, which is within the range of
ten years and one day to twelve years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, we further reduce the penalty by one more degree, which is
prision correccional, and that is within the range of six months and one day to six years.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The records show that Elmer Paglinawan died on April 3, 1990 while under detention. The fact of his death was reported by the provincial warden
to the trial court, which should have dismissed the case against said accused. Under Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the criminal liability of
an offender is totally extinguished by his death as to the personal penalties; while the pecuniary liability therefor is extinguished when the offender
dies before final judgment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Taking into account the nature of the crime and the fact that she was raped by the six accused, causing her mental anguish, moral shock,
besmirched reputation and social humiliation, the indemnity, in the concept of moral damages, is increased to P50,000.00 (People v. Grefiel, 215
SCRA 596 [1992]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that: (1) Nixon Ledesma is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of six (6) years, of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum; (2) in view of Elmer
Paglinawan's death, the case against him is DISMISSED; and (3) the award for damages to Thelma Villasanta is increased to
P50,000.00.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 86163, April 26, 1990 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BIENVENIDO SALVILLA, REYNALDO CANASARES, RONALDO CANASARES, AND SIMPLICIO
CANASARES, BIENVENIDO SALVILLA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Accused Bienvenido Salvilla alone appeals from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Iloilo City,* dated 29 August 1988, in Criminal
Case No. 20092, finding him and his co-accused Reynaldo, Ronaldo and Simplicio, all surnamed Canasares, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of "Robbery with Serious Physical Injuries and Serious Illegal Detention" and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Information filed against them reads:

"The undersigned City Fiscal accuses BIENVENIDO SALVILLA, REYNALDO CANASARES, RONALDO CANASARES, and SIMPLICIO CANASARES, whose
maternal surnames, dated and places of birth cannot be ascertained of the crime of ROBBERY WITH SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES AND SERIOUS
ILLEGAL DETENTION (Art. 294, paragraph 3, in conjunction with Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code), committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of April, 1986, in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, conspiring and
confederating among themselves, working together and helping one another, armed with guns and handgrenade and with the use of violence or
intimidation employed on the person of Severino Choco, Mary Choco, Mimia Choco and Rodita Hablero, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally take and carry away, with intent of gain, cash in the amount of P20,000.00, two (2) Men's wrist watches, one (1) Lady's Seiko quartz wrist
watch and one (1) Lady's Citizen wrist watch and assorted jewelries, all valued at P50,000.00; that on the occasion and by reason of said robbery,
Mary Choco suffered serious physical injuries under paragraph 2 of Article 263, Bienvenido Salvilla likewise suffered serious physical injuries and
Reynaldo Canasares also suffered physical injuries; that the said accused also illegally detained, at the compound of the New Iloilo Lumber
Company, Iznart Street, Iloilo City. Severino Choco, owner/proprietor of said Lumber Company, Mary Choco, Mimie Choco, who is a minor, being
15 years of age, and Rodita Hablero, who is a salesgirl at said Company; that likewise on the occasion of the robbery, the accused also asked and
were given a ransom money of P50,000.00; that the said crime was attended by aggravating circumstances of band, and illegal possession of
firearms and explosives; that the amount of P20,000.00, the ransom money of P50,000.00, two (2) Men's wrist watches, two (2) Lady's wrist
watches, one (1) .38 caliber revolver and one (1) live granade were recovered from the accused; to the damage and prejudice of the New Iloilo
Lumber Company in the amount of P120,000.00."
The evidence for the prosecution may be re-stated as follows:

On 12 April 1986, a robbery was staged by the four accused at the New Iloilo Lumber Yard at about noon time. The plan was hatched about two
days before. The accused were armed with homemade guns and a hand grenade. When they entered the establishment, they met Rodita Habiero,
an employee thereat who was on her way out for her meal break and announced to her that it was a hold-up. She was made to go back to the
office and there Appellant Salvilla pointed his gun at the owner, Severino Choco, and his two daughters, Mary and Mimie, the latter being a minor
15 years of age, and told the former that all they needed was money. Hearing this, Severino told his daughter, Mary, to get a paper bag wherein he
placed P20,000.00 cash (P5,000.00, according to the defense) and handed it to Appellant. Thereafter, Severino pleaded with the four accused to
leave the premises as they already had the money but they paid no heed. Instead, accused Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of
Severino after which the latter, his two daughters, and Rodita, were herded to the office and kept there as hostages.

At about 2:00 o'clock of the same day, the hostages were allowed to eat. The four accused also took turns eating while the others stood guard.
Then, Appellant told Severino to produce P100,000.00 so he and the other hostages could be released. Severino answered that he could not do so
because it was a Saturday and the banks were closed.

In the meantime, police and military authorities had surrounded the premises of the lumber yard. Major Melquiades B. Sequio, Station
Commander of the INP of Iloilo City, negotiated with the accused using a loud speaker and appealed to them to surrender with the assurance that
no harm would befall them as he would accompany them personally to the police station. The accused refused to surrender or to release the
hostages.

Thereafter, OIC Mayor, Rosa Caram, of Iloilo City arrived and joined the negotiations. In her dialogue with the accused, which lasted for about four
hours, Appellant demanded P100,000.00, a coaster, and some raincoats. She offered them P50,000.00 instead, explaining the difficulty of raising
more as it was a Saturday. Later, the accused agreed to receive the same and to release Rodita to be accompanied by Mary Choco in going out of
the office. When they were already out of the door, one of the accused whose face was covered by a handkerchief, gave a key to Mayor Caram.
With this, Mayor Caram unlocked the padlocked door and handed to Rodita the P50,000.00, which the latter, in turn, gave to one of the accused.
Rodita was later set free but Mary was herded back to the office.

Mayor Caram, Major Sequio, and even volunteer radio newscasters continued to appeal to the accused to surrender peacefully but they refused.
Ultimatums were given but the accused did not budge. Finally, the police and military authorities decided to launch an offensive and assault the
place. This resulted in injuries to the girls, Mimie and Mary Choco as well as to the accused Ronaldo and Reynaldo Canasares. Mary suffered a
"macerated right lower extremity just below the knee" so that her right leg had to be amputated. The medical certificate described her condition
as "in a state of hemorrhagic shock when she was brought in to the hospital and had to undergo several major operations during the course of her
confinement from April 13, 1986 to May 30, 1986."

For his part, Appellant Salvilla confirmed that at about noon time of 12 April 1986 he and his co-accused entered the lumber yard and demanded
money from the owner Severino Choco. He demanded P100,000.00 but was given only P5,000.00, which he placed on the counter of the office of
the lumber yard. He admitted that he and his co-accused kept Severino, his daughters, and Rodita inside the office. He maintained, however, that
he stopped his co-accused from getting the wallet and wristwatch of Severino and, like the P5,000.00, were all left on the counter, and were never
touched by them. He claimed further that they had never fired on the military because they intended to surrender. Appellant's version also was
that during the gunfire, Severino's daughter stood up and went outside; he wanted to stop her but he himself was hit by a bullet and could not
prevent her. Appellant also admitted the appeals directed to them to surrender but that they gave themselves up only much later.

After trial, the Court a quo meted out a judgment of conviction and sentenced each of the accused "to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
with the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs."

Appellant Salvilla's present appeal is predicated on the following Assignments of Error:

"1. The lower court erred in holding that the crime charged was consummated and in not holding that the same was merely attempted.
"2. The lower court erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender."
Upon the facts and the evidence, we affirm.

The defense contends that "The complete crime of larceny (theft/robbery) as distinguished from an attempt requires asportation or carrying away,
in addition to the taking. In other words, the crime of robbery/theft has three consecutive stages: 1) the giving 2) the taking and 3) the carrying
away or asportation. And without asportation the crime committed is only attempted" (Memorandum for Appellant Salvilla, Records, p. 317).

There is no question that in robbery, it is required that there be a taking of personal property belonging to another. This is known as the element
of asportation, the essence of which is the taking of a thing out of the possession of the owner without his privity and consent and without the
animus revertendi (Aquino, Revised Penal Code, p. 97, citing 5 C.J. 607). In fact, if there is no actual taking, there can be no robbery. Unlawful
taking of personal property of another is an essential part of the crime of robbery.

Appellant insists that while the "giving" has been proven, the "taking" has not. And this is because neither he nor his three co-accused touched the
P5,000.00 given by Severino nor the latter's wallet or watch during the entire incident; proof of which is that none of those items were recovered
from their persons.

Those factual allegations are contradicted by the evidence. Rodita, the lumberyard employee, testified that upon demand by Appellant, Severino
put P20,000.00 inside a paper bag and subsequently handed it to Appellant. In turn, accused Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of
Severino. In respect of the P50,000.00 from Mayor Caram, Rodita declared that the Mayor handed the amount to her after she (the Mayor) had
opened the padlocked door and that she thereafter gave the amount to one of the holduppers. The "taking" was, therefore, sufficiently proved
(TSN, July 1, 1987, pp. 12-13, 15-16, 27-31). The money demanded, and the wallet and wrist watch were within the dominion and control of the
Appellant and his co-accused and completed the taking.

"The State established a 'taking' sufficient to support a conviction of robbery even though the perpetrators were interrupted by police and so did
not pick up the money offered by the victim, where the defendant and an accomplice, armed with a knife and a club respectively, had demanded
the money from the female clerk of a convenience store, and the clerk had complied with their instructions and placed money from the register in
a paper bag and then placed the bag on the counter in front of the two men; these actions brought the money within the dominion and control and
of defendant and completed the taking." (Johnson vs. State, 432 So 2d 758).
"Severance of the goods from the possession of the owner and absolute control of the property by the taker, even for an instant, constitutes
asportation." (Adams vs. Commonwealth, 154 SW 381; State vs. Murray 280 SW 2d 809; Mason vs. Commonwealth, 105 SE 2d 149) [underlining
supplied].
It is no defense either that Appellant and his co-accused had no opportunity to dispose of the personalities taken. That fact does not affect the
nature of the crime. From the moment the offender gained possession of the thing, even if the culprit had no opportunity to dispose of the same,
the unlawful taking is complete (Reyes, Revised Penal Code Annotated, Book II, 1981 ed., p. 594).

"The crime is consummated when the robber acquires possession of the property, even if for a short time, and it is not necessary that the property
be taken into the hands of the robber, or that he should have actually carried the property away, out of the physical presence of the lawful
possessor, or that he should have made his escape with it" (People vs. Quinn, 176 P 2d 404; Woods vs. State, 220 SW 2d 644; People vs. Beal, 39 P
2d 504; People vs. Clark, 160 P 2d 553).
Contrary to Appellant's submission, therefore, a conviction for consummated and not merely attempted Robbery is in order.

It is the contention of Appellant that Rodita could not have seen the taking because the place was dark since the doors were closed and there were
no windows. It will be recalled, however, that Rodita was one of the hostages herself and could observe the unfolding of events. Her failure to
mention the taking in her sworn statement would not militate against her credibility, it being settled that an affidavit is almost always incomplete
and inaccurate and does not disclose the complete facts for want of inquiries or suggestions (People vs. Andaya, G. R. No. L-63862, 31 July 1987,
152 SCRA 570; People vs. Tan, et al., 89 Phil. 337 [1951]).

The fact, too, that Rodita was an employee of Severino would not lessen her credibility. The defense has not proven that she was actuated by any
improper motive in testifying against the accused.

In the last analysis, the basic consideration centers around the credibility of witnesses in respect of which the findings of the Trial Court are entitled
to great weight as it was in a superior position to assess the same in the course of the trial (see People vs. Ornosa, G.R. No. L56283, 30 June 1987,
151 SCRA 495; People vs. Alcantara, G. R. No. L-38042, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 326).

Anent the second assignment of error, the "surrender" of the Appellant and his co-accused cannot be considered in their favor to mitigate their
liability. To be mitigating, a surrender must have the following requisites: (a) that the offender had not been actually arrested; (b) that the
offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to his agent; and (c) that the surrender was voluntary (People vs. Ganamo, G. R. No. L
62043, 13 August 1985, 138 SCRA 141).

The "surrender" by the Appellant and his co-accused hardly meets these requirements. They were, indeed, asked to surrender by the police and
military authorities but they refused until only much later when they could no longer do otherwise by force of circumstances when they knew they
were completely surrounded and there was no chance of escape. The surrender of the accused was held not to be mitigating as when he gave up
only after he was surrounded by the constabulary and police forces (People vs. Sigayan, et al., G. R. No. L-18523-26, 30 April 1966, 16 SCRA 839;
People vs. Mationg, G. R. No. L 33488, 29 March 1982, 113 SCRA 167). Their surrender was not spontaneous as it was motivated more by an intent
to insure their safety. And while it is claimed that they intended to surrender, the fact is that they did not despite several opportunities to do so.
There is no voluntary surrender to speak of (People vs. Dimdiman, 106 Phil. 391 [1959]).

All told, the assigned errors remain unsubstantiated and we find the guilt of the accused-appellant, Bienvenido Salvilla, established beyond
reasonable doubt.

Although unassigned as an error, we deem it necessary to turn now to the nature of the linked offenses involved and the penalty imposed by the
Trial Court.

Appellant and his co-accused were charged in the Information with "Robbery with Serious Physical Injuries and Serious Illegal Detention ("Art. 295,
par. 3, in conjunction with Art. 267, RPC"), and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. We agree with the Trial Court that a complex crime under Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code has been committed such that the penalty for the more serious offense of Serious Illegal Detention (Art. 267, Revised
Penal Code), or "reclusion perpetuato death," is to be imposed instead of the penalty prescribed for Robbery with Serious Physical Injuries (Art. 294
(3), which is reclusion temporal.
Under Article 48, a complex crime arises "when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other." The term "necessary means" does not
connote indispensable means for if it did then the offense as a "necessary means" to commit another would be an indispensable element of the
latter and would be an ingredient thereof. The phrase "necessary means" merely signifies that one crime is committed to facilitate and insure the
commission of the other (Aquino, Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 624, citing Dissent, Montemayor, J., Amado Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515). In
this case, the crime of Serious Illegal Detention was such a "necessary means" as it was selected by Appellant and his co-accused to facilitate and
carry out more effectively their evil design to stage a robbery.

The facts of this case differ from those in People vs. Astor, et als. (G. R. Nos. L-71765-66, 29 April 1987, 149 SCRA 325) where the accused were
convicted of Robbery but acquitted in the case for Serious Illegal Detention and where it was held that "the detention is absorbed in the crime of
robbery." For one, in Astor, there were two (2) separate Informations filed, one for Robbery and another for Serious Illegal Detention. In the
present case, only one Information was filed charging the complex offense. For another, in Astor, the robbery had already been consummated and
the detention was merely to forestall the capture of the robbers by the police. Not so in this case, where the detention was availed of as a means
of insuring the consummation of the robbery. Further, in Astor, the detention was only incidental to the main crime of robbery so that it was held
therein:

"x x x were appellants themselves not trapped by the early arrival of the police at the scene of the crime, they would have not anymore detained
the people inside since they have already completed their job. Obviously, appellants were left with no choice but to resort to detention of these
people as security, until arrangements for their safe passage were made. This is not the crime of illegal detention punishable under the penal laws
but an act of restraint in order to delay the pursuit of the criminals by peace officers (People v. Sol, 9 Phil. 265; People v. Uday, 85 Phil. 167, cited in
the Revised Penal Code, Aquino, Vol. 3, 1976 ed., p. 1337). Where the victims in a robbery case were detained in the course of robbery, the
detention is absorbed by the crime of robbery (P v. Baysa, 92 Phil. 1008, id.). In the case at bar, the detention was only incidental to the main crime
of robbery, and although in the course thereof women and children were also held, that threats to kill were made, the act should not be
considered as a separate offense. Appellants should only be held guilty of robbery."
In contrast, the detention in the case at bar was not only incidental to the robbery but was a necessary means to commit the same. After the
amount of P20,000.00 was handed to Apellant, the latter and his co-accused still refused to leave. The victims were then taken as hostages and the
demand to produce an additional P100,000.00 was made as a prerequisite for their release. The detention was not because the accused were
trapped by the police nor were the victims held as security against the latter. The detention was not merely a matter of restraint to enable the
malefactors to escape, but deliberate as a means of extortion for an additional amount. The police and other authorities arrived only much later
after several hours of detention had already passed. And, despite appeals to appellant and his co-accused to surrender, they adamantly refused
until the amount of P100,000.00 they demanded could be turned over to them. They even considered P50,000.00, the amount being handed to
them, as inadequate.

The foregoing features also distinguish this case from those of U.S. v. Sol, 9 Phil. 265 (1907) where the restraint was for no other purpose than to
prevent the victims from reporting the crime to the authorities; from People v. Gamboa, 92 Phil. 1085 [1953] where the victims were taken to a
place one kilometer away and shot in order to liquidate the witnesses to the robbery; from People v. Baysa, 92 Phil. 1008 (1953); People v.
Manzanilla, 43 Phil. 187 (1922), all of which cases were cited in Astor, and where the victims were only incidentally detained so that the detention
was deemed absorbed in robbery.

In other words, unlike in the above cases, the elements of the offense of Serious Illegal Detention are present in this case. The victims were illegally
deprived of their liberty. Two females (Mary and Minnie), and a minor (Minnie), a specified circumstance in Article 267 (3), were among those
detained. The continuing detention was also for the purpose of extorting ransom another listed circumstance in Article 267 (last parag.), not only
from the detained persons themselves but even from the authorities who arrived to rescue them.

It follows then that as the detention in this case was not merely incidental to the robbery but a necessary means employed to facilitate it, the
penalty imposed by the Trial Court is proper.

WHEREFORE,the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Proportionate costs.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32997 July 30, 1982
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANICETO PEDROSO and AGUSTIN SALCEDO, accused-appellants.

PER CURIAM:

Mandatory review of the death sentence imposed upon accused-appellants Aniceto Pedroso and Agustin Salcedo in the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Cotabato, Branch IV rendered on November 23, 1970 in Criminal Case No. 57 for robbery in band with double homicide and
multiple frustrated homicide.

The accused-appellants Aniceto Pedroso and Agustin Salcedo together with Pedro Adorable, Rodolfo Sante, Jose Sante, Baldomero Cabasaan and
Cirilo Almirante, were charged with the crime of robbery in band, double homicide and multiple frustrated homicide in the following Information
filed by Provincial Fiscal Alfredo I. Gonzales, dated July 2, 1963, as follows:

The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Pedro Adorable alias Indong, Aniceto Pedroso alias Budon alias Maldo, Rodolfo Sante, Jose Sante,
Baldomero Cabasaan, Agustin Salcedo and Cirilo Almirante Alias Eloy Almirante, of the crime of robbery in band with double homicide and multiple
frustrated homicide, committed as follows.

That on or about February 10, 1963, in the Barrio of Muslim, Municipality of Tulunan, Province of Cotabato, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, in company with Silverio Acanto alias Ator alias Mayor Alias Bila-an, and Jose Miller alias Bert Alias Silver,
and who are still at large, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with unlicensed firearms and bladed
weapon, with the intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of violence, force and intimidation on
persons, take and carry away from the dwelling of one Agustin Mallorca, the following personal belongings, namely, one (1) shotgun, 12 gauge with
four (4) rounds of ammunition, all valued at P404.00 and cash money of P21.00 owned by said Agustin Mallorca, to his damage and prejudice in the
total sum of P425.00; that on the occasion of said robbery and for the purpose of enabling them to steal and carry away the above described
articles, the said accused, together with their companions above-mentioned, and in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation, and taking advantage of their superior strength and with intent to kill, attack
and assault Agustin Mallorca, Proceso Mallorca, Iluminada Cabardo, Leticia Mallorca y Agudo, Edmundo Agudo and Natividad Mallorca, and as a
consequence thereof, the first two persons suffered mortal wounds which caused their instantaneous death, and the rest four persons sustained
serious wounds which ordinarily would cause their death, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of
robbery with multiple homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of defendants,
that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to them which prevented their death.

All contrary to law, and with the aggravating circumstances of superior strength, uninhabited place and in band.

Upon arraignment, all of the accused pleaded not guilty. On August 10, 1966, Pedro Adorable withdrew his former plea of not guilty and changed
the same to guilty as charged and was accordingly sentenced. 1 Baldomero Cabasaan and Rodolfo Sante died during the trial and the cases against
them were dismissed on October 29, 1966 and November 13, 1970, respectively. 2

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Municipal Judge Elena de Leon of Tulunan, Cotabato; (2) Dr. Nicanor Capatan; (3) Dr. Jesus
Cuerpo; (4) Edmundo Agudo; (5) Antonina Mallorca; and (6) Sgt. Almazan. Thus, the following facts were proved:

On February 10, 1963, at approximately 6:00 a.m., seven (7) persons all armed with short guns went to the house of Proceso Mallorca at Bo.
Muslim, Tulunan, Cotabato. 3 Leticia Mallorca, Edmundo Agudo, Consuria Palid, Melentia Mallorca, Maxima Mallorca, Lilibeth Mallorca, Luchi
Mallorca and Edmar Mallorca were upstairs in the sala of said house, 4 while Proceso Mallorca and Agustin Mallorca were in the store located in
the ground floor of the house. 5 Accused-appellants Aniceto Pedroso and Agustin Salcedo together with Pedro Adorable, Rodolfo Sante and
Baldomero Cabasaan bought cigarettes from the store under the house and when Proceso Mallorca, the owner, handed to them the cigarettes,
they pointed their guns at the latter. 6 Beriong Bungi and Rodolfo Sante, with drawn guns, accosted Agustin Mallorca. 7

Appellants Pedroso and Salcedo, and Pedro Adorable went upstairs and threatened Edmundo Agudo, Antonina Mallorca, Maxima Mallorca, Leticia
Mallorca, Iluminada Mallorca and the children of Proceso Mallorca. 8 Rodolfo Sante stood guard in front of the house. 9 They were then heard to
say, "Don't move, don't shout, if you don't want to die." 10 They tried to force Edmundo Agudo to take out the gun he was keeping 11 and
appellant Agustin Salcedo in fact searched the house for said gun. 12 Not seeing the gun, appellant Salcedo went down the house and he, together
with Rodolfo Sante and Beriong Bungi, brought Proceso Mallorca upstairs. 13 Beriong Bungi asked Proceso Mallorca about a shotgun 14 to which
the latter refused to answer. Thereupon, Beriong Bungi kicked him 15 and Rodolfo Sante forced him to lie flat on the floor. 16 Instead of lying flat
on the floor, Proceso Mallorca jumped from the balcony of the house, 17 and the seven (7) intruders, herein appellants included, immediately fired
at Proceso Mallorca. 18 The latter was hit, fell to the ground and was unable to run any further. 19

Almost simultaneously, the robbers, herein appellants included, also fired at Edmundo Agudo, Leticia Mallorca, Iluminada Mallorca, Antonina
Mallorca and Maxima Mallorca. 20 Beriong Bungi went down the house saying that they are the number one holduppers and that he is Beriong
Bungi. 21 Thereupon, all the seven (7) persons searched the house. 22 They obtained money from Leticia Mallorca and Maxima Mallorca, 23 and
got one shotgun with four rounds of ammunition, 24 as well as dry goods being sold in the store. 25

After the robbers have left, Antonina Mallorca went towards the road and saw Cirilo Almirante and Jose Sante standing in the cornfield 26 and as
she was passing the place, Cirilo Almirante and Jose Sante immediately stood and shouted, "Chase her!"; 27 however, one of them said not to do so
since she was already wounded. 28

As a result, Proceso Mallorca and Agustin Mallorca died because of the gunshot wounds they suffered as verified by Dr. Jesus Cuerpo, Municipal
Health Officer of Mlang, Cotabato.

Accused Rodolfo Sante was apprehended on February 10, 1963, between 2:00 and 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon by a Philippine Constabulary patrol
led by Capt. Lachica at Bo. Maybula, Tulunan, Cotabato, and confiscated from him (Sante) was a .45 caliber revolver. The other accused Pedro
Adorable, Baldomero Cabasaan and appellants Aniceto Pedroso and Agustin Salcedo were apprehended by a PC patrol led by Cpl. Diserio Yamota.
All of the accused, Aniceto Pedroso, Agustin Salcedo, Rodolfo Sante, Pedro Adorable and Baldomero Cabasaan separately signed and subscribed to
extrajudicial confessions stating the participation of each accused in the crime, before Municipal Judge Elena de Leon of Tulunan, Cotabato. 29

The version of the defense hinges upon the defense of alibi. The accused Agustin Salcedo testified that on February 10, 1963, at about 6:00 o'clock
in the morning, he was with Felimon Mediana grazing his carabaos at barrio Lampagang, Tulunan, Cotabato. 30

The accused, Aniceto Pedroso set up a similar defense of alibi, in that he was, from 5:00 o'clock to 8:00 o'clock in the morning of February 10, 1963,
grazing his carabao at barrio Minapan, Tulunan, Cotabato. 31

On November 23, 1970, after due trial, the court a quo rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the court renders the following judgment: That with respect to the accused, Cirilo Almirante and Jose Sante, the prosecution has not
presented any evidence against the said accused, as may be borne by the records of the case other than the casual mention of their having been
seen near the road leading to the highway by Antonina Mallorca and for the failure of the prosecution to present evidence against them and to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery in band with double homicide, and multiple frustrated homicide, hereby acquits
them thereof, with costs de oficio.

With respect to the accused, Aniceto Pedroso and Agustin Salcedo, the Court believes that the prosecution has established their guilt beyond any
shade of doubt of the composite crime of robbery in band, double homicide, and multiple frustrated homicide, and sentences them to suffer the
maximum penalty of death, to pay the aggrieved party the amount of P404.00, the value of the stolen articles, and to indemnify the heirs of each of
the victims jointly and severally the amount of Twelve Thousand (P12,000.00) Pesos, and each to pay one-sixth (1/6) of the costs.

SO ORDERED.

From the aforementioned decision, appellants assigned three (3) errors contending that:

I. The trial court erred in classifying the injuries sustained by spouses Edmundo Agudo and Leticia Mallorca as frustrated homicide.

II. The trial court erred in finding that the value of stolen properties in the above-entitled case was P404.00.

III. The trial court erred in giving undue weight and credence to the evidence of the prosecution, particularly the testimonies of Antonina Mallorca
and Edmundo Agudo, while not giving any weight and credence to the evidence of the accused-appellants.

The first two assigned errors deserve scant consideration to warrant a reversal of the penalty imposed by the lower court. As to the first error, it
may be conceded that the wounds sustained by the spouses Edmundo Agudo and Leticia Mallorca were not fatal as in fact Dr. Nicanor S. Capatan
testified as follows: 32

Q. In your opinion as a doctor, what could you say would have been the gravity or seriousness of the wounds sustained by Leticia Agudo as
indicated on Exhibit "I"?

A. The wound is trivial in nature.

Q. What makes you say so?

A. Well, it is not fatal. She was able to walk and she was strong.

Q. Could you say that without medical assistance she could have died for it?

A. No, sir.

Q. How long have you rendered medical assistance to this Leticia Agudo?

A. Five days, sir.

Q. At the time she left your clinic, the wounds were still there?

A. The wounds were in the process of healing.

Q. But they were not yet totally healed?

A. Yes, sir.

With respect to the second error, there is the admission of the accused Aniceto Pedroso in his extra-judicial confession that the money taken
amounted to only P15.00 33 but it was also proved that the accused persons took and carried away one shotgun, 12 gauge with 4 rounds of
ammunition, cigarettes, cans of salmon and other goods from the store. Although there is no direct and specific proof of the values of these
articles, it is properly within the Court's power and discretion to estimate the total amount to be P404.00 as directed in the appealed decision and
order payment of the sum to the victims. At any rate, the error if any is not reversible to alter the imposition of the penalty of death.

Notwithstanding the two aforementioned errors, the same do not materially affect the crime committed which is the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide penalized in Article 294 (1) 34 of the Revised Penal Code, and not, as erroneously denominated by the court a quo as
"robbery in band, double homicide, and multiple frustrated homicide. " There is no special complex crime of robbery in band with double homicide
and/or serious, less serious or slight physical injuries under the present Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 373. If robbery with homicide (or
with the other crimes enumerated above) is committed by a band, the indictable offense would still be denominated as "robbery with homicide"
under Article 294 (1), but the circumstance that it was committed by a band is not an element of the crime but is merely a generic aggravating
circumstance which may be offset by mitigating circumstances. 35 The homicides or murders and physical injuries, irrespective of their numbers,
committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery are merged in the composite crime of "robbery with homicide." However, where two or
more persons were killed on the occasion of robbery, the additional killing should be appreciated further as an additional aggravating
circumstance, the reason being that "there will obtain an anomalous situation where, from the standpoint of the gravity of the offense, robbery
with one killing would be on the same level as robbery with multiple killings." 36

In the case at bar, two persons, Proceso Mallorca and Agustin Mallorca, were killed on the occasion of the robbery. The seven malefactors who
took part in the Commission of the offense were all armed. Under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposable for the crime of
robbery with homicide are two indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death.

There being the aggravating circumstance of band and two homicides, the extreme penalty of death should be affirmed. There is no further need
to consider the physical injuries which were alleged in the information and subsequently proved during the trial to have been committed by the
accused on the occasion of the robbery for purposes of determining the proper penalty to be imposed. Anyway, with or without such consideration
the conclusion would be the same — the accused should be sentenced to the maximum penalty provided by law. 37

Anent the third assigned error, appellants stress the inconsistency in the testimony of Edmundo Agudo who testified that the seven armed men
who perpetrated the offense were all armed with short guns as against the declaration of Antonina Mallorca that not all of the seven men were
armed with short guns. Appellants emphasize that this inconsistency is too important to be overlooked and ignored for it is sufficiently serious in
itself to cast a reasonable doubt on the credibility as well as the accuracy of the prosecution witnesses aforementioned. 38

Appellants' contention is untenable. A careful perusal of the records will reveal that the inconsistency stressed upon by the appellants is more
apparent than factual. The testimony of the aforementioned witnesses are congrous in its material and substantial details. In fact, Antonina
Mallorca (whose testimony allegedly counters with that of Edmundo Agudo) succinctly affirmed that the malefactors were all armed with short
guns in the following manner: 39

FISCAL PERALTA:

Q. How many of them were armed with short guns?

A. I do not know how many of them were. ...

COURT:

Let the witness answer the question categorically.

A. All of the seven of them were armed with short guns, sir.

Assuming that there is an inconsistency in the testimonies of the witnesses as to the appearance of the guns, the discrepancy is not of such
magnitude and character sufficient to affect the substance of their declarations much less impair the credibility of the witness who positively
Identified the accused as perpetrators of the crime. The alleged size of the guns is merely trivial and constitute a minor detail which does not, in
actuality, touch upon the basic aspects of the who, the how, and the when of the crime committed. We have repeatedly held that minor
inconsistency does not affect witness credibility. 40 Thus, the very important fact, that all of the robbers were armed with guns, will remain and
subsist, irrespective of whether the guns are long or short.

