Case

1AC
Plan: The United States Federal Government should reduce its sale of the Aegis
Ashore ballistic missile defense system to Japan.
 Scenario 1- Strategic Stability
Increasingly advanced BMDs undermine Russian and Chinese deterrence and
lead to regional instability
Gronning 18 (Bjorn Elias Mikalsen Gronning, Norwegian Armed Forces Senior Advisor,
“Operational and industrial military integration: extending the frontiers of the Japan–US
alliance,” International Affairs, https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/94/4/755/5039998)

The prospect of significant power aggregation deriving from Japan–US defence-

industrial and military-operational integration in missile defence is neither
uncontroversial nor unproblematic. Missile defence has attracted scholarly and diplomatic
criticism for undermining the strategic balance between the Great Powers and thus for
destabilizing international security. China and Russia, in particular, invoke failing strategic
stability in their vehement opposition to US-led missile defence efforts, whether through NATO
on Eurasia's Atlantic flank or through Japan–US and US–South Korean collaborations on its Pacific flank.60 In the light of
currently deployed missile defence systems, which fail to meet the technical specifications for defence against strategic ballistic missiles and whose
inventories are far from sufficient to absorb saturation attacks by shorter-range ballistic and cruise missiles, Russian and Chinese concerns appear

current R&D in missile defence, including

overstated, if not unwarranted. However, notwithstanding its official rationale,

rail guns and directed energy weapons, offers the potential to reduce allied vulnerability
to strategic ballistic missiles and saturation missile attacks, thereby eroding Chinese and
Russian deterrence vis-à-vis Japan and the United States, and thus destabilizing relations
between the most influential actors in international security. Further defence-industrial and military-
operational integration in missile defence hinges on the two allies’ willingness to accept the political and, potentially, strategic costs of their power-
aggregating efforts

Aegis Ashore is uniquely destabilizing due to offensive potential and

information sharing with the U.S.
Šimalčík 16 (Matej Šimalčík, Institute of Asian Studies Fellow and Transparency International
Analyst, “Ballistic Missile Defense and its Effect on Sino-Japanese Relations: A New Arms Race?,”
Institute of Asian Studies,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309466574_Ballistic_Missile_Defense_and_its_Effec
t_on_Sino-Japanese_Relations_A_New_Arms_Race)

Japan has deployed two BMD systems, the ground-based Patriot (PAC-3) and the maritime Aegis SM-3 IIA, and is further negotiating
To this end,

procurement of two other systems from the USA – THAAD and Aegis Ashore (Weitz 2013; JIJI 2014). All of the above mentioned BMD systems are of
U.S. origin. The currently deployed systems, PAC-3 and Aegis, provide for a relatively effective protection against ballistic missiles, as the two systems together act as a multi-tier
defense system, a BMD system capable of destroying incoming missiles at different altitudes – outside and inside the Earth’s atmosphere (Ministry of Defense 2012: 187). The
decision to deploy BMD systems was made following the 1998 overflight of the North Korean Taepodong missile over Japan. Prior to the Taepodong test, only few domestic
actors advocated for BMD system development and deployment, most notably the Japanese Defense Agency (Oros 2008: 155). While North Korean threat was the immediate
impetus that persuaded a broader set of policymakers to become involved with BMD systems, China has featured prominently in the Japanese BMD discourse. On one hand, the
Chinese missile program is also identified as a threat. However, when making the decision to collaborate with the USA on BMD development, special attention was paid to the
Chinese perception of any BMD undertakings of Japan (Oros 2008: 160). It has been previously stated that Japanese strategic culture rests on the following three basic tenets:
(1) Japan will not possess traditional military; (2) no use of force except in self-defense; and (3) no participation in foreign conflicts (Oros 2014: 233). The shifts in security policy,
which allowed Japan to work on the development of BMD systems and later to deploy them, are in line with the three tenets of the ‘anti- militarist’ strategic culture (Oros 2008:
149). Nevertheless, points were raised that the joint development of BMD systems with the USA is in breach of Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan. This issue was resolved
when the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, the office in charge of preparing new legislative proposals and making sure they would pass the tests of constitutionality, has found that
the integration of BMD systems with the USA is not unconstitutional (Oros 2014: 237–238; Oros 2015: 153). Furthermore, legislative changes had to be made to the arms export

What makes the

legislation which allowed for joint production and technology transfers when it came to BMD development with the USA (Oros 2014: 239). 17

Japanese BMD systems problematic for other regional actors, especially China, is the
fact that with the modern BMD systems there is a thin line between the purely
defensive nature of the systems and offensive capabilities. It has been demonstrated
that, by making alterations to the SM-3 interceptor, the Aegis BMD system has offensive
potential. This allows it to target satellites, thus making it an anti- satellite (A-SAT)
weapon. 7 The offensive capabilities of Aegis are not a given parameter, though. Converting Aegis from a defensive BMD system into an offensive A-SAT system requires
additional action on the part of the system’s operator (alteration of the SM-3 interceptor missile). Looking back at the basic tenets of the Japanese strategic culture, Japan is very

unlikely to take such an action. The Japanese cooperation with the USA is another concern that needs to
be addressed. It has already been mentioned that Japan had to reevaluate its arms export restrictions in order to make the cooperation with USA possible.
However, the USA has played a much larger role in the Japanese BMD policy. The USA has been exerting pressure on Japan to participate on BMD development ever since the

The decision to
Reagan administration, when Japan was pushed to participate in research, as part of the Strategic Defense Initiative (Oros 2008: 158).

adopt U.S. systems, especially Aegis, has raised questions regarding the prohibition of
the exercise of collective self-defense. The Japanese government has reiterated that any BMD system will be used only for the purpose of
protecting Japan, will be operated on Japan’s independent judgment, and that it will not be used for defense of third parties (Chief Cabinet Secretary 2003). Nevertheless,

effective operation of the Aegis system requires cooperation and information sharing
between the Maritime Self-Defense Forces and U.S. Navy. This raises doubts about the
actual independence of the Japanese BMD systems from its U.S. ally.

China won’t undertake aggressive nuclear modernization absent Aegis Ashore –

they’ll do the bare minimum necessary to maintain strategic stability
Chase 13 (Michael S. Chase, U.S. Naval War College Warfare Analysis and Research Associate
Professor, “China's Transition to a More Credible Nuclear Deterrent: Implications and Challenges
for the United States,” Asia Policy, Project Muse)

China’s nuclear strategy is “a type of minimum deterrence,” one that is

Shen Dingli of Fudan University argues that

“commensurate with its NFU doctrine .” 40 Shen highlights what he characterizes as the uniqueness of China’s approach to nuclear
deterrence among the acknowledged nuclear-weapon states, which he attributes in large part to its status as the only permanent member of the UN Security Council that

adheres to an NFU policy. Because its policy and strategy are limited to preparing for nuclear
retaliation, China needs fewer nuclear weapons than the other major nuclear powers. It also does not need
the highly accurate strike capabilities required to launch a disarming first strike against
another nuclear power. In Shen’s words, “for minimum deterrence, one only needs to assure a
credible nuclear retaliation so as to deter a first nuclear attack.” 41 Similarly, according to Teng Jianqun of the
China Institute of International Studies, China seeks to maintain a “minimum credible deterrence” capability

by ensuring that the PLA has the capability to retaliate following a nuclear attack. Teng argues
that China’s current nuclear modernization should be seen in this context. In his words, “ the purpose of [China’s] current nuclear

modernization is first and foremost to guarantee the security and reliability of nuclear
weapons in the face of threats, such as the U.S. development and deployment of
ballistic missile defenses.” 42 Sun Xiangli, deputy director of the Arms Control Research Division at the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational
Mathematics in Beijing, has asserted that China’s nuclear strategy should be referred to as “defensive nuclear deterrence characterized by the policy of NFU.” In reaching this

enduring beliefs about the nature and purpose of nuclear weapons have
conclusion, Sun argues that

influenced China’s strategic calculus and served as a framework for the development of
Chinese nuclear forces. 43 Chinese leaders and scientists have seen nuclear weapons as basically
useful for political reasons and strategic deterrence, rather than as having real tactical
or operational utility on the battlefield. They have generally believed that the threshold
for the infliction of unacceptable damage is significantly lower than Western strategists
have often claimed. 44 Sun writes that “based on these principles, and according to its economic, technical and geographic conditions, China has

developed a limited nuclear force.” 45 At the same time, he argues that even though China has felt that it only needs a relatively limited
 weapons must have a deterrent effect, and a certain number and
number of nuclear weapons, “these

survival of the nuclear weapons must be guaranteed.” Sun explains, “In short, the key to having a
credible nuclear deterrence is to guarantee an effective nuclear retaliatory capability.” 46
What is required to do so, however, is subject to change over time: in other words, Sun believes that the
number of nuclear weapons China needs is not “immutably fixed” but is related to
challenges to the survivability of the force and its ability to penetrate enemy defenses.
Accordingly, an appropriate rule for determining the size of China’s nuclear force is that it

must “be able to mount a nuclear strike that can penetrate an enemy’s missile defense
system after surviving a first strike.” Along similar lines, Chu Shulong and Rong Yu of Tsinghua University have described China’s nuclear
strategy as one of “dynamic minimum deterrence.” 49 They argue that this strategy retains key features of the PRC’s traditional approach while adjusting it to keep pace with
changes in the security environment and emerging threats. According to Chu and Rong, “China has all along adhered to a strategy that may be labeled as minimum deterrence.
However, as circumstances are always changing, the content, quantity, quality, and structure of minimum deterrence also must change.” 50 The approach is not tied to a specific
number of nuclear weapons but rather to the capability required to deter powerful countries like the United States an d Russia. In short, Chu and Rong assert that “the Chinese
understanding and practice of the strategy of minimum deterrence is dynamic—its features are continually adjusted to meet the changing strategic environment and threat

Aegis Ashore escalates tensions between China and the U.S.–Japan alliance –
China perceives it as Japanese remilitarization and a threat to their second
strike capabilities.
Panda 18 (Ankit Panda, The Diplomat Senior editor specializing in the Asia-Pacific region, “Will
Japan's Aegis Ashore Radar Choice Elicit China's Wrath,” The Diplomat, https://search-proquest-
com.dartmouth.idm.oclc.org/docview/2070751498?accountid=10422&rfr_id=info%3Axri%2Fsid
%3Aprimo)

, reports citing sources within the Japanese Ministry of Defense indicated that
Earlier this month

Japan’s deployment of the Aegis Ashore missile defense system will be built around a
variant of Lockheed Martin’s still-in-development Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR),
instead of the Raytheon SPY-6 radar. While details of the precise LRDR variant Japan will use are unknown, it is likely that the
radar will feature reduced range. In any case, the full-fledged LRDR, as described by Lt. Gen. Samuel A. Greaves, the director of the U.S. Missile Defense
Agency, in testimony earlier this year is a “midcourse sensor that will provide persistent long-range midcourse discrimination, precision tracking, and hit
assessment and improve BMDS target discrimination capability while supporting a more efficient utilization of the GMD interceptor inventory.” Setting

it bears interrogating whether the

aside the suitability of LRDR for Japan’s midcourse interception needs for a moment,

selection of LRDR might emerge as a new thorn in Sino-Japanese relations. As I explained last year,
China’s over-the-top reaction by U.S. Forces Korea to deploy a Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense battery in South Korea had to do primarily with the the advanced, high
resolution AN/TPY-2 radar accompanying the launchers—not the launchers themselves.
Similarly, even if the LRDR variant deployed by Japan is drastically different from the GMD-

supporting primary version in development for the United States, it’s far from clear that
China will let that pass. (Beijing declined U.S. invitations for technical talks over THAAD in 2016.) The idea behind
Chinese opposition to advanced missile defense sensors in Northeast Asia is simple:
China fears that U.S. efforts to establish theater-wide missile defense sensors could
erode the efficacy of the country’s relatively lean strategic deterrent. In specific terms, Beijing was
concerned that the United States could operate the AN/TPY-2 radar, now located in South Korea’s Seongju county, in forward-based mode. The United
States, meanwhile, has claimed that the radar will operate exclusively in terminal mode, which allows the THAAD system to serve a defensive role
against prospective ballistic missile threats from North Korea. Not only is LRDR being designed with support for the United States’ Ground-Based

the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) published earlier this year emphasized U.S.
Midcourse Defense (GMD) system in mind,

intentions to “cooperate on missile defense with Japan and South Korea to move
toward an area defense capability.” That’s not the same thing as homeland missile
defense, but, along with a prospective LRDR deployment in Japan, Beijing will have
reason for concern. (The NSS does also note that “enhanced missile defense is not intended to undermine strategic stability or disrupt
longstanding strategic relationships with Russia or China,” though the administration’s upcoming Missile Defense Review may tweak that view.)

Should Tokyo give Beijing assurances that its LRDR will be discrete from the U.S.
homeland missile defense sensor networks, it’s unlikely that China would take this for
granted—China cast aside similar assurances on the AN/TPY-2 deployed in South Korea.
For the moment, China has not chosen to treat reports of Japan’s selection of LRDR in the same way that it dealt with the THAAD deployment in South
Korea. Part of the reason for this might be that the Japanese Ministry of Defense has yet to confirm the decision on-the-record, or, more realistically,
that Japan’s deployment of Aegis Ashore remains years away in 2023. Tokyo and Beijing are currently undergoing a broader diplomatic thaw anyway
and it may not be in China’s interest to rock the boat over a deployment that is far from proximate. Either way, the few Chinese official statements that
have addressed the Japanese Aegis Ashore deployment decision have been careful not to overtly condemn Tokyo. Last August, following U.S.-Japan
military-to-military talks on Aegis Ashore deployment acceleration, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a cautionary note, but stopped short
of condemning Japan. “The Chinese government always maintains that the missile defense issue should be handled cautiously as it bears on global

strategic stability and the mutual trust between major countries,” spokesperson Hua Chunying added at the time. “While taking
into account their own security interests, all relevant parties should respect the legitimate security concerns of other countries, jointly follow the
principles of upholding global strategic stability and undiminished security for all countries and safeguard the international security environment
featuring peace, stability, equality, mutual trust, cooperation and win-win outcomes,” she added. In December, when Japan’s decision to select Aegis

was more pointed in her criticism, tying Tokyo’s procurement

Ashore over THAAD was announcement, Hua

decision to historical tensions in East Asia. “Due to what happened in history, Japan’s
moves in the fields of military and security are always followed closely by its Asian
neighbors and the international community.” She continued: “When it comes to the anti-missile
issue, the Chinese government always believes that it bears on the global strategic stability
and the mutual trust between countries. It bears noting, however, that we have yet to see anything from China coming
close to the high-level critical rhetoric that South Korea saw when in exploratory talks over the deployment of THAAD on its territory. As the United
States and South Korea debated the merits of deployment, none other than Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi felt it necessary, as early as February
2016, to emphasize that “the monitoring scope of [THAAD’s AN/TPY-2] X-Band radar, goes far beyond the defense need of the Korean Peninsula.” The

Tokyo may find itself facing similar Chinese concerns as 2023

official Chinese reaction was specific.

approaches and more specifics emerge about its Aegis Ashore deployment plans. In the
meantime, China is no doubt going to keep a close eye on Japan’s choices and evolving
U.S.-Japan cooperation on ballistic missile defense.

Aegis Ashore’s advanced missile defense capabilities wreck Chinese deterrence

- spurs nuclear modernization and expansion
Zhang 15 (Dr. Baohui Zhang, Linghan University Political Science Professor and Asian Pacific
Studies Director, China's Assertive Nuclear Posture: State Security in an Anarchic International
Order, 2015, pp. 103-4)

China’s recent efforts to modernize and expand its offensive nuclear capabilities are
rooted in the rise of the US defensive systems that could seriously compromise Chinese
nuclear deterrence. US missile defense, which includes both ground-based midcourse defense system (GMD) and various
theater- oriented missile defense (TMD) systems, is widely seen by Chinese military experts as a fundamental threat to its strategic
deterrence. Until recently, the Chinese military tended to believe that US missile defense could not effectively deter major nuclear powers
due to the steady maturing of a multilayered US missile defense,
such as China and Russia. However,

Chinese nuclear experts are losing confidence in China’s offensive capabilities. This pessimism
is best shown in an important 2008 interview of Wang Wenchao in a Chinese military magazine. As identified by the magazine, Wang is
the chief designer of China’s sea-based strategic missiles. In this interview, Wang expressed grave
pessimism about the ability of Chinese nuclear forces to penetrate US missile defense. As
he stated, “I have done a research: facing a multi-tiered missile defense system, if any single layer can achieve a success rate of 70%, then
100 single warhead missiles could all be intercepted even if they are mounting a simultaneous attack.” 24 Therefore, Yao Yunzhu, a PLA
nuclear strategist at the Academy of Military Sciences, suggests that US missile defense has had a profound impact on China’s nuclear
deterrence. As she points out, “missile defense has made China increasingly worried about the credibility of its deterrence against the
United States. ... Among the many influences on Chinese nuclear thinking, the development and deployment of missile defense is the most
important one. China must consider how to maintain a credible second strike capability
against US missile defense.” 25 Wu Chunsi, a civilian expert on nuclear deterrence,
emphasizes the impact of US missile defense on China’s no-first-use doctrine. She argues that
missile defense makes the doctrine increasingly difficult to maintain because it gives the
USA a double advantage in offensive first-strike capability and a credible defensive
capability. As she observes: China’s No First Use constrains its ability to counter American missile defense systems. Assuming a war
between the two countries, China, limited by its No First Use policy, obviously could not launch a first

strike against the United States. On the other hand, the limited number of Chinese nuclear
missiles would definitely become targets for American preemptive strikes. Given the US ability
to attack hard targets, how many of China’s intercontinental missiles could survive a first strike

and then manage to penetrate American missile defense systems? This obviously is an important
issue for the Chinese strategic community to consider. 26 Recently, Chinese strategists have been focusing on

the threat posed by a sea-based theater missile defense (TMD) system. This system, based on
Aegis equipped warships, is already becoming operational and is being deployed very close to China. A Chinese
military magazine organized a symposium to examine the impact of US sea-based missile defense on China’s nuclear deterrence. One
this sea-based capability will “forwardly extend US anti-missile deployment
article claims that

and compromise deterrence effectiveness by our strategic nuclear forces.” 27 Analysts believe
that if Chinese strategic missiles were launched from the first layer of inland provinces such

as Henan and Jilin, where China’s nuclear forces are rumored to be deployed, US TMD in the Pacific

could intercept these missiles during the boost phase of the flight, when the missile speed is relatively slow. Further, these
American warships could serve as an early warning for missile defense in North America,
improving the probability of eventual successful interception of Chinese nuclear missiles. The
latest PLA assessments believe that US missile defense will achieve significant progress toward combat effectiveness by 2030. According
to Li Fang and Yang Zhu, two PLA analysts, by then the US mid-course interception system will “possess full and complete combat
capabilities.” In the meantime, the US ability for boost phase interception will also “see steady breakthroughs.” Most importantly, the
sea-based Aegis missile defense system “will possess the ability of intercepting
intercontinental ballistic missiles.” 28 Thus, US missile defense has sown the seeds for
China’s nuclear expansion. Indeed, Chinese military strategists all recommend such a
course of action to maintain a credible nuclear deterrence. For example, Yao Yunzhu claims that “China
must evaluate the survivability and sufficiency of its nuclear arsenal. China must also consider what kind of nuclear capability can ensure
the mutual deterrence between the two countries.” 29 Other PLA strategists are more blunt in their recommendations. As proposed by Hou
We must first massively improve the
Xiaohe and Zhang Hui from the PLA National Defense University, “

development and modernization of our strategic weapons, increase the accuracy and
penetration ability of our medium and long range missiles to allow our lance to pierce
the shield of missile defense, and thereby restore strategic nuclear balance between
China and the United States.” 30 More specifically, Hou and Zhang suggest that China needs to
“develop nuclear missiles equipped with multiple warheads to overwhelm the US
defensive system.”
Chinese nuclear modernization ends in breakout and nuclear war – only the
plan’s restraint can solve
Logan, 17 – (David Logan, Ph.D. Student, Security Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public
and International Affairs Princeton University, 11-8-2017, Peer Reviewed, "Hard Constraints on
China’s Nuclear Forces," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 24, No. 1/2 (2017)
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10736700.2017.1371406)

China is the only nuclear weapon state recognized by the Nonproliferation Treaty that is actively
expanding its nuclear arsenal. Its nuclear forces have increased modestly from an estimated 130 to 200 warheads in 2006 to an
estimated 170 to 260 today. The qualitative changes to its nuclear forces have been more significant, with the introduction of more mobile solid-fueled
missiles, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), and an emerging fleet of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).
This modernization program has raised concerns over the past several years that China is currently
attempting or might soon attempt a nuclear breakout. Concerns of a Chinese breakout come in
two forms: either that Beijing will develop a nuclear warfighting capability that could neutralize
U.S. conventional superiority, or that Beijing will expand its strategic arsenal to achieve parity
with the United States, which could undercut U.S. security commitments to its regional allies.
While China is indeed in the midst of a significant modernization effort, the changes to its nuclear forces do not yet

represent a fundamental strategic shift. Rather, China’s nuclear evolution appears to be driven
by a desire to maintain a secure second-strike capability in the face of advancing U.S.
capabilities, which Beijing believes might threaten its nuclear deterrent. As I demonstrate in a new article in
the Nonproliferation Review, China’s nuclear arsenal and strategy are constrained by its limited views of the utility of nuclear weapons. Moreover,
Beijing would face several “harder” technical constraints in pursuing the kind of nuclear breakout about which some commentators warn. Concerns of
an Impending Chinese Breakout First, some commentators
have argued that China may be currently developing
a nuclear warfighting capability, or at least the nuclear arsenal to support one. A nuclear warfighting
capability can refer to either a force designed to attack an adversary’s nuclear arsenal, or a nuclear force designed for use on the battlefield, though
most commentators mean the latter when referring to China. These
developments, they argue, could lead to China
introducing nuclear weapons into an otherwise conventional conflict. Other observers have
contended that China may attempt a “sprint to parity,” a rapid buildup in its strategic nuclear
arsenal until it has roughly as many nuclear weapons as the United States (One scholarhas even fantastically
claimed, based on an analysis of the underground tunnel system designed to protect China’s missiles, that it may already possess more than 3,000
nuclear weapons). This would entail a dramatic expansion in the size of China’s nuclear arsenal. China’s
Current Nuclear Posture China’s nuclear forces and policies are constrained, first and foremost, by the country’s distinctive approach to nuclear
weapons. As Jeffrey Lewis has written, Chinese leadership has historically believed that nuclear deterrence is largely unaffected by the size and
configuration of the adversary’s nuclear arsenal, so long as the country can threaten a counterstrike of a few — or even one — nuclear warheads.
Marshall Nie Rongzhen, a leading figure in China’s early nuclear weapons program, called this “the minimum means of reprisal.” Recent research by
Fiona Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, based on reviews of Chinese doctrinal and academic writings and interviews with Chinese military and civilian
experts, indicates that these fundamental views have not changed and that China is likely to continue adhering to its relatively restrained strategy of
“assured retaliation.” In recent Track-1.5 and Track-2 dialogues between the United States and China, Chinese participants have said that China could
credibly threaten the United States with only “a few,” a “handful of,” or even “one” nuclear warhead. Designed to support more limited goals, China’s
nuclear forces are generally believed to be smaller and less alerted than those of other states. The country has yet to develop an early warning system
and some experts believe China would wait several days after suffering a nuclear strike before launching its own nuclear counterattack. Observers
believe Beijing does not mate its nuclear warheads to missiles in peacetime, instead storing them separately. According to the counting rules of the
New START treaty, China has nearly zero deployed nuclear weapons. China’s
ongoing nuclear modernization program is
indeed significantly changing the character and configuration of the country’s nuclear forces.
But these changes appear to be driven by a desire to maintain the survivability of the country’s
second-strike capability, not a fundamentally new view of nuclear weapons in Beijing. China has
identified advancing U.S. capabilities in conventional prompt global strike and ballistic missile
defense as serious threats to its nuclear forces. Regardless of whether these concerns are
reasonable, they appear sincere. By deploying more mobile missiles, China hopes to increase the
survivability of its overall deterrent. By deploying SSBNs and equipping some of its land-based
missiles with MIRV capability, it hopes to enhance its ability to penetrate U.S. missile defenses.
Hard Constraints In addition to these “softer” political constraints on a Chinese nuclear breakout, China would face several “harder” technical barriers
to both developing a nuclear warfighting capability and undertaking a sprint to parity. A nuclear warfighting capability would require China to deploy a
more diversified nuclear force, with smaller-yield warheads affixed to more accurate missiles. However, the country’s current warhead designs,
designed for the more limited strategy of assured retaliation, are too heavy and too powerful. During the Cold War, the average yield of U.S. tactical
weapons was reported to be 4 kilotons, and NATO war planners set an upper limit of 10 kilotons for bombs that could be used on their own territory.
More recently, the nuclear warhead for the U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile had a variable yield of 5 to 150 kilotons and weighed 130 kilograms. By
comparison, China’s smallest nuclear warhead is estimated to have a yield of 200 to 300 kilotons and to weigh 500 kilograms. China’s record of nuclear
weapons testing does not give it an ideal basis for developing reliable, smaller, modern designs. Most of China’s tests involved heavy, high-yield
devices. Beijing did successfully test an enhanced radiation device in the late 1980s that could serve as the technical foundation for tactical nuclear
weapons, though it’s not clear this design would be suitable for developing a robust warfighting arsenal. Even if China were to rely on this design, it
might face production constraints stemming from limited tritium and fissile material stockpiles. China might choose to resume nuclear testing to
develop newer warhead designs, but it would take time and resources to design and certify new warheads, and the international community would
detect any new testing. Finally, China generally lacks the supporting infrastructure needed to employ a nuclear warfighting capability. Such a capability
would require developing new technical capabilities, organizational arrangements, and operational practices, which China has generally avoided. For
instance, a nuclear warfighting capability would likely require more flexible command and control arrangements, including delegating more authority to
military commanders, as Pakistan has done to support its “asymmetric escalation” strategy. By contrast, China has prioritized strict political control over
its nuclear weapons, keeping its nuclear forces somewhat insulated from its conventional ones. China would face similar constraints in attempting a
strategic sprint to parity. The most significant challenge is its limited fissile material stockpile. China’s modern warhead designs use plutonium fuel, but
analysts believe Beijing last produced weapons-grade plutonium in 1991 and that it currently maintains a stockpile of only 1.8 metric tons. In addition,
China has relied on conservative warhead designs that use more fuel than other countries’ warheads. Given these high fuel requirements and its
limited stockpile, in a best-case scenario China could produce no more than 250 to 450 plutonium-based warheads. China could resort to using
uranium-based designs, though it faces a limited uranium stockpile as well. More significantly, the uranium designs it has tested in the past were
relatively unsophisticated and ill-suited for a modern arsenal. To develop modern and reliable uranium-based warheads, China would likely have to
resort again to testing new designs. Certainly, China
possesses the underlying economic, industrial, and
technological bases on which to either develop a nuclear warfighting capability or attempt a
sprint to parity. However, attempting either form of nuclear breakout would entail significant changes to China’s nuclear program,
possibly including developing new warheads, resuming weapons testing, renewing weapons-grade fissile material production, and significantly
changing operational practices. Given China’s historically conservative approach to its nuclear weapons program, it
appears unlikely that
it could undertake a military significant nuclear breakout in the near term or accomplish one in the long term without
being detected. Analysts who have warned of an impending nuclear breakout may be assuming that China’s ongoing modernization program
is more expansive than it is, conflating a push for greater survivability with a desire for “usability,” or viewing the modest quantitative growth in China’s
arsenal as a prelude to something much more expansive. Certainly, China has made tremendous progress in developing and deploying advanced
ballistic missile systems, which would be a crucial component of any nuclear warfighting capability. Indeed, some observers worry that the hardware
and operational practices associated with the conventional force could bleed over and end up benefitting the nuclear force. But a broader review of the
other technical requirements of either developing a nuclear warfighting capability or pursuing strategic parity suggests China would nonetheless face
harder obstacles. Policy Implications The constraints on China’s nuclear forces have important implications for U.S. policy. Policy decisions should rest
on realistic threat assessments of China’s nuclear program and avoid provoking self-fulfilling prophecies. Washington should recognize the constraints
on Beijing’s nuclear policy and work to reinforce those constraints and maintain strategic stability. First, observers
should watch for
indicators that China is fundamentally altering its approach to nuclear weapons. This could
include more obvious moves such as the resumption of production of military fissile material,
new rounds of nuclear weapons testing, or a shift in political statements about the purpose of
China’s nuclear weapons. Important indicators might also be subtler, such as changes in the organization and operation of the military
organizations that operate China’s nuclear weapons. Second, the United States should attempt to strengthen and reinforce the constraints on China’s
program. Ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would strengthen the international norm against testing, while funding the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty Organization increases the chance of detecting tests should they occur. (Though it would likely be more difficult to detect small-yield tests of
tactical warheads compared to the massive tests of China’s past, the history of the international monitoring system is cause for optimism. For example,
it detected North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test, which had an estimated yield of only 0.6 kilotons.) The United States should also attempt to stem the rise
of reprocessing in East Asia, which could raise regional anxieties by lowering the barriers to some states producing nuclear bombs. Finally,
policymakers should recognize that Chinese nuclear policies are driven in part by perceived
threats from the United States itself. Expanding conventional prompt global strike, ballistic
missile defense, and the role of U.S. nuclear forces could exacerbate Chinese threat
perceptions and trigger just the kind of nuclear breakout scenarios that observers fear. Calls to
develop so-called tailored nuclear options based on assumptions of an impending Chinese nuclear breakout should be met with skepticism. Rather

than exacerbating these dynamics, the U.S.-China nuclear relationship might be best served by
a dose of strategic restraint.
Nuclear war with China results in millions killed, radiation poising, and a
nuclear winter.
Wittner 11 (Professor of History @ State University of New York-Albany, Lawrence S. Wittner,
“Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?,” Huntington News, Monday, November 28, 2011 - 18:37
pg. http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446)

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used . After all, for
centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons.
The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet
another example of this phenomenon.
The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed
by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently
challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in
Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region .
According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own
position as a Pacific power.”

But need this lead to nuclear war?

Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and
China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to
attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and , later, during the conflict
over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter
confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear
weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.”

Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of
national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet
government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals,
should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling
persists.
Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and,
admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999,
between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such
wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war.
Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use
“any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its
border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan.

At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO
leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a
Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on
the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that
nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its
modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably
unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from
attacking by U.S. nuclear might?

Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them
from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its
Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five
thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly
three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the
United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China.

But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately
slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving
many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in
a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering,
radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions
would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying
agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.
Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The
Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is
expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States.
The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars
“modernizing” its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next
decade

Aegis Ashore is the tipping point of BMD modernization – causes buildup of

ICBMS and ballistic missiles, nuclear arsenal expansion, and the adoption of
launch-on-warning policies by Russia and China
Lewis 18 (George, Visiting Scholar at the Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies
at Cornell University, doctorate in experimental solid-state physics from Cornell’s Physics
Department, Fellow of the American Physical Society, was in the Technology and Security Group
of MIT’s Security Studies Program, his research has focused primarily on the technology,
capabilities, and implications of ballistic missile defense systems, Limitations on ballistic missile
defense—Past and possibly future, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2018.1486575)

More important, by 2020 the US Navy plans to begin deployment of a faster SM-3 Block IIA
interceptor co-developed with Japan. It has a burnout speed of about 4.5 kilometers per second
– 50 percent greater than the Block IA or Block IB. Also, its kill vehicle has “more than doubled
seeker sensitivity” and “more than tripled divert capability” compared to the current SM-3 Block
IB interceptor (Defense Department 2016 Defense Department. 2016. “Fiscal Year (FY) 2017
President’s Budget Submission, Missile Defense Agency, RDT&E Vol. 21.” February, 2a–891.
If deployed on a small number of offshore ships or at Aegis Ashore facilities, using the long-
range GMD radars for determining approximate intercept points, Block IIA could cover the
entire United States. According to Rondell Wilson, lead engineer for air and missile defense
products at Raytheon (the manufacturer of the SM-3 Block IIA), “We can provide the SM-3 Block
[II]A ashore as an under-layer capability for [ground-based interceptors]… . We can do that
immediately (Drew and Dimascio 2017 Drew, J., and J. Dimascio. 2017. “New Trajectory: As
Pentagon Adds Dollars for Missile Defense, Raytheon Pitches SM-3s as ICBM Killers.” Aviation
Week and Space Technology 179 (20): 58.

