"Iki," Style, Trace: Shūzō Kuki and the Spirit of Hermeneutics

Author(s): T. Botz-Bornstein
Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Oct., 1997), pp. 554-580
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
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T. Botz-Bornstein "IKI,'" STYLE, TRACE: SHOZO KUKI AND
THE SPIRIT OF HERMENEUTICS

Departmentof I
Philosophy,
University The comparative discoursethatwill be developedin thisstudyis
ofTampere,Finland meantnotonlyto comparesomeEastern and Western thinkers butalso,
and even moreso, to developrather autonomously an idea ofstylethat
willbe ofinterest forbothEastern and Westernphilosophy. Thisidea is
also not unrelatedto certainissuesthatare discussedin postmodern
aesthetics inboththeEastand theWest.
My aim is to pointout parallelsbetweentheJapanesephilosopher
Shaz6 Kukiand theEuropeanphilosophers Heideggerand Derridawith
regard to their philosophical discourses on the idea of styleand their
respective elaborations of thisnotion as a playfulquantity thatneeds
to be seized byequallyplayful philosophical approaches.I willmainly
considersome thoughts thathave been brought forward by thesephi-
losophers themselves. Of course, in the cases of Heideggerand Kuki,it
will be necessaryto referalso to certainaspectsoftheirbackgrounds,
especiallyto theGermanhermeneutic tradition and to some ideasthat
havebeen producedbyphilosophers oftheKyotoSchool.
Giventherelatively broadscope ofthisessay,itshouldperhapsbe
pointed out atthe beginning thatI willtrytoavoiddrawing linksbetween
different philosophical traditions bychoosinga rather generalizing per-
spective. On the contrary, mypurpose is to point out some concrete
ideasthatI see centeredon a certainattitude thatexiststowardthephe-
nomenaofstyleand playand to showthatthetreatment ofthenotionof
styleintherespective traditions can represent an important startingpoint
forcomparative analysis.
Shaz6 Kuki'sidea of ikican be-and has been-seen as such a
pointofdeparture; at thesametime,one shouldresist thetemptation to
use thisnotionof ikias a tool by meansofwhichone could formulate
concretestatements aboutexisting cultural links.Giventhisconstellation
ofmethodological presuppositions,designa discourseon ikiturnsout
to
to be a difficult task-and thisalso because ofthe bulkof ideological
ballastthatclingsto thesubject.Luckily forcomparative discourse,but
perhapsunluckily for iki iki
itself, has been chosen by Heideggeras a
East& West subject
Philosophy for his only exhaustive comment on an Easternphilosophical
Volume47, Number4 idea. In hisessay"Aus einemGesprichvon derSprache,"'Heidegger
October1997 involvesKukitogether withikiand somegeneralthoughts on Japanese
554-580 in hisown reflections an account ofwhat
culture philosophical bygiving
he presentsas a conversationbetween himselfand a Japanesescholar.
? 1997
of
byUniversity One of the consequences of his essay is thateverycomparativestudyof
Hawai'iPress ikineeds to startwitha considerationof thisconversation.

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 Some mightbe surprised at thisstatement simplybecausethecon-
versationitselfis problematic. We knowthatit reallydid take place,
betweenHeideggerand a partner who can easilybe identified as the
Japanese Germanist Tomio Tezuka (who would later write his own
r6sumeoftheconversation). However,theaccountofthe meetinghas
been changedinan essentialwaybyHeidegger. As somescholarshave
shown, the pointsthat are made about ikiseem to stemmainlyfrom
Heidegger's own remembrances ofearlier conversations withKukion the
one handand fromreadingsofbookson Japanesecultureon theother.
The ideologicalburdenthatclingsto thesubjectcan be seen inthefact
thatanybodywho intends todeal withiki,starting via Heidegger's essay,
will automatically be inclinedto assumethat,since an important phi-
losopherlikeHeideggerhas chosenikias a uniquesubjectofcontem-
plation,theremustbe an important linkbetweentheJapaneseikiand
Heidegger's This of
philosophy. is, course,a precipitant conclusion(as it
would be to assume that Heidegger'sanalysispoints some essential
to
insightsaboutikiitself).
Itcan now be mentioned that,alreadywithregardto Kuki,we are
confronted witha similarproblem. Thoughno Western personwouldtry
to understand "hermeneutics" through Kuki(whereasHeidegger's words
on ikiaremorelikely tobe takenforgranted), we stillruntheriskofbeing
overimpressed byKuki'sdecisionto givein hisbook Ikino K6z6sucha
privileged positionto thehermeneutic approach.2Itis knownthatKuki
had a verybroadbackground in Westernculture,and he could have
chosenotherWesternphilosophical currents forhisexposition ofiki.
The gap betweenwhatphilosophers did and whattheycould have
doneoftenrepresents a moreinteresting subjectofinquiry thanwhatthey
actuallydid. Especiallywithregardto ikiand hermeneutics, as longas
we choose to deal withtheseas cross-cultural we
phenomena, should
concentrate moreon the philosophers' intentions withregardto them
ratherthan tryto produce(even througha historicalconsideration)
statements aboutthephenomenathemselves (orlinksbetweenthem).
In thissense,thefactthatHeideggerwroteaboutKukiand ikiwill
certainly be seen as an important event,butthe impactof thisevent
entersintotheoverallargumentation in a muchmoreindirect waythan
has sometimes beenexpected.Inorderto lead theargumentation ofthis
essay in the rightdirectionfrom the beginning, itwill be usefulto note
some basic discrepancies thatarisewithregardto Heideggerand Kuki
and theircommonconcern,namelyiki.Reinhard May has shownhow,
as alreadymentioned, comparisons ofthe"Gesprichvon derSprache"
withthe "real" conversation make it obviousthatHeidegger's"con-
versation"with a Japanese needs to be seen as Heidegger's personal
"invention."3The firstconsequence of thisis thateven those statements
thatHeideggerattributes in his essay to the "Japanese" have no absolute T. Botz-Bornstein

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 authority intermsofscholarship aboutJapaneseculture.Inotherwords,
Heidegger is not dealing at all with arguments aboutikias theycould
have been providedby his "real" partner, TomioTezuka;on thecon-
trary, in the real conversation partnerdid not even talk about
the
iki. Heideggerseemsto derivehis mainideas about iki,as May has
noted,fromOscar Benl'sbook SeamiMotokiyound derGeistdes N6-
Schauspiels(1953). Thistext,however,is in principle, as well as for
particular reasons,extremely inappropriate foran elucidationof Kuki's
understanding ofiki(see p. 34).
Amongthedifferent reflections thathavebeenoffered byscholarsin
orderto pointtodiscrepancies betweenHeidegger's ideaofikiand ikias
itreallyexistedand existsinJapaneseculture, KOjinKaratani's statement
thatHeideggeris "in totalignorance ofwhatikiis"4 represents themost
radical.Also,MichikoYonedafindsthatHeidegger's definitionof ikias
"das WehenderStilledes leuchtenden Entzijckens" does not at all cor-
respondto thetermitself.5 Still,Karatani sees thenecessity ofdiscussing
iki'scharacter ofdistancedplay,whichfascinated Kuki,and itsresem-
blance to a Heideggerian "playingwiththe Abgrund";6and Yoneda
continuesherdiscussionby speculating whetherHeidegger's"defini-
tion"ofikidoes notcorrespond morewithBashO'snotionoffoga.7
Itseemsthatin thisdiscussioneven misunderstandings assumean
extremely sophisticated character. So Heidegger, albeitwithout having
been fullyawareofthe inappropriateness of thetextson the NO play,
mustalso have recognizedthedangerinherent in a strategy thattakes
elementsofhisown philosophy and reflectsthemagainstEasternideas
thathavethemselves been understood onlywithin thecontextprovided
by none other than hisown philosophy.8
A further pointneeds to be mentioned. An immensediscrepancy
betweenHeideggerand Kukiis constituted notonlyby different intel-
lectualpresuppositions withregardto theverysubjectbutalso by the
incompatibility ofthepersonalities ofthetwo men,formedby cultural
environments thatwere so different. Different evaluationsof certain
aspects of human civilization,in particularthose aspectsthatdetermine
different approaches to the phenomenon styleas a partof human
of
civilization,are, as has been notedby somescholars,important forthe
comparative discourseinquestionhere.
Itiscertain thatHeidegger's provincial mentality didnotprovidehim
withthemostdesirableintuitive equipment for the projectofseizingiki
in theway thattheTokyo-born Kuki, who was, to speak,leavened
so
withiki,understood andfeltit.RyOsuke Ohashialludesto Kuki'sslightly
condescendingamusementwhen hearingof Heidegger's"astonishment"
upon his firstcontactwithurbanlifeas a youngman in Berlin.9
However, one should not go as faras Steven Heine and draw con-
East& West clusions fromgeneral pointsthatcannot be justifiedwithregardto cer-
Philosophy

