!"#$!$%$&'()&*!$$+,-,$+),!./+&0/!,1#10/!

+&%"2&3%,$%)

Herausgegeben von
Tzotcho Boiadjiev, Georgi Kapriev
und Аndreas Speer

ǕǚǞǟǕǟǠǟǔǍǞǝǒǑǚǛǏǒǗǛǏǚǍǡǕǘǛǞǛǡǕǬǕǗǠǘǟǠǝǍ

Издаван от
Цочо Бояджиев, Георги Каприев
и Андреас Шпеер
252 Archiv XIX

IDOLIZING PAGANISM  DEMONIZING

CHRISTIANITY: À PROPOS: N. SINIOSSOGLOU,
RADICAL PLATONISM IN BYZANTIUM:
ILLUMINATION AND UTOPIA IN GEMISTOS PLETHON

&+5,67,$$1:.$33(6
81,9(56,'$''(/26+(0,6)(5,2648,72

Dr. Niketas Siniossoglou’s hefty tome1 attempts to provide

the reader with an intellectual history of Byzantium, while it
also seeks to solve riddles of Gemistos Plethon’s thought and
intellectual character. Plethon´s „paganism,“ his place in the
history of Byzantine thought (especially à propos historical rival
movements, e.g., Palamism), and other themes are touched upon
in S.’s work as the result of highly specialized research with an eye
toward enlightening the reader to obscure aspects of Byzantine
intellectual thought.
This review will evaluate S.´s contribution by both
contextualizing his approach and noting his method. It will
also attempt to critique S.´s hermeneutic by reviewing select
arguments within his work. Unfortunately, one foreboding aspect
of this work is its price (originally priced at £ 70.00 or € 91.00).
However, should an author successfully change the direction of
scholarly discussion in his field, the specialist may find that the
book price is well worth it.

1
N. Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium. Illumination
and Utopia in Gemistos Plethon (“Cambridge Classical Studies“),
Cambridge, 2011.
 Christiaan W. Kappes
(Universidad de los Hemisferios, Quito)

IDOLIZING PAGANISM  DEMONIZING

CHRISTIANITY: À PROPOS: N. SINIOSSOGLOU,
RADICAL PLATONISM IN BYZANTIUM:
ILLUMINATION AND UTOPIA IN GEMISTOS PLETHON

1. An author´s bibliography
may help the reader evaluate a book
as much as the text itself
Throughout the book S. spends significant intellectual capital in
order to argue not only Plethon´s positions and influences, but also
those of Barlaam the Calabrian; namely, their pagan-humanistic and
„optimistic“ epistemology (inter alia). As one would suspect in this
context, the content of any such epistemology is heavily indebted
to Platonism. Investigation of Plethon and Barlaam through the
prism of Platonism is S.’s forte in this work. This likely stems from
his doctoral dissertation on Theodoret of Cyrrhus, which has also
been recently published as: Plato and Theodoret: The Christian
Appropriation of Platonic Philosophy and the Hellenic Intellectual
Resistance.1 In this previous work, as in the present work under
review, a key advisor for S.’s thesis was Dr. Peter Garnsey,2 himself an

1
Id., Plato and Theodoret. The Christian Appropriation of Platonic
Philosophy and the Hellenic Intellectual Resistance, Cambridge,
2008 (Doct. Diss.).
2
http://www.classics.cam.ac.uk/faculty/staff-bios/research_staff/pe-
ter_garnsey/ (access 02.08.2012)
Idolizing Paganism – Demonizing Christianity:... 211

expert on Platonism. In fact, in Radical Platonism in Byzantium, S.’s

advisory team almost exclusively consists of experts on Platonism,
some of whom have also made contributions via studies of early
Christianity and (to some extent) Aristotelian philosophy.3 For this
reason, it is no surprise that S. attempts to syphon out Platonic
elements from both Plethon and Barlaam’s theology and philosophy
(as well as from other authors and texts). This project is both
commendable and interesting in itself.
Unfortunately, from the very beginning, such a noble
project has no possibility of being brought to term within
Radical Platonism in Byzantium. To begin with, a short glance
at the author´s bibliography alerts the reader to the fact that any
evaluation of Barlaam by S. can only be haphazard at best. Even
before a reader might want to consider engaging S.´s arguments,
this summary judgment can be rendered confidently. Such an
evaluation is due to S.’s apparent unfamiliarity with Barlaam´s
works that should ordinarily be essential reading for interpreting
the Calabrian’s theological and philosophical vision. S. failed
to consult two important compilations of Barlaam’s writings
relevant to his arguments (both of which are available in print
and in critical editions): Barlaam Calabro. Opere contro i Latini.
Introduzione, storia dei testi, edizione critica, traduzione e indici,
and Dalla controversia palamitica alla polemica esicastica con
un’edizione critica delle epistole greche di Barlaam.4 This glaringly
incomplete treatment of Barlaam’s corpus is coupled with a lack
of any references to important modern studies, especially those
of A. Fyrigos.5 It may be true that not all of Barlaam’s works can

3
Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1), p.
xii. Nearly all the names listed by S. are easily traceable to a univer-
sity’s or professor’s site. Of course, the present judgments about S.’s
advisors are the result of a perusal of each named professor’s Cur-
riculum Vitae.
4
Op. cit. (cf. supra, n. 1), pp. 427–429.
5
This omission is glaring and can be found wanting in the bibliography.
See: Id., Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1), p. 435.
Please note the following studies on Barlaam: A. Fyrigos, „Barlaam
Calabro tra l’aristotelismo scolastico e il neoplatonismo bizantino“,
212 Christiaan W. Kappes (Universidad de los Hemisferios, Quito)

be said to contribute to his philosophical vision,6 yet both the

introductions to and the texts of many of his writings are essential
for understanding his thought and its progression. In addition
to Fyrigos’ modern critical editions, there is not even a reference
to Schirò’s classic text of Barlaam’s epistles.7 On the contrary, S.
merely employs Gregory Palamas’ comments on Barlaam (and
those of some of his followers). Clearly, the reader cannot expect
any global presentation of Barlaam (which is actually essential for
portions of the narrative proposed within S.’s own work). Instead,
S. relies heavily on Gregory Palamas’ critique of Barlaam. Of
course, it is legitimate for a scholar to seek to argue that Palamas’
perspective is the most insightful interpretation of the Calabrian.
Still, the difficulty lies in the fact that the book leaves the reader with
an interpretation of Barlaam’s thought drawn almost exclusively
from the perspective of his most vehement adversary.
S. attempts to rectify this bias only to a limited degree. He
does so by relying on two critically edited texts of Barlaam by R.E.
Sinkewicz.8 A panoramic view of Barlaam would be naturally more

Il Veltro 27, 1983, pp. 185–194; ed. A. Fyrigos, Barlaam Calabro.

L’uomo, l’opera, il pensiero, Seminara, 1999.
6
E.g., ed. P. Carelos, 7P`ZPó[ c^š ?PZPQ`^š @^RXbcXYø (“Corpus
philosophorum Medii Aevi. Philosophi Byzantini“, 8), Athens,
1996. Still, the brief Introduction to these purely mathematical
writings includes a crucial discussion of the epistemological status
of mathematics, geometry, and astronomy from an Aristotelian-
Neoplatonic prespective.
7
Ed. G. Schirò, Barlaam Calabro. Epistole greche. I primordi epi-
sodici e dottrinari delle lotte esicaste, Palermo, 1954.
8
S. includes the following studies in his bibliography: R.E. Sinke-
wicz, „A New Interpretation for the First Episode in the Contro-
versy Between Barlaam the Calabrian and Gregory Palamas“, The
Journal of Theological Studies 31, 1980, pp. 489–500 (N.B., This
thesis is at odds with Fyrigos’ positions in both his Contro i Latini...
and Epistole greche...); Id., „The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God
in the Early Writings of Barlaam the Calabrian“, Mediaeval Stud-
ies 44, 1982, pp. 181–242. However, he fails to cite this important
study, by the same author: „The „Solutions“ Addressed to George
Lapithes by Barlaam the Calabrian and Their Philosophical Con-
Idolizing Paganism – Demonizing Christianity:... 213

cognizant of his sources in his Contra Latinos. Though heavily

indebted to Platonism, Barlaam’s Christian identity can in no way
be cast into doubt (contra Palamam). Furthermore, in his epistles,
Barlaam believed that pagan philosophers (except Platonici), and
even the „rationalists“ like Thomas Aquinas, were possessed by
demons.9 Barlaam’s „Platonism“ must be viewed from the optic
of Barlaam’s own views of compatibility between Aristotle and
Plato. Barlaam opted for compatibility, whereas Plethon upheld an
incommensurability view. S.’s simplification still leads the reader
to render Barlaam an enemy of the allegedly anti-philosophical
Palamas. However, it requires a logical leap to further claim that
Barlaam is, thus, a crypto-pagan. This conclusion merely mimics
a traditional Byzantine category (and accusation) of „Hellenizer“
against those who employ pagan learning. It should not naively be
upheld without foundation and the necessary nuances.
Additionally, the bibliography is selective, not comprehensive.
Many expected secondary sources are wanting with respect to
both updated and relevant studies on the historical figures that S.
wishes to engage within his opus.

