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Earthquake performance of telecommunications infrastructure in

Christchurch 2010 / 2011

Article · October 2011

DOI: 10.1109/INTLEC.2011.6099735

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 Earthquake Performance of Telecommunications
Infrastructure in Christchurch 2010 / 2011.
Colin Foster
BE, CPEng, MIPENZ
Christchurch
New Zealand
Colin.foster@chorus.co.nz
Abstract— Christchurch (population 350,000) New Zealand has
suffered from three significant earthquakes in the last 12 months
• September 4 2010 – magnitude 7.1 (no fatalities)
• February 22 2011 – magnitude 6.3 (182 fatalities)
• June 13 2011 – magnitude 6.3 (no fatalities)
Each earthquake had different centres and shaking
characteristics.
Telecom is the main provider of Fixed Line services in New
Zealand. It also operates Mobile, Broadband, Data and other
telecommunications services. Chorus is the business within
Telecom that owns and operates the Access part of that network
(cables and contractors that provision customer equipment) and
operates the Buildings portfolio (including the power equipment)
that houses the telecommunications equipment.
This paper discusses the impact the earthquakes had on the
Telecom network, the issues in maintaining and restoring
services and some of the permanent fixes required to its
infrastructure.
The Telecom NZ core network continued to operate both
through and after each event and the many aftershocks. There
was call overloading issues on both the PSTN and Mobile
networks, but much more significantly on the February 22 event
that coincided with the mid-day lunch break. After the
immediate aftermath panic, calling levels returned to manageable
levels.
Telephone exchange buildings, mobile cell towers and roadside
access cabinets suffered minimal damage, compared to the very
significant damage to other buildings in the CBD and eastern
suburbs. All equipment (network, power and air conditioning)
had been seismically supported and suffered no damage.
Telecommunications power systems continued to operate as
designed. There was widespread damage to the public power
systems and in some areas it was more than a month following
the February event before restoration was achieved.
Most exchanges in the affected areas had engine alternators to
support equipment loads. Mobil Cell Tower systems had
batteries that would last greater than two hours and Access
Cabinets (primarily installed to provide enhanced broadband
services) had batteries to last greater than five hours.
It was recognised from earlier events that the Mobile network
would be the prime mode of telecommunications (for both
restoration and normal communications); so many sites had been
provisioned to be easily connected to portable engine alternators.
Immediate restoration efforts were targeted at locating a
sufficient number of suitably sized engine alternators, to keep
these sites operational. Most had fibre connections back to a
telephone exchange. Few cell sites failed. The next priority was
refuelling on a regular basis.
Many more issues were identified and managed through as
efforts were made to restore some form of normality to the
running of the city. Resources were available locally to manage
most of the day to day restoration efforts but were significantly
boosted by Chorus people operating remotely and some who
travelled to the city to relieve the permanent residents as the
event restoration stretched on.
Other significant issues that became apparent were largely
dependant on other infrastructure services to provide permanent
solutions. These included the power system, water supply (for the
cooling towers of the central exchange that formed part of the
national network architecture) and access through damaged
streets to some network nodes (mainly Mobile sites).
The paper outlines details of both temporary and permanent
restoration solutions.
Keywords – Earthquake, Infrastructure performance,
Telephone services, Restoration management, Power
systems, Permanent restoration.
I. INTRODUCTION
Christchurch in the South Island of New Zealand has
suffered from a number of significant earthquakes since
September 2010. The most significant of these (measured on
the Richter scale) have been
• September 4 2010 (4.35am), magnitude 7.1 approximately
44 Km west of Christchurch, on the Greendale fault and
there were no fatalities
• February 22 2011 (12.51pm), magnitude 6.3 approximately
6 Km south east of Christchurch, on the Lyttelton fault and
caused 182 fatalities
• June 13 2011 (2.20pm), magnitude 6.3 approximately 7 Km
south east of Christchurch on the Lyttelton fault and there
were no fatalities.