The lower court, in arriving at the decision appealed from, took into account the contents of Exhibits "B" and "D". However, appellants assailed
their extra-judicial confessions (Exh. "B" and "D"), alleging that: "the same were extorted by physical violence directed against them by the PC
soldiers who arrested them without any warrant to that effect (Tsn, pp. 7-8, July 24, 1967; p. 14, July 14, 1967)." They claim further that "on
account of their being unlettered farmers (Tsn, p. 8, July 24, 1967) at the time of the investigation which led to the execution of E Exhibits " B" and
"D", they were interrogated in Ilongo and that they gave answers also in Ilongo (Tsn, p. 16, July 14, 1967; p. 7, July 24, 1967). In effect they
categorically stated that the answers in English contained in Exhs. "B" and "D" "were not theirs." 41

There are overriding circumstances and considerations which constrain us to hold that the extra-judicial confessions were voluntarily given by the
appellants. Firstly, the statements are replete and full of details, which could only be known by appellants themselves and could hardly been
supplied by disinterested police officers. Appellant Pedrosa admitted that only P15.00 in money was taken from the house of Proceso Mallorca
during the incident; that the persons who shot and killed the occupants of the house were Biryong Bungi, alias Ator, alias Mayor, alias Bila-an;
Butitoy alias Bitoy; Naldo Agustin alias Gustin; Rodolfo Sante; Pedro Adorable and he. 42 While appellant Agustin Salcedo, in his statement
admitted that he was armed with .38 caliber revolver; that he twice hit a woman and another occupant of the house on the right arm; that he was
assigned to surround the vicinity and after that he posted himself by the stairs of the door. 43

Secondly, the narrations contained in their affidavits (Exh. "B" and "D") are so fully informative, in many instances going beyond what the question
calls for, which indicate that the mind of the declarants were free from extraneous compulsion or restraint. Thus, Aniceto Pedroso declared the
following in his affidavit: 44

12. Q. After that talking of around 30 minutes, where did you and the group proceeded?

A. We all went to the national road. We went to a house whose owner I do not know. They talk with the owner. They went to another house. We
drink beer in the store or house of Nono in Bual. We consumed about one (1) case beer. We went to the house of Doming and get money. They did
not give us money on that night. It was already on the following morning. They gave it to Jose Sante. I do not know the amount given to him. We
went next to the house of Tay Leoncio. He gave the money also the following morning. We next went to the house of certain Asa. The same the
money was given the following morning.

13. xxx xxx xxx

14. Q. It will appear in the statement of Pedro Adorable, the name of Necesito Pedroso, what have you in relation to the same name?

A. I am the same person, sir. My alias is Budon.

xxx xxx xxx

22. Q. What time did the group reach the house of Proceso?
A. We passed the lot road leading to the house of Proceso and reaching thereat about 6:00 o'clock in the morning.

23. Q. In what manner did the group proceeded thereat the house of Proceso?

A. We walk but when we were very near the house, it rained and Beriong and Butitoy used a banana leaf to cover their body from getting wet.
Then, we ran towards the house of Proceso, as Beriong shouted "Manilong ta." When we were all at the house outside, Butitoy bought cigarettes
(marine) from Proceso, he was able to buy, then Butitoy or Bitoy pulled out pistol and pointed it to Proceso and Maldo held both hands of Proceso
by the back. He was lead upstairs while Beriong was already ahead and went upstairs. Beriong met Butitoy and Maldo together with Proceso
upstairs. I went up with Rodolfo Sante upstairs, but Beriong adviced me to go down, and Rodolfo Sante was left upstairs. I went down then I heard
a shot followed by many shots directed at Proceso who I saw jumped out of the balcony. Butitoy fired at Proceso then followed by Beriong who
went down and shoot Proceso several times. Many more shots followed. I was holding a revolver 38, but I tried to squeeze and I fired one round.
My target is the old woman who was carrying a small child in her arms. I missed the shot and then, Beriong told us to get out immediately. Then
they an went down and I saw Beriong carrying a shotgun. We all went out the house and proceeded to Lampagang. Pedro Adorable and Rodolfo
Sante were left behind at Maybula.

xxx xxx xxx

28. Q. Do you know if there were cash money taken from the house of Proceso during the incident?

A. Yes, sir, only FIFTEEN (P15.00) pesos.

The affidavit of accused Agustin Salcedo contains the following informative details, 45 thus:

15. Q. Upon reaching the house of Proceso, what did you do?

A. When we approached the house, I was assigned to surround the vicinity and after that I posted myself at the door just after the 3rd steps of the
ladder.

xxx xxx xxx

17. Q. How many times did you fire your revolver during that incident?

A. I fired twice hitting a woman also an occupant of the house on her right arm.

18. Q. What was the position of that woman when you shot her?

A. She was running inside the house.

19. Q. What did you take and carried away from the house after you killed Proceso and Agustin Mallorca?

A. I could not just determine because the things taken were all placed inside the sack handed to me by Butitoy and I was assigned to bring it. I also
saw a riot shotgun taken from the house and brought by one of our companion named Joe, after we left.

Thirdly, although the statements contained in the affidavits are in English, Municipal Judge Elena de Leon of Tulunan, Cotabato to whom said
confessions were signed, subscribed and sworn to, who could speak the Ilongo dialect very well, 46 clearly testified that after she had translated
the statements in Ilongo dialect, appellants answered that said statements were true, and that nobody forced, compel or intimidated them into
signing or executing the same. Thus, Judge de Leon testified: 47

Q. Before letting this Aniceto Pedroso sign this Exh. "B", what did you do?

A. I asked him what dialect he speaks and understands.

Q. What did he answer?

A. He said Ilongo dialect.

Q. What did you do?

A. I told him that I am going to read his statements one by one and instructed him to advise me if there are statements that are not true.

Q. And after that?

A. Then I further asked him if those statements are his own and given freely and voluntarily, and that if there was somebody who forced or
maltreated him to make the statement, and he answered there was none, and all the statements were his own and were given freely and
voluntarily.

Q. You want the Hon. Court to understand that you read the contents of Exh. "B", especially the questions and answers one by one to Aniceto
Pedrosa?

A. Yes, sir, in the Ilongo dialect.

Q. And after reading the contents to him, what did he say?

A. He said that those statements are all true and that nobody forced him to make those statements.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Before letting this Agustin Salcedo affix his thumbmark on this Exh. "D", what if any, did you do?

A. I asked him what dialect he speaks and understands, and he answered Ilongo dialect.

Q. And after that?

A. I told him that I am going to read every line of the statement in Ilongo dialect and instructed him to advise me which statements are not true and
correct.

Q. And you read the contents one by one?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. After reading the contents of Exhibit "D" to him what else did you do?

A. I asked him if that statement was his own and given voluntarily and if there was anybody who forced and intimidated him to give his statement.

Q. And after that, that was the time he thumbmarked Exh. "D"?

A. Yes, sir.

Aside from the presumption that Judge de Leon has regularly performed her duty, We find no motive, interest or bias on the part of Judge de Leon
to besmirch or bargain away her reputation for truth, honesty and integrity. We could not believe that a person of the status of a municipal judge
would be so depraved and perverted to conspire and falsely impute a capital offense to an innocent person.

Finally, the testimonies of alleged maltreatment were uncorroborated; the appellants did not attempt to present any corroborating witness. In
People vs. Revotoc, 48 We held that: "where the testimonies of the accused (that violence was inflicted upon them in the process of obtaining their
confessions) are uncorroborated, such confession must be conclusively held to be voluntary. Their testimonies standing alone, cannot withstand
the unyielding strength of the settled rule that an extra-judicial confession is presumed to have been willingly and freely given until the contrary is
clearly and fully shown."

It is not necessary to delve further upon the appellants' defense of alibi as the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the offense
charged. The witnesses presented by the prosecution have made positive and proper Identification of the offenders. It is basic and well-entrenched
that the defense of alibi cannot stand against positive Identification. 49 Besides, the appellants were not able to prove that it was physically
impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime.

To establish alibi, accused must not only show that he was present at some other place at about the time of alleged crime, but also that he was at
such other place for so long a time that it was impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed, either before, during
or after the time he was at such other place. 50

In sum and substance, the extra-judicial confessions of the appellants having been made voluntarily, corroborated with incontrovertible proof of
corpus delicti are sufficient to sustain a conviction. 51 The records satisfactorily proved the fact of loss sustained and the fact of death. No less than
two witnesses (Edmundo Agudo and Antonina Mallorca) who were in concord, testified to the fact of loss. They stated in open court that the
appellants were able to rob one shotgun, an ammunition, goods that were sold in the store of the victims and certain amount of money, the sum of
which they do not know. 52 The fact of death of Proceso Mallorca and Agustin Mallorca was established by the post-mortem findings 53 and court
testimony of Dr. Jesus Cuerpo, the Municipal Health Officer of Mlang, Cotabato. 54

The crime committed is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide defined and penalized in Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. As
previously discussed, We have considered the aggravating circumstances of band and double homicide against the accused. Since no mitigating
circumstances exist and the crime is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death, the correct and proper penalty is the supreme penalty of death.

WHEREFORE, with the modification of the proper denomination of the crime, the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr.,
JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32900 February 25, 1982
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DARWIN VELOSO Y MILITANTE ALIAS "CARLITO VILLAREAL", accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:

Before Us on automatic review is the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur imposing the capital penalty of death on accused
Darwin Veloso y Militante, alias Carlito Villareal, for the crime of robbery with homicide and double serious physical injuries.

Accused contends that (1) the trial court had no jurisdiction to try the case for want of preliminary investigation, (2) the extrajudicial confession he
executed was obtained through force and intimidation and, therefore, inadmissible in evidence, and (3) in the absence of adequate proof that it
was he who killed the deceased Hermenegildo Odiamar, he should be held guilty of the offense of robbery only, and not of the complex crime of
robbery with homicide and double serious physical injuries. We affirm.

The pertinent facts are as follows:

At about 7:30 in the evening of May 21, 1970, while Felimon Odiamar was leisurely reading the newspapers in the living room of his residence at
Bo. Pacol Naga City 1, he heard the piercing sounds of shattering glass, followed by several bursts of gun fire, coming from the main door of the
receiving room. 2 Felimon immediately ran upstairs to get his .22 cal. rifle and .45 cal. pistol, while his wife, Sotera, and children, Shirley and
Hermenegildo (Hermie), who had just finished their evening meal, helped each other lock the door between the living and dining rooms. This done,
Shirley rushed to the kitchen to close the backdoor. There she saw their housemaid, Merly, pushing the door through which the armed men were
trying to force their way in. She helped Merly push the door, but upon being overpowered, the two girls ran. Hence, accused Veloso and a
companion, both masked, entered the house. Veloso was armed with a.45 cal. pistol while his companion had a revolver. 3

Veloso told Shirley and the maid, "Hold-up ito, taas ang kamay!" [This is a hold-up, hands up!], and ordered them to lie flat on the floor. When
Hermie rushed to his sister's side, he too was told to lie flat on the floor. 4

The versions given by the parties as to what transpired next are at variance. The prosecution's evidence shows that Hermie, upon seeing his mother
at the foot of the stairs bleeding, rose and knelt; then, putting his hands up, begged the intruders to spare the fife of his mother. Notwithstanding
this plea, Veloso shot him on the chest with his .45 cal. pistol. 5 As Hermie lay dead, Veloso directed his companion to divest the deceased of his
wrist watch. 6 At this time, Veloso's mask had fallen off. Felimon, who was then at the third rung or midportion of the stairs, was also fired upon.
An exchange of fire between the robbers and Felimon, until the latter's .22 cal. rifle jammed. Filemon was about to fire his .45 cal. pistol when
Shirley, at the point of the gun trained on her by Veloso, "Pa, surrender na, Pa surrender na, tagagadanon ako, gagadanon kita gabas! [Pa,
surrender, Pa surrender; they will kill me; they will kill all of us!]. Felimon desisted from firing gave up his arms to the intruders. 7

The accused testifying on his own behalf, gave a different version. He claimed that he pulled Hermie, who was lying flat on the floor, by his back
shirt collar and, using him as human I shield directed him to ask his father, Felimon, to give up; that Hermie could do so, his father fired his .45 cal.
pistol, the bullet intended for him (accused) found its mark on Hermie's chest; and that he took hold of Shirley and ordered her to ask her father to
surrender. It should be stated, however, that after the accused had been arrested he executed an affidavit, Exhibit "O", wherein he admitted
having accidentally shot Hermie during the perpetration of the robbery.

Meanwhile, four [4] other masked men joined Veloso and his companion They ordered the Odiamars and the maid to go to a room upstairs where
they were told to lie flat on the floor, face down. 8

Shortly after, three of the Odiamar's tenants, Luis, Benedicto and Perfecto, all surnamed Balleber, who had arrived in the house, were also ordered
to go to a room upstairs by one of the masked men, and there they were likewise made to lie flat on the floor. 9

One of the robbers ransacked the place, while another demanded money from Felimon, who handed over his wallet containing the amount of
P108.00. When asked to produce more, Felimon pointed to his portfolio in the other room. The robbers also asked for the key to the aparador,
from where they took a tear gas gun, 3 necklaces, 4 wrist watches, 3 pairs of earrings and a collection of old coins, consisting of 36 one peso coins
and 100 pieces of P0.50-centavo coins. 10

After having taken the things they wanted, the robbers demanded from Mrs. Odiamar the key to the jeep parked at the drive-way leading to the
garage. They boarded the Odiamar's jeep and sped away. 11

The spouses Odiamar and the body of their son Hermenegildo were brought to the Camarines Sur Provincial Hospital in Naga City. Filemon
Odiamar was found to have suffered a punctured gunshot wound, 1/4 inch in diameter at the right supra-scapular region, 12 While Mrs. Sotera
Odiamar sustained a circular wound and contusion about 1/4 inch on the chin with swelling at the floor of the mouth, swelling at the tongue and
upper third of neck, anterior aspect. 13

According to Dr. Theo Jayme Santy who conducted an autopsy on the deceased Hermenegildo, the cause of the victim's death was "shock,
irreversible, acute internal and external hemorrhage, secondary to gunshot wound which destroyed the liver, and the 4th lumbar vertebra." 14

Immediately after the incident, the PC and the Naga City police conducted their separate investigations. On May 28, 1970, PC Sgts. Cervantes, Fruto
and Delloso were dispatched to verify a report that the suspect Darwin Veloso and his companions had left certain articles belonging to the
Odiamar family with one Mercedes Zuñiga, a resident of Bo. Maycatmon Milaor Camarines Sur. They recovered from Mercedes Zuñiga a diamond
ring 15 and a silver ring with rhinestones 16, and from her sister-in-law, Mrs. Nebria, a necklace 17 , a pair of Bantex shoes 18 and a reversible
jacket. 19 Mrs. Nebria pointed to a culvert near the railroad station where they found Odiamar's .22 cal. rifle 20 with a magazine 21 and 6 live
ammunitions. 22

When interrogated by the PC officers, Simeon Nebria, brother of Mercedes Zuniga, stated that the .22 cal rifle was left by Darwin Veloso; that the
necklace was given by Veloso as a gift to his wife; that Veloso pledged the diamond ring, Exhibit "J", to his sister Mercedes Zuñiga for the sum of
P10.00; and that the latter's husband, Armando Zuñiga, was the ore who buried the 22 cal. rifle in the culvert. 23
Elements of the Naga City police force, acting on the information given by Simeon Nebria, proceeded to Makati Rizal where they, with the help of
the Makati police, found Veloso in a house at Biak-na-Bato St., Makati, Rizal in the afternoon of June 2, 1970. Having caught him in the possession
of a .45 cal. pistol, 24 the law officers placed him under arrest. Veloso claimed that at the police station he was subjected to corporal punishment
by the Makati Police. 25

On June 3, 1970, Veloso was brought to Naga City, At the office of the City Mayor, he gave a written statement in the form od questions and
answers 26, wherein he admitted that he, was one of those who robbed the Odiamars and that in 'The course of the robbery he accidentally shot
Hermenegildo Odiamar. Said statement was subscribed and sworn to before City Judge Pedro Templo of Naga City.

On June 16, 1970, Darwin Veloso and five [5] others, who were still at large, were charged with the crime of robbery in and with homicide and
double serious physical injuries. After due trial, the court a quo handed down the aforesaid verdict of conviction.

The accused assails the jurisdiction of the trial court for want of preliminary investigation. We find neither factual nor legal bases for this thesis.

The record shows that on July 5, 1970, Judge Templo conducted a preliminary examination 27 , and on the basis of the sworn statements of
Filemon Odiamar and his witnesses, the corresponding information was filed on June 17, 1970 in the City Court of Naga City. On June 22, 1970,
Judge Templo set the case for preliminary investigation to afford the accused the occasion to confront the witnesses against him and to present his
own evidence. But instead of availing himself of this opportunity, the accused filed a manifestation stating that he ,"waives his right to present
evidence at the second stage of the preliminary investigation." Hence, the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur for
further proceedings. 28 It further appears that accused entered his non guilty plea without raising the question of lack of preliminary investigation.
29

The aforesaid actuations on the part of the accused constitute waiver of his right to preliminary investigation. It is well-settled that the right to
preliminary investigation is not a fundamental right and that the same may be waived expressly or by silence. 30 And it has been held that such
waiver carried with it the waiver of any procedural error or irregularity that may have attended the preliminary investigation. 31

Equally untenable is the claim that the accused's extrajudicial confession 32 is inadmissible for having been obtained through force and
intimidation. Even granting that the accused was mandhandled by the Makati police officers upon his arrest in Makati on June 2, 1970, as claimed
by him, there is nothing in the record to show that he was subjected to violence and intimidation after he was brought to Naga City where his
confession was given. In fact, the accused admitted in open court that he was never harmed while in the custody of the Naga City police. 33

Moreover, Judge Templo of the City Court of Naga, whose credibility is not assailed, testified that the accused not only admitted before him the
truth of the statements set forth in Exhibit "O", but likewise affirmed that he was not subjected to any threat or violence before or during the
taking of his statement by the Naga City police. 34

Accused further contends that his conviction of the com plex crime of robbery with homicide and double serious physical injuries is unwarranted
because of the absence of adequate proof that he was the one who fired upon the deceased Hermenegildo Odiamar. This contention, too, is
devoid of merit.

Filemon Odiamar and his daughter Shirley, testified that it was Veloso who shot Hermie while the latter was kneeling with his hands up. The court a
quo found their testimonies "clear and convincing", and this factual finding of the lower court is entitled to great respect.

It is undisputed that during the commission of the robbery, Hermenegildo Odiamar was shot and killed, while the Odiamar spouses sustained
serious physical injuries. Given this premise. it is unnecessary to dwell at length on the factual issue as to whether the accused inflicted the fatal
wound on the deceased. The fact that the death of Hermenegildo resulted during or on the occasion of the robbery, wherein the accused
admittedly participated, makes the latter guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide and double serious physical injuries. Well
entrenched is the rule that whenever a homicide has been committed as a consequence, or on the occasion, of a robbery, all those who took part
as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, although they did not
actually take part in the homicide, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. 35 As this Court held in People vs.
Mangulabnan: 36

... in order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with homicide it is enough that a homicide would result by reason or on the occasion
of the robbery [Decision of Supreme Court of Spain of November 26, 1892, and January 7, 1878, quoted in 2 Hidalgo's Penal Code, p. 267, and 259-
260, respectively]. This High Tribunal speaking of the accessory character of the circumstances leading to the homicide, has also held that it is
immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident [Decision of September 9, 1886, October 22, 1907, April 30, 1910 and July 14, 1917],
provided that the homicide be produced by reason or on the occasion of robbery, inasmuch as it is only the result obtained, without reference or
distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to be taken into consideration
[Decision of January 12, 1889 — see Cuello Calon's Codigo Penal, p. 501-502; Emphasis supplied].

The court a quo found that the crime was attended by six [6] aggravating circumstances, to wit: band, use of motor vehicle, disguise, nighttime,
dwelling and recidivism. The court's conclusion, except with respect to the circumstance of use of motor vehicle, is correct.

(1) Band: Six [6] malefactors, Darwin Veloso and five [51 others, all armed, cooperated in the commission of the offense. 37

(2) Disguise: That Darwin Veloso and his five [5] companions wore masks to conceal their Identity during the commission of the crime constitutes
disguise.

(3) Nighttime: The accused himself admitted that he and his co-conspirators waited for nighttime before committing the robbery to better
accomplish their plan; and nighttime is aggravating when it is especially sought for the purpose of impunity. 38

(4) Dwelling: This circumstance was correctly considered. Entry into the dwelling of the victim is not inherent in the crime of robbery with
homicide, since the authors thereof could have committed the offense without violating the domicile of their Victim. 39

(5) Recidivism: The prosecution has established the allegation in the information that the accused Veloso is a recidivist. It appears that prior to the
commission of the offense in question, he had been convicted by the Court of First Instance of Albay of robbery in Criminal Case No. 1872, 40 and
for another robbery in Criminal Case No. 4058. 41
But the lower court erred in considering the use of motor vehicle as an aggravating circumstance. The accused and his co-conspirators used the
jeep of the Odiamars merely to facilitate their escape. It was not intentionally sought to ensure the success of their nefarious plan; and there is no
showing that without the use of the vehicle the offense charged could not have been committed. 42

But even discounting the circumstance of use of motor vehicle, the trial court was correct in imposing the supreme penalty of death, the
commission of the crime charged having been attended by five [5] generic aggravating circumstances, without any mitigating circumstance to
offset the same.

The accused is a hardened criminal and his consummate perversity is revealed by a catalogue of crimes committed against society. The record
discloses that, apart from the offense charged herein, he had been previously convicted by final judgment of the following crimes, to wit:

1. Robbery, by the Court of First Instance of Albay in Criminal Case No. 1872; 43

2. Another robbery, by the Court of First Instance of Albay in Criminal Case No. 4058; 44

3. Assault upon an agent of a person in authority, by the Court of First Instance of Albay in Criminal Case No. 4056; 45

4. Illegal possession of firearms, by the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur in Criminal Case No. 6679; 46 and

5. Murder for the cold-blooded killing of one Jesus Diez committed on May 20, 1970, i.e., the day before the perpetration of the Odiamar robbery;
and the death sentence imposed by the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur in that case was affirmed by this Court in a per curiam decision
dated August 6, 1979. 47

WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Barredo, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Fernando, CJ., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30116 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FAUSTO DAMASO, VICTORIANO EUGENIO, alias TURING, ESTANISLAO GREGORIO alias ISLAO, LORENZO ALVIAR alias ORING AND BONIFACIO
ESPEJO alias MARCIA, defendants, FAUSTO DAMASO, LORENZO ALVIAR, BONIFACIO ESPEJO AND VICTORIANO EUGENIO, defendants-appellants.

PER CURIAM:

The penalty of death imposed on Fausto Damaso, Victoriano Eugenio Lorenzo Alviar and Bonifacio Espejo by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in
its Criminal Case No. 2253 for "robbery with double homicide" is now before this Court on automatic review together with a related case No. 2293
"for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition" involving only the accused, Lorenzo Alviar.

The Information in Criminal Case No. 2253 charged the accused therein of "robbery with double homicide" alleged to have been committed as
follows:

That on or about the 21st day of November, 1959, at nighttime, in the Municipality of Victoria, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, four of whom are armed with a scythe and firearms, namely: Fausto Damaso with a
rifle, springfield Cal. 30, Victoriano Eugenio with a paltik Cal. 12 ga., Estanislao Gregorio with a scythe, and Lorenzo Alviar with a paltik Cal. 22,
confederating, conspiring, helping and aiding one another, by means of force, violence, threats and intimidation upon the persons of Donata
Rebolledo, Victoriano de la Cruz and Susana Sabado, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain, take, steal and
carry away with them the following.

PROPERTY OF DONATA REBOLLEDO:

One jacket valued at

P25.00

One necklace valued at

50.00

One earring valued at

25.00

One ring valued at

15.00

One hat valued at.

5.00

Three scythes valued at

. 3.60

A document valued at

2.30

Total.

P125.90

PROPERTY OF VICTORIANO DE LA CRUZ

Cash money in the amount of

P15.00

PROPERTY OF SUSANA SABADO:

Cash money in the amount of

15.00

Ten bottles of liquor Bicolana;

Six bottles of Cana Rum;

One dozen Ligo Sardines;

One dozen Eatwell Sardines;

Six packages of Golden Star cigarettes;

three packages of cigarettes (Inyog);

and four packages of cigarettes

(La Ventaja) with a total value of.

P21.02

Total.

P36.02

Grand Total

P176.92

to the damage and prejudice of the said owners in the respective amounts of P125.90, P15.00 and P36,02, Philippine currency; that the said
accused, on the occasion of the commission of the crime above-mentioned, held and brought Catalina Sabado and Susana Sabado, daughters of the
said Donata Rebolledo, to a sugarcane field which is a secluded and uninhabited place, at Barrio Bangar, Victoria, Tarlac, and once there and after
tying together the respective forearms of the said Catatina Sabado and Susana Sabado, in pursuance of their concerted conspiracy, by means of
force and grave abuse of superior strength, the said accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, stab the said Catalina Sabado
and Susana Sabado on different parts of their body and cut their necks with a sharp pointed instrument (scythe), as a result of which the latter died
instantly.

That in the commission of the crime above mentioned, there concurred the aggravating circumstances of (1) abuse of superior strength, (2)
nighttime, (3) uninhabited place, (4) by a band, (5) treachery, and (6) disregard of sex. (pp. 116-117, rollo)

In Criminal Case No. 2293 Lorenzo Alviar was also charged of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, viz.—

That on or about November 24, 1959, in the Municipality of Victoria, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named accused, without authority of law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his posssession and
under his control a firearm, to wit; a paltik revolver caliber 22 with eight (8) rounds of ammunition, without first obtaining the corresponding
license or permit to keep and possess the same. (pp. 117-118, Ibid.)

The two cases were jointly heard by the trial court. In a joint decision rendered on December 10, 1968, by then Presiding Judge, Hon. Arturo B.
Santos, all the accused were found guilty as charged. In Criminal Case No. 2253 (robbery with double homicide) the accused Fausto Damaso,
Lorenzo Alviar, Bonifacio Espejo and Victoriano Eugenio were each sentenced to suffer the "penalty of death, to indemnify the legal heirs of the
victims, Catalina Sabado and Susana Sabado, jointly and severally in the amount of P12,000.00 for each of the victims, plus the sum of P15,00 which
was the money taken by the accused, and to pay the costs, share and share alike." One of the accused, Estanislao Gregorio, was no longer included
in the sentence because he died on April 6, 1967 while the cases were still undergoing trial.

In Criminal Case No. 2293, accused Lorenzo Alviar was sentenced "to three years imprisonment and to pay the costs," 1

The evidence of the prosecution as found by the trial court establish the following incidents: 2

Donata Rebolledo and her son-in-law, Victoriano de la Cruz were residents of Barrio Bangar, municipality of Victoria, province of Tarlac. At about 9
o'clock in the evening of November 21, 1959, Donata and Victoriano heard the barkings of dogs outside their house. Shortly, two men armed with
guns, entered, pointed their weapons at them, tied up the hands of Victoriano, covered him with a blanket and asked Donata for the wereabouts of
her daughter Catalina Sabado. Stricken by fear, Donata kept silent and blocked the door leading to her daughter's room but was promptly pushed
aside. Donata was then ordered to open an "aparador" from which the two men took valuables like jewelry, clothing, documents, and cutting
instruments. All the while, Donata and Victoriano could hear the movements and voices of some three to four other persons beneath the house.
The two men brought Catalina Sabado down from the house and then asked where they could find Susana Sabado, Donata's other daughter who
was then in her store located about five meters away in the same house. Thereafter, Donata heard the men opening the door to Susana's store.
After several minutes, feeling that the intruders had left, Donata untied the hands of Victoriano and asked him to go to the store to see if her
daughters were there. When the two women could not be found, Donata sent Victoriano to the barrio lieutenant to report the incident.
Accordingly, Victoriano went to the barrio lieutenant and the two later went to town to inform the police of the occurrence.

On the same night, Chief of Police Pedro Valdez with the aid of several policemen and a handful of civilians went out in search for the Sabado
sisters. It was only the following morning when the two women were found already dead with wounds in several parts of their bodies. They were
found in a sugar plantation belonging to one Ignacio Fabros, located about one hundred meters from Donata Rebolledo's house.
Dr. Carlos Briones, Municipal Health Officer of Victoria performed the autopsy on the two bodies and reported that the deaths were caused by
profuse hemorrhage due to a fatal, big, wide, gaping and deep lacerated wound just above the Adam's apple. He also testified in court that the
death weapon must have been a sharp instrument with a pointed tip, like a scythe.

A few days after the incident, Donata Rebolledo singled out the accused Fausto Damaso from a police line-up as one of the men who went up to
her house on that evening. She and Victoriano had recognized Damaso because of the light coming from a kerosene lamp placed on a small table
near the "aparador." Damaso, however, initially denied ever having been to Donata's house that night. Later, the PC rounded up four other
suspects in the persons of co-accused Gregorio, Eugenio Alviar and Espejo.

As further evidence, the prosecution presented separate extrajudicial statements, sworn to before Municipal Judge Conrado de Gracia of Paniqui,
Tarlac, wherein au the five accused admitted having participated in the crime.

In his sworm statement marked as Exhibit "J", Fausto Damaso stated that he was with his co-accused Gregorio, Eugenio, Alviar and Espejo on the
night the Sabado sisters were killed; that he never went into the house of Donata Rebolledo as Eugenio and Gregorio were the ones who did; that it
was Gregorio and Eugenio who actually did the killing while he, Alviar and Espejo merely stood by; that the victims were stabbed and their throats
cut with a reaping knife (pangapas or lait); that the killing was motivated by the failure of the older woman (Catalina) to pay for a carabao bought
from Gregorio; and that on that evening, Gregorio, Eugenio, Alviar and Espejo were carrying caliber .45 pistols while he was unarmed.

In a subsequent statement marked as Exhibit "P", Damaso reiterated his claim that it was Gregorio who actually stabbed and cut the throats of the
victims in the presence of all the accused; that Catalina was killed ahead of Susana; that Gregorio killed Susana as she was being held by Eugenio;
and that while still in the house, they were able to get P15 from Susana's store. Contrary to what he confessed in his previous sworn statements, he
admitted that it was he and Eugenio who went up to Donata Rebolledo's house and not Eugenio and Gregorio. He also changed his theory as to the
motive for the killings, declaring this time that the two women were killed because the latter had already recognized them. He further stated that
on that night, he was armed with a caliber .22 (paltik) revolver, Eugenio with a 12-gauge paltik, Gregorio with two reaping knives (lait), Lorenzo
with a long firearm and Espejo with two stones.

In this sworn statement, Exhibit "O", Victoriano Eugenio likewise admitted that he was a party to the commission of the offense: that it was
Gregorio who conceived of the plot to commit the crime; that it was also Gregorio who killed the two women with a reaping knife; that after
Catalina was killed he held Susana by the arms as Gregorio stabbed her and cut her throat; that Alviar, Damaso and Lorenzo were also with them
that night; that he did not know what motivated Gregorio to kill the victims; that he had no previous agreement with his co-accused to kill the two
women; that he and Damaso were the ones who entered Donata's house, took P15 from the "aparador," brought down Catalina and also got
Susana from another portion of the house; that he was then armed with a 12- gauge paltik, Damaso with a caliber.22 paltik revolver, Alviar with a
Springfield caliber .30 rifle, Gregorio with a reaping knife and Espejo with two stones; and that he was with the group that night because at about 7
o'clock in the evening, Gregorio dropped by his house and invited him to Barrio Bangar where the crime was committed.