text“, Mediaeval Studies 43, 1981, pp. 152–199, which reveals a lot
about the identity of Barlaam’s so-called Platonism.
9
For an example of Barlaam’s consideration of philosophers’ er-
rors as demonic in their origin, see: Barlaam Calabro, Epistlola
III, 27.256–264 (ed. A. Fyrigos, Dalla controversia palamitica alla
polemica esicastica con un’edizione critica delle epistole greche di
Barlaam (“Medioevo“, 11), Rome, 2005, p. 320). For an example of
Barlaam’s arguments against the value of Aristotelian (and Platon-
ic) demonstrations of „divine things“ ad sententiam Patrum, see:
op. cit., 75.685–81.744. There is a thorough assessment of Barlaam
and his sources (gleaned from Fyrigos’s two monumental studies)
in: J.A. Demetracopoulos, „Further Evidence on the Ancient, Pa-
tristic, and Byzantine Sources of Barlaam the Calabrian’s Contra
Latinos“, Byzantinische Zeitschrift 96, 2003, pp. 83–122. Also, see:
Id., „Barlaam the Calabrian“, in: ed. H. Lagerlund, Encyclopedia of
Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy between 500–1500, New York,
2011, pp. 141–144. This last citation provides a summary of con-
crete Neoplatonic texts used by Barlaam and serves as a preview to
a forthcoming monograph included in the article’s bibliography.
214 Christiaan W. Kappes (Universidad de los Hemisferios, Quito)

One small, illustrative example should suffice to alert the

reader to peruse parts of S.’s text cum cautela. Toward the
beginning of his work, S. proposes a precarious chronology for
George-Gennadius Scholarius (a key figure in S.’s work). Therein,
S. leaves the reader with the impression that Scholarius was a
former disciple of Gemistos Plethon.10 This proposition is both
an interesting and an exciting hypothesis, insofar as it introduces
both drama and a potential personal „history“ between two rival
figures (i.e., Plethon and Scholarius). Such an historical scenario
could add great weight to statements made by Scholarius about
Plethon’s personal history and thought. However, as his support,
S. cites only two 19th century authors (and a spurious composition
attributed to Scholarius). S. notes that these two authors proposed
that Scholarius had ventured to the Peloponnese to study under
Plethon.11 Interestingly, these two authors disagree among
themselves on the possible date for such an alleged visit. In his
citations, S. fails to alert the reader to the disagreement between the
two authors, nor does he attempt to solve the riddle of Scholarius’
visit (which would have constituted a minor contribution to
Scholarius’ biography). Instead he simply chooses one of the two
authors’ proposed dates as his preference and passes over the
other in silence. S. even goes so far as to propose more „persuasive“
evidence for his hypothesis by referring to a text once attributed
to Scholarius. Unfortunately, S. cites the Encomium of St. Leontius

10
Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1),
pp. 130–131.
11
C. Alexandre, „Notice préliminaire sur Pléthon, sur ses ouvrages
et en particulier sur son „Traité de Lois““, in: EZøWh\^a Bü[h\
bdRR`PeńacóbhUü[T\P5EZècV^\. Traité de lois, Paris, 1858, pp.
xiv-xv. H. Tozer, „A Byzantine Reformer“, Journal of Hellenic Stud-
ies 7, 1886, pp. 353–380, esp. p. 359. N.B., Alexandre claims this
took place in 1427, whereas Tozer assumes it certain by his time
that it was 1428. It turns out that the real date is fall of 1428. See:
George Sphrantzes, Chronicon XV, 8 – XVI, 2 (ed. R. Maisano,
Georgii Sphrantzae Chronicon (“Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzan-
tine“, 29), Rome, 1990, pp. 34–36).
Idolizing Paganism – Demonizing Christianity:... 215

of Monemvasia, which has proved almost certainly spurious.12 S.’s

presentation of the evidence can be misleading. He writes:
„However, Lampros considered it probable that Scholarius
studied in Mistra. His evidence comes from a piece attributed
to Scholarius that mentions an unnamed ØeVRVc÷a `Tcńa

_P`ôSTXR[PQú^d
who may possibly be identified with Plethon.
Zakythinos provided stronger grounds for considering a link
between Scholarius and Mistra: Scholarius is the author of the
epitaph of Demetrios Leontarios, an important personality
in the despotate who died in 1431. In that case Scholarios’
testimony implies that he first had contact with Plethon’s ideas
before that date.“13

Though S. briefly mentions (in a footnote) that Tinnefeld

considers the encomium spurious, he makes no attempt to inform
the reader that Tinnefeld and his lot represent the sanior pars.
The reader is left with the impression that S.’s preference is in the
ascendancy.14
This incomplete historical presention becomes more
pronounced after surveying 20th-21st century works on Scholarius.15

12
Were Scholarius its author, it would have firmly placed him in the
Peloponnese during his younger years. For the strong arguments
against the authenticity of the attribution, see: E. Angelomati-
Tsougaraki, „Ò ÐbX^a @Tü\cX^a Ì ŸY A^\T[QPbúPa ¥RYĀ[X^\ ŋ
7ú^a ŋ —Y^Z^dWúP ŋ bfTcXYPù _T`ù c^š Ìbú^d [TZöcPι“, @PYh\XYPù
b_^dSPù 7, 1983, pp. 61–107, esp. pp. 84–85.
13
Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1),
pp. 131–132.
14
With respect to the epitaph for Demetrios Leontarios, see: M.-H.
Blanchet, Georges Gennadios Scholarios (vers 1400-vers 1472): un
intellectuel orthodoxe face à la disparition de l’Empire byzantin,
Paris, 2008, p. 282. The authenticity of the epitaph is not debated.
Still, this circumstantial evidence (especially when it stands alone)
is weak.
15
Loenertz mentions nothing of a journey of Scholarius to the Pelo-
ponnese before 1437. See: R.-J. Loenertz, „Pour la biographie du
cardinal Bessarion“, Orientalia Christiana Periodica 10, 1944, pp.
116–149, esp. pp. 134–135. Turner does not allude to this possi-
216 Christiaan W. Kappes (Universidad de los Hemisferios, Quito)

These works tend either to ignore any such visit by Scholarius to

the Peloponnese in 1427/8, or they flatly deny that he either was a
disciple of Plethon or had visited the peninsula during this period.
Although S. is free to disagree with these authors, the nature of his
work would seem to demand more detail, perhaps a synthesis of
the data, and certainly some support for an important historical
assertion that is anything but definitive. In fact, the present author
happens to favor the Alexandre-Tozer hypothesis (along with S.)
as a distinct possibility. However, support for such speculation
would seem to demand taking into account more recent scholarly
contributions that touch on Scholarius’ life and times within the
confines of Byzantium.16

ble facet of Scholarius’ life either. He explicitly discusses aspects of

Alexandre’s work on Scholarius and Plethon, but neither confirms
nor denies Scholarius’ 1428 journey to the Peloponnese. Cf. C. J.
Turner, „An Anomalous Episode in the Relations between Schol-
arios and Plethon“, Byzantine Studies 3, 1976, pp. 56–63, esp. p. 56.
It is also absent from his thorough treatment of Scholarius’ chro-
nology in: Id., „The Carreer of George-Gennadius Scholarius“, Byz-
antion 39, 1969, pp. 420–455, esp. pp. 422–428. Tinnefeld makes
no judgment on the matter. See: F. Tinnefeld, „Georgios Gennadios
Scholarios“, in: edd. C.G. Conticello and V. Conticello, La théologie
byzantine et sa tradition. II: XIIIe–XIXe s., Turnhout, pp. 477–549.
The discussion is lacking in: Blanchet, Georges Gennadios Schol-
arios (vers 1400-vers 1472)... (cf. supra, n. 15).
16
The present author’s agreement with S.’s hypothesis is per accidens.
It would have been to S.’s credit to argue for lacunae in 20th and
21st century studies on this matter. Furthermore, it would have
been an opportunity to synthesize the results of modern histori-
cal research with respect to these seminal works. Instead of relying
principally on 19th century historical claims, it is now possible to
argue Scholarius’ visit to the Peloponnese via the facts now known
about his life. See: M.-H. Blanchet / Th. Ganchou, „Les fréquenta-
tions byzantines de Lodisio de Tabriz, Dominicain de Péra (†1435):
Géôrgios Scholarios, Iôannès Chrysolôras et Théodôros Kalékas“,
Byzantion 75, 2005, pp. 71–103; Th. Ganchou, „Les ultimae volun-
tates de Manuel et Iôannès Chrysolôras et le séjour de Francesco
Filelfo à Constantinople“, Bizantinistica. Rivista di Studi Bizantini
Idolizing Paganism – Demonizing Christianity:... 217

Though the bibliography is wanting and sometimes dated,

there are some excellent and unique bibliographical references

e Slavi 7, 2005, pp. 195–285. Here are but two articles establishing
Scholarius’ sojourn and relations in Constantinople that can now
be attested to with certainty in the 1420’s until 1426/7. Also, suf-
ficient historical data currently exists to place him within the en-
virons of Constantinople by 1430. Argyriou has finally allowed for
a dating of one of Scholarius’ letters (viz., to Macarius Makrês) to
the winter of 1430. A. Argyriou, Macaire Makrès et la polémique
contre l’Islam („Studi e Testi“, 314), Vatican City, 1986, pp. 8, 46.
Woodhouse thinks it likely that Scholarius was part of the imperial
retinue (1426/1428). However, without directly refuting previous
claims, he assumes that Scholarius never studied under Plethon.
See: C.M. Woodhouse, George Gemistos Plethon. The Last of the
Hellenes, Oxford, 2000, p. 39. Because of Scholarius’ associations
with important political personages in the 1420’s, evidence now ex-
ists to support Alexandre´s and Tozer´s assertions that Scholarius
may have accompanied the imperial retinue to the Peloponnese
around 1428. A synthesis of all these facts leaves open the possibil-
ity of travel between 1428–1430. Before these 20th century stud-
ies, Scholarius’ visit was based on a couple of vague references
within his corpus. This, coupled with an unknown chronology of
the young Scholarius, allowed for any number of hypotheses. One
modern argument for Scholarius as a possible former disciple of Pl-
ethon can be found in: Th. N. Zesses,8T\\ôSX^a7ŵGf^Zô`X^a7ú^a
ŋ bdRR`ô[[PcP ŋ SXSPbYPZúP („—\ôZTYcP 7ZPcôSh\“, 30), Thes-
sanoniki, 1979 (21988), p. 84. Zesses argues the possibility from
Scholarius’ own words: „Yea, with respect to myself, I myself do not
deem it unworthy to admit him to the post of teacher (translation
mine)“. See: George-Gennadius Scholarius, ?PcócŮ\EZńWh\^a
_^`XŮ\Ÿ_Ľ—`Xbc^cöZTX (edd. L. Petit / X.A. Sideridès / M. Jugie,
Oeuvres complètes de Georges Scholarios, Vol. IV, Paris, 1935, p.
115, ll. 7–11). Still, the meaning of this sentence can safely be de-
rived only in view of its context; Scholarius says that, if rumors of
Plethon’s desire not to be a Christian were ever falsified by Plethon
himself, Scholarius would be prepared to reconcile with Plethon
and recognize his wisdom –as if he were his teacher– (at least in the
context of the Plato-Aristotle affair). Obviously, this has nothing to
do with the issue of Scholarius’ mentors in his youth.
218 Christiaan W. Kappes (Universidad de los Hemisferios, Quito)

that point to S.’s philological background and studies. These are

valuable, indeed, for any scholar who wishes to compile a replete
bibliography covering figures of late Byzantium such as Plethon,
Palamas, etc.

