CITY OF MANILA VS.

CHINESE COMMUNITY
[40 Phil 349; No. 14355; 31 Oct 1919]

Facts: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the conversion into an ex-
tension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in the said portion of the private
cemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.

Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were available. They further
claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and
interested in the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed.

The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein
assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine
the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation.

Held:

The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the
purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must
comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to
exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or
entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts
have the right to inquire to.

REPUBLIC VS. PLDT

[26 SCRA 320; G.R. No. L-18841; 27 Jan 1969]

Facts:

The plaintiff Republic of the Philippines is a political entity exercising government powers through one of its branches, the Bureau of
Telecommunication. Herein defendant, PLDT is a public service corporation holding a franchise to install operates and maintains a
telephone system. After its creation, the BOT set up its own government telephone system by utilizing its own appropriations and
other equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable the govt offices to call privately. BOT entered into an
agreement with the RCA communications for joint overseas telephone service whereby BOT would convey overseas calls received
by RCA to local residents. PLDT complained to the BOT that it was a violation of the condition of their agreement since the BOT had
used trunk lines only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public in competition with
the business of PLDT. Subsequently, the plaintiff commenced suit against PLDT asking the court judgment be rendered ordering the
PLDT to execute a contract with the plaintiff, through the BOT for the use of the facilities of PLDT's telephone system throughout the
country under such conditions as the court may consider reasonable. The CFI rendered judgment stating that it could not compel
PLDT to enter into such agreement. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or Not PLDT may be compelled to enter into such agreement.

Held:

Yes, the state, may, in the interest of national welfare transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there
is no reason why the state ma not require a public utility to render services in the general interest provided just compensation is
paid.

PEOPLE VS. FAJARDO

[104 Phil 443; G.R. No. L-12172; 29 Aug 1958]

Facts:

The municipal council of baao, camarines sur stating among others that construction of a building, which will destroy the view of the
plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed at the expense of the owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant filed a
written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel
of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The re-
quest was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza.
Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the mayor turned down the request. Whereupon, appellants pro-
ceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former
house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property. Thereafter, defendants were
charged in violation of the ordinance and subsequently convicted. Hence this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or Not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.

Held:

No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently de-
prive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of
appellant’s property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of
neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents.

As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned
under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with

REPUBLIC VS. CASTELVI

[58 SCRA 336; G.R. No. L-20620; 15 Aug 1974]

Facts:

In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease agreement with Castelvi on a year-to-
year basis. When Castelvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding
against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in question.

Issue:

Whether or Not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that the “taking” should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just compensation should not be determined
on the basis of the value of the property as of that year.

The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a private property, 2) the entry must be for more than a momentary peri-
od, 3) it must be under warrant or color of authorities, 4) the property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appro-
priated or injuriously affected, and 5) the utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and de-
prive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. Under Sec. 4 Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, “just compensation” is to be deter-
mined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be
expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the
complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. In the instant
case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castelvi property, by authority of court, on August 10, 1959.
The “taking” of the Castelvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned
as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed. There is no basis to the contention of the Republic that a
lease on a year-to-year basis can give rise to permanent right to occupy since by express provision a lease made for a determinate
time, as was the lease of Castelvi land in the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a demand (Art. 1669, New
Civil Code). The Supreme Court, however, did not apply Art. 1250 of the New Civil Code for the adjustment of the peso rate in times
of extraordinary inflation or deflation because in eminent domain cases the obligation to pay arises from law independent of con-
tract.

AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA

[43 SCRA 360; G.R. No. L-26400; 29 Feb. 1972]

Facts:

Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her Transfer Certificate of Title (1924), there was no anno-
tation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the govern-
ment used a portion of the lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958, Amigable’s counsel wrote the Pres-
ident of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th En-
dorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his
capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the lot. According to the defendants,
the action was premature because it was not filed first at the Office of the Auditor General. According to them, the right of action for
the recovery of any amount had already prescribed, that the Government had not given its consent to be sued, and that plaintiff had
no cause of action against the defendants.

Issue:

Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue the government.
Held:

In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the government takes away property from a private
landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may prop-
erly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. In
the case at bar, since no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not exe-
cuted any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the government, then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then
bring an action to recover possession of the land anytime, because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since
such action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been used for other purposes, the only relief left is for the government to
make due compensation—price or value of the lot at the time of the taking.

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC

[244 SCRA 272; G.R. No. 119694; 22 May 1995]

Facts:

Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less than one-
half page for the common use of political parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of
charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of
government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme
Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the
Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. On behalf of the
respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police
power) of the Comelec over the information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure
a fair, impartial and credible election.

