In Re Testate of Suntay | 95 PHIL 500

Jose Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in Amoy, Fookien Province, China,
leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy and 9 children by the first
marriage had with the late Manuela T. Cruz and a child named Silvino by the second marriage had with
Maria Natividad Lim Billian who survived him.

Intestate proceedings were instituted in the CFI Bulacan and after hearing letters of administration were
issued to Apolonio Suntay. After the latter's death Federico C. Suntay was appointed administrator of
the estate.

On 15 October 1934 the surviving widow filed a petition in the CFI of Bulacan for the probate of a last
will and testament claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines on November 1929 by
the late Jose B. Suntay.

This petition was denied because of the loss of said will after the filing of the petition and before the
hearing thereof and of the insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss of the said will. After
liberation, claiming that he had found among the files, records and documents of his late father a will
and testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on 4 January 1931 and that
the same was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court, Province of Fookien, China, Silvino
Suntay filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the probate of the will executed in Amoy,
Fookien, China.

RULING: No. The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must be
proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The
legal requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by
competent evidence. There is no proof on these points. In the absence of proof that the municipal
district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may
be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are
a deposition or a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so, it does not measure same as those
provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a proceeding in rem and for the validity of such proceedings
personal notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The interested parties
in the case were known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice was
received by the interested parties residing in the Philippines.
In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in
accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate
and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal
district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or
allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a
competent court of this country.

PCIB vs. Escolin | 56 SCRA 265

FACTS: In November 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas made a will. In May
1957, while she was domiciled here in the Philippines (Iloilo City), she died.

In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges. Linnie however also
stated in her will that should her husband later die, said estate shall be turned over to her brother and
sister.

In December 1962, Charles died (it appears he was also domiciled here). Atty. Leon Gellada, the lawyer
of Charles filed a motion before the probate court (there was an ongoing probate on the will of Linnie)
so that a certain Avelina Magno may be appointed as the administratrix of the estate. Magno was the
trusted employee of the Hodges when they were alive. Atty. Gellada manifested that Charles himself left
a will but the same was in an iron trunk in Charles’ office. Hence, in the meantime, he’d like to have
Magno appointed as administratrix. Judge Venicio Escolin approved the motion.

Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for the said will. Since said will
basically covers the same estate, Magno, as admininistratrix of Linnie’s estate opposed the said petition.
Eventually, the probate of Charles’ will was granted. Eventually still, the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank was appointed as administrator. But Magno refused to turn over the estate.

Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the property to Linnie’s brother
and sister and since that is her will, the same must be respected. Magno also contended that Linnie was
a Texan at the time of her death (an alien testator); that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, successional
rights are governed by Linnie’s national law; that under Texas law, Linnie’s will shall be respected
regardless of the presence of legitimes (Charles’ share in the estate).

PCIB argued that the law of Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws because Linnie was
domiciled outside Texas at the time of her death (applying the renvoi doctrine).
ISSUE: Whether or not Texas Law should apply.

HELD: The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court. Both parties failed to adduce
proof as to the law of Texas. The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a
question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. The
Supreme Court however emphasized that Texas law at the time of Linnie’s death is the law applicable
(and not said law at any other time).

Vallarta vs CA | 150 SCRA 336

FACTS: Rosalinda Cruz, the private offended party, and accused Victoria Vallarta are long time friends
and business acquaintances.

On November 20, 1968, Cruz entrusted to Victoria Vallarta seven pieces of jewelry.

In December of the same year, Vallarta decided to buy some items, exchanged one item with another,
and issued a post-dated check in the amount of P5,000 dated January 30, 1969.

Rosalinda Cruz deposited said check with the bank. However, upon presentment, the check was
dishonored and Cruz was informed that Vallarta's account had been closed. Cruz apprised Vallarta of the
dishonor and the latter promised to give another check. Later, Vallarta pleaded for more time. Still later,
she started avoiding Cruz.

Hence, this criminal action was instituted.

ISSUE: Whether or not Villarta should be held guilty for non-payment of debt

RULING: Yes. By virtue of Rep. Act No. 4885, "(t)he failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the
amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or
the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds" is deemed
prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
To constitute estafa under this provision the act of post-dating or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation must be the efficient cause of defraudation, and as such it should be either prior to, or
simultaneous with the act of fraud.