.” Congress has recently mandated that, “if technologically feasible,” the Block IIA missile be
tested against an ICBM-range missile (US House of Representatives 2017 US House of
Representatives. 2017. “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Conference
Report to Accompany H.R. 2810.” Report 115–404, November 9, Section 1680.

The Block IIA interceptors are intended for deployment on the more than 85 Aegis ships that the
US Navy plans to operate, as well as at land-based Aegis Ashore missile defense sites. The
interceptors, therefore, are to be deployed in much larger numbers than the GMD interceptors
– totaling perhaps 400 or more, based upon the premise that each Aegis BMD ship has at least
90 vertical launcher cells that can house variety of weapons. If, on average, five of these cells on
each ship housed Block IIA interceptors, the total would be 425 plus whatever Block IIAs were
deployed at Aegis Ashore sites, as Figure 2 illustrates (Lewis 2018 Lewis, G. 2018. “Update to
‘How Many SM-3 Block IIA Interceptors?’” mostlymissiledefense blog, May 20.

Russia, when it signed New START in 2010, had nearly 50 times more strategic nuclear ballistic
missile warheads than the United States had strategic-capable interceptors. Nevertheless,
Russia stipulated that the treaty (US Defense Department n.d. US Defense Department. n.d.
“New Start: Article-by-Article Analysis Unilateral Statements.”

…may be effective and viable only in conditions where there is no qualitative and quantitative
build-up in the missile defense capabilities of the United States [and that] the ‘extraordinary
events’ that could justify [Russian] withdrawal from the Treaty… include a build-up in the missile
defense system capabilities of the United States that would give rise to a threat to the strategic
nuclear forces potential of the Russian Federation.

The US ballistic missile defense build-up could similarly lead China to significantly increase the
number and capabilities of its strategic ballistic missiles. China already has been deploying
additional ICBM warheads and has begun deploying submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
China’s development of ICBMs with multiple warheads is widely viewed as, at least in part, a
response to the US ballistic missile defense program.

While Russia and China understand the likely effectiveness of countermeasures against the
current US ballistic missile defense system, they harbor concerns about the US program’s
completely open-ended nature. They also are concerned that US leaders, in the belief that their
defenses are effective, could act more aggressively. In April, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued
a statement expressing concern on this issue (ITAR-TASS 2018 ITAR-TASS. 2018. “US’ Missile
Shield Gives it Wrong Feeling of Impunity and Invincibility – Russian Foreign Ministry.” April 24.
The risk is that the availability of a missile shield may give grounds for a vile feeling of
invincibility and impunity and, hence, lure Washington into new dangerous unilateral steps to
achieve its goals on the global and regional levels…

In fact, US political leaders are not being told about the vulnerability of US ballistic missile
defense systems to simple countermeasures. In February, Gen. Lori Robinson, commander of
the US Northern Command – responsible for defending the United States against ballistic
missiles – told Congress that she was “100 percent confident” in her ability to defend the United
States from a North Korean ballistic missile attack (Robinson 2018 Robinson, L. 2018. “United
States Northern Command and United States Southern Command.” Hearing before the
Committee on Armed Services, February 15. Stenographic Transcript.

In October 2017, President Trump, discussing the North Korean ICBM threat, stated that “We
have missiles that can knock out a missile in the air 97 percent of the time…” (Kessler 2017
Kessler, G. 2017. “Fact Checker: Trump’s Claim that a US Interceptor Can Knock Out ICBMs ‘97
Percent of the Time’.” The Washington Post, October 13.

Thus, large-scale deployment by the United States of strategic-capable ballistic missile defense
systems could lock the world into high numbers of nuclear weapons for the indefinite future.
Since China and Russia are primarily worried about the potential effectiveness of US defenses
against their retaliation after they absorb a hypothetical US first strike, US ballistic missile
defense also could lock Russia into its current launch-on-warning posture and lead China to
adopt a similar posture.

Cutting-edge BMDs and launch on warning policies make miscalculation likely

Weitz 15 (Richard Weitz, Center for Political-Military Analysis Director, “Arms Racing in Strategic
Technologies: Asia's New Frontier,” Hudson Institute, https://www.hudson.org/research/11307-
arms-racing-in-strategic-technologies-asia-s-new-frontier)

Although China, Russia, and the United States have together experienced numerous crises and
tensions since the end of the Cold War, one important reason that each state has refrained from

employing military force directly against the others is their robust nuclear deterrents
and survivable “second-strike” capabilities—their assured ability to retaliate effectively
with their own nuclear forces even if they were attacked first. Furthermore, US extended nuclear security
guarantees—Washington’s promise to protect its allies against nuclear threats with nuclear forces, if necessary—has dissuaded other potential nuclear weapons
states, namely Japan and South Korea, from pursuing their own nuclear weapons capability. Despite doubts, these countries have continued to place their faith in

new military technologies such as

Washington’s will and capacity to defend them against North Korea and other threats. However,

missile defenses, anti-satellite weapons, and hypersonic missile systems, could raise the
risks of nuclear weapons use in future crises, especially if accompanied by certain risk-acceptant operational concepts.
Ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems may convince their possessors that they could launch a

disarming first strike—expecting their missile shields to protect them against any
retaliatory strikes. Hypersonic delivery systems present new challenges for crisis stability
due to their rapid speed and unpredictable flight paths. Furthermore, states have incentives to
use cyber weapons early in a conflict to exploit any vulnerabilities of their opponent before their own can be
neutralized by an enemy. States may even consider launching their nuclear forces before they have

been attacked, such as on warning of an assault despite the risks of misperception and
miscalculation. Chinese and Russian officials have already complained about the allegedly disruptive nature of the expanding US capabilities for missile
defense, precision strikes, and other strategic technologies. The strong US offensive capabilities, both nuclear and

conventional, exacerbate these concerns since they increase its potential for
successfully pre-empting Chinese and Russian nuclear missiles before they have been launched. Experts 2

believe that the Chinese share Russian concerns about “conventional counterforce” – US

preemptive attacks using non-nuclear hypersonic weapons or even cruise missiles

against the PLA’s nuclear forces and command nodes and then using missile defenses to
defeat any ragged Chinese counterstrike. Both countries are seeking to overcome US offensive and defensive capabilities by
actively researching all these new strategic technologies for possible military application. It is important not to exaggerate the potential for near-term technological
breakthroughs in these capabilities. By their very nature, however, the pace and impact of these novel military weapons based on revolutionary capabilities are

The best time

hard to predict. Few existing treaties explicitly constrain the quantitative or qualitative dimensions of these new strategic technologies.

to negotiate arms control agreements limiting the development of potentially

destabilizing systems is before the weapons are deployed, but there are major impediments to progress in this
area.

Strategic stability collapse strongly incentivizes nuclear first strikes

Weitz 15 (Richard Weitz, Center for Political-Military Analysis Director, “Arms Racing in Strategic
Technologies: Asia's New Frontier,” Hudson Institute, https://www.hudson.org/research/11307-
arms-racing-in-strategic-technologies-asia-s-new-frontier)
Russian leaders have argued that US development of strategically disruptive technologies such as hypersonic weapons, ballistic missile defenses, and cyber
weapons makes it harder for Moscow to accept more cuts in offensive nuclear forces under any new arms control agreement. Both Chinese and Russians fear that
the expanding US strategic capabilities threaten their capacity for assured nuclear retaliation and thereby undermine their capacity to deter a direct US attack or

Though US BMD systems would have difficulty coping

constrain US military interventions against other countries.

with a full-scale Chinese or Russian missile strike, their task would be much easier
following a US first strike that destroys many of the attackers’ missiles in their silos and,
through kinetic or cyber strikes, disrupts their strategic command-and-control systems. In
such a scenario, China or Russia might even refrain from a retaliatory missile strike against the US homeland since such a weak counterstrike could fail and
provoke a full-scale nuclear response. One way China and Russia can counter the risk of a US pre-emptive strike with conventional, nuclear, or cyber weapons, and
of having their retaliatory missile strike weakened by US defenses, is to deploy more and better missiles and nuclear warheads, making them more capable of

some of their responses can also be potentially destabilizing

inflicting unacceptable damage on the United States. Yet,

and encourage first strikes, including Russia’s construction of massive liquid-fueled

missiles that are extremely vulnerable before launch, its arsenal of potentially thousands
of tactical nuclear weapons, China’s co-location of its conventional and nuclear systems,
or any launch on warning tactics. Furthermore, China and Russia are developing counter-space
and offensive cyber capabilities designed to attack US command and control systems,
which could contribute to inadvertent escalation in a crisis.
 Scenario 2 – Kuril Islands
Aegis Ashore decks Japan-Russia bilateral relations.
Brown, 18 (James D. J, associate professor in political science at Temple University Japan and a
specialist on Russo-Japanese relations, The Case Against Aegis Ashore, Shingetsu News Agency,
http://shingetsunewsagency.com/2018/08/20/the-case-against-aegis-ashore/)

SNA (Tokyo) — While the Abe administration presents Aegis Ashore as an essential and
relatively uncontroversial contribution to the defense of Japan from the North Korean threat, in
reality the deployment of this missile defense system risks further destabilizing the security
situation in Northeast Asia, especially with regard to Russia.

In December 2017, the Japanese government formally decided to purchase Aegis Ashore, the
US-made ground-based ballistic missile defense system. It is anticipated that two units will be
installed, with Akita and Yamaguchi prefectures identified as the candidate sites. The first of
these deployments is planned to be completed during fiscal 2023.
The Abe administration has justified the purchase of this system as a necessary response to the
growth in the missile threat from North Korea. Japan has two existing missile defense systems,
but each has limitations.

The first of these is the Patriot PAC-3, which can intercept incoming missiles during their
terminal phase. The units are mobile but provide limited coverage, meaning that they can offer
protection to specific sites, such as central Tokyo or military installations, but not to the country
as a whole.

The PAC-3 system is therefore combined with Aegis-equipped destroyers, whose interceptors
can eliminate missiles during their mid-course phase. This system can theoretically provide
cover for all of Japan, but it is dependent on keeping the Aegis-equipped ships on a continual
cycle of deployment in specific areas, something that places an enormous burden on Japan’s
Maritime Self-Defense Forces.

As such, there is an apparent logic in purchasing a third system that can provide constant
protection for all of Japanese territory. Additionally, the Aegis Ashore system has superior
capabilities and range than the existing Aegis-equipped destroyers. In particular, it is claimed
that it is better at dealing with simultaneous launches as well as missiles on a lofted trajectory,
both things that North Korea has simulated in recent missile tests.

Presented this way, it appears hard to argue with the decision to adopt Aegis Ashore.

Yet, as time has passed, the chorus of opposition has grown louder.

Voices of Opposition

One criticism is that the introduction of the missile defense system runs counter to the current
trend of reduced tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Indeed, some may argue that Aegis Ashore
is now superfluous following the meeting between President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim
Jong-Un in Singapore in June at which the North Korean leader agreed “to work toward
complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”
This is, however, a weak argument since it is far from certain that the North Korean
commitment in Singapore was sincere. Furthermore, even if denuclearization were to proceed
smoothly, Pyongyang would still retain a dangerous arsenal of non-nuclear missiles that are
capable of reaching Japan.

A more convincing criticism is of the cost of the system. It was always known that Aegis Ashore
would be expensive, but the extent is only now becoming clear.

At the end of July, sources in the Ministry of Defense revealed that the estimated cost of the
two Aegis Ashore units had been revised up by around 70%. With the inclusion of other
elements, such as the interceptor missiles, the total cost of the project is now expected to
exceed 600 billion yen (US$5.4 billion).

This is an extraordinary spending commitment in a country where government debt was

equivalent to 253% of GDP in 2017, and where the Abe administration pretends to be pursuing
the goal of a fiscal surplus by 2025.

Separately, there are concerns within the local communities near where the Aegis Ashore
batteries are set to be located. These center on the extent to which the presence of the missile
defense units will make their area a target for foreign military planners. Additionally, there are
worries about the health effects of the powerful, but largely unproven, Lockheed Martin Solid
State Radar that the Japanese government has selected for use with the Aegis Ashore units.

A Destabilizing Factor in Northeast Asia

Both the expense of the system and its potential health implications are genuine concerns, but
perhaps the most serious worry about Aegis Ashore is the destabilizing effect it could have on
Northeast Asian security. The Japanese government insists that it is a purely defensive system,
which will be under Japan’s exclusive control. This is not, however, the view of Japan’s
neighbors.

Tokyo’s decision to invest further in US missile defense has been criticized by both China and
North Korea. However, the most strident and sustained condemnation of Aegis Ashore has
come from Russia.

Russia is the only peer of the United States when it comes to nuclear weapons, and it has come
to rely ever more on its vast strategic arsenal since it lost the conventional superiority that the
Soviet Union enjoyed over the West in Europe. Moreover, as the United States has
demonstrated its willingness to use military force internationally since the 1990s, Russia has
come to regard its nuclear capabilities as a vital means of deterring US interventionism. This has
become all the more important following the recent increase in tensions between Russia
and the West, and Washington’s explicit identification of Russia as an adversary.
For this reason, Russian strategists regard US missile defense systems as a leading threat
to national security. From Moscow’s perspective, the United States is engaged in a long-
term project to undermine Russia’s strategic deterrent and thereby give itself a free
hand to act without fear of Russian retaliation.
The crucial step in this regard was the decision of President George W. Bush in 2002 to
withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Signed in 1972, this agreement had barred
Washington and Moscow from deploying nationwide defenses against strategic ballistic missiles.
The treaty’s preamble described this as a “substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic
offensive arms.”

During the years since this withdrawal, Moscow believes that the United States has worked
assiduously to surround Russia with elements of its expanding missile defense system. Some of
these units have been installed within the United States itself, while others have been planned
for deployment on the territory of US allies.

The Russian authorities claim that the US justifies these deployments by using the excuse that
the missile defense systems are needed to protect allies from the threat of rogue states. In
Europe, Iran is the supposed threat; in East Asia, it is North Korea. In each case, Russia believes
that it is the real target.

Aegis Ashore is therefore seen as just the latest link in the United States’ expanding
network of missile defense systems, and Moscow is dismissive of Tokyo’s claim that it
will be an independent Japanese system. This view was expressed by Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov in January 2018, when he told journalists that, “We don’t know any cases
anywhere in this world where the United States, having deployed its weapons systems, would
hand the control over them to a host country. I have strong doubts that they will make an
exception in this case.”

This view will only have strengthened when Isao Iijima, a special advisor to Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe, told the media in June that the decision to purchase Aegis Ashore was pushed upon
Japan by the United States.

Prior to the final decision being taken, Russia intensively lobbied the Abe administration not to
agree to purchase further US missile defense systems. This included the warning by Defense
Minister Sergei Shoigu in March 2017 that the deployment of such systems “will destroy the
balance in the Pacific region.” Having ignored these words of caution, Japan must expect some
consequences.

This was made clear immediately after the announcement of Japan’s decision to purchase the
system when Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated that Aegis Ashore will
create “a new situation, which we logically must take account of in our military planning.” At the
same time, Maria Zakharova, chief spokeswoman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, warned
that the decision “will have a negative impact on the overall atmosphere of bilateral relations,
including negotiations on the issue of a peace treaty.”

Although no explicit link has been made, it is likely that the recent intensification of the Russian
military presence on the disputed Southern Kuriles is connected with the Aegis Ashore decision.
In particular, in January 2018, the Russian government issued a directive which designates
the airport on the island of Iturup (Etorofu in Japanese) as dual-use. This opens the way for it
to be used for military jets and, sure enough, Su-35S fighters were deployed to the island in July.
Similarly, it is possible that Russia’s foot-dragging on the implementation of joint
economic activities with Japan on the disputed islands is also a response to Aegis
Ashore. This may be seen as an effective way of punishing the Japanese government
since Prime Minister Abe has made the joint projects a prominent feature of his foreign
policy and has presented them as a stepping stone to the resolution of the territorial
dispute.
Causing a setback to bilateral relations with Russia might be a price worth paying if Aegis Ashore
were to radically improve Japan’s security situation. In reality, however, it will not.

No Lasting Gain in Security

Although Aegis Ashore would undoubtedly enhance the technical capabilities of Japanese
missile defense, the system can still only deal with a limited number of missiles and is not
100% reliable. As such, just as Japan’s sense of security did not meaningfully change after the
billions that were spent on PAC-3 and the Aegis-equipped destroyers, so it will be with Aegis
Ashore.

Indeed, any small gain in security is certain to be swiftly eroded as those countries that
feel threatened by Aegis Ashore adapt their behavior or introduce more sophisticated
weapons systems to overcome Japan’s additional layer of missile defense. In no time at
all, the military experts will be arguing that Japan needs to spend yet more billions on some
other new system that also offers no more than a fleeting illusion of security. In other words,
Japan will simply have contributed to an emerging arms race and to the intensification
of nuclear tensions between the United States and Russia.
There is no question that Japan is genuinely facing a threatening security environment .
However, there is no technical fix to this problem. Instead, lasting security can only be achieved
through diplomacy, confidence building, and mutual threat reduction.

Ultimately, Aegis Ashore is an enormously expensive means of creating insecurity for

others while generating little added security for Japan itself. There remains time for Japan
to reconsider this decision. It should do so as a matter of urgency.

Russia fears Aegis Ashore will be deployed on the disputed Kuril islands –
prevents resolution of territorial claims
Azuma and Walker 19 (Hidetoshi Azuma, American Security Project Adjunct Junior Fellow, Dr.
Joshua Walker, Former U.S. Department of State Senior Advisor and Current German Marshal
fund fellow, “A SILVER LINING IN ABE’S UNREQUITED BROMANCE WITH PUTIN,” War on the
Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/a-silver-lining-in-abes-unrequited-bromance-with-
putin/)

Indeed, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been a perennial thorn in Moscow’s side in its
engagement with Tokyo and is increasingly becoming Putin’s primary concern in the Far
East. It bears particular importance in the Kremlin’s strategic calculations for the Far East given its submarine-launched ballistic missile sanctuary in
the Sea of Okhotsk that could potentially become vulnerable if Russia cedes any of the four adjacent islands to Japan. Moreover, the U.S.-
Japan ballistic missile defense program is entering a new phase with Tokyo’s recent
purchase of $1.2 billion Aegis Ashore batteries from its American ally. While the new land-based
missile defense currently targets North Korea, Moscow has leveled vehement objections to Tokyo’s

potential dual offensive-defensive use of missiles and the equipment’s interoperability

with the U.S. forces. Apart from these technicalities, Aegis Ashore batteries could theoretically be
deployed on some of the four Kuril islands, such as Iturup, under Japanese sovereignty. Such a possibility alone
would further dissuade Moscow, which views Japan as increasingly linked to
Washington’s perceived efforts to contain Russia with its global missile defense
network. From the Kremlin’s perspective, Japan could potentially become just another
frontline state similar to Poland in today’s blazing Russia-West geopolitical rivalry.

Aegis Ashore leads to Russian militarism in the Kuril islands - causes Russia-
Japan conflict
Gady 18 (Franz-Stefan Gady, The Diplomat Senior Editor, “Japan Asks Russia to Reduce
Militarization of Disputed Kuril Islands,” The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/japan-
asks-russia-to-reduce-militarization-of-disputed-kuril-islands/)

Japan asked Russia to reduce its military activities on a disputed island chain, known as
the Kurils in Russia and the Northern Territories in Japan, during “two-plus-two” security talks between the foreign and defense ministers of
Japan and Russia held in Moscow on July 31, according to Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera. “We have asked the Russian side to take

particular measures because Russia is building up its military potential on the four northern islands,”
Onodera was quoted by Reuters as saying following a meeting with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Shoigu. A Japanese Ministry of Defense (MoD)

statement issued on July 31 reiterates that Russian military activities on the islands are “incompatible” with “the position of Japan” and “regrettable .”
The Japanese MoD singled out the deployment of Russian military aircraft on the
disputed islands as a particular source of concern. In March 2018, the Russian Air Force
deployed two Su-35S fighters to an airfield on Iturup (Etorofu in Japanese) — the largest and northernmost island
in the southern Kurils — for the first time. The arrival of the aircraft was preceded by Russian Prime Minister Dmitry
Medvedev signing a decree permitting the deployment of military aircraft to the civilian airport in February 2018. Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Russia’s military activities are seen in response

(MoFA) lodged an official protest over the issue in the same month.

to Moscow’s concern over the possible procurement of two U.S.-made land-based Aegis
Ashore ballistic missile defense batteries by Japan. The Russian ministers once again officially
restated their concerns over the deployment of the Aegis Ashore ballistic missile
defense systems during the two-plus-two dialogue in Moscow on Tuesday. Russia is also concerned over the
stationing of additional U.S. missile defense systems to Northeast Asia. For example, Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly expressed his
apprehension over the deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to South Korea. As I reported previously, the Russo-
Japanese dispute over the islands has been going on for many decades: The disputed Northern territories – known in Japanese as the Shikotan,
Kunashiri, Etorofu and the Habomai islets – located in the Sea of Okhotsk in the Northwest Pacific, were seized by the Soviet Union in 1945. By 1949 the
Russians had expelled all 17,000 Japanese residents of the islands. Under the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, Tokyo renounced “all right, title and
claim to the Kuril Islands”; however, Moscow never signed the peace treaty and Tokyo refused to concede that the four disputed islands were in fact
part of the Kuril chain. Japan has repeatedly rejected Moscow’s offer to settle the dispute with the return of the two smallest territories of the chain,
The increasing Russian military presence on the disputed island chain is
Habomai and Shikotan.

bound to accentuate the ongoing disagreement between Moscow and Tokyo. The deployment
of Russian military aircraft (as of now not on a permanent basis) is just one item of a list of Japanese concerns regarding Russian military activities on
the islands. The Russian Navy has also been considering establishing a permanent naval base for its Pacific Fleet on one of the islands. Furthermore, the
Russian MoD announced that it will deploy an army division there. Additionally, Russia stationed anti-ship and missile defense systems on the disputed
territories in 2016..
Heightened tensions around the Kuril Islands risk World War 3.
Khanna, 18 (Parag Khanna, Senior Research Fellow in the Centre on Asia and Globalisation at
the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Avoiding World War III in Asia, National Interest,
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/avoiding-world-war-iii-asia-26313?page=0%2C2)

World War II still hasn’t ended, yet World War III already looms. When China and Japan
agreed to normalize relations in 1945, it was stipulated that the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands (a string of uninhabited rocks equidistant from Japan, China and Taiwan) would not be
militarized and the dispute would be put off for future generations. That future is here. The
recent discovery of large oil and gas reserves under the islands has heated up the situation
dramatically, with military budgets surging, and warships, coast guards and fighter jets
scrambling to assert control over the commons.

Meanwhile, tensions on the Korean Peninsula have drastically escalated into the world’s most
dangerous flashpoint over the past seven decades precisely because the Korean War itself was
never formally ended in 1953. Despite the recent summit between Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong-
un, neither South nor North Korea has yet to formally recognize the other’s existence, each
claiming to be the sole legitimate government of the entire Korean Peninsula. Similarly, the
unresolved status of the princely state of Kashmir at the time of the partition of South Asia into
independent India and Pakistan in 1947 has been the direct or proximate cause of three major
wars and a near nuclear standoff in 2001 between the postcolonial cousins.

These three major Asian fault lines are a reminder that the biggest risk of conflict in the twenty-
first century stems from unsettled conflicts of the twentieth century. Asia is awash in other
still-disputed territories and boundaries such as Arunachal Pradesh (between India and
China, which Beijing calls “South Tibet”), the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea
(claimed by numerous Asian countries) and the southern Kuril Islands (where there is Russo-
Japanese friction, with Tokyo calling them the “Northern Territories”).
The world has been lucky that deterrence, economic integration and a shared distaste
for the past two centuries of Western domination have prevented Asia’s major powers
from crossing the Rubicon. But rather than simply hope luck does not run out, the solution to
these tensions is to immediately seek permanent settlement on peaceful terms.

Ending interminably hot or cold wars requires a different approach to diplomatic

mediation than the ad hoc crisis management that has been the norm in these and
other conflicts. Indeed, there is a significant leap from traditional mediation to outright
settlement. Mediating conflict without a settlement is like turning down the temperature on a
pressure cooker without switching it off: the food inside will eventually burn and rot. The
temperature can also be turned back up, causing the top to eventually blow off. By contrast,
settling a conflict is like turning the stove off, removing the pressure cooker and getting on with
sharing the meal. Strategists focused on alliance management and force posture would be well
served to take a step back and remember that military maneuvering is not an end in itself. More
fundamental than preparing for war is eliminating the need for it in the first place.
US-Russia conflicts escalates to nuclear war – extinction.
Chossudovsky, 14 (Dr. Michel Chossudovsky, Professor of Economics at the University of
Ottawa, Founder and Director of the Centre for Research on Globalization, and Editor of Global
Research, “Dangerous Crossroads: US-NATO To Deploy Ground Troops, Conduct Large Scale
Naval Exercises against “Unnamed Enemy””, 8-24, http://www.globalresearch.ca/dangerous-
crossroads-us-nato-to-deploy-ground-troops-conduct-large-scale-naval-exercises-against-
unnamed-enemy/5397415)

The World is at a dangerous Crossroads.

The Western military alliance is in an advanced state of readiness. And so is Russia.
Russia is heralded as the “Aggressor”. US-NATO military confrontation with Russia is
contemplated.

Enabling legislation in the US Senate under “The Russian Aggression Prevention Act” (RAPA) has
“set the US on a path towards direct military conflict with Russia in Ukraine.”

Any US-Russian war is likely to quickly escalate into a nuclear war, since neither the US
nor Russia would be willing to admit defeat, both have many thousands of nuclear
weapons ready for instant use, and both rely upon Counterforce military doctrine that
tasks their military, in the event of war, to preemptively destroy the nuclear forces of
the enemy. (See Steven Starr, Global Research, August 22, 2014)
The Russian Aggression Prevention Act (RAPA) is the culmination of more than twenty years of
US-NATO war preparations, which consist in the military encirclement of both Russia and China:

From the moment the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the United States has relentlessly
pursued a strategy of encircling Russia, just as it has with other perceived enemies like China
and Iran. It has brought 12 countries in central Europe, all of them formerly allied with Moscow,
into the NATO alliance. US military power is now directly on Russia’s borders. (Steven Kinzer,
Boston Globe, March 3, 2014, emphasis added)

On July 24, in consultation with the Pentagon, NATO’s Europe commander General Philip
Breedlove called for “stockpiling a base in Poland with enough weapons, ammunition and other
supplies to support a rapid deployment of thousands of troops against Russia”.(RT, July 24,
2014). According to General Breedlove, NATO needs “pre-positioned supplies, pre-positioned
capabilities and a basing area ready to rapidly accept follow-on forces”:

“He plans to recommend placing supplies — weapons, ammunition and ration packs — at the
headquarters to enable a sudden influx of thousands of Nato troops” (Times, August 22, 2014,
emphasis added)

Breedlove’s “Blitzkrieg scenario” is to be presented at NATO’s summit in Wales in early

September, according to The London Times. It is a “copy and paste” text broadly consistent with
the Russian Aggression Prevention Act (RAPA) which directs President Obama to:
“(1) implement a plan for increasing U.S. and NATO support for the armed forces of Poland,
Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, and other NATO member-states; and

(2) direct the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO to seek consideration for permanently
basing NATO forces in such countries.” (S.2277 — 113th Congress (2013-2014))

More generally, a scenario of military escalation prevails with both sides involved in
extensive war games.
In turn, the structure of US sponsored military alliances plays a crucial role in war planning. We
are dealing with a formidable military force involving a global alliance of 28 NATO member
states. In turn, the US as well as NATO have established beyond the “Atlantic Region” a network
of bilateral military alliances with “partner” countries directed against Russia, China, Iran and
North Korea.

The Kuril Island Dispute prevents repair of Japan-Russia relations.

Miller 2012 (J. Berkshire Miller, senior fellow with the Japan Institute of International Affairs,
Japan, Russia Should Look To Each Other, Forbes,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanmiller/2012/09/26/japan-russia-should-look-to-each-
other/#34dd3b577cca)

Unfortunately for those hoping for a reset in Japan-Russia relations, there are serious
obstacles that prevent their partnership from expanding beyond its current state. The
two countries have gone to war twice in the past century. The first occasion demonstrated to
the world that Japan had arrived as a legitimate military power with its stunning defeat of the
Russian Empire in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5. The second had a different result after the
Soviet Union sent the Red Army into Manchuria to claim territorial spoils from a fatally crippled
Imperial Japan at the conclusion of World War II.

While the legacies of historical wounds often remain potent, it is their tangible element that
complicates attempts to repair frayed relationships. This is the case with Japan and
Russia as both states have been denied a cathartic restart due to the festering territorial
dispute over the Southern Kuril Islands (referred to as the Northern Territories in Japan).
There are positive signs, however, as the two countries work together on several important
bilateral and multilateral issues such as nuclear non-proliferation, counterterrorism, energy
security and information technology. So while the Kuril dispute has thus far not made the two
strategic rivals, it has smothered any chance of a deep and comprehensive partnership.

The Kurils Row

Diplomatic and legal attempts to decipher which country is the rightful owner of the
islands are muddied by a series of historical treaties dating back to 1855 . Tokyo claims
that the sovereignty of the Southern Kurils has never been debatable and that the four disputed
islands (Etorofu, Kunashiri, Habomai and Shikotan) have been part of Japan since the early 19th
century. This is confirmed, according to Japan, by the Shimoda Treaty of 1855 and the
Portsmouth Treaty of 1905 at the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese war.
This all changed when the Soviet Union took over the islands following World War II. For its part,
Russia remains unyielding to Japan’s protests that the islands be returned by pointing to
the Yalta Agreement (1945) and Potsdam Declaration (1945) as proof of its sovereignty. Russia
also emphasizes that the 1951 San Francisco Treaty serves as legal evidence that Japan
acknowledged Russian sovereignty over the islands, a claim Tokyo vehemently denies.

Because of the Kurils dispute, Japan and Russia have yet to officially sign a peace treaty
concluding World War II. There have been several attempts to reach an accommodation to
end the row, but both sides have thus far been unable to overcome domestic political
opposition to a compromise. While signing a treaty would be more ceremonial than
substantial, its absence signals a sustained deficit of trust that has stymied any
meaningful strategic engagement.
The Kuril Islands, showing the de facto divisi...

There have been a range of other proposals, both formal and informal, since the Kawana
summit. Russia once offered to return the two smaller islands to Japan (Shikotan and Habomai).
Other diplomatic attempts have proposed the return of three islands to Japan (all except
Etorofu) or the joint administration of the islands with no one state having sovereignty.
Unfortunately, none of these compromises has been able to satiate the domestic political
demands in both countries. Nationalist sentiment in Japan remains strong over the return of all
four islands and it is politically difficult for perpetually weak governments to propose a
compromise resolution. Similarly, the Russian public strongly opposes a return of the
islands to Japan. The islands are home to thousands of Russian citizens and remain a
nationalist badge symbolizing its victory during World War II. But public sentiment is not the
only reason. The islands are geopolitically important to Russia and represent a strategic
gateway to East Asia that complements its port in Vladivostok.

