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Geoforum 39 (2008) 511–526

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Wave of peace? Tsunami disaster diplomacy in Aceh, Indonesia

a,*
Jean-Christophe Gaillard , Elsa Clavé b, Ilan Kelman c

a
UMR 5194 Pacte – CNRS, Université de Grenoble, 14 Bis Avenue Marie Reynoard, 38100 Grenoble, France
b
Laboratoire Archipel – UMR 8170 Centre Asie du Sud-Est – CNRS, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 54,
Boulevard Raspail, 75006 Paris, France
c
Center for Capacity Building, National Center for Atmospheric Research1, 3450 Mitchell Lane, Boulder, CO 80301, USA

Received 13 October 2006; received in revised form 26 September 2007

Abstract

This paper uses the disaster diplomacy framework to address the impact of the 26 December 2004 tsunami disaster on the decades-
long conflict between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Government of Indonesia. This framework enables the identification of a
micro-factors of great importance in securing momentum for the peace talks. These factors include informal networks being created, plus
disaster relief and diplomacy occurring at multiple levels through multi-way processes and the position of GAM dedicated to reconstruc-
tion activities. This paper further shows that, in the case of Aceh, the disaster had a deep influence on the peace talks between GAM and
the Indonesian government and on the eventual implementation of the peace agreement reached. However, the tsunami disaster should
not be considered the sole vector of peace in Aceh, but as a powerful catalyst in diplomatic talks, since negotiation between both sides
were ongoing before the disaster and were favoured by recent changes in the political environment. Twenty-eight months after the tsu-
nami catastrophe, it is actually non-disaster and internal political factors which are likely to have a more significant impact on the long-
term resolution of the Aceh conflict. One important outcome is that it appears that the slow, unequal and often poor reconstruction
process is not hindering, or even threatening, the peace process because tsunami disaster related factors are less important for peace than
non-tsunami disaster related factors, findings in line with previous disaster diplomacy case studies.
Ó 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Disaster; Armed conflict; Diplomacy; Tsunami; Aceh; Indonesia

1. Introduction Lanka, violence between Colombo and Tamil rebels did

The 26 December 2004 tsunami that hit most of the
countries surrounding the Indian Ocean caused Western
and industrialised states, as well as some non-traditional
donors like China and North Korea, to offer assistance
on a unique scale in disaster history. Among beneficiary
countries were at least three states embroiled in internal
armed conflicts, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Indonesia. In Sri
*
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: jean-christophe.gaillard@ujf-grenoble.fr (J.-C. Gail-
lard), elsaclave@hotmail.com (E. Clavé), ilan_kelman@hotmail.com (I.
Kelman).
1
The National Center for Atmospheric Research is supported by the
National Science Foundation.
not subside following the disaster and relief aid has been
the object of further dissension amongst combating parties
(Frerks and Kelm, 2005b; Le Billon and Waizenegger,
2007; Rajasingham-Senanayake, 2005; Uyangoda, 2005).
On the other hand, the Indonesian government and the
Free Aceh Movement quickly reached an agreement that
seemed to have fostered peace in the northernmost tip of
Sumatra.
Both the Sri Lankan and Indonesian cases are relevant
examples of the impact of disaster on international and
internal diplomacies. In recent years, scholars have shown
an increasing interest in ‘disaster diplomacy’ (e.g. http://
www.disasterdiplomacy.org). Disaster diplomacy particu-
larly focuses on how and why disaster-related activities
do and do not yield diplomatic gains, looking mainly at

0016-7185/$ - see front matter Ó 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2007.10.010
 Author's personal copy
512 J.-C. Gaillard et al. / Geoforum 39 (2008) 511–526
disaster-related activities affecting diplomacy rather than
the reverse (Kelman, 2006, 2007). Disaster diplomacy com-
plements the ‘‘environmental security’’ literature (e.g.
Gleditsch, 1998; Homer-Dixon, 1999; Crank, 2003), which
focuses on how environmental stress affects the possibility
of violent conflict, by suggesting how environmental (and
other) hazards may conversely affect the resolution of
armed conflicts.
However, one significant limitation of the disaster diplo-
macy literature thus far is that many of the case studies
analysed – notably those by Kelman (2003, 2005, 2006,
2007) – involve neither field work nor interviews with peo-
ple involved in the disaster and diplomacy processes dis-
cussed. Other case studies do include such work (see the
next section), supporting the robustness of the disaster
diplomacy conclusions to date, including Kelman’s (2006)
pathways by which disaster diplomacy is promoted and
inhibited. Furthermore, most of the available case studies
of disaster diplomacy focus on how disaster-related activi-
ties spur on or hinder conflict and relationships at the inter-
state level.
Scope therefore exists for intra-state case study analyses
and for case study analyses based on field work. This paper
contributes towards filling in these gaps by providing a case
study of the short- and long-term impacts of the 26 Decem-
ber 2004 tsunami disaster on the resolution of the Aceh
conflict. The focus is on the disaster diplomacy framework
applied to Aceh, rather than on a comprehensive analysis
of Aceh. Thus, this paper’s analysis is different from previ-
ous work in its framing of the post-tsunami Aceh situation
as a disaster diplomacy issue to determine how well this
case study, based on field work, matches or does not match
other case studies. The current disaster diplomacy hypoth-
esis, described in the next section, is tested for this tsunami
diplomacy case study and disaster diplomacy pathways are
sought for Aceh’s post-tsunami peace-related events.
Some work has been completed on post-tsunami peace
and peace failures following the 26 December 2004 disas-
ter, both for Aceh and for other conflicts (John and Illerh-
ues, 2005; Kelman, 2005; Le Billon and Waizenegger, 2007;
McCullogh, 2005; Tjhin, 2005; Morfit, 2006; Oloruntoba,
2005; Rajagopalan, 2005; Renner and Chafe, 2006; Schu-
lze, 2005; Sukma, 2006; Waizenegger, 2007) but a detailed
analysis of Aceh tsunami diplomacy is not yet in the liter-
ature. Given the practitioner attention which this case
study has received, an academic analysis based on field evi-
dence is particularly helpful for testing the robustness of
disaster diplomacy.
The discussion here thus relies on extensive field work
conducted in the province of Aceh (formally known as
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, NAD) in January, March,
May and December 2005 followed up in January, February
and May 2006 (Fig. 1). Informants from the Free Aceh
Movement, the Indonesian Army, the Aceh Monitoring
Mission (AMM) which is described in Section 6, religious
organisations, non-government organisations and the civil
sector were interviewed. Additional interviews were con-
ducted with stakeholders of the tsunami disaster manage-
ment in Aceh and Jakarta. Names, positions, and
organisations of interviewees are not provided here to pre-
serve confidentiality. Field work was completed by collect-
ing secondary written documents such as journal
publications and relevant press clippings from regional,
national and international newspapers.
The next section of this paper will review previous disas-
ter diplomacy work. The third and fourth sections will
describe both the Aceh conflict and the 2004 tsunami disas-
ter in Indonesia. The following three sections will focus
particularly on disaster diplomacy in Aceh and its impact
on the conflict resolution over the short- and long-term,
including using the disaster diplomacy framework to
understand conflict resolution in post-tsunami Aceh. The
last section will address the contribution of the Aceh case
study to disaster diplomacy knowledge.
2. Disaster diplomacy in the literature
In examining how and why disaster-related activities do
and do not induce international cooperation amongst
enemy countries, past disaster diplomacy work has focused
on three main areas covering pre-disaster activities such as
mitigation and prevention and post-disaster activities such
as response and reconstruction. The first area is case study
analyses. In Kelman and Koukis (2000), disaster diplo-
macy inter-state case studies were the response to the earth-
quakes in Greece and Turkey in 1999 (Ker-Lindsay, 2000),
monitoring hurricanes which could affect both Cuba and
the USA (Glantz, 2000), and preventing a drought disaster
across southern Africa (Holloway, 2000). The term
‘‘enemy’’ was thus given a wide remit which is not confined
to violent conflict, but which refers to states which recently
have not been collaborating politically.