Moreover, it is now well settled that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law
providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded
upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome
such presumption of innocence"

It is still criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check which is made punishable under the Revised
Penal Code, and not the non-payment of the debt.

Dela Rama vs Ledesma | 143 SCRA 1

Parol Evidence Rule – Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not
admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument.

While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written contracts, it
cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions
which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake.

SUMMARY: Petitioner sued his nephew, the respondent, over a money claim. It transpired from the war
damages claim to be received by Inocentes de la Rama Inc. wherein petitioner was a stockholder.
Petitioner alleged that he sold his 140 shares to the respondent with an understanding that the latter
would deliver to him his (petitioner’s) proportionate equity in the war damage benefits upon payment
by the US foreign claim settlement commission. However, respondent failed to deliver the said
payment. Petitioner relied on their verbal understanding as evidence for his cause of action, however
the trial court, as affirmed by the Court, ruled in favour of respondent. It held that parol evidence
cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions
which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake.

FACTS: Petitioner was a stockholder of Inocentes de la Rama Inc. which suffered damages during the last
war. The corporation had an approved war damage claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission
(P106,000.00) and the first payment (P56,000) was made while De la Rama was still a stockholder. Upon
resolution of the majority of its stockholders, it was used for the reconstruction of the Iris Theater
Building.
Petitioner sold his shares to his nephew. On Nov. 18, 1958, prior to the payment of the balance of the
war damage claim, De La Rama sold to Ledesma at par value his 140 shares in the corporation by
endorsing his certificates of stock in favor of the latter. This was done with an alleged understanding
that De la Rama reserved to himself his proportionate equity in the war damage benefits due on his 140
shares. Ledesma promised to deliver to him this equity upon payment by the Foreign Claim Settlement
Commission of the United States of the remaining balance.

The corporation received a final payment of its war damage claim (P46,696.33) on March 20.1965 and
the Board of Directors passed a resolution distributing the final payment received by said corporation
among its stockholders as dividend computed at P29.59 per share.

o When Ledesma received the dividends pertaining to his total shareholding including the 140
shares he had purchased from De la Rama, the latter demanded from the former the return and delivery
to him of his corresponding share, yet he refused.

Thus, he filed a complaint against respondent, asking for moral and exemplary damages, including
attorney’s fees.

o In his answer, Ledesma admitted the allegation in the complaint except: (a) the alleged verbal
understanding between De la Rama and himself regarding the unpaid war damage claim; (b) the alleged
equity of De la Rama in the said claim as such equity is with the corporation itself, and not with the
stockholders individually; and (c) his liability for damages.

o By way of special defense, he claimed that the indorsement by De La Rama was their exclusive
contract and to allow the latter to prove an alleged simultaneous oral agreement would be contrary to
the Parol Evidence Rule and the Statute of Frauds. Also, the war damage claim belongs to the
corporation, not to the individual stockholders.

o In Reply to the special defense, De La Rama said that the said claim should go to those who
actually suffered damages during the war and that it is not profit of the corporation; that the Statute of
Frauds only applies to executory contracts, not to partially fulfilled ones; and that the instant case is
exempted from the Parol Evidence Rule since the writing fails to express the true intent and agreement
of the parties, and this fact is pleaded.

o He also alleged that the Board of Directors should be guided by the spirit and letter of the
Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946 and that the oral agreement of the parties is consistent with the
trust and confidence of the parties at the time in view of their close blood relationship.
The trial court, on the issue on whether De La Rama is allowed to present parol evidence to prove his
alleged reservation to the war damage benefits, ruled in the negative.

ISSUE: Whether the alleged verbal agreement of the parties concerning plaintiff's reservation of his right
to the balance of the war damage claim at the time of the sale of his shares to the defendant, can be
proven by parol evidence under the Parol Evidence Rule and the Statute of Frauds

RULING: No. A. (See doctrine) The exceptions to the rule do not apply in the instant case, there being no
intrinsic ambiguity or fraud, mistake, or failure to express the true agreement of the parties. If indeed
the alleged reservation had been intended, businessmen like the parties would have placed in writing
such an important reservation.

B. In the case at bar, nowhere in the complaint were the exceptions to the rule alleged or put in issue.

C. Since the alleged reservation is not admissible under the Parol Evidence Rule, the Court does not find
it necessary to discuss the applicability or non-applicability to the present case of the Statute of Frauds.