Machiavelli on Exodus 32: Moses and the fight against envy

Hugo Tavera Villegas, ITESM, México

As many others, I will start from chapter 6 of The Prince. More precisely, from his account

on the difficulties in founding a state. “Nothing is more difficult to handle, more doubtful of

success, nor more dangerous to manage -Machiavelli writes-, than to put oneself at the head

of introducing new orders”. Interestingly, this difficulty is explained through its connection

with a particular affect: envy (invidia). Only when the founders had “eliminated those who

had envied them”, Machiavelli argue, they can "remain powerful, secure, honored, and

happy” (The Prince, 6, italics are mine).

On Discourses on Livy (hereafter Discourses, followed by number of book and chapter), the

connection between the resistance to new orders and envy is outlined even more

straightforwardly in chapter 30 of the third book. Here, Machiavelli argues that envy prevents

the accomplishment of things very “useful for the fatherland” and that “whoever reads the

Bible judiciously [sensatamente] will see that since he wished his laws and his orders to go

forward, Moses was forced to kill infinite men who, moved by nothing other than envy, were

opposed to his plans” (D, III, 30, italics are mine).1

In this paper I discuss the role of envy in Machiavelli´s political theory. Particularly, I

emphasize the importance of this affect in relation with founding of a new political order.

Certainly, nowhere the Florentine offers a systematic treatment of envy. Nevertheless, from

its use in crucial passages it is possible to extract relevant lessons regarding the founding and

maintenance of a new regime. My focus here will be Discourses III, 30. From a “judicious”
reading of this chapter, I argue, a double lesson can be drawn: that the (envious) enemies of

Moses’s orders were the “few” and that the best way to combat them is by arming the people.

On Hatred (of the people) and Envy (of the grandi)

Envy, hatred, love, fear, contempt, ingratitude, all these emotions and psychological

dispositions receive a great deal of attention in Machiavelli´s texts. It could even be said that

for Machiavelli emotions are political -or at least that emotions have political implications.

In this sense, it is well known that in The Prince Machiavelli ponders if it is better for a prince

to be loved than feared. Being very difficult to achieve both simultaneously, Machiavelli

famously argued that “it is much safer to be feared than loved” (P, 17). This because the

obligations grounded on love are much weaker than those based in the dread of punishment,

a dread “that never forsakes you” (P, 17).2 However, a prince must make himself feared in a

way that avoids the hatred of his subjects.3

For Machiavelli, hatred is in fact one of the principal threats to the maintenance of any

political order. This is apparent in the chapter of the Discourses dedicated to conspiracies,

the longest of the whole book. There, examining the causes of conspiracies against princes,

Machiavelli affirms that these are many “but one of them is very important, more than all the

others; and this is being hated by the collectivity” (D, III, 6).4 This is consistent with the

insistent advise in The Prince on the necessity to avoid being hated. In chapter seven, for

instance, after describing the violent modes by which Cesare Borgia brought peace to the

Romagna, Machiavelli suggests that the Duke was so aware of the need to avoid the hatred

of his subjects that he made his minister, Remiro De Orco, responsible for all the cruelties

committed. In one of the most spectacular and bloody passages of the entire book,
Machiavelli describes how the Duke “had him [Remiro] placed one morning in the piazza at

Cesena in two pieces, with a piece of wood and a bloody knife beside him. The ferocity of

this spectacle left the people at once satisfied and stupefied” (P, 7). 5

Also in The Prince, in the vey much discussed passage about the usefulness of fortresses,

Machiavelli argues that the best fortress a prince can have is “not to be hated by the people,

because although you may have fortresses, if the people hold you in hatred fortresses do not

save you” (P, 20, italics are mine).6 Finally, in the chapters devoted to the princely virtues

Machiavelli reiterates the necessity of avoiding the hatred of the subjects. In fact, the criteria

that Machiavelli uses to redefine the virtues of the prince is precisely this affect -that is,

virtues are those behaviors and modes of action that allow the prince to avoid being hated.

This is in fact what explains that the virtue of liberality can become very harmful (a vice) for

a prince, according to Machiavelli. A generous prince, Machiavelli argues, “will always

consume all his resources […]. In the end it will be necessary, if he wants to maintain a name

for liberality, to burden the people extraordinarily, to be rigorous with taxes, and to do all

those things that can be done to get money” (P, 20). But by doing this the prince will become

hateful to his subjects. Hence, the prince should not worry about being considered stingy by

his subjects, because eventually they will see that he was able to govern without taxing them

excessively. Acting in this way, Machiavelli concludes, “he comes to use liberality with all

those from whom he does not take, who are infinite [infiniti], and meanness with all those to

whom he does not give, who are few [pochi]” (P, 20, italics are mine).

This distinction between the “many”, to whom he takes nothing away, and the “few”, to

whom he gives nothing, is key here. Very suggestively, it is reiterated much more
emphatically in chapter 19, titled “Of Avoiding Contempt and Hatred”. There, Machiavelli

argues that “since the prince cannot fail to be hated by someone, they are at first forced not

to be hated by the people” (P, 19, italics are mine). If he succeeds in avoiding the hatred of

the “many”7 (“the people”), the prince “has only to combat the ambition of the few which

may be checked in many modes and with ease” (P, 19). Numbers matter here. In any republic,

Machiavelli writes, “ordered in whatever mode, never do forty of fifty citizens reach the

ranks of command; and because this is a small number, it is an easy thing to secure oneself

against them” (D, I, 16).8

Returning to envy, notwithstanding some statements in which the envious nature of all men

is condemned9, when Machiavelli is judging the role of this affect in the context of the

introduction of new political institutions, he also refers -although less openly -to the division

between “the many” (people) and “the few” (grandi). Now, while in the passages devoted to

hatred Machiavelli warned about the dangers of being hated by the “many”, as far as