2. Interpretive approaches
to philosophy and authorities
Before entering into the main thesis of the author (i.e., a
historical revision of the personality and thought of Plethon
in Byzantium), it first behooves the reader to consider other
recurring oddities in the book so that s/he might be able to make
a discerning read of it. Another important facet of S.’s approach
to the historical data can be illustrated by his use of terminology
and footnotes. S.’s project in Radical Platonism in Byzantium is
expansive and ambitious. This, of course, can be a positive facet of
any work. However, the difficulty encountered in this ambitious
work is found in the illusive nature of his „categories“ to describe
the intellectual commitments and thought of several authors who
may only tangentially or partially fall into a category or under a
term employed by S. For example, in medieval philosophy, there
exists the traditional category of „Thomist“ (i.e., philosopher/
theologian ad mentem Thomae). This is meant to convey, more
or less, a generic idea, which encompasses a philosopher or
theologian’s worldview or intellectual method. Additionally,
„Aristotelian“ and „Platonic“ are examples of adjectives employed
within ancient philosophy to categorize a thinker according to a
specific criterion. The historical difficulty with such labels is that,
in the absence of a Rosetta stone within the author’s own text to
understand the „essential doctrines“ denoted by such terms, each
category could end up as either equivocal (varying in meaning
from author to author) or merely denote some peculiar univocal
idea held by the author that must be gleaned from within his text.
For example, an author could idiosyncratically define a Thomist
as: „anyone who admires the philosophy/theology of Thomas
Aquinas.“ In scholarship, however, a normative use of „Thomist“
Idolizing Paganism – Demonizing Christianity:... 219

would ordinarily signify something like: „a thinker who holds

‘x’, ‘y’, and ‘z’ philosophical and/or theological principles ad
mentem Thomae, or a thinker who employs Aquinas’ method to
philosophize/theologize.“
Throughout his work, S. frequently attempts to impose
metaphysically and philosophically gravid labels on theologians
and philosophers, which often prove to be simplistic and/
or idiosyncratic. Nowadays over-generalized and unqualified
categories have all but been abandoned by modern scholarship in
disciplines like the history of medieval philosophy. Most scholarly
historical approaches to theologians and theology take into
account the limitations of a category to encapsulate the thought
and worldview of any one individual author. Instead, historians of
philosophy and theology tend to give the reader a working definition
for any significant genus (e.g., „Platonist“) within defined limits or,
at least, an author will alert his reader to the school of thought that
he espouses (e.g., „neo-Thomist“) in order to help the reader have
an idea of the author’s semantic preference for terms with more
than one application/meaning. After providing the reader with
a definition or a point of reference, a philosopher or theologian
under study can be collocated in said category to the degree to
which his thought corresponds to the essential content falling
within that same category. This helps the reader to have in mind a
clear definition of any term, which may have various meanings or
ranges of application. For example, in medieval studies, scholars’
early presuppositions that a „Thomist“ school of philosophy (i.e.,
a school adhering to Pius X’s 24 theses)17 existed from the 13th

17
Scil., Sacra Studiorum Congregatio: „Theses quaedam, in doctrina
Sancti Thomae Aquinatis contentae, et a philosophiae magistris
propositae, adprobantur“ (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 6, 1914, pp. 383–
386). This paragraph’s distinctions are quite necessary to make. S.’s
published book-review (viz., N. Siniossoglou, „Judith R. Ryder,
„The Career and Writings of Demetrius Kydones: A Study of Four-
teenth-Century Byzantine Politics, Religion and Society““, Specu-
lum 87/4, 2012, p. 1248) argues that both nuance and objectivity
constitute a contentious concept and fictitious approach to scholar-
ship, respectively. The entire review, in polemical terms, is more of
220 Christiaan W. Kappes (Universidad de los Hemisferios, Quito)

century on have proved unfounded due to the ahistorical nature

of this modern anachronistic category.18 Instead, scholarship now
requires that each Scholastic author’s thought must be studied and
evaluated so as to discover each individual author’s intellectual
commitments expressed within his works. Only after one uncovers
a thinker’s sources and core intellectual values, to the extent that it is
applicable, can a modern author designate a thinker as a „Thomist,“
„Aristotelian,“ etc. The effect of this sort of methodological
approach has destroyed many ahistorical myths about not only
Thomism and the Thomistic „school“ of the 13th and 14th centuries,

a manifesto for rejecting „objective points of view.“ The difficulty

with this assertion for many a philosopher (even some nominalists)
lies in cross-cultural intelligibility of universal concepts (generals).
S. contends: „This widespread perspectivist assumption is anach-
ronistic to the extent that, say, Kydones did not thusly [sic] bracket
his self-understanding. It is also self-refuting, for it culminates in
an awkward type of unconfessed realism: it is only by tacitly claim-
ing access to reality (read: to the truthfulness of ‘balanced’ and
‘nuanced’ interpretations) that we can bracket the theological and
historical categories of our historical agents.“ It is highly doubtful
that most scholars hold „nuance“ to be a virtue if clarity already
exists (thus it is not an absolute value in every instance). Howev-
er, one can suspect that „balance“ (i.e., looking at different actors’
and sources’ presentation of the same material object) is a virtue
in modern scholarship. Yet, it must be conceded that S. faithfully
applies this (anti-)principle in Radical Platonism in Byzantium. He
rejects possible divergences from his preset universal categories
(without reference to historical figures’ own literary production)
and picks a „polarized“ interpretation of an author/event, generally
developing each as an instance of his pre-established divisions of
thought, etc. Of course, philosophically and historically, if scholars
cannot arrive at „universals“ through a gradual a posteriori process,
such that general categories can accurately and objectively describe
their individual instantiations, doesn’t scholarship –in contingent
matter– itself become a „flatus vocis“?
18
Among the last neo-Thomist attempts to defend this thesis, which
can still be read with benefit, was: F. Roensch, The Early Thomistic
School, Dubuque, 1964.
Idolizing Paganism – Demonizing Christianity:... 221

but even other alleged rigid intellectual movements. Thus, the so-
called genetic method, which includes studying an author’s entire
corpus, coupled with a comparison and contrast of his works to
his sources and various contemporary „schools“ of theology/
philosophy, supplies a modern reader with convincing evidence for
collocating a thinker of the Middle Ages and Renaissance within a
supposed intellectual movement.19
Such nuance and investigation of individual authors
are at times lacking when S. categorizes personalities within
medieval and Byzantine philosophy. For example, the famous
„Thomist“ (Demetrius Cydones) is incorrectly overgeneralized
as a „Platonizing philosopher“ at the beginning of the book.20
The reader will wait in vain, in subsequent chapters, to see either
authorities or arguments presented for such a hypothesis.21 Though

19
The winds have even changed within the Dominican Order (dedicat-
ed to defending the life and teaching of Thomas Aquinas). Many
Dominican heroes, or early „Thomists“, have been reevaluated in
light of modern scholarship, and these famous Dominicans have
often been found to be quite eclectic. For example, the following
may be consulted with profit: Saint Thomas au XIVe siècle. Actes
du colloque organisé par L’Institut Saint-Thomas-d’Aquin les 7 et
8 juin 1996 à l’Institut Catholique de Toulouse (“Revue Thomiste“,
XXVII/1), Toulouse, 1997.
20
Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1),
p. 1. On the myth of „Cydones Platonicus“ or „semi-paganus“, see:
J.A. Demetracopoulos, „Thomas Aquinas’ Impact on Late Byzan-
tine Theology and Philosophy: The Issues of Method or „Modus
Sciendi“ and „Dignitas Hominis““, in: edd. A. Speer / Ph. Steink-
rüger, Knotenpunkt Byzanz: Wissensformen und kulturelle Wech-
selbseziehungen, Berlin, 2012, pp. 333–410, at pp. 339–340.
21
One attempt at „proof“ for this revisionism is the following: „Ky-
dones is usually presented as a Thomist, yet in his letters to Manuel
and John Kantakouzenos he moves in the opposite direction from
Aquinas’ The Rule of Princes.“ See: Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism
in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1), p. 375. However, later, S. attributes
to Demetrius Cydones „Thomist ideas“ within the limited scope of
ecclesiastical union. Ultimately, the reader is simply left in limbo
with respect to Cydones’ intellectual commitments; for even if
222 Christiaan W. Kappes (Universidad de los Hemisferios, Quito)

the theological and philosophical literature until present has

continuously and firmly established Demetrius as a „Thomist,“22 S.
seems unwilling to subscribe to such a thesis, yet he fails to argue
his counter-thesis via reference to primary sources or secondary
literature. Scholars typically apply the epithet „Thomist“ (and
thus „Aristotelian“, by extension) to Cydones from at least three
perspectives. First, Demetrius describes himself as a Thomist.23

