Madhulika Chebrol

B.A. Phil & History (final year)

Miranda House
Delhi University
Syādvāda
Syādvāda, the ancient Jaina concept of conditional judgment, argues for the relativity of knowledge, i.e.
knowledge is varied and no single opinion or aspect of knowledge can constitute it in its entirety. As
Hiriyanna puts it, ‘It signifies that the universe can be looked at from many points of view and that each
view-point yields a different conclusion.’1 This is explained in the famous analogy of the six blind men
and the elephant, wherein the group decides that each blind man should feel one part of the elephant to
learn what the animal is like and find that, comparing results, their impressions are completely discordant.
Although syādvāda is a part of Jaina thought, syādvāda can also be applied to modern ethical dilemmas
outside of Jaina religiosity and doctrines. This essay is an attempt at understanding the concept of
syādvāda and its modern ethical ramifications.

The Jaina theory of knowledge proceeds largely from their concept of indetermination/manifoldness of
reality and universe, i.e. anekāntavāda, which is beyond the scope of the present work but must be
touched upon in order to explain the concept of syādvāda that succeeds it in logical sequence. The theory
of anekāntavāda repudiates the notion of a concrete universe or reality, thus nullifying the notion of an
absolute truth or absolute knowledge. According to anekāntavāda, the universe operates distinctly in and
of itself, independent from our mental perception and, hence, we cannot, on the basis of our perception,
conceptualize the entire reality in its manifoldness. According to this theory, the world operates on the
basis of five aspects or ‘reals’; matter (pudgala), space (ākāśa), time (kāla), Medium of motion (dharma)
and medium of rest (adharma), along with the mental world of infinite souls. To arrive at the ‘real’, then,
one would have to understand it viz. all that constitutes it. Only then can ‘real’ be defined. Thus, as
Mookerjee2 puts it, ‘there is not only diversity…, but each real is equally diversified.’ This is the central
metaphysic of Jainism which Hiriyanna3 elaborates with an example; ‘the atoms, according to it (Jainism)
are all of the same kind, but they can yet give rise to the infinite variety of things so that matter as
considered here is of quite an indefinite nature.’

Anekāntavāda proposes the interrelatedness of all ‘reals’ in the universe which in turn are ‘causally
efficient’. Kantian ‘reciprocity’ is intrinsically included in the ‘realism’ of Jainism. Each premise of the
central thesis of Jainism (i.e. anekāntavāda) logically follows from the previous as; the manifoldness of
the universe implies independence of consciousness and the world (a doctrine antithetical of the
absolutism of Advaita Vedanta), from which follows pluralism and the interrelatedness of all factors

1
M. Hiriyanna- Outlines of Indian Philosophy, page 163
2
S. Mookerjee - The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism, page 68
3
M. Hiriyanna - Outlines of Indian Philosophy, page 162
contributing to each aspect of the Universe. Thus, anekāntavāda is considered the most consistent system
of realism in Indian Philosophy.

Having briefly understood the central presumption of Jaina philosophy, we can move to the two
consequent part of this philosophy that logically follow; Naya and syādvāda. The Nayas (points of view
or partial explanations of truth) form the other side of the coin to syādvāda (dialectic of conditional
predication). Where syādvāda focuses on a systematic method of arriving at the truth, Naya elaborates on
the ‘half-truths’ or prepositions that form the complex truth. Thus, while Naya provides the analyses,
syādvāda focuses on the synthesis.

Syādvāda and saptabhaṅgī naya4, used almost synonymously, use seven different postulations of
judgment in discriminating the nature of a thing. Jainas insist that every proposition is a syād, a ‘maybe’.
Thus, according to syādvāda, a proposition, whether affirmative, negative or both; simple or complex,
depicts only one aspect of the truth of a thing. Full truth requires a synthesis of a veritable grid work of
such propositions. Each proposition, then, is only relative to the other propositions which form the truth.
Syādvāda offers this schema or grid, which in its variety of propositions, alternative and exclusive to each
other; offer an elaborate understanding of reality. As Dasgupta summarizes ‘There is no universal or
absolute position or negation, and all judgments are valid only conditionally’ 5. Padmarajiah terms it the
‘conjunctive dialectic’6of Anekāntavāda.

Syādvāda’s seven precepts are elaborated as follows:

1. Syad-asti: in a certain sense, it is

2. Syad-nasti, in a certain sense, it is not;
3. Syad-asti-nasti, in a certain sense, it is and it is not;
4. Syad-avaktavya in a certain sense, it is indescribable;
5. Syad-asti-avaktavya, in a certain sense, it is and is indescribable;
6. Syad-nasti-avaktavya, in a certain sense,, it is not and is indescribable, and
7. Syad-asti-nasti-avaktavya, in a certain sense, it is and is not and is indescribable.