“invidia” is concerned the opposite is true: for Machiavelli, envy, I suggest, is an aristocratic

affect. Whence, while authors like Harvey Mansfield argue that if Moses was forced to kill

“infinite men” it was because “all men” were his rivals10, I will argue here that in making

envy the key to understand Exodus 32 we are lead to an alternative conclusion: those who

opposed the Mosaic institutions were not all men or the “people” but the grandi.11

Defining Envy

But what is envy? Envy is a negative emotion related with the advantages or goods possessed

by others. Typically, involves a subject (the envious), a rival (the one who is envied) and a

good or ability that the latter possesses.12 It may involve the subject´s desire to achieve this
good as well as the desire that the rival does not have it, even when this does not make the

first better off. It is when identified with the second feeling that envy is considered irrational

and something that threatens the permanence of a political order. John Rawls addresses

directly this problem in A Theory of Justice.13 More recently, Martha Nussbaum has argued

that envy, alongside fear and anger, is a poisonous emotion that undermines the foundations

for democratic cooperation.14 “Envy -Nusbaumm write- leads to a picture of social

cooperation as a zero-sum game: for me to enjoy the good life, I have to make you

unhappy”.15

Now, despite his Aristotelianism Nussbaum never mentions Aristotle´s definition of envy,

which adds a fourth element to the three already mentioned -and one key for my argument-,

namely, the equality or proximity between the subject and the rival. In effect, in his Rhetoric,

distinguishing envy from indignation, Aristotle argues that while the second consist in pain

caused by the “unmerited” good fortune of others, “envy also is indeed a disturbing pain and

directed against good fortune, but not that of one who does not deserve it, but of one who is

our equal and like” (II.9.1386b, italics are mine). Envy, according to this definition, entails

competition between similarly situated men and therefore can only ensue between those who

are, or are considered to be, equals -and by equals Aristotle means equals in “birth,

relationship, age, disposition, distinction or wealth” (II.10.1387b).16

From this it is possible to state that envy has a “discriminatory” or “non-universal” character,

by which I mean that not everyone is close enough to each other so that one man could be

envied by all or “infinite men”. Also, having envy been defined as a negative emotion

regarding the possession by other(s) of something considered valuable, it could be assumed

that those who own more of these things, whether honors or wealth, will tend to be protected
from this “disturbing pain”. Aristotle, however, rejects this conclusion: “And those will be

envious who possess all but one of these advantages”, because “they think that everyone is

trying to deprive them of their own” (II.10.1387b). Furthermore, Aristotle argues that “the

ambitious are more envious than the unambitious” (II.10.1387b).

This is very interesting for two interrelated reasons. First, both last ideas are very similar to

what Machiavelli argues at the beginning of the Discourses, when he wonders who will be

more ambitious and therefore will have greater reasons to organize “alterations” against the

existing institutions, those who want to conquer or those who want to keep what they already

have.17 Surprisingly, Machiavelli argues that these alterations are most often caused by the

haves, “because the fear of losing generates in them the same wishes that are in those who

desire to acquire; for it does not appear to men that they possess securely what a man has

unless he acquires something else new” (D, I, 5). In addition, since “the few” possess greater

resources “they are able to make an alteration with greater power and greater motion” (D, I,

5).

Second, and even more suggestively, by connecting envy with ambition it becomes possible

to relate the first (“invidia”) with the desire to dominate that according to Machiavelli

characterizes the grandi. On this, it is important to recall that Machiavelli argued that the

ambition of the grandi is an inadequate foundation for the prince's power not only because

“one cannot satisfy the great with decency and without injury to others”, but also because a

prince that found his power on the greats finds himself “with many around him who appear

to be his equals, and because of this he can neither command them nor manage them to suit

himself” (P, 9, italics are mine). To which he adds that while “the worst that a prince can

expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned by it”, from an hostile aristocracy “he must
fear not only being abandoned but also that they may come against him” (P, 9, italics are

mine).18

Machiavelli on Exodus 32

For all this the reference to invidia in Discourses III, 30 should not be treated as something

trivial. After all, the golden calf is a story about the sin of idolatry, not envy. Exodus 32 does

not contain a single reference to this affect. Furthermore, the events described seem to have

been motivated not by envy toward Moses but by his absence. This is apparent when we read

the beginning of this important biblical chapter: “When the people saw that Moses was so

long in coming down from the mountain [where he was receiving the Law by God], they

gathered around Aaron and said, ‘Come, make us gods who will go before us. As for this

fellow Moses who brought us up out of Egypt, we don’t know what has happened to him’”

(Exodus 32: 1).19

Later we read that while Moses was descending to the camp with the tablets he saw the golden

calf and the Israelites dancing around. At that moment Moses´s anger “burned”, and he

proceeded to destroy the golden calf.20 Then,

he stood at the entrance to the camp and said, “Whoever is for the Lord, come

to me.” And all the Levites rallied to him. Then he said to them, “This is what

the Lord, the God of Israel, says: ‘Each man strap a sword to his side. Go back

and forth through the camp from one end to the other, each killing his brother

and friend and neighbor.’” The Levites did as Moses commanded, and that day

about three thousand of the people died (Exodus 32: 26-28).

