ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION

Ceroid E. Caiden and Naomi J. Calden

University of Southern California

The increased visibility of administrative corruption has become a persis-

tent and disturbing feature of our times. Almost every issue of the daily
press brings, it seems, fresh examples of allegedly corrupt behavior on the
part of responsible public and private figures. This growing prominence of
corruption has coincided with increased academic interest in a subject long
deemed inappropriate for serious research, and still not regarded as a re-
spectable topic for study in certain circles. Fortunately, obvious objections
to research into corruption—problems of measurement, difficulties of ac-
cess, bias, and evaluation—have been largely attenuated, if not overcome.
It is accepted now that it is the responsibility of social scientists to choose
for their research subjects which touch on or embrace problems central to
human society, and not merely those convenient to the tools they have to
hand.
For those interested in corruption as a social phenomenon, the tradi-
tional approach, which treated it in a moralistic manner, was inappropri-
ate. Studies of corruption were vague as to definition, condemned it a pri-
ori, and looked for explanations in individual behavior. Social scientists
demanded precise definitions, objectivity, and some relationship between
the workings of society and the existence of corruption. Thus was born a
"revisionist" approach (6), which defined corruption in terms of diver-
gence from a specific norm of accepted behavior, explained its existence by
reference to social mores and deficiencies in economic and political sys-

177
178 Gerald E. Caiden and Naomi ]. Gulden

tems, and enumerated conditions in which it might elicit approval rather

than condemnation. Although this approach contains much that is appeal-
ing, and has paved the way to more serious study of the problem of admin-
istrative corruption by non-revisionists (3) (26) (27) (33), careful examina-
tion of its assumptions and conclusions reveals several misconceptions.
These arise mainly because, although the revisionists deal with social vari-
ables, they still think of corrupt behavior in individual terms without rec-
ognizing the existence of systemic corruption.

The Revisionist Approach

Until recently corruption was treated in a moralistic manner. Its cause was
seen as the gaining of positions of power and trust by evil and dishonest
men. The solution was to "turn the rascals out." Corruption was therefore
incidental to the working of society which might be safeguarded by appro-
priate laws and exhortations. But even as the muckrakers did their work of
uncovering graft and corruption in the turn-of-the-century United States,
suspicion was growing that these phenomena did not exist in isolation. The
arch-muckraker, Lincoln Steffens himself, late in his career drew attention
to the role of incentives fostering corruption in the private enterprise soci-
ety, by providing "ordinary men" with "extraordinary temptations" (30).
A similar disquiet, and concern for corruption as rooted in the mores
and institutions of society, stimulated a rejection of moralistic and individ-
ualistic explanations by students of comparative administration. As inter-
est grew in non-Western systems of government and in the workings of de-
velopment programs, those concerned with international aid and
development encountered apparent and blatant corrupt administrative
practices in poor countries. It was natural to ask "Why do certain societies
at particular times appear especially prone to corruption?" Rejecting the
answer of comparative moral virtue as somewhat out of keeping with the
premises of the comparative administration movement, the revisionists
were led to the view that corruption stemmed from norms of polities and
administration which differed from those of the West, and might even fulfil
political, administrative, and economic needs better than the public ethic
fostered by aid officials. Corruption was not incidental but structural: it
could therefore be removed from the realm of the moral (and unspeakable)
to the neutral (and researeliable).
The first problem was "what is corruption?" Definitions have been clas-
sified into three types (20): public interest, public duty, and market cen-
tered. The first, which has largely been rejected by the revisionists, regards
corruption as arising:

whenever a powerholder .. . i.e., a responsible functionary or office holder, is

by monetary or other rewards not legally provided for, induced to take an ac-
Administrative Corruption 179

tion which favors whoever provides the rewards, and thereby does damage to
the public and its interests (17).

Such definition pre-judges the result of corruption, is imprecise (as the

meaning of public interest is open to different interpretations), and may
preclude recognition of corruption until after the event only when the pub-
lic interest can be clarified and judged.
The second type of definition, public duty, appears more promising.
Though a number of variations exist (3) (5) (21) (24) (26), the basic idea is
conveyed by the most often used definition:

. . . behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of
private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status
gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regard-
ing influence (28).

