SWEET LINES, INC.

, petitioner,

vs.

HON. BERNARDO TEVES, Presiding Judge, CFI of Misamis Oriental Branch VII, LEOVIGILDO TANDOG, JR., and ROGELIO TIRO,
respondents.

Filiberto Leonardo, Abelardo C. Almario & Samuel B. Abadiano for petitioner.

Leovigildo Vallar for private respondents.

SANTOS, J.:

This is an original action for Prohibition with Pre Injunction filed October 3, 1973 to restrain respondent Judge from
proceeding further with Civil Case No. 4091, entitled Leovigildo D. Tandog, Jr. and Rogelio Tiro v. Sweet Lines, Inc." after he
denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the complaint, and the Motion for Reconsideration of said order. 1

Briefly, the facts of record follow. Private respondents Atty. Leovigildo Tandog and Rogelio Tiro, a contractor by
professions, bought tickets Nos. 0011736 and 011737 for Voyage 90 on December 31, 1971 at the branch office of
petitioner, a shipping company transporting inter-island passengers and cargoes, at Cagayan de Oro City. Respondents
were to board petitioner's vessel, M/S "Sweet Hope" bound for Tagbilaran City via the port of Cebu. Upon learning that the
vessel was not proceeding to Bohol, since many passengers were bound for Surigao, private respondents per advice, went
to the branch office for proper relocation to M/S "Sweet Town". Because the said vessel was already filled to capacity, they
were forced to agree "to hide at the cargo section to avoid inspection of the officers of the Philippine Coastguard." Private
respondents alleged that they were, during the trip," "exposed to the scorching heat of the sun and the dust coming from
the ship's cargo of corn grits," and that the tickets they bought at Cagayan de Oro City for Tagbilaran were not honored and
they were constrained to pay for other tickets. In view thereof, private respondents sued petitioner for damages and for
breach of contract of carriage in the alleged sum of P10,000.00 before respondents Court of First Instance of Misamis
Oriental. 2

Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue. This motion was premised on the condition
printed at the back of the tickets, i.e., Condition No. 14, which reads:

14. It is hereby agreed and understood that any and all actions arising out of the conditions and provisions of this
ticket, irrespective of where it is issued, shall be filed in the competent courts in the City of Cebu. 3

The motion was denied by the trial court. 4 Petitioner moved to reconnsider the order of denial, but no avail. 5 Hence, this
instant petition for prohibition for preliminary injunction, 'alleging that the respondent judge has departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial preoceeding" and "had acted without or in excess or in error of his jurisdicton or in
gross abuse of discretion. 6
In Our resolution of November 20, 1973, We restrained respondent Judge from proceeding further with the case and
required respondent to comment. 7 On January 18, 1974, We gave due course to the petition and required respondent to
answer. 8 Thereafter, the parties submitted their respesctive memoranda in support of their respective contentions. 9

Presented thus for Our resolution is a question is aquestion which, to all appearances, is one of first impression, to wit — Is
Condition No. 14 printed at the back of the petitioner's passage tickets purchased by private respondents, which limits the
venue of actions arising from the contract of carriage to theCourt of First Instance of Cebu, valid and enforceable?
Otherwise stated, may a common carrier engaged in inter-island shipping stipulate thru condition printed at the back of
passage tickets to its vessels that any and all actions arising out of the ocntract of carriage should be filed only in a
particular province or city, in this case the City of Cebu, to the exclusion of all others?

Petitioner contends thaty Condition No. 14 is valid and enforceable, since private respndents acceded to tit when they
purchased passage tickets at its Cagayan de Oro branch office and took its vessel M/S "Sweet Town" for passage to
Tagbilaran, Bohol — that the condition of the venue of actions in the City of Cebu is proper since venue may be validly
waived, citing cases; 10 that is an effective waiver of venue, valid and binding as such, since it is printed in bold and capital
letters and not in fine print and merely assigns the place where the action sing from the contract is institution likewise
citing cases; 11 and that condition No. 14 is unequivocal and mandatory, the words and phrases "any and all", "irrespective
of where it is issued," and "shag" leave no doubt that the intention of Condition No. 14 is to fix the venue in the City of
Cebu, to the exclusion of other places; that the orders of the respondent Judge are an unwarranted departure from
established jurisprudence governing the case; and that he acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction in is the orders
complained of. 12