So, again, where did envy come from? There is nothing here about it. Moreover, in the

illustrious disputes around this quote, which includes theologians and philosophers such as

Augustine, Aquinas and John Calvin, envy is once more completely absent.21 On this subject,

Michael Walzer pointed out that “Exodus 32 was frequently cited in the long debates which

raged over the questions of religious persecution and holy war”.22 Within the context of this

disputes, the interpretation of the golden calf episode ranged over questions as the following:

Is the persecution of the wicked justified? Do Christian Priests have the authority to impose

physical punishments? Does the obedience due to God have moral limitations? How

Christians should act when their obedience to God's commands comes into tension with their

obligations toward their neighbors? For reasons of space it is not possible to delve into any

of these interpretations. I limit myself here to highlight that none of this theologians and

philosophers refers to envy in order to explain this episode.

Having urged that the Bible should be read sensatamente, that is, not in a devotional or

spiritual way but politically, it should come as no surprise that Machiavelli´s interpretation

of Exodus 32 laid outside these questions.23 In fact, by relocating the golden calf episode in

the context of the mundane struggle between Moses (and his orders) and those who opposed

him (“moved by nothing other than envy”), Machiavelli had not only transfigured the

timeless conflict between good (Christians) and evil (heretics) in a conflict between two

groups politically defined. By doing this, I argue, he also transforms a conflict between two

rival Cities (the earthly one and the city of God) in one that confronts two parts within the

city.

To make it clear, here I am not arguing that the violence used against the worshippers was

necessary in order to turning a disobedient multitude into a law-abiding people. This is, for
example, Maurizio Viroli´s version of Machiavelli´s Moses.24 Viroli, in effect, argues that

Moses was forced to kill infinite men “in order to impose on the people of Israel a respect

for the laws that God had entrusted to him and for his political orderings”.25 In contrast with

this reading, here I propose that the reference to Exodus 32 should be read parallel with

Machiavelli´s reflections on the maintenance of a newly constituted order. On this,

Machiavelli affirmed that “whoever takes up the governing of a multitude, either by the way

of freedom or by the way of principality, and does not secure himself against those who are

enemies to that new order makes a state of short life” (D, I, 16). Thus, it is within the context

of the necessary measures to secure the new orders against its enemies that the passage about

the murder of “infinite” men by Moses should be interpreted.26

Certainly, the idea that Moses´s killings tragically reflects the efforts of a single, solitary man

to punish, discipline or modify the character of an entire people (“infinite men”), has some

textual support. Machiavelli himself suggests in Discourses I, 9 that “a prudent orderer of a

republic, who has the intent to wish to help not himself but the common good, […] should

contrive to have authority alone”. Even more, Moses is enlisted as an example of these

“solitary” founders of republics: “one could give infinite examples to sustain the things

written above, such as Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, and other founders of kingdoms and

republics who were able to form laws for the purpose of the common good because they had

one authority attributed to them” (D, I, 9.).

However, immediately after that quote the Florentine invokes two examples of organizers

“not so celebrated” but worthy of consideration that complicates this picture. The first of

these “minor” examples is Agis, king of Sparta, who wanted to reorganize the institutions

with the aim of reviving the laws established by Lycurgus. He had barely begun his reforms
though when “he was killed […] by the Spartan ephors as a man who wished to seize the

tyranny” (D, I, 9). The second example is Cleomenes, who after “succeeded to the kingdom,

the same desire arose in him because of the records and writings he had found of Agis” (D,

I, 9). However, Cleomenes “knew that he could not do this good for his fatherland unless he

alone were in authority since it appeared to him that because of the ambition of men, he could

not do something useful to many against the wish of the few” (D, I, 9, italics are mine). So,

in order to avoid the fate of Agis and his reforms, Machiavelli concludes, Cleomenes “took

a convenient opportunity, had all the ephors and anyone else who might be able to stand

against him killed” (D, I, 9).

While it is not much what Machiavelli writes about Cleomenes, from the actions of this “not

so celebrated” prince we can draw the conclusion that far from conceiving the endeavor of

the founder in terms of the creation of the unity of the people through the submission of all

to the law, Machiavelli considered that any prudent (re)organizer knew that the establishment

of “new modes and orders” takes place over a conflictive terrain characterized by the

opposition between “the many”–who wishes not to be dominated- and “the few” –whose

desire is to dominate the people.27 In the following I will argue that in order to secure his

institutions against the “few”, Moses proceeded to arm people’s desire not to be dominated

and that it is in relation with this that the reference to envy should be interpreted.

“…they grew envious of Moses”: the rebellion of Korah and “his congregation”

Above I said that to read “sensatamente” the Bible means to reading it politically. To this I

would add now that a “judicious” reading also implies the reference to sources external to
the text being interpreted.28 To read “judiciously” Discourses III, 30, then, requires going

beyond the text and interpreting it through another text, that is, the Bible. In this sense, in a

very suggestive essay John Geerken argues that the most useful indication about

Machiavelli´s reference to envy in Discourses III, 30 comes from two different passages of

the Bible -one from Psalms and the other from the book of Numbers.29

The passage of Psalms is in fact a brief summary of a revolt against Moses described at length

in Numbers 16: “In the camp they grew envious of Moses and of Aaron, who was consecrated

to the Lord. The earth opened up and swallowed Dathan; it buried the company of Abiram.

Fire blazed among their followers; a flame consumed the wicked” (Psalms 106: 16-18).30 In

Numbers 16 we read that Korah, Dathan and Abiram took men and “revolted against Moses.

With them were 250 Israelite men, well known community leaders who had been appointed

members of the council” (Numbers 16: 2-3). They judged that Moses’s preeminence within

the congregation was unjustifiable and accused him of tyrannizing the whole congregation:

“Isn't it enough that you have brought us up out of a land flowing with milk and honey to kill

us in the desert? And now you also want to lord it over us?” (Numbers 16: 13).