Russia-Japan strategic partnership prevents Central Asian smuggling –

converging interest ensures regional stability – Kurils are the only barrier.
Miller 2012 (J. Berkshire Miller, senior fellow with the Japan Institute of International Affairs,
Japan, Russia Should Look To Each Other, Forbes,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanmiller/2012/09/26/japan-russia-should-look-to-each-
other/#34dd3b577cca)

Russia and Japan also share a common goal of promoting security in Central Asia.
International crime and drug trafficking from the region has proliferated in recent years
due to instability in Afghanistan and the border regions of Tajikistan. Both sides view the illicit
narcotics trade as a serious international security concern and have discussed ways to
cooperate with the US to curb the flows. Japan and Russia also can exploit their
partnership through joint investment projects in Central Asia. While this region is still in
Russia’s strategic sphere, Moscow’s primacy is increasingly being challenged by China and the
United States. Japan can lend its expertise in fields such as information technology and
manufacturing and combine this with Russia’s regional influence and existing capital.
Moving Past the Kurils

A strategic partnership between Russia and Japan clearly has it merits. But what are the
costs and is it palatable? Until the Kuril dispute is resolved, the two will be inhibited from
proceeding further. Japan’s differences with China, North Korea and – to a lesser degree –
South Korea have presented an opening for repairing relations with Russia. In fact, a closer
relationship with Moscow would help improve Japan’s ties with China and Korea by
demonstrating its willingness to compromise on lingering issues from the World War II.
Russia would also see its geopolitical standing in Asia increase with a strengthened relationship
with Tokyo. Russia realizes that Asia is changing and its neglected status as a Pacific power will
need to be dusted off and refurbished. This can be done with or without Japan, but having
Tokyo onside makes the transition easier and could result in a potential economic and security
windfall.

A strong Russo-Japanese strategic partnership would not only work on multilateral

security initiatives such as the Six Party talks and international narcotic flows, but would
also work to check a growing China. Both countries tacitly strive for this but recognize the
political difficulties due to the Kurils row. Now is the time for a grand bargain on the
Kurils. For officials in Moscow and Tokyo, resolving the territorial dispute will not come without
cost – both politically and economically. It will take political courage to navigate through such
thorny issues, but it is imperative that Japan and Russia commit to resolving the dispute if
they wish to assume primary roles in charting the future strategic course of the Asia-
Pacific region.

Smuggling causes nuclear terrorism – drug routes generate unique vulnerability

Henderson, 17 (Sophie Henderson, Research Analyst at RUSI within the National Security and
Resilience team., Central Asia: A Nuclear–Terrorism Nexus?, RUSI,
https://rusi.org/commentary/central-asia-nuclear%E2%80%93terrorism-nexus)

Central Asia's increasing vulnerability to the smuggling of nuclear fissile material poses a
potential threat to international security and requires a multilateral response.
Transnational smuggling routes throughout Central Asia are not a new problem: the region has
served for centuries as a vast transit hub for both legal and illicit trade to Europe and
the Middle East.
More recently, China’s new transnational One Belt, One Road (OBOR) strategy, which seeks
to revive Central Asia as a nexus of regional trade, was linked to the facilitation of illicit trade
and transnational crime in a report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
This fear was exemplified on 7 March, when the Kyrgyz Republic arrested several drug
control officers for illegally possessing over 7 kg of heroin. In a region where state
security services actively participate in a lucrative opiate trade out of Afghanistan, this is
hardly surprising.
What is less clear is the extent to which these same drug trafficking methods and routes are
being used to smuggle bomb-grade nuclear material from former Soviet states to terrorist
groups.

When ruled by the USSR, the five Central Asian states – Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan,
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan – played a key role in developing weapons of mass destruction by
producing fissile material and using their large, sparsely populated lands for testing.

Since their independence, these states were quick to dismantle their nuclear facilities and
expatriate any inherited nuclear missiles to Russia. By 2009, Central Asian states had signed and
ratified the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (CANWFZ).

Although concerns were raised over the treaty’s ambiguous language, which might allow Russia
to deploy nuclear weapons in Central Asia under the premise of providing ‘military assistance’,
all permanent members of the UN Security Council ultimately supported the treaty.

Thus, the willingness of Central Asian governments to combat nuclear proliferation provides an
encouraging space for security cooperation between the West and Russia. Despite the
achievement of CANWFZ, however, the region’s lack of physical security, pervasive drug
trafficking trade and increased connectivity, facilitated by OBOR, make Central Asia
vulnerable to nuclear trafficking.
Central Asia is geographically positioned to be a transit route between countries that
possess weakly guarded fissile material, especially those in the former Soviet Union, and
those that seek it, such as groups in Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Syria.
The region is already a transit route for a lucrative drug trade. The UNODC estimates
that in 2010, drug traffickers in the region made a net profit of $1.4 billion from
trafficking heroin out of Afghanistan, equal to roughly a third of Tajikistan’s GDP.
An estimated 200 kg of heroin and 50 kg of opium are trafficked daily across the
Tajikistan–Afghanistan border. These staggering numbers reveal the cracks in Central
Asia’s physical security.
Border security forces in the region often lack the funding, equipment, and training to
effectively combat trafficking. Inadequate salaries also motivate many border guards to turn
a blind eye to trafficking by accepting bribes or getting involved themselves. Some reports
suggested that state officials are also involvement in the drug trade.

Thus, the success of Central Asia’s drug trade indicates that there are routes through
which nuclear material can be smuggled and that the ability or willingness of some
states to police them is minimal.
Nuclear trafficking in the former USSR was a key concern immediately following its collapse.
Alarmist predictions of rampant nuclear trafficking throughout Russia, Central Asia and the
Caucasus, were largely proved to be exaggerated, and these fears receded.
However, recent cases of nuclear smuggling along Central Asia’s periphery and security
concerns over OBOR highlighted the need to renew security cooperation and non-
proliferation efforts in the region.
Recent media reports identified Moldovan criminal groups that attempted to smuggle
radioactive materials to Daesh (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS) in 2015.

Between January and June 2016, there were three incidents in Georgia of groups
attempting to smuggle radioactive material, specifically Cesium 137 and Uranium 235
and 238, presumably to Turkey. Uranium 235 can be used in nuclear weapons, while
Uranium 238 can be used to make plutonium, a key ingredient in nuclear weapons.
Cesium 127 can be used in a ‘dirty bomb’, a speculative explosive device that would spread
harmful radioactive material across a large area; Daesh is considered capable of producing
dirty bombs.
It is likely that most of this nuclear material comes from Russia. In January 2016, three
Georgians were caught attempting to sell Cesium 137 in containers that were labelled in
Russian.

Additionally, the 2016 Nuclear Security Index, created by nuclear security experts and the
Economist Intelligence Unit, ranked Russia as the worst among 24 countries that possess
weapons-usable materials. The insecurity of Russia’s nuclear stockpiles heightens concerns of
the material being trafficked out of Russia through Central Asia.

In addition to recent cases of nuclear trafficking on the borders of Central Asia, OBOR
exacerbates the risk of nuclear trafficking in the region. China’s strategy will dramatically
increase transportation connectivity across Central Asia, which risks further enabling the
smuggling of nuclear and other substances.

The 2016 UNODC report raised similar security concerns about OBOR, arguing that ‘intensifying
inter-regional connections’ for economic integration can facilitate the activities of transnational
criminal networks and trafficking routes.

The elevated risk of nuclear smuggling in Central Asia is made apparent by recent cases
of smuggling in the region’s periphery and the potential of OBOR’s connectivity
inadvertently enhancing pre-established smuggling routes.
However, these increased risks also provide an opportunity for renewed cooperation between
the West and Russia in nuclear non-proliferation. Non-proliferation is a relatively apolitical issue
and thus there is room for productive multilateral cooperation.

Efforts at increased information sharing, transparency, and reporting of nuclear smuggling

activity to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should be emphasised by all parties.

As a first step, all Central Asian states should sign up to the IAEA’s Convention on Nuclear Safety,
as currently only Kazakhstan is a Contracting Party. Additionally, reporting the seizure or
 loss of nuclear material to the IAEA’s Incident and Trafficking Database should also be
encouraged and promoted.

Central Asia’s vulnerability to harbouring a potential nuclear–drug–terrorism nexus

poses a potential threat to international security and requires a renewed multilateral
commitment and approach to combating nuclear smuggling and proliferation.

Nuclear terror causes extinction.

Bunn and Roth 17 (Matthew Bunn, Nickolas Roth, professor of practice at Harvard Kennedy
School former advisor in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, Research
associate at the Belfer Center’s Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University, The effects
of a single terrorist nuclear bomb, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists ,
https://thebulletin.org/2017/09/the-effects-of-a-single-terrorist-nuclear-bomb/)

The escalating threats between North Korea and the United States make it easy to forget the
“nuclear nightmare,” as former US Secretary of Defense William J. Perry put it, that could result
even from the use of just a single terrorist nuclear bomb in the heart of a major city.

At the risk of repeating the vast literature on the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—and the
substantial literature surrounding nuclear tests and simulations since then—we attempt to
spell out here the likely consequences of the explosion of a single terrorist nuclear bomb
on a major city, and its subsequent ripple effects on the rest of the planet. Depending on
where and when it was detonated, the blast, fire, initial radiation, and long-term
radioactive fallout from such a bomb could leave the heart of a major city a smoldering
radioactive ruin, killing tens or hundreds of thousands of people and wounding
hundreds of thousands more. Vast areas would have to be evacuated and might be
uninhabitable for years. Economic, political, and social aftershocks would ripple
throughout the world. A single terrorist nuclear bomb would change history. The country
attacked—and the world—would never be the same.

The idea of terrorists accomplishing such a thing is, unfortunately, not out of the
question; it is far easier to make a crude, unsafe, unreliable nuclear explosive that might
fit in the back of a truck than it is to make a safe, reliable weapon of known yield that
can be delivered by missile or combat aircraft. Numerous government studies have
concluded that it is plausible that a sophisticated terrorist group could make a crude
bomb if they got the needed nuclear material. And in the last quarter century, there
have been some 20 seizures of stolen, weapons-usable nuclear material, and at least
two terrorist groups have made significant efforts to acquire nuclear bombs.
Terrorist use of an actual nuclear bomb is a low-probability event—but the immensity of the
consequences means that even a small chance is enough to justify an intensive effort to reduce
the risk. Fortunately, since the early 1990s, countries around the world have significantly
reduced the danger—but it remains very real, and there is more to do to ensure this nightmare
never becomes reality.

Brighter than a thousand suns. Imagine a crude terrorist nuclear bomb—containing a

chunk of highly enriched uranium just under the size of a regulation bowling ball, or a
much smaller chunk of plutonium—suddenly detonating inside a delivery van parked in
the heart of a major city. Such a terrorist bomb would release as much as 10 kilotons of
explosive energy, or the equivalent of 10,000 tons of conventional explosives, a volume of
explosives large enough to fill all the cars of a mile-long train. In a millionth of a second, all of
that energy would be released inside that small ball of nuclear material, creating
temperatures and pressures as high as those at the center of the sun . That furious energy
would explode outward, releasing its energy in three main ways: a powerful blast wave; intense
heat; and deadly radiation.

The ball would expand almost instantly into a fireball the width of four football fields,
incinerating essentially everything and everyone within. The heated fireball would rise,
sucking in air from below and expanding above, creating the mushroom cloud that has become
the symbol of the terror of the nuclear age. The ionized plasma in the fireball would create
a localized electromagnetic pulse more powerful than lightning, shorting out
communications and electronics nearby—though most would be destroyed by the bomb’s
other effects in any case. (Estimates of heat, blast, and radiation effects in this article are drawn
primarily from Alex Wellerstein’s “Nukemap,” which itself comes from declassified US
government data, such as the 660-page government textbook The Effects of Nuclear Weapons.)

At the instant of its detonation, the bomb would also release an intense burst of gamma
and neutron radiation which would be lethal for nearly everyone directly exposed within
about two-thirds of a mile from the center of the blast. (Those who happened to be
shielded by being inside, or having buildings between them and the bomb, would be partly
protected—in some cases, reducing their doses by ten times or more.)

The nuclear flash from the heat of the fireball would radiate in both visible light and the
infrared; it would be “brighter than a thousand suns,” in the words of the title of a book
describing the development of nuclear weapons—adapting a phrase from the Hindu epic the
Bhagavad-Gita. Anyone who looked directly at the blast would be blinded. The heat from
the fireball would ignite fires and horribly burn everyone exposed outside at distances
of nearly a mile away. (In the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum, visitors gaze in horror at the
bones of a human hand embedded in glass melted by the bomb.)

No one has burned a city on that scale in the decades since World War II, so it is difficult to
predict the full extent of the fire damage that would occur from the explosion of a nuclear bomb
in one of today’s cities. Modern glass, steel, and concrete buildings would presumably be less
flammable than the wood-and-rice-paper housing of Hiroshima or Nagasaki in the 1940s—but
many questions remain, including exactly how thousands of broken gas lines might contribute to
fire damage (as they did in Dresden during World War II). On 9/11, the buildings of the World
Trade Center proved to be much more vulnerable to fire damage than had been expected.
Ultimately, even a crude terrorist nuclear bomb would carry the possibility that the
countless fires touched off by the explosion would coalesce into a devastating firestorm,
as occurred at Hiroshima. In a firestorm, the rising column of hot air from the massive
fire sucks in the air from all around, creating hurricane-force winds; everything
flammable and everything alive within the firestorm would be consumed. The fires and
the dust from the blast would make it extremely difficult for either rescuers or survivors
to see.
The explosion would create a powerful blast wave rushing out in every direction. For more than
a quarter-mile all around the blast, the pulse of pressure would be over 20 pounds per square
inch above atmospheric pressure (known as “overpressure”), destroying or severely damaging
even sturdy buildings. The combination of blast, heat, and radiation would kill virtually
everyone in this zone. The blast would be accompanied by winds of many hundreds of miles
per hour.

The damage from the explosion would extend far beyond this inner zone of almost total death.
Out to more than half a mile, the blast would be strong enough to collapse most
residential buildings and create a serious danger that office buildings would topple over,
killing those inside and those in the path of the rubble. (On the other hand, the office
towers of a modern city would tend to block the blast wave in some areas, providing partial
protection from the blast, as well as from the heat and radiation.) In that zone, almost anything
made of wood would be destroyed: Roofs would cave in, windows would shatter, gas lines
would rupture. Telephone poles, street lamps, and utility lines would be severely damaged.
Many roads would be blocked by mountains of wreckage. In this zone, many people would be
killed or injured in building collapses, or trapped under the rubble; many more would be burned,
blinded, or injured by flying debris. In many cases, their charred skin would become ragged and
fall off in sheets.

The effects of the detonation would act in deadly synergy. The smashed materials of
buildings broken by the blast would be far easier for the fires to ignite than intact
structures. The effects of radiation would make it far more difficult for burned and
injured people to recover. The combination of burns, radiation, and physical injuries
would cause far more death and suffering than any one of them would alone.
The silent killer. The bomb’s immediate effects would be followed by a slow, lingering
killer: radioactive fallout. A bomb detonated at ground level would dig a huge crater, hurling
tons of earth and debris thousands of feet into the sky. Sucked into the rising fireball, these
particles would mix with the radioactive remainders of the bomb, and over the next few hours
or days, the debris would rain down for miles downwind. Depending on weather and wind
patterns, the fallout could actually be deadlier and make a far larger area unusable than the
blast itself. Acute radiation sickness from the initial radiation pulse and the fallout would
likely affect tens of thousands of people. Depending on the dose, they might suffer from
vomiting, watery diarrhea, fever, sores, loss of hair, and bone marrow depletion. Some would
survive; some would die within days; some would take months to die. Cancer rates among the
survivors would rise. Women would be more vulnerable than men—children and infants
especially so.

Much of the radiation from a nuclear blast is short-lived; radiation levels even a few days after
the blast would be far below those in the first hours. For those not killed or terribly wounded by
the initial explosion, the best advice would be to take shelter in a basement for at least several
days. But many would be too terrified to stay. Thousands of panic-stricken people might receive
deadly doses of radiation as they fled from their homes. Some of the radiation will be longer-
lived; areas most severely affected would have to be abandoned for many years after the attack.
The combination of radioactive fallout and the devastation of nearly all life-sustaining
infrastructure over a vast area would mean that hundreds of thousands of people would have to
evacuate.

Ambulances to nowhere. The explosion would also destroy much of the city’s ability to respond.
Hospitals would be leveled, doctors and nurses killed and wounded, ambulances destroyed. (In
Hiroshima, 42 of 45 hospitals were destroyed or severely damaged, and 270 of 300 doctors were
killed.) Resources that survived outside the zone of destruction would be utterly overwhelmed.
Hospitals have no ability to cope with tens or hundreds of thousands of terribly burned and
injured people all at once; the United States, for example, has 1,760 burn beds in hospitals
nationwide, of which a third are available on any given day.

And the problem would not be limited to hospitals; firefighters, for example, would have little
ability to cope with thousands of fires raging out of control at once. Fire stations and equipment
would be destroyed in the affected area, and firemen killed, along with police and other
emergency responders. Some of the first responders may become casualties themselves, from
radioactive fallout, fire, and collapsing buildings. Over much of the affected area,
communications would be destroyed, by both the physical effects and the electromagnetic
pulse from the explosion.

Better preparation for such a disaster could save thousands of lives—but ultimately, there is no
way any city can genuinely be prepared for a catastrophe on such a historic scale ,
occurring in a flash, with zero warning. Rescue and recovery attempts would be impeded by the
destruction of most of the needed personnel and equipment, and by fire, debris, radiation, fear,
lack of communications, and the immense scale of the disaster. The US military and the national
guard could provide critically important capabilities—but federal plans assume that “no
significant federal response” would be available for 24-to-72 hours. Many of those burned and
injured would wait in vain for help, food, or water, perhaps for days.

The scale of death and suffering. How many would die in such an event, and how many would
be terribly wounded, would depend on where and when the bomb was detonated, what the
weather conditions were at the time, how successful the response was in helping the wounded
survivors, and more. Many estimates of casualties are based on census data, which reflect
where people sleep at night; if the attack occurred in the middle of a workday, the numbers of
people crowded into the office towers at the heart of many modern cities would be far higher.
The daytime population of Manhattan, for example, is roughly twice its nighttime population; in
Midtown on a typical workday, there are an estimated 980,000 people per square mile. A 10-
kiloton weapon detonated there might well kill half a million people—not counting those who
might die of radiation sickness from the fallout. (These effects were analyzed in great detail in
the Rand Corporation’s Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack and the British
Medical Journal’s “Nuclear terrorism.”)

On a typical day, the wind would blow the fallout north, seriously contaminating virtually all of
Manhattan above Gramercy Park; people living as far away as Stamford, Connecticut would
likely have to evacuate.

Seriously injured survivors would greatly outnumber the dead, their suffering magnified by the
complete inadequacy of available help. The psychological and social effects—overwhelming
sadness, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, myriad forms of anxiety—would be
profound and long-lasting.
The scenario we have been describing is a groundburst. An airburst—such as might occur, for
example, if terrorists put their bomb in a small aircraft they had purchased or rented—would
extend the blast and fire effects over a wider area, killing and injuring even larger numbers of
people immediately. But an airburst would not have the same lingering effects from fallout as a
groundburst, because the rock and dirt would not be sucked up into the fireball and
contaminated. The 10-kiloton blast we have been discussing is likely toward the high end of
what terrorists could plausibly achieve with a crude, improvised bomb, but even a 1-kiloton
blast would be a catastrophic event, having a deadly radius between one-third and one-half that
of a 10-kiloton blast.

These hundreds of thousands of people would not be mere statistics, but countless individual
stories of loss—parents, children, entire families; all religions; rich and poor alike—killed or
horribly mutilated. Human suffering and tragedy on this scale does not have to be imagined; it
can be remembered through the stories of the survivors of the US atomic bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the only times in history when nuclear weapons have been used
intentionally against human beings. The pain and suffering caused by those bombings are
almost beyond human comprehension; the eloquent testimony of the Hibakusha—the
survivors who passed through the atomic fire—should stand as an eternal reminder of the need
to prevent nuclear weapons from ever being used in anger again.

Global economic disaster. The economic impact of such an attack would be enormous. The
effects would reverberate for so far and so long that they are difficult to estimate in all
their complexity. Hundreds of thousands of people would be too injured or sick to work
for weeks or months. Hundreds of thousands more would evacuate to locations far from their
jobs. Many places of employment would have to be abandoned because of the radioactive
fallout. Insurance companies would reel under the losses; but at the same time, many
insurance policies exclude the effects of nuclear attacks—an item insurers considered
beyond their ability to cover—so the owners of thousands of buildings would not have the
insurance payments needed to cover the cost of fixing them, thousands of companies would go
bankrupt, and banks would be left holding an immense number of mortgages that would never
be repaid.
Consumer and investor confidence would likely be dramatically affected, as worried
people slowed their spending. Enormous new homeland security and military investments
would be very likely. If the bomb had come in a shipping container, the targeted country—and
possibly others—might stop all containers from entering until it could devise a system for
ensuring they could never again be used for such a purpose, throwing a wrench into the gears of
global trade for an extended period. (And this might well occur even if a shipping container had
not been the means of delivery.)

Even the far smaller 9/11 attacks are estimated to have caused economic aftershocks costing
almost $1 trillion even excluding the multi-trillion-dollar costs of the wars that ensued. The cost
of a terrorist nuclear attack in a major city would likely be many times higher.

The most severe effects would be local, but the effects of trade disruptions, reduced economic
activity, and more would reverberate around the world. Consequently, while some countries
may feel that nuclear terrorism is only a concern for the countries most likely to be targeted—
such as the United States—in reality it is a threat to everyone, everywhere. In 2005, then-UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned that these global effects would push “tens of millions
of people into dire poverty,” creating “a second death toll throughout the developing
world.” One recent estimate suggested that a nuclear attack in an urban area would cause
a global recession, cutting global Gross Domestic Product by some two percent, and
pushing an additional 30 million people in the developing world into extreme poverty.
Desperate dilemmas. In short, an act of nuclear terrorism could rip the heart out of a major city,
and cause ripple effects throughout the world. The government of the country attacked would
face desperate decisions: How to help the city attacked? How to prevent further attacks? How
to respond or retaliate?

Terrorists—either those who committed the attack or others—would probably claim they had
more bombs already hidden in other cities (whether they did or not), and threaten to detonate
them unless their demands were met. The fear that this might be true could lead people to flee
major cities in a large-scale, uncontrolled evacuation. There is very little ability to support the
population of major cities in the surrounding countryside. The potential for widespread
havoc and economic chaos is very real.
If the detonation took place in the capital of the nation attacked, much of the government might
be destroyed. A bomb in Washington, D.C., for example, might kill the President, the Vice
President, and many of the members of Congress and the Supreme Court. (Having some
plausible national leader survive is a key reason why one cabinet member is always elsewhere
on the night of the State of the Union address.) Elaborate, classified plans for “continuity of
government” have already been drawn up in a number of countries, but the potential for chaos
and confusion—if almost all of a country’s top leaders were killed—would still be enormous.
Who, for example, could address the public on what the government would do, and what the
public should do, to respond? Could anyone honestly assure the public there would be no
further attacks? If they did, who would believe them? In the United States, given the practical
impossibility of passing major legislation with Congress in ruins and most of its members dead or
seriously injured, some have argued for passing legislation in advance giving the government
emergency powers to act—and creating procedures, for example, for legitimately replacing
most of the House of Representatives. But to date, no such legislative preparations have been
made.

In what would inevitably be a desperate effort to prevent further attacks, traditional standards
of civil liberties might be jettisoned, at least for a time—particularly when people realized that
the fuel for the bomb that had done such damage would easily have fit in a suitcase. Old rules
limiting search and surveillance could be among the first to go. The government might well
impose martial law as it sought to control the situation, hunt for the perpetrators, and find any
additional weapons or nuclear materials they might have. Even the far smaller attacks of 9/11
saw the US government authorizing torture of prisoners and mass electronic surveillance.

And what standards of international order and law would still hold sway? The country attacked
might well lash out militarily at whatever countries it thought might bear a portion of
responsibility. (A terrifying description of the kinds of discussions that might occur appeared in
Brian Jenkins’ book, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?) With the nuclear threshold already crossed in
this scenario—at least by terrorists—it is conceivable that some of the resulting conflicts might
escalate to nuclear use. International politics could become more brutish and violent, with
powerful states taking unilateral action, by force if necessary, in an effort to ensure their
security. After 9/11, the United States led the invasions of two sovereign nations, in wars that
have since cost hundreds of thousands of lives and trillions of dollars, while plunging a region
into chaos. Would the reaction after a far more devastating nuclear attack be any less?

In particular, the idea that each state can decide for itself how much security to provide for
nuclear weapons and their essential ingredients would likely be seen as totally unacceptable
following such an attack. Powerful states would likely demand that others surrender their
nuclear material or accept foreign troops (or other imposed security measures) to guard it.

That could well be the first step toward a more profound transformation of the international
system. After such a catastrophe, major powers may feel compelled to more freely
engage in preventive war, seizing territories they worry might otherwise be terrorist
safe havens, and taking other steps they see as brutal but necessary to preserve their
security. For this reason, foreign policy analyst Stephen Krasner has argued that “conventional
rules of sovereignty would be abandoned overnight.” Confidence in both the national
security institutions of the country attacked and international institutions such as the
International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations, which had so manifestly failed to
prevent the devastation, might erode. The effect on nuclear weapons policies is hard to predict:
One can imagine new nuclear terror driving a new push for nuclear disarmament, but one could
also imagine states feeling more certain than ever before that they needed nuclear weapons.
 1AC v2
Plan: The United States Federal Government should substantially reduce its sale
of the Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense system to Japan.
 Scenario 1- Strategic Stability
Increasingly advanced BMDs undermine Russian and Chinese deterrence and
lead to regional instability
Gronning 18 (Bjorn Elias Mikalsen Gronning, Norwegian Armed Forces Senior Advisor,
“Operational and industrial military integration: extending the frontiers of the Japan–US
alliance,” International Affairs, https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/94/4/755/5039998)

The prospect of significant power aggregation deriving from Japan–US defence-

industrial and military-operational integration in missile defence is neither
uncontroversial nor unproblematic. Missile defence has attracted scholarly and diplomatic
criticism for undermining the strategic balance between the Great Powers and thus for
destabilizing international security. China and Russia, in particular, invoke failing strategic
stability in their vehement opposition to US-led missile defence efforts, whether through NATO
on Eurasia's Atlantic flank or through Japan–US and US–South Korean collaborations on its Pacific flank.60 In the light of
currently deployed missile defence systems, which fail to meet the technical specifications for defence against strategic ballistic missiles and whose
inventories are far from sufficient to absorb saturation attacks by shorter-range ballistic and cruise missiles, Russian and Chinese concerns appear

current R&D in missile defence, including

overstated, if not unwarranted. However, notwithstanding its official rationale,

rail guns and directed energy weapons, offers the potential to reduce allied vulnerability
to strategic ballistic missiles and saturation missile attacks, thereby eroding Chinese and
Russian deterrence vis-à-vis Japan and the United States, and thus destabilizing relations
between the most influential actors in international security. Further defence-industrial and military-
operational integration in missile defence hinges on the two allies’ willingness to accept the political and, potentially, strategic costs of their power-
aggregating efforts

Aegis Ashore is uniquely destabilizing due to offensive potential and

information sharing with the U.S.
Šimalčík 16 (Matej Šimalčík, Institute of Asian Studies Fellow and Transparency International
Analyst, “Ballistic Missile Defense and its Effect on Sino-Japanese Relations: A New Arms Race?,”
Institute of Asian Studies,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309466574_Ballistic_Missile_Defense_and_its_Effec
t_on_Sino-Japanese_Relations_A_New_Arms_Race)

Japan has deployed two BMD systems, the ground-based Patriot (PAC-3) and the maritime Aegis SM-3 IIA, and is further negotiating
To this end,

procurement of two other systems from the USA – THAAD and Aegis Ashore (Weitz 2013; JIJI 2014). All of the above mentioned BMD systems are of
U.S. origin. The currently deployed systems, PAC-3 and Aegis, provide for a relatively effective protection against ballistic missiles, as the two systems together act as a multi-tier
defense system, a BMD system capable of destroying incoming missiles at different altitudes – outside and inside the Earth’s atmosphere (Ministry of Defense 2012: 187). The
decision to deploy BMD systems was made following the 1998 overflight of the North Korean Taepodong missile over Japan. Prior to the Taepodong test, only few domestic
actors advocated for BMD system development and deployment, most notably the Japanese Defense Agency (Oros 2008: 155). While North Korean threat was the immediate
impetus that persuaded a broader set of policymakers to become involved with BMD systems, China has featured prominently in the Japanese BMD discourse. On one hand, the
Chinese missile program is also identified as a threat. However, when making the decision to collaborate with the USA on BMD development, special attention was paid to the
Chinese perception of any BMD undertakings of Japan (Oros 2008: 160). It has been previously stated that Japanese strategic culture rests on the following three basic tenets:
(1) Japan will not possess traditional military; (2) no use of force except in self-defense; and (3) no participation in foreign conflicts (Oros 2014: 233). The shifts in security policy,
which allowed Japan to work on the development of BMD systems and later to deploy them, are in line with the three tenets of the ‘anti- militarist’ strategic culture (Oros 2008:
149). Nevertheless, points were raised that the joint development of BMD systems with the USA is in breach of Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan. This issue was resolved
when the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, the office in charge of preparing new legislative proposals and making sure they would pass the tests of constitutionality, has found that
the integration of BMD systems with the USA is not unconstitutional (Oros 2014: 237–238; Oros 2015: 153). Furthermore, legislative changes had to be made to the arms export

What makes the

legislation which allowed for joint production and technology transfers when it came to BMD development with the USA (Oros 2014: 239). 17

Japanese BMD systems problematic for other regional actors, especially China, is the
fact that with the modern BMD systems there is a thin line between the purely
defensive nature of the systems and offensive capabilities. It has been demonstrated
that, by making alterations to the SM-3 interceptor, the Aegis BMD system has offensive
potential. This allows it to target satellites, thus making it an anti- satellite (A-SAT)
weapon. 7 The offensive capabilities of Aegis are not a given parameter, though. Converting Aegis from a defensive BMD system into an offensive A-SAT system requires
additional action on the part of the system’s operator (alteration of the SM-3 interceptor missile). Looking back at the basic tenets of the Japanese strategic culture, Japan is very

unlikely to take such an action. The Japanese cooperation with the USA is another concern that needs to
be addressed. It has already been mentioned that Japan had to reevaluate its arms export restrictions in order to make the cooperation with USA possible.
However, the USA has played a much larger role in the Japanese BMD policy. The USA has been exerting pressure on Japan to participate on BMD development ever since the

The decision to
Reagan administration, when Japan was pushed to participate in research, as part of the Strategic Defense Initiative (Oros 2008: 158).

adopt U.S. systems, especially Aegis, has raised questions regarding the prohibition of
the exercise of collective self-defense. The Japanese government has reiterated that any BMD system will be used only for the purpose of
protecting Japan, will be operated on Japan’s independent judgment, and that it will not be used for defense of third parties (Chief Cabinet Secretary 2003). Nevertheless,

effective operation of the Aegis system requires cooperation and information sharing
between the Maritime Self-Defense Forces and U.S. Navy. This raises doubts about the
actual independence of the Japanese BMD systems from its U.S. ally.