There have been in excess of 7000 aftershocks, many down at
magnitude 2. The earthquake’s have already had intense study
from engineering, scientific and governmental organisations
and is ongoing.¹
The February earthquake significantly damaged the buildings
of the central city which was where most of the deaths
occurred. This earthquake had vertical g-forces recorded of
greater than 2g. Many of the damaged buildings were early
20th century brick with minimal reinforcement support. They
had been constructed before the advent of seismic standards in
the 1930’s. Some multi-storied buildings either collapsed or
became seriously damaged. Significant land slumping
occurred alongside the Avon River and liquefaction damage
occurred extensively in the eastern suburbs adjacent to the
coast. In some areas around the river land has dropped by up
to 1.5 meters in some instances. Considerable quantities of
water was squeezed from the land (as part of the liquefaction)
and caused extensive flooding. Christchurch has a relatively
high water table.
The land slumping was most noticeable around bridges where
the structures remained stable but the approaches have
dropped. This change has cause considerable disruption to the
infrastructure (cables and pipes) that crosses the river over a
bridge. Many roads were difficult to access and some adjacent
to the river were unusable. This was to make access to plant,
exchanges, mobile sites (towers) and cabinets difficult even
more so because of the congestion on roads by other vehicles.
The immediate service impact to Telecom’s
telecommunications network has varied with each event. The
September quake was in the early hours of the morning and
because it was a way from the City centre was not as
significant from a damage perspective as the February or June
events. Both of the later events were near the middle of the
day when families were split up and people were attempting
the contact each other.
All core networks continued to operate. Both the PSTN (fixed
line) and Mobile networks became congested after each event.
Text messaging proved the most effective means of
communication.
II. DAMAGE TO TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND POWER
INFRASTRUCTURE
Power from the public utility failed for varying periods
around the region. All telephone exchanges have at least a
battery back-up for reserve and the larger ones also have
generator (engine) in case of mains failure. Only one engine
failed to start automatically.
Power cables had extensive damage in the eastern suburbs and
many have had to be replaced. In some cases temporary
overhead lines have been installed.
Damage to Telecom’s copper network was more extensive in
the February quake in the eastern suburbs where cables were
both stretched and crushed in some cases. Some larger cables
were considered too extensively damaged to be repaired and
so fibre cable and electronic options were used for service
restoration.
Some Mobile Cell towers developed a lean as a result of
liquefaction and land slumping.
The damage to Telecom’s buildings was minimal considering
the magnitude and locations to the earthquake epee centre. All
equipment had been seismically supported within these
buildings and all had continued to operate. Also most of the
building services had continued to function normally. These
services included DC power supply to equipment, engines to
support that continued operation and cooling of equipment
spaces where engines had been provided. Unrestrained
lighting systems were the main plant failures.
Two buildings did however suffer a reasonable level of
damage although these exchanges continued to operate. It is
probable that rebuild options will be considered for these sites.
The main points of failure were where buildings had been
extended since their original construction.
III. TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE RESTORATION
Even though the core telecommunications network continued
to operate, the extensive loss of power meant that ultimately
for those sites solely on battery, energy levels would run out
and fuel levels would be exhausted for those operating on
engines.
Telephone services to some areas of the city are provided by
fibre cable to roadside cabinets, then copper to customers.
Power is required in these cabinets along with a battery to
provide a nominal 8 hour power reserve. Telecom has been
deploying a Fibre to the Node programme since 2008 and is
due to be completed by the end of 2011 where broadband is
provided over the fibre, but telephone services continued over
the copper connected to the Telephone Exchange. The “Node”
is a roadside cabinet that requires a power supply and also has
a battery with a nominal 5 hour reserve.
Mobile cell sites did not have engines to back up their
continued operation except those that were accommodated at
Telephone exchanges. The nominal battery reserve for an
urban cell site is 2 hours at full power. In events like this these
sites have a much higher than normal power demand.
Chorus had learned from previous disruptive weather events
(snow and floods), that customers are migrating to relying on a
Mobile phone service as their prime means of communications
especially during the early stages. Mobile substitution for
fixed line services has not happened as fast as in other
international markets probably mainly because fixed line calls
are still part of the phone rental. It was therefore important to
focus on keeping Mobile cell sites operational.