Other case studies include rapprochement between India
and Pakistan following the 26 January 2001 earthquake
disaster in India (Kelman, 2003) and the 8 October 2005
earthquake disaster in Kashmir (Kelman, 2006), the USA
providing aid to Iran after the 26 December 2003 Bam
earthquake disaster (Waarner, 2005), and international
aid offered to the USA after the Hurricane Katrina disaster
in 2005 (Kelman, 2007). All these case studies are multilat-
eral, involving two or more states.
At the intra-state level. Buchanan-Smith and Christop-
los (2004a, p. 34) note that the 1998 famine that struck
Sudan ‘‘gave impetus to the collective unlocking of inter-
national political will to seek a political solution to
Sudan’s civil war’’ but the legitimacy of US intervention
has been questioned (Autesserre, 2002). Media coverage
of the 2003 devastating floods in Sri Lanka similarly
highlights that the Tamil Tigers donated relief supplies
amid recent tensions with the Colombo government
(British Broadcasting Corporation, 2003). On the other
hand, and despite initial hope, the perception that emer-
gency aid had been unequally distributed and that recon-
struction policies were socially, politically and culturally
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J.-C. Gaillard et al. / Geoforum 39 (2008) 511–526
Fig. 1. Location of the study area.
insensitive following the 26 December 2004 tsunami,
quickly confirmed and hardened tensions along the con-
flict-torn eastern coast of Sri Lanka (Frerks and Kelm,
2005a,b; Rajasingham-Senanayake, 2005; Wickremesin-
ghe, 2006). During the 2002 eruption of Mount Nyirag-
ongo in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the
Kinshasa government offered assistance to the city of
Goma located at the foot of the volcano, but faced
reluctance from rebels controlling the city. Eventual dip-
lomatic attempts to secure a peace agreement quickly
collapsed (United Nations Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs – Integrated Regional Informa-
tion Networks, 2002; Wisner, 2002). In the Philippines,
newspapers reported breaching of a disaster-related
ceasefire between the government and the New People’s
Army during the August 2006 Mayon volcano evacua-
tion operations (Calalo and Pangco-Pañares, 2006; Mal-
lari, 2006).
513
The pattern seen from the disaster diplomacy case stud-
ies examined so far is that:
(a) Disaster-related activities can, but do not always,
have a short-term impact on diplomacy.
(b) Over the long-term, non-disaster factors have a more
significant impact on diplomacy than disaster-related
activities.
Non-disaster factors could be a leadership change, dis-
trust, belief that an historical conflict or complaint should
take precedence over present-day humanitarian needs, or
priorities for action other than conflict resolution and dip-
lomatic dividends. Additionally, disaster-related activities
can exacerbate conflict, such as Glantz’ (2001) discussion
of climate as being a conflict flashpoint, Kelman’s (2003)
description of disasters as weapons of war, Rajasingham-
Senanayake’s (2005) analysis of the post-2004 tsunami
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514 J.-C. Gaillard et al. / Geoforum 39 (2008) 511–526
reconstruction in Sri Lanka and Brancati’s (2007) quantita-
tive analysis on earthquakes and conflict which validates
the traditional determinants of conflict while showing
how disasters exacerbate social conflict.
The third area of past work comprises characterisation
and categories of disaster diplomacy. Comfort (2000) and
Kelman (2003,2006,2007) propose and analyse patterns
for disaster diplomacy case studies. Factors include infor-
mation flow, actively pursuing disaster diplomacy rather
than passively watching events unfold, and physical prox-
imity and aid relationships of disaster diplomacy states.
These analyses support the conclusions from the previous
paragraph, but have not yielded patterns which would
assist in providing a predictive model for disaster diplo-
macy working or not working in different forms or
circumstances.
Kelman (2006) suggests ‘pathways’ to explain how dif-
ferent players choose different approaches in making disas-
ter-related activities either support or inhibit diplomatic
processes. Sections 5–7 of this paper will focus on these
disaster diplomacy pathways in order to apply them to
the Aceh case study. The framework in Kelman (2006) fur-
ther addresses the levels at which pathways are likely to
originate and be led by – (1) government, (2) organisations
and (3) people – and these levels are discussed with the
pathways.
Kelman (2006) also suggests a checklist of four ques-
tions to examine for disaster diplomacy:
1. Did disaster-related activities influence diplomatic activ-
ities? If not, then by definition it is not a disaster diplo-
macy case study.
2. Did new diplomacy result? If disaster-related activities
influence an already-established diplomatic process,
then catalysis rather than creation has occurred.
3. Is the diplomacy legitimate? The states and other stake-
holders involved must be seeking rapprochement rather
than using the events as a public relations exercise or
awaiting an opportunity to avoid proceeding further
with the diplomacy. Determining legitimacy can be chal-
lenging. Evidence against legitimacy is provided by
Glantz (2000) for Cuba–USA and by Kelman (2006)
for Eritrea–Ethiopia. Evidence for legitimacy is pro-
vided by Holloway (2000) for southern Africa and by
Ker-Lindsay (2000) for Greece–Turkey.
4. Does the diplomacy last? Defining the time scale for
‘‘lasting diplomacy’’ is not straightforward, so this ques-
tion might be better articulated as ‘‘How long does the
diplomacy last?’’
Applying this checklist and the pathways to further case
studies, especially at the intra-state level, and expanding it
as shown in Tables 1 and 2, could be useful for building up
further understanding of disaster diplomacy. The reason is
that diplomacy and conflict literature sometimes treats
state players and non-state players separately, even though
the line between them is becoming blurred regarding the
tasks they undertake; for example, consider pseudostates
(e.g. O 0 Loughlin et al., 1998), paradiplomacy (e.g. Duch-
acek et al., 1988), and protodiplomacy (e.g. Aldecoa and
Keating, 1999). Given the continuing evolution of the
meaning of a ‘‘state’’ and the increasing assertiveness of
non-state players, including non-state governments, in
disaster-related and diplomacy-related activities (e.g. Kel-
man et al., 2006), there might be little expectation for disas-
ter diplomacy to be different at the inter-state level
compared to the intra-state level. It would be prudent to
investigate this question.
The checklist of four questions from Kelman (2006)
will thus be applied to the Aceh tsunami diplomacy case
study in this paper in order to test the current hypothesis
of disaster diplomacy. The hypothesis is that in the
short-term, disaster-related activities can significantly
influence a diplomatic process which already had another
basis, but disaster-related activities only are unlikely to
generate new diplomacy. That is, in the short-term,
disaster-related activities can catalyse, but will not create,
cooperation, but in the long-term, non-disaster factors
will dominate the diplomatic process. Here, the hypothe-
sis is further expanded to suggest that disaster diplomacy
is not different at the intra-state level compared to the
inter-state level.
The disaster diplomacy approach examines one direc-
tion only: from disaster-related activities to diplomatic
activities. The impacts of diplomatic interactions, peace
and conflict, and other politically-related topics on disas-
ter-related activities, both pre-disaster and post-disaster,
are well-documented (e.g. Lewis, 1999; Mileti, 1999;
Buchanan-Smith and Christoplos, 2004b; Wisner et al.,
2004). The reverse is less covered, apart from in the disaster
diplomacy literature which is why this paper focuses on the
disaster diplomacy framework and adds to that literature,
without addressing all aspects of the Aceh situation.
Adopting a disaster diplomacy framework is particularly
important since disaster events in conflict-prone areas lead-
ing to peace is frequently promoted after an event. Exam-
ining this possibility from a research perspective would be
helpful for determining the robustness (or otherwise) of
disaster diplomacy, especially regarding solidifying or pro-
viding counterevidence for the hypothesis.