China won’t undertake aggressive nuclear modernization absent Aegis Ashore –

they’ll do the bare minimum necessary to maintain strategic stability
Chase 13 (Michael S. Chase, U.S. Naval War College Warfare Analysis and Research Associate
Professor, “China's Transition to a More Credible Nuclear Deterrent: Implications and Challenges
for the United States,” Asia Policy, Project Muse)

China’s nuclear strategy is “a type of minimum deterrence,” one that is

Shen Dingli of Fudan University argues that

“commensurate with its NFU doctrine .” 40 Shen highlights what he characterizes as the uniqueness of China’s approach to nuclear
deterrence among the acknowledged nuclear-weapon states, which he attributes in large part to its status as the only permanent member of the UN Security Council that

adheres to an NFU policy. Because its policy and strategy are limited to preparing for nuclear
retaliation, China needs fewer nuclear weapons than the other major nuclear powers. It also does not need
the highly accurate strike capabilities required to launch a disarming first strike against
another nuclear power. In Shen’s words, “for minimum deterrence, one only needs to assure a
credible nuclear retaliation so as to deter a first nuclear attack.” 41 Similarly, according to Teng Jianqun of the
China Institute of International Studies, China seeks to maintain a “minimum credible deterrence” capability

by ensuring that the PLA has the capability to retaliate following a nuclear attack. Teng argues
that China’s current nuclear modernization should be seen in this context. In his words, “the purpose of [China’s] current nuclear

modernization is first and foremost to guarantee the security and reliability of nuclear
weapons in the face of threats, such as the U.S. development and deployment of
ballistic missile defenses.” 42 Sun Xiangli, deputy director of the Arms Control Research Division at the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational
Mathematics in Beijing, has asserted that China’s nuclear strategy should be referred to as “defensive nuclear deterrence characterized by the policy of NFU.” In reaching this

enduring beliefs about the nature and purpose of nuclear weapons have
conclusion, Sun argues that

influenced China’s strategic calculus and served as a framework for the development of
Chinese nuclear forces. 43 Chinese leaders and scientists have seen nuclear weapons as basically
useful for political reasons and strategic deterrence, rather than as having real tactical
or operational utility on the battlefield. They have generally believed that the threshold
for the infliction of unacceptable damage is significantly lower than Western strategists
have often claimed. 44 Sun writes that “based on these principles, and according to its economic, technical and geographic conditions, China has

developed a limited nuclear force.” 45 At the same time, he argues that even though China has felt that it only needs a relatively limited
 weapons must have a deterrent effect, and a certain number and
number of nuclear weapons, “these

survival of the nuclear weapons must be guaranteed.” Sun explains, “In short, the key to having a
credible nuclear deterrence is to guarantee an effective nuclear retaliatory capability.” 46
What is required to do so, however, is subject to change over time: in other words, Sun believes that the
number of nuclear weapons China needs is not “immutably fixed” but is related to
challenges to the survivability of the force and its ability to penetrate enemy defenses.
Accordingly, an appropriate rule for determining the size of China’s nuclear force is that it

must “be able to mount a nuclear strike that can penetrate an enemy’s missile defense
system after surviving a first strike.” Along similar lines, Chu Shulong and Rong Yu of Tsinghua University have described China’s nuclear
strategy as one of “dynamic minimum deterrence.” 49 They argue that this strategy retains key features of the PRC’s traditional approach while adjusting it to keep pace with
changes in the security environment and emerging threats. According to Chu and Rong, “China has all along adhered to a strategy that may be labeled as minimum deterrence.
However, as circumstances are always changing, the content, quantity, quality, and structure of minimum deterrence also must change.” 50 The approach is not tied to a specific
number of nuclear weapons but rather to the capability required to deter powerful countries like the United States an d Russia. In short, Chu and Rong assert that “the Chinese
understanding and practice of the strategy of minimum deterrence is dynamic—its features are continually adjusted to meet the changing strategic environment and threat

Aegis Ashore escalates tensions between China and the U.S.–Japan alliance –
China perceives it as Japanese remilitarization and a threat to their second
strike capabilities.
Panda 18 (Ankit Panda, The Diplomat Senior editor specializing in the Asia-Pacific region, “Will
Japan's Aegis Ashore Radar Choice Elicit China's Wrath,” The Diplomat, https://search-proquest-
com.dartmouth.idm.oclc.org/docview/2070751498?accountid=10422&rfr_id=info%3Axri%2Fsid
%3Aprimo)

, reports citing sources within the Japanese Ministry of Defense indicated that
Earlier this month

Japan’s deployment of the Aegis Ashore missile defense system will be built around a
variant of Lockheed Martin’s still-in-development Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR),
instead of the Raytheon SPY-6 radar. While details of the precise LRDR variant Japan will use are unknown, it is likely that the
radar will feature reduced range. In any case, the full-fledged LRDR, as described by Lt. Gen. Samuel A. Greaves, the director of the U.S. Missile Defense
Agency, in testimony earlier this year is a “midcourse sensor that will provide persistent long-range midcourse discrimination, precision tracking, and hit
assessment and improve BMDS target discrimination capability while supporting a more efficient utilization of the GMD interceptor inventory.” Setting

it bears interrogating whether the

aside the suitability of LRDR for Japan’s midcourse interception needs for a moment,

selection of LRDR might emerge as a new thorn in Sino-Japanese relations. As I explained last year,
China’s over-the-top reaction by U.S. Forces Korea to deploy a Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense battery in South Korea had to do primarily with the the advanced, high
resolution AN/TPY-2 radar accompanying the launchers—not the launchers themselves.
Similarly, even if the LRDR variant deployed by Japan is drastically different from the GMD-

supporting primary version in development for the United States, it’s far from clear that
China will let that pass. (Beijing declined U.S. invitations for technical talks over THAAD in 2016.) The idea behind
Chinese opposition to advanced missile defense sensors in Northeast Asia is simple:
China fears that U.S. efforts to establish theater-wide missile defense sensors could
erode the efficacy of the country’s relatively lean strategic deterrent. In specific terms, Beijing was
concerned that the United States could operate the AN/TPY-2 radar, now located in South Korea’s Seongju county, in forward-based mode. The United
States, meanwhile, has claimed that the radar will operate exclusively in terminal mode, which allows the THAAD system to serve a defensive role
against prospective ballistic missile threats from North Korea. Not only is LRDR being designed with support for the United States’ Ground-Based

the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) published earlier this year emphasized U.S.
Midcourse Defense (GMD) system in mind,

intentions to “cooperate on missile defense with Japan and South Korea to move
toward an area defense capability.” That’s not the same thing as homeland missile
defense, but, along with a prospective LRDR deployment in Japan, Beijing will have
reason for concern. (The NSS does also note that “enhanced missile defense is not intended to undermine strategic stability or disrupt
longstanding strategic relationships with Russia or China,” though the administration’s upcoming Missile Defense Review may tweak that view.)

Should Tokyo give Beijing assurances that its LRDR will be discrete from the U.S.
homeland missile defense sensor networks, it’s unlikely that China would take this for
granted—China cast aside similar assurances on the AN/TPY-2 deployed in South Korea.
For the moment, China has not chosen to treat reports of Japan’s selection of LRDR in the same way that it dealt with the THAAD deployment in South
Korea. Part of the reason for this might be that the Japanese Ministry of Defense has yet to confirm the decision on-the-record, or, more realistically,
that Japan’s deployment of Aegis Ashore remains years away in 2023. Tokyo and Beijing are currently undergoing a broader diplomatic thaw anyway
and it may not be in China’s interest to rock the boat over a deployment that is far from proximate. Either way, the few Chinese official statements that
have addressed the Japanese Aegis Ashore deployment decision have been careful not to overtly condemn Tokyo. Last August, following U.S.-Japan
military-to-military talks on Aegis Ashore deployment acceleration, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a cautionary note, but stopped short
of condemning Japan. “The Chinese government always maintains that the missile defense issue should be handled cautiously as it bears on global

strategic stability and the mutual trust between major countries,” spokesperson Hua Chunying added at the time. “While taking
into account their own security interests, all relevant parties should respect the legitimate security concerns of other countries, jointly follow the
principles of upholding global strategic stability and undiminished security for all countries and safeguard the international security environment
featuring peace, stability, equality, mutual trust, cooperation and win-win outcomes,” she added. In December, when Japan’s decision to select Aegis

was more pointed in her criticism, tying Tokyo’s procurement

Ashore over THAAD was announcement, Hua

decision to historical tensions in East Asia. “Due to what happened in history, Japan’s
moves in the fields of military and security are always followed closely by its Asian
neighbors and the international community.” She continued: “When it comes to the anti-missile
issue, the Chinese government always believes that it bears on the global strategic stability
and the mutual trust between countries. It bears noting, however, that we have yet to see anything from China coming
close to the high-level critical rhetoric that South Korea saw when in exploratory talks over the deployment of THAAD on its territory. As the United
States and South Korea debated the merits of deployment, none other than Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi felt it necessary, as early as February
2016, to emphasize that “the monitoring scope of [THAAD’s AN/TPY-2] X-Band radar, goes far beyond the defense need of the Korean Peninsula.” The

Tokyo may find itself facing similar Chinese concerns as 2023

official Chinese reaction was specific.

approaches and more specifics emerge about its Aegis Ashore deployment plans. In the
meantime, China is no doubt going to keep a close eye on Japan’s choices and evolving
U.S.-Japan cooperation on ballistic missile defense.

Aegis Ashore’s advanced missile defense capabilities wreck Chinese deterrence

- spurs nuclear modernization and expansion
Zhang 15 (Dr. Baohui Zhang, Linghan University Political Science Professor and Asian Pacific
Studies Director, China's Assertive Nuclear Posture: State Security in an Anarchic International
Order, 2015, pp. 103-4)

China’s recent efforts to modernize and expand its offensive nuclear capabilities are
rooted in the rise of the US defensive systems that could seriously compromise Chinese
nuclear deterrence. US missile defense, which includes both ground-based midcourse defense system (GMD) and various
theater- oriented missile defense (TMD) systems, is widely seen by Chinese military experts as a fundamental threat to its strategic
deterrence. Until recently, the Chinese military tended to believe that US missile defense could not effectively deter major nuclear powers
due to the steady maturing of a multilayered US missile defense,
such as China and Russia. However,

Chinese nuclear experts are losing confidence in China’s offensive capabilities. This pessimism
is best shown in an important 2008 interview of Wang Wenchao in a Chinese military magazine. As identified by the magazine, Wang is
the chief designer of China’s sea-based strategic missiles. In this interview, Wang expressed grave
pessimism about the ability of Chinese nuclear forces to penetrate US missile defense. As
he stated, “I have done a research: facing a multi-tiered missile defense system, if any single layer can achieve a success rate of 70%, then
100 single warhead missiles could all be intercepted even if they are mounting a simultaneous attack.” 24 Therefore, Yao Yunzhu, a PLA
nuclear strategist at the Academy of Military Sciences, suggests that US missile defense has had a profound impact on China’s nuclear
deterrence. As she points out, “missile defense has made China increasingly worried about the credibility of its deterrence against the
United States. ... Among the many influences on Chinese nuclear thinking, the development and deployment of missile defense is the most
important one. China must consider how to maintain a credible second strike capability
against US missile defense.” 25 Wu Chunsi, a civilian expert on nuclear deterrence,
emphasizes the impact of US missile defense on China’s no-first-use doctrine. She argues that
missile defense makes the doctrine increasingly difficult to maintain because it gives the
USA a double advantage in offensive first-strike capability and a credible defensive
capability. As she observes: China’s No First Use constrains its ability to counter American missile defense systems. Assuming a war
between the two countries, China, limited by its No First Use policy, obviously could not launch a first

strike against the United States. On the other hand, the limited number of Chinese nuclear
missiles would definitely become targets for American preemptive strikes. Given the US ability
to attack hard targets, how many of China’s intercontinental missiles could survive a first strike

and then manage to penetrate American missile defense systems? This obviously is an important
issue for the Chinese strategic community to consider. 26 Recently, Chinese strategists have been focusing on

the threat posed by a sea-based theater missile defense (TMD) system. This system, based on
Aegis equipped warships, is already becoming operational and is being deployed very close to China. A Chinese
military magazine organized a symposium to examine the impact of US sea-based missile defense on China’s nuclear deterrence. One
this sea-based capability will “forwardly extend US anti-missile deployment
article claims that

and compromise deterrence effectiveness by our strategic nuclear forces.” 27 Analysts believe
that if Chinese strategic missiles were launched from the first layer of inland provinces such

as Henan and Jilin, where China’s nuclear forces are rumored to be deployed, US TMD in the Pacific

could intercept these missiles during the boost phase of the flight, when the missile speed is relatively slow. Further, these
American warships could serve as an early warning for missile defense in North America,
improving the probability of eventual successful interception of Chinese nuclear missiles. The
latest PLA assessments believe that US missile defense will achieve significant progress toward combat effectiveness by 2030. According
to Li Fang and Yang Zhu, two PLA analysts, by then the US mid-course interception system will “possess full and complete combat
capabilities.” In the meantime, the US ability for boost phase interception will also “see steady breakthroughs.” Most importantly, the
sea-based Aegis missile defense system “will possess the ability of intercepting
intercontinental ballistic missiles.” 28 Thus, US missile defense has sown the seeds for
China’s nuclear expansion. Indeed, Chinese military strategists all recommend such a
course of action to maintain a credible nuclear deterrence. For example, Yao Yunzhu claims that “China
must evaluate the survivability and sufficiency of its nuclear arsenal. China must also consider what kind of nuclear capability can ensure
the mutual deterrence between the two countries.” 29 Other PLA strategists are more blunt in their recommendations. As proposed by Hou
We must first massively improve the
Xiaohe and Zhang Hui from the PLA National Defense University, “

development and modernization of our strategic weapons, increase the accuracy and
penetration ability of our medium and long range missiles to allow our lance to pierce
the shield of missile defense, and thereby restore strategic nuclear balance between
China and the United States.” 30 More specifically, Hou and Zhang suggest that China needs to
“develop nuclear missiles equipped with multiple warheads to overwhelm the US
defensive system.”
Chinese nuclear modernization ends in breakout and nuclear war – only the
plan’s restraint can solve
Logan, 17 – (David Logan, Ph.D. Student, Security Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public
and International Affairs Princeton University, 11-8-2017, Peer Reviewed, "Hard Constraints on
China’s Nuclear Forces," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 24, No. 1/2 (2017)
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10736700.2017.1371406)

China is the only nuclear weapon state recognized by the Nonproliferation Treaty that is actively
expanding its nuclear arsenal. Its nuclear forces have increased modestly from an estimated 130 to 200 warheads in 2006 to an
estimated 170 to 260 today. The qualitative changes to its nuclear forces have been more significant, with the introduction of more mobile solid-fueled
missiles, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), and an emerging fleet of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).
This modernization program has raised concerns over the past several years that China is currently
attempting or might soon attempt a nuclear breakout. Concerns of a Chinese breakout come in
two forms: either that Beijing will develop a nuclear warfighting capability that could neutralize
U.S. conventional superiority, or that Beijing will expand its strategic arsenal to achieve parity
with the United States, which could undercut U.S. security commitments to its regional allies.
While China is indeed in the midst of a significant modernization effort, the changes to its nuclear forces do not yet

represent a fundamental strategic shift. Rather, China’s nuclear evolution appears to be driven
by a desire to maintain a secure second-strike capability in the face of advancing U.S.
capabilities, which Beijing believes might threaten its nuclear deterrent. As I demonstrate in a new article in
the Nonproliferation Review, China’s nuclear arsenal and strategy are constrained by its limited views of the utility of nuclear weapons. Moreover,
Beijing would face several “harder” technical constraints in pursuing the kind of nuclear breakout about which some commentators warn. Concerns of
an Impending Chinese Breakout First, some commentators
have argued that China may be currently developing
a nuclear warfighting capability, or at least the nuclear arsenal to support one. A nuclear warfighting
capability can refer to either a force designed to attack an adversary’s nuclear arsenal, or a nuclear force designed for use on the battlefield, though
most commentators mean the latter when referring to China. These
developments, they argue, could lead to China
introducing nuclear weapons into an otherwise conventional conflict. Other observers have
contended that China may attempt a “sprint to parity,” a rapid buildup in its strategic nuclear
arsenal until it has roughly as many nuclear weapons as the United States (One scholarhas even fantastically
claimed, based on an analysis of the underground tunnel system designed to protect China’s missiles, that it may already possess more than 3,000
nuclear weapons). This would entail a dramatic expansion in the size of China’s nuclear arsenal. China’s
Current Nuclear Posture China’s nuclear forces and policies are constrained, first and foremost, by the country’s distinctive approach to nuclear
weapons. As Jeffrey Lewis has written, Chinese leadership has historically believed that nuclear deterrence is largely unaffected by the size and
configuration of the adversary’s nuclear arsenal, so long as the country can threaten a counterstrike of a few — or even one — nuclear warheads.
Marshall Nie Rongzhen, a leading figure in China’s early nuclear weapons program, called this “the minimum means of reprisal.” Recent research by
Fiona Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, based on reviews of Chinese doctrinal and academic writings and interviews with Chinese military and civilian
experts, indicates that these fundamental views have not changed and that China is likely to continue adhering to its relatively restrained strategy of
“assured retaliation.” In recent Track-1.5 and Track-2 dialogues between the United States and China, Chinese participants have said that China could
credibly threaten the United States with only “a few,” a “handful of,” or even “one” nuclear warhead. Designed to support more limited goals, China’s
nuclear forces are generally believed to be smaller and less alerted than those of other states. The country has yet to develop an early warning system
and some experts believe China would wait several days after suffering a nuclear strike before launching its own nuclear counterattack. Observers
believe Beijing does not mate its nuclear warheads to missiles in peacetime, instead storing them separately. According to the counting rules of the
New START treaty, China has nearly zero deployed nuclear weapons. China’s
ongoing nuclear modernization program is
indeed significantly changing the character and configuration of the country’s nuclear forces.
But these changes appear to be driven by a desire to maintain the survivability of the country’s
second-strike capability, not a fundamentally new view of nuclear weapons in Beijing. China has
identified advancing U.S. capabilities in conventional prompt global strike and ballistic missile
defense as serious threats to its nuclear forces. Regardless of whether these concerns are
reasonable, they appear sincere. By deploying more mobile missiles, China hopes to increase the
survivability of its overall deterrent. By deploying SSBNs and equipping some of its land-based
missiles with MIRV capability, it hopes to enhance its ability to penetrate U.S. missile defenses.
Hard Constraints In addition to these “softer” political constraints on a Chinese nuclear breakout, China would face several “harder” technical barriers
to both developing a nuclear warfighting capability and undertaking a sprint to parity. A nuclear warfighting capability would require China to deploy a
more diversified nuclear force, with smaller-yield warheads affixed to more accurate missiles. However, the country’s current warhead designs,
designed for the more limited strategy of assured retaliation, are too heavy and too powerful. During the Cold War, the average yield of U.S. tactical
weapons was reported to be 4 kilotons, and NATO war planners set an upper limit of 10 kilotons for bombs that could be used on their own territory.
More recently, the nuclear warhead for the U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile had a variable yield of 5 to 150 kilotons and weighed 130 kilograms. By
comparison, China’s smallest nuclear warhead is estimated to have a yield of 200 to 300 kilotons and to weigh 500 kilograms. China’s record of nuclear
weapons testing does not give it an ideal basis for developing reliable, smaller, modern designs. Most of China’s tests involved heavy, high-yield
devices. Beijing did successfully test an enhanced radiation device in the late 1980s that could serve as the technical foundation for tactical nuclear
weapons, though it’s not clear this design would be suitable for developing a robust warfighting arsenal. Even if China were to rely on this design, it
might face production constraints stemming from limited tritium and fissile material stockpiles. China might choose to resume nuclear testing to
develop newer warhead designs, but it would take time and resources to design and certify new warheads, and the international community would
detect any new testing. Finally, China generally lacks the supporting infrastructure needed to employ a nuclear warfighting capability. Such a capability
would require developing new technical capabilities, organizational arrangements, and operational practices, which China has generally avoided. For
instance, a nuclear warfighting capability would likely require more flexible command and control arrangements, including delegating more authority to
military commanders, as Pakistan has done to support its “asymmetric escalation” strategy. By contrast, China has prioritized strict political control over
its nuclear weapons, keeping its nuclear forces somewhat insulated from its conventional ones. China would face similar constraints in attempting a
strategic sprint to parity. The most significant challenge is its limited fissile material stockpile. China’s modern warhead designs use plutonium fuel, but
analysts believe Beijing last produced weapons-grade plutonium in 1991 and that it currently maintains a stockpile of only 1.8 metric tons. In addition,
China has relied on conservative warhead designs that use more fuel than other countries’ warheads. Given these high fuel requirements and its
limited stockpile, in a best-case scenario China could produce no more than 250 to 450 plutonium-based warheads. China could resort to using
uranium-based designs, though it faces a limited uranium stockpile as well. More significantly, the uranium designs it has tested in the past were
relatively unsophisticated and ill-suited for a modern arsenal. To develop modern and reliable uranium-based warheads, China would likely have to
resort again to testing new designs. Certainly, China
possesses the underlying economic, industrial, and
technological bases on which to either develop a nuclear warfighting capability or attempt a
sprint to parity. However, attempting either form of nuclear breakout would entail significant changes to China’s nuclear program,
possibly including developing new warheads, resuming weapons testing, renewing weapons-grade fissile material production, and significantly
changing operational practices. Given China’s historically conservative approach to its nuclear weapons program, it
appears unlikely that
it could undertake a military significant nuclear breakout in the near term or accomplish one in the long term without
being detected. Analysts who have warned of an impending nuclear breakout may be assuming that China’s ongoing modernization program
is more expansive than it is, conflating a push for greater survivability with a desire for “usability,” or viewing the modest quantitative growth in China’s
arsenal as a prelude to something much more expansive. Certainly, China has made tremendous progress in developing and deploying advanced
ballistic missile systems, which would be a crucial component of any nuclear warfighting capability. Indeed, some observers worry that the hardware
and operational practices associated with the conventional force could bleed over and end up benefitting the nuclear force. But a broader review of the
other technical requirements of either developing a nuclear warfighting capability or pursuing strategic parity suggests China would nonetheless face
harder obstacles. Policy Implications The constraints on China’s nuclear forces have important implications for U.S. policy. Policy decisions should rest
on realistic threat assessments of China’s nuclear program and avoid provoking self-fulfilling prophecies. Washington should recognize the constraints
on Beijing’s nuclear policy and work to reinforce those constraints and maintain strategic stability. First, observers
should watch for
indicators that China is fundamentally altering its approach to nuclear weapons. This could
include more obvious moves such as the resumption of production of military fissile material,
new rounds of nuclear weapons testing, or a shift in political statements about the purpose of
China’s nuclear weapons. Important indicators might also be subtler, such as changes in the organization and operation of the military
organizations that operate China’s nuclear weapons. Second, the United States should attempt to strengthen and reinforce the constraints on China’s
program. Ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would strengthen the international norm against testing, while funding the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty Organization increases the chance of detecting tests should they occur. (Though it would likely be more difficult to detect small-yield tests of
tactical warheads compared to the massive tests of China’s past, the history of the international monitoring system is cause for optimism. For example,
it detected North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test, which had an estimated yield of only 0.6 kilotons.) The United States should also attempt to stem the rise
of reprocessing in East Asia, which could raise regional anxieties by lowering the barriers to some states producing nuclear bombs. Finally,
policymakers should recognize that Chinese nuclear policies are driven in part by perceived
threats from the United States itself. Expanding conventional prompt global strike, ballistic
missile defense, and the role of U.S. nuclear forces could exacerbate Chinese threat
perceptions and trigger just the kind of nuclear breakout scenarios that observers fear. Calls to
develop so-called tailored nuclear options based on assumptions of an impending Chinese nuclear breakout should be met with skepticism. Rather

than exacerbating these dynamics, the U.S.-China nuclear relationship might be best served by
a dose of strategic restraint.
Nuclear war with China results in millions killed, radiation poising, and a
nuclear winter.
Wittner 11 (Professor of History @ State University of New York-Albany, Lawrence S. Wittner,
“Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?,” Huntington News, Monday, November 28, 2011 - 18:37
pg. http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446)

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used . After all, for
centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons.
The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet
another example of this phenomenon.
The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed
by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently
challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in
Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region .
According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own
position as a Pacific power.”

But need this lead to nuclear war?

Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and
China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to
attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and , later, during the conflict
over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter
confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear
weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.”

Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of
national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet
government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals,
should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling
persists.
Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and,
admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999,
between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such
wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war.
Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use
“any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its
border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan.

At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO
leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a
Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on
the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that
nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its
modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably
unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from
attacking by U.S. nuclear might?

Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them
from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its
Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five
thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly
three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the
United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China.

But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately
slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving
many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in
a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering,
radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions
would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying
agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.
Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The
Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is
expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States.
The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars
“modernizing” its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next
decade

Aegis Ashore is the tipping point of BMD modernization – causes buildup of

ICBMS and ballistic missiles, nuclear arsenal expansion, and the adoption of
launch-on-warning policies by China.
Lewis 18 (George, Visiting Scholar at the Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies
at Cornell University, doctorate in experimental solid-state physics from Cornell’s Physics
Department, Fellow of the American Physical Society, was in the Technology and Security Group
of MIT’s Security Studies Program, his research has focused primarily on the technology,
capabilities, and implications of ballistic missile defense systems, Limitations on ballistic missile
defense—Past and possibly future, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2018.1486575)

More important, by 2020 the US Navy plans to begin deployment of a faster SM-3 Block IIA
interceptor co-developed with Japan. It has a burnout speed of about 4.5 kilometers per second
– 50 percent greater than the Block IA or Block IB. Also, its kill vehicle has “more than doubled
seeker sensitivity” and “more than tripled divert capability” compared to the current SM-3 Block
IB interceptor (Defense Department 2016 Defense Department. 2016. “Fiscal Year (FY) 2017
President’s Budget Submission, Missile Defense Agency, RDT&E Vol. 21.” February, 2a–891.
If deployed on a small number of offshore ships or at Aegis Ashore facilities, using the long-
range GMD radars for determining approximate intercept points, Block IIA could cover the
entire United States. According to Rondell Wilson, lead engineer for air and missile defense
products at Raytheon (the manufacturer of the SM-3 Block IIA), “We can provide the SM-3 Block
[II]A ashore as an under-layer capability for [ground-based interceptors]… . We can do that
immediately (Drew and Dimascio 2017 Drew, J., and J. Dimascio. 2017. “New Trajectory: As
Pentagon Adds Dollars for Missile Defense, Raytheon Pitches SM-3s as ICBM Killers.” Aviation
Week and Space Technology 179 (20): 58.

.” Congress has recently mandated that, “if technologically feasible,” the Block IIA missile be
tested against an ICBM-range missile (US House of Representatives 2017 US House of
Representatives. 2017. “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Conference
Report to Accompany H.R. 2810.” Report 115–404, November 9, Section 1680.

The Block IIA interceptors are intended for deployment on the more than 85 Aegis ships that the
US Navy plans to operate, as well as at land-based Aegis Ashore missile defense sites. The
interceptors, therefore, are to be deployed in much larger numbers than the GMD interceptors
– totaling perhaps 400 or more, based upon the premise that each Aegis BMD ship has at least
90 vertical launcher cells that can house variety of weapons. If, on average, five of these cells on
each ship housed Block IIA interceptors, the total would be 425 plus whatever Block IIAs were
deployed at Aegis Ashore sites, as Figure 2 illustrates (Lewis 2018 Lewis, G. 2018. “Update to
‘How Many SM-3 Block IIA Interceptors?’” mostlymissiledefense blog, May 20.

Russia, when it signed New START in 2010, had nearly 50 times more strategic nuclear ballistic
missile warheads than the United States had strategic-capable interceptors. Nevertheless,
Russia stipulated that the treaty (US Defense Department n.d. US Defense Department. n.d.
“New Start: Article-by-Article Analysis Unilateral Statements.”

…may be effective and viable only in conditions where there is no qualitative and quantitative
build-up in the missile defense capabilities of the United States [and that] the ‘extraordinary
events’ that could justify [Russian] withdrawal from the Treaty… include a build-up in the missile
defense system capabilities of the United States that would give rise to a threat to the strategic
nuclear forces potential of the Russian Federation.

The US ballistic missile defense build-up could similarly lead China to significantly increase the
number and capabilities of its strategic ballistic missiles. China already has been deploying
additional ICBM warheads and has begun deploying submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
China’s development of ICBMs with multiple warheads is widely viewed as, at least in part, a
response to the US ballistic missile defense program.

While Russia and China understand the likely effectiveness of countermeasures against the
current US ballistic missile defense system, they harbor concerns about the US program’s
completely open-ended nature. They also are concerned that US leaders, in the belief that their
defenses are effective, could act more aggressively. In April, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued
a statement expressing concern on this issue (ITAR-TASS 2018 ITAR-TASS. 2018. “US’ Missile
Shield Gives it Wrong Feeling of Impunity and Invincibility – Russian Foreign Ministry.” April 24.
The risk is that the availability of a missile shield may give grounds for a vile feeling of
invincibility and impunity and, hence, lure Washington into new dangerous unilateral steps to
achieve its goals on the global and regional levels…

In fact, US political leaders are not being told about the vulnerability of US ballistic missile
defense systems to simple countermeasures. In February, Gen. Lori Robinson, commander of
the US Northern Command – responsible for defending the United States against ballistic
missiles – told Congress that she was “100 percent confident” in her ability to defend the United
States from a North Korean ballistic missile attack (Robinson 2018 Robinson, L. 2018. “United
States Northern Command and United States Southern Command.” Hearing before the
Committee on Armed Services, February 15. Stenographic Transcript.

In October 2017, President Trump, discussing the North Korean ICBM threat, stated that “We
have missiles that can knock out a missile in the air 97 percent of the time…” (Kessler 2017
Kessler, G. 2017. “Fact Checker: Trump’s Claim that a US Interceptor Can Knock Out ICBMs ‘97
Percent of the Time’.” The Washington Post, October 13.

Thus, large-scale deployment by the United States of strategic-capable ballistic missile defense
systems could lock the world into high numbers of nuclear weapons for the indefinite future.
Since China and Russia are primarily worried about the potential effectiveness of US defenses
against their retaliation after they absorb a hypothetical US first strike, US ballistic missile
defense also could lock Russia into its current launch-on-warning posture and lead China to
adopt a similar posture.

Aegis Ashore is uniquely destabilizing – it’s more advanced than Aegis-equipped

destroyers, and other Northeast Asian countries perceive it as a major security
threat
Brown, 18 (James D. J, associate professor in political science at Temple University Japan and a
specialist on Russo-Japanese relations, The Case Against Aegis Ashore, Shingetsu News Agency,
http://shingetsunewsagency.com/2018/08/20/the-case-against-aegis-ashore/)

SNA (Tokyo) — While the Abe administration presents Aegis Ashore as an essential and relatively uncontroversial contribution to the defense of Japan from the
North Korean threat, in reality the deployment of this missile defense system risks further destabilizing the security situation in

Northeast Asia, especially with regard to Russia. In December 2017, the Japanese government formally decided to purchase Aegis Ashore, the US-made ground-
based ballistic missile defense system. It is anticipated that two units will be installed, with Akita and Yamaguchi prefectures identified as the candidate sites. The first of these
deployments is planned to be completed during fiscal 2023. The Abe administration has justified the purchase of this system as a necessary response to the growth in the missile

threat from North Korea. Japan has two existing missile defense systems, but each has limitations.
The first of these is the Patriot PAC-3, which can intercept incoming missiles during their
terminal phase. The units are mobile but provide limited coverage, meaning that they can offer
protection to specific sites, such as central Tokyo or military installations, but not to the country as a whole. The
PAC-3 system is therefore combined with Aegis-equipped destroyers, whose interceptors can eliminate missiles during
their mid-course phase. This system can theoretically provide cover for all of Japan, but it is dependent on keeping the Aegis-

equipped ships on a continual cycle of deployment in specific areas, something that

places an enormous burden on Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Forces. As such, there is an
apparent logic in purchasing a third system that can provide constant protection for all
of Japanese territory. Additionally, the Aegis Ashore system has superior capabilities and range than
the existing Aegis-equipped destroyers. In particular, it is claimed that it is better at dealing with
simultaneous launches as well as missiles on a lofted trajectory, both things that North Korea has simulated in
recent missile tests. Presented this way, it appears hard to argue with the decision to adopt Aegis Ashore. Yet, as time has passed, the chorus of opposition has grown louder.

the introduction of the missile defense system runs counter to the

Voices of Opposition One criticism is that

current trend of reduced tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Indeed, some may argue that Aegis Ashore is now
superfluous following the meeting between President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-Un in Singapore in June at which the North Korean leader agreed “to work toward
complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” This is, however, a weak argument since it is far from certain that the North Korean commitment in Singapore was sincere.
Furthermore, even if denuclearization were to proceed smoothly, Pyongyang would still retain a dangerous arsenal of non-nuclear missiles that are capable of reaching Japan. A

It was always known that Aegis Ashore would be expensive,

more convincing criticism is of the cost of the system.

but the extent is only now becoming clear. At the end of July, sources in the Ministry of Defense revealed that the estimated cost of
the two Aegis Ashore units had been revised up by around 70%. With the inclusion of other elements, such as the interceptor missiles, the total cost of the

project is now expected to exceed 600 billion yen (US$5.4 billion). This is an
extraordinary spending commitment in a country where government debt was
equivalent to 253% of GDP in 2017, and where the Abe administration pretends to be pursuing the goal of a fiscal surplus by 2025.
Separately, there are concerns within the local communities near where the Aegis Ashore batteries are set to be located. These center on the extent to which the presence of
the missile defense units will make their area a target for foreign military planners. Additionally, there are worries about the health effects of the powerful, but largely unproven,
Lockheed Martin Solid State Radar that the Japanese government has selected for use with the Aegis Ashore units. A Destabilizing Factor in Northeast Asia Both the expense of

perhaps the most serious worry about Aegis

the system and its potential health implications are genuine concerns, but

Ashore is the destabilizing effect it could have on Northeast Asian security. The Japanese
government insists that it is a purely defensive system, which will be under Japan’s
exclusive control. This is not, however, the view of Japan’s neighbors. Tokyo’s decision to invest further in US missile
defense has been criticized by both China and North Korea. However, the most strident and sustained condemnation of Aegis Ashore has come from Russia. Russia is the only
peer of the United States when it comes to nuclear weapons, and it has come to rely ever more on its vast strategic arsenal since it lost the conventional superiority that the
Soviet Union enjoyed over the West in Europe. Moreover, as the United States has demonstrated its willingness to use military force internationally since the 1990s, Russia has
come to regard its nuclear capabilities as a vital means of deterring US interventionism. This has become all the more important following the recent increase in tensions
between Russia and the West, and Washington’s explicit identification of Russia as an adversary. For this reason, Russian strategists regard US missile defense systems as a
leading threat to national security. From Moscow’s perspective, the United States is engaged in a long-term project to undermine Russia’s strategic deterrent and thereby give
itself a free hand to act without fear of Russian retaliation. The crucial step in this regard was the decision of President George W. Bush in 2002 to withdraw from the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty. Signed in 1972, this agreement had barred Washington and Moscow from deploying nationwide defenses against strategic ballistic missiles. The treaty’s
preamble described this as a “substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms.” During the years since this withdrawal, Moscow believes that the United States
has worked assiduously to surround Russia with elements of its expanding missile defense system. Some of these units have been installed within the United States itself, while
others have been planned for deployment on the territory of US allies. The Russian authorities claim that the US justifies these deployments by using the excuse that the missile
defense systems are needed to protect allies from the threat of rogue states. In Europe, Iran is the supposed threat; in East Asia, it is North Korea. In each case, Russia believes

Aegis Ashore is therefore seen as just the latest link in the United States’
that it is the real target.

expanding network of missile defense systems, and Moscow is dismissive of Tokyo’s claim that it will be an independent Japanese
system. This view was expressed by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in January 2018, when he told journalists that, “We don’t know any cases anywhere in this world where the
United States, having deployed its weapons systems, would hand the control over them to a host country. I have strong doubts that they will make an exception in this case.”