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tain individualexaminations. Heine statesthatthe "basic ambiance"
of iki"is a farcryfromHeideggertheSchwarzwalder whose laterwrit-
ingsincreasingly reflecta fascination with naturalism and a disinterest
in
humanrelations as an access to truth."10 I wouldnotsay thatHeine's
judgment ofHeideggeris wrongbutrather thathe neglectsa morepro-
found(andevenbasic)aspectofall manifestations of"style"ofwhichiki
is butone. The essentialpointis that"ikiforthemanof iki,"like"style
forthedandy,"is as natural as nature.Ikistrives, as MichikoYonedaalso
says,"naturgemlgi zu sein." In otherwords,at a certainpointin the
discussionofthismatter, thedistinction between"naturalism" and "civi-
lization"becomesirrelevant,11 and through thisfact(whichis so impor-
tantin Japaneseculture)one can again get hold of a pointof contact
betweenKukiand Heidegger.
PeterN. Dale has calledKuki'swork"one ofdisguised transposition,
of discovering a Japanesecounterpart to the occidentalcoxcomb,"12
claimingthatitderiveselementsdirectly fromBarbeyd'Aurevilly. Dan-
dyistaestheticism is foundedon a quitesophisticated idea ofstyle(orof
whatstylecouldbe),andthishasalreadybeenthesubjectofa number of
philosophical examinations.13 Inthis context, then, we can make an ob-
servation paralleltotheone we havemadeabouttheparticular relation-
shipbetween"naturalism" and "civilizational WhenStephen
stylistics."
Light writesthatKuki'sikiis nota questionof"other-worldliness" orofan
"extreme aestheticism for
of, instance, Des
Huysman's Esseintes,"14 this
showsthatthe more"moderateaestheticism" of Kuki(and of "real"
Dandyism,whichis different fromHuysman's)could be characterized,
from thepointofviewofaestheticism, as noaestheticism atall.Thismeans
thatitdoes notrepresent an aestheticism thatcouldbe defined froma non-
aesthetic or,letus say, moral of
point viewas aesthetical. The reasonfor
thisis thatin Kukiand indandyism, morality and aesthetics havefused,
no of
leaving possibility distinguishing one from the other.
Huysman, on theotherhand,as a decadentdandyannouncing the
declineofhisowngenre,infactlosessightofsocietybyturning dandyism
intoa purelyaestheticist movement. Thisisopposedtooriginal dandyism
(as "indifferent"as itmightappearto outsiders) as well as to Kuki.Kuki
wouldhave been againsttheaestheticism manifested by Huysmanifhe
was notagainst aesthetics as a whole.Ohashi'sremark-that Heidegger's
interpretationofKuki'sphilosophy as an attempt toseize ikiwiththehelp
of Europeanaesthetics would nothave been answeredaffirmatively by
Kuki-is veryimportant here.15Kuki'smethodwas Europeanbut not
aesthetical,at leastso longas we defineaestheticsas a philosophical
disciplinethatmakessenseonlyas a counterweight to otherphilosoph-
ical disciplines-for example, ethics.
The phenomenon of iki needs to be seen exactly withinthis con-
stellationof philosophicalforces.As Kukihimselfwrites,the ideal of the T. Botz-Bornstein

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 geishais "at once moraland aesthetic ... [andthatwhich]is called'iki',
is a harmonious unionofvoluptuousness and nobility."16 Closelylinked
to this,then,can be seen anotherproblemconcerning iki'srelationship
withdandyism, one thathas been raisedby Hosoi and Pigeotin their
reviewof Iki no KOz6.Theyclaimthat,because of different historical
origins, dandyism would ultimately not be iki at all. Quoting from Bau-
delaire,they state that "le dandy n'est pas 'iki' dans la mesure il
o~i est
'riche,oisif,l6ev6dans le luxe,'o~ il 'n'a pas d'autreoccupationque de
courira la quotedu bonheur.'"17 However,Hoso and Pigeotneglect
Baudelaire'sstatement aboutthedandy'swealthy origin:thatitis almost
as ironicas is his characterization of the dandy'slifeas a battlefor
"happiness."The reality showsrather thatthe dandy(exactlylikethe
and
military bourgeois classes of Edo) is comingfroma non-privileged
background, striving very hard to obtain not worldly happinessbutsocial
recognition. The fact that his strategy avoids so consistently thedisplayof
thestubborn ambition thatrepresents themainfeature ofhisenemy,the
careerist, givesus no right to place thedandyin theairlessdomainof
eitherserenestoicism orofaestheticism.
Also, and closely linked tothis,one thenneedsto mention theargu-
mentsofthosewho interpret Kuki'sambition to designan anthropology
of ikias a projectthathas a politicaldimension. Thesearguments will
purposely not be contested here. However, I hope that Kuki's ambitions
can be better understood whenplacedintheverycontext thatI amtrying
to draw.WhenLesliePincusclaimsthat"theexceptionality ofspirit that
Kukiclaimedin Ikino K6z6 wouldsoon becomea pretext forJapan's
domination of Asia and thespillingofAsianblood,"'8 it is difficult to
contradict him.However,thefactthattherewas nota "careerist" buta
dandywho was pleadingforand believingin a "stylistic superiority"
also represents an immensely valuablefactforcontemporary philosophy,
and thisespeciallyat a timewhenwe observetheactsofa cultural col-
onizationofthewholeworldbyexactlythoseWestern elements thatKuki
had alreadyfoundso disquieting. Itwouldbe a pityifKuki'shintwould
be submerged in arguments redescribing thephilosophical value of iki
through but
nothing political-ideological rules.
It is in thiscontextthatI also wishto makea contribution to the
development ofan "anatomyofstyle,"a contribution thatcan, inturn,
be helpfulforan understanding of Kuki.Lastly, to represent bothKuki
and Derridaas urbanizers ofHeideggerian thought might providea sup-
plementary opening to the subject, but while this representation is per-
hapsfundamental, is
it notinanywayintended to be seen as final.

II
We will take as a startingpoint the most essential passage in the
East& West unique recordof an encounterwithAsian thoughtby one of the princi-
Philosophy

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pal Westernphilosophers ofthiscentury. Bymeansofthealreadymen-
tionedstatement thatikirepresents an aestheticnotionthatcharacterizes
a "sensibleappearancethrough whose livelydelightshinesthe supra-
sensible,"19Heideggerrefersto the relationship, veryimportant for
Westernaesthetics, betweenthesensible(Greekaisteton)and thenon-
sensible(Greeknoeton).He thenpointsto the possibility of under-
iki
standing by means of Western metaphysics; also, for the Japanese
thereseems to be no iro (color)withoutku (emptiness). However,a
phenomenon likeikicannot,as Heideggerconcludesrather quickly,be
explainedby means of our language: Western philosophical languageis
foundedon themetaphysical distinctionbetweenthe"sensible"and the
"non-sensible," and thisis a distinction thatdoes notexistin thesame
way in Japanese.ForHeidegger,iki is a qualitythattranscends meta-
physics and that can be
only perceivedby means of a non-metaphysical
philosophy ofunderstanding.
Thesearethebasicconditions established byHeidegger atthebegin-
ning of thedialogue. before
Still, making any statement about ikiitself,
he pointsto Kuki'sambition to elucidatetheterms"hermeneutics" and
the "hermeneutical." Kukicame acrossthesetermswhen readingthe
notesof a lectureHeideggergave in 1934, titled"Logik."In thislec-
ture,so Heideggerdeclares,he was lookingfora meansto describethe
"essence (Wesen)of language."Heideggeradmitsthat,at thattime,he
was unableto finda suitablewordthatcouldcharacterize the Wesenof
language;buteven"today"(atthetimehe wrotethisessay),so he says,
theright wordis stillmissing.20
The contextintowhichall thefollowing arguments are putis thus
establishedby veryvague allusions,first to the importance of a philo-
sophicalpreoccupation withthe "hermeneutical" and second to the
of
impossibilitydefining the "essence of language."
Heideggerposits,then,thatKukihimself, throughhis preoccupa-
tionwiththe"hermeneutical," has seen ikiin a "clearerlight."When
Heideggersuggests thatikiis thequality"through which[Japanese] art
and poetry receivetheiressence,"thismeansthatikiistheinterpretative
hermeneutic qualitythatcan be revealedthrough theparticular kindof
interpretationdesignedby hermeneutics.21
LikeHeidegger, Kukialso abstainsfrom a cleardefinition ofikitothe
extentthatit is forhimsomething indefinable in termsofabstract con-
For
cepts. Kuki, ikiis "experiential"; thismeans that itasks, as Kuki writes t-f ,,4
1 KFr-
in Ikino K6z6,fora "specific'beingcomprehension' " (p. 5; p. 18).22 He
insiststhatwe "mustnotjusthandle'iki'as a specificconceptand seek
forthe'essentialinsight' whichlookstowards theabstract universal ofthe
that
genericconcept comprehends it"(ibid.).Instead of concentrating on
the"formal," we shouldconcentrate on the "concrete and individual."
Itmight comeas a surprise thatKuki,inspiteofthepopularity ofthe T. Botz-Bornstein

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 termiki,refuses to "define"itgenerally. Insteadhe refers notonlyto the
necessity ofa concrete but
approach also, likeHeidegger, thenecessity
to
ofa hermeneutical understanding of iki.The examination of ikishould
rff-ay~rMPRO notbe "eidetical,"he claims,but"hermeneutical" (p. 19). Ikicannot
be definedgrammatically orscientificallybutis an individual notionthat
does notexistas an "essence" ina metaphysical sense.However,when
Kukisaysthat"hermeneutics" is the alternative to metaphysical con-
templation lookingfor"essence,"one is inclinedto askwhatKukireally
understands by "hermeneutics" and in whatway his understanding of
thetermcorresponds withHeidegger's of it.