In his separate statement (Exhibit "Q"), Estanislao Gregorio narrated that in the afternoon of November 21, 1959, his four co-accused came and
informed him of a plan to rob the Sabado sisters, to which plan he agreed; that Damaso and Eugenio went up Donata Rebolledo's house, got P15 in
cash and brought out Catalina and Susana by force; that he stabbed and cut the throats of the victims with all his co-accused present; that Eugenio
held Catalina while Damaso held Susana as he killed them both with a reaping knife; that the two women were killed because they had recognized
Eugenio and Damaso and might testify against them in court; that during the commission of the crime, his only weapon was a reaping knife while
Alviar was carrying a caliber .22 paltik revolver, Damaso, a Springfield caliber .30 rifle, Eugenio a 12-gauge single shot paltik and Espejo was
unarmed.

Exhibit "N" is Bonifacio Espejo's sworn statement. Here he declared that he happened to be with the group because Damaso and Eugenio invited
him to Barrio Bangar and they dropped by the houses of Alviar and Gregorio before actually proceeding to the barrio; that they had a previous
agreement to commit the crime; that they planned the same in a lot owned by a certain Don Juan Garcia in Barrio Bangar; that it was Damaso and
Eugenio who entered Donata Rebolledo's house while he, Alviar and Gregorio were left downstairs to keep watch; that they were able to get P15
from the house; that it was Gregorio who actually killed the two women; and that Damaso and Eugenio were armed with a 12-gauge paltik and
another long arm the caliber of which he did not know; that Alviar had a caliber .22 paltik revolver, Gregorio a knife and he had two big stones.

Substantially similar were the admissions of Lorenzo Alviar in his sworn statement (Exhibit "R"). He likewise declared that he and his co-accused
took P15 from the house of the victims; that it was Gregorio who stabbed and cut the throats of the victims with a reaping knife; that the killing
was done in a sugarcane plantation between 10:00 and 11:00 o'clock in the evening of November 21, 1959; that Catalina was killed before Susana;
that he was armed with a caliber .22 paltik revolver, Eugenio with a single shot, 12-gauge paltik, Damaso with a Springfield caliber .30 rifle and
Espejo with two stones. He claimed, however, that he was only forced and intimidated by his co-accused to join the group.

At the trial, the five accused set up the defense of alibi and repudiated their respective sworn statements alleging that these were obtained from
them through duress, force and intimidation. Instances of the use of third degree methods like boxing, pouring of "7-up" into the nostrils, stripping
of clothes, pricking of the penis, kicking and slapping of the ears were narrated by the accused on the witness stand, all of which were not believed
by the trial court.

The accused-appellants are here represented by a counsel de oficio, Atty. Clemente A. Madarang, Jr., who filed an exhaustive brief for the accused.

Taken as a whole, the assigned errors boil down to the question of credibility and sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction of appellants
for the special complex crime of robbery with double homicide. It is argued that (a) there is no evidence of the alleged robbery; (b) that the
homicide was not committed by reason or on occasion of the robbery; and (c) that the crime was not attended by the aggravating circumstances of
armed band, treachery and uninhabited place.

There is no merit to appellants' submittal.

1. That robbery was committed is evident from the declaration of prosecution witness Donata Rebolledo who testified that the two men who
barged into her house, one of whom she recognized as Fausto Damaso, ordered her to open her "aparador" and then they took therefrom the
following items with their respective values a jacket-P25; a necklace P50; earrings — P25; a ring-P15; a hat-P5; scythes-P3.60; and documents
worth P2.30. 3 Moreover the appellants admitted in their separate statements that they were able to get P15 from Donata's house. On this point,
We agree with the Solicitor General that it matters not from what part of the house the accused got the P15. What is important is that the culprits
carried away personal property belonging to another by the use of force, intimidation or violence. 4
2. Counsel points out that because there was a motive, at least on the part of Gregorio, for the killing of the Sabado sisters, the double homicide
could not have been "committed by reason or on occasion of the robbery" as the law contemplates. He calls Our attention to the sworn statement
wherein Fausto Damaso declared that Gregorio killed Catalina and Susana because Catalina bought a carabao from him and did not pay for it.
Harping further on this motive theory, counsel mentions such circumstances as why the accused specifically asked for Catalina and Susana upon
entering Donata Rebolledo's house and why Donata and Victoriano were not killed together with the sisters if the purpose was to remove all
opposition to the robbery or to eliminate witnesses thereto.

As to Damaso's declaration, it should be noted that Damaso himself, in his subsequent sworn statement, changed his motive theory and stated that
the victims were killed in order to eliminate witnesses to the crime. This was corroborated by Gregorio in the latter's own written confession. Even
assuming, however, that such a motive for vengeance existed on the part of Gregorio, it does not necessarily exclude the fact that he and co-
accused also intended, when they went to Donata's house that night, to rob the family. In a complex crime of robbery with homicide, while an
intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life, the fact that the intent of the culprit was tempered with a desire also to avenge
grievances against the person killed does not prevent the punishment of the accused for the complex crime. 5

3. Counsel for appellants also argues that the trial court erred in its appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of armed band, treachery and
uninhabited place.

The aggravating circumstance of band exists whenever more than three armed malefactors act together in the commission of an offense. 6 Counsel
concedes that at least three of the accused-appellants, namely Eugenio, Alviar, and Gregorio, ,were armed during the commission of the crime. He
doubts, however, whether accused Damaso carried any weapon and whether the "two stones" carried by accused Espejo fall under the category of
"arms." But even granting that Espejo's stones do not constitute arms, the prosecution presented the following evidence to show that Damaso was
also armed and, as such, there were more than three of the accused who were armed: (1) that extrajudicial confession of Damaso himself (Exhibit
"P") that he was carrying a caliber .22 paltik revolver; (2) the sworn statement of accused Eugenio (Exhibit "O") that Damaso had a caliber .22 paltik
revolver; (3) the separate written confessions of Alviar, Gregorio and Espejo (Exhibits R, Q, and "N") that Damaso had a caliber .30 Springfield rifle;
and (4) the testimonies of Donata Rebolledo and Victoriano de la Cruz that both men who entered their house (one of whom they later Identified
as Damaso) were carrying firearms. It is clear from the above, that Damaso was armed during the night of the commission of the crime, and it is
immaterial what kind of firearm he carried, the only important thing being that he was armed. In this case, the presence of an armed band is to be
considered as a generic aggravating circumstance under Article 14(6) of the Revised Penal Code inasmuch as the crime committed was that
provided for and penalized in Article 294, paragraph 1 and not under Article 295, Revised Penal Code (see People v. Apduhan, Jr., per Justice, now
Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, 24 SCRA 798)

Treachery is present if the victim is killed while bound in such a manner as to be deprived of the opportunity to repel the attack or escape with any
possibility of success. 7 The fact that the bodies of Catalina and Susana were found dead with their arms tied behind their backs as well as the
admission of Gregorio in his confession (Exhibit "Q") that he killed the sisters while their arms were held by Eugenio and Damaso lead Us to
conclude that the killing of the two women was done under treacherous circumstances.

Anent the circumstances of uninhabited place, counsel disclaims its existence by pointing to the proximity of the sugarcane field where the victims
were killed to the national highway as well as to certain houses in the barrio. The uninhabitedness of a place is determined not by the distance of
the nearest house to the scene of the crime, but whether or not in the place of commission, there was reasonable possibility of the victim receiving
some help. 8 Considering that the killing was done during nighttime and the sugarcane in the field was tall enough to obstruct the view of
neighbors and passersby, there was no reasonable possibility for the victims to receive any assistance. That the accused deliberately sought the
solitude of the place is clearly shown by the fact that they brought the victims to the sugarcane field although they could have disposed of them
right in the house of Donata Rebolledo where they were found. Thus, in People v. Saguing, the Court considered the crime as having been
committed in an uninhabited place because the killing was done in a secluded place at the foot of a hill, forested, and uninhabited. 9

The trial court considered separately the three circumstances of armed band, treachery and uninhabited place where under other situations one
may be considered absorbed or inherent in the other. There is ample justification for this. The elements of each circumstance subsist
independently and can be distinctly perceived thereby revealing a greater degree of perversity on the part of the accused.

4. In the third assignment of error, defense counsel assails the sufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution. He urges that the extrajudicial
confessions, having been repudiated during the trial, are insufficient to sustain the trial court's judgment of conviction, specially so since no direct
evidence was introduced of any conspiracy or of the involvement of appellants in the crime in question.

Regarding this matter, the following are strongly persuasive. First, the appellants' separate extrajudicial confessions were subscribed and sworn to
before Municipal Judge Conrado de Gracia of Paniqui, Tarlac. On the witness stand, Judge de Gracia testified as to the authenticity and due
execution of the statements. He declared that before the statements were sworn to before him, he had the appellants' PC escorts excluded from
the room. He then took pains in translating and explaining to the appellants the contents of their written statements and got their assurance that
such statements were freely and voluntarily made. 10 If it were true that appellants were forced or intimidated into making the confessions, they
could have easily manifested before the judge that they did not voluntarily give the same. Certainly, they could have then been afforded the
necessary protection from any untoward incident that could happen. Their failure there and then to air any injustice or misdeed committed upon
them belies their stories of maltreatment. Too, there is no credible proof of the alleged maltreatment that they suffered in the hands of the police
or other authorities as a result of which they executed the confessions. Considering that repudiation of confessions comes very easily, the same
must be taken with a grain of salt. it occurs all too often that guilty persons, after confession to crime, experience a change of heart and repudiate
their confessions in the hope of escaping liability.

Secondly, there was the reenactment of the robbery and the killings. The movements reconstructed by the appellants conform substantially with
the details set forth in their individual sworn statements. The reenactment was done in the presence of people, including a photographer who had
no connection with the police or the prosecution.

Fiscal Magin Tañedo who was present during the reenactment testified that the entire proceeding was spontaneous and free from coercion. On
several occasions, appellants, even corrected themselves in certain details. Nobody directed the whole show except the appellants themselves. 11

Fiscal Tañedo's testimony was corroborated by photographer Manuel Gamalinda who also declared that there was no dictation, violence, force or
intimidation employed upon the appellants during the reenactment. 12 Gamalinda also testified as to the authenticity of the pictures he took
during the reenactment, which the prosecution also submitted as evidence. 13
Again, concerning the confessions, other circumstances are equally significant. Some of the statements made, specifically the one of accused Alviar,
were exculpatory in nature and would not have been included had the confessant been coerced into making his confession. Others cite plausible
facts and details which only actual participants in the crime could have known.

Also, partial corroboration of appellants' statements are found in the testimonies of Donata Rebolledo and Victoriano de la Cruz, more particularly,
as to the robbery. As such, the confessions, coupled by evidence of the corpus delicti the human remains of Catalina and Susana Sabado, are
sufficient bases for the trial court's declaration of guilt.

5. With regards to the defense of alibi, We find no justifiable reason for discarding the findings of the trial court on this matter. In People v.
Berdida, et al., this Court held that the defense of alibi is an issue of fact that hinges on credibility, which depends much on the credibility of the
witnesses who seek to establish it. In this respect the relative weight which the trial judge assigns to the testimony of the witnesses must, unless
patently and clearly inconsistent with the evidence on record, be accepted. The defense of alibi is worthless in the face of positive Identification by
prosecution witnesses, pointing to the accused as participants in the crime. (17 SCRA 520, citing People v. Tansiangco,
L-19448, February 28,1964; People v. Rivera, L-14077, March 31, 1964)

6. As to conspiracy, the trial court's inference as to the existence of the same is well-founded and is amply discussed in its decision. Said His Honor:

From the simultaneous and cooperative acts of the accused, the Court finds and so holds that there was conspiracy among them. For conspiracy to
exist, direct proof is not essential The same may be inferred from the acts of the conspirators in the commission of the offense. It is not essential
that each conspirator takes part in every act or that he should know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the
conspiracy. Conspiracy merely implies concert of design and does not require participation in every detail of execution. Neither is it necessary to
show any previous plan or that the parties should actually come together and agree in express terms in pursuing a common design. It is sufficient if
it is proved that the acts of the conspirators were in fact connected and cooperative in accomplishing the unlawful object, thereby indicating a
closeness of personal association and concurrence of sentiments.

In the case of the accused herein, they got together and planned the criminal act shortly before its execution; they proceeded together to the
house of the victims and, while Damaso and Eugenio went upstairs, the other accused stayed under the house as lookout; once inside the house,
the two asked and demanded for the victims, forcibly dragged them downstairs, handed them to those waiting under the house and, together as a
group, they brought the victims to the sugarcane field and mercilessly stabbed them to death. Clearly, there was a concert of acts among the
accused aimed at one common design, and each act was connected to and cooperative with the others.

The basic rule is that when conspiracy is established, like in the present case, the act of one conspirator is imputable to the others and the criminal
liability of each participant is the same as those of the others.

7. On the matter of accused Lorenzo Alviar's conviction for illegal possession of firearms in Criminal Case No. 2293, two errors are assigned. First,
that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case because the same having been previously filed before the Justice of the Peace Court of Victoria,
Tarlac, which also acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the latter court acquired jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

This is untenable. That the Justice of the Peace Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance in this case is not questioned. It,
however, appears from the order of the justice of the Peace Court forwarding the records of the case to the Court of First Instance 14 that the case
was brought before the former court merely for purposes of a preliminary investigation. Where a Justice of the Peace acquires jurisdiction for the
purpose of preliminary investigation and not for trial on the merits, such court does not necessarily acquire exclusive jurisdiction to try the case on
the merits. 15

In the second assigned error, counsel attacks the flimsiness of the evidence for the prosecution. He questions the sufficiency of a document (Exhibit
"B"), purportedly a receipt issued to Alviar upon the confiscation from him of the alleged firearm. It is argued that from the manner the receipt is
worded as well as from the fact that it is thumb marked by Alviar and not signed by the person confiscating, it appears to be a confession rather
than a receipt.

The controversial receipt, however, is not the only evidence presented by the prosecution. Sgt. Melencio Fiesta of the Philippine Constabulary also
declared on the witness stand that Alviar verbally confessed to him his (Alviar's) possession of a caliber .22 paltik revolver. 16 He further stated that
he properly translated from English to Ilocano the contents of the receipt before Alviar affixed his thumbmark on the same. 17 Whether Exhibit " B
" is taken as a receipt or as a confession, it has its own weight as an evidence against appellant Alviar.

Still on the illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution also presented as evidence Exhibit "C" properly sworn to before Judge Conrado de Gracia,
wherein Alviar confessed that he did own and possess a caliber .22 paltik which he carried on the night the robbery and killings were committed.
The voluntariness of this confession has not been disproved.

8. In conclusion, the crime committed by appellants in Criminal Case No. 2253 is robbery with homicide defined in Article 294, paragraph 1, Revised
Penal Code, to wit:

Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons Penalties - Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of
any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed.

xxx xxx xxx

The penalty is to be imposed in its maximum period by reason of the presence of three aggravating circumstances found by the trial court, to wit:
that the robbery was committed by a band, 18 with treachery, 19 and in an uninhabited place. 20 There is likewise the additional aggravating
circumstance that the robbery was committed in the dwelling of the victim. Donata Rebolledo which although not alleged in the Information is
however established by the evidence.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, We hereby affirm in toto the decision of the trial court in the two cases.

Without pronouncement as to costs at this instance.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-35465 May 31, 1984
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
KARUNSIANG GUIAPAR and SAPAL DADAS, defendants, KARUNSIANG GUIAPAR, defendant-appellant.

MAKASIAR, J.:

This case comes to Us on automatic review of the decision of the Honorable David P. Avila of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cotabato City in
Criminal Case No. 40, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Karunsiang Guiapar and Sapal Dadas," sentencing to death Karunsiang Guiapar for
robbery with homicide qualified by treachery, and aggravated by evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength, and craft.

On August 26, 1970, an information (docketed as Criminal Case No. 40) for robbery with homicide was filed in the CFI of Cotabato City as follows:

The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Karunsiang Guiapar and Sapal Dadas, of the crime of robbery with homicide, committed as
follows:

That on or about June 3, 1969, in the Municipality of Nuling, Province of Cotabato, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, in company with Karim Abo who is still at large conspiring, confederating together and helping one another and with intent of
gain, by means of force and violence against person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away one (1) revolver,
caliber .38, with Serial No. LA-695, valued at P400.00 and pocket money containing P70.00 cask Philippine currency, belonging to Demetrio
Fernandez without the consent and against the will of the latter to the damage and prejudice of said Demetrio Fernandez in the aforesaid sum and
by reason or on the occasion of such robbery, the said accused, armed with a hard wood and hunting knife with intent to kill, conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, hit, attack and stab said Demetrio
Fernandez with said hard wood and hunting knife, and as a result thereof, said Demetrio Fernandez sustained several stab wounds which directly
caused his death.

Contrary to law (p. 7, rec.).

Nuling and Sultan Kudarat are one and the same municipality.

Upon arraignment on October 26, 1970 (p. 20, CFI rec.), both accused pleaded not guilty.

On January 5, 1971, the prosecution presented its first two witnesses: Dr. Rogelio Chua, attending physician to the deceased victim, and Patrolman
Rakman Tomas (p. 19, rec.).

On March 17, 1971, one of the accused, Sapal Dadas, through counsel, manifested his intention to change his plea. After being appraised of the
consequences of his change of plea, Sapal Dadas was re-arraigned. He pleaded guilty to the crime of robbery with homicide. After hearing on the
same day, he was sentenced to reclusion perpetua (p. 20, rec.; TSN, March 17, 1971, pp. 4-12). With the consent of the trial court, and the People,
said Sapal Dadas was allowed to testify for the defense. He exculpated his co-accused, Karunsiang Guiapar, from any participation in the
commission of the crime charged.

On March 24, 1971, the prosecution closed its evidence with the testimonies of Kasan Lampak, an inmate in the municipal jail of Sultan Kudarat at
the time of the commission of the crime, and Patrolman Marumpil Lilang (p. 21, rec.). Kasan Lampak was presented as an eyewitness. The next day,
March 25, 1971, the defense closed its evidence with the testimony of the accused-appellant, Karunsiang Guiapar (p. 22, rec.).

The facts as recapitulated by the Solicitor General are as follows:

At about 5:00 a.m. on June 3, 1969, policeman Demetrio Fernandez of Sultan Kudarat, Cotabato, opened the door of the municipal jail to let out
appellant Karunsiang Guiapar, Sapal Dadas, Karim Abo and Kasan Lampak, all detainees, so that they may attend to their personal necessities. As
soon as the first three were out of the cell door, appellant struck Pat. Fernandez with a piece of 3 x 3 wood in the left occipital region. Pat.
Fernandez fen to the floor. Sapal Dadas took the hunting knife of Pat. Fernandez and stabbed him with it in the abdomen. On his part, Karim Abo
kicked the prostrate policeman. After doing the above, the three prisoners took the service revolver and wallet containing P70.00 of Pat. Fernandez
and Red. Prisoner Kasan Lampak remaining in the cell (pp. 3-7, TSN, March 24, 1971).

Patrolman Rakman Tomas was the commission of Pat. Fernandez as guard in the municipal building of Sultan Kudarat from 2:00 to 6:00 a.m. that
day of June 3, 1969. At about 5:10 a.m. he heard the opening of the steel door of the prison cell Almost simultaneously, he also heard a call for
help. He rushed to the cell He saw Pat. Fernandez sprawled near the cell door bathed in blood. He asked Kasan Lampak who assaulted Pat.
Fernandez. Kasan Lampak informed him that the three prisoners, appellant, Sapal Dadas and Karim Abo were the ones who did it. He also asked
Pat. Fernandez who was still strong and able to talk who assaulted him. He received the same information. He immediately went out the municipal
building to capture the escaping prisoners, but he was unsuccessful He returned to the municipal building. He noticed that the service revolver and
wallet of Pat. Fernandez which he knew contained P70.00 were missing (pp. 9-13, 16-17, TSN, January 5, 1971).

Pat. Marumpil Lilang was one of the policemen assigned to relieve Pat. Fernandez and Pat. Tomas at 6:00 a.m. on June 3, 1969. At about 5;00 a.m.,
he was awakened by a commotion at the prison cell. He proceeded to the place and found Pat. Fernandez sprawled on the floor near the cell door
bathed in blood. His revolver was missing. Prisoner Kasan Lampak was inside the cell. He brought Pat. Fernandez to the hospital (pp. 20-24, TSN,
March 24, 1971).

At the hospital, Pat. Fernandez was examined and operated on. He was found suffering from the following injuries: (a) stab wound in the abdomen,
caused by bladed weapon; and (b) contusion and abrasion in the left occipital region caused by a blunt instrument. The wound was fatal. After the
operation, Pat. Fernandez died (Exhibit A; pp. 3- 6, TSN, January 5, 1971).

According to Kasan Lampak, the night before the killing of Pat. Fernandez, appellant brought inside the cell the piece of 3 x 3 wood Identified as
Exhibit B and kept it under his bed. The act of appellant was not unusual because the prisoners were allowed to cook inside the cell. That night,
appellant told Kasan Lampak that Sapal Dadas, Karim Abo and he planned to escape. Appellant tried to induce Kasan Lampak to join. Kasan Lampak
declined because his case for which he was in jail was nearing settlement (pp. 5-6, 14-16, TSN, March 24, 1971).

Appellant was recaptured only after about ten (10) months from his escape. He was apprehended in Carmen, Cotabato (p. 47, TSN, March 25,
1971). Following his recapture, he was immediately charged before the trial court for robbery with homicide (pp. 4-7, Brief for the Appellee; p. 113,
rec.).

On March 31, 1971, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Karunsiang Guiapar, in conspiracy with Sapal Dadas and Karim Abo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
co-principal by direct participation, of the crane of robbery with homicide, defined and penalized under paragraph No. 1 of Art. 294 of the Revised
Penal Code, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, abuse of superior
strength, and craft by befriending the victim policeman without any mitigating circumstance to offset the same, and hereby imposes upon said
accused the capital punishment of death, to indemnify the heirs of Pat. Demetrio Fernandez the sum of P4,000.00, to pay the Municipal
Government of Sultan Kudarat, Cotabato, the value of the service revolver in the sum of P450.00; to pay the sum of P70.00 to the heirs of Pat.
Demetrio Fernandez representing the sum of money taken by the accused; to indemnify the heirs of said Demetrio Fernandez the sum of P4,000.00
and to pay the one third of the costs.

In view of the youthfulness of the accused who claims to be Twenty-five (25) years old and his susceptibility to reform, it is respectfully
recommended that the death penalty be commuted to life imprisonment.

The piece of wood, Exhibit B, is hereby confiscated in favor of the state. SO ORDERED (p. 18, rec.).

Thus, this appeal.

Appellant interposes this single assignment of error —

The trial court erred in convicting the accused Karunsiang Guiapar after having rendered the decision convicting his co-accused on the strength of
the latter's testimony that he committed the offense alone (p. 79, rec.).

The assigned error is without merit.

Appellant hinges his appeal on the testimony of co-accused Sapal Dadas given on March 17, 1971 (p. 82, rec.). This testimony consists of two parts:
(a) that pertinent to Sapal Dadas' own participation in the crime (TSN, March 17, 1971, pp. 7-12); and (b) that pertinent to the appellant's
involvement in the crime (ibid., pp. 17-28).

WE note that the first part of Sapal Dadas' testimony was given only to provide the said Sapal Dadas, having already pleaded guilty as charged, a
chance to testify and clarify on his participation in the crime. The trial court stated that said testimony was "just for that purpose" (ibid., p. 7). It is
therefore insufficient to exonerate a co-accused from any fault or participation in the commission of the crime charged.

The lower court acquiesced in the testimony of Sapal Dadas that it was Karim Abo, and not Karunsiang Guiapar, as the prosecution argues, who hit
deceased Demetrio Fernandez in the base of his head with a piece of wood (ibid., p. 11). Appellant herein now proposes that the lower court, by
such acquiescence erred in subsequently finding Karunsiang Guiapar guilty of the offense charged (pp. 88-89, rec.).

The proposition is untenable. WE reiterate that the testimony on which the above statement is based was made only to determine the
participation of Sapal Dadas in the commission of an offense to which said Sapal Dadas had already admitted guilt. WE note further that the tenor
of the statement saying that Karim Abo hit Demetrio Fernandez with a piece of wood is only descriptive of the circumstances of the commission of
the crime as testified to by Sapal Dadas. The pertinent excerpt from the transcript reads:

COURT:

... For purposes of ascertaining his participation in the crime charged, the Court allowed the defense to place said accused on the stand and testify
as to his participation in the commission of the crime. As a result, said accused admitted having directly participated in the killing of Pat. Fernandez,
using his knife to stab the victim. After he had fallen to the floor, having been hit by Karim Abu with a piece of wood in the base of his head, he was
stabbed by the accused ... (TSN, March 17, 1971, p. 11; Emphasis supplied).

The trial court merely reiterated Sapal Dadas' testimony without affording it credence.

And yet, assuming that the statement underscored did import a judgment by the trial court that Karim Abo inflicted the injury to the base of the
deceased's head, still We rule that the same cannot preclude a subsequent ostensibly inconsistent finding of the same court that it was Karunsiang
Guiapar, not Karim Abo, who hit the deceased with a piece of wood. Criminal Case No. 40 named only Karunsiang Guiapar and Sapal Dadas as
accused. Karim Abo was not joined as party-defendant therein. A judgment rendered against Karim Abo in said case therefore would be null and
void. To hold otherwise would run counter to the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused to be heard by himself or counsel, to defend
himself in court, to have counsel, to be informed of the accusations against him to be present at the trial and to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him. The judgment rendered against Karim Abo, if one may concede it to be, can be no more than a mere error of the court,
which the said lower court may rectify in the course of the trial The judgment rendered against Karunsiang Guiapar effected the correction.

Finally, appellant hoped to cast suspicion on the witness Kasan Lampak. He states:

In its decision, the lower court took into account the testimony of Kasan Lampak who according to the lower court is the 'star witness.' We submit
that Kasan Lampak is not a star witness, but a last-minute witness of the prosecution. This finds basis in the categorical statement of the
prosecution, after presenting Dr. Rogelio Chua and Pat. Rakman Tomas, that it had no other witnesses aside from the two. ...

xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, where did the called 'star witness' come from if according to the prosecution, it had no other witnesses? Kasan Lampak was all the time
available to the prosecution. He was one of those detained in the jail together with his co-accused. If he was an eyewitness to the crime, why did
the prosecution not present him before the other two witness were presented? (pp. 89-90, rec.).
However, WE agree with the People.

It is respectfully manifested that the manifestation of the Fiscal was lifted out of context. The following circumstances show that what the Fiscal
meant by his manifestation was that he had no more witnesses insofar as Sapal Dadas was concerned inasmuch as he had already admitted his
guilt:

1. Even before the manifestation was made, Pat. Tomas had testified that he was told by Kasan Lampak that he saw the commission of the crime
(p. 12, TSN, January 5, 1971). This negates the claim that the presentation of Kasan Lampak as a witness was an afterthought and that he was
trained or coached to testify against appellant.

2. Right after Sapal Dadas was sentence counsel for appellant filed a motion to defer the transfer of mid accused to the National Penitentiary so
that he may be utilized as witness for appellant. The trial court pointed out that the provincial jail was congested. To accommodate appellant, the
Fiscal manifested that he will try to expedite the presentation of his witnesses, but that one of his witnesses, 'a prisoner who was in jail at that
time,' an obvious reference to Kasan Lampak, was not available on that day. ...

xxx xxx xxx

It is clear from the foregoing that since the beginning the existence of Kasan Lampak as a witness and the intention of the Fiscal to present him on
the witness stand was made manifest to the court and to appellant. Appellant should not, therefore, say that Kasan Lampak is a "last-minute
witness" (pp. 13-14, 15-16, Appellee's Brief; p. 113, rec.).

In addition, We note that a counsel presenting his party's witnesses has the discretion, at a given stage of the trial as to the sequence of presenting
his witnesses. This discretion emanates from his duty of safeguarding the interests of his client (53 Am. Jur. 359-360, cited in Revised Rules of Court
of the Philippines, Vol. II, Vicente J. Francisco, 1966, p. 324). Finally, whether or not Kasan Lampak is a "last-minute witness" is of no moment,
because what is signifies it is the credibility of his testimony.

WE now determine the question of credibility.

WE recall that the defense presented only two witnesses: Sapal Dadas, appellant's co-accused, convicted upon his own plea of guilty, and
Karunsiang Guiapar, the appellant himself.

Appellee reiterates the lower court's proposition that Sapal Dadas' testimony, being one of a co-accused, is polluted and undeserving of credence.
WE modify this proposition. What is clear from Our past decisions is that the testimony of a co-accused is subject to grave suspicion insofar as it
may benefit such co-accused/witness (People vs. Cañete, No. 30491, 43 SCRA 14 [Jan. 21, 1972]; People vs. Orzame, L-17773, 17 SCRA 161 [May 19,
1966]; U.S. vs. Manabat, No. 16717, 42 Phil 569 [Dec. 22, 1921]). Where no such benefit is expected, such testimony may be afforded credence. In
this latter case, what matters is the cogency or inherent probability of the testimony (People vs. Orzame, supra) viewed with other competent
corroborating testimonies (U.S. vs. Remegio, No. 12822, 37 Phil. 599 [Feb. 11, 1918]). Sapal Dadas' testimony is wanting in these latter aspects.

The corroborating testimony of Karunsiang Guiapar, needless to say, is self-serving. Necessarily, it is subject to suspicion. And as shown next, said
testimony, together with that of Dadas', is not credible.

The defense's version is that Karunsiang Guiapar did not participate in any manner in inflicting injury to the deceased nor did he Participate in any
manner to perpetrate the crime; that it was Karim Abo, a co-escapee, and presently still at large, who hit Demetrio Fernandez with a piece of
wood; that it was the same Karim Abo who forced Karunsiang Guiapar at gunpoint to escape with him and Sapal Dadas; and that Karunsiang
Guiapar escaped with the two others for fear that Karim Abo might kill him if he did not.

The testimonies of the defense witnesses do not support the version. Appellant herein testified that there were four of them in jail at the time of
the commission of the crime: Karim Abo, Sapal Dadas, Karunsiang Guiapar and Kasan Lampak (TSN, p. 31, March 25, 1971). If it were true that
Karunsiang Guiapar escaped with Karim Abo and Sapal Dadas because Karim Abo threatened to kin him if he did not (TSN, Ibid., pp. 34-35; March
17, 1971, p. 21), WE wonder why Kasan Lampak was not equally threatened.

Both witnesses also testified that it was Karim Abo who fled first from jail; he was followed 40 meters behind by Sapal Dadas. Karunsiang Guiapar
followed Sapal Dadas 20 to 30 meters behind (TSN, March 25, 1971, pp. 42-44; March 17, 1971, pp. 23-24). At a distance of 60 to 70 meters, We
wonder how Karim Abo could have effectively threatened herein appellant during an escape.

Karunsiang Guiapar further testified that at a certain junction of the National Highway, the escapees parted ways (TSN, March 25, 1971, p. 44); and
that he proceeded alone from there to the municipality of Carmen where he was apprehended by enforcement agencies ten months after (ibid., p.
46). Assuming that there was in fact a threat on the life of Karunsiang Guiapar at the time of escape, upon the circumstances described by the
accused himself, said threat did not persist after the escape.