This view will only have strengthened when Isao Iijima, a special advisor to Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe, told the media in June that the decision to purchase Aegis Ashore
was pushed upon Japan by the United States. Prior to the final decision being taken, Russia intensively lobbied the Abe
administration not to agree to purchase further US missile defense systems. This included the warning by Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu in March 2017 that the

deployment of such systems “will destroy the balance in the Pacific region.” Having ignored these
words of caution, Japan must expect some consequences. This was made clear immediately after the announcement of Japan’s decision to purchase the system when

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated that Aegis Ashore will create “a
new situation, which we logically must take account of in our military planning.” At the same time,
Maria Zakharova, chief spokeswoman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, warned that the decision “will have a negative impact on the overall atmosphere of bilateral relations,
including negotiations on the issue of a peace treaty.” Although no explicit link has been made, it is likely that the recent intensification of the Russian military presence on the
disputed Southern Kuriles is connected with the Aegis Ashore decision. In particular, in January 2018, the Russian government issued a directive which designates the airport on
the island of Iturup (Etorofu in Japanese) as dual-use. This opens the way for it to be used for military jets and, sure enough, Su-35S fighters were deployed to the island in July.
Similarly, it is possible that Russia’s foot-dragging on the implementation of joint economic activities with Japan on the disputed islands is also a response to Aegis Ashore. This
may be seen as an effective way of punishing the Japanese government since Prime Minister Abe has made the joint projects a prominent feature of his foreign policy and has
presented them as a stepping stone to the resolution of the territorial dispute. Causing a setback to bilateral relations with Russia might be a price worth paying if Aegis Ashore

Aegis Ashore would

were to radically improve Japan’s security situation. In reality, however, it will not. No Lasting Gain in Security Although

undoubtedly enhance the technical capabilities of Japanese missile defense, the system
can still only deal with a limited number of missiles and is not 100% reliable. As such, just as
Japan’s sense of security did not meaningfully change after the billions that were spent
on PAC-3 and the Aegis-equipped destroyers, so it will be with Aegis Ashore. Indeed, any
small gain in security is certain to be swiftly eroded as those countries that feel
threatened by Aegis Ashore adapt their behavior or introduce more sophisticated
weapons systems to overcome Japan’s additional layer of missile defense. In no time at all, the military
experts will be arguing that Japan needs to spend yet more billions on some other new system that also offers no more than a fleeting illusion of security. In other words, Japan

Japan
will simply have contributed to an emerging arms race and to the intensification of nuclear tensions between the United States and Russia. There is no question that

is genuinely facing a threatening security environment. However, there is no technical

fix to this problem. Instead, lasting security can only be achieved through diplomacy,
confidence building, and mutual threat reduction. Ultimately, Aegis Ashore is an enormously
expensive means of creating insecurity for others while generating little added security
for Japan itself. There remains time for Japan to reconsider this decision. It should do so as a matter of urgency.
Cutting-edge BMDs and launch on warning policies make miscalculation likely
Weitz 15 (Richard Weitz, Center for Political-Military Analysis Director, “Arms Racing in Strategic
Technologies: Asia's New Frontier,” Hudson Institute, https://www.hudson.org/research/11307-
arms-racing-in-strategic-technologies-asia-s-new-frontier)

Although China, Russia, and the United States have together experienced numerous crises and
tensions since the end of the Cold War, one important reason that each state has refrained from

employing military force directly against the others is their robust nuclear deterrents
and survivable “second-strike” capabilities—their assured ability to retaliate effectively
with their own nuclear forces even if they were attacked first. Furthermore, US extended nuclear security
guarantees—Washington’s promise to protect its allies against nuclear threats with nuclear forces, if necessary—has dissuaded other potential nuclear weapons
states, namely Japan and South Korea, from pursuing their own nuclear weapons capability. Despite doubts, these countries have continued to place their faith in

new military technologies such as

Washington’s will and capacity to defend them against North Korea and other threats. However,

missile defenses, anti-satellite weapons, and hypersonic missile systems, could raise the
risks of nuclear weapons use in future crises, especially if accompanied by certain risk-acceptant operational concepts.
Ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems may convince their possessors that they could launch a

disarming first strike—expecting their missile shields to protect them against any
retaliatory strikes. Hypersonic delivery systems present new challenges for crisis stability
due to their rapid speed and unpredictable flight paths. Furthermore, states have incentives to
use cyber weapons early in a conflict to exploit any vulnerabilities of their opponent before their own can be
neutralized by an enemy. States may even consider launching their nuclear forces before they have

been attacked, such as on warning of an assault despite the risks of misperception and
miscalculation. Chinese and Russian officials have already complained about the allegedly disruptive nature of the expanding US capabilities for missile
defense, precision strikes, and other strategic technologies. The strong US offensive capabilities, both nuclear and

conventional, exacerbate these concerns since they increase its potential for
successfully pre-empting Chinese and Russian nuclear missiles before they have been launched. Experts 2

believe that the Chinese share Russian concerns about “conventional counterforce” – US

preemptive attacks using non-nuclear hypersonic weapons or even cruise missiles

against the PLA’s nuclear forces and command nodes and then using missile defenses to
defeat any ragged Chinese counterstrike. Both countries are seeking to overcome US offensive and defensive capabilities by
actively researching all these new strategic technologies for possible military application. It is important not to exaggerate the potential for near-term technological
breakthroughs in these capabilities. By their very nature, however, the pace and impact of these novel military weapons based on revolutionary capabilities are

The best time

hard to predict. Few existing treaties explicitly constrain the quantitative or qualitative dimensions of these new strategic technologies.

to negotiate arms control agreements limiting the development of potentially

destabilizing systems is before the weapons are deployed, but there are major impediments to progress in this
area.

Strategic stability collapse strongly incentivizes nuclear first strikes

Weitz 15 (Richard Weitz, Center for Political-Military Analysis Director, “Arms Racing in Strategic
Technologies: Asia's New Frontier,” Hudson Institute, https://www.hudson.org/research/11307-
arms-racing-in-strategic-technologies-asia-s-new-frontier)
Russian leaders have argued that US development of strategically disruptive technologies such as hypersonic weapons, ballistic missile defenses, and cyber
weapons makes it harder for Moscow to accept more cuts in offensive nuclear forces under any new arms control agreement. Both Chinese and Russians fear that
the expanding US strategic capabilities threaten their capacity for assured nuclear retaliation and thereby undermine their capacity to deter a direct US attack or

Though US BMD systems would have difficulty coping

constrain US military interventions against other countries.

with a full-scale Chinese or Russian missile strike, their task would be much easier
following a US first strike that destroys many of the attackers’ missiles in their silos and,
through kinetic or cyber strikes, disrupts their strategic command-and-control systems. In
such a scenario, China or Russia might even refrain from a retaliatory missile strike against the US homeland since such a weak counterstrike could fail and
provoke a full-scale nuclear response. One way China and Russia can counter the risk of a US pre-emptive strike with conventional, nuclear, or cyber weapons, and
of having their retaliatory missile strike weakened by US defenses, is to deploy more and better missiles and nuclear warheads, making them more capable of

some of their responses can also be potentially destabilizing

inflicting unacceptable damage on the United States. Yet,

and encourage first strikes, including Russia’s construction of massive liquid-fueled

missiles that are extremely vulnerable before launch, its arsenal of potentially thousands
of tactical nuclear weapons, China’s co-location of its conventional and nuclear systems,
or any launch on warning tactics. Furthermore, China and Russia are developing counter-space
and offensive cyber capabilities designed to attack US command and control systems,
which could contribute to inadvertent escalation in a crisis.
 Scenario 2 – Kuril Islands
Aegis Ashore decks Japan-Russia bilateral relations.
Brown, 18 (James D. J, associate professor in political science at Temple University Japan and a
specialist on Russo-Japanese relations, The Case Against Aegis Ashore, Shingetsu News Agency,
http://shingetsunewsagency.com/2018/08/20/the-case-against-aegis-ashore/)

SNA (Tokyo) — While the Abe administration presents Aegis Ashore as an essential and
relatively uncontroversial contribution to the defense of Japan from the North Korean threat, in
reality the deployment of this missile defense system risks further destabilizing the security
situation in Northeast Asia, especially with regard to Russia.

In December 2017, the Japanese government formally decided to purchase Aegis Ashore, the
US-made ground-based ballistic missile defense system. It is anticipated that two units will be
installed, with Akita and Yamaguchi prefectures identified as the candidate sites. The first of
these deployments is planned to be completed during fiscal 2023.
The Abe administration has justified the purchase of this system as a necessary response to the
growth in the missile threat from North Korea. Japan has two existing missile defense systems,
but each has limitations.

The first of these is the Patriot PAC-3, which can intercept incoming missiles during their
terminal phase. The units are mobile but provide limited coverage, meaning that they can offer
protection to specific sites, such as central Tokyo or military installations, but not to the country
as a whole.

The PAC-3 system is therefore combined with Aegis-equipped destroyers, whose interceptors
can eliminate missiles during their mid-course phase. This system can theoretically provide
cover for all of Japan, but it is dependent on keeping the Aegis-equipped ships on a continual
cycle of deployment in specific areas, something that places an enormous burden on Japan’s
Maritime Self-Defense Forces.

As such, there is an apparent logic in purchasing a third system that can provide constant
protection for all of Japanese territory. Additionally, the Aegis Ashore system has superior
capabilities and range than the existing Aegis-equipped destroyers. In particular, it is claimed
that it is better at dealing with simultaneous launches as well as missiles on a lofted trajectory,
both things that North Korea has simulated in recent missile tests.

Presented this way, it appears hard to argue with the decision to adopt Aegis Ashore.

Yet, as time has passed, the chorus of opposition has grown louder.

Voices of Opposition

One criticism is that the introduction of the missile defense system runs counter to the current
trend of reduced tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Indeed, some may argue that Aegis Ashore
is now superfluous following the meeting between President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim
Jong-Un in Singapore in June at which the North Korean leader agreed “to work toward
complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”
This is, however, a weak argument since it is far from certain that the North Korean
commitment in Singapore was sincere. Furthermore, even if denuclearization were to proceed
smoothly, Pyongyang would still retain a dangerous arsenal of non-nuclear missiles that are
capable of reaching Japan.

A more convincing criticism is of the cost of the system. It was always known that Aegis Ashore
would be expensive, but the extent is only now becoming clear.

At the end of July, sources in the Ministry of Defense revealed that the estimated cost of the
two Aegis Ashore units had been revised up by around 70%. With the inclusion of other
elements, such as the interceptor missiles, the total cost of the project is now expected to
exceed 600 billion yen (US$5.4 billion).

This is an extraordinary spending commitment in a country where government debt was

equivalent to 253% of GDP in 2017, and where the Abe administration pretends to be pursuing
the goal of a fiscal surplus by 2025.

Separately, there are concerns within the local communities near where the Aegis Ashore
batteries are set to be located. These center on the extent to which the presence of the missile
defense units will make their area a target for foreign military planners. Additionally, there are
worries about the health effects of the powerful, but largely unproven, Lockheed Martin Solid
State Radar that the Japanese government has selected for use with the Aegis Ashore units.

A Destabilizing Factor in Northeast Asia

Both the expense of the system and its potential health implications are genuine concerns, but
perhaps the most serious worry about Aegis Ashore is the destabilizing effect it could have on
Northeast Asian security. The Japanese government insists that it is a purely defensive system,
which will be under Japan’s exclusive control. This is not, however, the view of Japan’s
neighbors.

Tokyo’s decision to invest further in US missile defense has been criticized by both China and
North Korea. However, the most strident and sustained condemnation of Aegis Ashore has
come from Russia.

Russia is the only peer of the United States when it comes to nuclear weapons, and it has come
to rely ever more on its vast strategic arsenal since it lost the conventional superiority that the
Soviet Union enjoyed over the West in Europe. Moreover, as the United States has
demonstrated its willingness to use military force internationally since the 1990s, Russia has
come to regard its nuclear capabilities as a vital means of deterring US interventionism. This has
become all the more important following the recent increase in tensions between Russia
and the West, and Washington’s explicit identification of Russia as an adversary.
For this reason, Russian strategists regard US missile defense systems as a leading threat
to national security. From Moscow’s perspective, the United States is engaged in a long-
term project to undermine Russia’s strategic deterrent and thereby give itself a free
hand to act without fear of Russian retaliation.
The crucial step in this regard was the decision of President George W. Bush in 2002 to
withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Signed in 1972, this agreement had barred
Washington and Moscow from deploying nationwide defenses against strategic ballistic missiles.
The treaty’s preamble described this as a “substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic
offensive arms.”

During the years since this withdrawal, Moscow believes that the United States has worked
assiduously to surround Russia with elements of its expanding missile defense system. Some of
these units have been installed within the United States itself, while others have been planned
for deployment on the territory of US allies.

The Russian authorities claim that the US justifies these deployments by using the excuse that
the missile defense systems are needed to protect allies from the threat of rogue states. In
Europe, Iran is the supposed threat; in East Asia, it is North Korea. In each case, Russia believes
that it is the real target.

Aegis Ashore is therefore seen as just the latest link in the United States’ expanding
network of missile defense systems, and Moscow is dismissive of Tokyo’s claim that it
will be an independent Japanese system. This view was expressed by Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov in January 2018, when he told journalists that, “We don’t know any cases
anywhere in this world where the United States, having deployed its weapons systems, would
hand the control over them to a host country. I have strong doubts that they will make an
exception in this case.”

This view will only have strengthened when Isao Iijima, a special advisor to Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe, told the media in June that the decision to purchase Aegis Ashore was pushed upon
Japan by the United States.

Prior to the final decision being taken, Russia intensively lobbied the Abe administration not to
agree to purchase further US missile defense systems. This included the warning by Defense
Minister Sergei Shoigu in March 2017 that the deployment of such systems “will destroy the
balance in the Pacific region.” Having ignored these words of caution, Japan must expect some
consequences.

This was made clear immediately after the announcement of Japan’s decision to purchase the
system when Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated that Aegis Ashore will
create “a new situation, which we logically must take account of in our military planning.” At the
same time, Maria Zakharova, chief spokeswoman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, warned
that the decision “will have a negative impact on the overall atmosphere of bilateral relations,
including negotiations on the issue of a peace treaty.”

Although no explicit link has been made, it is likely that the recent intensification of the Russian
military presence on the disputed Southern Kuriles is connected with the Aegis Ashore decision.
In particular, in January 2018, the Russian government issued a directive which designates
the airport on the island of Iturup (Etorofu in Japanese) as dual-use. This opens the way for it
to be used for military jets and, sure enough, Su-35S fighters were deployed to the island in July.
Similarly, it is possible that Russia’s foot-dragging on the implementation of joint
economic activities with Japan on the disputed islands is also a response to Aegis
Ashore. This may be seen as an effective way of punishing the Japanese government
since Prime Minister Abe has made the joint projects a prominent feature of his foreign
policy and has presented them as a stepping stone to the resolution of the territorial
dispute.
Causing a setback to bilateral relations with Russia might be a price worth paying if Aegis Ashore
were to radically improve Japan’s security situation. In reality, however, it will not.

No Lasting Gain in Security

Although Aegis Ashore would undoubtedly enhance the technical capabilities of Japanese
missile defense, the system can still only deal with a limited number of missiles and is not
100% reliable. As such, just as Japan’s sense of security did not meaningfully change after the
billions that were spent on PAC-3 and the Aegis-equipped destroyers, so it will be with Aegis
Ashore.

Indeed, any small gain in security is certain to be swiftly eroded as those countries that
feel threatened by Aegis Ashore adapt their behavior or introduce more sophisticated
weapons systems to overcome Japan’s additional layer of missile defense. In no time at
all, the military experts will be arguing that Japan needs to spend yet more billions on some
other new system that also offers no more than a fleeting illusion of security. In other words,
Japan will simply have contributed to an emerging arms race and to the intensification
of nuclear tensions between the United States and Russia.
There is no question that Japan is genuinely facing a threatening security environment .
However, there is no technical fix to this problem. Instead, lasting security can only be achieved
through diplomacy, confidence building, and mutual threat reduction.

Ultimately, Aegis Ashore is an enormously expensive means of creating insecurity for

others while generating little added security for Japan itself. There remains time for Japan
to reconsider this decision. It should do so as a matter of urgency.

Russia fears Aegis Ashore will be deployed on the disputed Kuril islands –
prevents resolution of territorial claims
Azuma and Walker 19 (Hidetoshi Azuma, American Security Project Adjunct Junior Fellow, Dr.
Joshua Walker, Former U.S. Department of State Senior Advisor and Current German Marshal
fund fellow, “A SILVER LINING IN ABE’S UNREQUITED BROMANCE WITH PUTIN,” War on the
Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/a-silver-lining-in-abes-unrequited-bromance-with-
putin/)

Indeed, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been a perennial thorn in Moscow’s side in its
engagement with Tokyo and is increasingly becoming Putin’s primary concern in the Far
East. It bears particular importance in the Kremlin’s strategic calculations for the Far East given its submarine-launched ballistic missile sanctuary in
the Sea of Okhotsk that could potentially become vulnerable if Russia cedes any of the four adjacent islands to Japan. Moreover, the U.S.-
Japan ballistic missile defense program is entering a new phase with Tokyo’s recent
purchase of $1.2 billion Aegis Ashore batteries from its American ally. While the new land-based
missile defense currently targets North Korea, Moscow has leveled vehement objections to Tokyo’s

potential dual offensive-defensive use of missiles and the equipment’s interoperability

with the U.S. forces. Apart from these technicalities, Aegis Ashore batteries could theoretically be
deployed on some of the four Kuril islands, such as Iturup, under Japanese sovereignty. Such a possibility alone
would further dissuade Moscow, which views Japan as increasingly linked to
Washington’s perceived efforts to contain Russia with its global missile defense
network. From the Kremlin’s perspective, Japan could potentially become just another
frontline state similar to Poland in today’s blazing Russia-West geopolitical rivalry.

Aegis Ashore leads to Russian militarism in the Kuril islands - causes Russia-
Japan conflict
Gady 18 (Franz-Stefan Gady, The Diplomat Senior Editor, “Japan Asks Russia to Reduce
Militarization of Disputed Kuril Islands,” The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/japan-
asks-russia-to-reduce-militarization-of-disputed-kuril-islands/)

Japan asked Russia to reduce its military activities on a disputed island chain, known as
the Kurils in Russia and the Northern Territories in Japan, during “two-plus-two” security talks between the foreign and defense ministers of
Japan and Russia held in Moscow on July 31, according to Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera. “We have asked the Russian side to take

particular measures because Russia is building up its military potential on the four northern islands,”
Onodera was quoted by Reuters as saying following a meeting with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Shoigu. A Japanese Ministry of Defense (MoD)

statement issued on July 31 reiterates that Russian military activities on the islands are “incompatible” with “the position of Japan” and “regrettable .”
The Japanese MoD singled out the deployment of Russian military aircraft on the
disputed islands as a particular source of concern. In March 2018, the Russian Air Force
deployed two Su-35S fighters to an airfield on Iturup (Etorofu in Japanese) — the largest and northernmost island
in the southern Kurils — for the first time. The arrival of the aircraft was preceded by Russian Prime Minister Dmitry
Medvedev signing a decree permitting the deployment of military aircraft to the civilian airport in February 2018. Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Russia’s military activities are seen in response

(MoFA) lodged an official protest over the issue in the same month.

to Moscow’s concern over the possible procurement of two U.S.-made land-based Aegis
Ashore ballistic missile defense batteries by Japan. The Russian ministers once again officially
restated their concerns over the deployment of the Aegis Ashore ballistic missile
defense systems during the two-plus-two dialogue in Moscow on Tuesday. Russia is also concerned over the
stationing of additional U.S. missile defense systems to Northeast Asia. For example, Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly expressed his
apprehension over the deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to South Korea. As I reported previously, the Russo-
Japanese dispute over the islands has been going on for many decades: The disputed Northern territories – known in Japanese as the Shikotan,
Kunashiri, Etorofu and the Habomai islets – located in the Sea of Okhotsk in the Northwest Pacific, were seized by the Soviet Union in 1945. By 1949 the
Russians had expelled all 17,000 Japanese residents of the islands. Under the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, Tokyo renounced “all right, title and
claim to the Kuril Islands”; however, Moscow never signed the peace treaty and Tokyo refused to concede that the four disputed islands were in fact
part of the Kuril chain. Japan has repeatedly rejected Moscow’s offer to settle the dispute with the return of the two smallest territories of the chain,
The increasing Russian military presence on the disputed island chain is
Habomai and Shikotan.

bound to accentuate the ongoing disagreement between Moscow and Tokyo. The deployment
of Russian military aircraft (as of now not on a permanent basis) is just one item of a list of Japanese concerns regarding Russian military activities on
the islands. The Russian Navy has also been considering establishing a permanent naval base for its Pacific Fleet on one of the islands. Furthermore, the
Russian MoD announced that it will deploy an army division there. Additionally, Russia stationed anti-ship and missile defense systems on the disputed
territories in 2016..
Heightened tensions around the Kuril Islands risk World War 3.
Khanna, 18 (Parag Khanna, Senior Research Fellow in the Centre on Asia and Globalisation at
the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Avoiding World War III in Asia, National Interest,
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/avoiding-world-war-iii-asia-26313?page=0%2C2)

World War II still hasn’t ended, yet World War III already looms. When China and Japan
agreed to normalize relations in 1945, it was stipulated that the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands (a string of uninhabited rocks equidistant from Japan, China and Taiwan) would not be
militarized and the dispute would be put off for future generations. That future is here. The
recent discovery of large oil and gas reserves under the islands has heated up the situation
dramatically, with military budgets surging, and warships, coast guards and fighter jets
scrambling to assert control over the commons.

Meanwhile, tensions on the Korean Peninsula have drastically escalated into the world’s most
dangerous flashpoint over the past seven decades precisely because the Korean War itself was
never formally ended in 1953. Despite the recent summit between Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong-
un, neither South nor North Korea has yet to formally recognize the other’s existence, each
claiming to be the sole legitimate government of the entire Korean Peninsula. Similarly, the
unresolved status of the princely state of Kashmir at the time of the partition of South Asia into
independent India and Pakistan in 1947 has been the direct or proximate cause of three major
wars and a near nuclear standoff in 2001 between the postcolonial cousins.

These three major Asian fault lines are a reminder that the biggest risk of conflict in the twenty-
first century stems from unsettled conflicts of the twentieth century. Asia is awash in other
still-disputed territories and boundaries such as Arunachal Pradesh (between India and
China, which Beijing calls “South Tibet”), the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea
(claimed by numerous Asian countries) and the southern Kuril Islands (where there is Russo-
Japanese friction, with Tokyo calling them the “Northern Territories”).
The world has been lucky that deterrence, economic integration and a shared distaste
for the past two centuries of Western domination have prevented Asia’s major powers
from crossing the Rubicon. But rather than simply hope luck does not run out, the solution to
these tensions is to immediately seek permanent settlement on peaceful terms.

Ending interminably hot or cold wars requires a different approach to diplomatic

mediation than the ad hoc crisis management that has been the norm in these and
other conflicts. Indeed, there is a significant leap from traditional mediation to outright
settlement. Mediating conflict without a settlement is like turning down the temperature on a
pressure cooker without switching it off: the food inside will eventually burn and rot. The
temperature can also be turned back up, causing the top to eventually blow off. By contrast,
settling a conflict is like turning the stove off, removing the pressure cooker and getting on with
sharing the meal. Strategists focused on alliance management and force posture would be well
served to take a step back and remember that military maneuvering is not an end in itself. More
fundamental than preparing for war is eliminating the need for it in the first place.
US-Russia conflicts escalates to nuclear war – extinction.
Chossudovsky, 14 (Dr. Michel Chossudovsky, Professor of Economics at the University of
Ottawa, Founder and Director of the Centre for Research on Globalization, and Editor of Global
Research, “Dangerous Crossroads: US-NATO To Deploy Ground Troops, Conduct Large Scale
Naval Exercises against “Unnamed Enemy””, 8-24, http://www.globalresearch.ca/dangerous-
crossroads-us-nato-to-deploy-ground-troops-conduct-large-scale-naval-exercises-against-
unnamed-enemy/5397415)

The World is at a dangerous Crossroads.

The Western military alliance is in an advanced state of readiness. And so is Russia.
Russia is heralded as the “Aggressor”. US-NATO military confrontation with Russia is
contemplated.

Enabling legislation in the US Senate under “The Russian Aggression Prevention Act” (RAPA) has
“set the US on a path towards direct military conflict with Russia in Ukraine.”

Any US-Russian war is likely to quickly escalate into a nuclear war, since neither the US
nor Russia would be willing to admit defeat, both have many thousands of nuclear
weapons ready for instant use, and both rely upon Counterforce military doctrine that
tasks their military, in the event of war, to preemptively destroy the nuclear forces of
the enemy. (See Steven Starr, Global Research, August 22, 2014)
The Russian Aggression Prevention Act (RAPA) is the culmination of more than twenty years of
US-NATO war preparations, which consist in the military encirclement of both Russia and China:

From the moment the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the United States has relentlessly
pursued a strategy of encircling Russia, just as it has with other perceived enemies like China
and Iran. It has brought 12 countries in central Europe, all of them formerly allied with Moscow,
into the NATO alliance. US military power is now directly on Russia’s borders. (Steven Kinzer,
Boston Globe, March 3, 2014, emphasis added)

On July 24, in consultation with the Pentagon, NATO’s Europe commander General Philip
Breedlove called for “stockpiling a base in Poland with enough weapons, ammunition and other
supplies to support a rapid deployment of thousands of troops against Russia”.(RT, July 24,
2014). According to General Breedlove, NATO needs “pre-positioned supplies, pre-positioned
capabilities and a basing area ready to rapidly accept follow-on forces”:

“He plans to recommend placing supplies — weapons, ammunition and ration packs — at the
headquarters to enable a sudden influx of thousands of Nato troops” (Times, August 22, 2014,
emphasis added)

Breedlove’s “Blitzkrieg scenario” is to be presented at NATO’s summit in Wales in early

September, according to The London Times. It is a “copy and paste” text broadly consistent with
the Russian Aggression Prevention Act (RAPA) which directs President Obama to:
“(1) implement a plan for increasing U.S. and NATO support for the armed forces of Poland,
Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, and other NATO member-states; and

(2) direct the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO to seek consideration for permanently
basing NATO forces in such countries.” (S.2277 — 113th Congress (2013-2014))

More generally, a scenario of military escalation prevails with both sides involved in
extensive war games.
In turn, the structure of US sponsored military alliances plays a crucial role in war planning. We
are dealing with a formidable military force involving a global alliance of 28 NATO member
states. In turn, the US as well as NATO have established beyond the “Atlantic Region” a network
of bilateral military alliances with “partner” countries directed against Russia, China, Iran and
North Korea.
2AC
 General BMDs
BMDs escalate tensions with Russia and China.
Kelly 12/11/2017 (Tim Kelly, Tokyo-based Reuters Senior Correspondent, “Russian military chief
criticizes U.S., Japan and South Korea drills,” Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
northkorea-missiles-japan-russia/russian-military-chief-criticizes-u-s-japan-and-south-korea-
drills-idUSKBN1E50X9)

Russia’s military chief warned on Monday that military exercises by Japan,

TOKYO (Reuters) -

the United States and South Korea aimed at countering North Korea only raise hysteria
and create more instability in the region. Russian Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces General Valery Gerasimov,
issued his warning in Tokyo as the United States, Japan and South Korea began a two-day exercise to practice tracking missiles amid rising tension over

North Korea’s weapons programs. “ Carrying out military training in regions surrounding North Korea
will only heighten hysteria and make the situation unstable,” Gerasimov said at the beginning of
a meeting with Japanese Minister of Defence Itsunori Onodera. This week’s exercise by the United States and its

two Asian allies, in which they will share information on tracking ballistic missiles, comes
just days after large-scale drills by U.S. and South Korean forces that North Korea said
made the outbreak of war “an established fact”. North Korea says its weapons programs are necessary to counter
U.S. aggression. On Nov. 29, North Korea test-fired its latest ballistic missile, which it said was its most advanced yet, capable of reaching the mainland

China has also repeatedly called for the United States and South Korea to stop
United States.

their exercises, which North Korea sees as preparation for an invasion . Chinese Foreign Ministry
spokesman Lu Kang, asked in Beijing about the latest U.S., South Korean and Japanese drills, said the situation was in a vicious cycle that if followed to a
conclusion would not be in anyone’s interests. “All relevant parties should do is still to completely, precisely and fully implement the relevant U.N.
Security Council resolutions toward North Korea, and do more for regional peace and stability and to get all parties back to the negotiating table. Not
the opposite, mutual provocation,” Lu said. Gerasimov’s visit to Japan is the first by a senior Russian military official in seven years and follows the
resumption of “two-plus-two” defense and foreign minister talks in March after Russia annexed Crimea. Relations between Russia and Japan have been
hampered for decades over the ownership of four islands north of Japan’s Hokkaido, captured by Soviet forces at the end of World War Two. Japan has
declined to sign a formal peace treaty with Russia until the dispute is resolved. Gerasimov also met Katsutoshi Kawano, the chief of staff of Japan’s Self

China’s Defence Ministry said on Monday it had begun a planned joint

Defence Forces.

simulated anti-missile drill with Russia in Beijing, which had “important meaning” for
both countries in facing the threat from missiles. It said the exercise was not aimed at any third party. China
and Russia both oppose the development of global anti-missile systems, the ministry added in a
statement. China and Russia both oppose the deployment in South Korea of the advanced U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-

China in particular fears the system’s powerful radar could look deep into its
missile system.

territory, threatening its security. The United States and South Korea say the system is needed to defend against the threat of
North Korean missiles. It is not clear if this week’s exercise by U.S., South Korean and Japanese forces will involve the THAAD system.