On the other hand, private respondents claim that Condition No. 14 is not valid, that the same is not an essential element
of the contract of carriage, being in itself a different agreement which requires the mutual consent of the parties to it; that
they had no say in its preparation, the existence of which they could not refuse, hence, they had no choice but to pay for
the tickets and to avail of petitioner's shipping facilities out of necessity; that the carrier "has been exacting too much from
the public by inserting impositions in the passage tickets too burdensome to bear," that the condition which was printed in
fine letters is an imposition on the riding public and does not bind respondents, citing cases; 13 that while venue 6f actions
may be transferred from one province to another, such arrangement requires the "written agreement of the parties", not
to be imposed unilaterally; and that assuming that the condition is valid, it is not exclusive and does not, therefore, exclude
the filing of the action in Misamis Oriental, 14

There is no question that there was a valid contract of carriage entered into by petitioner and private respondents and that
the passage tickets, upon which the latter based their complaint, are the best evidence thereof. All the essential elements
of a valid contract, i.e., consent, cause or consideration and object, are present. As held in Peralta de Guerrero, et al. v.
Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc., 15

It is a matter of common knowledge that whenever a passenger boards a ship for transportation from one place to another
he is issued a ticket by the shipper which has all the elements of a written contract, Namely: (1) the consent of the
contracting parties manifested by the fact that the passenger boards the ship and the shipper consents or accepts him in
the ship for transportation; (2) cause or consideration which is the fare paid by the passenger as stated in the ticket; (3)
object, which is the transportation of the passenger from the place of departure to the place of destination which are
stated in the ticket.
It should be borne in mind, however, that with respect to the fourteen (14) conditions — one of which is "Condition No.
14" which is in issue in this case — printed at the back of the passage tickets, these are commonly known as "contracts of
adhesion," the validity and/or enforceability of which will have to be determined by the peculiar circumstances obtaining in
each case and the nature of the conditions or terms sought to be enforced. For, "(W)hile generally, stipulations in a
contract come about after deliberate drafting by the parties thereto, ... there are certain contracts almost all the provisions
of which have been drafted only by one party, usually a corporation. Such contracts are called contracts of adhesion,
because the only participation of the party is the signing of his signature or his 'adhesion' thereto. Insurance contracts, bills
of lading, contracts of make of lots on the installment plan fall into this category" 16

By the peculiar circumstances under which contracts of adhesion are entered into — namely, that it is drafted only by one
party, usually the corporation, and is sought to be accepted or adhered to by the other party, in this instance the
passengers, private respondents, who cannot change the same and who are thus made to adhere thereto on the "take it or
leave it" basis — certain guidelines in the determination of their validity and/or enforceability have been formulated in
order to that justice and fan play characterize the relationship of the contracting parties. Thus, this Court speaking through
Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Qua Chee Gan v. Law Union and Rock Insurance Co., 17 and later through Justice Fernando in
Fieldman Insurance v. Vargas, 18 held —

The courts cannot ignore that nowadays, monopolies, cartels and concentration of capital endowed with overwhelm
economic power, manage to impose upon parties d with them y prepared 'agreements' that the weaker party may not
change one whit his participation in the 'agreement' being reduced to the alternative 'to take it or leave it,' labelled since
Raymond Saleilles 'contracts by adherence' (contracts d' adhesion) in contrast to those entered into by parties bargaining
on an equal footing. Such contracts (of which policies of insurance and international bill of lading are prime examples)
obviously cap for greater strictness and vigilance on the part of the courts of justice with a view to protecting the weaker
party from abuses and imposition, and prevent their becoming traps for the unwary.