WE clearly perceive in the actuations of the appellant herein a deliberate intent to escape. And as correctly observed by the People, such flight is
evidence of guilt.

The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses. Three of them, Dr. Rogelio Chua, Patrolmen Rakman Tomas and Marumpil Lilang testified on the
circumstances prior to or after the commission of the crime. The other witness, Kasan Lampak, testified as an eyewitness to the actual commission
of the crime.

Kasan Lampak testified, among others, that on or about June 3, 1969, the three prisoners, Karunsiang Guiapar, Sapal Dadas and Karim Abo called
the attention of the jail guard on duty, Patrolman Demetrio Fernandez, to open the jail gate to allow them to answer the call of nature (TSN, March
24, 1971, p. 7). Since this was a normal procedure in jail, the patrolman obliged. While the guard was closing the jail door after the three inmates
had gone out, Karunsiang Guiapar struck the guard at the base of the back of his head with a piece of wood (TSN, March 24, 1971, p. 5). As the said
guard was falling down, Sapal Dadas grabbed the hunting knife from the guard's waist and stabbed the latter with it in the abdomen. As this was
going on, Karim Abo kicked the falling guard (ibid., p. 6). Thereafter, the three fled.

According to Kasan Lampak, the night before the escape Karunsiang Guiapar invited him to escape with them. He refused said invitation
accordingly because his own case was about to be settled (ibid., p. 5). In addition, he testified that the piece of wood which Karunsiang Guiapar
used in the assault was brought inside the cell by accused-appellant the night before the offense (ibid., p. 14).
WE take the testimony of witness Kasan Lampak as credible. WE reiterate the lower court's declaration that there is no reason to doubt said
testimony (pp. 14, 16, rec.). WE concede that at the time of the commission of the crime, Kasan Lampak was himself detained for homicide (TSN,
March 24, 1971, p. 9). But that does not militate against the credibility of his narration inasmuch as he does not stand to gain anything by his
testimony. Prior to the time he gave said testimony, he was already in fact a free man. Karunsiang Guiapar hit the deceased on the base of the back
of his head with a piece of wood.

Nonetheless, granting arguendo, that he was not the perpetrator of the assault on the guard's head, such fact does not militate, nay even mitigate
his liability for the crime charged.

The declaration of the deceased, as testified to by Patrolman Rakman Tomas (TSN, Jan. 5, 1971, p. 16) as to the circumstances of the assault against
said deceased, corroborates Kasan Lampak's testimony that the three escapees (including herein appellant) were the perpetrators of the assault.
WE agree with the State that the deceased's declaration qualify either as a "dying declaration" or a part of the res gestae admissible in evidence in
court.

Meanwhile, the testimony of Kasan Lampak on how the assault was consummated — Karunsiang Guiapar hitting the deceased with a piece of
wood, Sapal Dadas stabbing the deceased with a knife, and Karim Abo kicking said deceased as the latter was falling — reveals a concert of action
towards a single objective. There was conspiracy. Perforce, Karunsiang Guiapar would still be guilty of the crime charged as a co-conspirator and a
principal by direct participation.

Upon the testimonies of the witnesses and the foregoing discussions, We cull the following facts of the case: On or about June 3, 1969, at about
5:00 o'clock in the morning, three prisoners, Karunsiang Guiapar, Sapal Dadas and Karim Abo, got out of the prison cell of the municipality of Sultan
Kudarat on the pretext of having to answer the call of nature. Upon being allowed out, one of them hit the guard on the base of the back of his
head with a piece of wood; the other stabbed the said guard in the abdomen with the latter's own knife; the third kicked the guard even after the
wound has already been inflicted. One of the three took the gun of the guard as they fled the scene of the crime; the other brought the guard's
knife with him in the escape, The guard died not long after.

WE determine the intention of the offenders by their acts, prior to, contemporaneous with and subsequent to the commission of the crime. There
is no doubt that escape was intended by the offenders. But if escape were the sole objective, then the same could have been attained after the
first assault (hitting the guard on the head with a piece of wood). The kicking and the stabbing of the guard were unnecessary to effect the escape.
Equally unnecessary was the taking of the guard's gun and knife. These subsequent acts would merely delay the escape.

Clearly, robbery was equally intended and, in fact, consummated. The death of the guard resulting from the injury he sustained during the robbery
qualifies the offense to robbery with homicide. As long as homicide resulted during, or because of, the robbery, even if the killing is by mere
accident, robbery with homicide is committed (People vs. Mangulabnan, et al.. L-8919, 52 O.G. 6532 [Sept. 28, 1956]); it is only the result obtained,
without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken
into consideration. (People vs. Saliling, L-27974, 69 SCRA 427 [Feb. 27, 1976]; People vs. Arpa, et al., L-26789, 27 SCRA 1037 [April 25, 1969]).

Further, whenever a homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as principals in the
commission of the crime are also guilty as principals in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part
in the homicide unless it clearly appeared that they endeavored to prevent the homicide (People vs. Bautista, L-25095, 49 Phil. 389 [Sept. 18,
1926]; U. S. vs. Macalalad, L-2558, 9 Phil. 1, [Oct. 8, 1907]). There is no showing that Karunsiang Guiapar endeavored to prevent the injury to the
deceased. It is of no consequence whether or not said Karunsiang Guiapar hit the deceased on the base of the latter's head; nor does it matter
whether or not he took the guard's gun at the time of the commission of the crime. Robbery with homicide was committed; and Karunsiang
Guiapar is guilty thereof together with his co-accused.

Finally, We consider the circumstances appreciated by the lower court in the imposition of the proper penalty. The lower court found Karunsiang
Guiapar guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide "with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and with the aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength, and craft by befriending the victim policeman, without any mitigating circumstance to offset the
same ..." (p. 18, rec.).

Appellee concedes that the aggravating circumstance of craft is not shown by the evidence of this case. WE agree.

A careful examination of the evidence does not show any support for this finding of the trial court. There is no proof that the three assailants
gained the confidence of Pat. Fernandez by pretending to be his friends. Besides, craft involves intellectual trickery and cunning on the part of the
accused (Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 1969 ed., Book 1, p. 349). The mere act of befriending the victim cannot be said to be trickery or cunning
(p. 16, Appellee's Brief).

The opening of the jail by the deceased guard was normal at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning each day to permit the prisoners to attend to their
personal necessities. (TSN, March 25, 1971, p. 39).

To properly appreciate evident premeditation, it is necessary to establish with proof, as clear as the evidence of the crime itself, (1) the time when
the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient
lapse of time between the determination and the execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. (People vs. Jardiniano, L-
37191, 103 SCRA 530 [March 30, 1981]; People vs. Lim, L-34397-99, 71 SCRA 249 [June 10, 1976]; People vs. Tiongson, et al., L-31228, 47 SCRA 243
[Oct. 24, 1972]. Evident premeditation is inherent in crimes against property (People vs. Daos, No. 40331, 60 Phil. 143 [April 27, 1934]); but it may
be considered in robbery with homicide if there is evident premeditation to kill besides stealing (People vs. Pagal, et al., L-32040, 79 SCRA 570 [Oct.
25, 1977]; People vs. Nabual, et al., L-27758, 28 SCRA 747 [July 14, 1969]). Evident premeditation must be duly proved (People vs. Lacson, L-46338,
102 SCRA 457 [Jan. 27, 1981]) and clearly established (People vs. Rizal, L-43487-89, 103 SCRA 282 [Feb. 26, 1981]; People vs. Gida, L-41419, 102
SCRA 70 [Jan. 19, 1981]; People vs. Roncal. L-26857-58, 79 SCRA 509 [Oct. 21, 1977]).

Concededly, there are badges of premeditation in the case at bar: (a) the conspiracy earlier discussed; (b) the admission by Sapal Dadas that he and
Karim Abo planned to kill Fernandez days before the date of escape; (c) one of the escapees bringing a piece of wood inside the prison cell the
night before the assault; and (d) the alleged invitation to escape extended by Karunsiang Guiapar to Kasan Lampak the night before the escape.

WE note however that with reference to the appellant, these badges clearly do not indicate evident premeditation to kill the guard on duty. What
is clear from the conspiracy is the intention to rob and to disable. Even the stabbing by Sapal Dadas of the deceased in the latter's abdomen does
not in itself manifest an intention to kill as the wound on the abdomen was not per se fatal. Meanwhile, the admission of Sapal Dadas to a plot to
kill Fernandez extended only as between said Sapal Dadas and Karim Abo. Also, the bringing of the piece of wood inside the prison cell by one of
the prisoners the night before the assault, does not insinuate any premeditation to kin; because according to undisputed testimony, the same was
normal practice since the prisoners sometimes cooked food inside their cell. Finally, the alleged invitation to escape made by Karunsiang Guiapar to
Kasan Lampak cannot be interpreted to cover an invitation to kill the guard. Perforce, We cannot affirm the trial court's appreciation of the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation in the case at bar.

WE recognize earmarks of treachery in the commission of the crime herein.

The assault on the deceased was sudden and unexpected to the point of incapacitating the deceased to repel or escape from it. Appellants adopted
a method which tended directly to insure the accomplishment of their objective with no risk to themselves from any defense that the deceased
might have been able to make, (People vs. Araja, L-24780, 105 SCRA 133, 149).

The stabbing of the victim as he was falling from the blow on the base of the back of his head is a positive evidence of treachery (People vs. Garcia,
L-32071, 105 SCRA 325 [July 9, 1981]).

Meanwhile, We cannot affirm the trial court's finding that abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crime. Superiority in number
does not necessarily mean superiority in strength (People vs. Elizaga, et al., L- 2487, 86 Phil. 364 [May 18, 1950]). There is no marked difference in
physical strength here to warrant the appreciation of the attending circumstance of abuse of superior strength (People vs. Capillas, et al., L- 27177,
108 SCRA 173, [Oct. 23, 1981]; People vs. Gatch L-27251, 103 SCRA 207 [Feb. 26, 1981]) notwithstanding that one of the assailants was armed with
a piece of wood. The deceased had a gun and a knife. The fact that he did not have the opportunity to use them does not justify the appreciation of
abuse of superior strength in this case. Properly, that fact serves to bolster further the finding of treachery. In any case, assuming there was abuse
of superior strength the same would be subsumed in treachery. (People vs. Santiago, et al., L-12860-61, 110 Phil. 385 [Dec. 29,1960]).

Finally, We recall the testimony of Patrolman Tomas that prior to the incident, Patrolman Fernandez counted the money in his wallet in the
presence of the former; and that therefore said Patrolman Tomas knew that the deceased had P70.00 in his wallet at the time of the assault.
Immediately after the assault, Patrolman Tomas discovered that the wallet with its contents were missing. Evidently, the escapees effected their
conspiracy to rob the victim of said wallet and its contents.

WHEREFORE, FOR LACK OF NECESSARY VOTES, DEFENDANT- APPELLANT IS HEREBY SENTENCED TO RECLUSION PERPETUA. THE INDEMNITY IN
FAVOR OF THE HEIRS FOR THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM IS HEREBY INCREASED TO THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS.

IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS, THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr. Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

De le Fuente and Relova, JJ., for reclusion perpetua.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-8919. September 28, 1956.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellees, vs. AGUSTIN MANGULABNAN alias GUINITA, DIONISIO SARMIENTO, ARCADIO BALMEO,
PATRICIO GONZALES, FLORENTINO FLORES, CRISPIN ESTRELLA, FELIPE CALISON, PEDRO VILLAREAL, CLAUDIO REYES, “PETER DOE” and “JOHN
DOE” Defendant, AGUSTIN MANGULABNAN, Appellant.

DECISION

FELIX, J.:

At about 11:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary00 o’clock in the evening of November 5, 1953, the reports of gunfire awaked the spouses Vicente Pacson
and Cipriana Tadeo, the 4 minor children and Cipriana’s mother, Monica del Mundo, in their house at barrio Tikiw, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija.
Whereupon, Vicente Pacson crossed the room and shouted to one Tata Pisio that persons were going up their house and then hid himself inside
the ceiling.

In the meantime, someone broke the wall of the kitchen at the back of the house, and a few moments later a person suddenly entered the dining
room and shouted that the door leading to the living room be opened. As no one of the house members obeyed, the intruder removed 3 board
pieces in the wall and through the opening thus made he entered the living room. The intruder who was armed with a hunting knife was
recognized by Cipriana Tadeo to be Agustin Mangulabnan, who was previously known to her. Agustin removed the iron bar from the door leading
to the balcony and after opening said door, 2 persons whose identity has not been ascertained entered. Agustin then approached Cipriana Tadeo
and snatched from her neck one necklace valued P50 and also took from her person P50 in the paper bills and P20 in silver coins. Meanwhile, one
of the two unidentified marauders searched the person of Monica del Mundo and took from her P200 in cash and in gold necklace valued at P200.
But not contented with the loot, the same individual asked from Monica del Mundo to give her diamond ring which the latter could not produce,
and for this reason, he strucked her twice on the face with the butt of his gun. One of the small children of Vicente Pacson who was terrified called
to his mother and that unidentified person, irked by the boys impudence, made a move to strike him, but Monica del Mundo warded off the blow
with her right arm. At this juncture, the second unidentified individual put his companion aside the climbing on the table, fired his gun at the
ceiling. Afterwards, Appellant and his two unidentified companion left the place.

After they were gone, Cipriana Tadeo called to her husband Vicente Pacson, and receiving no answer she climbed the ceiling and she found him
lying face downward already dead. According to Dr. Vicente P. Llado, who performed the autopsy, Vicente Pacson sustained the injuries described
in his autopsy reports, which reads as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

November 6, 1953

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Post-mortem findings on cadaver Vicente Pacson, age-37 years, married, of barrio Tikiw, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija.

Time take:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 8:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary20 a.m.

1. Entrance — fracture of the frontal region of head due to gunshot wound.

Exit — wound at left side of the head, about the upper portion of the left ear.

2. Entrance — gunshot wound, left lateral side of the left middle arm.

Exit — gunshot wound inner side of left arm.

3. Entrance — gunshot wound, left lateral of the left forearm.

Exit — gunshot wound, left inner side of the left forearm.

4. Entrance gunshot wound around 2 inches more or less above the middle of the right clavicle.

Exit — gunshot would at the back in the region of the spinal cord between the two scapula.

Cause of death — severe hemorrhage due to go gunshot wound of the frontal region of the forehead.

(Exhibit C).

The incident was reported to the police authorities that same evening and in the ensuing investigation Cipriana Tadeo informed the Chief of Police
that Agustin Mangulabnan was one of the malefactors who entered their house. When the latter was investigated, he readily and voluntarily
subscribed before the Justice of the Peace of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, an affidavit admitting his participation in the robbery and killing of Vicente
Pacson (Exhibit A and B). Much later, however, he subscribed to another affidavit before the Clerk of Court wherein he exculpated from any
participation Crispin Estrella, one of those he implicated in his previous affidavit, though admitting the truth of the other allegations contained
therein (Exhibit D).

As the result of the investigation conducted by the authorities a complaint was filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija,
against Agustin Mangulabnan alias Guinita, a surrendered Huk and 10 other unidentified persons. But the complaint was amended on January 13,
1954, to include Dionisio Sarmiento, together with Arcadio Balmeo, Patricio Gonzales, Florentino Flores, Crispin Estrella, Pedro Villareal, Claudio
Reyes, “Peter Doe” and “John Doe”, who were still at large, as Defendants. After the preliminary investigation the case was forwarded to the Court
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija where Defendants were accused of robbery with homicide. In that Court, Agustin Mangulabnan was found guilty of
the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify Monica del Mundo in the sum of P400; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryCipriana Tadeo in the sum of P132; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryP6,000 to the heirs of Vicente Pacson, and to pay the costs.
Defendant Dionisio Sarmiento was acquitted while the information as against the other Defendants who continued to be at large was dismissed for
lack of evidence, with the proportionate part of the costs de officio.
Agustin Mangulabnan moved for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, but the motion was denied for lack of merit. Hence his
appeal which is now before Us.

The motion for a new trial was based on the affidavits of Dr. Numeriano D. Lustre, Marino Ventura, Marcosa Mudlong and Patricio Gonzales but
they were not really newly discovered nor could they alter the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court. As stated by the Solicitor General, it is a
settled rule in this jurisdiction that before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be
shown:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (a) That the evidence was discovered after trial; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(b) That such evidence could not
have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence (U. S. vs. Tan Jonjua, 1 Phil. 51; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryU.S. vs. Palanca, 5 Phil. 269; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU.S. vs. De Leon, 1 Phil. 188; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs.
Zamora, 2 Phil. 582; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Torrente, 2 Phil. 1); chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (c) That is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative or impeaching (U. S. vs. Luzon, 4 Phil. 343), and of such a weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted
(U. S. vs. Zamora, supra; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Alvarez, 3 Phil. 24; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Luzon, supra.; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Hernandez 5 Phil. 429; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Magtibay, 17 Phil. 417; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs.
Tongco, 2 Phil. 189; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryPeople vs. Cu- Unjieng, 61 Phil. 906; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand People vs. Reyes, 71 Phil. 598).
The motion for new trial did not comply with these requisites and was properly denied by the trial Court.

Appellant’s objection to the admissibility in evidence of post- morten report (Exhibit C) is evidently untenable. The fact that it is a mere carbon copy
is of no amount, for it has been signed by the physician who executed the same and his signature was identified by him at the witness stand.
Furthermore, Appellant did not offer any objection to its admission when it was presented in evidence at the hearing. His objection now comes too
late (Hodges vs. Salas et al., 63 Phil. 567; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Ong Shiu, 28 Phil. 242).

The lower court did neither err in rejecting Exhibit 1 for the defense. This is an affidavit purportedly executed by Sgt. Adan Fernando of the
Philippine Constabulary. The main portion of it (quoted in Appellant’s brief, page 32, and appearing on page 21 of the record), is as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“The Chief of Police of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, who first arrived at the scene of the crime, have already picked up the empty shells of Cal. 30,
Carbine type and were delivered to Cpl. Lopez, one of the investigators of our unit. Information revealed that Civilian Commando of barrio Pulo,
San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, has something to do with the crime committed, so I proceeded to barrio Pulo to confiscate their arms. Among those arms
confiscated were those registered under Pedro Villareal and Claudio Reyes and upon examination of the Ballistic Experts in Camp Crame, it
appeared positive as per Ballistic Report” (Exhibit 1).

As may be seen, the latter part of the aforequoted testimony of Sgt. Adan Fernando is hearsay and, anyway, it is of no moment in the case at bar,
because 2 of the 3 persons who entered the dwelling of the spouses Pacson were unidentified.

There is no denial that the crime of robbery with homicides was committed as described in the information. By Appellant’s own admission (Exhibit
A and B) and the testimony of Cipriana Tadeo, we cannot have any doubt as to Appellant’s participation in the execution thereof. And as pointed
out by the Solicitor General, Appellant and the rest of the malefactors came together to the house of the offended parties to commit the robbery
perpetuated therein and together went away from the scene of the crime after its perpetration. This shows conspiracy among the offenders which
rendered each of them liable for the acts of the others (People vs. Delgado, 77 Phil. 11).

Moreover, the record shows that Appellant participated in the criminal design to commit the robbery with his co-Defendants (People vs. Flores, et
al., G. R. No. L-231, August 21, 1946), and it is settled rule in this jurisdiction that unity of purpose and action arising from a common design makes
all parties thereto jointly liable (U. S. vs. Matanug, 11 Phil. 188), each being responsible for the result, irrespective of the character of their
individual participation (U. S. vs. Ramos, 2 Phil., 434).

It may be argued that the killing of Vicente Pacson undertaken by one of the 2 unidentified persons who climbed up a table and fired at the ceiling,
was an unpremeditated act that surged on the spur of the amount and possibly without any idea that Vicente Pacson was hiding therein, and that
the English version of Article 294, No. 1, of the Revised Penal Code, which defines the special, single and indivisible crime of robbery with homicide
only punished any persons guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person, with the penalty of reclusion perpetua
when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, but this English version of the Code is a poor
translation of the prevailing Spanish text of said paragraph, which reads as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“1. ° Con la pena de reclusion perpetua a muerte, cuando con motivo o con ocasion del robo resultare homicidio.”

We see, therefore, that in order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with homicide it is enough that a homicide would result by
reason of on the occasion of the robbery (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 26, 1892, and January 7, 1878, quoted in 2
Hidalgo’s Penal Code, p. 267 and 259-260, respectively). This High Tribunal speaking of the accessory character of the circumstances leading to the
homicide, has also held that it is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident (Decision of September 9, 1886; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryOctober 22, 1907; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryApril 30, 1910 and July 14, 1917), provided that the homicide be produced by
reason or on occasion of the robbery, inasmuch as it is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes,
modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to be taken into consideration (Decision of January 12, 1889 — see Cuello
Calon’s Codigo Penal, p. 501-502).

The crime committed in the case at bar, of which Appellant Agustin Mangulabnan is a co-participant, is the crime of robbery with homicide covered
by Article 294, No. 1, of the Revised Penal Code and punished with reclusion perpetua to death. The commission of the offense was attended by
the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, dwelling, abuse of superior strength and with the aid of armed men, and in consonance with the
provisions of Article 63, No. 1 of the same legal body, Appellant should be sentenced to the capital punishment, as recommended by the Solicitor
General. However, as the required number of votes for the imposition of the capital penalty has not been secured in this case, the penalty to be
imposed upon Agustin Mangulabnan is the next lower in degree or reclusion perpetua (Section 9, Republic Act No. 296, known as the Judiciary Act
of 1948).

Wherefore the decision appealed from being in accordance with law and the evidence, is hereby affirmed with costs against Appellant. It is SO
ORDERED.

Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30028 May 3l, 1982
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CRESENCIO DOBLE, ET AL defendants, CRESENCIO DOBLE, SIMEON DOBLE and ANTONIO ROMAQUIN, defendants-appellants.

DE CASTRO, J.:

This case refers to a bank robbery committed in band, with multiple homicide, multiple frustrated homicide and assault upon agents of persons in
authority, on June 14, 1966, in Navotas, Rizal. Only five of ten accused were brought to trial, the other five named only as "John Does" in the
information having remained at large. Two of the five accused who stood trial, Mateo Raga and Celso Aquino were acquitted, while the trial court,
the Court of first Instance of Rizal, imposed the death penalty on the appellants herein, Cresencio Doble, Simeon Doble and Antonio Romaquin The
decision of the trial court is now before Us for review for having imposed the death penalty.

Both the de •ficio counsel for appellants and the then Solicitor General, Hon. Felix Q. Antonio, a retired Justice of this Court, agree that as so
narrated in the appealed decision, and as quoted in appellants' brief, the relevant and material facts accurately reflect the evidence presented,
except only as to the fact that there were eight malefactors, with respect to which appellants are not in full conformity (p. 2, Appellants' Brief).

As stated in the decision under review, the crime was committed as follows:

Late in the night of June 13, 1966, ten (10) men, almost all of them heavily armed with pistols, carbines and Thompsons, left the shores of Manila in
a motor banca and proceeded to Navotas, Rizal. "Their mission: to rob the Navotas Branch of the Prudential Bank and Trust Company. Once in
Navotas and taking advantage of the darkness of the night, eight (8) men disembarked from the banca and proceeded to the beach in the direction
of the branch bank. Within a few minutes, shots were heard throwing the people around in panic. As confusion reigned, the people ran in different
directions scampering for safety. As time went on, the shots grew in intensity. As the commotion died down, the eight men returned to their banca,
still fully armed and some of them carrying what looked like "bayongs". "They boarded the waiting motor banca and sped away. As a result of the
shooting, many people got killed and some injured. Among those who were killed were agents of the law, like Sgt. Alejandro Alcala of the Philippine
Constabulary, Sgt. Eugenio Aguilos and Cpl. Teofilo Evangelista of the Navotas Police Department. Dominador Estrella, a market collector, was also
killed. 'Those who were injured were Pat. Armando Ocampo, Exequiel Manalus Jose Fabian, Rosalina Fuerten and Pedro de la Cruz.

The Prudential Bank and Trust Company branch office located at the North hay Boulevard, Navotas, Rizal, the object of the bloody mission, has an
unusual banking hours. It opens at midnight and closes at 8:00 in the morning. The bank has ten employees, more or less, including a security
guard. It has two cages or compartments for tellers. One cage was under the care of Melvin Domingo and the other one under the care of
Alejandro San Juan. At around 12:30 a.m. of June 14, 1966, Cesar Reyes, assistant cashier of the bank, was near the cage of Domingo when two
men entered the bank asking that their money be changed. Domingo refused, saying that they had no small denominations. Suddenly, three men
armed with long guns barged in and fired at the ceiling and the wall of the bank. They ordered the employees to lie down, face downward and then
demanded the key to the vault. When Reyes answered that they do not have the key, the armed men aimed their guns at the vault and fired upon
it until its doors were opened. They entered the vault and found that they could not get anything as the compartments inside the said vault were
locked. Not being able to get anything from the vault, the armed men went to the two teller cages and took whatever they could lay their hands
on. Not long afterwards, the men left, carrying with them the sum of P10,439.95.

Just beside the bank was a police outpost. On the night in question, Pat. Nicolas Antonio was in the outpost, together with Sgt. Aguilos, Pats.
Pangan, Burgos, Rosal Ocampo and Cpl. Evangelists. were on duty watching the fish landing. Suddenly, Antonio said, at around 1:30 a.m., he heard
a burst which he believed came from a Thompson. He said he saw a man pointing a Thompson upwards while he was in front of the banca
Afterwards, Antonio said, he heard another burst coming from the same direction. Antonio and his companions then went to the middle of the
road and again they heard shots, and this time they were successive, coming from their left. Antonio could not see who was firing the shots.
Suddenly, he said, he saw one of this companions Cpl. Evangelista topple down. He saw also Dominador Estrella sitting down folding his stomach.
They were both felled by the shots coming from the left side of the bank. Antonio told Ocampo to go beside the outpost and held Sgt. Aguilos by
the arm. Sgt. Aguilos, however, collapsed and fell down. He was hit. Later on, Antonio said, he went to the outpost and told Pat. Ocampo to go too.
He said that from the outpost he heard some more shots. Then he saw Ocampo hit in the thigh. After the firing ceased, Antonio saw his wounded
companions placed in a vehicle, together with Evangelista and Aguilos who were already dead. Later on, he said he saw Sgt. Alcala, a member of
the PC, lying prostrate in the ground already dead. (pp. 83-85, Rollo).

It is noteworthy that from the above narration as to how the robbery and the killing that followed in its wake were actually committed, the three
appellants had no participation. It is not surprising that the Solicitor General has recommended the acquittal of one of the appellants, Simeon
Doble. With this recommendation, it might be well to take up the case of this appellant ahead of the other two, appellants Antonio Romaquin and
Cresencio Doble.

In recommending Simeon Doble's acquittal, the Solicitor General made the following observation:

As to appellant Simeon, the evidence shows only that the malefactors met in his house to discuss the plan to rob the Prudential Bank This
circumstance, standing alone, does not conclude his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The facts do not show that he performed any act tending to
the perpetration of the robbery, nor that he took a direct part therein or induced other persons to commit, or that he cooperated in its
consummation by some act without which it would not have been committed. It could be that Simeon was present at the meeting held in his house
and entered no opposition to the nefarious scheme but, aside from this, he did not cooperate in the commission of the robbery perpetrated by the
others. At most, his act amounted to joining in a conspiracy which is not punishable. Mere knowledge, acquiescence, or approval of the act,
without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, but that there must be intentional
participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose (15 CJS 1062).

We are, therefore, unable to agree with the finding of the lower court that Simeon was a principal both by agreement and encouragement, despite
his non-participation in the commission of the crime. Nor was it clearly proved that Simeon received a part of the looted money as to make him an
accessory. Romaquin's testimony that the day after the robbery he gave P2.00 to Simeon who had asked for cigarettes (p. 5, t.s.n., May 25, 1967)
could hardly be considered as the latter's share of the loot. It is significant that in his statement he claimed he had not yet received his share. (pp.
10-11, Appellee's Brief; p. 146, Rollo).
A review of the evidence of record shows the foregoing observation of the Solicitor General to be with convincing rationality it is only that portion
in which is cited Simeon's statement made before the Navotas Police Department (Exh. I pp. 28-29, Folder of Exhibits) that "he has not yet received
his share" that detracts from the solidity of the Solicitor General's recommendation, for it gives the impression that Simeon had given material or
moral support or encouragement to the malefactors (referring to those still at large as the principal culprits) as to entitle him to a share in the loot.
However, a reading of his whole extra-judicial statement would erase that impression, and reveals the true import of that statement as intended
only to show that Simeon had nothing to do with commission of the crime and therefore did not receive any share of the fruits thereof. Thus, to
quote pertinent portions Of his statement. on custodial investigation:

3. T — Ano ang dahilan at ikaw ay naririto?

S — Dahil po sa aking pagkakasangkot sa holdapan dito sa isang Bangko sa Navotas, Rizal at ako ay hinuli ng mga tauhan ng M. P. D.

4. T — Kailan ka hinuli?

S — Noon pong Miyerkules ng madaling araw, hindi ko alam ang petsa pero nito pong buwan na ito.

5. T — Mayroon ka bang nalalaman tungkol sa pagkakaholdap ng isang bangko dito sa Navotas?

S — Ang nalalaman ko po ay doon nagpulong sa aming bahay ang mga taong nangholdap dito sa Navotas.

6. T — Sino-sino o ilang tao ang mga nagpulong sa inyong bahay?

S — Pirmero po ay walo (8), pagkatapos ay may dumating na dalawa pa at ang mga kilala ko lamang po ay sina Tony na may an ng bangka, si Joe
Rondina Cresencio Doble at narinig kong may tinawag pang Erning. lyon pong iba ay hindi ko alam ang pangalan pero makikilala ko Pag aking
nakitang muli.

7. T — Gaano katagal na nagpulong sa inyong bahay ang mga taong ito?

S — Mahigit pong mga isang (1) oras pero hatinggabi na nong Lunes ng gabi (June 13, 1966).

8. T — Ano ang mga bagay na pinagpulongan sa inyong bahay?

S — Tungkol sa kanilang lakad na pagpunta sa isang bangko sa Navotas,

9. T — Sino ang nangunguna sa pulong na iyon?

S — Iyan po (witness pointing to the picture of Rodolfo Dizon, after being shown five (5) other pictures).

10. T — Ano-ano ang mga narinig mong pinagpulongan?

S — Tungkol po doon sa gagawing pagnanakaw sa isang Bangko sa Navotas, Rizal.

11. T — Samantalang sila ay nagpupulong, ano ang iyong ginagawa?

S — Wala po, hindi ko sila sinasaway at hindi ako kumikibo bastat ako ay nakikinig lamang.

12. T — Bukod sa narinig mong magnanakaw sa bangko na usapan, ano pa ang iba mong mga narinig?

S — Sinabi nito (witness pointing to the picture of Rodolfo Dizon) at ni Jose Rondina na "MALAKING KUARTA TO, PERO MASYADONG MAPANGANIB,
AT KAILANGAN AY HANDA TAYO."

13. T — Ano pa ang sumunod?

S — Nagbubulong-bulongan ang iba tungkol doon sa gagawing paglaban.