Russia and china are taking retaliatory measures – increasing tensions

Lemon ’18 (Jason Lemon, writer for Newsweek, previously a contributor to The Atlanta Journal-
Constitution, “RUSSIA AND CHINA WILL RETALIATE AGAINST U.S. MISSILE SYSTEMS IN ASIA,
AMBASSADOR WARNS”, Newsweek, 7/23/18, https://www.newsweek.com/russia-china-
retaliate-against-us-defenses-asia-1037317)

Russia and China plan to take retaliatory measures against the deployment of U.S.
missile defense systems in Japan and South Korea, Moscow's ambassador to Beijing
warned on Monday.
Speaking to reporters, Ambassador Andrei Denisov said such actions by the neighboring Asian countries pose a security threat to
Russia and its regional ally China. He suggested that the decisions from Japan and South Korea would require a response from
Moscow and Beijing.

"Those who house such facilities on their territory, which our Chinese partners and we
think pose a threat to our security, essentially put their security in jeopardy, as we have
to take some retaliatory measures," Denisov said, Russian news agency Tass reported.
"And this is absolutely obvious."
South Korea announced in mid-2016 that it supported the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, a U.S.
missile defense program. The decision came during the constant threat of a nuclear attack from North Korea. However, in recent
months, Seoul and Pyongyang have significantly improved relations, signaling that a lasting peace agreement could be possible. At
the same time, skeptics suggest North Korea's Kim Jong Un is merely pandering to ease international sanctions so his country can
continue to improve its nuclear capabilities.

Japan agreed in December 2017 to expand its missile defense system with the help of
the U.S. The country plans to purchase and deploy two Aegis Ashore missile defense systems,
each costing about $900 million. They will be positioned in the north and southwest of the
country's principal island.

The warning from Russia follows similar statements regarding U.S. defenses established
in European countries neighboring the world's largest nation.
European NATO members have eyed Moscow's apparent expansionist ambitions with concern following a 2014 move to support
separatist Ukrainian rebels and annex the Crimean Peninsula. Russian neighbors Poland, Norway, Latvia, Sweden, Estonia and
Lithuania have raised concerns that Russia could make similar moves against their sovereignty.

In early June, Norway announced it would more than double the presence of U.S. Marines within its borders starting next year,
leading Russia to warn that there would be "consequences." Reports also circulated in May suggesting that Poland offered the U.S.
$2 billion to station troops permanently within its borders. Moscow said such a move could "lead to counteraction from" its side.

Recent satellite images also suggest that Russia has expanded a nuclear storage facility in its
Kaliningrad enclave, located near the borders with Poland and Lithuania, according to a report
released in mid-June by the Federation of American Scientists.
Despite threats from Moscow, and Washington appearing to increase its defensive posture against Russia around the world,
President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin recently met in Helsinki for a high-profile summit. Following the
meeting, the leaders said they agreed to work together more closely on security and military issues. They also said they discussed
their nation's respective nuclear arsenals.

Trump has hailed the meeting as a "great success," while many in Washington—from across the political spectrum—have
condemned the president for pandering to Moscow as the FBI continues to investigate the president's campaign team for
connections and alleged collusion with the Kremlin.
 China Scenario – General
Japanese possession of BMDs from the US causes China to feel threatened.
Cronin, March 19th, 2002 (Richard P. Cronin, Specialist in Asian Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense,
and Trade Division, Japan-US Cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defense: Issues and Prospects,
Congressional Research Service, https://heinonline-
org.dartmouth.idm.oclc.org/HOL/Page?collection=congrec&handle=hein.crs/crsacky0001&id=1
&men_tab=srchresults#)

Impact of Japan's active involvement in regional deployment of a BMD system on U.S.

operational flexibility.

Given the historical mistrust of Japan's intentions and programs among its Asian neighbors, a
highly visible involvement by Japan in missile defense, were it otherwise possible, could have
negative implications for U.S. security interests in Asia. China, for instance, might see an
integrated U.S.-Japan BMD capability as more threatening to its interests than a U.S. system
alone, because of the implication that Japan is joining a de facto collective security arrangement
that is aimed at China, especially in a confrontation involving Taiwan. China and other
neighboring countries may be less than convinced that Article 9 will continue to inhibit Japan's
participation in collective security with the United States, especially because the restriction has
become the target of nationalist opposition in Japan. Thus for China, North and South Korea,
and some Southeast Asian countries, an integrated U.S.-Japan BMD system could be viewed as
symbolizing the remilitarization of Japan under the cloak of alliance cooperation with the United
States. To the extent that joint BMD deployment generated fears of a rearmed Japan, it could
detract from the acceptability of a U.S. BMD capability. On the other side of the equation,
Japan's neighbors are likely to regard an independent Japanese BMD with even greater concern.
For some of Japan's neighbors, such as South Korea, a Japanese capability firmly linked to that of
the United States would seem more desirable. China, on the other hand, opposes both
deployment options.

Chinese have a retaliation policy-they would immediately respond to a

perceived nuclear attack increasing the risk for miscalc
Fiona Cunningham, 12-xx-2015, "Why China Won't Abandon Its Nuclear Strategy
of Assured Retaliation," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/why-china-wont-abandon-its-nuclear-
strategy-assured-retaliation, accessed 7-12-2019 (Kent Denver--EA)
This policy brief is based on "Assuring Assured Retaliation: China's Nuclear Posture and
U.S.-China Strategic Stability," which appears in the fall 2015 issue of International
Security. Bottom Lines A renewed U.S. threat to China's nuclear deterrent . Chinese
analysts worry that advances in U.S. strategic capabilities could undermine China's ability to
retaliate against a U.S. nuclear attack. Continuation of China's strategy of assured
retaliation. China is unlikely to dramatically increase its relatively small nuclear force or
abandon its second-strike posture. Instead, China will modestly expand its arsenal,
increase the sophistication of its forces, and allow limited ambiguity over its pledge not
to use nuclear weapons first. Potential pitfalls of limited ambiguity over no-first-use. Limited
ambiguity over no-first-use allows China to avoid an arms race, but it could increase
risks of nuclear escalation in a U.S.-China crisis. Limited ambiguity might also energize U.S.
pursuit of strategic superiority, if the United States sees it as a broad exception to China's no-
first-use policy. Whether China will abandon its long-standing nuclear strategy of assured
retaliation for a first-use posture will be a critical factor in U.S.-China strategic stability. In
recent years, the United States has been developing strategic capabilities such as missile
defenses and conventional long-range strike capabilities that could reduce the
effectiveness of China's deterrent. Writings by Chinese strategists and analysts, however,
indicate that China is unlikely to abandon its current nuclear strategy. A Renewed U.S. Threat
to China's Nuclear Arsenal China's strategists perceive missile defense as the most
serious future threat to China's nuclear arsenal. They worry that the current, limited U.S.
development and deployment of a missile defense system could be expanded in scope and
effectiveness to give the United States an effective shield against Chinese nuclear missiles. Even
if the system cannot reliably intercept ballistic missiles after they are launched, Chinese
analysts are concerned that missile defense deployments could trigger a regional arms
race if other countries see the U.S. commitment to the system as a proof of concept that
it may be effective. Chinese assessments of the threat posed by conventional long-range strike
capabilities are more mixed. Some Chinese analysts do not think that a U.S. conventional attack
on China's nuclear arsenal would be very likely or effective. They believe that China's efforts to
protect its arsenal from a nuclear attack, including hardening, dispersal, and mobility, would be
sufficient to protect China from a conventional attack as well. At the same time, analysts worry
that the United States may be more likely to use conventional weapons than nuclear weapons
against China's nuclear arsenal. Further, some analysts are concerned that U.S. conventional
long-range strike capabilities, if paired with improvements in U.S. intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance systems, could reduce the amount of strategic warning that China
would receive of an incoming attack. These capabilities could, therefore, undermine
China's deterrent. Continuation of China's Strategy of Assured Retaliation China will not
abandon its nuclear strategy of assured retaliation in response to an increasingly clear U.S.
commitment to strategic primacy. Instead, to avoid Cold War–style nuclear competition and the
risk of arms racing, China is altering how it implements assured retaliation. First, China is
allowing limited ambiguity over the application of its no-first-use policy. Debate among Chinese
strategists over the definition of "first use" has created uncertainty over how China would
respond to attacks with conventional weapons on its nuclear forces and infrastructure.
The main purpose of such limited ambiguity is to deter the United States from
conducting such conventional counterforce attacks. Chinese strategists are also
debating whether a launch-on-warning posture would be desirable and consistent with
China's no-first-use policy. Second, China seeks to maintain the smallest nuclear arsenal capable
of assuring retaliation against a nuclear-armed adversary. In response to U.S. capabilities
developments, the Chinese are making qualitative and limited quantitative improvements in the
country's force structure. China is modestly increasing the size and survivability of its
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force as well as its ability to penetrate missile
defenses. It is equipping some of its ICBMs with multiple, independently targeted
reentry vehicles, developing glide technology, and improving its strategic warning and
command and control systems. To counter future advances in U.S. strategic capabilities,
China is researching and developing missile defenses and hypersonic weapons technology, as
well as continuing to improve its ballistic missile submarine force. Potential Pitfalls of Ambiguity
over No-First Use Limited ambiguity over how China may define a "nuclear attack" for its
no-first-use policy allows it to maintain a smaller arsenal than it would need if it adhered
to a strict no-first-use policy. Yet limited ambiguity also raises the risk of nuclear
escalation in a crisis, as it increases the likelihood that the United States could mistake
Chinese nuclear signaling for preparations to use nuclear weapons. China's decision
implies that it views the economic, diplomatic, and strategic costs of arms racing as a bigger
threat to its national security than the risk of nuclear escalation in a crisis. China is also relatively
optimistic about the risk of nuclear escalation in any future U.S.-China crisis. A U.S.-China
crisis would most likely arise because of a dispute between a U.S. ally and China . Few Chinese
strategists believe that the stakes in any U.S.- China crisis would be sufficient for either China or the United States to risk nuclear escalation. Chinese analysts also
regard China's no-first-use policy as contributing to a clear firebreak between nuclear and conventional conflict. They believe that the United States would not be
tempted to cross that threshold by attacking China's nuclear arsenal with conventional capabilities, given the limited ambiguity over China's no-first-use policy.
Most Chinese strategists do not acknowledge the risk of unintentional escalation in a U.S.-China crisis. The United States does not share China's relative optimism
about the risk of nuclear escalation in a future U.S.-China crisis. Western experts worry that escalation could occur if the United States were to implement an
AirSea Battle Concept–style campaign to destroy China's conventional capabilities that simultaneously degraded Chinese nuclear capabilities and their supporting
infrastructure. One reason for this divergence of opinion may be that Western analysts believe that China's nuclear and conventional missile forces are colocated,
increasing the likelihood that a U.S. attack on Chinese conventional land-based missiles could degrade China's nuclear capabilities. Many Chinese analysts dismiss
this risk, however, arguing that China's conventional and nuclear capabilities are not colocated. Open-source information about China's strategic missile forces, the
Second Artillery, indicates that China's nuclear missiles are, in fact, not colocated with conventional ones. Within the Second Artillery, missile launch brigades are
organized based on either conventional or nuclear armaments. Conventional and nuclear missile brigades do share some infrastructure, but Chinese military texts
describe steps that have been taken to ensure redundancy in China's command and control structures. Thus, any U.S. conventional attack on a Chinese
It could still significantly escalate a
conventional missile brigade would probably not substantially degrade China's nuclear capabilities.

crisis, however, because of the message such an attack would communicate about U.S.
willingness and capabilities to conduct a similar attack on a Chinese nuclear brigade. China
would likely respond by signaling its resolve to retaliate if its nuclear weapons were
attacked, which could be misread by the United States as preparations for use. China's
decision to pair limited ambiguity over no-first-use with an otherwise restrained nuclear
posture could backfire. China likely underestimates U.S. willingness to run the risk of
nuclear escalation in a crisis. In addition, if the United States views China's limited ambiguity
as a bluff because China otherwise adheres to its no-first-use policy, it might ignore the risk of
nuclear escalation in conventional campaign planning, resulting in a deterrence failure in a
conventional conflict. Alternatively, if the United States views China's limited ambiguity as a
sign that China may abandon its no-first-use policy in circumstances other than a
conventional attack on its nuclear forces and infrastructure or nonnuclear strategic
targets, it may pursue strategic primacy more energetically, drawing China into the very
arms race it seeks to avoid. China's continuing commitment to a nuclear strategy of assured retaliation indicates that it will prioritize
avoiding a nuclear arms race with the United States. Nevertheless, leaders and militaries in both countries will need to be exceptionally careful to avoid nuclear
escalation in a crisis. Related Resources Thomas J. Christensen, "The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China's Strategic Modernization and U.S.- China Security
Relations," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4 (August 2012), pp. 447–487. M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, "China's Search for Assured Retaliation:
The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure," International Security, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 48–87. Avery Goldstein, "First Things First: The
Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations," International Security, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Spring 2013), pp. 49–89. Fiona S. Cunningham is a Ph.D.
candidate in the Department of Political Science and a member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. M. Taylor Fravel is
Associate Professor of Political Science and a member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. International Security is
America’s leading peer-reviewed journal of security affairs. It provides sophisticated analyses of contemporary, theoretical, and historical security issues.
International Security is edited at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and is published by The MIT Press. For more
information about this publication, please contact the International Security publications coordinator at 617-495-1914. Statements and views expressed in this
policy brief are solely those of the authors and do not imply endorsement by Harvard University, the Harvard Kennedy School, or the Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs. China is developing hypersonic weapons and satellite jammers-modernizing their military to start territorial conflict

Chinese are developing hypersonic weapons and satellite jammers-military

modernization is bad and increases risk of conflict
Tara Copp, Aaron Mehta, 1-15-2019, "New defense intelligence assessment
warns China nears critical military milestone," Defense News,
https://www.defensenews.com/news/your-military/2019/01/15/new-defense-
intelligence-assessment-warns-china-nears-critical-military-milestone/, accessed
7-12-2019 (Kent Denver--EA)
Tara Copp is the Pentagon Bureau Chief for Military Times Aaron Mehta is Deputy
Editor and Senior Pentagon Correspondent for Defense News, covering policy,
strategy and acquisition at the highest levels of the Department of Defense and
its international partners.

WASHINGTON — In recent years, top defense officials and internal Pentagon reports alike
have cautioned about the rise of China as a military power, in large part due to its
investments in high-end technologies like hypersonics and its development of
indigenous capabilities like stealth fighters and aircraft carriers. But it’s not a piece of
hardware that’s most worrisome for American interests, according to a new assessment
by the Defense Intelligence Agency. Instead, it’s the worry that the Chinese service
members behind each system have reached a critical point of confidence where they
now feel that in combat, the People’s Liberation Army can match competitors. In the
long term, that could be bad news for America — and especially for Taiwan. Speaking to
reporters Tuesday ahead of the new DIA 2019 “China Military Power” report, a senior
defense intelligence official called the idea that Beijing might soon trust its military
capabilities well enough to invade Taiwan “the most concerning” conclusion from the
report. “The biggest concern is that they are getting to a point where the PLA leadership
may actually tell [President Xi Jinping] they are confident in their capabilities. We know
in the past they have considered themselves a developing, weaker power,” the official
said. “As a lot of these technologies mature, as their reorganization of their military comes into
effect, as they become more proficient with these capabilities, the concern is we’ll reach a
point where internally in their decision-making they will decide that using military force
for regional conflict is something that is more imminent,” the official added. The
Pentagon is planning for war with China and Russia — can it handle both? War with China
and war with Russia would have some overlapping qualities, but the Pentagon needs to figure
out how and where to invest to deal with both. The report is the first public analysis of
Chinese military power released by the DIA, and the official said there is no classified
version of this production. The Pentagon annually issues a report to Congress on the issue
through a different, publicly released document. Sign up for our Early Bird Brief Get the defense
industry's most comprehensive news and information straight to your inbox Subscribe It is being
released just days after Patrick Shanahan, the acting secretary of defense, used his first staff
meeting to emphasize the Pentagon’s prime focus must remain on “China, China, China.”
Based on its assessment of Chinese official papers and statements, the DIA concluded
that Chinese military modernization was not undertaken with a major global war in
mind, but rather in preparation for further challenges to its regional efforts, potentially
leading to a local war. “Within the context of Beijing’s ‘period of strategic opportunity,’ as
[China] continues to grow in strength and confidence, [U.S.] leaders will face a China
insistent on having a greater voice in global interactions, which at times may be
antithetical to U.S. interests,” the agency reported. The reclamation of Taiwan is a long-
standing goal for Chinese leadership, and Xi has made no secret of that desire. The DIA notes
that much of China’s military modernization has been focused on Taiwan, including the
emphasis on short-range missile technology that would largely be useless in any other
theater of combat. Keeping Taiwan safe at the moment is a belief inside the PLA that the
armed service doesn’t have the training, doctrine and readiness levels needed for a full-scale
invasion of the island. But should that change, the military has the technology and numbers at
hand to make such a move possible. “We don’t have a real strong grasp on when they will think
that they are confident in that capability,” the official said. “They could order them to go today,
but I don’t think they are particularly confident in that capability.” Taiwan is not the only
potential flashpoint identified by the DIA. While China is unlikely to seek out an active
conflict near its territory, the official said, China’s construction of man-made, militarized
islands in the South China Sea as well as its assertion of rights to the Senkaku Islands in the East
China Sea could become points of tension. Here's the scoop on China's defense budget. But so,
too, could China’s expanded interests around the world, the official warned, citing the PLA’s
permanent base in Djibouti and willingness to sail ships farther abroad. “We now have to be
able to look for a Chinese military that is active everywhere,” the official said. “I’m not
saying they are a threat or about to take military action everywhere, but they are
present in a lot of places, and we will have to interact with them, engage with them,
deal with them, monitor them more broadly than we had to before when they were very
regionally focused near their own shores.” Technological upgrades While doctrine may lag
behind, China’s investments in new technologies are starting to bear fruit. In the more
than 100-page assessment on China, the agency noted China’s continued modernization
efforts of almost every aspect of its ground, sea, air and space forces. The vast
modernization effort — which includes the launch of its first independently developed
aircraft carrier in 2019, the continued development of the Hong-20 nuclear-capable
bomber and the emphasis it has placed in recent years on professionalizing its ground
forces — has produced “a robust, lethal force with capabilities spanning the air,
maritime, space and information domains which will enable China to impose its will in
the region,” the DIA found. Getting near par to American capabilities is one thing, but there are
some areas where China threatens to surpass America — and may have already done so. The
first is with hypersonic weaponry — delivery vehicles capable of going Mach 5 or faster.
In the last two years, the Pentagon has been increasingly vocal about the need to invest more in
its hypersonic capabilities, both offensive and defensive, largely because of how much China has
put toward the new weaponry. “They are on the leading edge of technology in that area [and
are] getting to the point where they are going to field this system,” the official said about
hypersonic weapons, singling out hypersonic glide vehicles for ballistic missiles as the area
in which Beijing has heavily invested. More broadly, China remains a leader in precision-
strike capabilities, especially with medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles —
something the official partly blamed on the fact the U.S. and Russia were barred from
developing such systems under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The sneaky ways
China and Russia could threaten US satellites The sneaky ways China and Russia could threaten
US satellites Kinetic attacks in space are still possible, but nations are looking more towards
electronic warfare and cyber attacks, a report has concluded. By: Aaron Mehta, Mike Gruss
China is also excelling at developing anti-satellite capabilities. “In addition to the research
and possible development of satellite jammers and directed-energy weapons, China has
probably made progress on kinetic energy weapons, including the anti-satellite missile
system tested in July 2014,” the report reads. “China is employing more sophisticated
satellite operations and probably is testing on-orbit dual-use technologies that could be
applied to counterspace missions.” Said the official: “They’ve clearly been pushing forward
on trying to build this comprehensive capability that can threaten U.S. and other satellites in all
orbits, to build capability to threaten all these systems. ... They think it’s a potential vulnerability
for us and allied forces, although they themselves are becoming more reliant on space-based
capabilities.”

japan’s aegis ashore causes escalating tensions with china

Ryall ’17 (Julian Ryall, Japan Correspondent for The Daily Telegraph, Member of the Foreign
Correspondents’ Club of Japan, Bachelor’s Degree in European Studies with French, Russian,
Economics, Politics & International Relations, “China, Japan wary of each other over advanced
missile radars”, Deutsche Welle, https://www.dw.com/en/china-japan-wary-of-each-other-
over-advanced-missile-radars/a-39041637)

The Japanese government has yet to comment on what is being seen as a thinly veiled threat
from China over its joint development with the US of a new generation of missile defense radars
that will strengthen Japan's protective shield against any missile strike.
But political analysts here say Beijing's complaints are "ridiculous" and that attempting to exert pressure to weaken Japan's defenses
is "deeply unprincipled."

China is also locked in a long-running dispute with South Korea over the deployment of the US
military's Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system, despite Seoul's
efforts to convince Beijing that it is designed purely to protect South Korean citizens from a
belligerent and nuclear-armed regime in North Korea.
China is worried that THAAD's powerful radar could gaze deep into Chinese territory and imperil the nation's security by
compromising its missile capabilities.
Since the dispute arose, China has imposed a range of measures designed to harm South Korean businesses - including a ban on the
sale of package tours to the country and a sharp increase in inspections of Korean firms' operations in China - although Beijing
denies the changes are related to the THAAD deployment.

The latest comments by a representative of the government in Beijing have aroused concerns that similar unofficial sanctions could
be used against Japan.

Impact on regional stability

Addressing a monthly press briefing at China's Defense Ministry recently, spokesman Ren
Guoqiang said Japan's development of advanced radar systems designed to counteract incoming
ballistic missiles would have a negative impact on strategic stability and damage trust between
nations in the region.
He added that Tokyo should act "cautiously" and hinted that neighboring countries would be alarmed at any improved military
capability because of imperial Japan's invasion and occupation of parts of Asia and the Pacific in the early decades of the last
century.

"Especially because of historical reasons, relevant moves by Japan in the military and security
field have always attracted close attention from its Asian neighbors and the international
community," Reuters quoted Ren as saying. "Japan should act cautiously on the anti-missile
issue," he added.
"It is a typical Chinese comment and attitude," said Yoichi Shimada, a professor of international relations at Fukui Prefectural
University. "And it must be pointed out that China has already deployed a radar system that is able to cover all the Japanese and US
bases in Japan, so this is another example of Beijing demanding one thing of its neighbors but ignoring other nations' concerns about
its own abilities," he told DW.

Shimada added that Japan would arguably not need to deploy new radar and defensive missile systems if Beijing had not supported
North Korea - both politically and materially - over the last seven decades, during which time the ruling Kim family in Pyongyang has
been able to develop nuclear weapons and appears close to perfecting an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching
targets in the continental US.

Recent missile launches

Underlining Japan's need to be able to defend its territory and population from unprovoked
North Korean attacks, a missile was fired on Sunday from a mobile launcher unit on the east
coast of North Korea. The weapon traveled an estimated 400 kilometers before falling into
Japan's exclusive economic zone in the Sea of Japan. The launch - North Korean state media claimed it was a
successful test of a new guidance system - was the third in a little over three weeks.

"China has played a big part in North Korea becoming a nuclear threat and it is only sensible that Japan takes countermeasures
against that threat," Shimada said. "For China to try to interfere in Japan's defense is deeply unprincipled."

Garren Mulloy, an associate professor of international relations at Daito Bunkyo University, said making reference to imperial
Japan's conquest of large parts of China is a "common tool for Japan-bashing because it is extremely easy to use."

The real reason that Beijing has been so stridently opposed to the deployment of both THAAD
and now the land-based version of the Aegis anti-missile system that is aboard a number of
Japanese navy warships is that it provides better defensive coverage, which impacts China's
offensive strategy, say observers.

"Basically, the Chinese have no right to make these sorts of demands against its neighbors, in
part because the situation we are in today in Northeast Asia - a nuclear-armed North Korea - is
in large part due to Beijing's policies," Mulloy said.
'To complain is ridiculous'
"These developments are not aimed at China; they are simply a reaction to the perceived threat
of ballistic missiles coming from North Korea and for Beijing to complain is ridiculous," Mulloy
noted.

Perhaps one of China's concerns is that the spread of such advanced technology might next
reach Taiwan, which Beijing still regards as a renegade province and has vowed to one day incorporate into the mainland regime.

Shimada believes that China will continue to exert pressure against Japan, but that the
government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will be strong enough to resist efforts to influence
domestic policies.
He is less optimistic about South Korea. "There are clear parallels with the situation in South Korea, but now they have elected what
is effectively a pro-Chinese and pro-North Korean government, I fully expect the country to become a virtual protectorate of China,"
he added.
 China Scenario - Aegis = Tipping Point
Absent Aegis Ashore, China won’t dramatically expand it’s nuclear arsenal –
they want the bare minimum number of weapons to maintain a credible
strategic strike capability
Chase 7/2013 (Michael S. Chase, U.S. Naval War College Warfare Analysis and Research
Associate Professor, “China's Transition to a More Credible Nuclear Deterrent: Implications and
Challenges for the United States,” Asia Policy, Project Muse)

China’s “no first use” nuclear policy and assured retaliation strategy have remained
relatively constant over the years. Recent doctrinal publications, however, suggest that the country’s nuclear
missiles could also help deter conventional strategic attacks. Moreover, China is currently modernizing and
expanding its nuclear force with the deployment of road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles and the development of a submarine- launched ballistic missile to arm its new

China is finally achieving

nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. After decades of reliance on a small and potentially vulnerable strategic deterrent,

the “lean and effective” nuclear force Chinese strategists believe their country needs to
protect its security. As a result of these growing nuclear-deterrence capabilities, nuclear issues will likely assume greater importance in the U.S.-China
relationship. policy implications China’s transition to a more secure second-strike capability is likely to contribute

to greater strategic stability in the U.S.-China relationship, but China’s larger and more sophisticated nuclear force will
also create challenges for U.S. policymakers. • Trying to trump China’s retaliatory capability through a large-

scale missile defense build-up would be costly and counterproductivee for the U.S. • Instead,
Washington should limit missile defenses intended to protect the U.S. homeland to a level appropriate for
dealing with the much smaller threat posed by North Korea, and pursue strategic
stability with China through mutual deterrence. • Washington should also continue pressing for an official U.S.-China dialogue on
strategic deterrence, one that encompasses nuclear, space, cyber, and conventional military capabilities. For many years, China’s relatively small nuclear force and stated
adherence to a policy of “no first use” (NFU) of nuclear weapons limited its salience in global debates about nuclear issues. However, the country’s growing strategic-deterrence
capabilities suggest this will soon change. Indeed, as a result of China’s transition to a larger and more sophisticated nuclear force, which will be centered on road-mobile
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) armed with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), China is likely to
become a more important consideration in such discussions. As the country’s strategic-deterrence capabilities grow, nuclear issues appear poised to assume greater significance in
the U.S.-China security relationship. The reasons for their increasing importance include heightened U.S. attention to Asia-Pacific security issues, the changing balance of
conventional military power in the region, rising tensions over maritime territorial disputes, and the implications of China’s growing nuclear capabilities for future arms control

China’s nuclear policy and strategy appear to have remained relatively constant
initiatives. 1

over the years, but recent doctrinal publications suggest that Chinese strategists see a role for nuclear
capabilities in deterring certain types of conventional strategic attacks. At the same time, the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is modernizing its nuclear forces to enhance their
survivability, increase their striking power, and counter missile-defense developments.
Official Chinese sources indicate that Beijing’s goal is fielding a “lean and effective” nuclear force that

meets its evolving national security needs. 2 China currently maintains the DF-3 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and DF-21
and DF-21A medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) for theater nuclear-deterrence missions. The country’s nuclear ICBM force consists of the older, limited-range DF-4, the
silo-based DF-5, and the recently deployed road-mobile DF-31 and DF-31A. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, China is enhancing its silo-based systems, deploying
more road-mobile ICBMs, and preparing to take its strategic deterrent to sea [ 72 ] •ch• inahul as a new generation of SSBNs enters service with the PLA Navy (PLAN). 3 (It
should be noted, however, that the new submarines still await their intended armament, the JL-2 SLBM, which remains under development.) In addition, China may be developing
a new road-mobile ICBM, possibly capable of carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV). 4 The transition to more advanced road-mobile ICBMs and
SSBNs is particularly significant in that it provides China with a much more survivable nuclear force. Although the country’s limited nuclear transparency complicates efforts to

China
predict future developments, recent trends offer a reasonable guide to understanding the likely future direction of Chinese nuclear force modernization. In recent years,

has focused on enhancing the survivability and striking power of its strategic deterrent.
This suggests that over the next fiv e to ten years, Beijing can be expected to continue shifting to a larger and more survivable nuclear force composed primarily of road-mobile

. Even as China’s nuclear force continues to increase in size and sophistication,

ICBMs and SSBNs

Beijing is highly unlikely to seek numerical parity with the United States and Russia, even if
the U.S. and Russian arsenals fall to numbers well below current levels. According to General Jing Zhiyuan,
former commander of the Second Artillery Force (which controls the PLA’s strategic missiles), China’s limited development of nuclear weapons “will not compete in quantity”
 Beijing intends to maintain the “lowest level” of nuclear
with the nuclear superpowers. Instead, Jing writes that

weapons that is sufficient to safeguard its national security. 5 Nonetheless, this statement indicates that China will
deploy the forces it perceives as required f r an assured retaliation capability, which is likely to entail considerable growth in the size of its nuclear missile force. Indeed,
according to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, the number of Chinese ICBMs capable of reaching the United States “probably will more than double” by 2025.

Aegis is the tipping point for Chinese nuclear expansion – limiting Aegis
capabilities solves
Hippel and Bin 1/2013 (Frank Von Hippel, Princeton Global Security Professor, Li Bin, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace Senior Fellow, “MINIMIZING THE LIKELIHOOD OF A CHINESE
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENAL BUILDUP,” WWS 591F POLICY WORKSHOP REPORT)

The second dynamic that could give rise to a buildup of China’s strategic nuclear forces
is a thickening of U.S. national BMD. China’s leaders fears that regional and national U.S. BMD systems are
intended to neutralize China’s nuclear deterrent against the United States, 24 despite numerous
assurances from U.S.policy makers stating otherwise. 25 More generally, China argues that “strategic missile defense

capabilities or potential” could be destabilizing and impede arms control.26 In response

to a perceived thickening of U.S. national BMD caused by developments in U.S. regional BMD capabilities, China
could expand its nuclear arsenal, including increasing its number of strategic ballistic
missiles, and potentially MIRVing them.27 In discussing U.S. BMD capabilities, this report focuses on the ability of U.S. interceptors to
engage with incoming warheads. Engagement is based on the burnout velocities of interceptors, for which reasonably reliable public estimates are available. Engagement does

not imply the ability to actually intercept a warhead, especially if the incoming missile uses decoys or other countermeasures. The effectiveness of U.S. BMD systems against

countermeasures remains in question,29 in part because tests with realistic countermeasures have not been conducted.30 This report does not address BMD system

discrimination and radar problems, but rather seeks to identify ways to assuage China’s worst-case scenario concerns given interceptor engagement ability. Despite
current limitations of U.S. interceptor discrimination capabilities, our Chinese
interviewees expressed the belief that, given enough time and money, the United States
could drastically improve these capabilities. Therefore, we believe that limiting Aegis
interceptor burnout velocities in a way that does not reduce their effectiveness for
regional defense can address some of China’s fears about U.S. BMD developments.

SM-3 missiles and Aegis capabilities pose a unique threat to Chinese deterrence
Jones 2009 (Chris Jones, Center for Strategic and International Studies Research Assistant,
“Managing the Goldilocks Dilemma: Missile Defense and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia,”
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Stratcom)

the Obama administration’s effort to recalibrate missile defense to better address regional
In conclusion,

missile threats could actually increase Chinese concern about U.S. missile defense. While the
reduction in operational GroundBased Interceptors should help reduce, though not ameliorate, Chinese concerns about missile defense negating the reliability of their ICBM

the new missile defense architecture has repercussions within Northeast

second-strike capability,

Asia that could greatly concern China. The increased emphasis upon the SM-3 missile,
stationed on mobile Aegis-capable ships, and movable THAAD batteries provides the
United States with additional capabilities that could be brought to bear in regional
contingency scenarios involving China, such as a conflagration over Taiwan . In addition, U.S.
missile defense cooperation efforts key regional allies, a priority in the BMDR, worry
Beijing. As China decides how to respond to the new 123 developments in U.S. missile defense, the United States should pursue high-level strategic dialogues with China on
the subject, while remaining firmly committed to alliance commitments in the region. U.S.-China strategic dialogues can help foster the trust and confidence needed for strategic
stability between the countries.