It is important to note that the book of Numbers covers 40 years of the history of the Hebrew

people during their journey through the desert to the promised land. It begins with a census

on Mount Sinai, just two years after leaving Egypt and concludes with the Israelites coming

near the promised land and still led by Moses. Numbers does not offer, however, a linear

narrative of the path of the Hebrew people towards the Promised Land. Now, if there is a

topic that gives some unity to the whole book it is that of rebellion. John Sturdy expresses

this very well when he writes that Numbers is not a “continuous story of what happened to
the Israelites in this period, but particular stories of the beginning and end of the period,

centring on the theme of grumbling and rebellion on the part of the people”.31

Now, there are two important differences that distinguish the rebellion of Korah from all the

other rebellions described in Numbers. First, Korah´s rebellion is not an uprising against

God´s authority but Moses’s. Certainly, as just said the years in the wilderness were fraught

with episodes of murmuring and rebellion by the Israelite people. In chapter 11, for instance,

tired of eating manna for a year in a row, the people begin to murmur and demanded meat.32

In Numbers 14 we read that after the return of the men who had been sent to spy the land of

Canaan before attacking it, the people again murmured against Jehovah when they judged

themselves militarily at disadvantage.33 This to mention only two prominent instances of

rebellion.

Korah´s rebellion, however, was the only rebellion directed against the civil and religious

authority of Moses. In fact, this is precisely what explains that the humanists of the Pope's

court in Rome had made use of the history of this revolt, and its consequences ("then the

earth was opened [...] and the flame burned the wicked"), to affirm the supremacy of papal

authority, which derived according to this interpretation directly from Moses.34

In addition to having been directed against Moses´s authority, another distinctive feature of

the rebellion narrated in Numbers 16 is that the agitators are clearly identified. While in the

other rebellions the agent is referred to as the “people”, or “all the Israelites", in Numbers 16

this is not the case. Here the rebels are mentioned by name: “Korah son of Izhar, the son of

Kohath, the son of Levi, and certain Reubenites—Dathan and Abiram, sons of Eliab, and On

son of Peleth—became insolent and rose up against Moses” (Numbers 16: 1-2).

For me this should be read as evidence that this was not a rebellion of the “people”, or of “all

the Israelites” but of only a part, a faction within the people. This is in fact reinforced by the

reiterated use of the formula “Korah and all his followers” within the text. Commenting the

repetition of this formula, Martin Noth write that with “his company Korah has arbitrarily

created a caricature of a ‘congregation’ and believes that he can thereby speak for the real

congregation as a whole”.35 Now, if Korah (“and his followers”) did not effectively speak in

the name of the entire congregation of Israel, from what part of the people did they come

from? In other words, what group roused up - “moved only by envy”- against Mosaic

institutions?

For me, this particular “congregation” correspond to the “few” or “grandi” in Machiavelli´s

language. This is apparent when we read Moses’s answer to their protests: “Isn’t it enough for

you that the God of Israel has separated you from the rest of the Israelite community and

brought you near himself to do the work at the Lord’s tabernacle and to stand before the

community and minister to them?” (Numbers 16:9). That they were “separated” from the rest

clearly shows that Korah and his followers enjoyed a privileged position within the

congregation.36 This privileged position within the congregation, coupled with the fact that

they justified their rebellion as a cry against a supposedly tyrannical exercise of power by
Moses, makes it possible for us to relate Korah and “his congregation” to the Spartan ephors

who killed Agis, who as we saw had tried to introduce reforms in Sparta with the intention

of “doing good to the many”.37

Therefore, John Geerken is right when he states that for Machiavelli the purge of “infinite”

men was not only a necessary response to the rebellion but above all a necessary response to

its cause, namely, envy.38 “There was no doubt in Machiavelli's mind –Geerken writes- that

rebellions begin with factions, factions begin with discontent, and discontent begins with

envy”.39 Unless envy is removed from the political body, the efforts of the founder are

doomed. What Geerken does not recognize, however, is that envy is for Machiavelli an

aristocratic affect.40

Savonarola, Soderini and the Envious Few

In Discourses III, 30, Machiavelli offers an exposition of three different strategies to combat

the envious. These different strategies are incarnated in three different figures: Moses, the

Dominican friar Girolamo Savonarola and Piero Soderini, gonfaloniero of Florence. While

Moses embodies the successful founder who was able to secure his laws and institutions from

the envious, Savonarola and Soderini incarnate failed strategies.41 This despite the fact that

both the Dominican friar and Soderini were well aware of the need to get rid of the envious:

“Friar Girolamo Savonarola knew this necessity very well; Piero Soderini, gonfalonier of

Florence, knew it too” (D, III, 30).

Savonarola, according to Machiavelli, was not able to defeat the envious “because he did not

have the authority to enable him to do it” (D, III, 30). Because of his ecclesiastical condition,

Machiavelli seems to suggest, the Friar was limited to a purely “rhetorical strategy”, which
consisted in publicly accusing his adversaries in his sermons: “his sermons are full of

accusations of the wise of the world and of invectives against them, for so he called the

envious and those who were opposed to his orders” (D, III, 30).42 The ineffectuality of this

strategy is pointed emphatically in The Prince, where Machiavelli states that the friar “was

ruined in his new orders as soon as the multitude began not to believe in them, and he had no

mode for holding firm those who had believed nor for making unbelievers believe” (P, 6).