14. T — Ano pa ang nangyari?

S — Maya-maya po ay lumakad na sila, hindi ako sumama.

15. T — Pagkatapos?

S — Makaraan po ang mahigit na isang (1) oras ay nagbalik silang lahat.

16. T — Ano ang nangyari ng magbalik na sila?

S — Matapos po silang bumaba doon sa malapit sa aming bahay ay nagmamadali na silang umalis dahil sa may tama ang isa sa kanila. At noon pong
umaga ng araw na iyon ay nagpunta ako kay Tony (Antonio Romaquin at kumuha ng dalawang piso (P2.00) dahil iyong aking parte ay hindi pa
naibibigay sa akin. Pagkatapos po ay umuwi na ako sa amin.

17. T — Ano pa ang iyong masasabi kaugnay ng pangyayaring ito. Ikaw ba ay mayroong nais na alisin o dili kaya ay baguhin sa salaysay mong ito?

S — Mayroon pa po akong ibig na sabihin.

18. T — Ano pa ang ibig mong sabihin?

S — Bago po tuluyang umalis sila sa aking bahay ay nag-usap-usap silang lahat at ako ay sumama sa kanilang pag-uusap at nakapagbigay pa ako ng
mungkahi na ako na lamang ang maghihintay sa kanila dahil sa ako ay may pinsala sa paa at maaaring hindi ako makatakbo at qqqmahuh lamang.
19. T — Iyan bang pinsala mo sa kaliwang paa ay matagal na?

S — Opo, may limang (5) taon na.

20. T — Samantalang nag-uusap sa loob ng bahay mo, nasaan ka?

S — Kasama po sa loob ng aking bahay.

21. T — Ano pa ang masasabi mo?

S — Wala na po.

The only link between Simeon and the crime is his house having been used as the meeting place of the malefactors for their final conference before
proceeding to Navotas to rob the Prudential Bank branch thereat. He did not join them because of a qqq5yeat old foot injury which would make
him only a liability, not one who can help in the devilish venture. To the malefactors he was most unwanted to join them. If they met at his house it
was only because it was near the landing place of the banca, and so he invited them to his house while waiting for the banca to arrive. His mere
presence in his house where the conspirators met, and for merely telling them that he could not join them because of his foot injury, and will just
wait for them; evidently as a mere gesture of politeness in not being able to join them in their criminal purpose, for he could not be of any help in
the attainment thereof, and also to avoid being suspected that he was against their vicious plan for which they may harm him, Simeon is by no
means a co-conspirator, not having even taken active part in the talks among the malefactors in his house.

Like the Solicitor General, We, therefore, find no culpable participation of Simeon Doble in the commission of the crime, for, indeed, by his physical
condition alone, he could not in any way be of help to the malefactors in the pursuit of their criminal design, nor could he have been desired by the
latter to be one of them.

Taking up next the case of appellants Antonio Romaquin and Cresencio Doble, their main contention is that their extrajudicial statements upon
which their conviction was principally made to rest, are inadmissible for having been allegedly obtained by force and intimidation, and in violation
of basic constitutional rights to counsel and against self-incrimination. In support of this contention, appellants have only their own self-serving
testimony to rely upon.

Thus, Cresencio Doble testified that while at the Navotas police department someone he could not name boxed him on the chest, while one Sgt.
Lacson hit him on the left side with the butt of a gun causing him to lose consciousness; that he was made to lie on a narrow table and peppery
liquid was poured over his face, his eyesight then becoming dim, and it was then that he was made to sign a piece of paper which he could not read
because of his blurred eyesight.

Romaquin gave a similar story of torture and maltreatment in order to force him to admit culpable participation in the heist. The inquiry must,
accordingly, be whether the claim of violence and involuntariness of their statements is true as to render said statements inadmissible in evidence.

Disputing the allegation of maltreatment in the execution of the custodial statements (Exhibits E, F, F-1, G, H-1), the Solicitor General argues that
the same is negated by how the details as given by both appellants in their respective statements fit into each other, at least as to the part played
by each from the time Cresencio went to Romaquin's place to procure the latter's banca up to their get-away from the scene of the crime. Thus,
while Romaquin claimed in his statement that although he wanted to escape from the scene after his passengers have disembarked for their evil
mission, he could not do so because Cresencio had a gun pointed at him to prevent his escape, as was the order given Cresencio by the rest of the
gang. The latter denied this allegation when he testified that he returned the gun given him because he did not know how to use or manipulate it,
although in his extra- judicial statement (Exhibit M, p. 35, Record of Exhibits), he stated that he accepted the gun.

The statement of Romaquin as just cited in an attempt to exculpate himself which is generally taken as an indication of lack of undue pressure
exerted on one while giving his statement on custodial interrogation. (People vs. Palencia, 71 SCRA 679).

The Solicitor General also observed, in disputing the claim of violent maltreatment to which appellant's were subjected to, that neither one of the
appellants presented medical certificate to attest to the injuries allegedly inflicted (p. 3, Appellee's Brief) which disproves the claim (People vs.
Tuazon, 6 SCRA 249; People vs. Dela Cruz, 88 Phil. 79). He also points to the fact that in his extrajudicial statement (Exhibit M, p. 35, Record of
Exhibits), Celso Aquino, one of the accused, made no admission of his participation in the bold bank robbery, and in his testimony in court, he
admitted that no violence was applied to him when he gave his statement (p. 12, t.s.n., July 12, 1967; p. 4, Appellee's Brief). 'This is evidence
enough that the appellants could not have been dealt with differently as their co-accused Aquino who was allowed to give his statement freely
without the employment of force or intimidation upon him. The evidence also disclosed a note (Exhibit E) of Cresencio addressed to Romaquin
asking the latter not to reveal the names of their companions. This means that the names of the members of the band led by Joe Intsik must have
been known to both appellants. That the Identity of five of those charged in this case has remained only as "John Does" indicate the non-
employment of any coercive means with which to force them into revealing the names of their companions in the robbery, again negating the
claim of torture and violence.

It is, likewise, to be noted that appellants Romaquin and Cresencio virtually confirmed their extra-judicial statements when they testified in court.
By all the proofs as cited, persuasive enough to show the voluntariness of their custodial statements plus the positive denial of Sgt. Lacson, the only
one named among the alleged torturers, that any violence was practiced by the investigators, specifically, the alleged delivery of fist blows on
Cresencio. (pp. 3, 6, 7, 18, t.s.n., October 27, 1967) the alleged involuntariness of the extra-judicial statements is fully discredited.

It is hinted that the killing of suspect Rodolfo Dizon while allegedly attempting to escape could have instilled fear in the minds of the appellants
which affected their freedom of will in giving their own statements (p. 12, Appellant's Brief). This is a far-fetched argument to prove involuntariness
in the giving of the statements, the killing having taken place after their interrogation. In his supplemental statement dated July 5, 1966 Exhibits F-
2, p. 20, Record of Exhibits), Romaquin pointed to the person of Rodolfo Dizon. His death therefore, took place long after appellants have given
their main statements, all in mid June, 1966. If counsel de oficio had only bothered to check the dates of the main statements of both appellants
which were given not later than just past the middle of June, 1966, and that of the supplementary statement of Romaquin which is July 5, 1966, he
would not have probably come forth with this argument.

Counsel de oficio, invoking a ruling in an American case, Miranda vs. Arizona, 16 L. Ed. 2nd. 694, harps on the inadmissibility of appellants' custodial
statements, for their having been unaided by counsel, nor informed of their right thereto during the interrogation. 'There might be merit in this
contention were the right to counsel during custodial interrogation one of constitutional grant as is provided in our 1973 Constitution, before
which the right was given only to an accused, not to a mere suspect during in-custody police interrogation (Magtoto vs. Manguera 63 SCRA 4;
People vs. Dumdum Jr. G. R. No. L-35279, July 30, 1979). At the time of their custodial interrogation in 1966, however, the requisite of assistance of
counsel was not yet made a matter of constitutional right, as it has been granted only by the new 1973 Constitution.

The right against self-incrimination, as invoked by appellants, can neither be appreciated to impair the admissibility of their extra-judicial
statements. It is the voluntariness of an admission or confession that determines its admissibility, for no principle of law or constitutional precept
should stand on the way of allowing voluntary admission of one's guilt, the only requisite justly demanded being that ample safeguard be taken
against involuntary confessions. Once the element of voluntariness is convincingly established, which, incidentally, is even presumed, the
admissibility of an extra-judicial confession, admission or statement becomes unquestionable. 1

The extra-judicial statements of appellants, however, when evaluated with the testimony they gave in court, would convince Us that their liability is
less than that of a co-principal by conspiracy or by actual participation, as as was the holding of the trial court. The most damaging admission made
in the extra-judicial statements of Cresencio is that he was asked by Joe Intsik, the gang leader, at 8:00 o'clock in the evening of June 13, 1966, if he
could procure a banca for his use, and that Joe Intsik, on being asked by Cresencio, allegedly told him that the banca would be used for robbery.
Cresencio gave an affirmative answer to Joe Intsik's query, having in mind Tony Romaquin who had a banca. Cresencio accompanied Joe Intsik to
Romaquin at 12:00 in the evening. In Romaquin's statement (Exh. C also Exh. 1, Romaquin, p. 15, Record of Exhibits), Cresencio allegedly asked him
to bring his friends in his banca, to board a launch for a trip to Palawan. The discrepancy between the statements of Cresencio and Romaquin as to
the intended use of the banca is at once apparent, for while according to the former, it was for the commission of robbery, according to the latter,
it was to bring Cresencio's friends to board a launch for a trip to Palawan. What is demonstrated thereby is the full freedom with which both
appellants were allowed to give their respective statements while in custodial interrogation.

Cresencio's consenting to look for a banca, however, did not necessarily make him a co-conspirator. Neither would it appear that Joe Intsik wanted
to draft Cresencio into his band of malefactors that would commit the robbery more than just asking his help to look for a banca. Joe Intsik had
enough men all with arms and weapons to perpetrate the crime, the commission of which needed planning and men to execute the plan with full
mutual confidence of each other, which is not shown with respect to appellants by the way they were asked to look and provide for a banca just a
few hours before the actual robbery.

Romaquin, for his part, appears not to be known to the principal malefactors still at large, to be asked to join actively in the conspiracy. The amount
received by Romaquin who alone was given money by the malefactors in the sum of P441.00, indicate that the latter did not consider appellant as
their confederate in the same character as those constituting the band of robbers. The sum given to Romaquin could very well represent only the
rental of his banca, and for the cooperation he extended to the malefactors, which, by no means, is an indispensable one. Cresencio, on the other
hand, was not given any part of the loot. It was only Romaquin who gave him P4 1.00, clearly not what should represent his share if he were a full-
fledged ally or confederate.

The apprehension of the malefactors that upon realizing the full impact of their vicious misdeeds, Romaquin might speed away from the scene in
fear of being implicated, as shown by the measure they had taken to prevent his escape, is further proof that Romaquin was not considered a co-
conspirator, who is one who should not be looked upon with mistrust. For his part, Cresencio testified that while he was given a gun with which to
cover Romaquin who might escape, he returned the gun because he did not know how to use it, and so one of the malefactors was left near the
beach to prevent appellants fleeing from the scene of the crime with banca. In his statement, however, (Exh. M, p. 35, Record of Exhibits), he
refused to accept the gun, but they gave it just the same, and he received it.

The circumstances pointed out would not make appellants liable as co-principals in the crime charged. At the most their liability would be that of
mere accomplices. They joined in the criminal design when Cresencio consented to look for a banca and Romaquin provided it when asked by the
gang leader Joe Intsik, and then brought the malefactors to the scene of the robbery, despite knowledge of the evil purpose for which the banca
was to be used. It was the banca that brought the malefactors to the bank to be robbed and carried them away from the scene after the robbery to
prevent their apprehension. Appellants thus cooperated but not in an indispensable manner. Even without appellants providing the banca, the
robbery could have been committed, specially with the boldness and determination shown by the robbers in committing the crime.

The complicity of appellant Cresencio is further shown by his note (Exhibit "H", p. 26, Record of Exhibits) addressed to Romaquin asking him not to
reveal to the police the names of their companions. He went to Romaquin and asked for money which the latter gave in the sum of P41.00, as if to
show that he had helped in some material way to deserve a share in the loot.

As to Romaquin, while he testified that the malefactors gave a gun to Cresencio with which the latter would prevent Romaquin from fleeing away
from the scene, evidently to show that he never joined in the criminal purpose, and that all his acts were in fear of bodily harm and therefore, not
voluntary, the measure taken by the malefactors to prevent his escape, could have been just an extra precaution, lest he would be stricken with
fear in the course of the commission of the crime specially if attended by shootings as it was really so. If it is true that he never voluntarily made
the trip with knowledge of the planned robbery, and with Cresencio saying that he returned the gun given him with which to prevent Romaquin
from speeding away, Romaquin could have tried a get-away, as should have been his natural impulse had he not joined in the criminal design. His
act of hiding the money he received from the malefactors, and repainting his boat, all attest to his guilty conscience arising from the act of
cooperation he knowingly extended to the principal culprit to achieve their criminal purpose.

An accomplice is one who, not being principal as defined in Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, cooperates in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts (Art. 18, Revised Penal Code). There must be a Community of unlawful purpose between the principal and
accomplice and assistance knowingly and intentionally given (U.S. vs. Belco 11 Phil. 526), to supply material and moral aid in the consummation of
the offense and in as efficacious way (People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38). In this case, appellants' cooperation is like that of a driver of a car used for
abduction which makes the driver a mere accomplice, as held in People vs. Batalan 45 Phil. 573, citing the case of U.S. vs. Lagmay, G.R. No. L-15009.

It is however, not established by the evidence that in the meeting held in the house of Simeon Doble, the malefactors had agreed to kill, if
necessary to carry out successfully the plan to rob. What appellants may be said to have joined is the criminal design to rob, which makes them
accomplices. Their complicity must, accordingly, be limited to the robbery, not with the killing. Having been left in the banca, they could not have
tried to prevent the killing, as is required of one seeking relief from liability for assaults committed during the robbery (Art. 296. Revised Penal
Code). 2

The finding that appellants are liable as mere accomplices may appear too lenient considering the gravity and viciousness of the offense with which
they were charged. The evidence, however, fails to establish their complicity by a previous conspiracy with the real malefactors who actually
robbed the bank and killed and injured several persons, including peace officers. The failure to bring to justice the real and actual culprits of so
heinous a crime should not bring the wrath of the victims nor of the outraged public, upon the heads of appellants whose participation has not
been shown to be as abominable as those who had gone into hiding. The desire to bring extreme punishment to the real culprits should not blind
Us in meting out a penalty to appellants more than what they justly deserve, and as the evidence warrants.
Accordingly, We find appellants Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin guilty beyond reasonable doubt, but only as accomplices for the crime of
robbery in band. 3 As discussed earlier, appellant Simeon Doble is entitled to acquittal as so recommended by the Solicitor General who finds no
sufficient evidence, to which We agree, to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The penalty imposable upon appellants Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin, as accomplices for the crime of robbery in band is prision mayor
minimum which has a range of 6 years, 1 day to 8 years as provided ill Article 295 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 294, paragraph 5
of the same code. The commission of the crime was aggravated by nighttime and the use of a motorized banca. There being no mitigating
circumstance, both appellants should each be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years, four (4) months, twenty-one (21) days
of prision correccional to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of each of the deceased in the sum of
1112,000.00 not P6,000.00 as imposed by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, modified as above indicated, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects. The immediate release of Simeon Doble
who is hereby acquitted is ordered, unless he should be continued in confinement for some other legal cause. Proportionate costs against
Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, Makasiar, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Vasquez, and Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Aquino and Escolin, JJ., took no part.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 125550. July 28, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LUDIGARIO CANDELARIO and GERRY LEGARDA, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Both the prosecution and the trial court postulate that lewd design and intent to gain concurred in the commission of the offense for which
accused-appellants stand indicted. The latter, however, vigorously challenge the correctness of such position, invoking their innocence and praying
that they be spared from the verdict of capital punishment. As lives are at stake, we endeavor to probe deep into these conflicting claims so that in
the end the laws dictates shall be carried out with full conviction that the constitutional right to presumption of innocence has been adequately
overturned by the State.

Herein accused-appellants Ludigario Candelario and Gerry Legarda, together with one Joel Benoza who remains at large, have been charged before
the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch XIV, with the crime of Robbery with Multiple Rape in an amended information1 that reads:

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses LUDIGARIO CANDELARIO alias CAPID of Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, GERRY LEGARDA y BORRES OF
Pinamangkaan, Balud, Masbate, presently detained at the Roxas City PNP Jail, Roxas City; JOEL BENOZA alias Cano of Isabela, Negros Occidental
who is at large, of the crime of ROBBERY WITH MULTIPLE RAPE, as defined and penalized under Article 294, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, in relation to Section 9 of R.A. 7659, committed as follows:

That on or about the 24th day of March, 1995, in Bgy. Baybay, Roxas City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, each armed with a deadly weapon, did then and there wilfully (sic),
unlawfully and feloniously, by means of violence and intimidation, take from its owner MARIBEL DEGALA, 17 years of age and resident of Bgy.
Punta Tabuc, Roxas City, Seven Hundred Pesos (700.00) cash money, and one (1) maong shorts valued at P75.00, Philippine Currency, with intent to
gain and against the consent of its owner, to the damage and prejudice of said owner Maribel Degala in the said total sum; that on the occasion of
the said robbery in pursuance of their conspiracy, said accused, each armed with a deadly weapon, by means of violence and intimidation and in
conspiracy with each other, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with said MARIBEL DEGALA, against
her will.

ALL CONTRARY TO LAW, and the offense of robbery was accompanied with multiple rape, committed by more than two (2) persons and with the
use of a deadly weapon.

Upon arraignment, accused-appellants entered their respective pleas of not guilty to the indictment. Trial ensued and, thereafter, the court a quo
rendered its decision2 on February 29, 1996, finding them guilty as charged and sentencing them as follows:

FOREGOING established facts considered, the Court finds accused Ludigario Candelario and Gerry Legarda GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of Robbery with three counts of Rape committed at Barangay Baybay, Roxas City in the early morning of March 24, 1995. Since it is a settled
rule that once conspiracy is established, the act of one conspirator is attributable to all, then each conspirator must be held liable for each of the
felonious acts committed as a result of the conspiracy regardless of the nature and severity of the appropriate penalties prescribed by law.

ACCORDINGLY, accused Ludigario Candelario is sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of Three (3) DEATHS in accordance with the doctrine of the
Supreme Court enunciated in People v. Jose, 37 SCRA 450, and to pay the complaining witness the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS
as moral damages and to pay the costs.

Considering that accused Gerry Legarda is a minor, 15 years of age, at the time of the commission of the offense, he is entitled to a privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority. Consequently, he is sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of thirty (30) years of RECLUSION PERPETUA for each
count and to indemnify private complainant Maribel Degala in the amount of FIFTY Thousand (P50,000.00) PESOS jointly and severally with
Ludigario Candelario and to pay the costs, without prejudice to his filing an application for suspension of sentence under Article 192 of Presidential
Decree 603.

SO ORDERED.

The facts as established by the prosecution follows.

Coming from Roselle Cinema 1 in downtown Roxas City at about 10:00 oclock in the evening of March 23, 1995, complainant Maribel Degala and
her boyfriend, Junlo Dizon, proceeded to Marcs Beach Resort which was located at Barangay Baybay, Roxas City. Upon arrival thereat, they
occupied one of the open cottages along the seashore and engaged in intimate conversation while caressing and kissing each other. The cottage at
the time had no lighting but there was illumination coming from the moonlight and the fluorescent lamps installed at the main building of Marcs
Beach Resort.

Realizing that it was already past midnight, they then decided to go home. Four armed men, however, barged into their cottage, one of whom men
immediately poked at ice pick at Maribels neck while another pointed a knife at Junlo. The two other companions stood by and merely acted as
lookouts. Finding an opportunity to escape, Junlo jumped out of the windows of the cottage and ran away. Three of the armed men gave chase and
tried to stab him but they were not able to catch up with him as he fled into the compound of Marcs Beach Resort to procure help from security
guards manning the same.

Meanwhile, the one left at the cottage, whom Maribel later identified as Ludigario Candelario, continued poking his weapon on her neck while
threatening her not to create any noise. Worried about her boyfriends safety, she kept quiet.

Two of the men who gave chase returned to the cottage and started frisking for valuables. Nothing, however, was found in her possession as she
already dropped her wristwatch earlier on the side of a wall.

Finding nothing, the trio took notice of a bag placed on a table containing Junlos clothes and short pants which Maribel bought for Junlo in the
amount of P75.00 as well as cash worth P700.00. Thereafter, they dragged complainant to the seaside and proceeded to Barangay Culasi, warning
her not to shout lest they kill her. They then passed through the dark portion of the seashore until they reached pandan groves.
At said place, Joel Benoza allegedly ordered complainant to undress which she, however, refuse to obey. Her refusal prompted the malefactors to
undress her themselves. Accused-appellants Candelario and Legarda held her by the arms while Benoza unbuttoned and pulled down her pants.

Upon removing her pants, the three spread her legs and started ravishing her, while Benoza starting first while the other two stood by at a distance
of about two to three meters. The trio alternately raped her, twice for each of them. Complainant could do nothing but cry in pain as her rapists
satisfied their lust.

Legarda was the last to have sexual intercourse with complainant after his two companions left. As Legarda stood up and tried to have coitus with
complainant for the third time, the latter mustered enough strength and kicked the former on the breast. Legarda fell and rolled on the ground,
giving complainant the opportunity to extricate herself from the rapists clutches. She immediately ran away and hid herself behind stans of pandan
while Legarda shouted to his companions that complainant had escaped. The trio searched the area but failing to find her, they proceeded to walk
towards Barangay Culasi. When the three were some distance away, complainant fixed her underwear and pants and then hid again under a tree
as she was afraid that her rapists might come back. After spending almost an hour in hiding, she decided to walk home towards Dumolog but
dropped by the cottage where she and her boyfriend stayed to look for her wristwatch. While traversing the national highway, a police patrol car
where her boyfriend was on board chanced upon her. She was hustled inside the car where she related her harrowing experience to her boyfriend
and the police. After dropping by at the crime scene, they proceeded to the Roxas City police station for investigation.

In the morning of the same day, complainant was brought to Roxas Memorial Provincial Hospital where she was examined by Dr. Ma. Lourdes
Lanada. Said examination yielded the following results:3

March 28, 1995

Date

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that MARIBEL A. DEGALA, 17 years old, male, female, single, married, widowed from Punta Tabuc, Roxas City was examined,
consulted, admitted, treated in this hospital, March 24, 1995 with the following findings:

NOI: ALLEGED RAPE

TOI: 1:00 A.M.

DOI: 3/24/95

POI: Marcs Beach Resort Baybay, Roxas City

TOE: 7:45 A.M.

DOE: 3/24/95

LMP: Feb. 27, 1995; 3 days duration

PE: Grossly normal female external female genitalia appropriate with age

Introitus: Admits 1 index finger with ease

Hymen: Open, intact

Discharges: Whitish, non-foul smelling

Cervix: Firm, Close

Uterus: small

For spermatozoa det.

SPERMATOZOA DET POSITIVE FOR SPERMATOZOA

This certification is issued per request of the interested party for whatever legal purpose it may serve her best.

(Sgd.) MA. LOURDES B. LANADA, M.D.

Medical Officer-III

Lic. No. 64123

At the witness stand, Dr. Lanada testified that the presence of whitish fluid discharge inside the complainants vagina which, upon analysis at the
Saint Martin Laboratory, turned out to be positive for spermatozoa and the fact that complainants vagina admitted one index finger with ease were
all consistent with her claim that she had been raped the night before. Aside from said medical findings, another physician, Dr. Dominga dela Cruz,
testified that she likewise examined complainant and found out that the latter had lineal straight laceration at the right lower portion of the labia
minora measuring one and one-half centimeters which indicates that the same could have been caused by a very recent and forceful entry of the
male organ. Moreover, Dr. dela Cruz also found a pinpoint mark on complainants neck which wound could have been caused or inflicted by a
pointed instrument.

Testifying on how accused-appellants were apprehended, PO3 Gonzalo Andrada declared that a team was created for this purpose upon
instruction of the Chief of Police. They initially visited the crime scene to conduct ocular inspection and gather evidence but failing to find valuable
information, they went to complainants house to ask her for a description of her assailants. On the theory that the culprits are likely to return to
the crime scene, the police disguised complainant and made her stroll along the beach of Barangay Baybay and Barangay Libas to identify the
suspects who might happen to be there but to no avail. The team then realized that the culprits might have been members of the crew of a fishing
boat which calls port at Barangay Culasi. At said port, complainant was again allowed to stroll and walk alone while the police were tailing her at a
distance. She then chanced upon a group of men drinking at a nearby store and told the police that one of her rapists was there. But as the police
closed in, the suspect disappeared, prompting the team to comb the area. They soon found the man they were looking for outside the Beta House
puffing at a cigarette. Having been assured by complainant that the man was her rapist, the police approached said man, introduced themselves as
law enforcers and informed him that he was one of the suspects in a rape complaint. This suspect, who turned out to be Candelario, was then
brought to the police station for formal investigation upon being duly informed of his constitutional rights. Investigation was temporarily called off
when Candelario opted to remain silent but apparently, during a conversation, he admitted having held complainant and referred to his
companions merely by their aliases, which did not help the police in any way to determine the identity of the other perpetrators.

Sometime later at Candelarios detention cell, he was convinced to disclose the identities of his companions who turned out to be crew members of
the fishing boat St. Jude. Acting on this new development, a team was sent to Barangay Culasi where they found out that one alias Weng Weng,
who was mentioned by Candelario as one of his alleged companions, was actually accused-appellant Legarda. The team waited for the fishing boat
to dock at Culasi where PO3 Felicito Aranza was instructed to go on board and invite the crew to proceed to the Barangay Hall of Culasi. At the hall,
a roll call was conducted and everyone was made to identify himself. When Legardas name was called, he admitted that he was also Weng Weng.
Forthwith, he was informed of the accusation against him and then invited to go with them to the police station where he was likewise positively
identified by complainant.

Accused-appellants defense consisted merely of denials and alibis.

Testifying for Legarda, witness Juanito dela Cruz claimed that he was a Maestro or Major Patron of the fishing vessel St. Jude whose crew of 14 men
included Legarda. He declared that the vessel was on the high seas at around 12:45 oclock in the morning of March 24, 1995 and that it docked at
the Culasi Port only at 10:00 oclock in the evening of said date. To support his claim, he presented a Certificate of Clearance issued by the Bureau of
Fisheries indicating the vessels port of origin as well as the time and date of departure. The back portion of said certificate apparently contained
the list of the crew members which included Legardas name. He admitted, however, that the certificates copy on file with the Bureau of Fisheries
contained no list of the crew members and that he was only the one who prepared such list. According to him, he learned about Legardas arrest
only on April 2, 1995. On cross-examination, he further admitted that he did not fill up the blank on said certificate indicating the vessels date of
arrival. Moreover, when the vessel left Culasi, there were actually only 12 crewmembers on board but that he put 14, nonetheless. Two
crewmembers were allegedly left behind on account of illness, which fact was not reported to the Bureau of Fisheries.

Likewise testifying for Legarda was Jesus Sevilla, a merchant engaged in buying and selling fish. He declared that on March 19, 1995, he had a
transaction with Legarda for the purchase of pacul fish from the latter. At about 11:00 oclock on March 24, 1995, he claimed that he went to the
Culasi fishing port but found out that Legarda had already gone ashore. He then proceeded to his elder sisters store where he met Legarda who
then handed him the pacul he ordered.

As third witness for Legarda, the defense also presented Roberto Articulo, provincial head of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR)
for the Province of Capiz. As clearing officer, his job was to issue certificates of clearance. When shown the Certificate of Clearance for the vessel St.
Jude, he admitted, however, that he did not require anymore the filling up of the blank asking for the vessels date of arrival as such date usually
varied. His testimony likewise revealed that he was not able to closely supervise the actual number of crewmembers sailing out to sea and that
with respect to St. Jude, he did not bother to ask why there were only 12 members on board instead of 14, and that he was not actually present
when the vessel departed. Finally, he admitted that his office would only learn of the vessels date of arrival when the certificate is surrendered. In
the case of St. Jude, he did not remember the date when its certificate was surrendered.

Testifying for and on his own behalf, Candelario vehemently denied having anything to do with the rape committed against complainant because
he was then on the high seas fishing on board F/B Marilie. To support this claim, he presented Gina Panaguiton, secretary/bookkeeper of Mr. Larry
Calimoso who owned F/B Marilie and St. Jude. She testified that she kept a columnar book containing the names of crewmembers that included
the name Ludigario Candelario also known as Capid. According to her, her record showed that Candelario was supposedly on board F/B Marilie for
the period of March 17-26, 1995 on a fishing trip to Masbate. On cross-examination, however, she admitted that she only relied on the names of
the crewmembers as supplied by the vessels Maestro or Patron and that she had no way of checking whether the crewmembers listed actually
went with vessels except upon their arrival to unload their catch.

As stated earlier, the trial court rendered a decision finding accused-appellants guilty of the crime of robbery with rape. The trial court justified its
decision, thus:

A careful scrutiny of the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution and documentary evidence presented during the trial reveals that a crime
of Robbery with Rape were (sic) committed against the person of complainant Maribel Degala in the early morning of March 24, 1995 at Barangay
Baybay, Roxas City. There is no doubt as to the claims of Maribel Degala that she was raped in that early morning as corroborated by the testimony
of Junlo Dizon and that of the police officers who investigated the incident and eventually apprehended the two accused, Ludigario Candelario and
Gerry Legarda, on March 25, 1995 and April 2, 1995 respectively. It is not too farfetched that the accused may have been sexually stimulated when
they witnessed and actually saw complainant Maribel Degala and her boyfriend, Junlo Dizon, caressing each other, probably passionate as (sic)
that, and kissing each other that impelled them to the commission of the crime by barging into the cottage, obviously under the influence of liquor
and started their savage act of molesting the complainant and almost killing her boyfriend, Junlo Dizon, by running after him and stabbing him only
that he was able to evade the stab and eventually ravishing her in that pandan grooves (sic).

The defense of alibi and denial interposed by both accused are certainly unavailing for them. Well settled (sic) is the rule that denial of the accused
cannot prevail over his positive identification by the witnesses whose version of the incident bear all the earmarks of candor, credibility and
spontaneity. Likewise, it is settled that when a woman says that she had been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that she had
indeed been raped, and if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis of the victims testimony. There is
no reason for her to claim that she had been raped if it is not true. Considering a Filipinas inbred modesty and antipathy in airing publicly the things
that affect her honor, it is hard to conceive that Maribel Degala would undergo the expense, trouble and inconvenience of a public trial, suffer the
scandal, embarassment and humiliation such action would indubitably invite and allow the examination of her private part if she had not been
raped and her motive was other than to bring to justice the person who committed the crime. (People v. Ricardo Lascuna, et al. G.R. No. 90626,
August 18, 1993, Davide, Jr.).

The court takes note of the fact that accused Gerry Legarda did not testify during the trial of this case, at least, to substantiate his defense of alibi.
Instead his counsel just submitted his Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. 4 Legarda) to establish the fact of his minority. While it is true that the accused
has the right to remain silent and this should not be taken against him, and the fact is, the peoples evidence remains unrebutted. (People v. Pizarro,
131 SCRA 624).