AEIt
understanding
As can be notedfromIkino KOz6,"hermeneutics" to Kukiappears
7t L, ru, as an appropriateapproachforan "anthropology of the concrete."It
is interesting thathe explainsthisby meansof a modelthatis also
dear to Heidegger:the overturning of Platonism.Kukiwrites:"But
aat,0E tt -Ntti what we should perceiveis notthe abstractgenerality of the generic

- CARE
-iCa-7 41M conceptsuch as so-calledPlatonicRealismemphasizes.... We must,
on thispoint,dare a reversetransformation of Plato'sepistemology"
(p. 52; p. 95).
C t.
tz?Zihtz? i 6 da0 Therearetwopossiblewaysofrelating thisstatement to Heidegger:
eitherKukiis controversial to Heidegger or he is onlylessradical.There
is a bigdifference betweenthesetwopossibilities.
Itis wellknownthatHeidegger, too,wantedto overcomePlatonism
butthathe didnotplantodo so bymeansofits"overturning." Heidegger
plannedto overcomePlatonism bymeansofwhathe calleda "twisting
out" (Herausdrehen) ofphilosophy from a movement thathe saw as itself
an endlesschain of overturnings of Platonism.In his first volumeon
Nietzschehe writes:
Whathappens whenthetrueworldis expunged? Doestheapparent world
stillremain?
No.Fortheapparent worldcanbe whatitisonlyas a counter-
partofthetrue:ifthetrueworld so must
collapses, theworld
ofappearances.
OnlythenisPlatonism overcome,whichistosay,inverted
insucha waythat
philosophical
thinkingtwists
freeofit.23
Platonicrealismproducesa purelygeneralviewoftheworldthatdeals
onlywith"essences"and abstractions. Heideggerwantsto abolishthis
Platonism butnotinorderto go fortheotherextreme, whichwouldbe
representedby a scientific
anthropology thatis restricted
to theanalysis
oftheconcreteand individual.
If we wantto see a linkbetweenHeideggerand Kuki,it might
be usefulto evokethethoughts of anotherJapanesephilosopher, Keiji
Nishitani,whosephilosophy, as representative
oftheKyotoSchool,is at
leastindirectly
relatedto Kuki's.Kuki'ssuggestionthatwe shouldfound
an anthropology oftheconcreteon an "overturned Platonism"reminds
East& West us of a reflection
Philosophy thathas been brought forward by Nishitani.In fact,

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Nishitanidoes notadvancean anthropology oftheconcrete;rather, in
an interesting
way, he tries
to introduceBuddhist as
thought exactly that
whichcouldfillthegap thatarisesafterthenegationofboth
alternative
metaphysics (thusPlatonism)and itsown "anti-."(Nishitanispeakshere
of Kantianism insteadof Platonism.)In Religionand Nothingness, he
writes:"A substanceaccessibleto reason,suchas thatfoundintheold
metaphysics, mightbe thought theobjective'being'ofthings
tosignify as
theyare in themselves...," and then he concludes: "The revolutionof
thought thatKantoccasioned,turning the standpoint of the old meta-
physics on its head, is, at a more fundamental level,stillgroundedon
thesame presupposition. Itis, properly speaking, the inverse oftheold
metaphysics."24
Nishitani triesto combatthe metaphysical splittingof subjectand
objectby revealing the circular interrelatedness of the two notions:"If
the idea of substance,as something tiedto objectiveexistence,con-
stitutionally
presupposes thesubjectas itscounterpart, inthesame way
theidea ofsubjectpresupposes an objectas itscounterpart."25
Nishitani, as a representative oftheKyoto-School, twistsphilosophy
outofitsmetaphysical framework to
bypointing purelyBuddhist
a alter-
native.It is verylikelythatKuki'sintention of inverting Platonismby
substituting it forthe Buddhistconceptionof ikishowsparallelswith
Nishitani'sidea ofovercoming metaphysics. Inthisway,we can sayalso
thatKuki'sidea mightpointto an interesting alternative to a Western-
stylepositivist,anti-metaphysical anthropology oftheconcrete.
The resultof Heidegger'sHerausdrehen of philosophy out of two
extremesis supposedto be a philosophicalhermeneutics. The main
characteristicofthishermeneutics isthatitadheresneither toa generalist
(Platonic)norto an individualist (empirical) view,butthatitarrivesat a
simultaneous manipulation ofthe"individual"and the"general."
Throughout all ofHeidegger's works,this"hermeneutics" is directly
relatedto the hermeneutic circle.The hermeneutic circle, first intro-
duced inSeinundZeit,is mainlyunderstood as a methodological means
thatconstantly holdsbackanyfinaldecisioninfavorofeither a generalist
or an individualist method."Hermeneutics" in Heidegger, and also, as
we shallsee, ina tradition thathadstarted long before Heidegger, triesto
settleon the middlegroundwithinthetensionbetweenthe individual
and thegeneral.
We needto reflect Kukiagainstthisbackground. Kukiasksto reverse
Platonism inorderto developa wayofseeingtheindividual intheform
ofan "ethnicspecificity" (p. 95). Atfirst sight,thefactthatKukicalls his
new approach a "hermeneuticsofethnicbeing" (p. 50; p. 92)26 suggests
that Kuki deeply misunderstoodHeidegger's hermeneutics.However,
even an expression like "ethnic being," which evokes perhaps many
undesirableundertones,could appear in at least a slightlynew light. T. Botz-Bornstein

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 Ohashipointsto theheartofthequestionwhenhe writes:
TheEuropean ofconcepts
system thatKukiwasafter
wasmoretheclassical
metaphysical one,whichbecomes also obvious
throughthefactthathe
the
applied conceptual couple tothe
"essential-existential" phenomenon of
'iki'andthathethendecidedtogivepriority
tothequestion
oftheexistentia
of'iki'.InthiswayKukiwantedtoinvert
thePlatonic
theoryofknowledge.27
Itwillbe thetaskofthefollowing analysisto see whether Kuki'sviewof
a "hermeneutics ofpopularbeing"reallyrepresents a descriptive anthro-
pology thatconcentrates only on the individual "existentia," or whether
itdoes notinsomewaycorrespond towhatHeidegger understands tobe
a hermeneutical approachthathas been "twistedout" the of endless
chainsof reversalsof generalist Platonism and individualist, empirical
contemplation of the world.
It needs to be said thatifthe firstis true,thenKukiunderstood
Heideggerin the wrongway. SomehowKukiinterpreted Heidegger's
thoughts as an "Anthropologie," and in thisfactone can perhapssee
Kuki'sfundamental misunderstanding ofHeidegger.Kuki,withhisover-
of
turning Platonism, claimed to produce,as he writes,a shiftfrom
theessentiato theexistentia, and thiscertainly contradicts Heidegger's
intentions. The important pointis thatalreadyforHeideggerthe dis-
tinction betweenessentiaand existentia shouldbe abolishedas repre-
sentative ofthemetaphysical heritage of Platonism.
However,itisstilluncertain whether Kukireallyunderstood thisexis-
tentiainthesamewaythatHeideggerunderstood it.Inotherwords,itis
questionablewhether Kukijoins hisanthropology of ikiwitha position
thatHeideggerwouldhave characterized as a Platonism thathas been
overturned.
SeveralpassagesinIkino K6z6causeustodoubtwhether Heidegger's
and Kuki'sconceptions ofexistentiareallyoverlap. Kuki insiststhattheiki
thatwillbe seizedafterhavingoverturned Platonism is no "reality"and
no "presence"thatwouldbe opposedto "concepts."On thecontrary,
he makesclearthat"'iki' ignoresall thefacilesuppositions ofrealityand
bracketsall real life.Whilstdetachedlybreathing neutralair,'iki' pur-
poselesslyand disinterestedly makesself-disciplined play" (p. 12; my
italics).In thissense iki is an aestheticnotion.It is no "presence"or
"reality"inthesenseofa metaphysical existentia butis more-as Kuki
also says,a "shade" or a "suggestion." Thismeansthatikiis no really
livedexperiencebutonly"thenegativeafter-image whichaccompanies
brilliant experience"(p. 40; p. 74). Kuki makes clear thatwherever the
aestheticnotionofikiappearsinart,its"disinterested play"is no incar-
nationor representation of "something" but is a suggestion of utmost
aesthetic subtlety.Itcan consist,as Kukisays,"simply in a hand gesture"
East& West (p. 30).
Philosophy

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 Kuki'semphasison theaesthetic character ofikiletsus recognizethat
Kuki's"anthropology oftheconcrete"and his"hermeneutics ofethnic
being" are as remote as possible from the contemporary ofmeta-
heirs
physics.Theyhaveno linkwitheither structuralist
anthropological meth-
ods or positivist ethnology butmorewitha kindofaestheticconceptof
"non-essence" (which has been developedby such post-Heideggerian
philosophers as Blanchot and Derrida).Ikiis an "ethnical"notionbut
onlyin thesenseof"an ethnically determined taste[that]thusmustbe
appreciatedby a 'sens intime' in the profoundest sense of the word"
(p. 48). We might thus say that the "existence" of ikias an aesthetic,
"disinterested is
play" opposed to both a metaphysics ofessentiaand a
metaphysical comprehension ofexistentia.
Apart from this, forHeidegger, too,theconsideration oftheexisten-
tia(as Ohashialso states)can lead to an understanding of Being.Thus,
one can arguethatKuki's"existentialist" approachis also in someway
inspiredby the searchforBeingin exactlythe non-metaphysical way
thatHeideggerunderstands it.
In otherwords,Kuki'sapproachis notrestricted to theanalysisof
eithertheindividual ortheconcreteaspectofikibuttriesto seize iki,as
he says,"interpretative[ly]" (p. 5; p. 19). This"interpretative" procedure
is opposedto all kindsofformalism-to metaphysical Platonism as well
as to thescientific method-andthiswas, finally, thereasonwhyKuki
was so attracted to Heidegger's term"hermeneutics."
Thisthought willbecomeclearerwhenwe makeplainthecharacter
of hermeneutics as a disciplinethatdwellswithinthetensionbetween
generalist and individualist approaches.First, however, inorderto under-
line the parallelism betweenKuki'sand Heidegger'sunderstanding of
hermeneutics, we will,as was announcedat thebeginning, shedsome
light on the affinity of ikiwith another Western concept that is relatedto
hermeneutics: style.
We have said thatiki is a kindof "style,"and thispointsus to a
notionfromaesthetictheory,the notionof "stylization." Ohashi has
shownverywell in his essay "'Iki' und 'Kire'als Frageder Kunstim
Zeitalter derModerne"howstriking theparallelscan be betweenikiand
theWesternact ofstylization.28 willcome to thisessaylater.Inthe
We
meantime we willexaminetheway in whichthe proximity of ikiand
can
style explain both Heidegger's and Kuki's in
interest hermeneutics.
Heidegger, in"AuseinemGespraich Oberdie Sprache,"quotesfrom
Schleiermacher's Hermeneutik undKritik. Thisbookrepresents thefoun-
dationofmodernhermeneutics as a theory ofinterpretation.
Heidegger's
referenceto Schleiermacheris interestingbecause Schleiermacheralso
saw the notion of style as a central concept of hermeneutictheory.
Schleiermacher,in anotherof his fundamentalworks,the posthumously
edited Hermeneutik,analyzes the phenomenon of styleand ultimately T. Botz-Bornstein