To the same effect and import, and, in recognition of the character of contracts of this kind, the protection of the
disadvantaged is expressly enjoined by the New Civil Code —

In all contractual property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral
dependence, ignorance indigence, mental weakness, tender age and other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his

protection. 19

Considered in the light Of the foregoing norms and in the context Of circumstances Prevailing in the inter-island ship. ping
industry in the country today, We find and hold that Condition No. 14 printed at the back of the passage tickets should be
held as void and unenforceable for the following reasons first, under circumstances obligation in the inter-island ship. ping
industry, it is not just and fair to bind passengers to the terms of the conditions printed at the back of the passage tickets,
on which Condition No. 14 is Printed in fine letters, and second, Condition No. 14 subverts the public policy on transfer of
venue of proceedings of this nature, since the same will prejudice rights and interests of innumerable passengers in
different s of the country who, under Condition No. 14, will have to file suits against petitioner only in the City of Cebu.
1. It is a matter of public knowledge, of which We can take judicial notice, that there is a dearth of and acute shortage
in inter- island vessels plying between the country's several islands, and the facilities they offer leave much to be desired.
Thus, even under ordinary circumstances, the piers are congested with passengers and their cargo waiting to be
transported. The conditions are even worse at peak and/or the rainy seasons, when Passengers literally scramble to
whatever accommodations may be availed of, even through circuitous routes, and/or at the risk of their safety — their
immediate concern, for the moment, being to be able to board vessels with the hope of reaching their destinations. The
schedules are — as often as not if not more so — delayed or altered. This was precisely the experience of private
respondents when they were relocated to M/S "Sweet Town" from M/S "Sweet Hope" and then any to the scorching heat
of the sun and the dust coming from the ship's cargo of corn grits, " because even the latter was filed to capacity.

Under these circumstances, it is hardly just and proper to expect the passengers to examine their tickets received from
crowded/congested counters, more often than not during rush hours, for conditions that may be printed much charge
them with having consented to the conditions, so printed, especially if there are a number of such conditions m fine print,
as in this case. 20

Again, it should be noted that Condition No. 14 was prepared solely at the ms of the petitioner, respondents had no say in
its preparation. Neither did the latter have the opportunity to take the into account prior to the purpose chase of their
tickets. For, unlike the small print provisions of contracts — the common example of contracts of adherence — which are
entered into by the insured in his awareness of said conditions, since the insured is afforded the op to and co the same,
passengers of inter-island v do not have the same chance, since their alleged adhesion is presumed only from the fact that
they purpose chased the tickets.

It should also be stressed that slapping companies are franchise holders of certificates of public convenience and therefore,
posses a virtual monopoly over the business of transporting passengers between the ports covered by their franchise. This
being so, shipping companies, like petitioner, engaged in inter-island shipping, have a virtual monopoly of the business of
transporting passengers and may thus dictate their terms of passage, leaving passengers with no choice but to buy their
tickets and avail of their vessels and facilities. Finally, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that the bulk of those who
board these inter-island vested come from the low-income groups and are less literate, and who have little or no choice
but to avail of petitioner's vessels.

2. Condition No. 14 is subversive of public policy on transfers of venue of actions. For, although venue may be
changed or transferred from one province to another by agreement of the parties in writing t to Rule 4, Section 3, of the
Rules of Court, such an agreement will not be held valid where it practically negates the action of the claimants, such as the
private respondents herein. The philosophy underlying the provisions on transfer of venue of actions is the convenience of
the plaintiffs as well as his witnesses and to promote 21 the ends of justice. Considering the expense and trouble a
passenger residing outside of Cebu City would incur to prosecute a claim in the City of Cebu, he would most probably
decide not to file the action at all. The condition will thus defeat, instead of enhance, the ends of justice. Upon the other
hand, petitioner has branches or offices in the respective ports of call of its vessels and can afford to litigate in any of these
places. Hence, the filing of the suit in the CFI of Misamis Oriental, as was done in the instant case, will not cause
inconvenience to, much less prejudice, petitioner.

Public policy is ". . . that principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a
tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good ... 22 Under this principle" ... freedom of contract or
private dealing is restricted by law for the good of the public. 23 Clearly, Condition No. 14, if enforced, will be subversive of
the public good or interest, since it will frustrate in meritorious cases, actions of passenger cants outside of Cebu City, thus
placing petitioner company at a decided advantage over said persons, who may have perfectly legitimate claims against it.
The said condition should, therefore, be declared void and unenforceable, as contrary to public policy — to make the
courts accessible to all who may have need of their services.

WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is DISMISS. ED. The restraining order issued on November 20, 1973, is hereby
LIFTED and SET ASIDE. Costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987

MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON,
GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP, respondents.

Tanjuatco, Oreta and Tanjuatco for petitioners.

Pecabar Law Offices for private respondents.