some concessions are made to Cydones’ Thomism late in the book,

S. attempts to dilute Cydones’ Thomism (once again) by attribut-
ing Cydones’ Thomistic enthusiasm to pro-Latin political motives.
Op. cit., p. 402. A study of Cydones’ philosophical and theological
thought is badly needed and the recent monograph by J. Ryder, The
Career and Writings of Demetrios Kydones: a Study of Fourteenth-
Century Byzantine Politics, Religion and Society, Leiden-Boston,
2010, does not fill this gap. Still, S. does not seem aware of the dif-
ferent degrees of progress in the research on Cydones (inter alios).
22
See: J.A. Demetracopoulos, „Thomas Aquinas’ Impact...“ (cf. supra,
n. 21), pp. 339–341, 346–347, 352–354.
23
The Emperor John Cantacuzenus had admired ThomasAquinas and
his erudition. Because of Demetrius Cydones’ initial translations,
the emperor even financed the entire translation of the Summa
contra Gentiles. See: N. Russell, „Palamism and the Circle of De-
metrius Cydones“, in: edd. Ch. Dendrinos / J. Harris / I. Harvalia /
J. Herrin, Porphyrogenita. Essays on the History and Literature of
Byzantium and the Latin East in Honour of Julian Chrysostomides,
London 2003, pp. 153–174, at p. 155. However, Demetrius went
so far as to even recommend Thomas to the Emperor Manuel II,
known as an anti-unionist (N.B., the identity of the recipient of the
letter below is not known with absolute certainty, other than being
one of the three emperors that Demetrius served). Demetrius rec-
ommends to the emperor the „Master“ of the Dominicans who he
claims is the apex of theologians and that Thomas has taught only
what is best and greatest in the realm of the things of God. „—ZZĽ
ÐcXc^š[PYP`ú^d[T[\V[ö\^a=h[Ķ
Ð\Ìc^þch\f^`ûaY^`dePŒ^\
ŸSö]Pc^ YPù Ð\ ^×Y ‘\ P»bfd\^ú[V\ YPù [TRúbc^Xa SXSôbYPZ^\
Ÿ[Pdc^š _`^bTX_Ā\
 ^×Y TÁf^\ [÷ c^ýa ŸYTú\^d f^`Tdcóa YPù
eXZTŒ\ YPù P»STŒbWPX YPù _Ķ\ Ø_õ` c^þch\ ZöRTX\ Ð Y‘\ ŸYTŒ\^\
T»_TŒ\Ÿ\ü[XbPZPQü\cPeh\ø\ (Epistle 399, ll. 10–14).“ See: ed. R.-
J. Loenertz, Démétrius Cydonès. Correspondance. Vol. II (“Studi e
Idolizing Paganism – Demonizing Christianity:... 223

Secondly, following the studies of M. Jugie, many of Cydones’

writings have been analyzed by theologians and philosophers
and have been found to utilize Thomistic theses and Scholastic
terminology.24 Finally, Cydones confesses that he was personally
motivated to translate several works of Aquinas and his followers
because of his devotion to the Angelic Doctor and his system.25 Of
course, possible exceptions to a purely „Thomistic“ Cydones could
be flushed out of some of his works, like his De contemnenda
morte26 and his apologetic writings employing the Fathers of the

Testi“, 208), Vatican City, 1960, p. 354. Presuming that this letter is
addressed to Manuel II Palaologos, it may serve as the explanatory
cause for Manuel’s latent uses of Aquinas’ theonymical doctrine in
formulating his own Palamism. See: J.A. Demetracopoulos, „Pala-
mas Transformed. Palamite Interpretations of the Distinction be-
tween God’s ‘Essence’ and ‘Energies’ in Late Byzantium“, in: edd. M.
Hinterberger / C. Schabel, Greeks, Latins, and Intellectual History
1204–1500 („Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales“,
11), Leuven, 2011, pp. 327–341.
24
For example: M. Jugie, „Démétrius Cydonès et la théologie latine
à Byzance aux XIVe et XVe siècles“, Echos d’Orient 27, 1928, pp.
385–402 ; M. Candal, „Demetrio Cidonio y el problema trinitario
palamitico“, Orientalia Christiana Periodica 28, 1962, pp. 76–120;
F. Kianka, „Demetrius Cydones and Thomas Aquinas“, Byzantion
52, 1982, pp. 264–286.
25
A. Glycofrydi-Leontsini, „Demetrius Cydones as a Translator of
Latin Texts“, in: eds. Ch. Dendrinos – J. Harris – I. Harvalia – J.
Herrin, Porphyrogenita. Essays on the History and Literature of
Byzantium and the Latin East in Honour of Julian Chrysostomides,
London, 2003, pp. 175–185. Demetrius, through the emperor’s pa-
tronage, was able to both translate and distribute multiple copies of
his Summa contra Gentiles to both his fellow Byzantine scholars
and his own disciples. In his Apologia pro vita sua he remarked with
a certain degree of legitimate pride: „Thus I provided our learned
scholars with the opportunity to become even more learned“. Dem-
etrius Cydones, Apologia, in: ed. J. L, Ending the Byzantine
Greek Schism, New York, 1992, p. 26.
26
Ed. H. Deckelmann, Demetrii Cydonii De contemnenda morte ora-
tio, Leipzig, 1901. N.B., Even though previous studies have referred
to this minor opus as an example of Platonism, Cydones included
224 Christiaan W. Kappes (Universidad de los Hemisferios, Quito)

Church.27 The former contains Platonic elements in some of its

sections, while the latter argues from the perspective of patristics
and Greek (as well as Latin) authorities.
This incorrect use of a Platonic epithet points to a puzzling
tendency of S. to make use of categories in an unexplained or
confusing fashion. It is highly doubtful, when looking at S.’s passing
descriptions of Aquinas, that S. considers the Angelic Doctor
a „Platonizer.“ Yet –to a considerable degree– Aquinas’ Platonic
pedigree has also been firmly established for over half a century.28
A modern analysis, employing nuance and analyzing Aquinas’
sources, easily recognizes a more complex picture of Aquinas (and
by extension his strictly „Thomistic“ disciples like Cydones).
Like Cydones’ use of occasional Platonic elements, Aquinas
utilizes Platonism frequently within his works. It is undeniable
that fundamental Aristotelian concepts dominate throughout
Aquinas’ works (e.g., unicity of substantial form, matter as
principle of individuation), but there is considerable influence of
Platonists within the Thomistic corpus.29 What is more, Aquinas
(especially in ethics) also makes considerable concessions to
Stoic philosophy, viz., pace Cicero.30 On the contrary, S.’s use

an argument for the immortality of the soul he borrowed from

Aquinas as well as material from Gregory of Nyssa et al. This argu-
ment was subsequently adopted by Plethon and Scholarius. See:
J.A. Demetracopoulos, EZøWh\ YPù =h[Ķa —YdX\ôcVa —_û c÷\
¼bc^`úPc^šQdUP\cX\^šWh[Xb[^š, Athens, 2004, pp. 39–41, 54–59,
165–168.
27
Ed. A. Koltsiou-Nikita, Hû Yš`^a cŮ\ EPcö`h\ cńa ¥YYZVbúPa
AXó\öYS^cVŸ_Xbc^ZXY÷_`PR[PcTúPřJXZ^b^eXY÷YPùWT^Z^RXY÷
7XQZX^WøYVř, 42), Thessaloniki, 2000 (22002).
28
This seminal work is still the most authoritative on the subject. See:
R. Henle, Saint Thomas and Platonism. A Study of the Plato and
Platonici texts in the Writings of Saint Thomas, The Hague, 1956.
29
See: Henle, Saint Thomas and Platonism... (cf. supra, note 29), pp.
7–241. A quick perusal of these passages will easily result in a rather
„nuanced“ approach to Thomas´ attitude to Plato and Platonists.
30
An excellent study of the Stoic elements (inter alia) in Aquinas’ di-
visions of the virtues in his ethics demonstrates this thesis convinc-
Idolizing Paganism – Demonizing Christianity:... 225

of undefined and summary categories (e.g., „Platonizer“) for

personalities like Demetrius Cydones severely limits the reader’s
ability to understand Cydones, while simultaneously leaving the
reader without arguments in support of S.’s alternative view. Quite
a number of S.’s observations that employ metaphysical terms or
philosophical vocabulary requires more justification or a helpful
reference to support his presuppositions.
A second example of this is found where S. makes the
gratuitous assertion:
„As if in a purposeful effort to corroborate the suspicions
of Aquinas [...] that Platonism is the source of all things
heretic[al], Plethon proceeds to a dechristianisation of Plato.“31

In order to investigate this claim, a convenient resource exists

for uncovering each and every one of Aquinas’ references to Plato
and the Platonici. S. assumes that Aquinas held Plato responsible
for being the source of every heresy. This is exaggerated, even

ingly. See: R.E. Houser, The Cardinal Virtues: Thomas, Albert and
Phillip the Chancellor, Toronto, 2004.
31
Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1),
p. 223. Though S. proposes this as Aquinas’ ideology, he provides
the reader with no reference for verification. If the reader
diligently searches for some evidence for this position, one might
suppose S. is referring to his position on p. 17, wherein he notes
Scholarius’ affinity for Aquinas’ arguments „against the Hellenes“
in Scholarius’ epitome of the Summa contre Gentiles. Both Aquinas
and Scholarius associate Arius and Eunomius with theologia
platonica on a particular theological question. In the Summa
contra Gentiles IV,6, Aquinas writes: „Est autem haec positio Arii
et Eunomii. Et videtur a Platonicorum dictis exorta, qui ponebant
summum Deum, patrem et creatorem omnium rerum, a quo pri-
mitus effluxisse dicebant quandam mentem, in qua essent omnium
rerum formae, superiorem omnibus aliis rebus, quam paternum
intellectum nominabant; et post hanc, animam mundi; et deinde
alias creaturas.“ This is something much narrower: it only has to do
with the Trinitarian doctrine, not „all things heretic [sic].“
226 Christiaan W. Kappes (Universidad de los Hemisferios, Quito)

if it approaches more to the truth than the opposite view.32 An

informed study of Aquinas easily uncovers Aquinas’ more critical
utilization and inferior regard of Plato and Platonists (with respect
to Aristotle) in his many works since he often had to „purify“ them
of fundamental philosophical errors. Although Aquinas may reject
many doctrines that he believes are fundamental to Plato and the
Platonists, nonetheless, at times he recognizes Plato’s insights, as
well as those whom he designates „Platonists.“33
In a last example within the vein of Thomism, S. reaches a
startling conclusion toward the end of his book. He writes:
„In the Differences as well as in the Nomoi Plethon challenged
apophaticism and the major proposition shared by Palamas
and Aquinas that god is not in a genus, that the essence of god
is ultimately inaccessible to the human intellect.“34

