BAYAN MUNA V. ROMULO (G.R. NO.

159618; FEBRUARY 1, 2011)

FACTS: In 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed
the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is “subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval” by the signatory states.

In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government, the RP, represented by
then DFA Secretary Ople, finalized a non-surrender agreement which aimed to
protect certain persons of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits
that might be brought against them in international tribunals.

Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and

ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or
at least declared as without force and effect.

ISSUE: [1] Did respondents abuse their discretion amounting to lack

or excess of jurisdiction in concluding the RP-US Non Surrender
Agreement in contravention of the Rome Statute?
[2] Is the agreement valid, binding and effective without the
concurrence by at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate?
HELD: The Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ
from, the Rome Statute. Far from going against each other, one complements the
other. As a matter of fact, the principle of complementarity underpins the
creation of the ICC. According to Art. 1 of the Statute, the jurisdiction of the ICC
is to “be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions [of the signatory
states].” the Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states,
like the RP, over serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the
complementary jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the signatory
states are unwilling or unable to prosecute.

Also, under international law, there is a considerable difference between a State-

Party and a signatory to a treaty. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, a signatory state is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat
the object and purpose of a treaty. The Philippines is only a signatory to the
Rome Statute and not a State-Party for lack of ratification by the Senate. Thus, it
is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of
the Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the Philippines to follow any provision
in the treaty would be premature. And even assuming that the Philippines is a
State-Party, the Rome Statute still recognizes the primacy of international
agreements entered into between States, even when one of the States is not a
State-Party to the Rome Statute.

The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity
of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From
the earliest days of our history, we have entered executive agreements covering
such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most favored-nation rights,
patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation
arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been
seriously questioned by our courts.

Executive agreements may be validly entered into without such concurrence. As

the President wields vast powers and influence, her conduct in the external
affairs of the nation is, as Bayan would put it, “executive altogether.” The right of
the President to enter into or ratify binding executive agreements has been
confirmed by long practice. DISMISSED.

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL v. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL (G.R. No. 191618; NOVEMBER 23, 2010)

FACTS: Atty. Romulo Macalintal questions the constitutionality of the

Presidential Electoral Tribunal(PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.

ISSUES: Whether the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is

unconstitutional for being a violation of paragraph 7, Section 4 of Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution

HELD: First Issue: Petitioner, a prominent election lawyer who has filed
several cases before this Court involving constitutional and election law issues,
including, among others, the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003),cannot claim
ignorance of: (1) the invocation of our jurisdiction under Section 4, Article VII of
the Constitution; and (2) the unanimous holding thereon. Unquestionably,
theoverarching frameworkaffirmed inTecson v. Commission on Electionsis that
the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide presidential and vice-
presidential election protests while concurrentlyacting as an independent
Electoral Tribunal.
 EN BANC RESOLUTION, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J:

G.R. No. 224302 November 29, 2016

Hon. Philip A. Aguinaldo v.

His Excellency President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III

FACTS:
The Judicial & Bar Council submitted several lists of nominees for possible appointees to the
vacancies in the Sandiganbayan. The nominees were clustered into several lists like for example
17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st with five (5) nominees for each cluster. President Aquino appointed
Justice’s to the vacant positions, but did not pick the appointees from the clusters concerned but
appointed justices from one cluster to another position. Petitioners who were listed in the cluster
for the 17th Justice questioned the appointments. They contended that the President could only
choose one nominee from each of the six separate shortlists for each specific vacancy and no
other and the appointment made in deviation of this procedure is a violation of the Constitution.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the clustering done by the JBC is constitutional.

HELD:
The Supreme Court (SC) has affirmed its decision striking down as unconstitutional the clustering
of shortlisted nominees made by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) last year in connection with
Sandiganbayan vacancies.

The power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit the President's power to
appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose someone whom he/she considers worth appointing
to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end, the President appoints
someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment is valid.

President Aquino was not obliged to appoint one new Sandiganbayan Associate Justice from
each of the six shortlists submitted by the JBC, especially when the clustering of nominees into
the six shortlists encroached on President Aquino's power to appoint members of the Judiciary
from all those whom the JBC had considered to be qualified for the same positions of
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
The JBC, in sorting the qualified nominees into six clusters, one for every vacancy, could influence
the appointment process beyond its constitutional mandate of recommending qualified nominees
to the President. Clustering impinges upon the President's power of appointment, as well as
restricts the chances for appointment of the qualified nominees, because (1) the President's
option for every vacancy is limited to the five to seven nominees in the cluster; and (2) once the
President has appointed from one cluster, then he is proscribed from considering the other
nominees in the same cluster for the other vacancies. The said limitations are utterly without legal
basis and in contravention of the President's appointing power.

In view of the foregoing, President Aquino validly exercised his discretionary power to appoint
members of the Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering of nominees into six separate
shortlists for the different vacancies. This did not violate Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987
Constitution which requires the President to appoint from a list of at least three nominees
submitted by the JBC for every vacancy.