Soderini's strategy consisted in combating envy thorough “goodness” and the dispense of

“benefits”. He thought it was possible to “extinguish ill humors with patience and goodness

and wear away some of the enmity to himself with rewards to someone” (D, III, 3). Although

he was well aware of the necessity to eradicate envy, and was even conscious that the

“ambition of those who struck him gave him opportunity to eliminate them, […] he never

turned him to doing” (D, III, 3).43 Interestingly, Soderini is not only contrasted with Moses´s

actions in The Discourses. In the third book Soderini's “goodness” is counterposed with the

“severity” of Brutus: “not less necessary than useful was the severity of Brutus in maintaining

in Rome the freedom that he had acquired there” (D, III, 3).

There the Florentine points out that a “judicious” reading of “ancient things” makes clear that

after a change of regime a “memorable execution against the enemies of present conditions

is necessary” (D, III, 3). In the case of a “newly emerged” republic or a “free state” this means

the execution of conspirators against the people’s liberty: “whoever makes a free state and

does not kill the sons of Brutus, maintains himself for little time” (D, III, 3). Machiavelli had

referred to this episode already in the first book, in which he underlines that the sons of Brutus

conspired against the republic because “they could not take advantage extraordinarily under

the consuls as under the king, so that the freedom of that people appeared to have become
their servitude” (D, I, 16). They revolted against the new orders because they could not

anymore satisfy their desire to dominate the people.

One could argue that Soderini´s enemies, who conspired to bring the Medici back to power,

also came to experience the institutions of the Florentine republic as “servitude”, specially

the Great Council which embodied better than any other institution the people’s freedom.44

But while Brutus’s “severity” warded off the peril and kept the republic alive, seeking to

avoid extraordinary and scandalous actions Soderini permitted the fall of the “free state”:

“through not knowing how to be like Brutus, he lost not only his fatherland but his state and

his reputation” (D, III, 3). In sum, neither the “accusations” (Savonarola) nor the “benefits”

and “goodness” (Soderini) are enough to keep in check the envious. Extraordinary means are

instead necessary.45

On Moses´s Prudence: Envy and the Arming of the People

Interestingly, the other topic discussed by Machiavelli in Discourses III, 30 is the modes by

which the “multitude” must take up arms. This chapter is indeed titled: “For One Citizen

Who Wishes to Do Any Good Work in His Republic by His Authority, It Is Necessary First

to Eliminate Envy; and How, on Seeing the Enemy, One Has to Order the Defense of a City”.

These two subjects, the elimination of envy and the defense of the city from its enemies are

connected in the text apparently only by the example of Camillus’s protecting Rome from all

Tuscany. In the second part of the chapter Machiavelli indeed only makes reference to the

provisions that Camillus took for the safety of Rome.46 The lesson he draw from those

provisions can be summed up as follows: it should be avoided that the multitude take up arms

without “certain order and a certain mode” (D, III, 30).47

Now, stressing the “prudence” of Camillus, who against the general opinion ordered the

creation of a “third army” that should remain in Rome, Machiavelli states that “whosoever

might be wise as he was” would have acted the same way, knowing that “there is no more

dangerous nor more useless defense than that which is done tumultuously and without order”

(D, III, 30, italics are mine). The reference to “whosoever might be wise as he was”, I suggest,

should be read as an allusion to Moses, whom, if we go back to Exodus 32, also gave clear

instructions about how the “multitude” should take up arms.48

As well as Camillus, Moses also “ought first to have those enrolled and selected whom he

wishes to be armed, whomever they have to obey [Moses himself], where to meet, where to

go” (D, III, 30):

So he [Moses] stood at the entrance to the camp and said, ‘Whoever is for

the Lord, come to me’. And all the Levites rallied to him. Then he said to them,

‘this is what the Lord, the God of Israel, says: ‘Each man strap a sword to his

side. Go back and forth through the camp from one end to the other, each killing

his brother and friend and neighbor’” (Exodus 32: 26-27, italics are mine).

From this point of view, Moses represents something more than the need to use violence

against the envious. If what I am suggesting is true, that is, that Moses is included in the

discussion about the defense of the city through the reference to “whosoever wise”, it is

possible to conclude that the leader of the Hebrews incarnates this other “effective truth”:

that the only way to subdue the envious is by arming "with a certain order and method" the

people. It is certainly true that Discourses III, 30 only deals with the topic of military defense

against external enemies. Machiavelli argues that those who imitate Camillus will be able to
defend their city from any assault by another army: “Those who hold to this order in a city

that has been assaulted can easily defend themselves” (D, III, 30). Nonetheless, if Moses, as

suggested, must also be included as an example to be imitated regarding city´s defense, the

discussion about the arming of the multitude should not be limited to external war. After all,

the envious enemies of Mosaic institutions were not foreigners, but the few.

On the other hand, in many places of the Discourses Machiavelli´s reflections on the

organization of a popular army are intermingled with those about the conflict between the

senate and the plebs. This is particularly evident in Discourses I, 6, were Machiavelli wonders

if "Rome could have organized a state that avoided the aforementioned controversies"49

between the people and the Senate. Here, through the contrast between Rome, a “tumultuous”

republic, and Sparta and Venice, examples of “quiet” republics, Machiavelli argues that it

was precisely the fact of having been armed that allowed the Roman plebs to counter the

desire for domination of the nobility. Moreover, at the end of this chapter Machiavelli links

the topic of the popular army with the creation of the tribunes. He writes that it was necessary