This amazing assertion betrays the author’s unfamiliarity

with the basic fundaments of Thomistic theology and Thomism’s
historical conflict with Orthodoxy vis-à-vis Palamism. Whereas
God may not be in any metaphysical genus of „being“ for either
Palamas or Aquinas, nonetheless, Aquinas is adamantly convinced
and quite vocal that the human intellect can be capacitated to
see God’s essence via the lumen gloriae.35 After the translation

32
Henle, Saint Thomas and Platonism... (cf. supra, n. 29), pp. 347–
350. Here the author provides the reader with several passages of
Aquinas that clearly distinguish the errors of the pre-Socratics from
Plato. Apparently, Aquinas was quite aware that other philosophers,
irreconcilable with Plato, had contributed to errors in philosophy.
33
Op. cit., pp. 421–425. The author’s conclusions recognize the criti-
cal attitude of Aquinas to some central doctrines of Plato and Pla-
tonists, as well as Aquinas’ utilization of Plato as an authority.
34
Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1), p.
405.
35
J.F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: from
Finite Being to Uncreated Being („Monographs for the Society for
Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy“, 5/1), Washington, D.C.,
2000, p. 541. Instead of providing the numerous clear references to
Thomas’ doctrine, it has been deemed preferable to use a reference
Idolizing Paganism – Demonizing Christianity:... 227

of Aquinas’ Summae into Greek, Palamites made this a point

of contention with Thomists.36 The Council of Florence (1439)
marks a crescendo in the conflict between the Thomistic school’s
assertion that man can see God’s essence and the Palamites’ denial
thereof.37 The Palamites refused to concede this point at the
Council.38 Therefore, a compromise formula had to be adopted to
please the Greek contingent present at Florence.39 Even before the
Council, there already existed a consistent interpretive tradition
of Palamas that pitted Thomism against Palamism precisely on
the point of the visio beatifica.40 So far as the present author is

to Wippel. S. himself utilizes Wippel approvingly as an authority for

his own interpretations of Aquinas. Here, however, Wippel clearly
asserts an interpretation that contradicts S. with regard to Aquinas’
view of the beatific vision. Cf. Summa Theologiae, Ia, qu. 12, art. 6;
De veritate X,12, Quaestiones quodlibetales VII,1. Of course, there
are numerous other works and places for Aquinas’ clear exposition
of the divine essence as the ultimate and direct object of the human
intellect.
36
Scholarius himself omitted references to the lumen gloriae in his
translation-summaries of the Summa contra Gentiles and Summa
Theologiae. This was an accommodation of Aquinas to Palamite
theology and its rejection of a „habitus“ allowing it to „see God’s
essence.“ See: George-Gennadius Scholarius, An Abridgment of the
„Summa contra Gentiles“ III,58 (edd. L. Petit / X.A. Sideridès / M.
Jugie, Oeuvres complètes de Georges Scholarios, Vol. V, Paris, 1931,
p. 150, ll. 35–38; id., An Abridgment of the „Summa Theologiae“, Ia,
qu. 12, art. 1–13 (edd. Id., ibid.), pp. 346–348).
37
Another source cited by S. notes the controversy on divine vision (et
alia) between the Thomists and Palamites. See: J. Gill, The Council
of Florence, Cambridge, 1959 (repr. 2011), pp. 120, 206, 225, 285.
38
Op. cit., pp. 285–286. Gill accurately describes the Thomist-Pala-
mite antipathies (including the visio beatifica).
39
This conflict is ably treated in a study more recent than Gill’s. See:
A. de Halleux, „Bessarion et le palamisme au concile de Florence“,
Irénikon 62, 1989, pp. 307–332.
40
This anti-Thomistic Palamism reached its zenith in Mark Eugenicus’
explicit condemnations of Aquinas’ theological tenets (vis-à-vis
Palamism). See: Mark Eugenicus, On the Distinction between Es-
228 Christiaan W. Kappes (Universidad de los Hemisferios, Quito)

aware, interpretation of the Angelic Doctor on this point has

never wavered, even withstanding Scotist attacks. Scotists
thought it absurd that an accidental quality could be added to the
soul to allow it to see an infinite essence, especially since Thomists
claimed that the only adequate objects of the intellect are created
essences via abstraction.41
Even outside of the context of Thomism, S. seems unaware
of important distinctions that must be made to comprehend
Scholasticism and the diverse Western approaches in theology.
Within S.´s bibliography, one work appears that should have
alerted him to understanding Scholarius’ Scotistic tendencies.
Sebastian Guichardan´s Doct. Diss. (Le problème de la simplicité
divine en Orient et en Occident aux XVe et XVe siècles) is still
useful for illustrating aspects of Scotism’s role in the theology
of Scholarius.42 A quick perusal of its treatment of John Duns

sence and Energy: First Antirrhetic against Manuel Kalekas, ll. 5–7
(ed. M. Pilavakis, On the Distinction between Essence and Energy:
First Antirrhetic against Manuel Kalekas. Editio princeps (Doctoral
Dissertation), London, 1987, p. 187). „D×Sõ\Ÿ_úYcVc^\cŮ\WTúh\
»SXh[ôch\
ŸY[ö\c^XcŮ\_^cTZTb[ôch\
SVZPS÷cŮ\YcXb[ôch\

YPcócóaŸ\T`RTúPacPþcPa
ZZĽ^×YPcĽ^×búP\Ì=TûaÌ`ĶcPX“ In
op. cit., pp. 175–176, Mark explicitly embroils „Latins“ and „Aqui-
nas“ in a theological conspiracy to make the Holy Spirit into a crea-
ture, etc. Aquinas is likewise his enemy in the passage just above
(contra Calecam). Eugenicus had clearly explored Aquinas’ read of
both Ps.-Dionysius and Damascene in Summa Theologiae, Ia, qu.
13, art. 2 and art. 8. He was not impressed by Aquinas’ arguments
that we name the divine attributes from their effects since the hu-
man mind can only process creaturely perfections, which are mul-
tiple, while God himself is an indistinguishable principle. This is
coupled with Mark’s denial of Aquinas’ assertion that the intellect
can see the divine essence.
41
R. Cross, Duns Scotus, New York, 1999, pp. 149–152.
42
S.´s puzzling presentation Thomism must be paired with the nota-
ble absence of discussion of Scotism, for S. cites an important study
on Scotism and Scholarius wthin his work. This published disser-
tation should have alerted S. to the important role of the De ente et
essentia commentary for contextualizing the two subsequent trea-
Idolizing Paganism – Demonizing Christianity:... 229

Scotus would have led to the conclusion that all Scholasticism is

not the same. Furthermore, Scotism is particularly reconcilable to
Palamite sensibilities (with respect to ad intra divine attributes).
M. Jugie had also made this philosophical judgment.43 In effect,
a plurality of distinct energies/attributes within God’s essence
represents a commonality between Scotists and Palamites
(quoddamodo). This calls into question S.’s assertion:
„The principal objection of all major anti-Palamite intellectuals
was that a plurality of divine energies comes dangerously
close to Proclan henotheism while in a sense re-sacralising
the physical world. With one possible exception, Celtic
Christianity, this Hellenic connection was atrophic in the Latin
West.“44

Had S. been aware of Scotism’s (let alone via Guichardan)

basic metaphysical premises, he still would have been able to
claim that „anti-Palamites“ were intellectually opposed to a
metaphysical multiplicity of distinct perfections within the
godhead (since Scotists can interpret this in a manner favorable
to Palamism). However, the rather large and sometimes dominant
medieval school ad mentem Scoti calls into question the „atrophic“
evaluation of Western theology vis-à-vis a „real“ distinction
between God’s essence and energies/attributes.45

tises on the essence-energies question. See: S. Guichardan, Le pro-

blème de la simplicité divine en Orient et en Occident aux XIVe et
XVe siècles: Grégoire Palamas, Duns Scot, Georges Scholarios, Lyon,
1933, pp. 184–199.
43
M. Jugie, Theologia dogmatica christianorum orientalium ab eccle-
sia catholica dissidentium, vol. 2, Paris, 1933, p. 148. Jugie referred
to Scotistic ad intra metaphysics of the godhead as Palamismus in
fieri. Though one minor article of Jugie is cited in S.’s bibliography,
vols. 1 and 2 of this important work are notably missing in S.’s revi-
sion of Plethon and his personality.
44
Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1),
pp. 400–401.
45
Vos spends some time emphasizing the reality of this distinction.
In fact, the entire Franciscan tradition lays claim to priority of the
230 Christiaan W. Kappes (Universidad de los Hemisferios, Quito)

A thorough read of S.’s work raises many doubts concerning

S.´s piecemeal presentation of medieval and Byzantine Scholastic
philosophy. This leads one to the conclusion that S. would have
benefited greatly from at least one medievalist or Scholastic on his
advisory team.