RESOLUTION

GANCAYCO, J.:

Acting on the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Second Division of January 28,1987 and another
motion to refer the case to and to be heard in oral argument by the Court En Banc filed by petitioners, the motion to
refer the case to the Court en banc is granted but the motion to set the case for oral argument is denied.

Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing fee must be assessed on the basis of the amended complaint
cite the case of Magaspi vs. Ramolete. 1 They contend that the Court of Appeals erred in that the filing fee should be levied by considering the amount
of damages sought in the original complaint.

The environmental facts of said case differ from the present in that —

1. The Magaspi case was an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land with damages.2While
the present case is an action for torts and damages and specific performance with prayer for temporary restraining
order, etc.3

2. In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint seeks not only the annulment of title of the defendant to the
property, the declaration of ownership and delivery of possession thereof to plaintiffs but also asks for the payment of
actual moral, exemplary damages and attorney's fees arising therefrom in the amounts specified therein. 4However, in
the present case, the prayer is for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the
action against the defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs for the property in
question, to attach such property of defendants that maybe sufficient to satisfy any judgment that maybe rendered, and
after hearing, to order defendants to execute a contract of purchase and sale of the subject property and annul
defendants' illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff, ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff actual,
compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% of said amounts as maybe proved during the trial as attorney's
fees and declaring the tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid and producing the effect of payment
and to make the injunction permanent. The amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the body
of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Million as damages suffered by plaintiff.5

3. Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest difference of opinion as to the nature of the action in the
Magaspi case. The complaint was considered as primarily an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a
parcel of land. The damages stated were treated as merely to the main cause of action. Thus, the docket fee of only
P60.00 and P10.00 for the sheriff's fee were paid. 6

In the present case there can be no such honest difference of opinion. As maybe gleaned from the allegations of the
complaint as well as the designation thereof, it is both an action for damages and specific performance. The docket fee
paid upon filing of complaint in the amount only of P410.00 by considering the action to be merely one for specific
performance where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation is obviously erroneous. Although the
total amount of damages sought is not stated in the prayer of the complaint yet it is spelled out in the body of the
complaint totalling in the amount of P78,750,000.00 which should be the basis of assessment of the filing fee.

4. When this under-re assessment of the filing fee in this case was brought to the attention of this Court together with
similar other cases an investigation was immediately ordered by the Court. Meanwhile plaintiff through another counsel
with leave of court filed an amended complaint on September 12, 1985 for the inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable
Corporation as co-plaintiff and by emanating any mention of the amount of damages in the body of the complaint. The
prayer in the original complaint was maintained. After this Court issued an order on October 15, 1985 ordering the re-
assessment of the docket fee in the present case and other cases that were investigated, on November 12, 1985 the
trial court directed plaintiffs to rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts which they are asking for. It was
only then that plaintiffs specified the amount of damages in the body of the complaint in the reduced amount of
P10,000,000.00. 7 Still no amount of damages were specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.

On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the amount of P3,104.00 as filing
fee covering the damages alleged in the original complaint as it did not consider the damages to be merely an or
incidental to the action for recovery of ownership and possession of real property. 8 An amended complaint was filed by
plaintiff with leave of court to include the government of the Republic as defendant and reducing the amount of
damages, and attorney's fees prayed for to P100,000.00. Said amended complaint was also admitted. 9

In the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one for recovery of ownership but also for damages, so that
the filing fee for the damages should be the basis of assessment. Although the payment of the docketing fee of P60.00
was found to be insufficient, nevertheless, it was held that since the payment was the result of an "honest difference of
opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee" the court "had acquired jurisdiction over the case and the
proceedings thereafter had were proper and regular." 10 Hence, as the amended complaint superseded the original complaint, the allegations of
damages in the amended complaint should be the basis of the computation of the filing fee. 11

In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was possible as the allegations of the complaint, the designation and the prayer show clearly that it is an
action for damages and specific performance. The docketing fee should be assessed by considering the amount of damages as alleged in the original complaint.

As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket
fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court . 12 Thus, in the present case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the
payment of only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. 13 For an legal purposes there is no
such original complaint that was duly filed which could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and
actions taken by the trial court are null and void.

The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case that the basis of assessment of the docket fee should
be the amount of damages sought in the original complaint and not in the amended complaint.