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 declaresthatitshouldrepresent thefirstaimofhermeneutic understand-
ing:"The entireaim ofhermeneutics should be seen as theunderstanding
ofstyle."29
We noticehere a parallelwhose detectionshouldcertainlynot
lead us to simplificationsbutwhichshouldstimulate our reflection
and
directittowarda particular focus.In some way,as iki is forKuki,so
forSchleiermacher "style"constitutesthe essentialqualitythatshould
be revealedby hermeneutic understanding; and as forKuki,so also for
Schleiermacher thisqualityresistsdefinitionthrough abstractnotionsor
concepts. Schleiermacher writes:"Grammatically one cannotsubsume
an individualityin a concept,butone needscontemplation. Alsotech-
nically.One cannotproducea conceptof a certainstyle."30Forthe
understanding ofstylea general(grammatical) methodisuseless;we need
an approachthatcan seize individuality. However,in Schleiermacher,
too,thisindividualityis notthescientific,
empiricalone. Thisbringsus to
hermeneutics.

III
Beforecontinuing thisexamination
oftheWestern rapprochement of
ikiand "style,"we needto see thatikiis foundedon somefundamental
principles ofBuddhistculture.Kukiwritesthat"'iki' has itsorigininthe
r4 j t ... F
r ?j k-: 'Worldof Suffering'.... thatis thedisinterestedness
Now, 'resignation',
in 'iki',is an urbaneand wellformedheartwhichhas gonethrough the

Fj-6b
jL,
f?-F,
-D-
ft
r. polishingof the hardand heartlessfloatingworld ..." (p. 11; p. 26). Iki
is producedthrough a "resignation
This meansthat
to fateand thegaietybased on 'res-
ikias a kindof "style"asksforthe
9LE6t &L J
t -o- r ignation'"(ibid.).
negation of an "everydayworld."Kukicalls thisworldthe "conven-
tional"world.
In moresimpletermswe couldsaythatifwe resignfromthe"con-
ventional,"we discover"style."The decisivepoint,however,is that
through thenegation ofthe"conventional," ikiwillnotbe "discovered"
as an "essence"thatalreadyexisted"outthere,"outsideeveryday life.
On thecontrary, theact ofresignationfromeveryday liferevealsa kind
ofikithatalwaysexistedwithin everyday life(andevenwithin ourselves)
butthatwas coveredbytheconventional. In thissense,Kukiwrites,"If
... we are able to combine the abstractconceptual momentsof trans-
formation obtainedthrough analysis,and to constitute
thebeingof'iki',
thatis because we alreadycarryikiwithus as experiential meaning"
(p. 48). Andearlieron he says:"youwillbe chicwhentheconventional
has been rubbedaway" (p. 11).
Ohashi'scontributiontotheWestern understandingofKuki'sikicon-
sistsofexplainingitexactlyas thisactof"cuttingoff"ofeverydaylife.For
thepersonwho wantsto experienceiki,thenegationofeveryday lifeis
East& West notundertaken
Philosophy in orderto enterintoa sphereoftotalretreat fromthe

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everyday sphere.On thecontrary,
the"cut"ismadeinorderto"re-enter"
lifeafterhavingobtainediki. In his essay "'Iki' und 'Kire"' Ohashi
explainstheimportance oftheact of"cutting"(kire)fortheexperience
ofikiand ofstyleingeneral:"The everydayness is 'cut',butjustthrough
thiscut is produceda new everydaylifein whichone is awareofthe
mortalityof everydaylife.The renunciationof Buddhismis a decisive
'Kire'."31
Only througha paradoxical,simultaneous negationand affirma-
tionofthe"conventional"can Kuki'sconceptof ikibe understood as
a "fusionof coquetrywithresignation" (p. 12). ftis the "essence" of
coquetry and refinement that is no "essence" that would be found
in a metasphereoutsideeverydaylife,but it is an "existence"that
can onlyexistwithineverydaylife.In thissense, ikimaybe seen, as
Kukiwrites,"as an intermediate termbetweenrefined and unrefined"
(p. 16).
The "ground"ofikiis no essentialqualityoutsideikibutis ikiitself,
as becomesclearwhenKukiwrites:"To prefer 'iki',and to choose the
conventional, is a difference oftaste.Absolutevaluejudgements are not
objectively provided for" (p. 18). However, even ifwe call "taste"the
"ground"of iki,itis onlya tastethatis producedwithineverydaylife:
"We literally 'learntaste'.Further, we makea value judgementwith
learnedtasteas itsbasis"(p. 47).
To quiteveryday lifenotinordertoenterNirvanabutinorderto live
everydaylifein anotherway is one oftheprinciples ofZen Buddhism,
and inthiswe also recognizeKuki'smainsuggestions concerning iki.Iki
is kindred to thenotionofstyle,at leastinthesensethatitseemsto be a
matter of a "taste"thatis dependenton boththe aestheticaland the
social.
Italso becomesimportant herethatJapaneseZen Buddhism makes
a considerableeffort to distinguish itselffroman attitude thatwouldbe
constituted onlybya Nirvaa-likesilencethatwouldbecomefalseand
"unreal."The negationofeveryday lifeis notmerelyitsoverturning into
exclusionfromeveryday life.
ShinichiHisamatsuhas insistedon the particularconstellation
betweeneverydaylifeand itsown negation.In Zen and theFineArts,
he explainsthatthe detachment fromeverydaylifeand, as a con-
sequence, from all rules provided by everydaylife,shouldnotsimply
createnew rulesof nonattachment. This meansthatifwe negatethe
"conventional"only to enter into Nirvaa, thisNirvanawillwear the
rulesof the "nonconventional." In thiscase the conceptof the "con-
ventional"has been overturned. Zen Buddhismand, in particular, Zen
art have found means to negate the rules of the conventionalwithout
producing new rules of the nonconventional.Hisamatsu explains the
"Rule of No Rule" characterof Zen Buddhism: T. Botz-Bornstein

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 Non-attachmentmeansnotadhering notonlynotadhering
toregulations; to
established butalso nottofuture
rules, ones.InJapanwe speakina good
senseofa personwhois beyond conventional as onewhomno
regulations
coilofropecanbind.Sucha person
single hassomething rules.
transcending
Thisquality toasymmetry,
isrelated forleavingrulesas wellas perfection
to
crumbleandcollapseispartofnon-attachment.32
Hisamatsu's"Rule of No Rule" represents an absolutefreedomfrom
i"rules"as faras all rulesare conventional (including the rulesof the
nonconventional) and need to be negated.Accordingly, Hisamatsu
writes:"The Zen freedombeingdescribeddoes not mean beingfree
rationallyand volitionally accordingto therules,butis freedomin the
senseofnotbeingunderanyrules."33
Thereis a linkbetweentheRuleofNo Ruleand ikias a "fusionof
coquetry and resignation" thatsimultaneously negatesand affirms every-
day lifeand has itsgroundin nothing butitself.To obtainiki,it is not
enoughto overturn therulesofeveryday life:ikiis,rather,"formless."
This,then, is also one reason why Kuki refuses to defineikiconcep-
tually(bynamingitsmostabstract, constitutive
rules).The "ground"of
iki,likethatoftheformless Self,does notlie in anything or in
positive,
rules,or in methods; the"ground"has simplybeen substituted a
by cir-
cularmovement. We can comparethiswitha statement by Hisamatsu:
"In Zen ... thetrueauthority is thatSelfwhichis itself theauthority and
does notrelyon anything. Zen's authorityconsistsinthenon-duality of
'thatwhichrelies'and 'thatwhichis reliedupon'.... Thistrue-relying is
'not-relying.'
"34
It is now importantthatKukialso, whenreferring to "painting and
sculpture,"is convincedthatit"can expressintactas content thenatural
formof 'iki"sexpression"(p. 32). Iki,as it becomesmanifest in art,is
a of
producedby negation (conventional) a
forms, negation thatdoes not
createnewnon-forms.