As long as no confusion exists regarding the standard from which corrupt

practices diverge, i.e., the nature of public duty, corruption may clearly be
defined and recognized. Once, however, the public standard is challenged,
or regarded as relative to circumstances, then considerable ambiguity en-
ters. Who sets the standard to say what behavior is acceptable and what
corrupt? What is undue influence? What is misuse of authority? What is
public irresponsibility? If there is no accepted public standard, or if the
standards of public office and public duty are regarded as foreign importa-
tions inapplicable in given conditions, is there then innocence of corrup-
tion (20)? In short, "Are ideas and theories offered by Western scholars
about the state of corruption in the developing nations valid in the light of
the divergent social norms that govern the conduct of public office in the
West and those in the transitional societies of Asia" (19)?
The issue is one of conflict of values. Against the Western, impersonal,
and universalistic norms of bureaucracy are set the values of kinship and
reciprocity. Are these to be denied validity, and the public servant: who ful-
fils their expectations to be considered as corrupt? After all,

. . . in a given society, various kinds of norms operate, some congruent, others

inconsistent with one another. Legal norms may conflict with moral, religious
and cultural norms, so that a sample of behavior defined as illegal may be ac-
ceptable using cultural standards (19).

In retaining a residual definition of corruption, but rejecting the specific

substantive standard to which it pertains, the revisionists have dissolved
corruption. In their conception, corruption is by definition exceptional, the
departure from the normal ways of doing business: corruption cannot itself
be the norm. Once corruption, in other words, becomes sufficiently wide-
180 Gerald E. Caiden and Naomi J. Caiden

spread as to constitute a normal rather than an exceptional mode of behav-

ior, it ceases to exist.
Analysts is taken beyond public ethics by market-oriented types of defin-
ition, such as "Corruption involves a shift from a mandatory pricing model
to a free-market model" (31), or "Corruption is an extra-legal institution
used by individuals or groups to gain influence over the actions of the bu-
reaucracy" (23). Unlike the public duty-type definitions, there is no doubt
as to what "public" ways of doing things represent. It is in the former case
a "centralized allocative mechanism" and in the latter a stipulated institu-
tionalized decision-making process. But again, the standard is purely rela-
tive, since these institutions are regarded as so inadequate to fulfill the de-
mands placed upon them that corruption provides an alternative means of
allocation or of access to decision making. Once again corruption is legit-
imized in terms of its prevalence and of faulty working of Western-style
norms and institutions.
These definitions provide the under-pinning for explanations of why cor-
ruption is allegedly more prevalent in certain places, notably poor coun-
tries. The "cultural" explanation starts from the assumption that in "de-
veloping" countries there exists a gap between law (as imposed Western
and alien standards) and accepted informal social norms (sanctioned by
prevailing social ethics), i.e., there is a divergence between the attitudes,
aims, and methods of the government of a country and those of the society
in which they operate (24). The individual who assumes a public role is:

.. . torn between two social forces operating in his world. Because of the ra-
tional, impersonal and universalistic norms of the bureaucracy, he must accept
that a public office is a public trust, not a personal domain. He must therefore
commit himself to serve the national and community's need ahead of his per-
sonal and family interests. But there, too, are strong kinship bonds which
compel him to look after the needs not only of the immediate members of his
family but even those of his extended family system, otherwise he violates a
stronger norm which is deeply rooted in the personalistic and familistic out-
looks wrhich characterize traditional cultural values. As he imbibes Weberian
ideas in school, including possible post-graduate studies abroad, he faces a
conflict in regard to his duties to his family and his kin, some of whom may
have helped him bear the cost of an expensive education (19).

In the resulting role conflict, the Weberian, bureaucratic role is only one
open to the official, and not necessarily the most compelling (13). So-called
corruption appears to be consistent with customs and traditions, whereas
the laws and ethics that make it illegal and immoral are alien, imported, or
super-imposed (1). It is also suggested that traditional values pre-dispose
toward corruption, which in turn eases the gap between citizen and gov-
Administrative Corruption 181