China is particularly concerned by advanced SM-3 missile interceptors

Colby and Denmark 4/2013 (Elbridge A. Colby and Abraham M. Denmark, “Nuclear Weapons
and U.S.-China Relations: A Way Forward,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,
https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/publication/130307_Colby_USChinaNuclear_Web.pdf)

the United States is pursuing two interrelated programs. First, it continues to develop and deploy
Consistent with this policy,

theater missile defense systems that are designed to protect U.S. forces, regional bases,
as well as U.S. partners and allies from the short- and medium-range ballis- tic missiles of potential adversaries, including China, primarily with
conventional contingencies in mind. Theater defenses include Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)

batteries, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries, Standard Missile-3
(SM-3) interceptors aboard Aegis cruisers, and supporting radars and sensors. As part of its
rebalancing of forces, the United States is planning upgrades to its missile defense architecture in

East Asia, including the deployment of new X-band radars. Theater defenses will be sized to meet the threat of shorter-range convention- all missiles from whatever
quarter, including China’s anti-access/area-denial capabilities. However, these interceptors have essentially no capability against China’s long-range nuclear-capable missiles. At
the same time, the United States will continue to build and posture a limited national missile defense designed to protect the U.S. homeland against hostile nations with less
sophisticated long-range missile delivery capabilities, in particular Iran and North Korea—but not Russia or China. Currently, the only deployed system the United States has with
any capability against long-range missiles is the combination of 30 ground-based midcourse interceptors at Fort Greeley in Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base in California.

The United States also plans to develop more advanced interceptors—such as the SM-3
Block IIB—that could have some capability against ICBMs, but those capabilities are still in the planning phase and are
being designed to counter the missile threat from Iran and North Korea. Nonetheless, future variants of the SM-3 are of particular

concern to China because they blur the distinction between national and theater missile
defenses, creating uncertainty for China’s long-term planning.

Removing Aegis solves Chinese deterrence concerns

Hippel and Bin 1/2013 (Frank Von Hippel, Princeton Global Security Professor, Li Bin, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace Senior Fellow, “MINIMIZING THE LIKELIHOOD OF A CHINESE
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENAL BUILDUP,” WWS 591F POLICY WORKSHOP REPORT)
For example, consider an ICBM launched from a base in central China heading towards Washington, D.C. The trajectory of the warhead is shown in orange in Figure 3 above. Block IA and IB interceptors could
engage this warhead before it reached its target, but, assuming that the warhead is on a minimum- energy trajectory,37 they could be launched only from the area shaded in red. If Block IIA has a burnout velocity
of 4.0 km/s, interception could be attempted from the purple area. A faster version of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor, with a burnout velocity of 4.5 km/s, could be used to attempt an interception from the area

Block IIA and IIB

shaded in yellow. Finally, a Block IIB interceptor with a burnout velocity of 5.0 km/s could be used to attempt an interception from the area shaded in light blue.

interceptors greatly increase the area where Aegis ship- or land-based interceptors could be
stationed and still engage with a Chinese ICBM. Policy Option: The United States could refrain
from deploying Block IIA or IIB interceptors on U.S. Aegis ships or in North America. 7 Given that GMD already has an adequate number

of interceptors to defend against foreseeable North Korean and Iranian threats, deployment of additional interceptors in North America is unnecessary. Moreover, such a deployment

could trigger a Chinese nuclear buildup. If the U.S. did not deploy Block IIA or IIB
interceptors on Aegis ships, China would be less concerned that U.S. regional BMD
interceptors could be used to thicken U.S. national defenses against Chinese ICBMs and
SLBMs. If China’s concerns about its second-strike capability remain, China may seek to
increase its nuclear arsenal. Not deploying Block IIA and IIB on ships or in North America could assuage
Russian as well as Chinese fears that the United States is developing a thick national
BMD system, and could allow the United States and Russia to agree to further arms
reductions. Choosing not to deploy Block IIA or IIB on Aegis ships is unlikely to harm U.S.
regional missile defense capabilities. Our calculations indicate that U.S. Aegis ships, equipped with SM-3 Block IA and IB interceptors and other defenses, would
likely allow the United States to maintain its ability to defend its carriers and bases from regional threats. In particular, our calculations indicate that Block IA and IB interceptors likely have the necessary burnout
velocity to engage China’s short-range ballistic missiles, includingtheDF-21D. GiventheBMD coverage provided by land-based interceptors and the Aegis-based Block IA and IB interceptors, it appears unnecessary
to deploy sea-based Block IIA or IIB interceptors in East Asia. Additionally, the United States could encourage Japan to consider only deploying the jointly-developed Block IIA interceptors on land, not on Japanese
Aegis ships. Japan should consider whether it can adequately defend itself against the North Korean threat with Aegis-based IA and IB and land-based IIA interceptors because deploying IIA on Japanese Aegis ships
may risk worsening relations with China.
 Russia Scenario
The Aegis Ashore systems cause Russia-Japan tensions because of distrust
surrounding future US involvement in controlling the weapon system.
Plopsky, 2/7/18 (Guy Plopsky, Political and military analyst with an MA in International Affairs
and Strategic Studies from Tamkang University, Taiwan, “Russia’s Objections to Japan’s Aegis
Ashore Decision”, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/russias-objections-to-
japans-aegis-ashore-decision/)

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Cabinet decision to procure two Aegis Ashore systems
with the stated purpose of strengthening Japan’s ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities in
the face of persistent North Korean provocations and threats drew heavy condemnation from
Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “[T]he adoption of a decision to purchase and deploy these systems should be
viewed as disproportionate to the real missile threats in the region,” declared Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria
Zakharova in late August 2017, adding that they “may undermine strategic stability in the northern part of the Pacific.” Deputy
Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov was equally critical in December, and proceeded to threaten that the future presence of such
systems in Japan is “something we certainly cannot fail to take into account in our military planning.”

Objections to decisions made by the United States and regional allies on the stationing of BMD
assets in the Asia-Pacific region are not new. The deployment of a U.S. Army Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) system to South Korea in 2017 was met with heavy criticism from both Moscow and Beijing despite repeated reassurances
from Washington and Seoul that the purpose of the deployment was to bolster South Korea’s defense against a potential missile
strike from the North. For Russia, both the THAAD deployment and the Aegis Ashore decision represent the continued expansion “of
the U.S. global ballistic missile defense system.”

Unlike THAAD, however, the two Aegis Ashore systems are intended for Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF). Tokyo has
repeatedly conveyed this point to Russian officials, reassuring them that the systems will be operated by Japan. Moscow,
however, continues to stick to its accusations. “We heard the allegations that Japan would control
this system and that the United States would have no relation thereto,” Russian Foreign
Minister Sergey Lavrov told journalists in mid-January 2018, adding that “[w]e have serious
doubts that this is so.” This dubious Russian assumption has served as the basis for all of
Moscow’s objections to the installation of the systems, and is likely to damage Russia’s
relationship with Japan as well as further strain U.S.-Russia relations in the future.

The Aegis Ashore uniquely increases tensions between Russia and Japan and is
the issue which prevents compromise over the Kuril Islands.
Stratfor, Aug, 2018 (Russia, Japan: Representatives Struggle to See Eye-to-Eye On Military
Matters, Stratfor Worldview, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/russia-japan-
representatives-struggle-military-matters-missiles-two-plus-two)

Japan and Russia held their third 2+2 meeting of foreign and defense ministers on Aug. 1 in
Moscow. Agreements were made on several points related to the ongoing ministerial talks and
respective approaches to dealing with North Korea, but discussions failed to make progress on
some more contentious military issues. During the talks, officials planned annual 2+2 vice-
ministerial meetings, tabled two upcoming September meetings between Japanese Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe and Russian President Vladimir Putin, organized a Russian port visit and
arranged for a Japanese business delegation to the disputed Southern Kurils. Notably, Russia
offered to help resolve the issue of North Korean abductions of Japanese nationals. However,
the two countries were less aligned in other areas: Japan asked Russia to show restraint in
military buildups in the disputed Kuril Islands, while Russia expressed concern about Japan's
planned deployment of the Aegis Ashore Ballistic Missile Defense System.

Why It Matters

This latest meeting signals that, despite a committed effort on both sides, Russia and Japan are
still struggling to strengthen their bilateral ties. Japan's status as a U.S. ally amid the ongoing
standoff between Russia and the West has been a barrier to improving relations. In fact, the 2+2
dialogue itself was suspended from 2014 to 2017 following Russia's annexation of Crimea. These
complications have stalled Tokyo's efforts to resolve its longstanding territorial dispute over the
Southern Kurils and complete a peace treaty ending World War II. Japan has long hoped to trade
economic concessions in the islands for an easing of Russian territorial claims and military
deployments. In February, Moscow approved deployments of military aircraft to the island
chain.

Further Context

For several months now, military deployments have been a particularly thorny topic between
Japan and Russia. Russia is concerned that Japan could use its ballistic missile defense systems in
conjunction with the United States to threaten Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent. For instance,
Japan has chosen to use the Long Range Discrimination Radar for its Aegis Ashore system, which
is the same radar that the United States will use with its Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
system in Alaska and California. Russia is worried that Japan will feed into the same network and
help the United States defend against a potential Russian attack. Aegis Ashore is also compatible
with midcourse interceptors that have a wider range than the Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) system deployed in South Korea. For Russia, there is the risk that these
missiles could eventually be used to intercept Russian missiles directed toward the U.S. from
positions in Japan. All in all, Moscow feels threatened by the wider American buildup of ballistic
missile defense, be it in the United States or in allied territory in Europe and Japan.

Russia is concerned that Japan could use its ballistic missile defense systems in conjunction with
the United States to threaten Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent.

Japan's development of the Aegis Ashore system was initially justified by the threat posed by
North Korea, and Russia is still offering unspecified assistance to Japan when it comes to dealing
with Pyongyang. But this will not eliminate the longer-term issues. A resolution on North Korea
would not change Japan's missile defense calculations, given China's massive ballistic missile
arsenal, which is far more capable than North Korea's. And while Japan would like to alleviate
military tension with Russia to the north so it can focus on China in the south, Moscow's
constant strategic paranoia about U.S. involvement overseas is a major obstacle to doing so.
Russia views the Aegis Missile Defense System as a threat which perpetuates
the dispute over the Kuril Island- an issue which prevents Russia and
China from resolving the war in the Pacific.
DW News 5/30/19, (Japan and Russia accuse one another of dangerous military buildup, DW
News, https://www.dw.com/en/japan-and-russia-accuse-one-another-of-dangerous-military-
buildup/a-48980407)

Japanese and Russian foreign and defense ministers meeting in Tokyo on Thursday accused each
others' governments of unacceptable military buildups in the region.

The Japanese say Russia's expanded military presence in the disputed Kuril Islands is
"unacceptable," whereas the Russians say Japan's planned installation of a US-made Aegis
Ashore missile defense system poses a "potential threat."

Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono told his counterpart Sergei Lavrov, "Our country's legal
position does not accept the missile drills, fighter aircraft deployment, and enhancement of the
military presence in the Northern Territories."

Lavrov defended his country's actions, saying, "The Russian armed forces are active on their
sovereign territory, and they have the right to do that based on international law."

Japan's US co-operation irks Russians

Lavrov objected to Japan's planned deployment of the Aegis missile defense system, as well as
Japan's increased military cooperation with the US.

The subject was addressed by Japanese Defense Minister Takeshi Iwaya, who told his Russian
counterpart Sergei Shoigu that the system was "purely for defensive purposes and never for use
to threaten Russia or other countries."

Japan has been bolstering its missile defense systems as it sees itself under increasing threat
from neighboring China and North Korea. In December, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe also
approved plans to buy F-35 stealth fighter jets and cruise missiles as part of the nation's growing
military collaboration with the US.

The disputed islands, referred to as the Kurils by Russia and the Northern Territories by the
Japanese, were seized from imperial Japan by the Soviet Union at the close of the Second World
War.

Situated between the Sea of Okhotsk and the Pacific Ocean, just off the northern Japanese
island of Hokkaido, the dispute over the islands has kept both countries from formally ending
the war in the Pacific.

Prime Minister Abe has been keen to regain the islands in hopes of developing oil, gas, and
other natural resources.

Last November, Japanese Prime Minister Abe and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to
speed up negotiations — based on a 1956 Soviet proposal — to return the islands to Japan, yet
progress has been slow.
Thursday's meeting was convened in a "two plus two" format of two ministers from each
country to work out details regarding the islands before Abe and Putin meet at the upcoming
G20 summit in Osaka, Japan, in late June.
 AT: Poland Thumper
Missile Defense in Poland is super uncertain
McLeary, 18 – (Paul McLeary has covered national security, foreign policy and defense issues for
Foreign Policy, The Atlantic, Defense News, The New Republic and elsewhere. In addition to his work
reporting from the Pentagon and Capitol Hill, he has embedded for multiple stints with U.S. forces during
combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria. Crucial Polish Missile Defense Site Delayed Two Years:
MDA https://breakingdefense.com/2018/03/crucial-polish-missile-defense-site-delayed-two-years-mda/)
NL

A critical, U.S.-made missile defense system slated to come online in Poland later this year is being
delayed, the head of the Missile Defense Agency said on Thursday, and likely won’t be ready until at least 2020. The
Aegis Ashore radar and missile defense complex is seeing “an unsatisfactory rate of construction
progress,” Lt. Gen. Samuel Greaves, head of the Missile Defense Agency, told a Senate Armed Services
Committee panel. He did not offer more details. The Pentagon didn’t respond to a request for more information about the delay by
press time.
 AT: Romania Thumper
Russia has nothing to fear from Romanian BMD because it sucks, and poses no
threat
George Friedman, 5-9-2016, -- George Friedman is a Hungarian-born U.S. geopolitical
forecaster, and strategist on international affairs. He is the founder and chairman of Geopolitical
Futures, an online publication that analyzes and forecasts the course of global events. "Ballistic
missile defence and reality," Euractiv, https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-
europe/opinion/ballistic-missile-defence-and-reality/NC

A US ballistic missile defence (BMD) system site in Romania became operational on 5 May. The
system is intended to defend against attacks by one or a few missiles. The system has
been under consideration and construction for several years – it came online in December, but had to
be integrated into NATO’s larger BMD framework before it could become operational. Missile defence in Europe has
become as much a political symbol as a weapon. I would argue that if political symbols matter, then it has
served a purpose, because it is hard to envision the military purpose of the system . The system is
designed to block one or a few (the precise number is likely unknown) missiles targeted toward a large area. This would be
ineffective against Russia, should it wish to launch a nuclear strike against Europe,
because the system would be easily saturated by a relatively small number of missiles
and would be completely irrelevant if the Russians launched a massive strike, which is
certainly something they could do. If some other nuclear power decided to launch an attack, it would likely have
fewer missiles to launch, so the system could be effective. The problem with this is that it is unclear why a
country with relatively few missiles would launch a strike at all, and totally unclear why their target
would be Europe. Nuclear weapons were developed by the United States in World War II as a substitute for massed bombing
attacks. World War II bombers were so inaccurate that the destruction of a single factory required thousands of bombs. Inevitably,
since most factories needed workers and were in cities, the destruction of a few factories required the destruction of a city.
 Kuril Islands Japan-Russia Scenrio
Escalation is likely – it goes nuclear.
YOSHIDA Date (REIJI YOSHIDA, quals, As foreign ministers lay groundwork for Tokyo-Moscow
territorial talks, what are the issues and obstacles?, The Japan Times,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/01/14/national/politics-diplomacy/foreign-ministers-
lay-groundwork-tokyo-moscow-territorial-talks-issues-obstacles/#.XStXc-hKhPY')

Russian strategic nuclear submarines, which carry ballistic missiles capable of hitting the
United States mainland, are believed to be regularly deployed in the Sea of Okhotsk,
adjacent to Etorofu and Kunashiri.

For Russia, stationing a nuclear force in the area provides critical nuclear deterrence
power against the United States because strategic nuclear submarines based there
would be capable of staging a catastrophic counterattack in case of a nuclear war.
Meanwhile, the channels between the four disputed islands, in particular Etorofu and Kunashiri,
are considered key routes for the Russian submarines to travel between the Sea of Okhotsk and
the Pacific Ocean, military analysts point out.

During his annual news conference in Moscow on Dec. 20, Putin also expressed concerns that
the U.S. may deploy military units on some of the disputed islands if Moscow ever hands them
back to Japan.

“We do not know what will happen after the peace treaty is concluded, but without an answer
to this question it will be very difficult to make any crucial decisions,” he said.

Putin also has expressed concerns over the U.S.-made Aegis Ashore anti-missile defense
units that Japan plans to deploy in Akita and Yamaguchi prefectures to defend against
any North Korean ballistic missiles.
“We do not consider this to be defensive weapons; this is part of the U.S. strategic
nuclear potential placed outside. And these systems, they are synchronized with the
missile strike systems,” he said.
Currently thousands of Russian residents live on the disputed territory, and Russia’s central
government recently beefed up the military presence there. Isn’t it politically difficult for
Moscow to hand over any of the islands?

That’s another headache for Japanese diplomats engaging in territorial talks.

As of January 2017, about 5,500 people lived on Etorofu, 8,200 on Kunashiri and nearly 3,000 on
Shikotan.

On the Habomai islet groups, only national border security guards are stationed there, according
to the Hokkaido Shimbun.
Russia, meanwhile, invested ¥48 billion from 2007 through 2015 to build social infrastructure
such as roads, ports and housing on the four disputed islands. From 2016 through 2025, another
¥120 billion is budgeted for the islands.

In 2016, Russia deployed anti-ship missile units on Etorofu and Kunashiri.

According to Kyodo News, by 2020 the Russian military plans to station more ground-to-ship
missile units so that they can cover all of the Kuril Islands and the disputed islands off Hokkaido.

japan’s aegis ashore system escalates tensions with russia over disputed islands
Yamauchi 5-30-19 (Mari Yamaguchi, Associated Press journalist covering nuclear politics,
defense and human rights on AP News, “Japan, Russia accuse each other of military buildups”,
AP News, https://www.apnews.com/f91768ae444c443abc1cbbae55e71592)

TOKYO (AP) — Russia and Japan accused each other of military buildups as their foreign and
defense ministers met in Tokyo on Thursday for talks that failed to make progress on decades-
long island disputes.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said at a joint news conference after the talks that Russia
was concerned about Tokyo’s plan to build a pair of land-based Aegis Ashore missile defense
systems, saying they pose a “potential threat to Russia.”

The Aegis Ashore systems, planned for deployment in Akita on Japan’s northern coast and in
Yamaguchi in the southwest, are part of Japan’s rapidly expanding missile defense system to
bolster its ability to counter potential threats from North Korea and China. Under guidelines
approved in December, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s government plans to increase purchases of
expensive American military equipment including F-35 stealth fighter jets and cruise missiles as
Japan continues to expand its military cooperation with the U.S.

Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono accused Russia of a military buildup on Russian-controlled
islands claimed by both countries.

The dispute over the islands, which Russia calls the southern Kurils and Japan the Northern
Territories, has prevented the two countries from signing a peace treaty formally ending their
World War II hostilities.

“Our country’s legal position does not accept the missile drills, fighter aircraft deployment, and
enhancement of the military presence in the Northern Territories,” Kono said.

Japanese Defense Minister Takeshi Iwaya told his counterpart, Sergei Shoigu, and Lavrov that
the Aegis Ashore interceptors are “purely for defensive purposes and never for use to threaten
Russia or other countries.”

Lavrov brushed off Kono’s criticism, saying his country is only operating in its own territory.
“Under international law, the territory is under Russia’s sovereignty and those are Russian
military activities in Russian-held territory,” he said.

Regaining the disputed islands, which are north of Japan’s northern main island of Hokkaido, has
been a priority for Abe and his conservative base. Abe is eager to make progress on the dispute
with Russia and find opportunities to cooperate in developing oil and gas and other natural
resources.

In November, Abe and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to accelerate negotiations based
on a 1956 Soviet proposal to return two of the islands to Japan, but progress has since stalled.

Russia has control of the Kuril Islands-They are militarizing the zone which
could provoke conflict with Japan
Yoko, 2018 (Hirose, Professor in the Faculty of Policy Management of Keio University, Japan,,
Japan-Russia Relations: Can the Northern Territories Issue be Overcome?, Center for Strategic
and International Studies, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/180402_Strategic_Japan_Yoko_Hirose_paper.pdf?hyrXAqS45pW4vaKWsrE7ZNbqvbfICkw
N)

The Northern Territories The resolution of the Northern Territories dispute is the most
important issue in Japan-Russia relations. If it is not resolved, it will be almost
impossible to conclude a Japan-Russia Friendship Treaty and improve bilateral relations.
However, the two countries’ perceptions of this issue differ greatly. Japan insists that the
Northern Territories are Japanese territory and that Tokyo must recover all four islands.
Russia’s position is that there is no territorial dispute at all. Sometimes Russia has shown a
softer attitude and suggested that Japan should compromise by negotiating for two islands. Yet,
even returning two islands has never been realistic. Other challenges to negotiations have
included the bipolar Cold War system, international criticism of Russia, and the Ukraine crisis.
For example, the so-called “Dulles Threat Incident” of 1956 shows the effect of the Cold War
mood on the territorial dispute. At the time, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told Japanese
Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu that if Japan gave up its claim to the southern Kuril Islands,
then the United States might feel obliged to retain Okinawa in perpetuity. Many academics,
especially Soviet scholars, insist that Dulles’s statement was intended to prevent a Treaty of
Friendship between Japan and the USSR. However, newly declassified documents make clear
that Dulles was trying to help Japan in the negotiations and that the U.S. government had
already recognized the Northern Territories as Japanese territory. 21 Nevertheless, Dulles’s
“threat” has had a big impact, which is why Putin mentioned that Japan should consider the
implications of U.S. military bases in Japan. There are many obstacles to Russia’s return of the
Northern Territories to Japan. Most critically, Russia insists that the Northern Territories
were the fruit of USSR’s victory against Japan at the end of World War II and that Japan
abandoned all the Chishima Islands under the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. Japan
disagrees with these Russian arguments for three reasons. First, Japan insists that the Northern
Territories were not included in the Chishima Islands, although some Japanese academics say
that the Northern Territories were called “South Chishima.” Second, Japanese citizens see the
USSR’s violation of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact as illegal, given that the USSR denounced
the pact on April 5 and then invaded Manchuria and attacked Japan on August 9, less than the
one year required to withdraw from the Pact. Third, Japan insists that the USSR did not
participate in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, so it has no rights to territory under that
agreement. 21 Vlad M. Kaczynski, “The Kuril Islands Dispute Between Russia and Japan,” Russian
Analytical Digest. 9 In addition, territory is important for the Russian people and Moscow has
emphasized the importance of defending its territory. It is difficult for the general public to
accept the transfer of territory, so strong leaders are needed this obstacle. Yet, it is also true
that strong leaders cannot easily abandon territory. Furthermore, the Soviet victory in the
“Great Patriotic War” is significant to the Russian people and they remember the lives lost to
attain that victory. This makes some of the people value the land just as they value Russian lives,
so abandoning the Northern Territories would undermine the historical meaning of the “Great
Patriotic War.” Moreover, the Northern Territories are important to Russian security.
Moscow sees the United States military and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) as its most serious security threats. Due to the Japan-U.S. alliance, U.S. troops
could be deployed to the Northern Territories if Russia returns them to Japan. Putin has
warned about this repeatedly. Recently, Russia has been militarizing the Northern
Territories, although some experts say that this is directed against China. Russia has also been
cautious about Chinese movements, although Beijing is Moscow’s most important partner.
Russian leaders do not trust their Chinese counterparts, but they have few other options in the
current international situation. Although Russia and China have been tightening their
relationship, these ties are mainly global in nature (opposing the unipolar U.S.-led order,
cooperating on Eurasian initiatives, coordinating energy projects, etc.) and Russia has always
been cautious of Chinese regional movements. The Northern Territories have become more
strategically important because of the Arctic. The melting of Arctic ice has accelerated in
recent years, opening up the Northern Sea Route, which connects the Arctic region to
Asia via Hokkaido. Although the Northern Sea Route is not yet commercially viable,
many countries—including Russia, China, and Japan—are interested in this possibility.
The Northern Territories are situated at the end of the route, so Russia has incentive to retain
the islands. Japan is also concerned about the recent Russian militarization of the
Northern Territories. Russia has been upgrading its weapons and has deployed new military
systems to the Northern Territories. The 18th Mechanized Artillery Division is currently
deployed on the islands. It includes 3,500 personnel and will receive modern defensive systems
to protect against attacks from the air and sea. Japanese concerns about the militarization
of the Northern Territories have led Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to assure
Tokyo that the deployment is “not aimed against any country, but only to protect the
territory of the Russian Federation, its borders, both from the sea and from the air.”22
Moscow insists that these units and formations will be protected from airstrikes by the Tor-M2
and Buk-M2 anti-aircraft missile systems. Russian leaders say that offensive weapons will not be
deployed on the islands, implying that the only change in that respect will be 22 Nikolai Litovkin,
“What does Russia’s militarization of the Kuril Islands consist of?” Russia Beyond, March
21, 2017, https://www.rbth.com/international/2017/03/21/militarization-of-the-kuril-islands-
723823. 10 the replacement of the outdated BM-21 Grad rocket launchers with the
9A52-4 Tornado. 23 Yet, Japanese leaders remain skeptical of whether these Russian military
moves are only for defensive purposes. Meanwhile, substantial economic cooperation has not
occurred. Even after the agreement on joint economic activities, Russia has continued to invite
Chinese and Korean companies and factories to the Northern Territories and the Russian Far
East. In addition, Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev signed a document that approved the
establishment of a special economic zone in Shikotan Island (one of the Northern Territories) in
August 2017. Russia is planning to build a marine products processing factory there. Russia
assumes that the plan will attract about 7.4 billion rubles in both domestic and foreign
investment and create more than 700 jobs. However, this plan conflicts with the joint economic
activities plan. Furthermore, Russia has opposed making special rules for joint economic
activities and instead insists that they be conducted under Russian law. In short, Putin
has been insisting that Russia cannot negotiate with Japan without trust , while he
stresses that Russia and China can build strong relations over the long term. The Japanese
proposal for joint economic activities was intended to answer Putin’s argument, but it is
now in crisis. Therefore, Russia’s return of the entire Northern Territories to Japan is
extremely unlikely. Prime Minister Abe has started a new approach, but the new initiative’s
likelihood of success seems low. In addition, the Japanese government has to hurry to resolve
the issue because most of the former Japanese residents of the Northern Territories have
already died, so only a small number of older residents remain alive. On the other hand, the
Russification and militarization of the islands are proceeding rapidly.

Russia and China accuse each other of building up militaries on Kuril Islands-a
war between Russia and Japan is likely
Mari Yamaguchi, 5-30-2019, "Japan, Russia accuse each other of military
buildups," AP NEWS,
https://www.apnews.com/f91768ae444c443abc1cbbae55e71592, accessed 7-
11-2019 (Kent Denver--EA)
TOKYO (AP) — Russia and Japan accused each other of military buildups as their foreign
and defense ministers met in Tokyo on Thursday for talks that failed to make progress
on decades-long island disputes. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said at a joint news
conference after the talks that Russia was concerned about Tokyo’s plan to build a pair
of land-based Aegis Ashore missile defense systems, saying they pose a “potential threat
to Russia.” The Aegis Ashore systems, planned for deployment in Akita on Japan’s northern
coast and in Yamaguchi in the southwest, are part of Japan’s rapidly expanding missile defense
system to bolster its ability to counter potential threats from North Korea and China. Under
guidelines approved in December, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s government plans to
increase purchases of expensive American military equipment including F-35 stealth
fighter jets and cruise missiles as Japan continues to expand its military cooperation
with the U.S. Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono accused Russia of a military buildup
on Russian-controlled islands claimed by both countries. The dispute over the islands,
which Russia calls the southern Kurils and Japan the Northern Territories, has prevented
the two countries from signing a peace treaty formally ending their World War II
hostilities. “Our country’s legal position does not accept the missile drills, fighter aircraft
deployment, and enhancement of the military presence in the Northern Territories,”
Kono said. Japanese Defense Minister Takeshi Iwaya told his counterpart, Sergei Shoigu, and
Lavrov that the Aegis Ashore interceptors are “purely for defensive purposes and never
for use to threaten Russia or other countries.” Lavrov brushed off Kono’s criticism,
saying his country is only operating in its own territory. “Under international law, the
territory is under Russia’s sovereignty and those are Russian military activities in
Russian-held territory,” he said. Regaining the disputed islands, which are north of Japan’s
northern main island of Hokkaido, has been a priority for Abe and his conservative base. Abe is
eager to make progress on the dispute with Russia and find opportunities to cooperate
in developing oil and gas and other natural resources. In November, Abe and Russian
President Vladimir Putin agreed to accelerate negotiations based on a 1956 Soviet
proposal to return two of the islands to Japan, but progress has since stalled.
Off Case Answers
CPs
 2ac at: Adv CP – GMD solvency deficit
GMD Missiles are k2 United States national security, limiting them could put
national security at risk during conflict
CSIS Missile Defense Project, 06-15-2018, "Ground-based Midcourse Defense
(GMD) System," Missile Threat, https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/gmd/,
accessed 7-14-2019 (Kent Denver--EA)
The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is currently the only U.S. missile
defense system devoted to defending the U.S. homeland from long-range ballistic
missile attacks. GMD and its associated elements span 15 time zones, including Ground-based
Interceptors (GBIs) at two locations (Ft. Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg AFB, CA), seven types of
sensors on land, sea, and space, and multiple and distributed fire control systems. By the end of
2017, there will be 44 deployed GBIs, 40 based at Ft. Greely, and four at Vandenberg AFB. The
2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) included funds to conduct environmental
reviews of potential East Coast sites for a future addition to the GMD system. When ballistic
missile defense sensors detect a missile launch, these data are fused and fed into the GMD fire
control system, which is used to launch one or more GBIs. The GBI will fly into the path of an
incoming missile before releasing an Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV), which uses onboard
sensors to hunt down and physically collide with the warhead, destroying it on impact. SYSTEM
ELEMENTS AN/SPY-1 Radar Cobra Dane Command and Control, Battle Management, and
Communications (C2BMC) Defense Support Program (DSP) GMD Fire Control and
Communication Ground-based Interceptor (GBI) Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) Sea-
based X-band Radar (SBX) Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) Space-based Infrared
System (SBIRS) TPY-2 X-band Radar Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR) GMD is designed
specifically to counter long-range ballistic missiles threatening the U.S. homeland. It uses a
three-stage booster, giving the necessary “legs” to perform intercepts over great distances. This
range gives GMD by far the greatest coverage area of any U.S. missile defense system,
defending all fifty states and Canada. Other missile defense systems, including Aegis,
THAAD, and Patriot, are generally classified as “regional” systems, and are geared toward
short to intermediate range ballistic missile threats. While some may have homeland defense
applications in certain circumstances, they have much smaller coverage areas as compared to
GMD, and generally much less capability, if any, against ICBMs. Conversely, GMD is not capable
of shorter range, regional defense missions. North Korea’s short and medium range missiles
threatening South Korea and Japan, for example, fall outside of GMD’s engagement envelope.
These threats require other solutions, such as Aegis, THAAD, or Patriot. The GMD architecture
emerged from the development of the Clinton Administration’s National Missile Defense (NMD)
program. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) formed the initial Joint Program
Office for the NMD program in April 1997, with the goal of conducting an integrated test in 1999
and operational deployment by 2003.1 Flight testing of Ground-based interceptors began in
1997, with the first successful intercept in 1999. Findings from the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission
report asserted that the United States had underestimated the ballistic missile threat. This
reassessment provided impetus for Congress to pass the 1999 National Missile Defense Act,
which committed the United States “to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an
effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the
United States against limited ballistic missile attack.”2 The Clinton administration ultimately
deferred the decision to deploy homeland missile defense to the next administration. In
December 2001, the George W. Bush Administration announced that it would withdraw the
United States from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which opened the door to accelerated
investment in a homeland missile defense system. In 2002, the White House issued National
Security Presidential Directive 23 (NSPD-23), ordering the deployment of an initial limited
homeland defense capability by 2004. In 2002, then-Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld
redesignated the BMDO as the Missile Defense Agency (MDA).3 In 2004, Lt. Gen. Henry “Trey”
Obering, III, USAF, the Director of MDA, declared limited defensive operations including five
GBIs in silos at Fort Greely, Alaska; an upgraded Cobra Dane Radar at Eareckson Air Station in
Shemya, Alaska; and an upgraded radar at Fylingdales in the United Kingdom. The GMD system
was intended to grow to 44 GBIs distributed between Fort Greely and Vandenberg Air Force
Base.4 In addition, the Bush Administration proposed a European GMD site to counter the
future development of an Iranian ICBM. This component of the GMD system would have
included an additional ten GBIs in Poland and an X-band radar in the Czech Republic.5 In 2009,
the Obama Administration announced the cancellation the European GMD sites proposed by
the Bush Administration in favor of the European Phased Adaptive Approach.6 The
administration also capped the planned GBI deployments to 30, a reduction from the 44
planned under Bush.7 In 2013, then-Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel announced a reversal of the
decision to reduce the U.S. based interceptors and reconstituted a plan to deploy 44 GBIs by
2017.8 In 2015, the administration also awarded a contract to build the S-band Long Range
Discrimination Radar (LRDR) at Clear Air Force Station in Alaska to improve the discrimination
capability of the radars in the system.9 The FY 2016 NDAA authorized $1.8 billion in funding for
the GMD system to improve the CE-II kill vehicle, develop a Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV), invest
in the LRDR, and support advancements in a selectable two or three stage GBI booster.10
 2ac at: China Leverage – China says no
China is not willing to bargain over a TMD.
Allen et al., 2000 (Kenneth W. Allen, Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center in
Washington, DC, Theater Missile Defenses in the Asia–Pacific Region, Henry L. Stimson Center,
https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Theater_1.pdf)

Some Japanese have argued that TMD should be used as a bargaining chip with China .
They hope that it might be traded against Chinese missile or nuclear cuts, for example, or for
commitments by Beijing to avoid development of destabilizing Multiple Independently
Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV)-ed missiles. In this view, TMD development would lead not
to deployment, but to disarmament.27 These arguments are unlikely to be persuasive to
Chinese leadership. Others who support TMD do so because it would be effective to offset
Chinese “missile blackmail” capability. TMD would enhance Japan’s political stature while
lowering that of China—and without the severe image costs associated with developing a
nuclear deterrent.28
 2ac at: China Leverage - Turn
US using missile defense as a bargaining chip collapses NATO.
Jermalavicius, 2017 (Tomas Jermalavicius, BA in political science from the University of
Vilnius, an MA in war studies from King’s College London and an MBA degree from the
University of Liverpool, Missile “show” in East Asia—a headache for NATO?, journal information,
https://icds.ee/missile-show-in-east-asiaa-headache-for-nato/)

Second, the credibility of the US – its commitments as well as deterrent policies and messages–
under the Trump administration is being tested in the Korean peninsula, and this is not only being
watched in Beijing. We have already seen how the Obama administration’s backing away from its
“red lines” in Syria encouraged Russia to test the limits of Washington’s indecision – in Ukraine as
well as in Syria. Whatever the US administration says or does—or, equally importantly, does not say
or do—in a high-stakes game in East Asia will shape the perceptions and calculi of adversaries and
allies elsewhere. Washington is now in an unenviable position: acting too tough may well set off a
major war in East Asia, while being seen as soft and indecisive may invite aggression or
splinter alliances in the region and elsewhere. In a similar vein, should Washington trade
away THAAD deployment in the ROK as a bargaining chip for more genuine and
productive cooperation from Beijing in coercing the DPRK, it would send a signal to us, on
NATO’s eastern flank, that the US military posture is a tradeable commodity in “doing
good deals” between the “big boys”.