3. The author’s method

for making references to previous studies
Another important consideration of S.’s method is derived
from an occasionally unconventional way of employing footnotes.
S. can sometimes be found asserting a fact in the text and then
footnoting an authority for such an assertion, although the work
cited actually contradicts his point in the text.
For example, S. relies on Paul Tavardon’s dated study on
Scholarius’ and Plethon’s interpretation of Aristotle’s statement
that „being is said in many ways.“46 S. argues that Plethon holds
for the doctrine of „univocity of being“ on the authority of
Tavardon’s study (which itself has problems that other scholars
always mention).47 Then, immediately following this citation, S.
claims that Scholarius argues for „equivocity of being“ in the same

thing over mind, and gives credit to the human mind for having rec-
ognized something that really is distinct in the considered object.
See: A. Vos, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus, Edinburgh, 2008,
p. 255.
46
Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1),
pp. 230–231. Also see: P. Tavardon, „Le conflit de Georges Gémiste
Pléthon et de Georges Scholarios au sujet de l’expression d’Aristote
cûÍ\ZöRTcPX_^ZZPfŮař, Byzantion 47, 1977, pp. 268–278.
47
E.g., S. Ebbesen / J. Pinborg, „Gennadius and Western Scholasti-
cism. Radulphus Brito’s Ars Vetus in Greek Translation“, Classica
et Medievalia 33, 1981–1982, pp. 263–319; J. Monfasani, „The Pro-
Latin Apologetics of the Greek Émigrés to Quattrocento Italy“, in:
ed. A. Rigo, Byzantine Theology and its Philosophical Background
(“Studies in Byzantine History and Civilization“, 4), Turnhout,
2011, pp. 160–186.
Idolizing Paganism – Demonizing Christianity:... 231

breath. S. fails to alert the reader that his assertion of Scholarius’

„equivocity of being“ is polar opposite to Tavardon’s study (which
he just cited as his authority). Tavardon’s study in fact argues
that both Plethon and Scholarius hold doctrines of univocity.48
More precisely, Tavardon attempts to demonstrate that Plethon
and Scholarius hold for univocity of the „concept“ of being. The
effect of this use of authorities confuses the reader into believing
that there is scholarly agreement about Scholarius’ equivocity,
whereas, in reality, Scholarius may have indeed adopted (at least
in the 1430’s) a concept of univocity very close to the one espoused
by John Duns Scotus.49 This is further complicated by the fact that
S. accuses Plethon of pantheism claiming that „all univocity leads
to pantheism.“ In reality, there are at least two kinds of univocity
identified by Tavardon (i.e., Plethonic-pantheistic and Scholarian-
modist/Scholastic). A more thorough study of medieval modism
would even lead to nuances within the camp of „univocity of
the concept of being.“50 Metaphysical univocity may well lead to
pantheism, yet the univocity espoused by many medieval Christian
philosophers and theologians has been convincingly argued to be
free of any such danger. Considerable literature has been written
on the subject since the renewed interest in univocity of being in
the 1930’s until present.51

48
P. Tavardon, „Le conflit de Georges Gémiste Pléthon...“ (cf. supra, n.
47), pp. 268–278.
49
S. Ebbesen, „Concrete Accidental Terms: Late Thirteenth-Century
Debates about Problems Relating to Such Terms as „album““, in:
ed. N. Kretzmann, Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy.
Studies in Memory of Jan Pinborg (“Synthese Historical Library“,
32), Boston, 1998, pp. 107–174, esp. pp. 120–132. This article is
invaluable for comparing the various theories of „univocity“. Es-
pecially pertinent to the present discussion is the comparison be-
tween Radulphus Brito and Duns Scotus’ univocities.
50
Ibid.
51
Parthenius Minges has been recognized as one of the first mod-
ern expositors of Scotus who has attempted to be faithful to the
ipsissima verba of Scotus, despite the lamentable lack of solid
knowledge surrounding Scotus´ authentic corpus at the time. For
232 Christiaan W. Kappes (Universidad de los Hemisferios, Quito)

This important similarity between Plethon and Scholarius is

clearly emphasized and argued in Tavardon’s study. Tavardon was
operating under the false assumption that Scholarius had himself
composed „his“ logical commentaries. However, Scholarius did
not compose, but (for the most part) translated these logical
commentaries from Radulphus Brito. This important point
was unknown to Tavardon and represents a severe limitation to
Tavardon’s study.52 S. seems to be unaware of several limitations
of Tavardon’s study and misuses Tavardon’s main thesis to
contrast Plethon’s univocity to Scholarius’ equivocity. From S.’s
bibliography, one may glean the reason why he is unaware of many
nuances and facets of Scholarius’ thought. Both Ebbesen and
Pinborg’s article, as well as Barbour’s study on Scholarius’ sources
and translations, could have saved S. from misinterpretations

his clear defense of univocity, see: P. Minges, Ioannis Duns Scoti

doctrina philosophica et theologica quoad res praecipuas proposita
et exposita, vol. 1, Ad Claras Aquas, 1930, pp. 22–40. A (now) clas-
sic monograph on univocity followed the work of Minges with: C.
Shircel, The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Philosophy
of John Duns Scotus, Washington, D.C., 1942. However, some of
Shircel’s errors were corrected (passim) in: A. Wolter, The Tran-
scendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus
(“Philosophy Series“, 3), St. Bonaventure, 1946. From this point on,
Wolter –to a large degree– became the apostle of a „Scotistic evan-
gelization“ of the English-speaking philosophic world. His efforts
began to bear significant fruits in the last quarter of the 20th cen-
tury. One such beneficiary of these Scotistic forebearers, A. Vos,
has made it a point to acknowledge Minges as a faithful expositor
of the Subtle Doctor. See: A. Vos, The Philosophy of John Duns Sco-
tus... (cf. supra, n. 46), pp. 120, 565. Lastly, some of Scotus’ philo-
sophic inspiration on this point stems from a cultivation of seedling
beneplacita in Bonaventure’s philosophy. See: E. Bettoni, „Punti di
contatto fra la dottrina bonaventuriana dell’illuminazione e la dott-
rina scotista dell’univocità“, in: Scholastica: ratione historico-critica
instauranda. Acta Congressus Scholastici Internationalis („Biblio-
theca Pontificii Athenaei Antoniani“, 7), Roma, 1951, pp. 517–532.
52
Tavardon also thought that Radulphus was a „Briton“ and not a „Bret-
on.“
Idolizing Paganism – Demonizing Christianity:... 233

of Scholarius’ philosophy and intellectual tendencies.53 It is

most likely that S. misappropriates Scholarius’ two essence-
energies works, written against Latins and Latin theology, for the
Scholarius-Plethon debate due to his unfamiliarity with important
contributions of secondary literature. These grave errors call
into question S.’s efforts to contextualize the real debate between
Plethon and Scholarius. The result of such a trajectory in Radical
Platonism in Byzantium is to undermine a reader’s confidence in
any conclusions or observations that S. may have about the nature
of the Plethon-Scholarius debate.

4. Methodological considerations
with respect to the relaton between
primary and relevant secondary literature
Within the narrative driven by S., Scholarius’ two essence-
energies treatises are presented as works against Plethon and are
implicated as being a reaction against humanism-paganism.54 This,
of course, puzzles the reader since S. seems intent on designating
Byzantine humanists as crypto-pagans (or at least unconscious
bearers of paganism).55 From the very first chapters of the book this
thesis is developed to some extent, but it conveniently ignores any
in-depth treatment of personalities like Photius of Constantinople
(and later Mark Eugenicus). Both are considered humanists and,
simultaneously, pillars of Orthodoxy.56 In a section dedicated

53
Viz., Ebbesen / Pinborg, „Gennadius and Western Scholasticism...“
(cf. supra, n. 48); H. Barbour, The Byzantine Thomism of Gennadios
Scholarios and His Translation of the Commentary of Armandus
de Bellovisu on the „De Ente et Essentia“ of Thomas Aquinas (“Studi
Tomistici“, 53), Vatican City, 1996.
54
Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1),
pp. 230–247.
55
Op. cit., pp. 64–66, 400–401.
56
S. omits such a discussion, though he approves and is aware of Pod-
skalsky’s work on this exact subject. Podskalsky firmly places Pho-
234 Christiaan W. Kappes (Universidad de los Hemisferios, Quito)

to humanism, S. gives the reader the idea that humanism and

Platonic study were trends that went against the grain of the entire
ecclesiastical establishment during Photius’ time. However, S. fails
to resolve for the reader how Photius can be both a humanist and
the leading figure of the ecclesiastical establishment within the
same period without being at war with himself.57 The position of
Photius (and, later, Mark Eugenicus) within S.’s categorical division
of Byzantine intellectuals into conscious or unconscious crypto-
pagans (i.e., humanists), Palamites, and Thomists leaves some
important figures in Byzantium in the position of intellectual exiles.
Furthermore, S.’s belief in the anti-Plethonic nature of
Scholarius’ two essence-energies treatises is a lesson to the scholar
on the important role that secondary literature can play when
writing a book that (meritoriously) prefers primary sources for the
bulk of its discussion. No doubt S. has a solid grasp of the Greek
language and a specialization in Platonism. However, he is seemingly
unaware of the role that Scholarius’ translation-commentary De
ente et essentia (especially chapters 94–95) plays in the genesis of
the two essence-energies treatises. This translation-commentary
(1445) predates the two essence-energies treatises, and has been