eminent (29). A variation on this theme is the view that corruption is "dis-
located" behavior resulting from a lag in the value system of the commu-
nity in relation to institutional change (32).
The "cultural" explanation blurs into considerations of governmental
capacity, which have two major emphases. The first of these might be
called "economic," since it relates to the government's inability to provide
the services demanded of it. The centralized allocative mechanism breaks
down because of disequilibrium between supply and demand, and the mar-
ket reasserts itself (31). In poor countries the situation is aggravated by cul-
tural factors, rising expectations and demands, the predominance of gov-
ernment as a supplier of resources, and lack of alternatives. Similarly, one
can refer to the inability of morally approved structures to fulfill essential
social functions (25).
The "political" aspect of the explanation relates corruption to access to
power and political institutionalization. Corruption is seen as primarily re-
lated to inadequate political channels, and as such simply a special case of
political influence (29). Again, poor countries are good candidates for cor-
ruption because of the disproportionate impact of government on society,
bureaucratic dominance, a weak sense of nation with a high value placed
on kinship, and a marked gap between citizen and government. There is a
heavy burden for political institutions to carry in terms of capacity and le-
gitimacy, and corruption fills the gap. Corruption is the equivalent of pres-
sure group influence in more politically developed countries, but taking
place after the passage of legislation rather than prior to its passage be-
cause of factors such as erratic administration or public discrimination
against minorities (29). Similarly corruption is regarded as the result of
modernization in the absence of political institutionalization (21). Refer-
ence is made to the disruptive effects of changes in values (e.g., ascription
to achievement; acceptance of public role), the creation of new sources of
wealth and power, the expansion of governmental functions and regula-
tion, and the lack of strong political parties. Corruption has much the
same function as violence (and acts as an alternative). Its emergence is in-
versely related to the degree of social stratification in the society. The lack
of opportunities outside government leads to the use of public office to
build private fortunes, and foreign business activities tend to encourage lo-
cal corruption (29).
As these explanations have strong functional overtones, they stress the
positive effects of corruption. Since attention is on "developing" countries,
the main issue raised is the probable effect of corruption on economic, po-
litical, and, to a lesser extent, administrative, development. On the whole,
considerations relating to administrative development are the most pes-
simistic, for obvious reasons, since corruption undermines bureaucratic
norms. Cited are non-achievement of goals, rise in the price of administra-
182 Gerald E. Caiden and Naomi J. Caiden

tion, diversion of resources from public purposes, erosion of morale, low-

ered respect for authority, a poor example enhancing lack of political
courage, diversion of energies into lobbying, fiddling, etc., resulting in ar-
gument and bitterness, delays, and the use of inappropriate criteria in deci-
sions (5). On the other hand, corruption is also regarded as a means of sur-
mounting either traditional laws and/or bureaucratic regulation (21) and
considered as a means of cutting down uncertainty in decision making
(29). Nepotism may even result in the appointment of more competent bu-
reaucrats (2).
As far as economic development is concerned, however, corruption is
seen as positive in effect, on the assumption that governmental administra-
tion acts as a stifling force against private initiative. Thus corruption may
impel better choices, increase the allocation of resources to investment, im-
prove the quality of public servants, increase the responsiveness of bureau-
cracy and through nepotism substitute for a public works system (5).
While admitting that corruption may lead to capital outflow, investment
distortions and aid forgone, it may be functional as a source of capital for-
mation, cutting red tape and offering private incentives to entrepreneurs
given certain conditions, viz., a tolerant culture and dominant groups, per-
ceived security by elites, and certain societal or institutional restraints.
Corruption funnels capital to struggling entrepreneurs, minimizing
wastage of resources, wresting control of trade and industry from aliens,
and promoting investment through politicians (2).
Finally, corruption is seen as making a positive contribution to political
development, usually viewed in terms of national integration and the
strengthening of political parties. Corruption is cited as an acceptable al-
ternative to violence (21) (28) and as aiding national unification and stabil-
ity, helping integration by bringing in groups otherwise alienated, and in-
creasing participation in public affairs (21) (2). It is also argued that
corruption reduces pressure for policy change and weakens the govern-
mental bureaucracy, both of which are regarded as functional for political
institutionalization (21). Others stress elite integration: the bourgeoisie can
buy its way into the elite, and corruption can cement together a conserva-
tive coalition, while holding back or cancelling out the effects of growing
collective demands and humanizing government tor non-elites. Finally, cor-
ruption contributes to the strengthening of political parties and will itself
be defeated in the long run, since vigilant and strong political parties will
tend to reduce opportunities for corruption (21).
In sum, poor countries for cultural and historical reasons have a propen-
sity toward corruption, seen as a violation of Western norms. To this
propensity may be added a breakdown in the allocative mechanisms of so-
ciety, or economic, political, and administrative reasons, so that corruption
steps in to fulfill the missing functions. Corruption is thus legitimized in
Administrative Corruption 183

terms of its prevalence, and of its functionality: indeed, given the inappro-
priateness of Western norms and inadequacy of Western institutions, cor-
ruption does not really exist at all—it is simply a different way of doing
business. Before such conceptualization can be accepted, however, we have
to ask two questions. First, does corruption really disappear once it be-
comes normal behavior, or is it a substantive phenomenon, which may ex-
ist as normal behavior itself? Second, whereas corruption may arise be-
cause a system is failing to achieve its purpose, might not that purpose be
better served by reforming the system than acquiescing in corruption?