“to tolerate the enmities that arise between the people and the Senate, taking them as an

inconvenience necessary to arrive at Roman greatness”, adding that the “tribunate authority

was demonstrated to have been necessary for the guard of freedom” (D, I, 6). Thus, since

the capacity of the Roman plebs to counter the ambitions of the nobility rested precisely on

the fact of their being armed, one can argue that in Machiavelli´s mind the popular army was

not only a weapon against external enemies but also an instrument of freedom within the

city.50

It is also within the context of the conflict between the people and the grandi that the

following statement should be read: “[t]here has never been a new prince who has disarmed
his subjects; on the contrary, whenever he has found them unarmed, he has always armed

them” (P, 20). Here, I suggest, Machiavelli is not only warning about the dangers involved

in making the security of the state depended on mercenary weapons.51 In addition to this, he

is arguing that the only way the founder has to secure his institutions against the envious is

by arming the people. The neccesity to arm the multitude is thus for Machiavelli related not

only with the defense against external enemies but also against those whose desire is to

dominate the people. Machiavelli indeed emphasizes this point when he writes that the

mercenary armies are not so “numerous” as to be able to defend the city against “powerful

enemies and suspect subjects” (P, 20).

Hence, for the defense of the city, conceived in this broad sense, that is, as a defense against

both external and internal enemies, the only effective method is arming the “many”. “The

histories are full of examples of this” (P, 20). A “judicious” reading of Discourses III, 30

indicate us that one of these “histories” is that of Moses arming the people to defend his

institutions from the envy of the great.

Conclusion: Envy and Politics

Envy has sparked diverse controversies in political philosophy. Recently, this topic has been

much discussed in relation with egalitarian theories of justice. His critics have insistently

argued that these theories are motivated by envy.52 Probably the most systematic recent

treatment of envy by a political philosopher is that of John Rawls. In his A Theory of Justice,

the American philosopher offers very interesting reflections on what he calls the “problem

of envy”. Rawls discusses this problem in the part of his book dedicated to the stability of a

well-ordered society. While in constructing the “original position” from which deliberators
select the principles of justice Rawls assumes that the parties are not motivated by envy , in

the second part of his argument he analyzes whether a basic structure which satisfies his two

principles of justice is likely to produce a tendency to envy that would undermine its

arrangements.

The “problem of envy” is thus the posssibility that a widespread envy might effect this. This

possibility depends in turn on the extent of the social inequalities allowed by the “difference

principle”. When these inequalities are too great, they can undermine the bases of self-respect

of those who are less well off. “For those suffering this hurt -Rawls argue-, envious feelings

are not irrational; the satisfaction of their rancor would make them better off” (1959, p. 468).

Then, the less advantaged could consider imposing losses on those better placed, even at

some cost to themselves. If, again, this destructive animus against the betters off is

sufficiently widespread, it can eventually threaten political stability.

Now, while Rawls argues that his principles of justice are not likely to arouse envy in such a

troublesome extent, in a recent and very suggestive book Jeffrey Green (2016) argue that

“reasonable envy” should be at the heart of a liberal “plebeianism”. In an inegalitarian and

unjust world as it is ours, that is, in a world characterized by a “shadow of unfairness”,

reasonable envy should be part of a “principled vulgarity” founded on the “desire to see the

powerful specially burdened— whether economically or politically— on the public stage”

(2016: 122). Very suggestively, Green considers this “plebeianism” as related with what in

another place he calls a “Machiavellianism for the people”, by which he means an extension

to the “many” of the ethics and behavior of the Prince.53

In contrast with this, here I have argued that envy is for Machiavelli an aristocratic affect that

takes place when a (re)organizer of a republic arranges orders and modes that are useful to

“the many”. Certainly, for Machiavellli the “problem of envy” should be reasoned about

within the context of the division between people and grandi. However, for the Florentine

the principal peril to the institutions of a new state comes from “the few”, who are envious

of the prince of the republic and of the “possessions” of the “many” within it.

Then, while for Rawls and Green envy is a consequence of the great disparities between the

most (“the few”) and the least advantaged (“the many”) groups within society, for

Machiavelli envy is connected with another “humor”, that is, the desire to dominate others.

It is when this desire is checked by the new institutions of a free state that the few will revolt

against the prince of the republic. Therefore, envy can only be fight against by opposing it

other powerful desire: people´s desire not to be dominated. Machiavelli argues, then, that the

most effective mode a new prince of a new republic has to secure his institutions against the

envious few is by arming people´s desire not to be dominated.