3. The Aceh conflict in retrospect
The present separatist movement led by the Gerakan
Aceh Merdeka (GAM) or Free Aceh Movement is the con-
temporary extension of older struggles against the Java-
based colonial government even before Indonesia formally
gained its independence in 1949. During this history, of
which only a brief overview is provided because the refer-
ences provide further details, the separatist claim became
religious, social and economic in nature as well as territo-
rial (Van Dijk, 1981; Sjamsuddin, 1990; Robinson, 1998;
Aspinall and Berger, 2001; Sulistiyanto, 2001; Fau, 2003;
Mardhatillah, 2004; Reid, 2005, 2006).
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J.-C. Gaillard et al. / Geoforum 39 (2008) 511–526 515

Table 1
Checklist of items essential to disaster diplomacy at the inter-state level (adapted from Kelman, 2006)
Case study Diplomacy characteristics Summary of reasons
Disaster- New Legitimate Lasting Reconstruction-related Addressing
related long-
standing
issues
Cuba–United Yes Yes No No No for hurricane relief. No Both states consider the lack of diplomacy to be
States Not applicable for advantageous
hurricane monitoring
Ethiopia– No No No No Not applicable No The disaster minimally influenced the conflict
Eritrea
Greece– Yes No Yes Yes No Yes The diplomatic process had started before the
Turkey earthquakes
India– Yes Yes Yes No No To some The diplomatic process collapsed six months after the
Pakistan extent earthquake
after the
2001
earthquake
India– Yes No Yes Not Not yet known To some Not enough time has elapsed to judge whether or not
Pakistan yet extent the diplomacy is lasting
after the known
2005
earthquake
Iran–United Yes No No No No No No new diplomacy was evident and neither state
States pursued the potential opening
North Korea– Yes Yes No No No No Both North Korea and the United States stymied the
United diplomatic process
States
Southern No Yes Yes Yes Not applicable Yes The new, legitimate and lasting diplomacy emerged
Africa from political changes. The drought emergency
permitted that diplomacy to function and to be seen,
but was not a significant causative factor

Table 2
Checklist of items essential to disaster diplomacy at the intra-state level and contribution of the Aceh case
Case study Diplomacy characteristics Summary of reasons
Disaster- New Legitimate Lasting Reconstruction- Addressing
related related long-standing
issues
Aceh after the 2004 Yes No Yes Not No Initially only Diplomatic negotiations were on-going before
tsunami yet the tsunami. The political reconstruction is still
known problematic
Sri Lanka after the 2003 Yes Yes Not enough No No No Tamil Tigers donated relief supplies amid
floods evidence to recent tensions with the Colombo government
judge
Sri Lanka after the 2004 Yes Yes Yes initially No Somewhat but No Unequal distribution of aid and insensitive
tsunami did not last reconstruction policies hardened tensions
Sudan after the 1998 Yes Yes No for US No No No Drought drew international attention on
drought assistance Sudan but aid did not address the root causes
of the conflict
Eastern DRC following Yes No No No Not applicable No Kinshasa offered assistance to Goma but faced
the 2002 Nyiragongo reluctance from rebels. Peace talks quickly
eruption collapsed
Mayon volcano 2006 Yes No Yes No Not applicable No Despite ceasefire, encounters occurred between
eruption Army and NPA
(Philippines)

Despite Aceh enjoying some autonomy after Indonesia’s vourable to the development of the province, an Acehnese
independence, this autonomy was slowly drained of reality. businessman, Hasan Di Tiro, founded in 1976 the Gerakan
Disappointed to see no social and economic progress in Aceh Merdeka (Reid, 2004). The foundation of GAM
Aceh and blaming Jakarta for policies considered as unfa- marked the resurgence of the pre-independence armed
 Author's personal copy
516 J.-C. Gaillard et al. / Geoforum 39 (2008) 511–526
struggle, conducted through an army called Teuntara
Neugara Atjeh (TNA), for their view of social justice and
Acehnese independence. In its early years, GAM activists
gained support from a large part of the rural population,
but was not too effective due to a lack of weapons. The
struggle for independence fared better after 1989 under
the leadership of the Aceh Sumatra Liberation Front–Gera-
kan Aceh Merdeka (ASNLF-GAM) with foreign support
(Chalk, 2001; International Crisis Group, 2001). The con-
flict then intensified. From 1989 to 1998, Indonesian pres-
ident Suharto launched a large-scale military operation
during which human rights violations were frequent. Mur-
ders, kidnappings, beatings, arbitrary detentions, torture,
and rapes were conducted by the Indonesian army, but
also, less often, by GAM combatants (Al Chaidar, 1999;
Amnesty International, 1998; Budiardjo, 2000; Sulistiyan-
to, 2001; KontraS, 2006).
In 1998, the fall of Suharto after 31 years of dictatorship
marked the beginning of a period of political reform known
as Reformasi which temporarily cooled the Aceh conflict
(Sulistiyanto, 2001; Jemadu, 2004; Reid, 2004). In 1999,
President A. Wahid launched a new round of discussions
to obtain a ceasefire. On 8 November 1999, between
500,000 and one million people or one eighth to one quarter
of Aceh’s population gathered in front of Banda Aceh’s big-
gest mosque to ask for a referendum (Sulistiyanto, 2001; He
and Reid, 2004). This alternative to the armed struggle,
widely supported by the population and introduced by the
Senter Informasi Referendum Aceh (SIRA) or Center of
Information for the Referendum of Aceh, was repressed
by the Indonesian army whose leaders became alarmed by
the quick spread of the protest movement (Jemadu, 2004).
In 2000, under the initiative of the Swiss-based Henri
Dunant Centre (HDC), a humanitarian ceasefire was
finally signed and led to an Agreement of Cessation of
Hostilities (CoHA) on 9 December 2002 (Jemadu, 2004;
Reid, 2004). In parallel to the ceasefire discussion, in
August 2001 the national government passed the Nanggroe
Aceh Darussalam (NAD) Law which granted Aceh unprec-
edented authority over its internal affairs (Miller, 2004).
Neither the CoHA nor the NAD law brought sustain-
able peace and political autonomy to Aceh. Only five
months after its signature, the CoHA was breached by mili-
tias suspected of being funded by the Indonesian army
(Reid, 2004) while Jakarta’s effort to implement the law
failed and conversely resulted in further oppression (Miller,
2004). In mid-2003, the Indonesian army benefited from
national political instability partly due to presidential turn-
over to regain control of Aceh. Incumbent president M.
Soekarnoputri then declared the state of military emer-
gency in May 2003, replaced one year later by the state
of civil emergency. The province was closed to foreigners,
most non-governmental organisations and the media (Jem-
adu, 2004; Handmer, 2005).
Interviews with informants in villages of Aceh Besar,
Pidie and Takengon districts (Fig. 1) indicate that, between
2003 and 2004, the scale of violence and fear reached its
highest. Taxes had to be paid to GAM combatants or
the Indonesian army several times for each vehicle along
all major roads and it was common for trade goods to be
robbed. Farmers similarly feared attending to their land
in the mountains or their rice paddies on the foothills. Oral
reporting to military or police outposts was compulsory for
travelling. Even walking in the street was dangerous
because of frequent shoot-outs, following which villagers
could be beaten, raped or tortured in revenge.
4. The 26 December 2004 tsunami disaster in Aceh and its
direct impact on the conflict
On 26 December 2004 at 7:58 am local time, a huge
moment magnitude 9.1 earthquake at 30 km depth struck
off the northwestern coast of Sumatra, near the small island
of Simeulue (Lay et al., 2005). Within 30 min, a powerful
tsunami hit the coast of Aceh and caused tremendous dam-
age. The series of up-to-30 m-high waves battered 2500 vil-
lages located along a 800 km coastal stretch (International
Organization for Migration and Departemen Pekerjaan
Umum, 2005). Early estimates of the death toll in Aceh
reached 234,000 in February 2005 (Soesastro and Atje,
2005). Later assessments set the number of people killed
and missing following the tsunami at between 165,700
according to the Bakornas, the governmental disaster man-
agement agency cited in Rofi et al. (2006), and 167,000
according to the Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi
(BRR), the institution in charge of coordinating Aceh’s
reconstruction (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi
et al., 2005). 500,000 more individuals were rendered home-
less in Aceh (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi et al.,
2005).