IV
Lookingat thepublications thathavebeen producedon Heidegger
I noticethatone topichaswidelybeenexcluded
and hisAsianaffinities,
fromconsideration: Einfihlung (empathy). Only Ohashi, in his essay
"
"'lki' und'Kire' talksaboutikibythinking aboutitspossiblelinkwith
EinfOhlung. Thisidea could lead us to profounder intothepro-
insights
nouncedrelationship betweenikiand hermeneutics.
Kukiwritesthateven when not havingbeen awakenedto iki,
"we alreadycarry'iki'withus as experiential meaning,"a formulation
thatcorrespondsto Hisamatsu'sstatementthat"'coming to awake' ...
means thatthe one who is originallyawakened but at presentunawak-
ened comes to awake, and thatis the True Self."35There is a circularity
East& West in these thoughtsabout the awakening and those about the "discover-
Philosophy

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ing" of iki,since iki,whichneedsto be discovered,also needsto be
knownbeforehand.
It is almostimpossiblenotto be reminded hereofwhatappearsas
a Westernequivalentforthisconceptualmodel,namelythecircularity
knownas the"hermeneutic circle."As is generally known,theGerman
tradition of hermeneutics understood thiscircularity as a relationalele-
mentbetweenthegeneralandtheindividual: being unable to understand
the individual withoutconsidering at thesame timethegeneral,we as
well cannotperceivethegeneralwithoutperceiving theindividual ele-
mentsbywhichitis constituted.
It is interesting to notethatin the Germanhermeneutic tradition
therehave been different of
ways dealing with this circularity.
Though
Friederich Schleiermacher generallyrecognizedthe importance of the
hermeneutic circle,thereareseveralstatements inhisworksthatpointto
ways of surmounting it by establishing a fundamental standardcode
(Kanon) of the subjectthatis supposedto be understood hermeneuti-
cally.InHermeneutik undKritik, forexample,Schleiermacher writes:"In
orderto understand the first,one needs to have seized the whole
already.Not,ofcourse,inthewaythatitwouldbe equal to theentirety,
butonlyas a skeleton, as a groundplan."36Thoughitis notobviousat
itis arguablethatinthisas inmanyotherpassages,Schleiermacher
first,
annulsor at least"softens"thecirclebyreferring to a technicalmethod
thatwouldbe capableofseizing(nachbilden) thecreativeprocessofthe
authorhimself, who first saw thewholeand thenwenton to an explo-
rationofthedetails.Schleiermacher writes:"Withregardto everylarger
complex, he also saw firstthe whole and proceededfromthereto the
particular."37
Finally,the intention to locate in the firstplace a "groundplan"
(Grundrig) or "skeleton" pointsin the direction of a morestructuralist
spiritthat would to
alwaysgivepreference generalconsiderations. Itis
truethatthisremainsonlyone aspectof Schleiermacher's treatment of
thecircle.Ingeneral,Schleiermacher, likehispredecessor FriedrichAst,
holdsa viewon thehermeneutic circlethatis positive,announcing, like
this,an attitude thatHeidegger wouldlateradoptas an essentialargument
fora philosophicalhermeneutics: the idea thatall theoretical solutions
(L6sungen) forthecircleaskfora "goingthrough" itinorderto derivea
positiveoutput from it.38
Itis interestingatthispointtoobserveinthecontext ofourstudythat
already with Schleiermacher (and still
more clearlyafter him)a newidea
fora "solution"oftheproblemofthehermeneutic circleis putforward:
theconceptofEinfihlung. Schleiermacher's pupilAugustBoeckhisvery
doubtful abouta final"solution"(in thesense of an Aufl6sung) of the
hermeneuticcircle butrefusesat the same timeto leave itaside as a phe-
nomenonwithwhich a theoryof interpretation should notbe concerned. T. Botz-Bornstein

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 In hisEncyclopaidie undMethodenlehre derphilologischen Wissen-
schaften, A. Boeckhexaminesthe meaningof the hermeneutic circle
withregardto thecoordination ofgrammatical and
(general) subjective
(individual) interpretation. Thoughhe is obviouslyreworking hereone of
theolder"discoveries" ofSchleiermacher, hisargument turnsina slightly
different direction: "We callgrammaticalthe linguistic explanation which
isbasedon an objective, of
general,point view, whereas the one which is
based on a subjectivepointofviewwillbe called the individual inter-
pretation."39 He thenquicklyrefers tothemethodological problems that
spring from the shiftfrom the individual to the general: "In that waythe
different kindsof interpretation presuppose real knowledge;however,
theycan onlybe obtainedby meansof an interpretation of theentire
sourcematerial."40
Atfirst sighta solutionto thecircleseemsto be close: "The gram-
maticalinterpretation will producethe sense of thewordby seeingit
inthecontext ofdifferent individual and realconditions. Inthiswayone
obtainsa foundation forall theremaining kindsofinterpretation."41 Here
itstillseemsas ifa "ground"fora theory ofinterpretation hasbeenestab-
lishedbymeansofgrammar. However,whathappensifa grammatical
phenomenonis generalbutat thesame timeindividual? Stylistic phe-
nomena,forexample,are constituted by such a condition. The styleofa
workofartisan expression ofthegeneralstylistic tendency of an 6poque
and at the same timean expressionof an individual, creativemind.
Boeckhadmitsthatthecirclecannotalwaysbe avoided.The reasonfor
thisis that,in somecases, "thesameobjectrepresents theonlyfounda-
tionforthegrammatical and, at the same time, the individual ... inter-
pretation; in thiscase the task cannot be solved."42
Thereisno solution tothehermeneutic circle,butthereisa particular
way to use the circleas a "positivepossibility ofunderstanding." Boeckh
uses a wordthatrecallstheRomanticEinfiJhlung (whichhas also been
usedbyDilthey): a GefOhl BythisBoeckhmeans"a feeling
(feeling). with
theaid ofwhichwe can recognize,at once,whattheotherhad recog-
nized beforehand."43 Withthe "feeling,"so Boeckhdeclares,"imagi-
nationobtains,withinhermeneutic activity,the positionof reason."44
No theory and no puretechniqueof interpretation can produceunder-
standing: "Nobodywillbecomea goodinterpreter andcritic onlythrough
theory, in the same as
way nobody will become a good philosophical
thinker onlythrough hisknowledge oflogic."45
Boeckhis certainly notthefirst personwho has introduced "style"
intohermeneutic activity; Schleiermacher didthispreviously byclaiming,
forexample,that"das ganze Ziel [derHermeneutik] istzu bezeichnen
als vollkommenes Verstehen des Stils."46However,itis remarkable that
Boeckhestablishes a surprising linkbetweenthehermeneutic conception
East& West ofstyleand theprinciple
Philosophy ofEinfihlung.

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 Withregardto Ohashi'sreflections on Einf0hlung, we now have a
reasontocomebacktothesubjectofiki.Ohashihasdescribedhowclose
iki,especiallyinconnection withkire,can cometo an act ofEinfihlung
that,in turn,has to do with the notionof style.Ohashi does thisby
pointing totheconceptof "Stilisierung" as ithas beendevelopedbythe
foremosttheoretician of EinfOhlung, Theodor Lipps. Ohashi writes:
"Withinan act of completeempathythe separateness oftheone who
sees and thatwhichis seen disappears.Atthispointthestylization that
Lippshas in mindbecomespossible."47In thissense,forOhashithe
LippsianStilisierung becomesa Westernsisterof iki,and withthishe
certainly an
provides interesting insight, an insight thatI intendedto
underlineby meansofthe precedingconsiderations of Einfiihlung and
hermeneutics.
A pointthatneeds to be added (and whichdoes rathersupport
Ohashi'sfurther elucidations on thesubject)is thattheLippsianEinfiih-
lungis different fromthe hermeneutic one; it is even so different that
Lipps'philosophy leddirectly to positivistideologies.(On theotherhand,
justthisfactmakesthewholesubjecteven moreinteresting, especially
withregardto the hesitant fascination thatKukimanifested towardthe
"liaisonbetweenphilosophy and positivescience"thathe admiredso
muchin Frenchphilosophy.) Fora Lippsianphilosophy of Einfiihlung,
humanunderstanding also comesaboutas Ohashisays,through a direct
contactbetween"Sehendem"and "Gesehendem," and thisunityis not
obtainedthrough a processof "fusion"as itwouldbe in hermeneutics.
On thecontrary, itisobtainedbymeansofwhatLippscallsa "monarchic
subordination" (Unterordnung). ForLipps,theimageof"Verschmelzung"
represents from the verybeginning a wrongidea, because withinthis
image, "kann das 'Verschmolzene'innerhalbdes Verschmelzungs-
produktes gleichwertig nebeneinander stehen."48 Lipps,however, wants
the contrary: he wantsto establish,through a "subordination" of the
subjectunderthe object,an immediateempatheticcontactbetween
thosetwo;and thisis finally done byabstracting from theobject.
ForLipps,thismeansthatthe "isthetische Apperzeption" is always
the "abstrahierende,"49 a perception thatabstracts fromall individual
elementscharacterizing our objectof understanding. It is obviousthat
the abstract and scientific character ofthisintellectual modelis greatly
removedfromall aestheticideasofstyleas a "livingnotion"ina herme-
neuticsenseand also in thesensethatKukiwouldhave preferred with
regard to iki.Lipps'Einftihlung as wellas his of
concept Stilisierung live,
unlikeKuki'siki,exclusivelyin the domainof abstraction. Thisis cer-
tainlyalso the reason why Ohashi concludes thatin Lipps,"stylization"
happens "auf der Ebene des jeweiligen bzw. gelegentlichen'Gefiihls'
des Betrachters," whereas fora productionof iki it should happen "auf
der Ebene des t~itigenLebens."50s T. Botz-Bornstein

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 Mylastclaimcan be madeevenstronger bypointing tothefactthat
of
Lipps'philosophy EinfOihlung led not to
only positivism butalso to an
aestheticideologicalorientationthatwas, byprinciple, unacceptableto
Kuki:impressionism.51 Inone ofthelectures onJapaneseartthathe gave
inPontigny, Kukistressed theviewthat"thewordimpressionism hastoo
oftenbeen thoughtlessly employed." The reason forthisis that "man is
nota mechanism passivelyreceiving This
impressions." means thatwe
shouldnotperceivesimply"impressions" but,in Kuki'swords,a "fleet-
ing,'momentary impression', [which]is veryoftentheexpression ofan
eternaland mystic coming from the depth ofthe soul."52It goes without
sayingthatnothing can be moreremotefroma positivist conceptionof
thanan aesthetics
Einfiihlung thathasdecidedto capturethese'momen-
taryimpressions'."
Withhermeneutics, on theotherhand,we getmuchfurther. Through
Schleiermacher we have seento whatextenttheconceptofstylerepre-
sentsa centralnotionforhermeneutics. Schleiermacher's pupilBoeckh
makesitquiteclearthatEinftihlung is forhermeneutics an equallybasic
notionin the sense thatit bringsabouta kindof hermeneutic under-
standing the
thatflowsoutofthetensionbetween general and the indi-
vidual,and withinthistensionresidesalso the notionof style.Finally,
through thetensionbetweenthegeneraland theindividual
Einftihlung,
is notannulled,norisanydecisionmadeinfavorofeithertheindividual
orthegeneral.Through EinfOhlung,thehermeneutic circleas a wholeis
transformedintoa positivepossibilityofunderstanding, and as itssubject
ofunderstanding itdiscovers"style."

