CASE:

BRIONES v. CA | G.R. No. 204444 | January 14, 2015

SUMMARY:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari are the Decision dated March 5, 2012 and the Resolution dated October 4, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R.
S.P. No. 117474, which annulled the Orders dated September 20, 20104 and October 22, 20105 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 173 (RTC) in Civil
Case No. 10-124040, denying private respondent Cash Asia Credit Corporation’s (Cash Asia) motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in ordering the outright dismissal of Briones’ complaint on the ground of improper venue.
RATIO:

To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely
abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount
to lack of jurisdiction. To be considered ‘grave,’ discretion must be exercised in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of
law.

The general rule is that the venue of real actions is the court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof,
is situated; while the venue of personal actions is the court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
As an exception, jurisprudence in Legaspi v. Rep. of the Phils., 559 SCRA 410 (2008), instructs that the parties, thru a written instrument, may either introduce
another venue where actions arising from such instrument may be filed, or restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue.

CASE:
MAULEON v. PORTER | G.R. No. 203288 | July 18, 2014
SUMMARY:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated April 11, 2012 and the Resolution dated August 30, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 121353 which affirmed the Decision dated June 25, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 128 (RTC) in S.P. Civil Action No.
C-984 dismissing petitioner Remedios M. Mauleon’s (petitioner) petition for certiorari filed in the said case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the dismissal of petitioner’s certiorari petition.
RATIO:

At the outset, it bears to note that petitioner’s course of action before the RTC was principally anchored on the validity of the August 18, 2009 Order which
granted the execution of the MeTC Decision. On this score, Section 1(e), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that an order of execution is not
appealable, hence, an aggrieved party may resort to the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This is because an order of
execution is not a final order or resolution within the contemplation of the rules, but is issued to carry out the enforcement of a final judgment or order
against the losing party, hence, generally not appealable. While there are circumstances wherein appeal from an improper execution is allowed, none
obtains in this case. Consequently, the Court finds that petitioner properly availed of the remedy of certiorari before the RTC, contrary to the finding of the
CA that she should have appealed therefrom.
In Banaga v. Judge Majaducon (526 Phil. 641, 649-650; 494 SCRA 153, 162 [2006]), the Court enumerated the following exceptional circumstances where a
party may elevate the matter of an improper execution for appeal, to wit:(a) the writ of execution varies the judgment; (b) there has been a change in the
situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust; (c) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution; (d) it
appears that the controversy has never been subject to the judgment of the court; (e) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains
room for interpretation thereof; or (f) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued
against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority.

CASE:
NORTHERN ISLANDS CO., INC v. SPS. GARCIA | G.R. No. 203240 | March 18, 2015
SUMMARY:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated January 19, 2012 and the Resolution dated August 24, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 97448, ordering the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 215 (RTC) to appoint a commissioner to determine the value of the attached
properties of respondents Spouses Dennis and Cherylin Garcia (respondents), and to discharge any excessive attachment found thereby.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC had lost jurisdiction over the matter of the preliminary attachment after petitioner appealed the decision in the Main Case, and
thereafter ordered the transmittal of the records to the CA; and (b) whether the CA erred in ordering the appointment of a commissioner and the subsequent
discharge of any excess attachment found by said commissioner.
RATIO:

Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that in appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the
appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.

Note that in Sps. Olib v. Judge Pastoral, 188 SCRA 692 (1990), the Supreme Court (SC), in view of the nature of a preliminary attachment, definitively ruled
that the attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate action independent of the principal action because the attachment was only an incident of
such action, viz.: Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which the property of an adverse party is taken into legal custody, either at the
commencement of an action or at any time thereafter, as a security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper
party. It is an auxiliary remedy and cannot have an independent existence apart from the main suit or claim instituted by the plaintiff against the defendant.
Being merely ancillary to a principal proceeding, the attachment must fail if the suit itself cannot be maintained as the purpose of the writ can no longer be
justified. The consequence is that where the main action is appealed, the attachment which may have been issued as an incident of that action, is also
considered appealed and so also removed from the jurisdiction of the court a quo. The attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate action
independent of the principal action because the attachment was only an incident of such action.
CASE:
VICENTE v. ACIL CORP | G.R. No. 196461 | July 15, 2015
SUMMARY:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated September 30, 2010 and the Resolution dated March 18, 2011 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 03508-MIN which found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 8 (RTC) in ordering
the execution of judgment in Civil Case No. 22,866-94.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing Vicente’s petition for certiorari.
RATIO:

While a litigant’s right to initiate an action in court is fully respected, once his case has been adjudicated by a competent court in a valid final judgment, he
should not be permitted to initiate similar suits hoping to secure a favorable ruling, for this will result to endless litigations detrimental to the administration
of justice.