This disaster was not the first to hit Aceh in the last 100
years. Between 1907 and 2002, the Center for Research on
Epidemiology of Disasters’ (2006) database lists nine other
disastrous events that each killed at least ten people,
affected at least 100 people, involved a declaration of a
state of emergency, or required international aid. However,
the consequences of the 2004 tsunami disaster went far
beyond previous events. This is partly due to the intensifi-
cation of the armed conflict since 2003 and its lingering
effect on the population of Aceh. The link between disaster
vulnerability and armed conflicts has long been underlined
in the literature (e.g. Brancati, 2007; Wisner, 2003; Wisner
and Walker, 2005 for recent syntheses) and recent catastro-
phes have often struck conflict-affected areas such as Sri
Lanka (2004 tsunami), Pakistan (2005 earthquake), El Sal-
vador (1998 Hurricane Mitch and 2001 earthquakes),
Colombia (recurrent landslides), Algeria (2003 earthquake)
and Western Africa states (recurrent famines). In Aceh, the
impact of the tsunami was greatly accentuated by conflict-
induced coastward population displacements, difficult
access to land and resources, poverty, food insecurity,
physical violence and torture.
Both fighting sides were affected by the disaster but the
Indonesian Army (TNI) was worst hit. The army used to
 Author's personal copy
J.-C. Gaillard et al. / Geoforum 39 (2008) 511–526
control the coastal strip stretching between the Sumatra
circumferential road and the sea, which was the most
severely affected by the tsunami (Fig. 1). Several army
camps in Banda Aceh and Meulaboh were totally devas-
tated but the only available assessment estimates that
2698 soldiers died out of several thousand positioned along
Aceh’s West coast (Waizenegger, 2007). Therefore, the
response capacity of TNI was hindered by the disaster
and the government had to redeploy troops from the East-
ern Aceh coast to the West where damages were much
greater.
GAM combatants who were hiding in the mountains
felt the effect of the tsunami less but two detainment centres
near Banda Aceh and Meulaboh were inundated and none
of the more than 500 prisoners survived the tsunami.
According to informants in Aceh, GAM fighters were the
promptest to respond to the disaster by running down
the hills and extending help to family and neighbours living
in the coastal lowlands. Nevertheless, the response to the
catastrophe quickly became an international affair of
unprecedented scale in disaster history.
5. Post-disaster diplomacy in Aceh
It took three long days for the reluctant Indonesian gov-
ernment to officially call for international aid. Opening the
closed and military-controlled Aceh was not an easy move
for Jakarta. Before the tsunami struck, only two interna-
tional NGOs were permanently working in Aceh and only
with local staff. Within a few weeks of the call for interna-
tional aid, more than 500 NGOs, international aid agencies
and foreign military forces established missions in Aceh. In
the face of this massive influx of foreign influence, the
Indonesian government unofficially stated that all interna-
tional military troops and relief organizations should leave
by 26 March 2005. As it became obvious that the relief
operation could not be as short, the Indonesian govern-
ment decided to restrict movements of foreign individuals
in Aceh to keep its control on the province. Under the pre-
text that the security of aid workers and materials may be
endangered by GAM, foreign individuals’ movements were
either prohibited or highly restricted outside of Banda
Aceh and Meulaboh, the two major cities of the province
(McCullogh, 2005).
Despite these restrictions, there was an international
consensus to say that the tsunami emergency situation
was a great opportunity to foster peace talks in Aceh
(e.g. Aglionby, 2005; Kelman, 2005; Oliver, 2005; Rajago-
palan, 2005; The Observer, 2005; Global Exchange, 2006;
Renner and Chafe, 2006). Many observers agreed that
resorting to military solutions to resolve the conflict in a
concurrent post-disaster emergency and rehabilitation con-
text would be politically incorrect in the eyes of the wider
Indonesian population and international community (e.g.
Sukma, 2006). The huge need for aid all over the province
and the limited capacity of response of the local authorities
could potentially overcome political tensions. This senti-
517
ment was finally confirmed by an announcement by the
Indonesian government on 23 January 2005 which stated
that the Indonesian government and GAM were soon to
resume peace talks in Helsinki.
Eventually, many international analysts, especially from
the media, considered the tsunami to be the single vector of
peace in Aceh (e.g. Aglionby, 2005; Oliver, 2005; Foley,
2006; Vatikiotis, 2007). Therefore, even though other theo-
retical approaches exist for analysing the interaction
between the tsunami disaster and the conflict, considering
disaster diplomacy in further detail would be important
to verify or refute such claims.
With respect to disaster diplomacy, this influx of foreign
aid, foreign aid workers, and foreign aid organisations cov-
ers Kelman’s (2006) pathways of informal networks being
created plus disaster relief and diplomacy occurring at mul-
tiple levels through multi-way processes. Symbolism, using
disaster-related activities to make diplomatic points, was
also prevalent but was made stronger through aid groups
wanting peace in order to distribute aid. It was therefore
particularly important to make sure that foreign aid would
remain conflict-blind.
In the field, the separate involvement of both GAM and
TNI in the emergency response and the early phase of reha-
bilitation resulted in a sharp decrease in the number of con-
flict-related incidents which reached almost zero (Barron
et al., 2005). With GAM fighters, government soldiers
and ordinary citizens perishing without distinction in the
disaster, all were confronted with the same reality. Inter-
views with field informants show that informal help was
extended throughout GAM/military/civilian communities
so that both the GAM and the Indonesian government
appeared to be victims and donors in the tsunami disaster.
At the same time, interviews with foreign aid workers who
flocked to Aceh after the tsunami reveal that they did not
ask if victims were GAM members, government officials,
soldiers or civilians when extending assistance. Only aid
channelled through the military proved to be problematic
as many field informants admitted that pro-GAM villages
were discriminated against in terms of relief provision.
However, overall, as Wilson (2005) states ‘‘much of the
relief effort was conducted as if the conflict did not exist’’.
These factors certainly contributed to level belligerents’
feelings of animosity.
Yet, as soon as April 2005, the number of recorded con-
flict incidents had increased, reaching 33 cases in June
2005, which is still almost half the rate of pre-tsunami
times. Meanwhile, the Army had been accused of abuse,
corruption and human rights violations in the rescue, relief
and early rehabilitation (Human Rights Center and East-
West Center, 2006).
Detailed commentaries and early studies thus ques-
tioned the realism of the tsunami as the sole vector of
peace, promoting other factors as contributing. Schulze’s
(2005) insightful account on the relationship between
tsunami aid, reconstruction and the conflict resolution
reflects the ambiguity between those opposing discourses.
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518 J.-C. Gaillard et al. / Geoforum 39 (2008) 511–526
Regarding the date of the talks resuming, she, presumably
incorrectly, writes (Schulze, 2005, p. 23) that ‘‘on 27 Janu-
ary 2005, GAM and the Indonesian government met for
the first time since the collapse of the Geneva peace process
in May 2003’’ but she then continues with a helpful discus-
sion on non-tsunami factors providing an impetus for
peace.
Indeed, according to informants from AMM, peace
talks actually resumed in 2004 following initial contacts
between Y. Kalla, then Minister for the Coordination of
the Social Affairs, and GAM officials through the help of
Bugis (a Sulawesi ethnic group) businessmen in Finland
and Aceh. Field interviewees confirmed that Bugis busi-
nessmen facilitated negotiations with M. Ahtisaari, the for-
mer Finnish president, well known for his conflict
resolution and trusted by GAM representatives.