Administrative Corruption as a Norm

Up to this point, corruption has been treated simply as divergence from an
acknowledged standard, whose applicability is now felt in some quarters
to be in doubt. It is assumed, therefore, that until this standard came into
being in Western Europe at the end of the 18th century, corruption did not
exist: corruption was, in effect, the creation of bureaucracy.
Before the clear distinction between public and private standards of be-
havior which emerged with the ideas of the French Revolution, the argu-
ment runs, many practices now regarded as corruption, such as venality
and nepotism, were not against the law and were even exploited to their
own benefit by rulers. Corruption, in accordance with a public duty defini-
tion, did not and could not exist since no concept of public duty existed.
Behavior now thought of as corrupt might at most be seen as a special cat-
egory of "proto-corruption," regarded as normal and legitimate by con-
temporaries (29).
It is true that current concepts of corruption date from the ideas of the
French Revolution, which swept away private monarchical government
and replaced it with representative government (9). Office became a public
trust, and officials servants of the community. Public and private were sep-
arated. Privilege and hereditary tenure were replaced by qualification for
office. Venality and nepotism were abolished and office holders ceased to
have private rights in their office. Officials became full-time, and were paid
by salary, not from private profits gained from conducting the govern-
ment's business. A clear distinction was made between the personal lives of
officials and the conduct expected from them in their work by the enforce-
ment of rules. Public accountability entailed continued hierarchical bu-
reaucratic control, as opposed to sporadic, dilatory judicial intervention
(11).
It is also true that before this transformation practices now thought of as
corrupt provided the basis of government. Nepotism, venality, exploitation
of public function for private profit, were not only usual but also served
needs of the crown which could not be fulfilled through more legitimate
184 Gerald E. Caiden and Naomi J. Caiden

channels. But even while such practices were commonplace, they were by
no means accepted. As long ago as the ancient empires, before even money
was in common use, corruption was recognized and vigorous attempts
made to combat it, as for example in the bureaucracy of Mauryan India
(18) (22). In the Athenian city-state, a public audit was instituted in order
to check corruption and enforce a public role upon officials (7). In republi-
can Rome, even while provincial officials and others were making their
fortunes at the expense of the state and its subjects (the current joke was
that a governor needed three years to make his fortune—one to pay off his
debts, one to provide a nest-egg for himself, and one to bribe his judges
when he returned to Rome [4]), awareness of corruption existed and ora-
tors such as Cicero spoke out against it. Machiavelli attempted to analyze
corruption in the Italy of his day (8). The monarchies of Europe all insti-
tuted some machinery to combat corruption, even though to serve their
own needs, they sometimes acquiesced in its subversion (10) (14) (15) (16).
Lack of bureaucratic standards, entrenchment and pervasiveness, func-
tionality for the short-run purposes of the regime or participants, did not
mean that corruption did not exist. Though widespread and prevalent, the
phenomenon of corruption was well recognized and its consequences real-
ized. As a frequent, and sometimes normal, accompaniment of govern-
ment, it was not an exception from the norm: it was the norm itself, al-
though regarded as wrong.

Administrative Corruption as Functional

That corruption should at times serve certain interests, even those of the
state itself, is not surprising: its very raison d'etre indicates that someone is
profiting. The revisionists, however, have made a link between corruption
and development, by indicating that where political and administrative sys-
tems are deficient, corruption may compensate and prove of general bene-
fit to development.
The problem is to what exactly the revisionists are referring. They link
"corruption" defined in residual rather than substantive terms, and "devel-
opment," a concept which has come to mean all things to all men (12).
Further, the relationship may be far from positive, i.e., rather than "cor-
ruption" (whatever it might be) aiding "development" (in mythic terms of
whatever one would like it to be), a particular kind of development may
tend to be accompanied by corruption. Often there is an uneasy ambiva-
lence regarding which is to be the dependent variable, development (or
modernization) or corruption.
Beyond the semantic problem, however, lies the issue of functionality. It
is generally accepted that system survival is bound up with a system's abil-
ity to adapt and survive, in turn dependent on its ability to absorb and ben-
Administrative Corruption 185