V
The preceding considerations on thedifferent
aspectsof Einfiihlung
can also help us to understand the complexif not paradoxicalcon-
stellationof Germanand FrenchelementsthatKukiwas obviously
designing through his Westernizing methodologizationof thetermiki.
In theend itnevertheless becomesclearwhyKukiputforward ikias a
phenomenon thatshould be treated"hermeneutically."
Thisclaimcan be madestillstronger by lookingat thetreatment of
thehermeneutic circlethatHeidegger himselfsuggested.Itis known that
no otherphilosopher has reflectedmoreuponthehermeneutic circleas
ofunderstanding"
a "positivepossibility thanHeidegger, whointroduced
thesethoughts forthefirsttimeinsection32 ofSeinund
Zeit.
mustinanycase alreadyoperateinthatwhichis under-
Butifinterpretation
stood,and ifitmustdrawitsnurture
from this,howis itto bringanyscientific
withoutmovingin a circle,especiallyif,moreover,
resultsto maturity the
understanding stilloperateswithinourcommoninfor-
whichis presupposed
East& West
Philosophy mationaboutmanandtheworld?"53

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Heideggeris also convincedthatour knowledgeof the worldalways
roamsin the sphereof everydaylife("gemeineMenschenund Welt-
kenntnis")and thatonlyifwe understand "knowledge"as a "scientific
result"willwe claimthatitcan and shouldcome aboutonlythrough a
totalnegationofeverydaylife.In otherwords,knowledgecan become
"positive"(ina scientificsense)onlythrough a negationof itseveryday
environment. Heidegger now asks us to see in the circularmovement
thatconstantly refersus back to everydaylifea positivepossibility of
understanding. Thisdoes notmeanthathe wouldaffirm uncritically
any
conditionofeveryday lifeas a "positive"groundofknowledge. On the
contrary,Heideggerdoes not affirm any groundof understanding: he
only affirmsthe which
circle, constantly refersus back to everyday life.
Heidegger's affirmationofthecircledoes notsignify a resignationin
thesenseofan intellectual fatalism, whichwouldbe a beliefthatknowl-
edge as such is impossible.ForHeidegger,we are noteternally con-
of
demnedto stayin thesphere "commonknowledgeof manand the
world."Itisthescientist whoseesthecircleas a vitiosum thatneedstobe
avoided;he negatescommon,everyday life.Also,thepersonwhosimply
"tolerates"(duldet)thecirclehas resigned fromanypossibility ofpositive
understanding and developsan equallyindifferent attitudetowardevery-
day life.Heideggerasks fora thirdapproach:an activeaffirmation of
thecirclethatnegateseveryday lifeas a negativecondition whosecon-
ventionalcharacter(be it the "man" or the "durchschnittliche Seins-
verst5ndnis")shouldbe overcome.Atthesame timeHeideggeraffirms
everyday lifeas theprovider ofa positivepossibility ofunderstanding.
In Heidegger's ideason thehermeneutic circlethereis a paradoxical
simultaneous affirmationand negationof everydaylifethatproduces
an ambiguousattitude inall thesephenomenaas "pre-comprehension,"
or "average understanding of life."This ambiguousattitudeimplies
thattheeveryday conditionof lifeneedsto be negatedbecause itdoes
notrepresent a "finalresult"oftheprocessofunderstanding. However,
in "comingback" to it we can considerit as a positivemomentof
understanding.

VI
Kuki'sparadoxicalphilosophicalpositionbetweenFrenchration-
alismand Germanhermeneutic historicism
can be considereda widely
personal one. At the same time,however, it is difficult
to resistthe
temptation to see the aforementioned conceptual shifts
thatKukiis
involvedin,and whichsometimeslethimappearlikesomeonetrying
to squarea circle,as shifts
thatare caused bytheparadoxicalnatureof
iki itself.
An elucidation of this problem is extremelydifficult,
and, in my
opinion, it can be undertakenonly by an examinationof Kuki'sthought T. Botz-Bornstein

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 thatwouldfocuson his linkswiththeFrenchrationalist traditionto the
same extentthatone is generally inclinedto focuson hisaffinities with
Heidegger. This,however, cannot be done within the limitsofthis arti-
cle, thepurposeofwhichis mainlyto crystallize someessentialphilo-
sophicalstatements on the notionof styleand the possibilities of its
in
development contemporary philosophy.
Thisshouldnottherefore be understood as an evasionintoa dif-
ferent sphereof argument, butmoreas thecontrary, whenI introduce,
as I am aboutto now,a philosopher who has adoptedand developed
Heidegger's mainclaimson thesubjectofplayand non-foundedness, all
bykeeping a clear distancefrom the German hermeneutic tradition.This
philosopher is JacquesDerrida.Infact,I believethatan examination of
some of Derrida'spointsin thecontextofthediscussionthathas been
providedon thepreceding pageswillrather helpus to understand iki.
The remarkable thingabout Derrida is that, like Heidegger, re-
he
versesPlatonism by combating Plato'sideas of substanceand essence;
however, thenonsubstantial qualitythatremains afterthereversal (which
in a
is, fact, Heideggerian "twisting-outeffect") receives a name: 6criture.
Derridagetsto thispositionbyconcentrating on Plato'sconceptof lan-
guage,in whichhe discoversa centralconceptionthathe depictsas
representative of a whole metaphysical tradition: spokenlanguage.For
Plato, as for metaphysics, written language is seen as a kindof poison
thatis refusedbecause itrunstheriskoffalsifying the "substantial" or
"authentic" character oflanguage.Derridainterprets Plato'sopposition
of speech againstwriting as a disguisedversionof the metaphysical
opposition ofa stable"essence"againstan unstable"non-essence."
Derridashowsthatifwe wanttoovercomePlato'srealism("thetruth
of the eidos as thatwhich is identicalto itself..."),54 we should adopt
a non-metaphysical conceptionof understanding that perceivesno
"authentic," "original," or "essential"speech, but onlywhathe calls
"writing." All signs that we perceive when we understandthe world
shouldbe seenas nothing otherthan6criture.
This"writing" or"script"is notruth inthesenseofan essenceoran
but
origin hasthe self-foundationalcharacter ofa game.Thismeansthat
thetruth thatcan be foundin thiswriting is onlya "played"truth,a
"simulacrum" that"is in itstypethemimeofmemory, ofknowledge,of
truth...."ss
We can nowsaythat"writing," whichhas no essenceand no rela-
tionship with any constant source or origin(forexample,a logos),is
"essentially"ruleless,and thisestablishesa firstlinkwithiki's rule-
lessness,which has been treatedearlier.No "rules" about itsbeing can
be imposed fromoutside itself;like the game, it has only "inner" rules.
Derridaexpressesthisby sayingthatthe "being" ofwritingis constituted
East& West only by mimeticgestures,which self-sufficiently
Philosophy imitateonlythemselves

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and whichare regulated by neitherrulesnorno-rules.Finally,Derrida
compares thiswith the activity of a mimeartist, and thisbecomesim-
portant, as the mime is described in Mallarm6's poem Mimique:"The
Mimeimitates nothing. And to beginwith, he does notimitate. Thereis
nothing priortothewriting ofhisgestures. Nothing is prescribedforhim.
The Mimefollowsno preestablished script... does not obeyanyverbal
order."56
This "writing," which is "groundless"and as self-sufficient as a
game,can onlytakeplace in theperipheral spheresof bothPlatonism
and anti-Platonism because ithastransgressed all conceptions of"truth"
as "presence,""origin,"or "aletheia."Derridawrites:"The mimepro-
duces, thatis to say makesappear in praesentia,manifests the very
meaningofwhathe is presently writing: ofwhathe performs."57 Writing
is a game,since itis neither nor
reality simplynegatedreality: plays "It
enjoyment, renders itpresent and absent."58
What remainsonce Derridahas "deconstructed" the phone is a
game-likeperformance comparableto thatof the mimeartist; and this
can
performance certainly be
only experienced but never conceptu-
alized. Infact,itis notevenexperienced as a "reality," a "presence,"or
a symbol(ofa reality or a presence).Itis a "mimetic"gesture, ground-
less,likea game.
Thoughthisshouldnotbe overstated, a certainresemblance with
Kuki's"disinterested of
play 'iki'," which can "consist simply in a hand
gesture,"is verystriking. In the ikigesturethereis,as in the"mimitic"
gesture,neitherpresencenor an imitation of a "past presence."Iki
comes intobeingwhena momentis reproduced thatis neitherpastnor
Kuki
present. says that ikisignifiesthe factof "having leftthenear past."
Withregardto Japanesepaintings in whichwe can findiki,Kuki
writes:"as an ikipose thereis also thatofJustHavingLefttheBath.In
carrying the recollection of the nude in its nearpast and havingjust
casually dressed in a simple robe ..." (p. 26). This means thatonly by
being a representationneitherof the past nor of the presentbut by
expressingthe stateof "havingleftthe near past" does the painting
obtainthequalityofbeingiki.
The perceptionof ikitakesplace at themoment when(as Nishitani
has writtenaboutJapaneseaestheticsin general)"the essentialimper-
manence of all things,or sheer being-in-the-world, is aesthetically
felt."'9WithDerridawe could commenton the ikifactofJustHaving
LefttheBath:"Thisimitator havinginthe lastinstanceno imitated, this
havinginthelastinstanceno signified...."60 Inotherwords,in
signifier
an ikipaintingthereis no presentationbut onlythe trace (or the writing)
of the nude, which we could easily call the "trace [of] thatwhich does
not let itselfbe summed up in the simplicityof a present."''61 Derrida
reduces the metaphysicaldualism of essence and existenceto what he T. Botz-Bornstein