When in October 2004 S.B. Yudhoyono and Y. Kalla
were elected as president and vice president of Indonesia,
negotiations were boosted. Y. Kalla received more power
than in the previous Megawati Sukarnoputri’s Nationalist
government in which many people were opposed to peace
talks with GAM. On 31 October 2004, an agreement was
signed between the Indonesian government and M. Manaf,
GAM’s panglima (military chief) for Aceh. This agreement
planned the repartition of lands and plantations between
GAM leaders (20 hectares per person), GAM regular mem-
bers (3 hectares per person) and traditional Acehnese Kor-
anic schools, dayah (100 hectares per dayah). GAM leaders
and fighters were also supposed to benefit from a 60 billion
Rupiah (US$ 6.6 million) compensation and other benefits.
Yet this agreement eventually failed, partly because it was
revealed by an Acehnese magazine and partly because the
division of lands seemed to benefit representatives of the
central government (Feillard, 2006; International Crisis
Group, 2005).
According to AMM officials interviewed in Aceh, it
took almost two months of discussions before peace talks
eventually secretly resumed on 24 December 2004, just
two days before the tsunami disaster. The 2004 secret dis-
cussions show that the ground was already set for further
developments in negotiations between GAM and the Indo-
nesian government. Without any doubt, the tsunami disas-
ter acted as a powerful catalyst, but it could not be
pinpointed as the only agent of peace in Aceh.
Following the 23 January 2005 statement that peace
talks will go public and reach an international level, the
choice of who will lead them became of critical importance.
From the beginning, the United Nations, because of nega-
tive experience in the resolution of East Timor conflict, and
the United States of America, because of their conflicting
relationships with Islamic states, were out of the race.
The government of Indonesia insisted on having neigh-
bouring Asian states as mediators while GAM wanted a
Western counterpart in the negotiations. The European
Union was a legitimate candidate given the long involve-
ment of EU member states, especially Sweden and Finland,
in the peace negotiations in Aceh and its experience in
resolving armed and political crises. The roster was then
completed with five ASEAN member states (Thailand, Sin-
gapore, Brunei, the Philippines and Malaysia) which were
chosen for their knowledge of regional politics and
diplomacy.
In front of this international line up, GAM participated
in the negotiations through its military representatives in
the field in Aceh, its political leaders in exile in Sweden
and Finland, freelance American reporter W. Nessen who
served as GAM’s foreign political advisor and Australian
scholar D. Kingsburry. Within the GAM structure, the
military organisation and the top-down chain of command
facilitated the acceptance by field combatants of orders
coming from abroad and greatly eased the negotiations.
On the other side, the government of Indonesia appointed
B. Tamarono, a former Army general who led the 2003
offensive against the GAM, as its chief negotiator. Tamar-
ono was assisted by current Army officers and police lead-
ers. At the national political level, the consensus to foster
peace was wide and only two members of parliament
opposed the peace talks. As he had already played an
instrumental role in the peace process in the Moluccas in
2002, Vice-President Kalla turned out to be the true man
of peace in Aceh although President Yudhoyono was even-
tually nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize (Liddle, 2005;
Feillard, 2006).
After five rounds of discussions in seven months, the
formal peace talks materialised in August 2005, when all
parties finally sat together around a table of negotiation
in Helsinki, Finland. On 15 August, GAM leaders and
the representatives of the Government of Indonesia signed
a Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) to foster peace
in Aceh. The MOU distinguished two steps in the Aceh
peace process (Aceh Monitoring Mission, 2005): The
demilitarisation of the province and then its political inte-
gration within the Republic of Indonesia.
Morfit (2006) suggests that it was an intricate combina-
tion of mainly political factors which gave way to the
Helsinki MOU: the common willingness of S.B. Yudhoy-
ono and Y. Kalla to take political risk, the complemen-
tarity of both these men, the backing of the military,
the establishment of a clear and firm strategy, the non-
Javanese out-of-the-bureaucracy delegation in charge of
negotiating with GAM and the Indonesian ownership of
the peace process yet with timely support from foreign
mediators. Schulze (2005) similarly provides four key fac-
tors that fostered peace in Aceh beyond the tsunami
effect: the pre-tsunami weakening of GAM’s military
forces, the personal commitment of both S.B. Yudhoyono
and Y. Kalla, the on-going and secret back-channel nego-
tiations between exiled GAM leaders and the Indonesian
government and finally the GAM’s long-standing strategy
of internationalisation. Le Billon and Waizenegger (2007)
focus on pre-disaster political and military contexts to
explain different peace outcomes in post-tsunami Aceh
and post-tsunami Sri Lanka. Clearly, more than the disas-
ter led to the diplomacy.
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J.-C. Gaillard et al. / Geoforum 39 (2008) 511–526
6. Making the guns fall silent to allow international relief
Morfit’s (2006) and Schulze’s (2005) factors are effec-
tively macro-factors at the national scale, largely overlook-
ing local factors which turned out to have provided strong
grassroots support for macro-factors to operate. Those
grassroots causes for the resolution of the Aceh conflict
may be emphasised through the disaster diplomacy frame-
work (see also Ker-Lindsay, 2000 for the Greece–Turkey
grassroots-driven case study) and were identified mainly
through field work and interviews with local stakeholders
of the conflict resolution. While they principally involved
local issues, they were inextricably linked with external
influences, including those mentioned in the previous sec-
tion, and international relief.
In particular, the mutual help between combatants of
both sides coupled with the conflict-blind foreign assistance
and scientific studies all acted as unofficial and grassroots
contributions supporting official peace talks in the field.
As soon as local elections were at stake in the MOU, grass-
roots support became of crucial importance for securing
peace in Aceh. Mutual help between former combatants
and conflict-blind assistance confirmed to the people of
Aceh that all local, national and international stakeholders
were converging in the same direction despite some dis-
agreements on how they should proceed. This multiplicity
of levels and ways which led to and then supported the
Aceh rapprochement confirms Kelman’s (2006) statement
that a combination of players at multiple levels is needed
for disaster diplomacy.
For instance, in the eye of international donors, an ini-
tial ceasefire in Aceh was a prerequisite to allow post-tsu-
nami relief aid to flow easily into the province.
Eventually, long-term demilitarisation was needed to com-
bine post-tsunami reconstruction with post-conflict recon-
struction in a single vast programme. Both steps
(ceasefire and then demilitarisation) therefore received
strong endorsement by the international community. The
GAM/Government of Indonesia MOU thus included two
major statements to facilitate the demilitarisation of Aceh.
First, GAM combatants would return 840 firearms which
would be destroyed. Meanwhile, the Indonesian govern-
ment would withdraw all unnecessary military and police
forces from Aceh before 31 December 2005.
GAM’s position throughout helped in building mutual
respect with the Indonesian government in the long run.
GAM leaders and combatants remained dedicated to facil-
itating the relief efforts. This is despite the Indonesian mil-
itary sending more troops to Aceh immediately after the
tsunami to maintain the pressure on the secessionist move-
ment and to keep its combatants from being sustained by
aid provision. Field informants largely acknowledged that
GAM’s moderate position prevented a sharp increase in
the number of observed incidents in early 2005. Those inci-
dents turned out to be rather isolated events. Interviews
with stakeholders from the communities, GAM and the
Indonesian government show that mutual respect enforced
519
long-term trust between both parties. Focusing first on
disaster-related activities eventually gave the confidence
to build on and to pursue diplomatic negotiations.
To monitor the implementation of the peace agree-
ments, the EU and ASEAN state members involved in
the MOU negotiations created in early September 2005
the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). The AMM was
mostly composed of representatives of member states of
the European Union (EU) with the help of a handful of
EU personnel. It worked in close cooperation with repre-
sentatives of ASEAN state diplomats. AMM’s 160-person
staff comprised present or former military officers, police
representatives and diplomats. The AMM mandate was
originally set to serve until 15 March 2006 but was eventu-
ally extended up to 15 June 2006 and then until November
2006 with a cut of half in the personnel. Its mandate was
finally ended on 15 December 2006, immediately after the
local elections. Since then, observation of the peace process
has been informally taken over by Interpeace, an interna-
tional NGO headed by M. Ahtisaari, whose 35-member
team, composed mostly of Acehnese leaders accompanied
by F. Husain, a former assistant of Y. Kalla during the
peace talks, will serve for two years (Radzie, 2006).