The basics order of service continuity was determined as
• Core Network
• Mobile (3G had priority over 2G)
• Fixed line (PSTN)
• Broadband
Broadband was considered the least important because in
general customers rely on a power from the public supply to
operate their own equipment. Customers close to Telephone
exchanges still had their broadband services direct from the
exchange. There would be about 50% of customers with
services from a roadside cabinet.
A significant number of cabinets and Mobile cell sites had
provision to install a portable engine. There were insufficient
engines locally to support the continued operation of these
field sites. It was something that Chorus had undertaken
planning on and provisioned portable engines for the previous
events. However the demand for this earthquake out stripped
the quantities and sizes required for a population density such
as Christchurch. The field sites were in the order of
 • Mobile cell sites – 20 and required at least a 10 kW engine
each
• Fixed line roadside cabinets – 20 and required at least a 2.5
kW engine each
• Broadband cabinets – 200 and required around a 3 kW
engine each.
There were also two Telephone Exchanges without engines
and without the prospect of an immediate restoration of power
in each of the earthquakes and required at least 20 kW
engines. The February event had the greatest impact.
Some engines were available in Christchurch and were under
the custodianship of the Chorus Services Contractor. Others
were held in other parts of the South Island while others were
both flown in from the North Island and purchased off the
shelf where ever technically suitable product could be located.
Chorus was not the only player in this market.
Power was restored progressively as power distribution
systems could be made secure and repaired. Power restoration
rates varied depending on the impact of each earthquake to the
system
• September saw 90% restored within 12 hours
• February it took 10 days to get to 90% and
• June was about 20 hours to get 90% restoration.
Generators were deployed based on importance (Exchanges
then Mobile sites) and the availability of adequately sized
machines.
IV. RESTORATION MANAGEMENT
Chorus had the task of managing the restoration of
Telecom’s services. This was done by teams set up around
New Zealand some of which this type of activity was an
extension of business as usual activity.
In Christchurch a team worked from the Christchurch Central
Exchange for the September earthquake but access to the site
was restricted by Civil Defence. Following a return to
business as usual and comments by the GNS (institute of
Geological and Nuclear Science) group that provides expertise
on earthquakes within New Zealand that more large
earthquakes could be expected, it was decided to relocate the
“War Room” to a Telephone exchange outside of the Central
Business District (CBD). This had been partially set up by
February.
For the “Buildings” group, there were local representatives
working in the “War Room” but were managed through
regular audio conferences from management in other parts of
the country. Because the February event was recognised as
being much longer lasting, both local and distant staff were
rostered onto regular days off, to ensure burn out did not occur
and continuity could be kept up 7 days a week.
Chorus has a contract with a consultancy group Opus to
develop and operate a building inspection process following
any significant seismic event.² This involves a model that
predicts damage to key buildings around the country (based on
an earthquakes epee centre and strength) and a national
inspection team that can respond to ensure buildings are safe
to enter. This process links into the Civil Defence systems to
ensure other professional don’t impede the access of Chorus
contractors. All significant buildings were checked after each
significant earthquake or after shock, normally anything over a
Richter magnitude 5 or more particularly a VII on the
Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMS) scale, a measurement that
more indicates the level of local shaking.
Chorus employs contractors to maintain and manage its
“Building” and network infrastructure. These contractors
formed part of the crisis management team and were required
to respond to faults, assist in sourcing temporary plant (such as
engines) and keep them operational through refuelling
schedules or “runs”.
V. ACCESS RESTRICTIONS
After each major earthquake roads became congested with
people trying to get to family or friends and emergency
services attempting to respond to calls for help. The state of
roads (liquefaction, sinkholes and flooding) and particularly
bridges slowed traffic movements. This impeded the rate at
which contractors could respond to the deployment of portable
engines (generators) and in some cases attend to network
faults. The management of portable generator deployment was
based on planned power restoration times communicated to
Chorus by the power distributor, Orion.
After the September earthquake the CBD was closed for about
a week, while buildings and infrastructure was checked.