Issue:

Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.

Held:

The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media companies to donate “Comelec
space” amounts to “taking” of private personal property without payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases.
Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec, considering that the newspa-
pers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but
not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the
state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or mag-
azine publishers.

SUMULONG v. GUERRERO

September 30, 1987 | Expropriation

GIST: NHA filed for the expropriation of the land of Sumulong for purposes of so-
cialized housing, in compliance with BP 1224. While Sumulong assailed the same as
it is according to him, not for public use, the SC ruled that the expropriation was in-
deed for public use as expanded by the definition provided for in BP 1224 for social-
ized housing itself is a basic need in order to promote welfare.

DOCTRINE: Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state

concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment
and in sum, the general welfare. Therefore, expropriations in the name of socialized
housing, which has for its purpose providing low cost houses for below minimum
wage earning families, automatically connotes expropriation for public use.
MANOSCA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
[252 SCRA 412; G.R. NO. 106440, 29 JAN. 1996]

Facts:

The National Historical Institute declared the parcel of land owned by Petitioners as a national historical landmark, because it was
the site of the birth of Felix Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. The Republic of the Philippines filed an action to appropriate the
land. Petitioners argued that the expropriation was not for a public purpose.

Issue:

Whether or Not the taking or exercise of eminent domain may be granted.

Held:

Public use should not be restricted to the traditional uses. The taking is for a public use because of the contribution of Felix Manalo
to the culture and history of the Philippines.

EPZA VS. DULAY

[148 SCRA 305; G.R. No. L-59603; 29 Apr 1987]

Facts:

The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is
to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are
registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement as to the com-
pensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compen-
sation. It was later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was object-
ed to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value
declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the commissioner’s report. EPZA then
filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case.

Issue:

Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render
the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree
may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s own
judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a
judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a violation
of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute,
decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts
be precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.

MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE VS. VM REALTY CORPORATION

[292 SCRA 676; G. R. NO. 127820; 20 JUL 1998]

Facts:

Petitioner sought to exercise its power of eminent domain based on a resolution by the municipal council. Petitioner cites a previous
case wherein a resolution gave authority to exercise eminent domain. Petitioner also relies on the Implementing Rules, which pro-
vides that a resolution authorizes a Local Government Unit to exercise eminent domain.

Issue:

Whether or Not an LGU can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution by its law-making body.
Held:

Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160), it is stated as the first requisite that LGUs can exercise its
power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted by its legislative body enabling the municipal chief executive. A resolution
is not an ordinance, the former is only an opinion of a law-making body, the latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner involves BP
337, which was the previous Local Government Code, which is obviously no longer in effect. RA 7160 prevails over the Implement-
ing Rules, the former being the law itself and the latter only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former.

Republic v. Lim, G.R. 161656, June 29, 2005

Fact: On September 5, 1938, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted a special civil
action for expropriation with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu, involving Lots of the
Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for the purpose of establishing a military reserva-
tion for the Philippine Army. After depositing ₱9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bank, the
Republic took possession of the lots. Thereafter, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Re-
public to pay the Denzons the sum of ₱4,062.10 as just compensation. In 1950, Jose Galeos, one
of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for
the two lots, but it “denied knowledge of the matter.” Another heir, Nestor Belocura, brought the
claim to the Office of then President Carlos Garcia who wrote the Civil Aeronautics Administra-
tion and the Secretary of National Defense to expedite action on said claim. in 1962, the CFI
promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the owners
and have retained their right as such over Lots 932 and 939 because of the Republic’s failure to
pay the amount of ₱4,062.10, adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. In view of “the differ-
ences in money value from 1940 up to the present,” the court adjusted the market value at
₱16,248.40, to be paid with 6% interest per annum from April 5, 1948, date of entry in the ex-
propriation proceedings, until full payment.
Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged and foreclosed Lot 932 to Vicente Lim
for failure to pay. in 1992, respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title with the (RTC) seek-
ing an absolute and exclusive possession of the property. in 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in
favor of respondent. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA but the Ruling of the RTC was up-
held and affirmed.
Issue: Whether the owner of the expropriated land is entitled for the repossession of his property
when party condemning refuses to pay the compensation which has been assessed or agreed
upon?

Held: Yes, while the prevailing doctrine is that “the non-payment of just compensation does not
entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots,26 however, in cases
where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of
the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to re-
cover possession of their property. This is in consonance with the principle that “the government
cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment.” To be sure, the five-year period limitation
will encourage the government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with jus-
tice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property from pri-
vate persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation which the court de-
fined as not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the property owner but
also the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensa-
tion cannot be considered “just.”