1
Machiavelli is referring to the episode known as “the golden calf” (Exodus 32). There we read that Moses
punished the Israelites who, during his absence, had set up a golden calf as their God. Specifically, the quote
make reference to versicles 27 and 28: “Then he [Moses] said to them [the Levites], ‘This is what the Lord,
the God of Israel, says: ‘Each man strap a sword to his side. Go back and forth through the camp from one
end to the other, each killing his brother and friend and neighbor’. The Levites did as Moses commanded, and
that day about three thousand of the people died”.
2
For a suggestive treatment of the role of fear in the Discourses, see Gabriele Pedulla (2018: 84-116)
3
“[S]ince men love at their convenience and fear at the convenience of the prince, a wise prince should found
himself on what is his, not on what is someone else’s; he should only contrive to avoid hatred” (P, 17).
4
For a democratic reading of this chapter, see James Martel (2013: 88-113)
5
On this quote, see Winter (2018: 34-65). For a theologico-political reading of this passage, see McCormick
(2011).
6
Moreover, in Discourses II, 24, Machiavelli says that not only fortresses are more harmful than useful but
that they actually are one of the causes of the hatred of the subjects: “the prince or republic that fears his or its
subjects and their rebellion, such fear must first arise from the hatred one's subjects have for one, the hatred
from one's bad behavior, and the bad behavior either from believing one can hold them by force or from the
lack of prudence of whoever governs them. One of the things that make one believe he can force them is
having fortresses”. On this quote, see Wolin (2016). On the topic of fortresses, see also Dietz (1986).
7
Here, Machiavelli reiterates that what make the prince hateful “is to be rapacious and a usurper of the
property and the women of his subjects”.
8
This can be done at least in two ways: “either by getting rid of them or by having them share in so many
honors, according to their situations, that they have to be in good part content” (D, I, 16). Moreover, getting
rid of “the few” is a very efficacious way to win over an initially hostile people. This because in addition to
security over their possessions the people also have this desire: “to be avenged against those who are the
cause that it is servile” (D, I, 16). Machiavelli exemplifies this through the case of Clearchus, who was
brought from exile by the aristocrats of Heraclea in the course of a “controversy” with the people. “Finding
himself between the insolence of the aristocrats, whom he could not in any mode either make content or
correct, and the rage of the people, […] Clearchus decided to free himself at one stroke from the vexation of
the great and to win over the people to himself” (D, I, 16). In a passage that reminds us that of Borgia’s
“knife”, Machiavelli writes that “having taken a convenient opportunity for this, he cut to pieces all the
aristocrats, to the extreme satisfaction of the people” (D, I, 16). On this passage, see John P. McCormick
(2012).
9
A noteworthy example of this kind of general statements on envy is found in the Preface to the first book of
the Discourses, where the Florentine describes the difficulty of introducing new modes of thinking:
“Although the envious nature of men has always made it no less dangerous to find new modes and orders than
to seek unknown waters and lands, because men are more ready to blame than to praise the actions of others”
(D, P, italics are mine).
10
H. Mansfield (2001) Machiavelli´s New Modes and Orders: a Study of the Discourses on Livy. Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, p. 400
11
Discussing the reference to “infinite” men, Warren Montag (2015) argues that “we must not so quickly
translate it as ‘a great many’ or ‘countless’” (p. 238). The word “infiniti”, for him, is linked with the
opposition between virtù and fortuna or, more precisely, between the virtuous founding of a state that lasts
and “the ceaseless, that is, infinite, concourse of fortuna inside as well as outside the new principality and its
people, the very element within which the new order [...] must perpetually adjust itself if it is to survive and
not to fall to ruin” (Idem, italics are mine). I fully agree with Montag on this.
12
For a general account of envy within political philosophy, see D’Arms (2017).
13
J. Rawls (1999) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, secc. 80 and 81. I will deal with
Rawls perspective on my conclusions.
14
See M. Nussbaum (2019) The Monarchy of Fear: A Philosopher Looks at Our Political Crisis. New York:
Simon and Schuster, pp. 135-164
15
Nussbaum (2019, in n. 14), pp. 136-137
16
Conversely, there can be no envy regarding those whom, “in our opinion or that of others, we take to be far
below us or far above us” (II.10.1387b).
17
“There it was much disputed which is the more ambitious, he who wishes to maintain or he who wishes to
acquire; for either one apetite or the other can be the cause of very great tumults” (D, I, 5).
18
[A]nd the prince must be on guard against them, and fear them as if they were open enemies, because
in adversity they will always help ruin him” (P, 9)
19
For the medieval rabi Nachmanides, the golden calf incarnates not envy but the people´s desire for a new
leader, a new Moses, since Moses himself seems to be lost. Cited by G. Hammill (2012) The Mosaic
Constitution: Political Theology and Imagination from Machiavelli to Milton. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, p. 46
20
“When Moses approached the camp and saw the calf and the dancing, his anger burned and he threw the
tablets out of his hands, breaking them to pieces at the foot of the mountain. And he took the calf the people
had made and burned it in the fire” (Exodus 32: 19-20).
21
For a succint account about the history of the reception of Exodus 32, see M. Walzer (1986) “Exodus 32
and the Theory of Holy War: The History of a Citation”, The Harvard Theological Review, 61, 1: 1-14
22
Walzer (1986, in n. 21), p. 4
23
For me, to read “sensatamente” the Bible implies subjecting it to the same type of critical examination to
which Machiavelli subjects Livy’s History of Rome. Hence, when Machiavelli criticizes his contemporaries
“for not having a true knowledge of histories” at the beginning of the Discourses, he would have in mind not
only those related to Greek and Roman history but also the biblical histories. Paul Rahe suggests the same
when he writes that “the only plausible antidote for the disease that afflicts Europe is the ‘true knowledge’
that he himself imparts by teaching men to ‘read’ Livy and ‘all the histories’, especially the Bible,
sensatamente so that they can draw ‘from reading them that sense’ and ’from savoring them that taste that
they have in themselves’” (2008: 99).
24
See M. Viroli (2010) Machiavelli´s God. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, pp. 62-64
25