In its mission, AMM only resorted to diplomatic
resources and was not granted any political power or eco-
nomic means of pressure. It could only grant or withdraw
support of the international community to both opposing
sides. Despite these power restrictions, the agreements
between the two sides were well respected and monthly
deadlines for surrendering arms were met. The Indonesian
government withdrew 25,890 soldiers and 5791 policemen
from Aceh, while GAM surrendered 840 firearms and
became a political party on 27 December 2005. The release
of political detainees was tackled on a case-by-case basis
and was assisted by human rights experts. As of March
2006, 1956 political prisoners had been freed on the condi-
tion that they were not involved in terrorist acts or criminal
cases such as drug trafficking (Barron et al., 2006). Accord-
ing to AMM informants, only a few isolated and minor inci-
dents, which caused one death and several injuries, occurred
within six months following the signing of the MOU.
One of the critical points of the demilitarisation process
is the reinsertion of political prisoners and former GAM
combatants into civilian life (Barron et al., 2006). Besides
the released prisoners, the progressive implementation of
the peace agreement pushed many conflict refugees to
return to their native lands in the mountains. Conflict vic-
tims exiled in neighbouring North Sumatra province as
well in Malaysia also decided to come back to Aceh. The
Indonesian government promised incentives including
money, land title and easy access to education and voca-
tional training.
To each former political prisoner, the government pro-
vided a package of 5 million Rupiah (US$ 508) in cash
and in-kind assistance that they primarily used to pay off
debt and to meet everyday needs (Barron et al., 2006). Each
former combatant who surrendered firearms and chose to
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520 J.-C. Gaillard et al. / Geoforum 39 (2008) 511–526
register on government lists should have been granted three
rounds of 1 million Rupiah (US$ 102) in cash. This aid was
planned for 3000 people, which is roughly the number of
full-time GAM members, and was distributed through
the help of local GAM leaders and a commission, the
Badan Reabilitasi Aceh (BRA), set up to oversee the
post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction. In reality,
field interviews show that not all GAM combatants felt
secure enough to leave their hidden life, so the reinsertion
process required more time than originally planned by
the government. Moreover, 3000 beneficiaries turned out
to be an underestimate, as it failed to include GAM mem-
bers or supporters who did not carry arms. The slow trans-
fer of funds from the Indonesian government further
delayed the process. Thus, only 35–50% of the 1 million
Rupiah financial assistance went to the decommissioned
fighters because local GAM leaders chose to distribute a
large fraction of the grant to other beneficiaries such as
widows of combatants killed, orphans and other conflict-
affected people.
Overall, the initial demilitarisation is at the time of writ-
ing (March 2007) a success which made guns quickly fall
silent in Aceh after almost three decades of intense conflict.
The role of the international community, especially the EU
and ASEAN, has been instrumental. The demilitarisation
of Aceh was an international matter to help the foreign
aid reach the tsunami-affected areas and all stricken areas
in Aceh can be freely visited by local or foreign relief
organisations.
The need for peace therefore deeply influenced the
involvement of the international community. On the other
hand, the eventual integration of the province into the lar-
ger national context is an Indonesian internal affair as long
as it does not hinder the post-tsunami reconstruction effort.
That task is much more challenging.
7. Looking beyond the tsunami: reconstructing Aceh politics
The political integration of Aceh into the Republic of
Indonesia is difficult. The GAM/Government of Indonesia
MOU states that GAM shall give up its claim for Aceh’s
independence while, in return, the Indonesian government
shall grant further autonomy to the province of Aceh and
a larger share (70% versus a maximum of 30% under the pre-
vious nationwide 1999 decentralisation law) of economic
revenues from Aceh’s resources (Alisjahbana, 2005). Those
new policies should be framed within a new Aceh Gover-
nance Law, called Rancangan Undang Undang Pemerintahan
Aceh, which should have been ratified by the Indonesian par-
liament before 31 March 2006. In reality, it took much longer
to draft the document and the law was only approved on 11
July 2006. Despite this delay and additional consultative
meetings held by the team in charge of preparing the legal
document, the Aceh Governance Law turned out to be a dis-
appointment for both GAM and Acehnese NGOs who
promptly claimed that the law was not aligned with the
agreements stated in the MOU.
To cool down the situation, P. Feith, AMM chairman,
declared that the terms are not in conflict with those agreed
in the MOU, but called a special meeting of the Commis-
sion on Security Arrangements (CoSA) on 22 July 2006.
The commission asked the Indonesian government to clar-
ify several points in the Aceh Governance Law which are
not in compliance with the Helsinki MOU. In parallel,
GAM prepared for AMM its own assessment of the Aceh
Governance Law. Articles 8, 11 (in which Aceh’s sover-
eignty is minimised in comparison to the MOU state-
ments), 193 (in which investigations on Indonesian
Army’s crimes are cut short), 215 (in which punishments
for human rights abuses are downgraded) have particularly
been challenged by both AMM and GAM. Despite these
dissensions among Aceh peace stakeholders, on 14 August
2006, all parties held a CoSA meeting which was attended
by former Finnish president M. Ahtisaari.
Difficulties in reaching a political consensus are rooted
in a deep division within the Indonesian government
between those who believe in the Helsinki MOU and make
the peace process a priority and those who look at the
MOU as a threat to national unity. In fact, the establish-
ment of local political parties provided in the Aceh Gover-
nance Law does not comply with the Indonesian
constitution which underlines that political parties should
be of national scope, should have their headquarters in
Jakarta and should have representatives in at least half
the country’s provinces. Interviews with government repre-
sentatives show that some fear that more local parties may
arise and trigger future claims for independence.
The local election to define local officials and choose the
head of the Aceh administration was therefore an issue of
critical importance. It should have been held in April
2006 but the delay in drafting the Aceh Governance Law
and in preparing new identification documents for each
local citizen compelled the elections to be postponed.
Opposing viewpoints on the Aceh issue within the Indone-
sian government were further evident when it came time
to extend AMM’s mandate. President Yudhoyono, who
asked for an extension, faced virulent opposition from the
chairman of the parliament who wanted AMM to be dis-
solved. Elections were finally held on 11 December 2006
under the monitoring of AMM representatives and military
and governmental officials from Jakarta. Contradicting all
foreign and national expectations, but confirming local pre-
dictions, I. Yusuf and M. Nazar topped the results with 39%
of the ballots. The success of Yusuf and Nazar, former
GAM military commander and SIRA’s leader respectively,
reflects the rift which has been pitting GAM political lead-
ers based in Sweden against young field combatant leaders
who fought in Aceh. Yet Yusuf and Nazar’s formal and tra-
ditional investitures received the blessing of all GAM fac-
tions, prompting locals and international analysts as well
as GAM representatives to consider the December 2006
Aceh peaceful elections as a true expression of people’s will.
Beyond the elections, GAM leaders are facing their own
difficulties in integrating the national political framework
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J.-C. Gaillard et al. / Geoforum 39 (2008) 511–526
(International Crisis Group, 2006). Leadership issues are
arising following structural changes within the organisa-
tion which is shifting from a military structure with a
top-down chain of command to a political party with dem-
ocratic rules. Interviews with GAM leaders show that sev-
eral political parties may emerge. The People of Aceh
(Partai Rakyat Aceh – PRA) has already been established
while a newly-created women activists’ NGO called Ligue
for Acehnese Women (Liga Inong Aceh – LIGA) may turn
into a political party as well. GAM’s headquarters in
Banda Aceh also must accommodate an unplanned influx
of people seeking help from the former military
organisation.