CASE:
ALANGDEO, ET AL v. THE CITY MAYOR OF BAGUIO | G.R. No. 206423 | July 1, 2015
SUMMARY:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated June 29, 2012 and the Resolution dated March 5, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 87439, which reversed the Decision4 dated April 27, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 60 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 6007-R
granting the complaint for injunction filed by herein petitioners Leoncio Alangdeo, Arthur Verceles (Verceles), and Danny Vergara (collectively, petitioners).
ISSUE:
The issues for resolution are: (a) whether the CA should have dismissed respondents’ appeal as it involves pure questions of law and/or for lack of merit; and
(b) whether the issuance of a writ of injunction is warranted.
RATIO:

Rule 41 of the Rules of Court (Rules) provides for three (3) ways by which an appeal from the RTC’s decision may be undertaken, depending on the nature
of the attendant circumstances of the case, namely: (a) an ordinary appeal to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction;
(b) a petition for review to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (c) a petition for review on certiorari directly
filed with the Court where only questions of law are raised or involved. The first mode of appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules is available on questions of fact
or mixed questions of fact and of law. The second mode of appeal, governed by Rule 42 of the Rules, is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or
mixed questions of fact and of law. The third mode of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules is filed with the Court only on questions of law.

There is a “question of law” when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and which does not call for an examination
of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a “question of fact” when the doubt or controversy
arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn
therefrom is correct, is a question of law.

It is well settled that for an injunction to issue, two (2) requisites must concur: first, there must be a right to be protected; and second, the acts against
which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right.
CASE:
REICON REALTY BUILDERS CORP v. DIAMOND DRAGON REALTY AND MANAGEMENT, INC | G.R. No. 204796 | February 4, 2015
SUMMARY:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Resolutions dated May 21, 20122 and November 21, 20123 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 116845 which dismissed outright petitioner Reicon Realty Builders Corporation’s (Reicon) certiorari petition on procedural grounds.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Reicon’s certiorari petition before the CA was properly served upon the person of Diamond.
RATIO:

A certiorari proceeding is, by nature, an original and independent action, and, therefore not considered as part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition
of the judgment or order complained of.

In ordinary civil cases, a conditional appearance to object to a trial court’s jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be made when said party
specifically objects to the service of summons, which is an issuance directed by the court, not the complainant. If the defendant, however, enters a special
appearance but grounds the same on the service of the complainant’s initiatory pleading to him, then that would not be considered as an objection to the
court’s jurisdiction over his person. It must be underscored that the service of the initiatory pleading has nothing to do with how courts acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant in an ordinary civil action. Rather, it is the propriety of the trial court’s service of summons — same as the CA’s service of
its resolution indicating its initial action on the certiorari petition — which remains material to the matter of the court’s acquisition jurisdiction over the
defendant’s/respondents’ person.

CASE:
SPS GUEVARRA v. THE COMMONER LENDING CORP, INC | G.R. No. 204672 | February 18, 2015
SUMMARY:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated October 3, 2011 and the Resolution dated October 17, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 02895, which affirmed with modification the Order dated October 20, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Guimbal, Iloilo, Branch 67 (RTC) in
Cadastral Case Nos. 118 and 122, allowing petitioners-spouses Rodolfo and Marcelina Guevarra (Sps. Guevarra) to exercise their right to repurchase the
mortgaged property subject of this case, conditioned upon the payment of the purchase price fixed by respondent The Commoner Lending Corporation, Inc.
(TCLC).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in ruling that the repurchase price for the subject property should be fixed by TCLC.
RATIO:

In an extrajudicial foreclosure of registered land acquired under a free patent, the mortgagor may redeem the property within two (2) years from the date
of foreclosure if the land is mortgaged to a rural bank under Republic Act No. (RA) 720, as amended, otherwise known as the Rural Banks Act, or within one
(1) year from the registration of the certificate of sale if the land is mortgaged to parties other than rural banks pursuant to Act No. 3135. If the
mortgagor fails to exercise such right, he or his heirs may still repurchase the property within five (5) years from the expiration of the aforementioned
redemption period pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land Act, which states:
SEC. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase
by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of the conveyance.
Redemptions from lending or credit institutions, like TCLC, are governed by Section 7857 of the General Banking Act (now Section 47 of the General Banking
Law of 2000), which amended Section 6 of Act No. 3135 in relation to the proper redemption price when the mortgagee is a bank, or a banking or credit
institution.

Settled is the principle which this Court has affirmed in a number of cases that stipulated interest rates of three percent (3%) per month and higher are
excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable, and exorbitant. While Central Bank Circular No. 905-82, which took effect on January 1, 1983, effectively removed
the ceiling on interest rates for both secured and unsecured loans, regardless of maturity, nothing in the said circular could possibly be read as granting
carte blanche authority to lenders to raise interest rates to levels which would either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets.
Since the stipulation on the interest rate is void for being contrary to morals, if not against the law, it is as if there was no express contract on said interest
rate; thus, the interest rate may be reduced as reason and equity demand.

In addition to the principal and interest, the repurchase price should also include all the expenses of foreclosure, i.e., Judicial Commission, Publication Fee,
and Sheriff’s Fee, in accordance with Section 4769 of the General Banking Law of 2000.