efit from change. The revisionists handle the problem of change along clas-
sic functional lines, i.e., corruption is a dysfunction of the system, which
arises because the system cannot accommodate change—it is thus a func-
tional dysfunction, whereby the new (and therefore functional) norms it
represents replace outmoded norms. Exactly where this fits into the argu-
ment regarding cultural norms or propensity to corruption is unclear: for
here the new norms are, in fact, the old (pre-development, non-Western)
norms. There is a further ambiguity in the "cultural" argument, which
does not make it altogether clear whether we are discussing actual tradi-
tional norms held by "traditional man" (if he exists) or the breakdown in
these norms impacted upon by Western-type development. There is also a
missing link in the analysis, which should explain the actual dynamic
whereby new norms are evolved, and what kind of norms these will be.
Leaving aside the ambiguities, we have to ask whether the norms of cor-
ruption have been able to accommodate the needs of societal change. In
the case of the transition to bureaucratic norms and public responsibility in
Western countries, they failed to do so. In the end the old ways of conduct-
ing state business simply could not cope with the state's needs for increased
mobilization of resources, effective and honest disbursement of funds, pub-
lic trust in government, and control over its activities (9).
The entrenchment of corruption prevented these changes taking place on
an orderly basis. In the most extreme example, that of 18th-century
France, corruption helped suppress and funnel opposition to the regime
until it reached disastrous proportions, on the analogy of landscape along
a fault line which remains unaffected by repeated shocks for a long period
and then is completely transformed by a catastrophic earthquake. In other
words, the more that corrupt practices approached the dimensions of a
norm, or accepted standard of behavior, the more they impeded both ad-
ministrative and societal changes. The impulse for change had to come not
from within, from the continuing development and modification of ac-
cepted and corrupt means of administration, but from reformers promot-
ing innovation and new norms. Though corruption might prove functional
to the interests of certain individuals and groups, and to the system insofar
as it shares those interests, its very functionality is a symptom or indication
of the need for reform. Corruption does not disappear when it becomes en-
trenched and accepted: rather it assumes a different form, that of systemic
as opposed to individual corruption.

Individual and Systemic Corruption

Although revisionists have recognized corruption as a social fact, with
structural causes and consequences, it is our contention that they have
continued to think of it in individual terms. The definitions they suggest
186 Gerald E. Caiden and Naomi J. Caiden

are well suited to individual corruption—the individual who strays from a

prevailing norm of official public behavior. Several of the hypotheses they
put forward may even be plausible as long as they are thought of in indi-
vidual terms—informal organizational short-cuts; the occasional accom-
modation of personal favor; mutual "understandings." These may, ac-
cording to circumstances, be condonable or reprehensible, but they still
bear the vital characteristics of individual corruption—they can be coped
with and minimized (though rarely if ever eliminated) within a reasonably
effective control system, and they do not subvert or sabotage organiza-
tional purpose.
The conceptions of the revisionists, however, do not appear to stretch to
encompass the significance of what they often appear to describe, which is
systemic corruption—a situation where wrong-doing has become the
norm, and the standard accepted behavior necessary to accomplish organi-
zational goals according to notions of public responsibility and trust has
become the exception not the rule. In this situation, corruption has become
so regularized and institutionalized that organizational supports back
wrong-doing and actually penalize those who live up to the old norms.
Such systemic corruption is found today in many countries and jurisdic-
tions, particularly where society prizes organizational loyalty over the pub-
lic interest, where past standards of public rectitude and personal integrity
have been eroded, and where notions of public responsibility and trust
have been thrust aside with exploitation of public office for private gain.
The key is not so much the techniques of organizational method, e.g., bu-
reaucracy, as organizational goals and the qualities necessary to support
and maintain them, viz., honest administration and public accountability.
The issue only becomes tangled where goals are displaced, so that specific,
substantive, and public goals are transposed into, on one level, generalized
and hazy development goals, and on another particularized benefits for
privileged individuals or groups.
Systemic corruption has not been subject to much specific research. Ex-
amples readily come to mind in many large-scale organizations and at dif-
ferent levels of government. The Watergate affair showed that the White
House was not immune. The Fitzgerald revelations indicated that defense
contracting was riddled with systemic corruption, and other brave whistle-
blowers have questioned law enforcement agencies, regulatory commis-
sions, and public inspection bodies. Systemic corruption occurs whenever
the administrative system itself transposes the expected purposes of the or-
ganization, forces participants to follow what otherwise would be termed
unacceptable ways, and actually punishes those who resist. Deviant con-
duct is so institutionalized that no individual can be personally faulted or-
ganizationally (not morally) for participating, and dysfunction is actually
protected. In systemic corruption:
Administrative Corruption 187