Telecom’s major exchange (Telecom House) for the South
Island and a significant site for the New Zealand Network is in
the centre of the CBD. After the February shake, with such
extensive damage to buildings in the CBD the whole area was
locked down with patrols by the Police and Armed Forces
combined – it is known as the “red” zone. A state of national
civil emergency had been declared. While Telecom House
remained operational, being supported on engine power, the
major part of the cooling system used open cooling towers and
therefore required a continuous source of water. The normal
city mains supply was not available. An on site artesian well
was available but had to be manually connected. This started
the development of a liaison between Chorus and the Civil
Defence and Police that has continued on into a recovery
organisation CERA (Canterbury Earthquake Recovery
Authority), which has the task of fast tracking the
redevelopment of the city over a 5 year period.
Telecom House not only accommodates the local PSTN
switching, but also substantial links to the rest of the country,
the Mobile switches for the South Island, some other national
functionality and customers network equipment. It was
essential that a significant number of people could get access
to the site. Careful liaison with and education of the authorities
of Telecom’s functions in this area, have helped substantially
in keeping the access routes open. In some respects it can be
seen as a privilege as others including property owners have
not been allowed in while other buildings are deemed unsafe
and are being deconstructed. It is expected this restriction is
going to last for some areas in excess of 12 months.
 VI. THE TELECOM HOUSE CHALLENGE
The Telecom House site was in the middle of the “red”
zone. There were damaged buildings around the site, and those
that had potential to affect operations from the site had those
risks mitigated. As above, access was a challenge, but
recognition of the site’s criticality for both the local and
national telecommunications networks, made issues around
these issues easier to resolve.
Following the February earthquake power was shut off to the
site for 5 days as a safety measure. The site has two diverse
power feeds but both of these were through other sites within
the CBD that were either damaged or flooded. All were in the
“red” zone as well. The local power distributer Orion arranged
the pumping out of one substation that then enabled power
restoration.
The engines serving the site were 2 x 1.2Mva diesel fuelled
and these could then be shut down. They were then
immediately given a thorough maintenance check to give
confidence in case of further power disruptions. Only one of
the power feeds was able to be restored initially.
The main cooling plant for the building is chilled water and
relies on wet cooling towers to reject the heat. Hence a
constant water supply of around 14,000 litres per day is
required. An artesian well was a secondary source of water for
this purpose. A temporary feeding arrangement was available.
The well was not damaged in any of the earthquakes, but was
always a risk from silting. In fact the artesian water supply
improved as a result of the earthquakes. It took about 4
months before a reliable public source was available again but
this was supplied at a reduced pressure due to leaks in the
street mains pipes as a result of the earthquake.
As with all major telecommunications sites, there was a
constant need to augment or repair network functions at the
site. Also customers who had networks operating from the site
were also requesting changes. With a significant range of
networks on site, there was a need to arrange access for a
range of skilled resources. Some of these times needed to be
during curfew (7pm to 7am) so that the changes could be
made to meet national network needs at a time of minimal
network use. Many changes were automated though.
The future use of the building is still being debated as it is
expected the restricted access to the site will last until at least
mid 2012.
VII. PERMANENT RESTORATIONS
It is difficult to determine when permanent restoration should
take place given the continuity of after shocks. Advice from
the Chorus Structural Consultants indicates that once some
damage has occurred, then some deterioration can be expected
to continue with each major after shock. While a permanent
solution can be determined, when to apply them is a mixture
of commercial and technical considerations.
A number of Mobile cell towers were damaged in that they
developed leans of up to 5 degrees from vertical mainly
through localised liquefaction. Another tower located by the
Avon River suffered from lateral spread of the ground. Issues
here are the continued stability of the tower and the
effectiveness of the directional antenna. Solutions are being
developed for remedying the tower bases.
The power systems for the road side cabinets and Mobile
cellular sites do not include a “low volts” disconnect system.