The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the
original complaint in this case of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the
amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to
evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee. This
fraudulent practice was compounded when, even as this Court had taken cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an
investigation, petitioner through another counsel filed an amended complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of
damages being asked for in the body of the complaint. It was only when in obedience to the order of this Court of
October 18, 1985, the trial court directed that the amount of damages be specified in the amended complaint, that
petitioners' counsel wrote the damages sought in the much reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body of the
complaint but not in the prayer thereof. The design to avoid payment of the required docket fee is obvious.

The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of this unethical practice.

To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should
specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said
damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with
this requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.

The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of
the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee
based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case 14 in so far as it is inconsistent with this
pronouncement is overturned and reversed.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Sarmiento and
Cortes, JJ., concur.

Paras, J., took no par

G.R. No. L-20761 July 27, 1966

LA MALLORCA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MARIANO BELTRAN, ET AL., respondents.

G. E. Yabut, R. Monterey and M.C. Lagman for petitioner.

Ahmed Garcia for respondents.

BARRERA, J.:

La Mallorca seeks the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 23267-R, holding it liable for
quasi-delict and ordering it to pay to respondents Mariano Beltran, et al., P6,000.00 for the death of his minor daughter
Raquel Beltran, plus P400.00 as actual damages.

The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals, briefly are:

On December 20, 1953, at about noontime, plaintiffs, husband and wife, together with their minor daughters,
namely, Milagros, 13 years old, Raquel, about 4½ years old, and Fe, over 2 years old, boarded the Pambusco
Bus No. 352, bearing plate TPU No. 757 (1953 Pampanga), owned and operated by the defendant, at San
Fernando, Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. At the time, they were carrying with them four
pieces of baggages containing their personal belonging. The conductor of the bus, who happened to be a half-
brother of plaintiff Mariano Beltran, issued three tickets (Exhs. A, B, & C) covering the full fares of the plaintiff
and their eldest child, Milagros. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both were below the height at
which fare is charged in accordance with the appellant's rules and regulations.

After about an hour's trip, the bus reached Anao whereat it stopped to allow the passengers bound therefor,
among whom were the plaintiffs and their children to get off. With respect to the group of the plaintiffs, Mariano
Beltran, then carrying some of their baggages, was the first to get down the bus, followed by his wife and his
children. Mariano led his companions to a shaded spot on the left pedestrians side of the road about four or
five meters away from the vehicle. Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to get his other bayong,
which he had left behind, but in so doing, his daughter Raquel followed him, unnoticed by her father. While said
Mariano Beltran was on the running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him his bayong which
he left under one of its seats near the door, the bus, whose motor was not shut off while unloading, suddenly
started moving forward, evidently to resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor has not given
the driver the customary signal to start, since said conductor was still attending to the baggage left behind by
Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus was again placed into a complete stop, it had travelled about ten
meters from the point where the plaintiffs had gotten off.

Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano Beltran immediately jumped from the running board without
getting his bayong from the conductor. He landed on the side of the road almost in front of the shaded place
 where he left his wife and children. At that precise time, he saw people beginning to gather around the body of
a child lying prostrate on the ground, her skull crushed, and without life. The child was none other than his
daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she rode earlier together with her parents.

For the death of their said child, the plaintiffs commenced the present suit against the defendant seeking to
recover from the latter an aggregate amount of P16,000 to cover moral damages and actual damages
sustained as a result thereof and attorney's fees. After trial on the merits, the court below rendered the
judgment in question.

On the basis of these facts, the trial court found defendant liable for breach of contract of carriage and sentenced it to
pay P3,000.00 for the death of the child and P400.00 as compensatory damages representing burial expenses and
costs.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, La Mallorca claimed that there could not be a breach of contract in the case, for the
reason that when the child met her death, she was no longer a passenger of the bus involved in the incident and,
therefore, the contract of carriage had already terminated. Although the Court of Appeals sustained this theory, it
nevertheless found the defendant-appellant guilty of quasi-delict and held the latter liable for damages, for the
negligence of its driver, in accordance with Article 2180 of the Civil Code. And, the Court of Appeals did not only find
the petitioner liable, but increased the damages awarded the plaintiffs-appellees to P6,000.00, instead of P3,000.00
granted by the trial court.