tius, Mark Eugenicus, and George-Gennadius Scholarius within

the humanist camp. See: G. Podskalsky, Von Photios zu Bessarion:
der Vorrang humanistisch geprägter Theologie in Byzanz und deren
bleibende Bedeutung („Schriften zur Geistesgeschichte des östli-
chen Europa“, 25), Wiesbaden, 2003, pp. 16–18.
57
Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1),
pp. 64–65. S.’s only effort to contextualize Photius’ positive and/or
negative contribution to his theory happens when he notes one his-
torical episode from Photius’ life, wherein he converts a wayward
humanist by appeal to Aristotle. From this, should one understand
that Photius was an „Aristotelian“ with a disdain for Plato and (neo)
Platonists? Photius, too, is a more complicated figure; for he seems
to have argued staunchly against the philosophical sustainability of
Platonic „ideas“ as well as against the Aristotelian „forms“ and opt-
ed for the Stoic „conceptualist“ views of universals. See B.N. Tata-
kis, Byzantine Philosophy (La philosophie byzantine, Paris, 11949),
translation by N. Moutafakis, Indianapolis, 22003, pp. 101–105.
Idolizing Paganism – Demonizing Christianity:... 235

amply explored by H. Barbour in the mid-1990’s. A perusal of this

monograph would key the reader into the chapter where Thomism
explicitly inspired Scholarius to plan to write a treatise on the
essence-energies question due to Armandus of Bellovisu’s (and
other Thomists’) theory of ‘second intentions’ in metaphysical
logic.58 Scholarius alludes to the fact that Thomism’s theory of
‘second intentions’ and the divine attributes are suspect as being
„Akindynist“ and that Thomas may even deserve the appellation
„Barlaamite.“ This is hardly new, for some aspects of this Palamite
accusation against Aquinas, per S. Salaville, had already been noted
as early as the 1920’s.59 Barbour has more recently discovered the
source text for Scholarius’ worries about Thomistic metaphysical
logic in Armandus’ commentary on the De ente et essentia that led
to his two additional treatises.60 Even excluding the translation of
Armandus’ De ente et essentia commentary, in Scholarius’ later
essence-energies treatises, he explicitly condemns „Barlaamites,“
„Akindinysts,“ and „Latin-thinkers“ (with no mention of Plethon
or pagans).61 Scholarius even explicitly cites Mark Eugenicus’

58
See: George-Gennadius Scholarius, Commentary on Aquinas’ „De
ente et essentia“ (edd. L. Petit / X.A. Sideridès / M. Jugie, Oeuvres
complètes de Georges Scholarios, Vol. VI, Paris, 1933, p. 283, ll.
3–19). The De ente et essentia commentary was also studied in
detail by another of S.’s bibliographical references, well before
Barbour. Guichardan draws attention to ch. 94 as well. See: Guich-
ardan, Le problème de la simplicité divine... (cf. supra, n. 43), pp.
190–195.
59
S. Salaville, „Un thomiste à Byzance au XVe s.: Gennade Schola-
rios“, Echos d’Orient 23, 1924, pp. 129–136.
60
Here, Scholarius explicitly predicts the possibility of writing a fu-
ture treatise on second intentions. See: Scholarius, Commentary
De ente et essentia, (cf. supra, n. 59), p. 285. „?PùcPšcP[õ\`YTú!
ch
cüRT\š\£f^\
bcT\ŮacTT»`V[ö\PäaŸ\ŸYS`^[ŅYPù_Z^þ!
bcT`ü\_ha
äa‘\_ZTú^bX\£YSVZPT¿V¥\»SúĴSõ_`PR[PcTúĴ_T`ù
c^þch\
 ‘\ Ì =Tûa WöZł
 Ÿ[QPWd\^š[T\ ců UVcø[PcX c^þcŬ
 YPù
ÐbPSTŒ_T`ùP×c^š\Xf\Tþb^[T\
YPWÿa‘\cüWĽ¬[Œ\Ÿ[_\TdbWTúV
K^[[T\cP`g^\cVT»9TT\cTTcTbbT\cXP“ XCIV, p. 285, ll. 18–22).“
61
See: George-Gennadius Scholarius in his Against the Partisans of
Acindynus: à propos a passage of Theodore Graptos (edd. L. Petit /
236 Christiaan W. Kappes (Universidad de los Hemisferios, Quito)

treatise against Manuel Calecas (and Thomas Aquinas) as one of

his inspirations for his first essence-energies treatise. Scholarius
further argues based on his own Scholastic theory of second
intentions (which he mentions in the De ente et essentia and his
first and second essence-energies treatise)62 within the realm of
metaphysical logic. There is no room in these treatises for anti-
Plethon apologetics or themes. Instead, they are directed toward
anti-Palamites ad mentem Thomae.

5. Observations on the author’s arguments

and appeal to authorities
Sometimes in S.’s work, it is difficult to understand the
philosophical commitments and perspectives that lead to his
conclusions. For example, in the medieval philosophical world
(as well as the Byzantine), there are different philosophical and
theological tenets espoused by different thinkers for what does
and does not violate divine simplicity.63 S.’s narrative assumes that
Palamas „violated“ divine simplicity. He writes:
„More evidence is apt here. According to Palamas, Akindynos
taught that god possesses no energies but is pure divine
essence. He merely is (TX\PX), which means that god’s will
is indistinguishable from his real essence. The inescapable
conclusion is that the Palamite distinction between energies

X.A. Sideridès / M. Jugie, Oeuvres complètes de Georges Scholarios,

Vol. III, Paris, 1930, p. 212, ll. 7–17).
62
See: id., Commentary on Aquinas’ „De ente et essentia“ (cf. supra, n.
59), p. , ll. 6–7; id., Against the Partisans of Acindynus: à propos
a passage of Theodore Graptos (cf. supra, n. 62), p. 212, ll. 25–26;
id., On the Distinction between the Essence and Its Operations (edd.
L. Petit / X.A. Sideridès / M. Jugie, Oeuvres complètes de Georges
Scholarios, Vol. III, Paris, 1930, p. 230, ll. 9–10).
63
Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1), p.
266.
Idolizing Paganism – Demonizing Christianity:... 237

and essence in god hopelessly compromised divine simplicity

and purity.“64

It may be that Palamas compromised divine simplicity, but the

reader is left in the dark as to whether S.’s evaluation of Palamas
springs from Platonic, Aristotelian, Thomistic, Scotistic or
contemporary philosophical principles being applied to Palamas’
theology. An Orthodox Christian could object to S.’s critique based
upon theological tenets that liberate the Christian from pagan
philosophy; for –among the Seven Ecumenical Councils– no
Aristotelian or Platonic definition of „divine simplicity“ has ever
been imposed on the Christian Church. A Latin Christian, like
Bonaventure and Scotus, would also reject Aristotle’s simplicity
criterion. Yet, both mutually opposed camps of Christians still
thought of God as super-simple, though with meaningful and
(with the latter) formally distinct attributes.65 It is unclear from
what perspective S. levels his accusation against Palamas for his
„theological crime“; for S. inserts his opinion into the middle of
a description of Palamas’ and Akindynos’ arguments against one
another without opting for one or the other side.66 This leaves
the impression that S. is an objective observer making his own
evaluation based on some criterion to which both Akindynus and

64
Ibid.
65
The roots of Duns Scotus’ formal distinction have already been dis-
covered (for some time) to be traceable to Bonaventure, the doc-
tor of the Franciscan Order. T. Svabó, „De distinctionis formalis
origine bonaventuriana disquisitio historico-critica“, in: Scholas-
tica ratione historico-critica instauranda. Acta Congressus Scho-
lastici Internationalis (“Bibliotheca Pontificii Athenaei Antoniani“,
7), Rome, 1951, pp. 380–445.
66
This phenomenonoccurs repeatedly, as already mentioned above. See:
Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1), p.
405. These tendencies are all the more interesting since S. seems to
reject the possibility of such „perspectivism“ in his critique of schol-
arship (pace J. Ryder). There he seems to advocate „taking sides“.
However, it is not clear whose side S. is taking contra Palamam
here. See: Id., Book-review: „Judith R. Ryder, The Career and Writ-
ings of Demetrius Kydones...“ (cf. supra, n. 18), pp. 1248–1250.
238 Christiaan W. Kappes (Universidad de los Hemisferios, Quito)

Palamas are not privy. However, the reader is never clued into what
philosophical principle guides S.’s own evaluation.

6. Observations
on the revisonist history of Plethon
The reader may reasonably ask whether or not this review
will engage the main thesis of the author in detail. Unfortunately,
the answer must be in the negative. Due to the wide range of
deficiencies in S.’s approach to his revisionist history of Gemistos
Plethon, it is doubtful that he can accomplish the colossal task of
deciphering both the context and content of Plethon’s thought
(let alone his attempts to connect Plethon to modern and
contemporary philosophers).
This last section will illustrate clearly why this review must
continue to limit itself to methodological concerns about S.’s
approach to the question of Plethon and his role in Byzantium.
Though S.’s work does recognize (to a limited degree) some ways
in which Plethon is dependent on his intellectual predecessor,
Michael Psellos, S. seems generally uninterested in integrating
known late Byzantine sources for Plethon’s literary production into
his synthesis of all previous scholarly work in order to enunciate
his revisionist historical conclusions.67
One outstanding illustration of this fact will be sufficient
to alert the reader to be wary of the necessarily incomplete and
haphazard nature of S.’s revisionist conclusions due to his tendency