There is no doubt that the accused committed the offenses charged in conspiracy with one another. Proof of a previous agreement to commit a
crime is not essential to establish conspiracy. It is sufficient that the accused be shown to have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.
(People v. Dominador Salcedo, G.R. No. 78774, April 12, 1989).

In another case, the Supreme Court said, the existence of conspiracy may be inferred from proof of circumstances which show concurrence of will
of the parties in the furtherance of a common design and every act of one of the conspirators in furtherance thereto is the act of all. (Geronimo
Manalaysay vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79946; and Froilan Manalaysay vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 79971, both dated April 12, 1989).

Likewise, it has been established by the prosecution that the instant charges of Robbery with Multiple Rape were committed with the use of the
deadly weapons and by three persons as defined and penalized under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code.4

In light of the above pronouncement of the court a quo and after a meticulous study of the parties respective arguments, the Court finds itself
confronted with the following major questions:

1. Did the prosecutions evidence sufficiently establish beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellants participation in the rape of complainant and
asportation of a bag containing her valuables?

2. Did the trial court correctly designate and hold accused-appellants liable for the special complex crime of robbery with rape?

As regards the question of their involvement in the incident complained of, accused-appellants strongly contend that they could not be held liable
for robbery with rape because, first, there was no proof that complainant was divested of anything as she, in fact, admitted the same during her
direct examination and, second, the rape charge was of doubtful veracity since it happened during nighttime and there was no showing that the
cottage where the incident happened was lighted, so that it would have been impossible for complainant to recognize who her rapists
were.5cräläwvirtualibräry

These arguments fail to persuade us.

We fully concur with the trial courts conclusion that there was a taking of complainants valuables not only because it was in a better position to
observe the witnesses demeanor and manner of testifying as to justify its findings giving great weight to the credibility of the witnesses, but also
because after scrutinizing and evaluating the testimony of the complaining witness, as transcribed from the stenographic notes, we find her
answers to the incisive questions propounded to her firm and straightforward.

Accused-appellants citation of complainants testimony that nothing was taken from her was made out of context. Had they continued reading the
entire testimony given on direct examination and not merely lifted that which was favorable to them, then they would have discovered that there
was reason for her to say that nothing was taken from her. This was because she already dropped her watch earlier when the accused-appellants
barged into the cottage. But this does not negate the fact of asportation for in said testimony the complainant declared thus:

Q: After frisking you, you said that nothing of value was taken of (sic) you, then after that, what happened next?

A: When the three armed men have [taken] nothing from me, or from my person, one of them notice (sic) the bag of Junlo Dizon which was placed
on the table, then it was taken by one of their companions who is present here in the court room, today.

Q: Do you know the contents of that bag?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: What were the contents of that bag?

A: Inside the bag was (sic) the clothes of Junlo Dizon and the short [pants] I bought for P75.00 which I bought on March 23, and my wallet [which]
contained P700.00.

Q: After one of them took that bag what happened next?

A: When they got hold of that bag they dragged me out of the cottage.

[Underscoring supplied].

It is clear, therefore, that when complainant testified that nothing was taken from her, what she meant was that nothing was taken from her
person because her other possession were inside a bag on top of the cottages table. Against this positive testimony of complainant who was
extensively examined by the defense, accused-appellants offered no evidence to the contrary, except the bare reliance upon complainants alleged
statement that nothing was taken from her. We then hold that in this respect, the prosecution has indeed been able to establish the fact of taking
by accused-appellants who were positively identified by no less than the complainant herself.

As to the fact of accused-appellants carnal knowledge with complainant, we are likewise convinced that the same has been adequately proved by
the prosecutions evidence. Even as under settled jurisprudence, the evidence for conviction must be clear and convincing to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence,6 we do find the straightforward, consistent and detailed manner in which complainant related her
harrowing experience in the hands of accused-appellants bearing all the earmarks of verity. Not only that, the corroborative testimony of
complainants boyfriend, Junlo Dizon, was not only consistent with her story in all material respects but also replete with minutiae of the incident.
In addition, the rape committed upon the person of complainant could not have been a mere tall tale, as the physicians medical findings which
were obtained in the very morning of March 24, 1995 disclosed the fact that discharge from complainants vagina confirmed the presence of
spermatozoa and laceration. All these indicate that complainant had indeed been recently deflowered. Needless to say, it has been held in a long
line of cases that when a woman says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that she had been raped,7 since a
woman will not expose herself to a humiliation of a rape trial, with its attendant publicity and the morbid curiosity it will arouse, unless she has
been truly wronged and seeks atonement for her abuse.8cräläwvirtualibräry
Accused-appellants' claim that they would not have been identified by complainant because the cottage where the incident took place was not
lighted likewise holds no water. Quite the contrary, the cottage was sufficiently illuminated and was not completely dark as to preclude the
possibility of identifying accused-appellants. The complainants testimony9 shows this:

Q: Could you place (sic) describe the cottage where you and Junlo Dizon were conversing?

A: The cottage has a roof, open walls and windows and has benches in (sic) both sides and a table in one corner of the cottage.

Q: What kind of materials is the cottage made of?

A: Bamboos.

Q: At around 12:45 past midnight of March 24, 1995 in the early morning while you and Junlo Dizon were conversing with each other at the open
cottage made of bamboos, could you still recall the surrounding when you and your boyfriend Junlo Dizon were conversing?

A: In front of the cottage there was a lighted post and across the street road fronting the cottage there was also a lighted post and at the back of
the cottage there was also a lighted post.

Q: While you and your boyfriend Junlo Dizon were conversing in that open cottage, could you see each other (sic) face?

A: Yes, Sir, I could see his face.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: While you and Maribel were conversing inside that unlighted open cottage, can you see with each others face?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Why do you say that you can see with each others face?

A: Because of the light coming from the main building aside from the light also coming from our back and also there was moonlight. [Underscoring
supplied].

Moreover, as we held in People v. Dolar,10 it is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see the looks and faces of their
assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often the face of the assailant and body movements thereof, create
lasting impressions which cannot be easily erased from their memory. We do not see cogent reason why this should not apply in the case at bar
considering that when asked to identify to the courtroom who her assailants were, she readily pointed to accused-appellants.11cräläwvirtualibräry

Finally, accused-appellant Candelarios insinuation that he was not identified by complainant when the latter saw him outside the beta house is
hardly credible. There was actually no difficulty on the part of complainant in identifying him. In fact, she was even the one who told the police
team that Candelario, who was then drinking in a store together with other men, was with said group. What happened was that she was merely
acting upon instructions of PO3 Andrada, Jr. to be sure that the police would be apprehending the right suspect. The record of PO3 Andrada, Jr.s
testimony12 clearly shows this:

COURT:

Q: So what did you do?

A: I told Maribel to be more certain because we do not want to apprehend people who are not involved in that case so that [what] she did was to
return to the beta house pretended to be watching also the beta movie and stayed very close to that person and kept on looking at his face.

PROSECUTOR FIRMALINO:

Q: After the cigarette dropped to the ground, what did you and your other companions do, if you did anything?

A: After the cigarette of the suspect dropped to the ground, I called Maribel and asked her, Maribel, are you really sure now that he is one of the
suspects? Maribel told us that, I have been telling you before that he is the one of the suspects. [Underscoring supplied].

As regards accused-appellants liability of robbery with rape, considering that the evidence has established accused-appellants participation in the
acts of rape and the taking of complainants personal belongings, the next logical question is whether they should be held liable for the special
complex crime of robbery with rape. There is no doubt that the recitals in the information were really for the crime of robbery with rape. What is
important though is to determine if the evidence supports said indictment.

People v. Faigano,13 holds that to be liable for the special complex crime of robbery with rape, the intent to take personal property of another
must precede the rape, and if the original plan was to rape but the accused after committing the rape also committed robbery when the
opportunity presented itself, the offenses should be viewed as separate and distinct. In this case, the Court declared that two separate offenses of
rape and robbery were committed by accused-appellant as evidence showed that when accused-appellant entered the victims house he only had
in mind sexual gratification. The taking of the cash and pieces of jewelry against Nelys will appears to be an afterthought.14cräläwvirtualibräry

Reiterating the same rule, the Court likewise held in People v. Cruz15 that the accused-appellant therein could be held liable only for the separate
offenses of robbery and rape as the rape was first committed prior to accused-appellants act of grabbing the victims wristwatch.

In the case at bar, we find evidence clearly showing intent to gain and asportation preceding Maribels rape. It must be noted that right after
accused-appellant and two others barged into the cottage and chased Dizon who managed to jump out of the window and escape, they
immediately frisked complainant and eventually took a bag containing personal effects belonging to her and Dizon. To our mind, these
contemporaneous acts of accused-appellants stress the fact that they were initially motivated by animus lucrandi. The rape only occurred after the
acts of robbery had already been consummated. A review of complainants testimony16 is in order:
Q: After two of the three men who gave chased (sic) to Junlo Dizon while you were being held by Ludigario Candelario, what happened next?

A: When the armed men came back, Ludigario Candelario was still holding me while the two armed men were frisking for my valuable things that
they may get from me.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: After frisking you, you said that nothing of value was taken of (sic) you, then after that, what happened next?

A: When the three armed men have [taken] nothing from me, or from my person, one of them notice (sic) the bag of Junlo Dizon which was placed
on the table, then it was taken by one of their companions who is present here in the court room, today.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: After one of them took that bag what happened next?

A: When they got hold of that bag they dragged me out of the cottage.

Further reading of complainants testimony would show that after she was dragged out of the cottage, she was brought to the place where she was
forced to undress and then ravished. This is proof that indeed the taking preceded the rape. It should also be emphasized that robbery, and not
merely theft, was committed even if the bag were just lying on the table because at the time of its taking, force and intimidation were continuously
applied against the person of complainant as an ice pick was poked on her neck.17cräläwvirtualibräry

Under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, the special complex crime of robbery with rape has a corresponding penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death. The characterization of the offense as robbery with rape, however, is not changed simply because there were several rapes committed.
The multiplicity of rapes should instead be taken into account in raising the penalty to death. This is consistent with our ruling in the case of People
v. Obtinalia18 where we took note of the absurdity of punishing rape committed by two or more persons with the penalty of death and then
punishing the offender only with reclusion perpetua if he commits robbery along with rape.

But since conspiracy as among the three malefactors was successfully proved by the prosecution, then it necessarily follows that each one is
likewise liable for the acts of the two others. In this case, therefore, Candelario and Legarda shall each be liable for three counts of robbery with
rape.

The case of Gerry Legardas penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of robbery with rape need not detain us long considering the fact that the
trial court correctly appreciated the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority in his favor.

Consistent, however, with prevailing jurisprudence, the civil indemnity ex delicto for the victim shall be in the amount of P75,000.00 for each count
of rape and moral damages of P50,000.00, likewise for each count of rape without need of pleading or proof of the basis thereof.

Four members of the Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribe the death penalty, is unconstitutional;
nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the Court, by a majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should be
accordingly imposed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch XIV, in Criminal Case No. C-4692 dated February
29, 1996 imposing the death penalty on accused-appellant Ludigario Candelario and reclusion perpetua on accused-appellant Gerry Legarda is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellants shall be ordered to indemnify the victim Maribel Degala in the amount of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages, respectively for each count of the offense charged.

Costs against accused-appellants.

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the
records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of executive clemency.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima , Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., on leave.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 130508 April 5, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARMANDO REGALA y ABRIOL, Accused-Appellant.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Armando Regala appeals from the judgment in Criminal Case No. 7929 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 46, 5th
Judicial Region, convicting him of the crime of Robbery with Rape.

The information against accused-appellant on November 27, 1995, filed by 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jesus C. Castillo, reads as follows:

That on or about September 11, 1995, in the evening thereof, at Barangay Bangon, Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within
the jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused confederating together and helping one another, with intent to gain, violence and intimidation upon
persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the kitchen of the house of Consuelo Arevalo and when inside, hogtied said
Consuelo Arevalo and granddaughter Nerissa Regala (sic), take, steal, rob and carry away cash amount of P3,000.00 and two (2) gold rings worth
P6,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of owner Consuelo Arevalo in the total amount of P9,000.00, Philippine Currency; and in pursuance of the
commission of the crime of robbery against the will and consent of the granddaughter Nerissa Regala (sic) wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
accused Armando Regala y Abriol has for two times sexually abused and/or intercoursed with her, while hogtied on the bed and in the kitchen.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 1

Accused-appellant was apprehended by the police four days after the incident. He was identified at a police line-up by Nerissa and her
grandmother.

The prosecution presented three witnesses: Dra. Conchita Ulanday, Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, who personally examined the
rape victim; Nerissa Tagala the rape-victim, 17 years old, a third year high school student; and her grandmother, Consuelo Arevalo, who was her
companion when the robbery with rape transpired at Consuelo's house.

The prosecution's version is stated in Appellee's Brief as follows:

On September 11, 1995, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening at Barangay Bangon, Aroroy, Masbate, then 16-year old victim Nerissa Tagala and her
grandmother (Consuelo Arevalo) were sleeping, when appellant Armando Regala and his two other companions entered the former's house. (pp. 6-
7, TSN, August 26, 1996).

Appellant and his companions entered the house through the kitchen by removing the pieces of wood under the stove. Appellant went to the room
of Nerissa and her grandmother and poked an 8-inch gun on them, one after the other. (p. 8, TSN, August 26, 1996)

Nerissa and her grandmother were hogtied by appellant and his companions. Thereafter, Nerissa was raped by appellant Armando Regala in bed
while her grandmother was on the floor. After the rape, appellant and his two companions counted the money they took from the "aparador." (pp.
9-10, TSN, August 26, 1996)

Appellant and his companions then ran away with P3,000 in cash, 2 pieces of ring valued at P6,000 and two wrist watches worth P5,000. (pp. 11-13,
TSN, August 26, 1996)

The following day, September 12, 1995, Nerissa went to the Rural Health Clinic of Aroroy, Masbate for medical examination. In the Medical Report
presented by Municipal Health Officer Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday, it was shown that Nerissa sustained laceration of the hymen at 4:00 o'clock and
7:00 o'clock positions (fresh wounds), indicating a possible sexual assault upon the victim. (p. 16, TSN, August 26, 1996) 2

The defense presented accused-appellant who testified that on September 11, 1995, he was staying in the house of Antonio Ramilo at barangay
Syndicate, Aroroy, Masbate. Ramilo was the manager in the gold panning business where accused-appellant was employed. Antonio Ramilo
testified and corroborated his defense and stated that accused-appellant was in his house, which is about 5 kilometers away from Barangay
Bangon.

The trial court held that the defense of alibi cannot overcome the positive identification of the accused. The dispositive portion of the judgment
reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Armando Regala y Abriol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery
with Rape, as penalized under Par. 2 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua;
to indemnify the victim Consuelo Arevalo the sum of P9,000.00, the cash and value of the looted articles; to indemnify the victim Nerissa Tagala the
sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the further sum of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. No subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the cost. 3

Armando has appealed to this Court pleading that:

(1) THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXIST TO ESTABLISH CLEARLY THE IDENTITY OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT AS PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

(2) THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED. 4

which alleged errors were discussedintly.

In essence, accused-appellant questions the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence in identifying him as one of the perpetrators of the crime
charged. He claims that the complaining witness could not have positively identified him as there was no electricity nor any light in the place of the
incident which took place at 9:00 o'clock in the evening. Consuelo Arevalo was able to identify accused-appellant only after he was pinpointed by
Nerissa, and made contradictory statements in court when she stated that accused-appellant removed his mask after she was hogtied, and later
stated that accused-appellant removed his mask before she was hogtied. The medico-legal officer, Dr. Ulanday, herself testified that the
complaining witness either voluntarily submitted to a sexual act or was forced into one.
The appellee insists that appellant's lame defense of alibi cannot stand against the positive identification made by the victim, and avers that the
victim, a 16 year old barrio lass at the time the rape was committed, was motivated by a sincere desire to seek and obtain justice. The Solicitor
General also recommends an additional award of compensatory damages of P50,000.00 in favor of Nerissa Tagala.

We affirm the judgment of conviction.

There was sufficient evidence to establish the identity of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.

Nerissa positively recounted the incident on the witness stand. She was sleeping with her grandmother in the latter's house when the accused-
appellant Regala, together with the unidentified companions entered the house. Regala pointed a gun, about 8 inches long, at her grandmother,
and then at her, and hogtied both of them. Regala took of her panty and her shorts, and removed his own "porontong" pants, and made sexual
intercourse ("itot") with her while she was hogtied in bed. Her grandmother was at the floor. She saw the aparador of her grandmother being
opened. She could not shout because the gun was pointed at her, and she was afraid. Two companions of the accused-appellant entered the room
as she was being raped. Two rings valued at about P6,000.00 and 2 wrist watches (one "Seiko" and the other "Citizen") and money was taken by
the accused-appellant and his companions. After raping her in bed, Nerissa saw accused-appellant counting the money taken from the aparador.
Thereafter, she was brought to the kitchen, still hogtied, and rape again, 5 On cross-examination, Nerissa stated that although there was no
electricity, and the light in the house was already off, she was able to see the face of Regala because at the time Regala was counting the money,
one of his companions was holding the flashlight "beamed to the money" and there was "some reflection" on the face of Regala. 6 She
remembered the face of Regala because of an earring on his left ear 7 which he was wearing when presented at the police line-up. 8

Consuelo Arevalo testified and corroborated the testimony of her granddaughter. Nerissa Regala entered the house with two companions, hogtied
her and Nerissa, and were asking for money. After having sexual intercourse with Nerissa, Regala took P3,000.00 in paper bills and coins from her
aparador, and got a stainless Seiko wristwatch and two gold rings valued at P6,000.00. She was able to recognize Regala because of his earring on
his left ear, and because he was pinpointed by Nerissa at the police station. She was not able to shout at the time because her mouth was gagged
with a piece of cloth by
Regala. 9 On cross-examination, Consuelo Arevalo declared that she was able to see Regala because he used her flashlight, and he took off the
mask he was wearing; she recognized Regala because of his earring and his flat top hair cut. 10

The Court gives its approbation to the finding of the trial court that the evidence was sufficient to clearly establish the identity of Armando Regala
as the person who, with two companions, committed the crime of robbery accompanied by rape on the night of September 11, 1995. Nerissa
Tagala positively identified Armando Regala because at the time he was counting the money on her bed, the other companion of the accused
beamed the flashlight towards the money and there was a reflection on the face of Regala. Although the three intruders were wearing masks when
they entered the house, they removed their masks later. 11

Our cases have held that wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight and starlight may, in proper situations, be sufficient illumination, making the attack
on the credibility of witnesses solely on this ground unmeritorious. 12

We are not persuaded by the contention of accused-appellant that the contradictory replies of Consuelo Arevalo when asked whether Regala
removed his mask "before" 13 or "after" 14 she and Nerissa were hogtied exposed the fact that she was not able to identify the accused-appellant.
The contradiction referred to a minor detail and cannot detract from the fact that both Nerissa and Consuelo positively identified Regala as there
was a flashlight used to focus at the money while it was being counted and there was a reflection on the face of Regala. Both Nerissa and Consuelo
remembered the earring on his left ear, which he was still wearing at the time of the police line-up inside the police station.

Dr. Conchita Ulanday's testimony does not support the contention of accused-appellant that Nerissa voluntarily submitted to the sexual advances
of Regala. The admission of Dr. Ulanday that her findings point to the fact that Nerissa "either voluntarily or was forced into sexual act" does not
prove that Nerissa voluntarily submitted to the sexual act. Dr. Ulanday testified that there was suggested evidence of penetration as shown by the
two lacerations at 4 o'clock and at 7 o'clock which were fresh wounds. That the act was involuntary was clearly established by the facts that Nerissa
was hogtied when she was sexually attacked. As correctly pointed out by appellee, Nerissa was a 16-year old barrio lass, not exposed to the ways of
the world and was not shown to have any ill-motive to falsely implicate accused-appellant, who was a stranger. And as repeatedly pronounced by
this Court, it simply would be unnatural for a young and innocent girl to concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts
and thereafter subject herself to a public trial or ridicule if she was not, in fact, a victim of rape and deeply motivated by a sincere desire to have
the culprit apprehended and punished. 15

The crime of robbery with rape was committed in 1995 when RA 7659 was already in force. Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code as amended now
provides, under paragraph 1 thereof:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when for any reason of or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been
committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.

The victim in the case at bar was raped twice on the occasion of the robbery. There are cases 16 holding that the additional rapes committed on
the same occasion of robbery will not increase the penalty. In People vs.
Martinez, 17 accused Martinez and two (2) other unidentified persons, who remained at large, were charged with the special complex crime of
robbery with rape where all three raped the victim. The Court imposed the penalty of death after considering two (2) aggravating circumstances,
namely, nocturnidad and use of a deadly weapon. However, the Court did not consider the two (2) other rapes as aggravating holding that "(T)he
special complex crime of robbery with rape has, therefore, been committed by the felonious acts of appellant and his cohorts, with all acts or rape
on that occasion being integrated in one composite crime."

There are likewise cases 18 which held that the multiplicity of rapes committed could be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. In People vs.
Candelario 19 where three (3) of the four (4) armed men who robbed the victim "alternately raped her twice for each of them", this Court, citing
People vs. Obtinalia, 20 ruled that "(T)he characterization of the offense as robbery with rape, however, is not changed simply because there were
several rapes committed. The multiplicity of rapes should instead be taken into account raising the penalty to death."

It should be noted that there is no law providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s should be considered as aggravating circumstance. The
enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive as opposed to the enumeration in Article 13 of
the same code regarding mitigating circumstances where there is a specific paragraph (paragraph 10) providing for analogous circumstances.
It is true that the additional rapes (or killings in the case of multiple homicide on the occasion of the robbery) would result in an "anomalous
situation" where from the standpoint of the gravity of the offense, robbery with one rape would be on the same level as robbery with multiple
rapes. 21 However, the remedy lies with the legislature. A penal law is liberally construed in favor of the offender 22 and no person should be
brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the statute. 23

In view of the foregoing, the additional rape committed by herein accused-appellant should not be considered as aggravating. The penalty of
reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court is proper.

As regards the civil indemnity, we find well-taken the recommendation of the Solicitor General that compensatory damages should be awarded in
the amount of P50,000.00. Nerissa Tagala is entitled to an award of civil indemnity ex delicto of P50,000.00, which is given in favor of the offended
party in
rape. 24 Also a conviction for rape carries with it the award of moral damages to the victim since it is recognized that the victim's injury is
concomitant with and necessarily results from the ordinary crime of rape to warrant per se an award of P50,000.00 as moral damages. 25

WHEREFORE, the judgment convicting Armando Regala y Abriol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape, is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Nerissa Tagala is entitled to an additional award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon,
Jr., JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 99868 August 19, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ARIEL LIMBAUAN alias Acio, ALFREDO LAMAN, LEONOR TAMANG, ELISEO SANCHEZ, ROLANDO TANDAYU, LUCIO AFUNAY and NESTOR LUGA,
accused.

PADILLA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Second Judicial Region, Branch 16, Ilagan, Isabela, in Criminal Case No. 778,
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Ariel Limbauan alias Acio, Leonor Tamang, Rolando Tandayu, Lucio Afunay, and Nestor Luga." The dispositive
part of the decision reads as follows:

Accordingly, accused Ariel Limbauan and Leonor Tamang are each sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay Elisa Austria
civil indemnity solidarily in the amount of P50,000.00.

The imposable penalty for robbery in band as against Luga, Tandayu, and Afunay is Prision correccional, maximum to prision mayor, medium (Art.
294, par. 5). However, there being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period.

Accused Lucio Afunay, Nestor Luga and Rolando Tandayu are eached [sic] sentenced to suffer a prison term of Four (4) years, two (2) months as
minimum to ten (10) years as maximum after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and to indemnify solidarily with Ariel Limbauan, and
Leonor Tamang, the victim Marcela Bacani in the amount of P7,000.00.

With Costs.

SO ORDERED. 2

The accused were charged with the crime of robbery with rape in the following information:

The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses ARIEL LIMBAUAN alias ACIO, ALFREDO LAMAN, LEONOR TAMANG, ELISEO SANCHEZ, ROLANDO
TANDAYU, LUCIO AFUNAY and NESTOR LUGA of the crime of ROBBERY WITH RAPE, provided for and penalized under Article 294, paragraph 2, in
connection with Articles 296 [sic] of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about the 14th day of December, 1986, in the Municipality of Delfin Albano, province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, all armed with assorted firearms, conspiring and confederating together and all helping one another,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of force and intimidation against persons, take, steal and
carry away cash money in the amount of P3,000.00; one (1) cassette brand AIWA valued at P2,500.00; instimatic [sic] camera valued at P300.00
and jewelries [sic] and assorted goods/items valued at P6,550.00 all belonging to Marcela G. Bacani and Armalite M16 Rifle valued at P12,000.00
belonging to Primitivo C. Rodriguez, a member of the Integrated National Police, to the damage and prejudice of said Marcela G. Bacani in the total
amount of P12,350.00 and to Primitivo C. Rodriguez in the amount of P12,000.00; that on the occasion of said robbery, the herein accused, Ariel
Limbauan with the aide [sic] of Leonor Tamang, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and intimidation have
carnal knowledge with Elisa Austria against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

Upon arraignment, Ariel Limbauan entered a plea of guilty; the rest of the accused pleaded not guilty. In the course of the trial, the case against
accused Alfonso Laman and Eliseo Sanchez was dismissed on 29 June 1988 on motion of the prosecution in view of the demise of the said accused
as shown in their death certificates. 4 After the trial of the case, the trial court rendered the now appealed decision of 26 March 1991.

From the judgment of conviction, only accused Leonor Tamang has appealed, alleging that:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT LEONOR TAMANG OF THE COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY IN BAND WITH
RAPE INSTEAD OF ROBBERY IN BAND ONLY.

Appellant submits that he is guilty of robbery in band but not of the complex crime of robbery with rape as charged. He maintains that the mere
fact that he brought Elisa Austria downstairs and upon reaching the ground floor of the house, Ariel Limbauan took hold of Elisa and forced her to
go with him outside said house of Marcela Bacani, where Limbauan raped her, does not prove that he (appellant) conspired with Limbauan in the
rape of Elisa Austria.

Appellant claims that his purpose in forcing Elisa to go downstairs was for her to join the others on the ground floor but not to turn her over to
Limbauan. In support of his claim, appellant refers to the testimony of Marcela Bacani who, on cross-examination, declared that Elisa was beside
her when Limbauan forcibly brought Elisa outside the house to rape her. This assertion of appellant clearly lacks merit.

During the testimony of Elisa Austria, she referred to one Renzi Bacani, daughter of Marcela Bacani, who was inside the room where she (Elisa) was
sleeping. When appellant entered the room, he could not have missed seeing Renzi together with Elisa inside the room. 5 If, as appellant claims, his
purpose in forcing Elisa Austria to go downstairs was for her to join the others on the ground floor, why did he pick on Elisa only and leave Renzi
inside the room upstairs?

Upon reaching the living room on the ground floor, appellant handed Elisa Austria over to Ariel Limbauan who forcibly took her outside the house
and brought her to the banana grove to rape her. Elisa's testimony, both during direct and cross examinations, shows how appellant forced her out
of the room and handed her over to Ariel Limbauan.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, you said, now, why did Leonor Tamang took [sic] you from the room . . . I reform . . . How did Leonor Tamang took in [sic] the room?
A He pointed a gun and took hold of my right shoulder and brought me outside the room, sir.
Q Where did he bring [sic] when he took you out of the room?
A He brought me to the living room, sir. 6

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now when you were in the sala of the house of Mrs. Bacani what did Leonor Tamang and his companion do?
A Leonor Tamang passed me to Ariel Limbauan, sir.
Q If that Ariel Limbauan is in court were you able [sic] to point at him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will [sic] point to him?
A That man, sir, wearing white T-shirt. 7

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, Miss Austria you stated that this Leonor Tamang forcibly took you and brought you down thereafter passed you to Ariel Limbauan is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean to say he passed you like a ball?
A Yes, sir.
Q To the waiting arms of Ariel Limbauan?
A No, he gave me to Ariel Limbauan, sir.
Q He passed your hands towards Ariel Limbauan?
A Leonor Tamang brought me down and Ariel Limbauan was at the door at the house and when we were there he gave me to Ariel Limbauan, sir. 8

Moreover, the statement (Exh. "E") given by Elisa Austria before the investigating officer on 15 December 1986, a few hours after the incident
happened, states unequivocably the participation of appellant in the commission of the felony.

Q Who is this Ariel Limbauan?

A He is the very person who forced and intimidate [sic] me with the use of long fire arms [sic] to have a sexual [sic] intercourse, sir.
Q How about this Eleanor Tamang?
A He was the one appeared [sic] and beligerently inquired me [sic] to stand inside the bed room [sic] upstair [sic] where I'm sleeping and thereafter
dragged and brought me downs stair [sic].
Q When and where [sic] the incident happen if any?
A At the banana plantation of Mrs. Marcela Bacani at Barangay Ragan Sur, Delfin Albano, Isabela, on December 14, 1986 at around 3:30 o'clock
a.m. Sir.
Q How did the incident happen?
A While I'm sleeping in the bedroom upstair [sic] at the house of Marcela Bacani at said place when suddenly Eleanor Tamang appeared and
pointed towards me a short gun, beligerently [sic] inquire me [sic] to stand up at this point dragged me down stair [sic], and when we are [sic]
already downstair Ariel Limbauan took and forcibly brought me to the banana plantation.
Q What did you do when Ariel Limbauan forcibly took and brought you to the banana plantation?
A I tried my best to struggle to evade my self [sic] from the incident instead said Ariel Limbauan pointed and poked me with fire arms [sic].
Q What happen [sic] next?
A While we are struggling to [sic] each other said Eleanor Tamang appeared and pointed towards me his fire arms [sic], and immediately thereafter
Arnel [sic] Limbauan bodily carried me and forced me to laid [sic] down facing up-ward, [sic] and because of my fearness and tiredness I became
unconscious, when I regain(ed) my knowledge I noticed and feel [sic] that my vagina is too hurt [sic] and bleeding, and same the spermatozoa is
contaminated [sic] at my private parts. 9

A conspiracy exists when two (2) or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. While
proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, the agreement itself may be inferred from the conduct of the parties disclosing a
common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. 10

In the present case, we are fully convinced that appellant and accused Ariel Limbauan had a previous agreement relating to the commission of the
felony which they decided to finally commit. From the time of the investigation and all throughout her testimony in court, Elisa Austria never
diverted from her declaration positively pointing to Leonor Tamang as the person who helped and aided Ariel Limbauan in committing the felony.
We quote with approval the finding of the trial court that —

(T)he act of Tamang in handing over Elisa Austria to Limbauan however, must be construed as evidence of conspiracy. When Limbauan disappeared
in the banana groove [sic] with Elisa Austria there is no doubt that Tamang knew what was the intention of Limbauan. 11

The evidence of the prosecution has abundantly established and beyond reasonable doubt that conspiracy existed between appellant Leonor
Tamang and accused Ariel Limbauan in the commission of the crime charged.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-31401 October 30, 1979
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. PEPITO VILLA, ANASTACIO SALCEDO, NORBERTO SALCEDO and ERNESTO SALCEDO,
Defendants-Appellants.