There are several reasons for not implementing these based on
cost to install, space required for reliable disconnect devices
and the economics around the likelihood of extended power
outages. When power was restored to these systems, they
came back “on line” with what appeared to be no lasting
effect. Because the power outage times well exceeded the
reserve capability of the Gel technology batteries, it was
decided to investigate samples of what had happened to
installations with a range of battery ages and power failure
times. Most of these systems have Eaton rectifiers with
software control incorporating their “DC Tools” analysis
capability. This system depresses the float voltage, allowing
the equipment power to be drawn from the battery. A preset
time and voltage window is used to determine the health of the
battery. A sample of the early results is:
Systems tested: 12
Systems failed: 4
There is a range of battery ages in the failed category.
This ratio indicates that all sites need to be visited to
determine if the early permanent damage has occurred.
A typical readout from the software is below.
Feb Quake
60 3.5
50 3
Load Current (A)
Bus Voltage (V)
2.5
40
2 Bus Voltage
30
20
1.5 Load Current
1
10 0.5
0 0
22/02/2011
0:00
23/02/2011
0:00
24/02/2011
0:00
25/02/2011 26/02/2011
0:00 0:00
27/02/2011
0:00
28/02/2011
0:00
Date
(Current measurement has a granularity of only 1 Amp steps)
It appears that the major load in both the Mobile and
Broadband installations stopped working at about 38 volts. At
that stage the load was reduced considerably to monitoring
devices only.
The intention from this exercise is to determine which sites
will require early battery replacement because of the effects of
extended power outages as a result of earthquakes. Early
results indicate that even though all voltages dropped to < 0.8
volts per cell, not many were damaged to the extent that they
would not perform in future power outages.
AGM battery systems have been used in the Mobile cell sites.
In general the loss of power at these sites was compensated by
the use of generators, but some sites have suffered from cell
voltages below 1.7 volts. The permanent effect on the batteries
at these sites has yet to be investigated.
VIII. KEY POINTS TO MANAGING DISASTERS
The following is a list of issues that were used to good effect
and some that were learned as the event continued to unfold
over the many months.
 1. Preplanning can only be effectively done to a certain Story”, Chorus and Opus International Consultants
level. It usually needs to include those issues that can Limited, Christchurch, New Zealand. April 2011.
take some time to put in place but have a
considerable impact on being able to manage and
mitigate the effects of the event. In this case having
more of the most suitably sized generators would
have been more effective in keeping Mobile sites
operational initially, especially when their nominal
battery reserve is only 2 hours.
2. Use a mixture of local and distant people to manage
and control the event. The distant management need
to be willing to listen to the locals and the locals need
to be aware that what might seem the most logical
solution may not provide the most effective answer.
The local’s families came first.
3. Because so many of the basics (water, food, toilets
etc) were not readily available, special supply
arrangements were required.
4. A control bunker (or War Room) set up with basic
computer and phone connection facilities, audio
conferencing, whiteboards and controlled access.
Also it is essential that generator power is available.
5. Early liaison with who will be the key people in
support infrastructure especially power distribution
and those that control physical access.
6. Be prepared to change at short notice the way events
are being managed where critical success factors will
be compromised if the present approach is continued.
7. The use of Gel technology in roadside cabinets
appears to be relatively resilient. The resilience of
AGM batteries in the Mobile network has yet to be
determined.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The author thanks Allan Bradshaw and Stewart Ross for
their contribution and review in the preparation of this paper.
Also thanks to Gray Renwick for his investigations of the
batteries deployed in roadside cabinets.
For those who helped in the restoration and development of
permanent solutions and for the many well wishes and offers of
help from around New Zealand and Internationally to the
impact of these events, thank you for your support and advice.

REFERENCES
[1] Royal Society of New Zealand & the Office of the
Prime Minister’s Science Advisory, “The Canterbury
Earthquakes: Scientific Answers to Critical Questions
(2011)”,
http://www.royalsociety.org.nz/media/Information-
paperThe-Canterbury-Earthquakes-Scientific-
answers-to-critical-questions3.pdf
[2] Colin Foster, Robert Davey, Jamie Lester & Will
Parker, “The Performance of the Telecommunication
Network in the Darefield Earthquake: A Success

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