67
There are only a total of five pages of the entire work dedicated
to Psellos’ relationship with Plethon. This seems incredibly mod-
est, especially given the discoveries of Plethon’s dependencies
on Psellus in modern scholarship. For a good example noting
Plethon´s textual dependence on Psellos, see: L. Brisson, „Pléthon
et les Oracles Chaldaïques“, in: eds. M. Cacouros / M.-H. Congour-
deau, Philosophie et sciences à Byzance de 1204 à 1453 (“Orientalia
Lovaniensia Analecta“, 146), Leuven, 2006, pp. 127–142.
Idolizing Paganism – Demonizing Christianity:... 239

to ignore known sources and important influences for Plethon’s

theological and philosophical production.
S.’s work cites an important monograph, which is essential
for understanding Plethon’s own approach to philosophy and
theology. This study has recently provided Byzantine scholars
with solid evidence demonstrating Plethon’s own reliance on
Thomas Aquinas for important aspects of his own intellectual
production.68 Numerous extracts from Thomas’s Summae were
lifted by Plethon only to be incorporated into his theological vision.
Demetracopoulos argues that Plethon has a discernible method
for employing these extracts within his writings.69 In a fascinating
example of Plethon’s Thomistic bent, Demetracopoulos uncovers
Plethon’s manner of arranging the four cardinal virtues ad
sentetiam Thomae, drawing his inspiration directly from the
Summa Theologiae.70 It comes as quite a surprise, even to the
specialist, that Plethon was a „Thomist,“ albeit in a very bizarre
(and admittedly limited) way. That Plethon would side with
Aquinas’ own approach to understanding some aspects of ethics
is quite significant. This should immediately raise questions as to
how much influence Demetrius Cydones and Thomas Aquinas
both had on Plethon’s ethical theory.
However, in S.’s historical revision of Plethon’s character
and role in Byzantium, there is no real attempt to contextualize
or evaluate Aquinas’ role in Plethon’s thought.71 Not only does

68
Demetracopoulos, EZøWh\ YPù =h[Ķa —YdX\ôcVa (cf. supra, n.
27), pp. 49–68.
69
Ironically, Demetracopoulos noted that in Woodhouse´s scho-
larly work on Plethon (cf. supra, n. 17), he was correct to note the
genuine influence that Thomas´ Summae had on late Byzantine
thought. Unfortunately, Woodhouse had not noticed that his own
observation was especially pertinent with respect to Plethon. This
correction of Woodhouse´s oversight must have been missed by
S.´s reading Demetracopoulos´ work on the matter. See: Demetra-
copoulos, EZøWh\YPù=h[Ķa—YdX\ôcVa... (cf. supra, n. 27), p. 49.
70
Op. cit., pp. 41–43.
71
Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1),
pp. 99, 268.
240 Christiaan W. Kappes (Universidad de los Hemisferios, Quito)

Chapter Three of EZøWh\YPù=h[Ķa—YdX\ôcVa provide dozens

of pages where Plethon adopts Thomism, but its Appendix II
provides another dozen or so pages of Plethon’s works in which
extracts were lifted from Aquinas’ Summae.72 Though S. makes
a reference to Demetracopoulos’ study in his lengthy tome, the
reader has no idea what real content and discovery lie hidden
among the pages of that study. With respect to this same
monograph, the modern reader would encounter real obstacles to
consult this study on his own, for it is only limitedly available and,
at that, only in Modern Greek. Still, there is a very useful 66-page
long English abridgement of the monograph available. 73 S. does
once make reference to his own perusal of this important study
listed in his bibliography.74 That Plethon´s Thomism fails to be
considered in the historical revision of the personality and role
of Plethon in Byzantium is really unfathomable. This also draws
attention, once again, to the puzzling use of footnotes in S.’s work.
Any scholar who confronts Plethon’s Thomism will certainly have
to spill a considerable amount of ink explaining what effect this
eclecticism has on categorizing Plethon as both a philosopher and
a theologian. One will simply look in vain within S.’s revision of the
intellectual character of Plethon to find any indication of what role
this Thomist aspect of Plethon’s thought plays in his worldview.
Given this deficient approach to Plethon´s sources and
thought, it remains to be seen how much of Plethon´s Platonism
reflects a direct dependence on Plato and „Neoplatonists.“ Much
of what Plethon has to say come from indirect citations made

72
Demetracopoulos, EZøWh\YPù=h[Ķa—YdX\ôcVa... (cf. supra, n.
27), pp. 145–168.
73
See: Id., „Georgios Gemistos-Plethon’s Dependence on Thomas
Aquinas’ Summa contra Gentiles and Summa Theologiae“, Archiv
für mittelalterliche Philosophie und Kultur 12, 2006, pp. 276–341.
74
S. is non committal to whether or not Plethon is significantly in-
fluenced by Aquinas. He ignores Demetracopoulos’ main thesis
and merely alerts the reader that Demetracopoulos suggests that
Plethon may have been influenced by an anti-Palamite theologian,
John Kyparissiotis. See: Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzan-
tium... (cf. supra, n. 1), p. 268.
Idolizing Paganism – Demonizing Christianity:... 241

from late Byzantine authors or even Latin authors’ utilization of

Neoplatonists within their opera (e.g., Aquinas). S.’s advisory team
was undoubtedly useful for confirming S.’s suspicions of possible
links between Plethon and the Hellenic past. Still, this is simply
not sufficient for a thorough treatment of a Byzantine author who
has already been shown to be dependent on ex professo Christian
authors, who themselves adopted Platonic elements in their
pursuit of knowledge and exposition of wisdom.

7. Conclusions
Undoubtedly, S. makes many insightful suggestions of
potential Platonic and Neoplatonic influences within the works
of various Byzantine writers that he investigates within Radical
Platonism in Byzantium. The present author appreciated all of
S.’s attempts to maximize Platonic readings of the 14th and 15th
century Byzantine authors. Had S. limited his project to just that,
he might have been able to accomplish a more modest task within
the limits of his expertise. Instead, S.´s attempted tour de force –
spanning the entire history of Byzantine philosophy and theology
and beyond– has, perhaps, exposed him to unfamiliar themes
in late Byzantine studies. Furthermore, his occasional ventures
into the realm of Scholasticism also betray lack of familiarity
with another very specialized –and difficult to master– field. In
such cases, it always benefits a neophyte to rely on advice and
critiques from scholars operating within any realm of study new
to a researcher. By relying on academic peers within the new field
of study, an author can avoid many an embarrassing mistake and
misinterpretation of sources or major lacunae with respect to
secondary literature.
If a reader attempts to engage S.´s work he will encounter
an author with many interests. S. engages his reader through
the optic of (neo)Platonism, metaphysics, history of medieval
philosophy, Byzantine history and theology, modern and
contemporary philosophy (e.g., Spinoza and Levinas), and more.
However, if the reader wishes to limit his interests to Plethon and
242 Christiaan W. Kappes (Universidad de los Hemisferios, Quito)

his thought and immediate influence, a reader would still do well

to concern himself first with Masai´s classic text and follow up
with Woodhouse´s more recent work on Plethon.75 Now, an even
more recent monograph is available by Brigitte Tambrun.76 One
would expect that her approach to Plethon would be satisfactory
for a scholar with S.’s views; for she fully recognizes Plethon’s anti-
Christian spirit and sincere adherence to Plato. She, furthermore,
argues at length for Plethon’s optimistic and cataphatic theology.
All the same, her research into Plethon’s thought does not occupy
the place it deserves in S.’s reconstruction of Plethon’s thought. In
fact, granted that both of their readings of Plethon harmonize on
many points, S. fails to provide his reader with any new views or
substantial development of his intellectual predecessor’s thought.
Until S.´s basic methodological approach is adjusted, it will simply
not be able to contend with these well established works as a
standard text for understanding the life, thought, and significance
of Plethon´s intellectual production in Byzantium.
As a last point, it may be helpful to draw attention to an
observation of a contemporary philosopher, who was also cited with
approval by S. Karl Popper’s critique (and attempted corrective)
of modern science, as well as its methods for theorizing, argues
the validity of an important axiom.77 The same is also useful for
evaluating S.´s ambitious project. Popper reminds the scientific
community repeatedly that the probability of falsification of
a scientific theory proportionally increases as more complex
versions of the theory seek to explain more and more puzzles.
In other words, the more expansive the theory is, the greater the
statistical probability that it will fail (i.e., falsification). This is
especially the case for all-encompassing theories built on series of

75
Scil., F. Masai, Pléthon et le platonisme de Mistra, Paris, 1956; C.M.
Woodhouse, George Gemistos Plethon... (cf. supra, n. 17).
76
Scil., B. Tambrun, Pléthon: le retour de Platon, Paris, 2006. This
work represents the culmination of her research from the 1980’s
until 2006.
77
K.R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific
Knowledge, London, 1962 (72002).
Idolizing Paganism – Demonizing Christianity:... 243

unproven hypotheses. As such, a modest theory (distasteful as it

may be) establishes the safest path for the scientist to be successful.
In a similar vein, the attraction of S.´s grand theory is that such
a theory claims for itself the capacity to answer all major questions
and to impose order on intellectual figures, complex movements,
and history itself (pace paganism and its clash with Palamism in
Byzantium, paganism’s culmination in the figure of Plethon as the
precursor to Spinoza, etc.). The weakness of S.´s theory (after the
fashion of Hegelianism) is that S.’s a priori points of departure
inherently risk ignoring any anomalies incommensurate with S.’s
pre-established categories. Furthermore, a posteriori disciplines,
which require a method of reducing a very complex and messy
set of data either to a fewer set of probable principles or to likely
causes, can play only a tangential or auxiliary role (at best) to
confirm S.’s paradigms. It is the present author’s opinion that, in
contingent matters like history, disciplines that favor a genetic
and historical method to catalogue the history of philosophy are
far better equipped than an ingenious philosophy of history78 to
produce a study of perennial value for both the enthusiast and
specialist on Byzantine studies and other related fields.79

78
This criticism was also proferred by A. Johnson, when reviewing S.’s
work on Theodoret. See: http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2009/2009–
05–05.html (access 2013). Among the reviewer’s personal com-
ments, he draws attention to the fact that S. is more of a philoso-
pher than a historian. He also correctly identifies S.’s polemically
charged arguments against Christian authors on behalf of pagans.
In a similar way, Radical Platonism in Byantium is likewise „phil-
osophical“ in nature and tends to belie its objective investigation
with the same polemical spirit and equally one-sided readings of
the sources.
79
I would sincerely like to thanks Mrs. Carol Kappes and Rev. Dr.
Peter Damian Fehlner, FI, for their suggested corrections.