PER CURIAM:

In the early evening of June 28, 1968, Juan Acosta was killed at his residence in Barrio Buyon, Municipality of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte. 1Swift action by
elements of the 121st P.C. Company at Camp Juan, Laoag City, aided by civilians, led to the apprehension of accused Anastacio Salcedo Pepito Villa,
Norberto Salcedo and Ernesto Salcedo two hours after midnight of the same day, while the four were in a Manila bound bus which the P.C. soldiers
flagged down in front of their detachment in Badoc, southernmost town of Ilocos Norte, along the highway to Manila. Southward along the same
highway, is Sinait Ilocos Sur, hometown of the four accused. Barrio Buyon of Bacarra, where the crime occurred, is about five kilometers north of
Laoag City. From Laoag City to Badoc, southward, is about forty kilometers distance. Sinait Ilocos Sur, is nine kilometers from Badoc. 2

Immediately after investigation, the P.C. Command in Ilocos Norte initiated in the Municipal Court of Bacarra, three cases, to wit: Criminal Case No.
939, for robbery in band with homicide; Criminal Case No. 941, for usurpation of official function; and Criminal Case No. 942, for illegal possession
of firearms and ammunition. Dominga Domingcil Acosta widow of the victim Juan Acosta, also initiated in the same Court Criminal Case No. 940,
for rape. 3

Criminal Case No. 942, for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition was terminated when the accused Norberto Salcedo pleaded guilty and
was sentenced by the Municipal Court of Bacarra. 4Criminal Cases 939, robbery in band with homicide; 941, usurpation of official function; and
940, for rape, were forwarded to the trial court. 5 The rape case (Criminal Case No. 940) was dismissed and consolidated with the criminal case for
robbery in band with homicide (Criminal Case No. 5199-111, for Robbery with Homicide and Rape). A separate information for usurpation of official
function was filed by the Provincial Fiscal (Criminal Case No. 5202-111).chanrobles virtual law library

The information filed in Criminal Case No. 5199-111 (Robbery in Band with Homicide and Rape) reads:

That on or about the 28th day of June, 1968, at about 7:00 o'clock p.m., in baio Buyon, municipality of Bacarra, province of Ilocos Norte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, armed with guns and sharp pointed bolos, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and by
means of violence against and intimidation of persons, take and carry away personal properties belonging to the spouses Juan Acosta and Dominga
Domingcil to wit:

Articles

Value

One (1) lady's watch

P150.00

Five (5) necklaces for women

100.00

Two (2) finger rings for women

80.00

Two (2) finger rings for minors

7.00

Two (2) pairs of earrings

5.00

One (1) engagement ring

5.00

One (1) 8-Transistor Radio

68.00

Four (4) batteries

1.00

Spare parts for sewing machine

250.00

One (1) locket for men

35.00

Two (2) pants for men

45.00

Two (2) Polo barong

30.00

One (1) Saya for women

15.00

One (1) pant, khaki

6.00

One (1) Rural Bank book

10.00

Cash money

720.00

Three (3) blankets

75.00

One (1) pomade

.25

One (1) plier

5.00

One (1) face towel

.80

Three (3) wallet for children

1.50

One (1) Lighter

5.00

Total

P1,614.95

with a total value of One Thousand Six Hundred Fourteen Pesos and Ninety-five Centavos (P1,614.95), Philippine Currency, to the damage and
prejudice of the aforenamed owners in the said amount.chanrobles virtual law library

That by reason of or on the occasion of the commission of the robbery, the above named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery, attack, assault, shoot
and stab, the husband Juan Acosta, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds on the different parts of his body causing his death immediately
thereafter;

That likewise the commission of the crime of robbery had been accompanied by rape when the accused, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and by using force and intimidation have carnal
knowledge of the woman Dominga Domingcil;

That the crime was committed with the following aggravating circumstances: abuse of superior strength, treachery, evident premeditation,
ignominy, dwelling of the offended parties who have not given provocation, craft and disguise, nocturnity and by a band which facilitated the
commission of the crime.chanrobles virtual law library

Contrary to law. 6

The information filed in Criminal Case No. 5201-111 Usurpation of Official Function), reads:

That on or about the 28th day of June, 1968, at about 7:00 o'clock p.m. in barrio Buyon, municipality of Bacarra, province of Ilocos Norte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, represent themselves knowingly and falsely as members of the
Philippine Constabulary, to the spouses Juan Acosta and Dominga Domingcil and consequently gained entry into the house of the said spouses, and
once inside, and under pretense of official position, the said accused, without being lawfully entitled, performed acts pertaining to a person in
authority, by then and there claiming to possess search warrants and opening and ransacking the chests, aparadors and trunks of the said spouses
and searching the whole house.chanrobles virtual law library
Contrary to law. 7

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 5199-111 and 5201-111, and the two cases, being
closely related and arising from the same occasion, were tried jointly. 8

The lower court, after trial, rendered a decision of conviction in Criminal Case No. 5199-111 and acquittal in Criminal Case No. 5201-111, with the
dispositive portion, to wit:

Wherefore,

In Criminal Case No. 5199, the Court finds the accused Pepito Villa, Anastacio Salcedo Norberto Salcedo and Ernesto Salcedo, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, attended by the aggravating circumstances of rape, dwelling, nighttime, by a band, and
craft, without any mitigating circumstance in their favor, and hereby sentences said accused to suffer the supreme penalty of death, with the
accessories prescribed by law; to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Juan Acosta in the sum of P12,000.00 and to pay said heirs the sum of
P1,060.79, the values of the things stolen but not recovered, and to pay further the costs.chanrobles virtual law library

The money amounting to P26.16 (Exhibits J-9 "J-10" to "J-18") and other articles recovered from the accused, namely Exhibits "J-19" to "J-25", "J-
27" to "J-29", "J-31" to "J-37", "J-39", J 40 to "J-43", are hereby ordered returned to Dominga Domingcil the widow of Juan Acosta. "Exhibit "J-1 "
(revolver, paltic); "J-2 " to J-6 (live bullets); J-7 and J-8 (empty shells); "J-44" (Khaki belt); "J-45" (PC ranger patch); "J-46" PC ranger cap); "J-47"
(KhaKi overseas cap); "J-48" KhaKi uniform); "J-49" (fatigue uniform); and "J-50" (buri bag) are hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the go
vernment.chanrobles virtual law library

In Criminal Case No. 5201, the Court hereby orders the acquittal of the accused, for insufficiency of evidence, with costs de oficio.chanrobles virtual
law library

So Ordered. 9

The injury suffered by the victim Juan Acosta, according to Dr. Jovencio Castro, who performed an autopsy of the body of the deceased on June 29,
1968, at 3:00 p.m., is as follows:

Post Mortem Findings

1. Skin and mucocutaneous surfaces - pale

2. Stabbed wound l"wide,penetrating the level of the second intercostal space incising the lobe of the left lung, chest left.chanrobles virtual law
library

3. Lacerated wound one-half (.5 inch) wide, parieto temporal region, left.

Cause of Death:

Internal hemorrhage, severe secondary to stabbed wound penetrating at the level of the second inter-costal space incising the left lung, chest left.
10

The principal issues to be determined in this automatic review, are: which of the conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense as to how
the crime was committed is correct; and whether the confessions of the accused (Exhibits "A", "B" "C" and "D") were given voluntarily, or extracted
by force and intimidation.chanrobles virtual law library

The prosecution's version of the crime is as follows:

Estrella Acosta, ten-year old daughter of the victim Juan Acosta and Dominga Domingcil stated that in the early evening of June 28, 1968, at their
house in Barrio Buyon, Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, both her parents, together with the witness and her two sisters, were at the kitchen. Her brother,
George, 4 years old, was sleeping in the sala, Her father Juan was arranging tobacco leaves in a stick, while witness and her mother was cooking.
11When their three dogs began to bark at about 6:30 p.m., her father went to the stairs leading to the kitchen, carrying a hasag lamp to see why
the dogs were barking. Her mother and herself followed Juan at the head of the stairs. Estrella saw four men in uniform. The four were wearing
fatigue and khaki uniforms and they were with weapons tied at their waists with leather holster. 12 Accused Anastacio Salcedo and a certain Felix
Salcedo used to eat in the house of her father. Two of the accused were wearing oversea caps and the other two were wearing adolfo caps. One
oversea cap was colored brown while the other was spotted with yellow. Adolfo caps were gray and black. Accused Anastacio Salcedo was wearing
the oversea cap spotted with yellow, 13while the other accused was wearing a brown oversea cap. 14 Estrella was sure that two wore fatigue
uniforms and that two wore khaki uniforms. 15 Accused Anastacio Salcedo wore a fatigue uniform. Witness Estrella Identified the companion of
accused Anastacio Salcedo at that time as accused Pepito Villa, Norberto Salcedo and Ernesto Salcedo Norberto Salcedo wore a khaki oversea cap,
while Pepito Villa and Ernesto Salcedo wore adolfo hats. 16 Norberto Salcedo asked for the gun of her father and Juan Acosta answered he had no
gun. Accused Norberto said they were going up the house to search for the gun as they were P.C. rangers searching for that gun. 17 Accused
Norberto Salcedo, Ernesto Salcedo and Anastacio Salcedo went up the house, while accused Pepito Villa went near the other stairs leading to the
sala. The three accused went to the sala of the house followed by the spouses and their children. The three looked around the house. Ernesto
Salcedo grabbed the hasag lamp from Juan and put it out. Thereafter, the group went inside the room. The three accused and her parents went to
the northern part of the room, where Norberto Salcedo told her mother to open a carton containing washed clothes. 18 Norberto took out the
clothes, shook them and threw them to the floor, while accused Ernesto Salcedo focused a flashlight he was holding on the clothes being taken out
from the carton by Norberto. Accused Anastacio Salcedo was at that time pointing a gun at Juan. 19The three said they were looking for a gun but
they did not find any in ransacking the contents of the carton. Estrella heard the dogs barking and she saw through the window accused Pepito Villa
focusing a flashlight at the dogs which were trying to attack him. Pepito retreated towards the stairs leading to the sala, went up the house and
joined his companions. 20

Accused Pepito Villa ordered Estrelia's mother to open the aparador of her father, and he ransacked the contents of the aparador, shaking the
articles and throwing them to the floor of the house, wale Norberto Salcedo focused his flashlight on the articles inside the aparador. 21 Norberto
Salcedo ordered the opening of a trunk containing blankets and searched the contents of the trunk while Ernesto Salcedo focused on the said items
a flashlight he was holding. 22 Then, Ernesto Salcedo ordered the opening of the aparador used by her mother and the children. Ernesto ransacked
the aparador in the same manner, while Anastacio Salcedo focused a flashlight on the contents. 23

At that moment, Estrelia's brother George sleeping in the sala, woke up and began crying, so she went to the sala to pacify him. While in the sala,
Estrella heard a voice say "you bring out the proceeds of the sale of your cow" and she heard her mother answer "We did not sell any cow. 24
Accused Pepito Villa took his father to the sala of the house and struck her father with the handle of his gun on the nape. 25 Juan Acosta fell face
downward on the bamboo floor, whereupon Pepito Villa made Juan stand up and walk back to the room. Then, witness heard the report of a gun in
the southern part of the room. She heard her father say: "By gosh, we know each other, you should not be that cruel." After that, she heard
another shot also in the southern portion of the room. 26 Estrella and her younger sisters and brothers were crying. Afterwards, Estrella saw
accused Norberto Salcedo bring her mother out of the room to the porch holding her mother by the shoulder and pointing his gun towards the
mouth of her mother. 27After accused Norberto Salcedo brought her mother to the porch, accused Ernesto Salcedo came to the place where the
children were huddled together and covered them with a blanket. 28 While covered with the blanket, Estrella noticed persons walking towards the
porch. 29

After about five minutes, Estrella removed the blanket covering her, went to the window and saw her mother in the porch lying face upward with
hands and feet hogtied. She went back to the place where her brothers and sisters were and she saw accused Anastacio Salcedo, who said "Let us
go. " She saw Norberto Salcedo leaving the place with something bundled in a blanket under his arms. 30

After the four accused left, Estrella went to the porch and she removed a piece of cloth tied around the mouth of her mother. She then went for
help to the house of her uncle Martin de la Cruz and she came back to the house with her grandmother Basilia. 31

In their house, Estrella took the wick lamp and entered the room accompanied by her grandmother, younger sisters and brothers. She saw her
father lying face upward, head and face covered with a T-shirt. They cried. She noticed a wound on the left side of his chest, with a stocking stuck
on the wound. Her father's body was naked except for short pants. His hands were tied with a rope and his feet were tied with a dog's collar. She
saw a pair of scissors struck between the bamboo slits north of the place where her father's body was. Then, her mother arrived in the house with
her aunts Benjamina and Dionicia Domingcil sisters of her mother. Natividad Pascual a sister-in-law of her mother, was also with them. 32Later, her
aunts and her mother transferred the body of her father to the sala. Sometime afterwards, Sgt. Galapon and her uncle Sgt. Anastacio Domingcil of
the P.C. arrived, as well as Municipal Judge Pilar.chanrobles virtual law library

Dominga Domingcil Acosta, widow of the victim Juan Acosta, corroborated the narration of Estrella, her daughter, from the time of the arrival of
the four accused in the early evening of June 28, 1968, their announced purpose to look for a gun belonging to the victim Juan Acosta, up to the
time they went up the house, ransacked the contents of a carton, an aparador and a trunk. 33Accused Ernesto Salcedo took out pieces of jewelry
from the drawer of the aparador and pocketed them. 34 Ernesto also asked Dominga to produce the proceeds of a sale of a cow and insisted that
the money be produced. Accused Anastacio Salcedo said that the couple really sold a cow the previous Sunday. 35

Accused Anastacio Salcedo took the 11450 and the coin deposits of her children. Accused Pepito Villa said that if the proceeds of the sale of the
cow would not be brought out, the couple would be killed Pepito struck the left side of the head of Juan Acosta with the handle of his gun. 36When
Juan felt Pepito Villa raised the T-shirt of Juan up and covered the latter's face with it. Pepito also tied the hands of Juan with a rope, while Ernesto
Salcedo tied Juan's feet with a dog's collar. Then accused Norberto Salcedo and Pepito Villa carried Juan and placed him crosswise on the bed. 37
Pepito Villa pressed his gun at the left side of the head of Juan. Dominga tried to prevent Villa from doing so, but accused Ernesto Salcedo pushed
her. She cried and then she heard a gun report. She subsequently saw Pepito Villa leaving her husband Juan. Accused Norberto Salcedo went near
Juan and pressed his gun at the left side of Juan's breast. Dominga wanted to go near her husband Juan, but accused Ernesto Salcedo held her and
turned her around. She again heard a gun report. She saw accused Norberto Salcedo leaving Juan's side and she also saw a wound on Juan's breast
that was bleeding. 38

Afterwards, Norberto Salcedo placed his left arm around Dominga's shoulder and held his gun pointed at her when she was taken to the porch. The
three accused followed them to the porch. Accused Ernesto Salcedo and Norberto Salcedo held each of her hands. Pepito Villa went in front of
Dominga and raised her dress. He lowered her panties. Ernesto Salcedo remarked, "The children may see us." Whereupon, he went inside the
room, took a blanket and went to the place, where her children were. Norberto Salcedo raised her hand and placed her on three chairs west of the
porch. She cried while Anastacio Salcedo pointed a gun at her. When Dominga was forced to he down on the chair, Anastacio Salcedo went in front
of her, raised her dress, spread her legs apart, brought out his private part and inserted it inside her private part. 39She wanted to struggle but
Norberto Salcedo held her arms. Then Anastacio Salcedo held her hands while Norberto Salcedo also raped her. Afterwards, she was made to lie
face down on the floor. Pepito Villa tied both her hands and feet with rope, and stuffed her mouth with a handkerchief. Then Pepito Villa and
Ernesto Salcedo told Dominga not to cry for help because they would guard her till morning. Her daughter Estrella came afterwards and removed
the handkerchief from her mouth. She told her daughter to go and ask for help from the spouses Carolina Acosta and husband. 40

Dominga was able to remove the rope that bound her and she went for help in her father's house. When she returned to her house and the room
where her husband was Juan was found lying beside the bed, with a wound on the left side of his breast stuffed with a stocking, a pair of scissors
near the body on the floor. His hands and feet were tied and his T-shirt covered his head and face. Many of their personal belongings were missing
41A good portion of the missing personal belongings were later recovered from the possession of the accused when they were apprehended at
Badoc.chanrobles virtual law library

The morning following the night of the incident she was examined by Dr. Maximiano Agbayani of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Hospital at Laoag City
for the outrage committed against her by the accused. His findings are included in a medical certificate, to wit:

1. Linear abrasion above wrist across the dorsal aspect of left forearm.chanrobles virtual law library

2. Abrasion vertibule of vulva near the upper ends of labia minora.chanrobles virtual law library

3. Viginal smear negative for spermatozoa. 42

Mrs. Dominga D. Acosta explained the statement she made in her sworn statement 43 taken on June 29, 1968, the very next day of the incident,
that her husband was shot when the autopsy report showed he was stabbed, by stating in her testimony that she was still in a state of shock when
her sworn statement of June 29, 1968, was taken, and having heard two shots when the incident happened she had the impression that her
husband Juan was shot . 44 Furthermore, Dominga stated that later, when she realized her mistake, she even told the Municipal Judge who
conducted the preliminary investigation of the case, but he told Dominga just to correct the mistake later when she testified in court.chanrobles
virtual law library
Regarding the early apprehension of the four accused, P.C. Sgt. Mariano Galapon testified that at about 9 p.m. on June 28, 1968, P.C. Sgt. Anastacio
Domingcil reported to the headquarters of the 121st P.C. Co. in Laoag City the incident that happened in the house of his brother-in-law Juan
Acosta at barrio Buyon, BacArra Acting on the report, Sgt. Rufino Lasaten ordered Sgt. Galapon, Sgt. Tabladillo and Pvt. Nelson Acosta to
accompany Sgt. Domingcil to the scene of the crime to investigate and apprehend the suspects. They left the P.C. Camp immediately but before
they went to Bacarra, they first proceeded to San Nicolas, the next town south of Laoag City because Sgt. Domingcil said that Anastacio Salcedo,
one of the suspects, is from Sinait Ilocos Sur, and it is possible that the suspects went southward. They found three civilians, relatives of Sgt.
Domingcil in front of the San Nicolas town hall, who could Identify Anastacio Salcedo. After staying there for a short while, Sgt. Galapon instructed
Sgt. Tabladillo and Pvt. Nelson Acosta to wait for a ride to Badoc and to proceed thereto with the three civilians to intercept the suspects. Sgt.
Galapon and Sgt. Domigcil went to Bacarra and conducted a cursory inquiry in the house of the Acostas, after which the two proceeded to Badoc
When they arrived in Badoc at about 2:30 the following morning, the accused were already apprehended. Sgt. Claudio Alcaraz, PC Detachment
Commander at Badoc, turned over to Sgt. Galapon the articles confiscated from the accused and he made an inventory of said articles. 45He
interrogated the accused about the P.C. uniforms which were confiscated from them. Ernesto Salcedo admitted that the khaki uniform was his, and
Anastacio Salcedo admitted that the fatigue uniform was his. Both Ernesto and Anastacio admitted they wore those uniforms when they went to
the house of Juan Acosta and that they were not soldiers. They had a picture taken with the "our accused together with the confiscated loot. 46
Anastacio Salcedo and Norberto Salcedo wore the fatigue and khaki uniforms, respectively, for the picture taking. After the picture was taken, Sgt.
Galapon, Sgt. Tabladillo and Pvt. Acosta took the four accused to the P.C. Headquarters at Laoag City, together with the recovered articles. At the
P.C. Headquarters, Sgt. Galapon turned over the four accused and the recovered articles to Sgt. Visaya, their Chief Investigator. 47

P.C. Pvt. Nelson Acosta corroborated the testimony of Sgt. Galapon. From San Nicolas, Sgt. Tabladillo and Pvt. Acosta and the three civilians took a
ride and they arrived at Badoc about 10 p.m. In Badoc, they checked all southward going motor vehicles. At about 2 a.m., the following morning,
they stopped a southward bound Philippine Rabbit Bus. Pvt. Acosta, Sgt. Bernabe Nicolas of the Badoc detachment and the three civilians boarded
the bus. Eleuterio Domingcil a civilian and brother of Sgt. Domingcil pointed out to Pvt. Acosta the accused Anastacio Salcedo who was sitting in the
first seat behind the driver's seat left side of the bus. The person sitting beside Anastacio had curly hair. Pvt. Acosta frisked Anastacio Salcedo for
firearms but found none. When Pvt. Acosta asked Anastacio for the latter's companions, he pointed at his seatmate and two others who were
sitting in the first seat, right side of the bus. Sgt. Nicolas searched Anastacio's seatmate and found a .22 caliber paltik revolver 48 at his waist. Sgt.
Nicolas opened the cylinder of the revolver, and Pvt. Acosta saw the cylinder full of bullets. When Sgt. Nicolas asked that person his name, he
answered he was Norberto Salcedo. Pvt. Acosta searched the other two men seated on the right side front seat and he did not find any sidearm.
When Pvt. Acosta inquired from the two their names, they answered - Ernesto Salcedo and Pepito Villa. Pvt. Acosta saw a buri bag 49 in front of the
seat of the two. He saw a jacket and a transistor radio in the bag, and Eleuterio Domingcil told Pvt. Acosta those things belong to the victim Juan
Acosta. On the order of Pvt. Acosta, the four accused alighted from the bus accompanied by the former and his companions. They all went to the
Badoc P.C. detachment where Pvt. Acosta turned over to Sgt. Alcaraz the buri bag and its contents. Pvt. Acosta again searched Anastacio Salcedo
and he found in the latter's pocket one (1) ten peso bill and five (5) one peso bills 50Eleuterio Domingcil remarked that the polo baring with blue
decorations 51and the gray pants 52 which Anastacio Salcedo was then wearing belonged to the victim Juan Acosta. Eleuterio Domingcil also said
that the polo barong with brown decorations 53which accused Pepito Villa was wearing belonged to Juan Acosta. Sgt. Alcaraz poured out the
contents of the buri bag on the table. At that moment, Sets. Galapon and Domingcil arrived. Sgt. Alcaraz turned over the recovered articles to Sgt.
Galapon who prepared an inventory of the same. They then had a picture taken with the four accused, and the confiscated articles. Afterwards,
they proceeded to the P.C. Headquarters at Laoag City. Ernesto Salcedo admitted that they owned the burl bag. 54

P.C. Sgt. Mariano Visaya, as Chief Investigator of the 121st P.C. Company with headquarters at Camp Juan, Laoag City, stated that at about 6:00
a.m. on June 29, 1968, Sgt. Galapon delivered to his custody at the camp, the four accused and the articles confiscated from them when they were
apprehended in Badoc, together with a pair of scissors which Sgt. Galapon took from the scene of the crime. Sgt. Visaya investigated the accused
Anastacio Salcedo and Norberto Salcedo, while Sgt. Herminigildo Paguirigan investigated accused Pepito Villa and Ernesto Salcedo. After the
statements of the accused were taken, the four accused and their statements were brought before the Municipal Judge of Bacarra so they could
sign and swear to their respective statements. 55

P.C. Sgt. Herminigildo Paguirigan testified that on the morning of June 29, 1968, he investigated Pepito Villa and Ernesto Salcedo. Both of them
read their respective written statements. Those statements were given to Sgt. Visaya who brought the four accused before the Municipal Judge of
Bacarra for the signing and swearing of their statements. Sgt. Paguirigan also said that he and Sgt. Juan Jerez went to the Provincial Jail on August
15, 1968, where Sgt. Jerez took the statement of Norberto Salcedo 56 after which they brought Norberto Salcedo to the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal where Norberto swore to the truthfulness of the contents of said statement. 57

P.C. Sgt. Juan C. Jerez stated that on July 2, 1968, it occurred to him to inquire from accused Norberto Salcedo about the scissors found near the
cadaver of victim Juan Acosta, and Norberto explained that he was ordered by accused Anastacio Salcedo, during the incident of June 28, 1968, to
stab Juan Acosta through the gunshot wound on his breast. So he stabbed Juan Acosta with a pair of scissors, and left the weapon near the body of
Juan Acosta. Sgt. Jerez explained that due to pressure of work he was not able to get the written statement of Norberto until August 15, 1968. That
written statement of Norberto was taken in the Provincial Jail in the presence of several provincial guards and Sgt. Herminigildo Paguirigan. After
the statement was taken, Norberto was brought to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal where Norberto signed and swore to the truthfulness of its
contents before Asst. Provincial Fiscal Napoleon R. Flojo. 58

Municipal Judge Elias Pilar of Bacarra, testified that the four accused, accompanied by P.C. soldiers, went to his office in the morning of June 29,
1968, and the accused signed in his presence and swore before him to the truthfulness of their respective statements. 59 The accused voluntarily
signed their respective statements, and there were no indications whatsoever of their being forced to sign those confessions. Judge Pilar saw the
victim Dominga Domingcil Vda. de Acosta slap the face of Anastacio Salcedo outside of his room. 60 Those affidavits were sworn to before him in
the morning of June 29, 1968, while the complaint was filed that same afternoon. 61

Another victim, Benjamina Domingcil sister of victim Mrs, Dominga Domingcil Vda. de Acosta, testified that on June 28, 1968, at about 4:30 p.m.
she saw accused Anastacio Salcedo, together with three companions, at the Shell gasoline station, north of the Far East Bank Building of Laoag City.
They were standing close together, and Norberto Salcedo was then 62holding a buri bag.chanrobles virtual law library

The defense's version of the incident admitted the presence of the four accused in the house of the victims spouses Acostas on June 28, 1968,
allegedly for Anastacio Salcedo to ask for his agreed commission of P,50 for the sale of a cow belonging to the Acostas. The four accused denied the
robbery, and denied that they raped Dominga on that occasion. Such version, supported by the testimony of the four accused, follows:

Accused Anastacio Salcedo was requested by victim Juan Acosta to look for a buyer of his cow for P450, with the promise that he would give P50 to
the former, if a buyer could be found. Anastacio Salcedo did find a buyer in the person of one Faustino Tangonan from Sinait Ilocos Sur, who
bought the cow for P450 a week before the incident. On June 28, 1968 about noontime, accused Anastacio Salcedo casually met his three co-
accused at a market place for livestocks (dayo) in Barrio Sta. Cruz, Sinait Ilocos Sur. They went to Laoag City to see a movie. After they left the
movie at about 5 p.m., and after taking some refreshments in a store nearby, they proceeded to the waiting place for buses going to Sinait their
home town. While waiting for their ride, Anastacio Salcedo saw Benjamin Domingcil sister-in-law of Juan Acosta. Anastacio Salcedo remembered
that he had not yet collected his fifty peso commission for the sale of Juan Acosta's cow. Anastacio proposed to his three companions that they first
go to Barrio Buyon, Bacarra for he wanted to collect his commission. They agreed, so they proceeded to the house of the Acostas at Bacarra where
they arrived after dark. Juan Acosta invited the four accused to his house. After the usual amenities, Anastacio told Juan his purpose, but Juan
answered that he had no more money. Anastacio told Juan that he needed money and pleaded that he be given an advance of P30. Juan insisted
that the money was already spent, and told Anastacio that even if he searched the house he would not find any. Although Anastacio declined to do
so, the wife of Juan opened a box containing washed clothes and invited the four accused to look, but they did not mind her.chanrobles virtual law
library

Anastacio with Ernesto and Pepito started to leave the place, passing this time through the batalan leading to the stairs near the kitchen. As soon
as the three reached the batalan they heard a gun report and they ran away. They noticed that Norberto was left behind. They waited by the road
and when Norberto appeared he told the three of them that he killed Juan because the latter grabbed and took away from him (Norberto) his gun
and afterwards fired it' at him two times. Norberto said he grabbed a pair of scissors which he saw nearby and when he saw Juan pointing
Norberto's own gun at him he stabbed. Juan twice with the scissors and after Norberto recovered his gun, he ran away 63

A scrutiny of the conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense, together with the evidence presented to support them, clearly shows that
the version of the prosecution is the credible one. The testimonies of eyewitnesses Estrella Acosta and Mrs. Dominga Domingcil Vda. de Acosta
were given in a simple straightforward manner, mentioning details of the incident that could not have been merely concocted, indicating sincerity
in narration of events during the incident, indicative of truth as to what actually happened 64The ten year old Estrella Acosta showed remarkable
intelligence in her narration of events during the direct examination and survived the cross examination by clinging to the veracity of her version in
the sequences of events she observed on the night of June 28, 1968. 65 Likewise, Mrs. Dominga Domingcil Vda. Acostas never wavered in her
narration of what happened during that night when she was subjected to a searching cross-examination. 66

The narration of the incident coming from both eyewitnesses coincided and are consistent with each other. They are clear and of logical
sequence.chanrobles virtual law library

When Mrs. Dominga Domingcil Vda. de Acosta was asked to explain her statement appearing on Exhibit "4", taken on June 29, 1968, the day after
the incident, that her husband was shot, while. the autopsy report showed that he was stabbed, she stated that on June 29, 1968, she was still in a
state of shock and as she heard two shots and later saw her husband Juan dead, he assumed that he was shot. Anyway, she realized her mistake,
and told the Municipal Judge of Bacarra about it, but she was told that the mistake could be corrected when Dominga testified in court.chanrobles
virtual law library

The confessions of the accused 67 cannot be totally ignored even if they repudiated all of them on the ground of alleged extraction by force and
intimidation, because the narration's contained in them coincide with the narration given by the eyewitnesses Estrella Acosta and Dominga Vda. de
Acosta. The details contained in these confessions could not have been known to the P.C. investigators before whom they were given, taking into
consideration that they were given on the morning of June 29, 1968, immediately after the apprehension of the four accused at 2 a.m. of the same
morning, and within 24 hours after the crime was committed at dusk of June 28, 1968. It is likewise difficult to believe that the P.C. investigators
could have concocted events and fabricated evidence against the accused in such a short time.chanrobles virtual law library

The contention of the accused that they were maltreated and forced to sign the confessions Exhibits "A", "B", "C", and "D" cannot be given
credence. The P.C investigators apprehended the accused at 2:00 a.m. of June 29, 1968. The same morning of June 29, 1968, the sworn statements
of the four accused were taken, and before noon said statements were subscribed and sworn to by the accused before the Municipal Judge of
BacArra The accused could not show any medical certificate about the supposed physical injuries they suffered. They admitted that there were
many persons present when they were apprehended and investigated. The Municipal Judge of Bacarra did not notice any intimidation against the
four accused. On the contrary they all voluntarily signed their confessions and swore to them before the Municipal Judge. The P.C. investigators,
Sgt. Mariano Visaya and Sgt. Herminigildo Pagairigan merely performed their duties as such when they took down the statements of the accused
on June 29, 1968. The trial court observed "that the respective signatures of the accused in their separate extrajudicial confessions appear to be
continuous and stable, indicating that they were made by firm hands. 68The trial court was correct when it stated that even if the confessions of
the accused are disregarded, sufficient evidence exists to establish the prosecution's version of the crime.chanrobles virtual law library

The version of the defense that accused Norberto Salcedo alone stabbed and killed in self-defense Juan Acosta during the incident because the
latter grabbed Norberto's gun, fired twice, and was pointing the gun at him, is completely unbelievable. That version is based on the lone testimony
of accused Norberto Salcedo while the version of the prosecution is based on the testimony of eyewitnesses Estrella and Mrs. Dominga Domingcil
Vda. de Acosta. It is very difficult to believe that Juan Acosta in the presence of his family and for no known reason at all would suddenly grab the
gun of Norberto Salcedo and fire twice at close range without hitting anybody. It is likewise incredible that Norberto Salcedo would just suddenly
find a pair of scissors and use it to stab Juan. Evidence is very clear that when the body of Juan was found in the room his hands and feet were
tied.chanrobles virtual law library

The evidence for the prosecution proves the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. all the accused are guilty of robbery with homicide and
rape as charged. The crime is punishable under paragraph 1, Article 294, Revised Penal Code, the rape committed on the occasion of the crime
being considered an aggravating circumstance. 69 The other aggravating circumstances proven present in the crime are: dwelling, for the crime
was committed in the dwelling of the offended parties without the latter having given any provocation; night time, the accused having purposely
sought it to realize the crime with ease; by a band, the accused being more than three who were all armed; and craft, the accused having
pretended to be P.C. Rangers in order to gain entrance into the house of the offended parties. No mitigating circumstance was proven.chanrobles
virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the decision dated November 26, 1969 in this case, being in accordance with law and the evidence, is affirmed in all respects, with
corresponding proportionate costs against the accused.chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J. and Abad Santos, JJ., took no part.chanrobles virtual law library

Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.chanrobles
virtual law library

Antonio, J., * took no part.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. Nos. 100391-92, September 26, 1994 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MARIANO TIMPLE, BERNARDO GUDOY Y SUMALBAG, ALFREDO UBIANO Y PAYON, RUDY
MAIQUEZ Y MANGLANLAN, RANDO EDUARDO SAGUN Y GRANDE, ROGELIO AGU-YAOY, CIPRIANO PADUA ALIAS "EDWIN," DANILO LAPITAN,
AND RODOLFO PADUA - ALL ACCUSED AS PRINCIPAL BY DIRECT PAR-TICIPATION; AND MIN. EDGARDO S. ALCANTARA, FORMER RESIDENT
MINISTER OF THE IGLESIA NI CRISTO CHURCH IN BALOC, STO. DOMINGO, N. ECIJA, ACCUSED HEREIN AS ACCESSORY, ACCUSED, MARIANO
TIMPLE, APPELLANT.