Finally, GAM leaders face hostile militias which are
allegedly acting on behalf of the Indonesian military and
powerful Jakarta-based businessmen whose illegal activi-
ties are hindered by peace (Eye on Aceh, 2004). As an
example, in April 2006, when the chief of the BRA, Usman
Hasan, stepped down without clear reasons, a militia lea-
der was groomed to replace him. It compelled GAM lead-
ers to threaten to withdraw their support of BRA before a
compromise was found and an Islamic scholar, Yusni Sabi,
was appointed to the top post. At the administrative level,
the influence of GAM still has to spread as it only con-
trolled seven of 19 NAD districts.
Overall, reconstructing Aceh politics turned out to be a
much longer process than expected by AMM. The resulting
over-mediation of the post-tsunami Aceh peace process
may also threaten the fragile agreement. For instance, on
3 July 2006, or one week before the publication of the final
draft of the Aceh Governance Law, an AMM car was tar-
geted by unidentified snipers in the northern part of the
province and an ex-GAM combatant was killed. Media
(Afrida, 2006; Ma et al., 2006) reported that the AMM del-
egation was on its way to a military outpost to negotiate
and calm down the population which was asking for the
liberation of a villager arbitrarily arrested and beaten by
Indonesian army members. Given how rapidly diplomatic
events progressed and the numerous challenges involved
in the peace process, did micromanagement by AMM help
or hinder the resolution of incidents within the context of
resolving the long-term issues? Perhaps the huge interna-
tional diplomatic expectations for a swift and permanent
peace in Aceh were beyond what could reasonably be
achieved within a few months following the tsunami.
In addition to this ‘‘expectations’’ disaster diplomacy
pathway, the ‘‘other events’’ pathway inhibited the peace
process in Aceh and the reconstruction of Aceh politics.
First, Indonesia was soon hit by a series of other disasters
– for example, the May 2006 Merapi volcano eruption and
earthquake disasters in Central Java, the July 2006 tsunami
disaster also in Java, and the January 2007 flood disaster in
Jakarta – which all shifted some attention to other emer-
gency situations which were closer to the capital region.
International institutions, NGOs and local government
agencies acknowledge that they re-dispatched some of their
staff to Java, thus reducing the support given to Aceh.
521
These other events indicate that, in a disaster diplomacy
case study, external factors may soon supersede the
impacts of a disaster which had hit a conflict area, as noted
in Kelman’s (2006) pathways.
The difficulties experienced by both GAM and the Indo-
nesian government go far beyond the tsunami disaster and
the initial peace talks fostered by the international commu-
nity to allow foreign aid to flow easily into Aceh. Hence-
forth, internal cultural, economic, social and political
factors (including other events, especially those closer to
the capital), which ruined ceasefires and peace talks in
the past, will be of much greater importance than tsu-
nami-related issues to establish a long-lasting peace in
Aceh especially with anti-GAM groups allegedly being
funded by the military and powerful businesspeople. Disas-
ter diplomacy pathways at different levels had a catalysing
influence, but can only go so far.
8. The Aceh case study’s contribution to disaster diplomacy
Summarising the observations and analysis from the
previous section, disaster diplomacy theory contributes to
understanding this case study by emphasising the micro-
factors (at the local level) which helped to support the
peace process. Additionally, the disaster diplomacy path-
ways which tended to inhibit the peace process were
macro-factors (at the national and international levels).
In contrast, other literature on the post-tsunami peace pro-
cess tends to focus on the macro-factors which supported
the rapprochement. No contradictions emerge. Disaster
diplomacy and non-disaster diplomacy literature have each
made contributions to the overall analysis indicating the
complexity of the situation and the need to examine multi-
ple factors at multiple scales rather than focusing on only
one approach – including the limitations of using only
the disaster diplomacy framework.
The Aceh case therefore provides a significant addition
to the existing disaster diplomacy literature and knowledge,
enabling underpinning questions of disaster diplomacy to
be addressed in more detail than in many other case studies.
First, by being supported by the field work and second to be
tested at the intra-state level. The four questions from Sec-
tion 2 are now answered for this case study.
1. Did disaster-related activities influence diplomatic activ-
ities? Obviously the 26 December 2004 tsunami disaster
had a deep influence on the initial peace talks between
GAM representatives and the Indonesian government
and the eventual implementation of the peace agreement
in the field. The involvement of the international com-
munity, notably the EU and ASEAN countries, has
been instrumental, but motivated by the need to allow
foreign aid to reach tsunami-affected areas. The initial
and informal ceasefire in Aceh was therefore a prerequi-
site for widespread international aid and it was pro-
foundly influenced by the involvement of the
international community. Eventually, the long-term
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522 J.-C. Gaillard et al. / Geoforum 39 (2008) 511–526
demilitarisation of the province mattered to try to com-
bine post-tsunami reconstruction and post-conflict
reconstruction. The Aceh intra-state case therefore
matches other inter-state disaster diplomacy work in
that the disaster catalysed but did not create diplomacy
(Tables 1 and 2).
2. Did new diplomacy result? In the Aceh case, the answer
is no. Negotiations between GAM leaders and govern-
ment representatives were ongoing for months before
the disaster and materialised into secret peace talks on
24 December 2004. Those talks were favoured by recent
changes in the political environment and the coming to
power of the Yudhoyono-Kalla duumvirate in Septem-
ber 2004 which was open to negotiations. Schulze
(2005) adds two more catalysts to the accelerating pace
of peace talks in post-tsunami Aceh. First, the GAM mil-
itary capacity severely suffered from the 2003 TNI offen-
sive, so resuming peace talks may have saved them from
marginalisation and an apparent military defeat. Second,
the strategy of international lobbying long used by GAM
exiled leaders received fantastic momentum with the
world’s attention focused on the province. The tsunami
disaster should therefore be considered as a powerful cat-
alyst of diplomatic talks, but not as the single vector of
peace in Aceh. Conclusions from most disaster diplo-
macy cases studies at the inter-state level are mirrored
by the Aceh intra-state case (Tables 1 and 2).
3. Is the diplomacy legitimate? On the basis of facts
observed in the field, the Indonesian government and
GAM leaders engaged in legitimate diplomacy when ini-
tiating and implementing peace talks (Tables 1 and 2).
Both parties sought rapprochement rather than using
the events as a public relations exercise. The quick
demilitarization of Aceh and the political negotiations
for the reintegration of the province in the larger Indo-
nesian framework justify this statement. However, more
concerning may be the foreign involvement in the demil-
itarisation of Aceh. Besides AMM and the punctual
intervention of the Finnish president, the international
community has been relatively quiet on the resolution
of the Aceh political issue. International involvement
did not go far beyond the need for a ceasefire in order
to allow post-tsunami aid to reach Aceh. Despite
reminders that conflict resolution and post-conflict
reconstruction should not be divorced from the post-tsu-
nami reconstruction (e.g. Badan Rehabilitasi dan
Rekonstruksi et al., 2005), the conflict-affected areas still
remain of secondary interest for NGOs and interna-
tional donors. The EU and USAID, the biggest donors
for post-conflict reconstruction, have only pledged
US$20 million and US$10 million, respectively, which
is much less than their post-tsunami contribution of
US$250 million and US$400 million, respectively. In
that context, one might ask if the disaster diplomacy
in Aceh was intended to serve Western countries
involved in the huge relief effort? Many countries fought
hard to gain commercial markets in a country of almost
220 million people. Meanwhile, the American govern-
ment naively tried to overcome the deep level of anti-
American antipathy which exists in minority sectors of
Indonesia by providing aid (Kelman, 2005). Finally,
the huge investment of the Turkish government could
relate to its pending application to join the EU.
4. Does the diplomacy last? This is probably the most chal-
lenging question. While the guns quickly fell silent in
Aceh following the tsunami disaster, the long-term polit-
ical reconstruction of Aceh is still uncertain. In its first-
year activity report, BRR notes that ‘‘the tsunami
created an unprecedented opportunity for peace and
recovery in Aceh, but many challenges remain’’ (Badan
Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi et al., 2005, p. 116). The
3 July 2006 so-called Paya Bakong incident (see Section
8) shows the fragile nature of the rapprochement. Even
the AMM representatives, who once strongly believed
that the peace process is irreversible, expressed their con-
cern (Aceh Monitoring Mission, 2006). At this point of
the peace process, factors other than the tsunami, as dis-
cussed above, are thus likely to have a more significant
impact on the long-term resolution of the Aceh conflict.