In its brief before us, La Mallorca contends that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in holding it liable for quasi-delict,
considering that respondents complaint was one for breach of contract, and (2) in raising the award of damages from
P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 although respondents did not appeal from the decision of the lower court.

Under the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, we have to sustain the judgement holding petitioner liable for
damages for the death of the child, Raquel Beltran. It may be pointed out that although it is true that respondent
Mariano Beltran, his wife, and their children (including the deceased child) had alighted from the bus at a place
designated for disembarking or unloading of passengers, it was also established that the father had to return to the
vehicle (which was still at a stop) to get one of his bags or bayong that was left under one of the seats of the bus.
There can be no controversy that as far as the father is concerned, when he returned to the bus for his bayongwhich
was not unloaded, the relation of passenger and carrier between him and the petitioner remained subsisting. For, the
relation of carrier and passenger does not necessarily cease where the latter, after alighting from the car, aids the
carrier's servant or employee in removing his baggage from the car.1 The issue to be determined here is whether as to
the child, who was already led by the father to a place about 5 meters away from the bus, the liability of the carrier for
her safety under the contract of carriage also persisted.

It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the
passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues
until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is
a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. Thus, a person
who, after alighting from a train, walks along the station platform is considered still a passenger.2 So also, where a
passenger has alighted at his destination and is proceeding by the usual way to leave the company's premises, but
before actually doing so is halted by the report that his brother, a fellow passenger, has been shot, and he in good faith
and without intent of engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve his brother, he is deemed reasonably and necessarily
delayed and thus continues to be a passenger entitled as such to the protection of the railroad and company and its
agents.3

In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not unloaded when they
alighted from the bus. Raquel, the child that she was, must have followed the father. However, although the father was
still on the running board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run,
so that even he (the father) had to jump down from the moving vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who must
be near the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had
exercised the "utmost diligence" of a "very cautions person" required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed
by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers. In the first place, the driver,
although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the
bus conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter was still unloading part of the baggages of the passengers
Mariano Beltran and family. The presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they are,
therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage.
But even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, herein petitioner can be held liable
for the negligence of its driver, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Paragraph
7 of the complaint, which reads —

That aside from the aforesaid breach of contract, the death of Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter, was caused
by the negligence and want of exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of the
defendants and their agent, necessary to transport plaintiffs and their daughter safely as far as human care
and foresight can provide in the operation of their vehicle.

is clearly an allegation for quasi-delict. The inclusion of this averment for quasi-delict, while incompatible with the other
claim under the contract of carriage, is permissible under Section 2 of Rule 8 of the New Rules of Court, which allows a
plaintiff to allege causes of action in the alternative, be they compatible with each other or not, to the end that the real
matter in controversy may be resolved and determined.4

The plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the culpa or negligence upon which the claim was predicated when it was alleged in
the complaint that "the death of Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of
exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of the defendants and their agent." This
allegation was also proved when it was established during the trial that the driver, even before receiving the proper
signal from the conductor, and while there were still persons on the running board of the bus and near it, started to run
off the vehicle. The presentation of proof of the negligence of its employee gave rise to the presumption that the
defendant employer did not exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its
employees. And this presumption, as the Court of Appeals found, petitioner had failed to overcome. Consequently,
petitioner must be adjudged peculiarily liable for the death of the child Raquel Beltran.

The increase of the award of damages from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 by the Court of Appeals, however, cannot be
sustained. Generally, the appellate court can only pass upon and consider questions or issues raised and argued in
appellant's brief. Plaintiffs did not appeal from that portion of the judgment of the trial court awarding them on
P3,000.00 damages for the death of their daughter. Neither does it appear that, as appellees in the Court of Appeals,
plaintiffs have pointed out in their brief the inadequacy of the award, or that the inclusion of the figure P3,000.00 was
merely a clerical error, in order that the matter may be treated as an exception to the general rule.5Herein petitioner's
contention, therefore, that the Court of Appeals committed error in raising the amount of the award for damages is,
evidently, meritorious.1äwphï1.ñët

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified by sentencing, the petitioner to pay to the
respondents Mariano Beltran, et al., the sum of P3,000.00 for the death of the child, Raquel Beltran, and the amount of
P400.00 as actual damages. No costs in this instance. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., concurs in the result.