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 a similarprojectwithhis
calls "trace,"and itseemsthatKukiundertakes
iki.62

VII
Thisarticlehas intendedto show,amongotherthings, thatKuki's
philosophy of iki does not tryto undertake what Benjamincalled an
"aestheticization of the political." Aestheticizationas a stylizationofthe
(political)presentis, in myopinion,a much too narrow conceptto be
brought together withKuki'sphilosophical ambitions. The pointabout
an "aestheticization ofthepolitical"is made by LesliePincuswhenhe
drawslinksbetweentheGermanVolkstum andtheJapaneseminzokuby
relating itto Kuki.Though I admit thatthere existsa certaingroundon
whichsuchan argumentation can be based,I wouldclaimthatitshould
be relativized on thebasisofmyconsiderations above. Pincusmentions
"theaestheticization ofthepolitical,"a projectthatBenjamin(whohad
the extremeexampleof the ItalianFuturists in mind)identified as the
"distinguishing markoffascism."63
First ofall, I wouldtryto makethismorepreciseand admitthatthis
kindof aestheticization of the worlddoes certainly existin proximity
witha philosophy oforganicism thatwas, as Pincusremarks, dominant
in Europebetweenthewars.However,itshouldbe notedthatthe"logic
of organicism," whichwantsto arrangethewhole world(art,politics,
religion, science)intoa coherent,harmonious
and structural network,
does notinthefirst place evokethekindofatmosphere thattheGerman
hermeneutic tradition was trying todistribute."Organicalness" is morea
headword ofmorescientific branches ofthought-for example,analytical
philosophy (especially thatofWhitehead) andtheextremely astheticizing
movements of latermodernity (forexample,certainmovements within
modernarchitecture inthe1960s). However,whatall thesemovements
have incommonis thatforthemthemodelofan organic(and,together
withthis,also an aesthetic) structure is nature,and thisis decisiveinthe
presentcontext.Itmeansthatforthemto aestheticize theworldmeans
always to make the world more natural.
It seemsto me thatthe statement aboutorganicalness thatPincus
but
quotesfromKukicould, finally does not,suggest such a "naturalist"
strategy withregardto an aestheticization oftheworld.The reasonsfor
thisshouldhavebecomeclearfrom whathasbeenexplainedabove.The
quotedpassagefromIkino K6z6 readslikethis:"The relation between
7% -D1 thetwo terms[meaningand languageon theone hand,and thecon-
PAhTilsoyEas&We sciousbeingofan ethnoson theother]is nota mechanicalone inwhich
the partsprecede the whole, but an organic one in which the whole

&West
East
Philosophy
determinesthe parts."64However,as Pincus pointsout, since thishas to
do withhermeneutics, one should insistmore on the tensionthatexists
betweenthepartand thewhole, a tensionthat,forexampleforHeidegger,

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wouldneverbe sublated.Thistensioncreatesmorea sphereof "unde-
withinwhicheven "theaesthetical"cannotbe definedinan
cidability"
absoluteand "logical" way. Kuki'shermeneutic idea of "organicism"
does notso much pointto a kindof organicism relies,in orderto
that
exist,on nothingotherthanthehardlogicalstructure thatit lodges,as
"nature-like"
to a kindofself-sufficient, inside
quantity Itpointsto
itself.
transitory that
qualities settlebetween and
existentia essentia.

NOTES

1 - M. Heidegger,
"Aus einemGesprichvon der Sprache:Zwischen
in Unterwegs
einemJapanerund einemFragenden," zur Sprache
Neske,1959).
(TUibingen:
2- S. Kuki,Ikino K6zd(Tokyo:Iwanami,1930).
von TezukasDarlegungen
3- "UnterBerijcksichtigung im Nachwort
zu seinerjapanischenibersetzungdes 'Gespraichs'wird nach
sorgfiltigemVergleich ... klar ..., dag Heidegger einen stofflich
anspruchsvollen Dialog erfunden hat,handeltes sich nichtein-
mal um eine anniherndgrogziugige Wiedergabedes tatsichlich
GesprachsmitTezuka" (ReinhardMay, Ex orientelux:
gefUihrten
Heidegger'sWerkunterostasiatischem Einflul[Stuttgart:
Steiner,
1989],p. 27).
4- K. Karatani,
"One Spirit,Two Nineteenth SouthAtlantic
Centuries,"
Quarterly87 (3) (Summer 1983): 621.
5- M. Yoneda, Gespr'ichund Dichtung(Bernand New York:Lang,
1984),pp. 93-94.
6- Karatani,
"One Spirit,"
p. 622.
7- Yoneda,GesprichundDichtung,pp. 93-94.
8- The problematiccharacter underlying Heidegger'sprocedurefrom
the beginningbecomesextremely obviousthrough Tezuka'sown
accountof theconversation. He clearlystatesthatin his opinion
Heideggerhad gone a little"overthetop" withsome pointsthat
aremostessentialfortheentireargumentation ofHeidegger's essay,
his
especially equations of theJapanese word for"Sprache"(kotoba)
and the word "Ding." Duringthe conversation, afterhavinglis-
tenedto the veryhesitating explanationsof the Japaneseon this
subject,Heidegger said, according to Tezuka:"Interessant!Dann,
HerrTezuka,ist mdglicherweise die Bedeutungdes japanischen
'Sprache'(kotoba)'Ding'?"Tezukacomments on thisstatementas T. Botz-Bornstein

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 follows:"Es schienmir,dag erdieseAuslegung mehroderweniger
iberzogenhat, und zwar imHinblick aufeinen vorgefa~ten Begriff"
(It seemed to me thathe had moreor less overdonethisinter-
andthiswithregard
pretation, toa premeditated notion)(T.Tezuka,
"EineStundebei Heidegger," inMay,Exorientelux,p. 87; another
Germantranslation ofthearticlecan be foundinH. Buchner, Japan
undHeidegger[Sigmaringen: Torbecke,1989]).
9- R. Ohashi,"Heideggerund GrafKuki:Zu Spracheund Kunstin
Japanals ProblemderModerne,"in H.-H.Gander,VonHeidegger
her:Mel3kirchner Vortrige(Frankfurt:Klostermann, 1989),p. 99.
10- S. Heine, "The FlowerBlossoms'WithoutWhy': Beyondthe
Heidegger-Kuki Dialogue on Contemplative Language," in A
Dreamwithin a Dream(Bernand New York:Lang,1991),p. 170.
11- Yoneda,Gespradch undDichtung, p. 95. Yonedaestablishes a link
betweenikiand figa,all byredescribing fagaas "Natur selbst,"as
of
man's"natural"way being.
12- PeterN. Dale, The Mythof JapaneseUniqueness(New York:
St.Martin'sPress,1986),p. 72.
13- See myarticleon Dandyismas a philosophical phenomenon (with
bibliography): "Rulefollowing in Dandyism: 'Style'as an Over-
comingof'Rule'and 'Structure'," ModernLanguageReview90 (2)
(April1995).
14- S. Light,Shaz6bKukiand JeanPaul Sartre:Influence and Counter
Influencein theEarlyHistory of Existential
Phenomenology (Car-
bondale:Southern IllinoisUniversity
Press,1987),p. 11.
15- Ohashi,"HeideggerundGrafKuki,"p. 95.
16- S. Kuki,"Proposon Japan,"in Light,Shaz6 Kukiand Jean-Paul
p. 87.
Sartre,
17- A. HosoiandJ.Pigeot,"La structure 308 (1973):50.
d'iki,"Critique
18- L. Pincus,"In a Labyrinth of WesternDesire: KukiShuzo and
the Discoveryof JapaneseBeing," in M. Miyoshiand H. D.
Harootunian, eds.,Japanin the World(Durham:Duke University
Press,1989).
19- "... sinnliche[s] Scheinen, durch dessen lebhaftes Entzacken
hindurchscheint"
ibersinnliches "AuseinemGesprach
(Heidegger,
vonderSprache,"p. 101).
20- Ibid.,p. 93.
21- "... durch ... das Hermeneutische... das Iki in ein anderes Licht
East& West
Philosophy gelangtsein" (ibid.,pp. 101 and 100).

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22- In thisarticle,I will be quotingthe Englishpassages fromthe
unpublishedEnglishtranslation of Iki no K6z6 by JohnClark
(London, 1979). Double page referenceswill be to both the
Japanese version and theClark translation.
23- "Was geschieht,wenn die wahreWelt abgeschafft wird?Bleibt
dann nochdie scheinbareWelt?Nein.Denn die scheinbareWelt
kanndas, was es ist,nursein als Gegenstock zur wahren.Wenn
mugauch die scheinbarefallen.ErstdannistderPlato-
diese f5llt,
nismusOberwunden, d.h. so umgedreht, dag das philosophische
Denkenaus ihmherausgedreht wird"(M. Heidegger,Nietzsche,
vol. 1 [Pfullingen: Neske,1961], p. 233 [myitalics];Nietzsche,
vol. 1, trans.D. F. Krell[San Francisco:Harperand Row,1979],
p. 201).
24- K. Nishitani,Religionand Nothingness of
(Berkeley:University
California Press,1982),pp. 133, 135.
25- Ibid.,p. 112.
26- Ohashi speaks of a "Hermeneutik des volkstUimlichenSeins"
("HeideggerundGrafKuki,"p. 96).
27- "Das 'europiischeBegriffssystem,dem Kukinachjagte,war viel-
mehrdas Klassisch-metaphysische, was auch dalrauszu ersehen
ist,dag er das Begriffspaar
essentiaexistentia
aufdas Phanomen
von ikianwandteund der Fragenach der existentia des ikiden
Vorrang gab. Kukiwolltedadurch die Erkenntnislehre
platonische
umdrehen" (R.Ohashi,"Die frUiheHeidegger-RezeptioninJapan,"
in H. Buchner,Japan und Heidegger[Sigmaringen: Torbecke,
1989],p. 29).
28- R. Ohashi,"'Iki' und 'Kire'als Frageder Kunstim Zeitalterder
Moderne,"Aesthetics(Tokyo:Tokyo University Press),March
1992.
29- "Das ganzeZiel [derHermeneutik] istzu bezeichnenals vollkom-
menesVerstehen des Styls"(F. Schleiermacher,Hermeneutik, ed.
H. Kimmerle[Heidelberg:Winter, 1959],p. 108).
30- "Grammatisch kann man keine Individualitatin einem Begriff
zusammenfassen, sondernsie wollenangeschautsein. Technisch
ebenso.Von keinemStyl159tsichein Begriff
geben"(ibid.,p. 115).
31- "Die Alltdglichkeit
wirddorteinmal'abgeschnitten', aber gerade
durchdas Abschneidenentstehtein neues inderman
Alltagsleben,
der Sterblichkeit
des Alltagsgewahrwird. Die Entsagungdes Bud-
dhismus ist ein entscheidendes 'Kire"' (Ohashi, "lki und Kire,"
p. 111). T. Botz-Bornstein