DECISION
FELICIANO, J.:

Mariano Timple appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32 of Guimba, Nueva Ecija which found him and Bernardo Gudoy,
Randy Eduardo Sagun and Rudy Maiquez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) crimes of robbery with multiple homicide.

In Criminal Case No. 505-G, accused Mariano Timple, Bernardo S. Gudoy, Alfredo P. Ubiano, Rudy M. Maiquez, Randy Eduardo G. Sagun, Rogelio
Aguyaoy, Cipriano Padua, Danilo Lapitan, and Rodolfo Padua were charged with robbery with multiple homicide in an information which read as
follows:

"That on the night of February 8, 1989, in Culong, Municipality of Guimba, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all armed with long assorted firearms/Armalite Rifles M16 and M14, Carbines, M2 and Cal. 30, and .22
cal rifle and bladed weapons, conspiring, confederating together, and helping one another and taking advantage of the darkness of the night, and
with intent of gain by means of superior force and violence upon the persons of ERNESTO SEMACIO and ZENAIDA SEMACIO and the members of
their family in their dwelling house and after hog-tying their said victims with the use of electric wires, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away personal belongings, jewelries and appliances, such as one portable Sanyo 12" black and white TV, car stereo,
other assorted items and cash, all in the aggregate amount of more than FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of
ZENAIDA SEMACIO and her children in the same amount; that by reason or on occasion of said robbery and for the purpose of enabling them
(accused) to take, steal and carry away the said personal belongings/personal properties in pursuance of their conspiracy, and for the purpose of
insuring the success of their criminal act or to suppress evidence thereof, the accused, conspiring, confederating, and helping one another, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, stab, and shoot ERNESTO SEMACIO, LORETO RAMOS, VIRGILIO FLORA, and ANGELO
BESAMES, thereby inflicting on all of them fatal stab and gunshot wounds, which caused their instantaneous death, likewise, by reason or on
occasion of the robbery, accused Mariano Timple and Alfredo Ubiano took turns in having sexual intercourse of Mrs. ZENAIDA SEMACIO by means
of force and intimidation against her will.
That due to the robbery and death of ERNESTO SEMACIO, his heirs sustained actual, moral, and consequential damages in the total sum of
P100,000.00, for the rape of ZENAIDA SEMACIO she herself sustained actual, moral, and consequential damages in the sum of P50,000.00 and for
the death of LORETO RAMOS, VIRGILIO FLORA, and ANGELO BASAMES, their respective heirs sustained actual, moral, and consequential damages
in the sum of P80,000.00 each victim."[1]
In Criminal Case No. 506-G, the same accused were also charged with another robbery with multiple homicide committed on the same night and in
the same municipality:

"That on the night of February 8, 1989, in Culong, Municipality of Guimba, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all armed with long assorted firearms/Armalite Rifles M16 and M14, Carbines, M2 and Cal. 30, and .22
cal. rifle and bladed weapons, conspiring, confederating together, and helping one another and taking advantage of the darkness of the night, and
with intent of gain by means of superior force and violence upon the spouses ALBERTO PANIO and ADORACION PANIO and members of their
household, and upon spouses DIOSDADO SAMOY and ELVIRA SAMOY, in their dwelling house and after hogtying all of their said victims, with
electric wires, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take, steal and carry away personal belongings/personal properties,
jewelries, cash, and home appliances such as one Sony radio cassette recorder, and other assorted items/properties, including one Squibman .22
cal. rifle with serial no. 38352, in the total amount of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) more or less, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
Alberto Panio and Adoracion Panio in the sum of P15,000 and Elvira Samoy in the sum of P5,000.00; that by reason or on occasion of said robbery
and for the purpose of enabling them (accused) to take, steal and carry away the said personal belongings/personal properties in pursuance of
their conspiracy, and for the purpose of insuring the success of their criminal act or to suppress evidence thereof, the accused, conspiring,
confederating, and helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, stab, and shoot ALBERTO PANIO,
ADORACION PANIO, ELVIN PANIO, DIOSDADO SAMOY, ARNEL SEMACIO, ERNESTO PANIO, MIGUEL BADUA, and EDUARDO PANTALEON, thereby
inflicting on all of them fatal stab and gunshot wounds, which caused their instantaneous death, likewise, by reason or on occasion of the robbery,
accused Mariano Timple had carnal intercourse of Mrs. ELVIRA SAMOY by means of force and intimidation against her will.[2]
The accused pleaded not guilty in both cases.

Because the two (2) cases were related, a joint trial was ordered by the trial court.[3] After trial, the court rendered judgment finding appellant
Timple along with three (3) other accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the two (2) crimes of robbery with multiple homicide and rape. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the above findings based on the evidence adduced, this Court finds the accused Mariano timple, Bernardo Gudoy, Randy
Eduardo Sagun, and Rudy Maiquez GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt on both Criminal Cases 505-G and 506-G for having committed the crime of
Robbery with Homicide and Rape as defined and penalized in Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no mitigating
circumstance to offset the aggravating circumstances of Treachery which absorbs the other aggravating circumstances of use of superior strength
and nighttime and rapes which are to be treated likewise as aggravating circumstance in these cases, the same accused MARIANO TIMPLE,
BERNARDO GUDOY, RANDY EDUARDO SAGUN, and RUDY MAIQUEZ are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua on each case; to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the twelve (12) murder victims the sum of SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P60,000.00) per victim; to pay the value of the unrecovered stolen properties; and to pay the costs of the suit, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
Accused CIPRIANO PADUA, RODOLFO PADUA, ROGELIO AGUYAOY, DANILO LAPITAN, for lack of sufficient evidence to establish their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, are found not guilty and are therefore, acquitted. Their immediate release from custody is hereby ordered unless they are to be
detained in connection with other cause that will warrant their further detention.
In the meantime, the proceedings against accused EDGARDO ALCANTARA [are] hereby ordered held in abeyance pending his apprehension. Let,
therefore, an alias warrant of arrest be issued against the same accused. Let the whole records of this case be forwarded to the Honorable
Supreme Court for the automatic review of the cases.
SO ORDERED."[4]
The factual findings of the trial court may be outlined as follows.[5]
At around 7 o'clock in the evening of 8 February 1989, Zenaida Semacio was at their house at Barangay Culong, Guimba, Nueva Ecija with her
children Arnel, Arnold, Edgar, Erwin, and Ernaida. Ernesto Semacio, her husband, who had gone to the poblacion together with Angelo Besames,
Loreto Ramos and Robert Flora, was not in the house at that time.

Armed persons who identified themselves as soldiers went to their house. They immediately ordered the children to lie face down on the ground.
Zenaida, who was then in the kitchen, came out of the house to meet them, but she was likewise ordered to do the same by Mariano Timple and
Rudy Maiquez.

The children were taken outside and hogtied with electric wire. The group then asked them for guns and for the money and jewelry of their
mother. Arnel Semacio told them that they had no guns; at this statement, one of the men hit him with a rifle butt. Some of the men then began to
ransack the house.

Meanwhile, Mariano Timple brought Zenaida to the kitchen, ordered her to lie down on top of the dining table, and there raped her. Following the
lead of Timple, Maiquez pulled Zenaida towards the comfort room, ordered her to remove her pants, and sexually abused her in a standing
position while brandishing a gun at her. After Rudy Maiquez, Alfredo Ubiano tried to take his turn with Zenaida. He took her near the pumping well
and started touching her breasts through the neckline of her blouse. He brought her inside the house, tied her hands and feet on a bamboo bench,
and continued to molest her sexually. Ubiano, however, did not have sexual intercourse with her. After Ubiano went away, accused Sagun
mischievously inserted his finger into her vagina and then rubbed that finger on her nose.

Ernesto Semacio, apparently unaware of what was taking place in his house, arrived home in his jeep together with Loreto Ramos, Virgilio Flora,
and Angelo Besames. When he got down from his jeep, he was surprised by Timple and company. Ernesto asked them what they wanted from him;
in response, he was struck with rifle butts. The armed men took Ernesto and his three (3) companions away from the house and shot them to
death.

Meanwhile, Arnold Semacio succeeded in freeing himself by untying the wire around his hands and feet. He stood up and untied his brothers Edgar
and Erwin. He noticed his brother Arnel signalling them to go ahead and run away. They did run away, together with Zenaida and Ernaida Semacio
and reached the neighboring barangay. The next morning, the dead bodies of Ernesto Semacio, Angelo Besames, Loreto Ramos, and Roberto Flora,
were found scattered around the premises of the Semacio house. Assorted personal belongings, clothes, cash, jewelry, and appliances such as a TV
set and a car stereo had been taken and were missing from the household of the Semacios.

After the slaughter in the premises of the Semacios, between 8 and 9 o'clock in the same evening of 8 February 1989, the group of Timple
proceeded to the household of Elvira Samoy where they once more introduced themselves as military men. They called for the father of Elvira who
was then living in a house adjacent to hers, only four (4) meters away. Her father met the armed men. They asked him how many male persons
were living therein and in the house of Elvira, and he informed them that there were only four (4) males in his house and only one, his son-in-law,
in Elvira's house. The armed men ordered the males out of the two (2) houses and told them that they were only pursuing and searching for a man
who had gone in the direction of their place. Elvira tried to follow the others, but she was prevented by Eduardo Sagun and an unidentified man.
The two (2) then asked her to go upstairs.

She went upstairs as ordered and the two (2) followed her. After asking for firearms and not getting any, the two (2) men began to ransack the
house. They took the bag of her husband and stuffed it with men's clothing taken from the family aparador. Jewelry and a wallet were likewise
taken. The following items were taken from the household of Elvira Samoy:

(estimated value)
one (1) piece ring with stone
P 800.00
one (1) piece necklace
600.00
one (1) piece bracelet
250.00
one (1) piece wallet
100.00
cash
100.00
one (1) piece travelling bag
120.00
one (1) piece jacket
200.00
long pants
1,000.00
two (2) pieces polo shirts
300.00
assorted T-shirts
1,000.00
one (1) piece wedding ring
400.00
one (1) pair earring
180.00
one (1) piece flashlight
50.00
one (1) piece cassette
2,500.00[6]
While Sagun and his companion were ransacking the house, Timple and Gudoy went inside and ordered Elvira downstairs. Pointing their firearms at
her, Timple and Gudoy ordered Elvira to undress and to lie down on the bamboo sofa, and the two (2) took turns in raping her. While she was being
sexually violated by Gudoy, she heard her mother from the other house pleading for mercy. This was followed by a gunshot and a shout from her
younger brother uttering the word "Inang".
After ravishing Elvira Samoy, Gudoy went out of the house. Not long after that, Elvira heard several shots followed by the sound of scampering feet
at the back of their house. A man whom Elvira Samoy identified as Alfredo Ubiano went back and stared at her, but left without assaulting her. She
went to the house of her parents and there found her mother and several other persons shot to death.

Only Mariano Timple filed a notice of appeal.[7] In his appeal brief, Timple claimed that the following errors were committed by the trial court:

The trial court erred in not finding that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the accused-appellant Mariano
Timple as allegedly one of the perpetrators of the crimes charged in the informations.
II

The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant Mariano Timple of the crimes charged in the informations.
After a careful examination of the records, we find that the guilt of the accused-appellant Mariano Timple had been proved beyond reasonable
doubt.

The identification of Mariano Timple as one of the marauders is beyond cavil. Zenaida Semacio testified that when she went out of her house to
check out the group of men ordering her children to lie on the ground, she immediately recognized Mariano Timple and Romeo Maiquez, as the
two (2) were only one (1) meter away from a kerosene lamp.[8] Furthermore, the image of Timple became etched in her memory, perhaps
indelibly, when he ordered her to remove her pants, lie on the table, and to guide his penis into her vagina. This is an occurrence so traumatic and
humiliating that it is not surprising its most minute details should remain embedded in the memory of Zenaida.

Arnold Semacio was likewise able to recognize Timple. After Arnold and his brothers were ordered to lie face down on the ground, Arnold was able
to raise his head at the instant when one of the armed men bent down to tie his shoelace. At that moment, the face of the man was only half a
meter away from the lamp on a table, and that man himself was only around two (2) meters away from Arnold. Arnold recognized him as appellant
Mariano Timple.[9]

Elvira Samoy also testified that she saw Timple with the group of armed men in her house on 8 February 1989. She recognized Timple as the man
who ordered her downstairs while some members of the group were ransacking the house. More tellingly, she remembered him as one of those
who had sexually abused her on that night. Because of the unspeakable coercion and indignity he had subjected her to, Elvira Samoy would
certainly remember Timple.

In his appeal, Mariano Timple did not directly question the testimony of the prosecution witnesses identifying him as one of the participants in the
terrible slaughter of twelve (12) persons on the night of 8 February 1989. Instead, he argued mainly that the police line-up conducted on 10
February 1989 when he was first identified was fraudulent. He presented his own version of what happened at the police line-up, contending that
in the initial line--up, Arnold Semacio, Zenaida Semacio and Elvira Samoy entered the room in the police station where he and four (4) of his
relatives were waiting at the time. For thirty to thirty-five minutes, the three (3) were unable to identify him. This inability prompted Capt. de los
Santos to order Timple to put on and later take off a bonnet and then coached the witnesses to point to him. Only then were the witnesses able to
pinpoint him. Timple testified in the following manner:

"ATTY. WYCOCO:
Q. While you were standing and the five of your companions fronting four to five meters, tell the court if anyone of your companions was ever
pinpointed to as ordered by Capt. delos Santos?
MARIANO TIMPLE:
A. For a period of about thirty to thirty-five minutes that we were there, not one of them was able to pinpoint me.
Q. After thirty five minutes had lapsed and not one of your companions was pinpointed, what happened next?
A. Captain delos Santos went out and when he returned, he let me wear a bonnet and I saw him whispering something to the complainant- - 'Ituro
mo na.' It was only a whisper and it was not in a loud voice.
Q. After you have heard the whisper of Captain delos Santos saying in the vernacular 'ituro mo na,' what did Captain delos Santos do if any?
A. Captain delos Santos removed the bonnet from me and thereafter the complainant pointed at me and said, 'yan na nga ho.'"[10] (Emphases
supplied)
The story presented by the appellant seeks to contradict the version of the prosecution, which insisted that the police line-up conducted on 10
February 1989 was free from any irregularity and had been preceded by a thorough investigation. The evidence of the prosecution on the
important matter of identification of appellant Timple is summarized in the following paragraphs.

On 9 February 1989, on the morning after the commission of the crimes, Sgt. Bergado of the Philippine Constabulary ("PC") went to talk with the
surviving victims. Zenaida Semacio told him that she would recognize their assailants if she saw them again. She also described their physical
appearances. Samoy echoed the same sentiments. That afternoon, the investigators focused on a particular suspect.

On that same day, Sgt. Bergado went back to see the victims and showed them a photograph of their suspect. Elvira Samoy nodded her head upon
looking at the photograph, but did not categorically state that the person was one of their assailants, as only the side view of the person was shown
in the photograph. She had a "strong feeling," though, she said, that the person in the photograph was one of them.[11]

Zenaida Semacio was more certain, and she immediately declared that the person in the photo was one of the armed men who had gone to their
house on the night of the massacre.[12] The man in the photograph was appellant Timple.

On 10 February 1989, Zenaida Semacio, Elvira Samoy, and Arnold Semacio were invited to the headquarters of the 128th PC Company in Guimba,
Nueva Ecija. They were asked to peep through a small opening in a window and see if they could recognize the men in the room. Zenaida and
Arnold Semacio pointed to Mariano Timple in that room as one of their assailants. Elvira Samoy too recognized Timple, and without any hesitation,
immediately pointed him out to Capt. de los Santos.

Zenaida Semacio described the police line-up in her testimony in court:

"FISCAL LACUROM:
Q. Why did you go to the PC Headquarters?
ZENAIDA SEMACIO:
A. They told us to identify the persons apprehended by them at the PC Headquarters.
Q. Who called for you?
A. Certain Soriano with his companions.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Arriving thereat, what transpired?
A. They told us to peep at the slit of the window of the camp of the 126th Company to identify those persons apprehended by them.
Q. And after peeping through the slit of the window, what did you say if any?
A. I told them I can only identify one of those persons inside.
Q. How many persons were there inside the room at that time?
A. Five, sir.
Q. To whom did you say that you identified one of those persons?
A. I told the matter to Captain de los Santos and Lt. Soriano.
Q. Who did you say as the one whom you identified?
(Witness went down to the witness stand and tapped the shoulder of Mariano Timple.)
Q. Who is this Mariano Timple in relation to that incident on the night of February 8, 198?
A. He was one of those who raped me."[13] (Underscoring supplied)
Elvira Samoy also described the police line-up conducted on 10 February 1989 as follows:

"COURT:
Q. What happened thereat when you arrived at the 126th PC Headquarters that morning of February 10, 1989?
ELVIRA SAMOY:
A. We were brought at the back of the town and according to them they have with them some male persons and they will be shown to us if we can
recognize them.
FISCAL LACUROM:
Q. Where were these five persons at that time?
A. In a room at the back of the camp.
Q. Did you do anything?
A. We were told to peep and to identify them.
Q. Where did you peep?
A. In the window.
Q. How wide was the opening of the window?
A. It is only a small opening enough to peep through.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. After peeping into that room, what did you say, if any?
A. I pointed one.
Q. To whom did you make this revelation or disclosure?
A. To Lt. Soriano and Captain Santos.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Who was that person whom you identified in that room as one of those who robbed you?
A. Mariano Timple."[14] (Underscoring supplied)
Furthermore, there is absolutely no showing that the witnesses connived falsely to denounce a person known to them to be in fact innocent. Elvira
Samoy who had been uncertain regarding the person depicted in the photograph shown to her, took one look at the suspect and immediately
identified him (Mariano Timple) during the line-up as one of the armed marauders to Capt. de los Santos. She did not even hear what the Semacios
told Capt. de los Santos after they had taken a peep at the persons in the line-up.[15]

In the light of the conflicting versions of the prosecution and herein appellant, the well-settled rule is that the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses are to be accorded great weight and are not to be disturbed, unless the judge had clearly overlooked facts of substance and
value which, if taken into account, would affect the result of the case.[16] This Court is unable to find any compelling reason to depart from this
rule and to disturb the conclusion of the trial court that the prosecution witnesses were more credible in their testimonies regarding the conduct of
the line-up on 10 February 1989 than appellant Timple who offered only his bare allegations in a story which, at all events, was merely inconclusive
and speculative.

We note that the story of Timple about the line-up is also contrived and implausible. It is not in accord with ordinary human experience for a
person to spend thirty minutes in a task the impossibility of which should have become apparent after a few seconds. Indeed, it is difficult to
believe that the three (3) witnesses (Elvira, Zenaida and Arnold) simply stood there in the same room looking at the five (5) suspects for thirty
minutes notwithstanding their inability to identify Timple from among the latter. The observation of the Solicitor General is also in point:

"If any prior prompting was done, the identity of the culprit could have been described to the complainants in a less obvious or suspicious manner
than what was allegedly done. Hence, there is no credibility to the claim that a bonnet was used to provide a cue to the complainants that
appellant was the culprit."[17]
Appellant Timple argues that the PC authorities had already harbored the notion that he was the mastermind of the Culong massacre even before
he was actually arrested. In effect, appellant is arguing that there was no probable cause for his arrest, and that the fraud which allegedly attended
the line-up was consistent with his contention that the PC orchestrated his false arrest and his subsequent identification by the victims.

We are unable to subscribe to this argument. When Timple was asked to go to the PC Headquarters on 10 February 1989, his invitation was not the
product of mere caprice on the part of the PC authorities. The previous day, on 9 February 1989, the victims had described to the PC investigators
at least some of their assailants. In the light of these descriptions, the PC investigators came to suspect the involvement of Mariano Timple. This
suspicion was not without basis. As Captain Undan himself stated, Timple was implicated in a prior murder case in Naglabrahan. Moreover, Timple
had been spotted in a fatigue uniform near the scene of the crime on the afternoon of 8 February 1989, or a few hours before the robberies and
killings and rape.[18] It was only natural for the investigators, then, to consider Mariano Timple as a suspect, considering that his body appearance
fitted one of the descriptions of the assailants given by the victims.[19] Eventually, the suspicion of the investigators would be confirmed when the
victims picked out Timple from the line-up conducted on 10 February 1989.

Appellant argues further that the police line-up conducted on 10 February 1989 was null and his identifica-tion therefrom was inadmissible
because he had not been assisted by counsel. He contends that the line-up was an important part of the custodial investigation.[20]

It has been held, however, that a police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation, where, as here, the suspects had not yet been held then to
answer for the criminal offense with which they were later charged and convicted.[21] The Court has held that there is no real need to afford a
potential suspect the services of counsel at the police line--up, for the customary practice is that it is the witness who is investigated or
interrogated in the course of the line-up. It is the witness who gives a statement to the police, rather than the accused who is not questioned at all
at that stage.[22] In the present case, it does not appear that the appellant was ever questioned in the course of the line-up; to the contrary, it
even appears that the line-up was conducted outside the room where the appellant and four (4) others were. Accordingly, the absence of Timple's
counsel during the line--up did not affect the validity of the line-up.

Appellant also objects that the prosecution had failed to adduce convincing evidence of his alleged conspiracy with accused Sagun, Gudoy, Maiquez
and Ubiano.

An examination of the records clearly show that this argument too is bereft of merit. Conspiracy, like any ingredient of an offense, must be
established not by mere conjecture but by evidence which satisfies the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. To establish conspiracy,
two or more persons must be shown to have come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony. It is not, of course, indispensable that
direct proof be adduced to establish the agreement to commit the felony; the availability of such direct proof of the agreement to commit the
felony is, in the nature of things, clearly the exception rather than the rule. Conspiracy must commonly be inferred from acts of the accused which
clearly manifest a concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime. In the great majority of cases, conspiracy is established by
proof of acts done in concert, that is to say, acts which yield the reasonable inference that the doers thereof were acting with common intent or
design.[23]

The acts of Timple and the other members of his band established by the prosecution clearly yield this inference. From the evidence on record, it is
clear that an armed group attacked two (2) households successively in Culong, Guimba, Nueva Ecija on the night of 8 February 1989. In both
instances, the group robbed, killed, and raped. Timple was present when the group committed these acts. His presence, however, was not
coincidental nor innocent. The record permits no doubt that Timple acted in concert with the armed group in the commission of the two offenses.

In the two (2) households, he was armed with a rifle like the other members of the band. In the house of Zenaida, it was he who ordered that the
children be hogtied. While the house was being ransacked, it was he who ordered Zenaida to come dawn. His order was not meant to spare her
from the distress of seeing her worldly goods taken away; he was also bent on taking something from her: her personal honor and human dignity in
a few minutes of carnal pleasure.

In the house of Elvira too, he was present while the house was being stripped of various goods. As in the house of the Semacios, he did nothing to
stop the commission of the robbery or the killings. While the men were taking away what they could carry from the house of the Samoys, Timple
was raping Elvira Samoy. Sagun who was identified by Zenaida as the man who had ordered her to produce their gun and other valuables, followed
the example of Timple and sexually abused Elvira.

The conspiracy having been shown, each of the conspirators is liable for all the acts of the others. There is thus no need for the prosecution to
establish who shot any one or more of the twelve (12) victims of the band.

The trial court correctly designated the crime as robbery with homicide, with rape being considered as an aggravating circumstance.

In the two (2) instances when the assailants struck, their overriding intention was to commit robbery. After the children had been hogtied in the
Semacios premises, one of the armed men demanded money and jewelry.[24] Thereafter, they started to ransack the house. When the husband of
Zenaida arrived, the robbers went out and promptly killed him and his luckless companions.

In the house of the Samoys, all the male occupants were asked to come out first. Only then did the men begin to ransack the place. After
ransacking the house, the male occupants were shot to death.

In both instances, the intent to gain was present and had been realized. Furthermore, the killing of four (4) persons in the Semacio household and
eight (8) in the Samoy's was committed on the occasion of, or by reason of, the robbery. The killings were done to facilitate the escape of the
assailants, or to eliminate opposition to their criminal objective. With the sole exception of the mother of Elvira, all the dead were males and
presumably capable of giving a fight. The course of action chosen by the accused appears to reflect a strategy of moving in only after "softening" or
eliminating the defenses of the target. In the house of the Semacios, the children were hogtied first; in the Samoys, the males were herded out
before the malefactors actually commenced to ransack the house.

It may be observed that the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery. While the records clearly show that the
accused had killed the victims, they do not show the precise manner in which this was done. The witnesses did not actually see the accused fire
their guns at the victims. Absent such kind of proof, we cannot presume that the victims had been killed treacherously. Furthermore, this
aggravating circumstance is appreciated only in crimes against persons,[25] and is not to be applied in robbery with homicide which is classified as
a crime against property.[26] In some cases, however, the Court has held that treachery may be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance
in robbery with homicide, but not as a qualifying circumstance.[27]

While the number of persons killed does not alter the characterization of the offense as robbery with homicide, the multiplicity of the victims slain
should have been appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. This would preclude an anomalous situation where, from the standpoint of the
gravity of the offense, robbery with one killing would be treated in the same way that robbery with multiple killings would be.[28]

The trial court, however, was correct in treating the raping of Elvira Samoy and Zenaida Semacio as an aggravating circumstance.[29]

Under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, robbery with homicide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. In view, however, of the first
paragraph of Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:

"Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed,
unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced
to reclusion perpetua" (Underscoring supplied)
only the penalty of reclusion perpetua could be imposed by the trial court. Hence, the attendant aggravating circumstances in this case had no
impact upon the determination of the proper penalty by the trial court.[30]

By Republic Act No. 7659 (effective 31 December 1993),[31] Congress re-imposed the death penalty for certain heinous crimes, including robbery
with homicide and robbery with rape. By the same statute, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code was amended to read as follows:

"Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation on any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or
when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
xxx xxx x x x"[32]
(Underscoring supplied)
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, however, cannot be applied retroactively in this case. To do so would be to
subject the appellant to the death penalty which could not have been constitutionally imposed by the court a quo under the law in effect at the
time of the commission of the offenses.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, finding herein appellant Mariano Timple guilty of two (2) crimes of robbery with homicide, is
AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant Timple.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Melo, and Vitug, JJ., concur.

Bidin, J., on leave.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 21390. March 26, 1924. ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANCISCO, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

OSTRAND, J. :

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila convicting the defendant of robbery and sentencing him to suffer six
years, ten months and one day of presidio mayor, with the accessory penalties, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P2, and to pay the
costs.

It appears from the evidence that on August 7, 1923, the accused, Francisco Francisco, who was then a sanitary inspector in the Philippine Health
Service, on inspecting the merchandise in Sy Ham’s store in Pasay, discovered that some lard there exposed for sale contained some blackish
substance and concluding that the lard was unfit for consumption, he threatened to take it to the municipal building unless Sy Ham paid him P2. Sy
Ham, for fear that, if the unclean lard was taken to the municipal building, he might be arrested, prosecuted, and convicted, and would have to pay
a fine of P15, chose the alternative of complying with the defendant’s demand. The payment of the P2 was, however, not affected without
considerable bargaining, Sy Ham first offering P1, then P1.50 and finally paid the P2 when the defendant refused to consider anything less.

Three days later the defendant again came to the store and reprehended Sy Ham for having told others about the incident on August 7th; and on
the following day, August 11th, he returned accompanied by a policeman. Sy Ham maintains that everything in the store was then clean as he, after
the defendant’s second visit, anticipated trouble and had taken special pains to have everything in the store clean, but the defendant, unnoticed by
the policeman, put some cigarette ashes in the supply of lard and also in some wine and after showing the policeman the ashes in the lard
confiscated it and lodged a complaint against Sy Ham for infraction of the regulations of the Bureau of Health.

The evidence leaves no room for doubt as to the defendant’s guilt, but some doubt has been expressed as to whether the offense committed is
bribery, under article 383 of the Penal Code, or whether it constitutes robbery, under paragraph 5 of article 503 of the same Code. Upon this point
we are bound by numerous previous decisions of this court. (See, for instance, U. S. v. Flores, 19 Phil., 178; U. S. v. Osorio, 21 Phil., 237; U. S. v.
Martin, 23 Phil., 58; U. S. v. Sanchez, 26 Phil., 83; U. S. v. Dedulo, 31 Phil., 298.)

The principal distinction between the two offenses is that in bribery the transaction is mutual and voluntary; in the case of robbery the transaction
is neither voluntary nor mutual, but is consummated by the use of force or intimidation. If the offended party in the present case had voluntarily
offered to pay the defendant the P2 the transaction would have constituted bribery. But such is not this case. The defendant demanded the
payment of the P2, accompanying the demand with threats of prosecution and arrest and is therefore guilty of robbery.

The sentence appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Street, Avanceña, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.