The difficulties regarding the lasting effect of the tsunami
disaster diplomacy in Aceh support the evidence from
previous work at the inter-state level that, over the
long-term, disaster diplomacy is often superseded by fac-
tors other than disaster-related activities (Tables 1 and 2).
Besides those four initial questions, the Aceh case raises
two more key questions to understand disaster diplomacy’s
failure or success. Both relate to disaster diplomacy case
studies where a disaster event has occurred.
5. Is the diplomacy dependent on the characteristics of the
post-disaster reconstruction? From the Aceh case, could
the slow, unequal and often poor reconstruction process
heralded by most witnesses (e.g. Badan Rehabilitasi dan
Rekonstruksi et al., 2005; Human Rights Center and
East–West Center, 2006; Alexander et al., 2006; Global
Exchange, 2006; Perlez, 2006) be hindering, or even
threatening, the peace process? So far, this argument
has not been advanced by either GAM leaders or the
Indonesian government nor have they threatened to
resume hostilities nor raised other controversial issues
such as the susceptibility of the reconstruction process
to corruption (Asian Development Bank et al., 2005).
The reconstruction is seen as a an opportunity to
strengthen peace by bringing entire communities to
work together (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi
et al., 2005; Kuncoro and Resosudarmo, 2006) and the
newly-elected Aceh government promised to spur job
creation as part of the reconstruction process in the
coming five years. It therefore seems that the peace pro-
cess depends on the resolution of long-lasting unequal
relationships between Jakarta and far-away provinces.
These concerns are of a political and economic, not
disaster-related, nature (Tables 1 and 2).
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J.-C. Gaillard et al. / Geoforum 39 (2008) 511–526
6. How does post-disaster diplomacy address those long-
standing political and economic issues? The MOU
signed between GAM leaders and government represen-
tatives on 15 August 2006 considered a better share of
natural resources for Aceh as well as Aceh’s control of
internal affairs. But the law still had to be approved by
the Jakarta-based parliament. Eventually, the Aceh
Governance Law published in July 2006 partially broke
the initial agreement through slight semantic nuances,
especially in revoking the initial prerequisite for local
leaders’ agreement on any Aceh affair. Moreover, the
law downgrades Aceh’s share of local natural resources
revenue from 70% to 60%. If GAM leaders initially
hoped for the possibility of an Acehnese near-sovereign
government within the Indonesian state, they are today
much more cautious. Overall, it seems that short-term
well-meant post-disaster diplomacy hardly overcomes
long-standing political and economic issues (Tables 1
and 2).
9. Conclusions
Studying Aceh following the 26 December 2004 tsunami
provides useful insights regarding questions underpinning
disaster diplomacy issues at the intra-state level along with
testing the disaster diplomacy hypothesis. The evidence
available suggests that inter-state and intra-state disaster
diplomacy are similar, irrespective of the players involved –
and that disaster diplomacy is similarly limited in both sets
of case studies. The expanded portion of the disaster diplo-
macy hypothesis is thus confirmed that disaster diplomacy
is not different at the intra-state level compared to the
inter-state level.
The conclusions drawn from previous disaster diplo-
macy contributions at the inter-state level are confirmed;
disaster-related activities can have a short-term impact on
diplomacy but, over the long-term, non-disaster factors
have a more significant impact. That is, the entire disaster
diplomacy hypothesis detailed earlier has been confirmed,
supported by an intra-state case study.
The short-term nature of disaster diplomacy, when it
manifests, is the main limitation of the framework in that
policy-makers and practitioners should not rely on disaster
diplomacy to yield peace, irrespective of its popularity and
promotion amongst the media and the public. The ephem-
eral property likely explains why inter-state and intra-state
disaster diplomacy are similar. First, policy and decision
makers at any level can be equally distracted by influences
other than disasters, irrespective of whether their concerns
are inter-state or intra-state. Second, when a disaster event
is the focus of disaster diplomacy, as in the case of Aceh’s
earthquake and tsunami, it strikes without regards to bor-
ders, plus the time scale of onset and decay is the same,
irrespective of the number of countries affected or the prox-
imity of borders to the worst-hit areas. Reactions of enemy
players should not be expected to be different whether
523
boundaries between the enemies are international borders,
for inter-state disaster diplomacy, or are differing opinions
potentially expressed through violence, for intra-state
disaster diplomacy. In fact, Kelman’s (2006) disaster diplo-
macy pathways tend to highlight players at different levels,
without explicitly suggesting or seeming to assume that
they must be inter-state players.
With similar factors and pathways influencing disaster
diplomacy at inter-state and intra-state levels, similar
(and similarly limited) outcomes would be expected from
disaster diplomacy, as seen in post-tsunami Aceh. The
disaster diplomacy framework itself is not flawed, because
it is clear regarding its limitations; however, the frequent
view that disaster diplomacy does and should work should
be overturned by emphasising the entire hypothesis which
has been tested here for Aceh. Additionally, using the
disaster diplomacy framework enabled the identification
of a couple of important micro-factors to secure field
momentum for the peace talks and another couple of fac-
tors which may still inhibit diplomacy in the long run.
Disaster diplomacy therefore assists in analysing situations
where disaster-related activities and diplomacy are
intertwined.
In Aceh, the sudden openness to international attention
and access, spurred on by the overwhelming havoc caused
by the tsunami disaster, was the major catalytic impact
identified by disaster diplomacy. The disaster diplomacy
framework further emphasises ‘pathways’ which supported
the peace process at the grassroots level, e.g. the multiple
levels of formal and informal networks of mutual relations
amongst conflicting parties. However, realistic expectations
must be maintained regarding the middle and long-term
outcomes of post-tsunami diplomacy, especially given
‘pathways’ which inhibit disaster diplomacy, e.g. neither
the post-disaster reconstruction nor the peace agreements
fully address long-standing political and economic issues.
Moreover, recent disasters on Java have shifted some
attention away from Aceh, further inhibiting long-term
diplomacy. Disaster diplomacy has limited impact, espe-
cially over the long-term, and should not be relied on to
maintain or boost the so far successful peace process.
By using an intra-state case study and by using field
work, this work has strengthened and supported disaster
diplomacy work so that policy and decision makers can
be more comfortable in accepting the conclusions. A differ-
ent research method and a different type of case study has
led to the same overall conclusions regarding disaster
diplomacy, suggesting the robustness of the framework –
and of understanding the framework’s limitations. Addi-
tionally, it is possible to speculate that the ongoing research
and practice work on non-state players, including non-state
governments, being involved in international diplomacy
endeavours is boosted by this study because it re-affirms
that diplomatic processes are increasingly blurring the lines
between the expected roles of state and non-state players.
Regarding Aceh, retaining or losing the post-tsunami
diplomacy effects over the long-term could depend on
 Author's personal copy
524 J.-C. Gaillard et al. / Geoforum 39 (2008) 511–526
whether or not Aceh is ever as closed as it was beforehand
and whether or not international attention continues to
affect internal affairs to a large degree. With the newfound
openness, are all parties being forced to work legitimately
towards a robust peace or are they freely enjoying the
opportunity to illustrate what could be achieved in Aceh
beyond conflict and disaster?
Acknowledgements
Field work was partially supported by the Tsunarisque
programme through grants from the Délégation Intermin-
istérielle Pour le Tsunami (France), the French Embassy to
Indonesia and the Conseil Général de l’Essonne (France).
The National Center for Atmospheric Research is sup-
ported by the National Science Foundation. The authors
would like to thank M. Pelling (King’s College London),
J. Twigg (University College London), Katie Willis (Royal
Holloway, University of London) and three anonymous
reviewers for their useful suggestions.
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