This can be explained with an example. Supposing that the object being discussed here is a jar, one person
may say that the jar is here and another, who has a different conception of what a jar looks like, may
negate it by saying that it is not here. Alternatively, supposing the first person meant that the jar is in this
location, the other meant that it is not in the location he thought it was in. So for the first, the jar is here,
and for the other it is not here. The first two propositions, thus, logically combine into the third; the jar is
4
Syādvāda and saptabhaṅgī naya are often used interchangeably. Where syādvāda is the theory, saptabhaṅgī naya
allows for its practical application through the seven conditional viewpoints. Scholars differentiate between them on
the basis of etymology. However, for the purpose of philosophy both are the same.
5
S. N. Dasgupta – A History of Indian Philosophy Volume I, page 181
6
Y. J. Padmarajiah - A Comparative Study of the Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge, page 102
here and the jar is not here. It is important to understand, here, that this proposition is not a contradiction
simply because the jar is being talked about from different angles. Any single proposition only grasps one
aspect of it. Then, logically, the jar is indescribable, simply because there are far too many angles to the
same concept which cannot be expressed in words. The existence of the jar is inexplicable and indefinite.
The other postulations are a mere series in probability. The jar may exist but be indefinite, it may not exist
and be indefinite and it may be, not be and be indefinite. Like the example of the blind men and the
elephant, the truth may differ, only coming together when all the seven angles are taken together. These
seven postulates, when taken together comprise the whole truth. Once we examine anything from all
seven aspects, we are closer to knowing the truth about it.

Thus, Jaina philosophy strikes a balance between two extreme views. Its relationship with other Indian
Philosophical thought is as a ‘half-way’ house between Vedanta (which argues for an absolute singular
truth) and Buddhism (which presents the view that all things are relative). In its negation of absolutism
and dogma, syādvāda paves the way for a method of systematic discrimination. All truth is relative but
understanding all aspects of the truth brings us closer to true knowledge. No single proposition or aspect
of truth is complete in and of itself.

This core Jaina philosophy has been criticized on many grounds, chiefly by Advaita schools. Sankara
comments, ‘As thus the means of knowledge; the knowing subject, and the act of knowledge are all alike,
indefinite, how can the tīrthaṅkara (Jaina) teach with any claim to authority and how can his followers act
on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether indeterminate?’ The philosophy has also been criticized as
containing ‘half-truths’ lacking in proper synthesis. According to Hiriyanna, ‘It is all right so far as it
cautions against one-sided conclusions but it leaves us in the end…with little more than one-sided
solutions.’ Syādvāda animosity towards absolutism has also been used to undermine its validity. Other
critics consider it a variety of skepticism, while Bādarāyaṇa (c. 1st century CE) contends that, if all
knowledge concerning reality is relative, the Jaina view must also be relative.

In answering these criticisms, Jainas reiterate that reality is not as continuous or as ethereal as theorists
make it. In the real world, absolute concepts rarely hold meaning and, in that, syādvāda provides for a
system of discriminating unity rather than a dogma that cannot be proven or synthesized. It takes the here-
and-now approach rather than recourse to the Ultimate which cannot be defined. It reconciles differences
between varying views and, in doing so, is requisitely lacking in synthesis to avoid any absolutist dogma.

Against the charge of skepticism, the Jaina replies that skepticism implies that real knowledge cannot be
attained. However, syādvāda merely contends that knowledge is multifaceted and cannot be
comprehended in one paradigm. Radhakrishnan defends syādvāda in his statement that syādvāda is ‘a
conceptual system in which the presence and interrelation of many concepts is specially provided for.’
Regardless of criticism, the implications of syādvāda in Jaina ethics are irrefutable. It forms the basis for
their concept of ahimsā (non-violence). Since, according to this theory, all aspects of reality are
interrelated, all forms of life are interconnected and, thus, ahimsā is nothing but empathetic relations with
others, mindful of the diversity of another person’s concept of reality. It calls for a broader understanding
of another’s point of view and focuses on harmonious living. Since no single point of view is accurate by
itself, other’s opinion must be respected and correlated to our own. The self-flattering habit of supposing
that one’s own mind is superior to all others is apprehended admirably by the realism of syādvāda.

Even outside the paradigm of Jaina beliefs, syādvāda holds true. The ‘point of view’ approach of
syādvāda can be extended to ethical questions as well as cross-cultural relations, even though it was
conceived only as a means of reconciling sects. In broad ethical concepts, its applicability can be better
understood with the help of an example. Supposing that the initial proposition is that ‘Killing is a Sin’,
applying the seven dialectics of syādvāda, the postulates become;

1. In some ways, killing is a sin. (i.e. in certain circumstances killing is wrong) (syād-asti)
2. In some ways, killing is not a sin. (i.e. killing is permitted in certain circumstances, such as in war
and in self defence) (syān-nāsti)
3. In some ways, killing is a sin and it is not a sin. (i.e. killing is a not a sin in hunting for livelihood
but it is not right either) (syād-asti-nāsti)
4. In some ways, killing is indescribable. (i.e. it is difficult to define whether killing is a sin or not; it
cannot be expressed in simple terms. This follows logically from the first two propositions)
5. In some ways, killing is a sin and is indescribable. (i.e. in some situations killing is a sin but it is
indefinite whether this is so; in capital punishment, the state kills and offender but it is hard to tell
whether it is a Sin to do so.)
6. In some ways, killing is not a sin and is indescribable. (i.e. in some situations killing is not a sin
but it is indefinite; if a person is shot by accident, for example, the shooter has committed a
wrong but there was no intent and it is hard to tell whether he has sinned.)
7. In some ways, in some ways killing is a sin, is not a sin and is indescribable (this follows
logically from the ambiguity of 5 and 6.)
Combining all the above postulates, we are closer to understanding whether killing is a sin or not.

Thus, Syādvāda, by insisting on conditionality of judgment, offers scope for compassionate relationships
and broader universal cooperation. Even outside Jaina religiosity, syādvāda holds true for ethical debates,
proposing a system for analysis that takes a comprehensive approach to a situation.