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 32 - S. Hisamatsu,
Zen and theFineArts(Tokyo:Kodansha,1971),p. 35.
33- Ibid.,p. 36.
34- S. Hisamatsu,
"Zen: ItsMeaningforModernCivilization,"
in East-
ernBuddhist1 (1) (1965):22-47, at p. 27.
35- S. Hisamatsu, "UltimateCrisisand Resurrection,"
in EasternBud-
dhist8 (2) (1975): 37-65, at p. 50.
36- "Um das erstegenauzu verstehen
mugmanschondas ganze auf-
genommen haben. NatUrlichnicht.Insofern
es der Gesamtheit
gleich ist,sondern als Skelett,Grundrig..." (Fr. Schleiermacher,
Hermeneutik undKritik, ed. M. Frank[Frankfurt:Suhrkamp, 1977],
p. 98).
37- "Denn bei jedemgri6erenComplexushatdieserauch das ganze
ehergesehn,als erzum Einzelnen (ibid.).
fortgeschritten"
38- Cf. F. Ast,Grundlinien der Grammatik: Hermeneutik und Kritik
(Landshut, 1808). "Jeweiter ich in der des
Auffassung Einzelnen
fortschreite,um so offenbarer wir mirder Geist,um so mehr
sichdie Idee des ganzen,die mirschoninjederEinzelheit
entfaltet
entstanden ist"(Thefurther I advancein theestablishment of the
particular,the more and I
obviously authentically perceivethe
can
and
spirit the more the idea ofthewholewhichhas been present
formealreadyineveryparticularity willdeployitself)(quotedfrom
J.Wach,Das Verstehen, vol. 1 (TUibingen:
Mohr,1926).
39- "Wir nennen die Spracherkl5rung aus jenem objektivenall-
gemeinen StandpunktegrammatischeInterpretation, die aus
dem Standpunkte der Subjektivitat individuelleInterpretation"
(A. Boeckh,Encyclopa'die und Methodenlehre derphilologischen
Wissenschaften [Leipzig:Teubner,1877],p. 84).
40- "So setzendie verschiedenenArtenderAuslegung realeKenntnis-
sen voraus,und doch k6nnendiese erstdurchdie Auslegungdes
gesammten Quellenmaterialsgewonnen werden" (ibid.).
41- "Die grammatische Auslegungwird namlichden Wortsinner-
indemsie ihnunter
mittlen, verschiedenenindividuellen
undrealen
Bedingungen betrachtet.
Hierdurchhatman eine GrundlagefUrdie
ObrigenArtender Auslegung..." (ibid.).
42- "... genau derselbe Gegenstand[ist]zugleich die einzige Grund-
lage der grammatischenund individuellen... Interpretation... so
istdie Aufgabeunldsbar"(ibid.,p. 86).
43- "... ein Gefihl, verm6gedessen miteinem Schlage wiedererkannt
East& West
Philosophy wird,was ein anderererkannthat" (ibid.).

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44- "... trittan die Stelle des Verstandesdie Phantasieals hermeneu-
tischeTLtigkeit"
(ibid.).
45- "Durch die Theoriewirdniemandein guterExegetund Kritiker
werden,so wenigals man durchKenntnis der Logikein philoso-
phischerDenkerwird"(ibid.,p. 76).
46- Boeckh,Hermeneutik undKritik, p. 168.
47- "In einer vollkommenenEinfoihlung
... verschwindetdie Zweiheit
vonSehendemundGesehendem.Dortwirddie vonLippsgemeinte
Stilisierung
erm6glicht" (Ohashi,"'Iki' und'Kire',"p. 108).
48- Th. Lipps,VonderFormderasthetischen Apperzeption inphiloso-
phischeAbhandlungen: Gedenkschrift fOrRudolf Haym (Halle:
Niemeyer, 1902),p. 372.
49- Ibid.,p. 394.
50- Ohashi,"'Iki' und'Kire',"p. 109.
51- On conceptuallinksbetweenEinfOhlung, positivism, and impres-
sionism, see OskarWalzel'sbookDas Wortkunstwerk: Mittel
seiner
Erforschung Wissenschaftliche
(Darmstadt: Buchgesellschaft, 1968),
pp. 58 ff.
52- S. Kuki,"L'expression
de I'infinie
dansI'artjaponais,"inPropossur
le temps(Paris:Renouard,1928); translated by S. Lightas "Con-
siderationson Time,"in S. Light,Shaz6 Kukiand Jean-Paul Sartre
(Carbondale:Southern IllinoisUniversity
Press,1987),p. 62.
53- "Wenn aber Auslegungsich je schon im Verstandenen bewegen
und aus ihm her sich nihrenmug,wie soil sie dann wissen-
schaftlicheResultaten
zeitigen,ohnesichineinemZirkelzu bewe-
gen, zumal wenn das vorausgesetzte Verstindnis Uberdiesnoch
in der gemeinenMenschen und Weltkenntnis sich bewegt?"
(Heidegger,Sein und Zeit [TUibingen: Niemeyer,1986], p. 152;
Beingand Time,trans.J. Macquarrieand E. Robinson[Oxford:
Blackwell,1980],p. 195).
54- "... v6rit6de I'eidos comme ce qui est identiquea soi" (J.Derrida,
La Dissemination[Paris:Seuil,1972], p. 140; Derrida,Dissemina-
tion, B.
trans. Johnson[Chicago:University ofChicagoPress,1981]
p. 123).
55- "... mimeen sontypela memoire, le savoir,la v6rit6..." (Derrida,
La Dissemination,
p. 120; Dissemination, trans.Johnson, p. 105).
56- "Le Mime n'imiterien. Etd'abord il n'imitepas. II n'y a rienavant
I'6criturede ses gestes. Rien ne lui est prescrit.... Le mime ne suit
aucun livretpr66tabli... n'obditA aucun ordreverbal" (Derrida,La
Dissimination,p. 221; Dissemination,trans.Johnson,pp. 194-95). T. Botz-Bornstein

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 57- "Le mimeproduit, c'est-a-dire
faitparaitre
dans la presence,mani-
festele sensmemede ce que pr6sentement il 6crit:de ce qu'ilper-
forme"(Derrida,La Dissemination, pp. 233-234; Dissemination,
trans.Johnson,
p. 206).
58- "Ellejoue la jouissance,la rendabsenteet pr6sente.Elleestle jeu"
De
(J.Derrida, la grammatologie [Paris:Minuit,1969],p. 440; Of
trans. C.
Grammatology, G. Spivak[Baltimore: JohnsHopkinsUni-
versity Press,1974],p. 312). ForfurtherparallelsbetweenDerrida
and Eastern thought, see ZhangLongxi,"The Taoand theLogos,"
CriticalInquiry 11 (March1985); MichelleYeh,"The Deconstruc-
tiveWay,"Journal ofChinesePhilosophy 10 (1983);and Hongchu
Fu, "Deconstruction and Taoism,"Comparative Literature
Studies
29 (3) (1993).
Religionand Nothingness,
59- Nishitani, p. 247.
ce
n'ayantpas d'imit6en derniereinstance,
60- "C'estque cet imitant
de ce
n'ayantpas signifi6, signen'ayantpas
signifiant de en
ref6rent
derniere instance ..." (Derrida, La Dissemination,p. 235-236;
trans.Johnson,
Dissemination, p. 207).
61- "... trace [de] ce qui ne se laisse pas resumerdans la simplicit6
d'un present"(Derrida,De la grammatologie, p. 97; Of Gramma-
tology,trans.Spivak,p. 66).
62- In thiscontextone needsto considerthe history ofJapaneselan-
guage:thewritten scripthasalwaysbeenessentialto understanding
the language.InJapaneseculture,understanding can nevercome
abouton thebasisofa verbal"presence"butonlyon thebasisof
writtensignsto whichspeakersconstantly evenwhenspeak-
refer,
ing"orally."HansWaldenfels has writtenabouttheimportance of
writingin communication amongJapanese "Auf
individuals: jeden
Fallverbinden sichLautundBildzu einersolchenWeisedes Ver-
stehens,dag Horenund Intuition sich verbindenund die ideale
Formnuancierten Verstehens dann erreichtist,wenn die Ge-
sprichspartner sich in der Niederschriftgleicher Bildzeichen
treffen"(HansWaldenfels, "Zen undPhilosophie," Zen Buddhism
2
Today [1984]:7).
63 - Pincus,"In a Labyrinth,"p. 235.
64- Ibid.,p. 12.

East& West
Philosophy

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