Viroli (2010, in n. 24), p. 63. For a similar interpretation, see A. Melamed (2003) The Philosopher-King in
Medieval and Renaissance Jewish Political Thought. New York: State University of New York Press, pp.
157-158. Melamd highpoints the fact that the slaying of the worshippers was Moses´s first very act after the
Law was revealed to him by God.
26
“This always be know by those who read of ancient things, that after a change of state […] a memorable
execution against the enemies of present conditions is necessary” (D, III, 3).
27
For a similar reading of Cleomenes, see McCormick (2015) “Of Tribunes and Tyrants: Machiavelli’s
Legal and Extra-Legal Modes for Controlling Elites”, Ratio Juris: an International Journal of Jurisprudence
and Philosophy of Law, 28, 2: 252-266.
28
So I agree with Patrick Coby (1999: 272) when he writes that a “judicious hermeneutics would also allow
comparison with outside sources, as when a pagan text is used to reveal the effectual truth of the biblical
narrative -for example that entry into the Promised Land was a necessary war, not a covenant fulfilled, in
which a migrant and homeless people, the Israelites, displaced and indigenous people [D, II, 8]”. Now, while
Coby moves from the biblical text to the Discourses, here I follow the reverse direction and go from the
Discourses to the Bible.
29
J. Geerken (1999) “Machiavelli´s Moses and Renaissance Politics”, Journal of the History of Ideas, 60, 4:
579-595. For the alternative thesis that Machiavelli´s treatment of envy in Discourses III, 30 is in fact
indebted to Savonarola´s sermons on the book of Exodus, see M. Jurdjevic (2014) A Great and Wretched
City: Promise and Failure in Machiavelli´s Florentine Political Thought. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, pp. 40-42
30
Very interestingly, the following versicles recover the story of the golden calf: At Horeb they made a calf
and worshiped an idol cast from metal. They exchanged their glorious God for an image of a bull, which eats
grass. They forgot the God who saved them, who had done great things in Egypt” (Psalms 106: 19-21).
31
J. Sturdy (1976) The Cambridge Bible Commentary on the New English Bible: Numbers. London:
Cambridge University Press, p. 1
32
“The rabble with them began to crave other food, and again the Israelites started wailing and said, “If only
we had meat to eat!” (Numbers 11: 4).
33
“All the Israelites grumbled […] “If only we had died in Egypt! Or in this wilderness! Why is
the Lord bringing us to this land only to let us fall by the sword?” (Numbers 14: 2-3).
34
Under this interpretation Korah and his followers became a powerful symbol to denigrate the conciliarists
and, in general, anyone who dared to question the authority of the Pope. In fact, among the frescoes that Sixto
IV commissioned to adorn the walls of the Sistine chapel it is one that reproduces this event (“Punishment of
the Rebels” [Punizione dei ribelli]), made by Sandro Botticelli between the years 1481- 1482. On this topic,
see Brett Foster (2014), “’Types of Shadows’: Uses of Moses in the Renaissance”, en Jane Beal (ed.),
Illuminating Moses: a History of Reception from Exodus to the Renaissance, Leiden, Brill, pp. 395-396.
35
M. Noth (1968) Numbers: A Commentary. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, p. 124
36
John Sturdy (1976, in n. 31) argues that this fact makes his failure the more striking, p. 116
37
“He was killed in his firts beginnings by the Spartan ephors as a man who wished to seize tyranny” (D, I,
9).
38
Geerken (1999, in n. 29), p. 589
39
Geerken (1999, in n. 29), p. 589
40
Geerken (1999, in n. 29), in fact, argues that “for Machiavelli envy is inherent in human beings; it is most
commonly expressed as ingratitude; […] and it is a universal cause of hate” (pp. 589-590).
41
“[B]oth of these two were ruined and their ruin was caused by not having known how or having been able
to conquer this envy” (D, III, 30).
42
In fact, Machiavelli adds that Savonarola was not able to overcome the envious “because he was not
understood well by those who followed him, who would have had authority for it” (D, III, 30). This suggests
that Savonarola's failure is largely attributable to his followers, who had not fully understood him. How to
interpret this opinion? Is it reasonable to expect that a group of Christian followers were willing to commit
acts of violence? About this quote, see William Parsons (2016) Machiavelli´s Gospel: The Critique of
Christianity in The Prince. Rochester: University of Rochester Press, pp. 51-53
43
“He did not know that malignity is not tamed by time or appeased by any gift” (D, III, 3).
44
See John P. McCormick (2007) “Machiavelli's Political Trials and "The Free Way of Life"”, Political
Theory, 35, 4: 385-411. Very suggestively, McCormick refers to these conspirators as the “sons of Piero”, and
write that “they envied the institutional embodiment of an empowered people, the Great Council” (p. 400).
45
“[T]o conquer this envy, there is no remedy other than the death of those who have it” (D, III, 30).
46
“The other notable point is the order that Camillus gave inside and outside for the safety of Rome” (D, III,
30).
47
“But Camillus […] never permitted a multitude to take up arms except with a certain order and a certain
mode. So upon this example, one individual who is put in charge of the guard of a city ought to avoid like a
reef having it arm the men tumultuosly” (D, III, 30).
48
For a similar reading, see Christopher Lynch (2006) “Machiavelli on Reading the Bible Judiciously”,
Hebraic Political Studies, 1, 2: 162-185
49
This is a reference to Discourses I, 4, were Machiavelli famously write that “those who damn the tumults
between the nobles and the plebs blame those things that were the first cause of keeping Rome free, and that
they consider the noises and the cries that would arise in such tumults more than the good effects that they
engendered. They do not consider that in every republic are two diverse humors, that of the people and that of
the great, and that all the laws that are made in favor of freedom arise from their disunion”. For a general
interpretation of the perspective defended here by Machiavelli, see Pedulla (2018)
50
On this, see, among others, Winter (2012) and Del Lucchesse (2009).
51
“And because you cannot remain unarmed, you must turn to a mercenary military […] and even if it were
good, it cannot be so good as to defend you against powerful enemies and suspect subjects” (P, 20)
52
See, among others, R. Nozick (2013) Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic Books, pp. 239-246
53
“In its dominant form, Machiavellianism applies only to the few who possess great power, not to the many
destined to live ordinary political lives on the sidelines of statecraft. […] The plebiscitarianism I defend
argues that Machiavellianism ought not be limited to the governing elite and the conduct of statecraft—that
the redefinition of political ethics can and ought to be extended to the ethics of the everyday citizen” (Green
2010, 24-25).