A. the organization professes an external code of ethics which is

contradicted by internal practices;
B. internal practices encourage, abet, and hide violations of the
external code;
C. non-violators are penalized by forgoing the rewards of violation
and offending violators;
D. violators are protected, and when exposed, treated leniently; their
accusers are victimized for exposing organizational hypocrisy,
and are treated harshly;
E. non-violators suffocate in the venal atmosphere; they find no
internal relief and much external disbelief;
F. prospective whistle-blowers are intimidated and terrorized into
silence;
G. courageous whistle-blowers have to be protected from
organizational retaliation;
H. violators become so accustomed to their practices and the
protection given them that, on exposure, they evidence surprise
and claim innocence and unfair discrimination against them;
I. collective guilt finds expression in rationalizations of the internal
practices and without strong external supports there is no serious
intention of ending them;
j . those formally charged with revealing corruption rarely act and,
when forced by external pressure to do so, excuse any incidents
as isolated, rare occurrences.

The point to be stressed above all is that few corrupt practices can be
conducted without collusion. Few can be kept secret for any length of time.
Violations of public norms are known to all.
As we have previously illustrated, some revisionists argue that, moral
judgment apart, if public business is conducted according to systemic cor-
ruption, that is how things are, that is how public power is exercised, that
is the operational norm of public administration, and can no longer be
considered corruption. It is merely an extra-legal device to gain influence
over public policy, to fill vacuums left by inadequate public laws, to get
around unrealistic administrative norms, to bridge lags in the value system
of the community in relation to institutional change, to reallocate re-
sources and services when disequilibrium arises between supply and de-
mand, to stabilize the political system and replace violence, to cut down
uncertainty in decision making, to cut through bureaucratic red tape, and
to increase the responsiveness and sensitivity of public organizations. Sys-
temic corruption may do all these things and more, but when one reduces
the term to specific actions, then the dangers are self-evident and its institu-
tionalization is obviously dysfunctional to society. In most cases, the prac-
188 Gerald E. Caiden and Naomi J. Caiden

tices constitute theft, bribery, or extortion and probably involve deceit,

hypocrisy, and false testimony, and so are indictable offenses, even if they
fall into the category of victimless crime.
Individual cases of corruption can be rooted out by the application of
organizational sanctions. The wrong-doer is taxed with the evidence, pe-
nalized for minor offenses, and dismissed, and possibly prosecuted under
the criminal code, for major offenses. The scandal is localized and steps are
taken to prevent repetition. Systemic corruption cannot be handled so eas-
ily. There is no guarantee that if the most serious offenders are dismissed,
or if everyone who is guilty is replaced, corruption will not persist. The old
patterns will continue with new players. Further, the scandal will have a re-
inforcing effect. Successors will make sure they will not be caught so easily
by examining where their predecessors went wrong and so reorganizing to
make any repetition of exposure much harder. The people may change, but
the system persists. Moreover, in the wider society, systemic corruption im-
pedes rather than aids change.

A. Systemic corruption perpetuates closed politics and restricts

access, preventing the reflection of social change in political
institutions.
B. Systemic corruption suppresses opposition contributing to
increasing resentment. Thus corruption far from being an
alternative to violence is often accompanied by more violence.
C. Systemic corruption perpetuates and widens class, economic, and
social divisions, contributing to societal strain and preventing
cohesion.
D. Systemic corruption prevents policy change, particularly where
this works against immediate market considerations. Individual
or sectional interests are not the best guide to the public interest.
E. Systemic corruption blocks administrative reform, and makes
deleterious administrative practices profitable, e.g., induced
delays.
F. Systemic corruption diverts public resources and contributes to a
situation of private affluence, public squalor, especially serious
where affluence is confined to the few.
G. Systemic corruption contributes to societal anomie in shoring up
or transmuting traditional values into inappropriate areas.
H. The effects of systemic corruption are not limited to a specific
case: there is an accumulator effect upon public perceptions and
expectations which subverts trust and cooperation far beyond the
impact upon the individuals immediately concerned.
I. Systemic corruption is not confined to poor, developing, or
modernizing countries, but found in all organizational societies.
Administrative Corruption 189

These hypotheses might better form the starring point for serious re-
search into administrative corruption than the historically inaccurate as-
sumptions and often unfounded assertions of the revisionists, w h o have
confused individual and systemic corruption. In contemporary public ad-
ministration, the issue is not so much individual misconduct in public of-
fice, serious as that is, as the institutionalized subversion of the public in-
terest through systemic corruption.

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