NATO collapse destroys the global international order.

Binnendijk 3/19 (Hans Binnendijk, senior fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at
Johns Hopkins’ School for Advanced International Studies, served on the National Security
Council staff as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Defense Policy and
Arms Control., 5 consequences of a life without NATO, Defense News,
https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/03/19/5-consequences-of-a-life-
without-nato/)

The fourth consequences of life without NATO would be global. American bilateral
alliances in Asia would each be shaken to their core should NATO fail. America’s defense
commitments there would become worthless. With China determined to claim a dominant
position in Asia, the collapse of NATO would cause America’s Asian partners to seek
accommodation with China, much as the Philippines is in the process of doing.
Trump’s decision to abandon the economic Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement has already
given China new advantages in the region. Without credible American security commitments,
there would be little to stop China from controlling the South China Sea and probably occupying
Taiwan as well. Add to this equation the new footholds that China is building in central Asia,
Africa and Europe: Abandoning NATO would help assure China’s competitive success.

The final impact of NATO’s retirement would be the near collapse of what has been
called the “liberal international order.” This order consists of treaties, alliances,
agreements, institutions and modes of behavior mostly created by the United States in
an effort to safeguard democracies.
This order has kept relative peace in the trans-Atlantic space for seven decades. The
Trump administration has begun to unravel elements of this order in the naive notion that they
undercut American sovereignty. The entire European project is built on the edifice of this
order. NATO is its principal keystone. Collapsing this edifice would undercut the multiple
structures that have brought seven decades of peace and prosperity.
So the answer is clear. Life without NATO would be more dangerous and less prosperous.
Russia and China would be the big winners at America’s expense. NATO simply can’t
retire.
Yes, NATO has problems. It needs to be managed. But there is too much left to be done for
retirement. And there is too much to lose if NATO fails.
 2ac at: Generic Leverage – Says no
The US is not powerful enough to leverage – empirics prove

Walt 19 Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international
relations at Harvard University and a Contributor to Foreign Policy. Published April 26,
2019 in Foreign Policy Online. “America Isn’t as Powerful as It Thinks It Is”
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/26/america-isnt-as-powerful-as-it-thinks-it-is/ //HL

Just how powerful is the United States? Is it still the unipolar power, able to impose its will on adversaries, allies, and neutrals, and
force them—however reluctantly—to go along with policies they think are foolish, dangerous, or simply contrary to their interests?
Or are there clear and significant limits to U.S. power, suggesting that it should be more selective and strategic in setting goals and
pursuing them? The
Trump administration has embraced the first position, especially since
John Bolton became White House national security advisor and Mike Pompeo took over
as secretary of state. Whatever President Donald Trump’s initial instincts may have
been, their arrival marked a return to the unilateralist, take-no-prisoners approach to
foreign policy that characterized George W. Bush’s first term as president, when Vice
President Dick Cheney and the neoconservatives held sway. A key feature of that earlier period was
the assumption that the United States was so powerful that it could go it alone on many issues and that other states could be cowed
into submission by demonstrations of U.S. power and resolve. As a senior advisor to Bush (reportedly Karl Rove) told the journalist
Ron Suskind: “We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality.” Compromises and coalition-building were for
wimps and appeasers; as Cheney himself reportedly said in 2003: “We don’t negotiate with evil; we defeat it.” The
Bush-
Cheney approach produced a string of failures, but the same unilateral arrogance lives
on in the Trump administration. It is evident in Trump’s decision to threaten (or in some
cases, to actually begin) trade wars not just with China but with many of America’s
economic partners. It was part and parcel of the impulsive decisions to abandon the
Trans-Pacific Partnership and leave the Paris climate accord. It is the basis of the
administration’s “take it or leave it” approach to diplomacy with North Korea and Iran,
wherein Washington announces unrealistic demands and then ratchets up sanctions in
the hope that the targets will capitulate and give the United States everything it wants,
even though this approach to both countries has repeatedly failed in the past. It is even more
obvious in the recent decision to impose secondary sanctions on states that are still buying Iranian oil, a move that threatens to
drive up oil prices and damage U.S. relations with China, India, Turkey, Japan, South Korea, and others. It is almost certainly true of
the so-called peace plan that nepotist-in-chief Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and senior advisor, keeps promising to reveal, a
proposal likely to make Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Republican donor Sheldon Adelson, and other fans of the
concept of Greater Israel happy but won’t advance the cause of peace in the slightest. A similar faith in America’s vast ability to
control outcomes can also be seen in the premature recognition of Juan Guaidó as interim president of Venezuela and the strident
U.S. demands that “Maduro must go.” However desirable that outcome would be, it would be nice if we had some idea how to bring
it about. The
underlying assumption behind all of these policies is that U.S. pressure—you
know, what Pompeo likes to call “swagger”—will eventually force acknowledged
adversaries to do whatever it is the United States demands of them, and that other
states won’t find ways to evade, obstruct, divert, dilute, hedge, hinder, or otherwise
negate what Washington is trying to do. It assumes we are still dwelling in the unipolar
moment and that all that matters is the will to use the power at America’s disposal.
Perhaps most important, this approach denies that there are any real trade-offs
between any of these objectives. If the United States is really all-powerful, then
sanctioning China over oil purchases from Iran won’t have any impact on the trade talks
that are now underway with Beijing, and Turkey won’t respond to the same pressure by
moving closer to Russia. It further assumes that America’s NATO allies are so desperate to keep the U.S. military in
Europe that they will accept repeated humiliations and follow the U.S. lead against China, despite the growing evidence that this is
not the case. It sees no downsides to going all-in with Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf, and it sees little risk should relations
with Iran or others escalate to war. To be fair, it is not hard to understand why hawks think they can get away with this approach to
foreign policy, at least in the short term. Despite many recent missteps, the United States is still very powerful. Its active assistance is
still something that some other states want, and its “focused enmity” is something no state can completely ignore. The United
States is still a vast and valuable market, the dollar remains the world’s main reserve currency, and the ability to cut other states or
financial institutions off from the infrastructure of global finance gives Washington unusual leverage. Many U.S. allies are
accustomed to deferring to Washington and are understandably reluctant to do anything that might encourage the United States to
withdraw support. Trump and company can also count on the support of authoritarian soul mates in the European right (including
the present rulers in Poland and Hungary), as well as America’s morally compromised allies in the Middle East. Plus, most Americans
don’t care all that much about foreign policy and are usually willing to go along with whatever the executive branch is doing,
provided that it doesn’t prove too costly or embarrassing. Nonetheless, there are even more potent
reasons why this bullying approach has produced no major foreign-policy successes so
far and is unlikely to yield significant success in the future. First of all, even much weaker
states are loath to succumb to blackmail, for one very good reason: Once you’ve shown
you can be coerced, there may be no end to subsequent demands. Moreover, when the
United States insists on complete capitulation (i.e., by calling for total North Korean
disarmament or regime change in Iran), it gives the target state zero incentive to
comply. And given Trump’s amply demonstrated dishonesty and fickle approach to diplomacy, why would any foreign leader
believe any assurances he (or Pompeo) might give? Put all this together, and you have a perfect recipe for “no deal.” Second,
bullying nearly everyone makes it much harder construct powerful coalitions whose
support can enhance America’s diplomatic leverage. This problem is perhaps most apparent in the
administration’s haphazard approach to economic diplomacy with China. By leaving the Trans-Pacific Partnership and picking trade
fights with other key partners, the administration missed an opportunity to organize a broad coalition of industrial powers united by
a desire to get China to reform its own economic practices. Trump’s trade team may still get some sort of deal with Beijing, but it
won’t be as good as what they could have achieved with a more sophisticated and cooperative effort. Much the same lesson applies
to Iran. The Trump administration deliberately set out to kill the Iran nuclear deal, and it did it in plain sight. It is so focused on this
goal that it is even willing to punish the other signatories in a vain attempt to get Iran to say uncle. Tehran has continued to abide by
the terms of the agreement despite Washington’s reneging on the deal, but its patience is probably not infinite, especially when the
administration has made it clear that regime change is its real objective. Should Iran eventually restart its nuclear weapons
program—which has been in abeyance for more than a decade—the rest of the world is not going to suddenly line up behind the
United States and support more forceful action. Why? Because everyone knows that it was the United States—not Iran—that killed
the deal, and there won’t be a ton of sympathy for America when it starts bleating about Iran’s response. America’s Middle East
clients will no doubt be happy if Washington decides to fight another war on their behalf, but don’t count on a lot of help from them
or from anyone else. Third,
other states don’t like being beholden to the whims of others, and
especially when others behave selfishly, erratically, and with ill-disguised contempt for
others’ interests. Not surprisingly, therefore, other states are starting to develop
workarounds designed to limit U.S. leverage, most notably by designing financial
arrangements outside the network of institutions that Washington has been using to
coerce allies and adversaries into compliance. As Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman recently wrote in FP,
“instead of leading states and businesses to minimize contact with the targets of U.S. sanctions,” the Trump administration’s strong-
arm tactics “may lead states and businesses to minimize their contact with the U.S.-led global financial system and to start to
construct their own workarounds. Over time, those workarounds might even begin to accumulate into an effective alternative
system.” Lastly,
being a bully encourages adversaries to join forces out of their own self-
interest, while giving potential allies more reason to keep their distance. It is no accident
that Russia and China continue to move closer together—even though they are not
natural allies, and a smarter U.S. approach could give Moscow reasons to distance itself
from Beijing—and America’s same bullying impulses are going to push states like Iran
even closer to them. Bolton and those of his ilk will probably come up with some trite new moniker for this group—“Axis
of Evil” and “Troika of Tyranny” are taken, so perhaps “Triad of Troublemakers” or “Coalition of Chaos”—ignoring the fact that their
own policies have helped push these powers together. What we are witnessing, therefore, is a real-world test of two competing
visions of contemporary geopolitics. One version sees U.S. power as essentially undiminished and believes that a combination of
material capabilities, favorable geography, and entrenched institutional capabilities will allow it to pursue an ambitious and
revisionist foreign policy at little cost and with a high probability of success. The
second version—to which I
subscribe—sees the United States as very powerful and in a privileged position (for
various reasons) but also believes there are limits to U.S. power and that it is necessary
to set priorities, minimize trade-offs when possible, and collaborate with others on
many issues. It also assumes that others cannot be browbeaten into abject capitulation
and that effective and durable international agreements require a degree of mutual
compromise, even with adversaries.
 2ac at: Generic Leverage – No solvency
Leveraging fails – empirics prove international pressure ESPECIALLY from the
U.S. fail—unilateral concessions best.
Thrall et al 18 (Trevor Thrall, a senior fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s Defense and Foreign Policy Department, with
expertise in international security and the politics of American national security and an associate professor at George Mason
University’s Schar School of Policy and Government where he teaches courses in international security; Caroline Dorminey, a policy
analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute also worked on issues pertaining to the US defense budget,
defense politics, force structure, and involvement in the international arms trade, “Risky Business, The Role of Arms Sales in U.S.
Foreign Policy,” https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-
policy#_idTextAnchor039)

The hidden assumption underlying the balance of power strategy is that the
United States will be able to predict accurately what the impact of its arms sales
will be. If the goal is deterrence, for example, the assumption is that an arms sale
will be sufficient to deter the adversary without spawning an arms race. If the
goal is to promote stability, the assumption is that an arms sale will in fact reduce
tensions and inhibit conflict rather than inflame tensions and help initiate
conflict. These assumptions, in turn, depend on both the recipient nation and
that nation’s neighbors and adversaries acting in ways that don’t make things
worse.

As it turns out, these are often poor assumptions. Although arms sales certainly
enhance the military capability of the recipient nation, the fundamental problem
is that arms sales often initiate a long chain of responses that the United States
generally cannot control. The United States, after all, is not the only country with
interests in regional balances, especially where the survival and security of local
actors is at stake. The United States is neither the only major power with a keen
interest in critical regions like Asia and the Middle East, nor the only source of
weapons and other forms of assistance. Nor can it dictate the perceptions,
interests, or actions of the other nations involved in a given region. For example,
though a nation receiving arms from the United States may enjoy enhanced
defensive capabilities, it is also likely to enjoy enhanced offensive capabilities.
With these, a nation’s calculations about the potential benefits of war,
intervention abroad, or even the use of force against its own population may shift
decisively. Saudi Arabia’s recent behavior illustrates this dynamic. Though the
Saudis explain their arms purchases as necessary for defense against Iranian
pressure, Saudi Arabia has also spent the past two years embroiled in a military
intervention in Yemen.

Likewise, arms sales can heighten regional security dilemmas. Neighbors of

nations buying major conventional weapons will also worry about what this
enhanced military capability will mean. This raises the chances that they too will
seek to arm themselves further, or take other steps to shift the balance of power
back in their favor, or, in the extreme case, to launch a preventive war before they
are attacked. Given these dynamics, the consequences of arms sales to manage
regional balances of power are far less predictable and often much less positive
than advocates assume.54
This unpredictability characterizes even straightforward-seeming efforts to
manage the balance of power. The most basic claim of arms sales advocates is
that U.S. arms sales to friendly governments and allies should make them better
able to deter adversaries. The best available evidence, however, suggests a more
complicated reality. In a study of arms sales from 1950 to 1995, major-power
arms sales to existing allies had no effect on the chance that the recipient would
be the target of a military attack. Worse, recipients of U.S. arms that were not
treaty allies were significantly more likely to become targets.55
Nor is there much evidence that arms sales can help the United States promote
peace and regional stability by calibrating the local balance of power. On this
score, in fact, the evidence suggests that the default assumption should be the
opposite. Most scholarly work concludes that arms sales exacerbate instability
and increase the likelihood of conflict.56One study, for example, found that during
the Cold War, U.S. and Soviet arms sales to hostile dyads (e.g., India/Pakistan,
Iran/Iraq, Ethiopia/Somalia) “contributed to hostile political relations and
imbalanced military relationships” and were “profoundly destabilizing.”57
There is also good reason to believe that several factors are making the promotion
of regional stability through arms sales more difficult. The shrinking U.S. military
advantage over other powers such as China and the increasingly competitive
global arms market both make it less likely that U.S. arms sales can make a
decisive difference. As William Hartung argued as early as 1990, “the notion of
using arms transfers to maintain a carefully calibrated regional balance of power
seems increasingly archaic in today’s arms market, in which a potential U.S.
adversary is as likely to be receiving weapons from U.S. allies like Italy or France
as it is from former or current adversaries.”58
In sum, the academic and historical evidence indicates that although the United
States can use arms sales to enhance the military capabilities of other nations and
thereby shift the local and regional balance of power, its ability to dictate specific
outcomes through such efforts is severely limited.

Arms for (Not That Much) Influence. Successful foreign policy involves
encouraging other nations to behave in ways that benefit the United States. As
noted, the United States has often attempted to use arms sales to generate the
sort of leverage or influence necessary to do this. History reveals, however, that
the benefits of the arms for influence strategy are limited for two main reasons.

First, the range of cases in which arms sales can produce useful leverage is much
narrower than is often imagined. Most obviously, arms sales are unnecessary in
situations where the other country already agrees or complies with the American
position or can be encouraged to do so without such incentives. This category
includes most U.S. allies and close partners under many, though not all,
circumstances.
Just as clearly, the arms for influence strategy is a nonstarter when the other
state will never agree to comply with American demands. This category includes a
small group of obvious cases such as Russia, China, Iran, and other potential
adversaries (to which the United States does not sell weapons anyway), but it also
includes a much larger group of cases in which the other state opposes what the
United States wants, or in which complying with U.S. wishes would be politically
too dangerous for that state’s leadership.59
In addition, there are some cases in which the United States itself would view
arms sales as an inappropriate tool. The Leahy Law, for example, bars the United
States from providing security assistance to any specific foreign military unit
deemed responsible for past human rights abuses.60 More broadly, arms sales are
clearly a risky choice when the recipient state is a failed state or when it is
engaged in a civil conflict or interstate war. Indeed, in such cases it is often
unclear whether there is anyone to negotiate with in the first place, and
governments are at best on shaky ground. At present the United States bars 17
such nations from purchasing American arms. As long as these nations are
embargoed, arms sales will remain an irrelevant option for exerting influence.61
Apart from these cases, there is a large group of nations with tiny defense budgets
that simply don’t buy enough major conventional weaponry to provide much
incentive for arms sales. On this list are as many as 112 countries that purchased
less than $100 million in arms from the United States between 2002 and 2016,
including Venezuela, Jamaica, and Sudan. Lest this category be dismissed
because it includes mostly smaller and less strategically significant countries
from the American perspective, it should be noted that each of these countries
has a vote in the United Nations (and other international organizations) and that
many of them suffer from civil conflicts and terrorism, making them potential
targets of interest for American policymakers looking for international influence.

By definition, then, the arms-for-influence strategy is limited to cases in which a

currently noncompliant country might be willing to change its policies (at least
for the right price or to avoid punishment).

The second problem with the arms for influence strategy is that international
pressure in general, whether in the form of economic sanctions, arms sales and
embargoes, or military and foreign aid promises and threats, typically has a very
limited impact on state behavior. Though again, on paper, the logic of both
coercion and buying compliance looks straightforward, research shows that
leaders make decisions on the basis of factors other than just the national balance
sheet. In particular, leaders tend to respond far more to concerns about national
security and their own regime security than they do to external pressure. Arms
sales, whether used as carrots or sticks, are in effect a fairly weak version of
economic sanctions, which research has shown have limited effects, even when
approved by the United Nations, and tend to spawn a host of unintended
consequences. As such, the expectations for their utility should be even more
limited.62 A recent study regarding the impact of economic sanctions came to a
similar conclusion, noting that, “The economic impact of sanctions may be
pronounced … but other factors in the situational context almost always
overshadow the impact of sanctions in determining the political outcome.”63 The
authors of another study evaluating the impact of military aid concur, arguing
that, “In general we find that military aid does not lead to more cooperative
behavior on the part of the recipient state. With limited exceptions, increasing
levels of U.S. aid are linked to a significant reduction in cooperative foreign policy
behavior.”64
Perhaps the most explicit evidence of the difficulty the United States has had
exerting this kind of leverage came during the Reagan administration. Sen.
Robert Kasten Jr. (R-WI) signaled the concern of many when he said, “Many
countries to whom we dispense aid continue to thumb their noses at us” at the
United Nations, and Congress passed legislation authorizing the president to
limit aid to any state that repeatedly voted in opposition to the United States at
the UN.65 In 1986, the Reagan administration began to monitor voting patterns
and issue threats, and, in roughly 20 cases in 1987 and 1988, it lowered the
amount of aid sent to nations the administration felt were not deferential enough.
An analysis of the results, however, found no linkage between changes in
American support and UN voting patterns by recipient states. The authors’
conclusion fits neatly within the broader literature about the limited impact of
sanctions: “The resilience of aid recipients clearly demonstrates that their policies
were driven more powerfully by interests other than the economic threat of a
hegemon.”66
The U.S. track record of generating influence through arms sales specifically is
quite mixed. U.S. arms sales may have improved Israeli security over the years,
for example, but American attempts to pressure Israel into negotiating a durable
peace settlement with the Palestinians have had little impact. Nor have arms
sales provided the United States with enough leverage over the years to prevent
client states such as Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Indonesia, and Morocco from invading
their neighbors. Nor have arms sales helped restrain the human rights abuses of
clients like Chile or Libya, or various Middle Eastern client states. Although the
United States has used the promise of arms sales or the threat of denying arms
successfully from time to time, the failures outnumber the victories. The most
rigorous study conducted to tease out the conditions under which arms for
influence efforts are successful is a 1994 study by John Sislin.67 Collating 191
attempts between 1950 and 1992, Sislin codes 80 of those attempts (42 percent)
successful. Sislin’s analysis is incomplete, however, since he looks only at the
immediate benefits of arms sales and does not consider the long-term
consequences.
Furthermore, a close look at the supposedly successful attempts reveals that
many of them are cases in which the United States is in fact simply buying
something rather than actually “influencing” another nation. Thirty of the cases
Sislin coded as successful were instances of the United States using arms to buy
access to military bases (20 cases) or to raw materials (5 cases) or to encourage
countries to buy more American weapons (5 cases).68 Without those in the
dataset, the U.S. success rate drops to 31 percent.
Finally, the conditions for successful leverage seeking appear to be deteriorating.
First, Sislin’s study found that American influence was at its height during the
Cold War when American power overshadowed the rest of the world. With the
leveling out of the global distribution of power, both economic and military, the
ability of the United States to exert influence has waned, regardless of the specific
tool being used. Second, as noted above, the U.S. share of the global arms market
has declined as the industry has become more competitive and, as a result,
American promises and threats carry less weight than before. As William
Hartung noted, “The odds [of] buying political loyalty via arms transfers are
incalculably higher [worse] in a world in which there are dozens of nations to
turn to in shopping for major combat equipment.”69
So far we have argued that arms sales lack a compelling strategic justification,
amplify risks, and generate a host of unintended negative consequences. These
factors alone argue for significantly curtailing the arms trade. But the case for
doing so is made even stronger by the fact that greatly reducing arms sales would
also produce two significant benefits for the United States that cannot otherwise
be enjoyed.

The first benefit from reducing arms sales would be greater diplomatic flexibility
and leverage. Critics might argue that even if arms sales are an imperfect tool,
forgoing arms sales will eliminate a potential source of leverage. We argue that,
on the contrary, the diplomatic gains from forgoing arms sales will
outweigh the potential leverage or other benefits from arms sales.
Most importantly, by refraining from arming nations engaged in conflict, the
United States will have the diplomatic flexibility to engage with all parties as an
honest broker. The inherent difficulty of negotiating while arming one side is
obvious today with respect to North and South Korea. After decades of U.S.
support for South Korea, North Korea clearly does not trust the United States.
Similarly, U.S. attempts to help negotiate a peace deal between the Israelis and
Palestinians have long been complicated by American support for Israel. To stop
arming one side of a contentious relationship is not to suggest that the United
States does not have a preferred outcome in such cases. Rather, by staying out of
the military domain the United States can more readily encourage dialogue and
diplomacy.

Forgoing arms sales is likely to be a superior strategy even in cases where the
United States has an entrenched interest. In the case of Taiwan, for example,
though it is clear that Taiwan needs to purchase weapons from other countries to
provide for its defense, those weapons do not have to be made in the United
States. Having Taiwan buy from other suppliers would help defuse U.S.-China
tensions. Even if Taiwan’s defenses remained robust, China would clearly prefer a
situation in which American arms no longer signal an implicit promise to fight on
Taiwan’s behalf. This could also promote more productive U.S.-China diplomacy
in general, as well as greater stability in the Pacific region. Most important,
breaking off arms sales would also reduce the likelihood of the United States
becoming entangled in a future conflict between Taiwan and China.

The second major benefit of reducing arms sales is that it would imbue the
United States with greater moral authority. Today, as the leading arms-dealing
nation in the world, the United States lacks credibility in discussions of arms
control and nonproliferation, especially in light of its military interventionism
since 2001. By showing the world that it is ready to choose diplomacy over the
arms trade, the United States would provide a huge boost to international efforts
to curtail proliferation and its negative consequences. This is important because
the United States has pursued and will continue to pursue a wide range of arms
control and nonproliferation objectives. The United States is a signatory of
treaties dealing with weapons of mass destruction, missile technology, land
mines, and cluster munitions, not to mention the flow of conventional weapons of
all kinds. The effectiveness of these treaties, and the ability to create more
effective and enduring arms control and nonproliferation frameworks, however,
depends on how the United States behaves.

This is not to say that unilateral American action will put an end to the problems
of the global arms trade. States would still seek to ensure their security and
survival through deterrence and military strength. Other weapons suppliers
would, in the short run, certainly race to meet the demand. But history shows
that global nonproliferation treaties and weapons bans typically require great-
power support. In 1969, for example, Richard Nixon decided to shutter the
American offensive-biological-weapons program and seek an international ban
on such weapons. By 1972 the Biological Weapons Convention passed and has
since been signed by 178 nations.98 In 1991 President George H. W. Bush
unilaterally renounced the use of chemical weapons. By 1993 the United States
had signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, which now has 192
signatories.99 Both of these efforts succeeded in part because the United States
took decisive early action in the absence of any promises about how others would
respond.100 Without U.S. leadership, any effort to limit proliferation of major
conventional weapons and dangerous emerging technologies is likely to fail.
 2ac at: Japan UQ CP

Japan is not ready to get into any more agreements-fears Seoul

Anderson 5-31-19 (Claire Anderson, Claire is an overnight news reporter at Express.co.uk. She
has worked in national and regional newsrooms since 2017 with specialisms in home and
foreign news. "South China Sea: Japan and South Korea FAIL to deter Beijing as Shangri-La talks
collapse," Express.co.uk, https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1134297/south-china-sea-
latest-news-world-war-3-beijing-japan-south-korea-asian-security-forum )

Pressure on Beijing’s island building in the disputed seas has eased since defence ministers from
Japan and South Korea failed to negotiate security. The pair were due to meet at the Asian
security forum in Singapore until it was decided formal talks would be “premature”, South China
Morning Post (SCMP) reported. International relations expert Stephen Nagy said the only winner
between the two US allies would be China.

Mr Nagy told SCMP: “My sense is that Japan sees South Korea as not engaging in negotiations
on a number of issues and not adhering in good faith to agreements that it has already signed.

“Japan is not ready to get into any more agreements because it fears that Seoul will not follow
through or that they will become politicised in the future.

“Tokyo wants binding, long-lasting agreements rather than having to renegotiate something
each time a new Korean government comes in.

“The biggest winner in this stand-off between the US’ two most important allies in the region is,
of course, China. “They must be delighted to see this playing out because it means the US is not
able to exert nearly as much pressure in areas such as the South China Sea.”

The US has vowed to keep the Indo-Pacific free and open.

They have conducted several freedom of navigation operations in the area to push back China’s
claims on the sea.

China claims almost all of the strategic South China Sea with Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam pushing competing claims to parts of the maritime region.

Mr Nagy added: “If Japan, South Korea and the US could find a way to cooperate, imagine the
influence they could exert over the South China Sea or over North Korea.

“If Japan and Korea could find a way to put their differences aside and with their security
capacity, it would be a powerful deterrent to Beijing and Pyongyang.”

Another expert, Toshimitsu Shigemura, told SCMP: “By avoiding talks in Singapore, Japan is
doing its best to avoid public problems between the two sides and I believe that talks are
already taking place between the two governments on these issues.

“The US will have told Tokyo and Seoul that it does not want to see more disagreements and
that it is very important that they cooperate and calm things down a bit."
China is developing new capabilities and operational concepts and will continue
to no matter what
Brands 6-18-19 (Hal Brands, , "New U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy Isn’t Going to Scare China,"
Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-06-18/u-s-indo-pacific-
strategy-isn-t-going-to-scare-china )

The Trump administration has taken the next step toward fleshing out its approach to China, by
releasing the Pentagon’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Report. The 64-page paper deals with a number of
regional security issues, but it focuses primarily on how to preserve a congenial climate as an
ambitious, autocratic China asserts its growing influence.

Those who are looking for a fresh, definitive answer to this question are going to be
disappointed. The main thrusts of the document are familiar; they date back to the Barack
Obama years and even before. Where the Indo-Pacific report is more interesting is in
highlighting — intentionally and unintentionally — the key challenges the U.S. has yet to
overcome.

The Indo-Pacific strategy is essentially a follow-on to the National Security Strategy and National
Defense Strategy, two documents that put the threat from revisionist great powers — especially
China — at the center of U.S. policy. The report describes the Indo-Pacific as America’s “priority
theater,” because that region is likely to be the engine of economic growth and the epicenter of
geopolitical rivalry in the 21st century. To shore up an eroding U.S. position and prevent China
from achieving hegemony, the Defense Department will pursue three interlocking initiatives.

First, the Pentagon will enhance U.S. preparedness to defeat potential Chinese aggression, by
developing new capabilities and operational concepts to offset Beijing’s growing military might.
Second, it will expand and deepen U.S. partnerships in the region, to form a broader regional
coalition against malign Chinese behavior. And it will improve upon the existing system of
bilateral U.S. alliances and partnerships by networking these relationships into a larger, more
cohesive whole. By doing all this, America can preserve a “free and open Indo-Pacific” — a
region in which nations can trade freely, maintain their sovereignty, and avoid being dominated
by Beijing.

This strategy, like the previous strategy documents, thus takes a sharp rhetorical line toward
China. It weaves in some of the new initiatives the Trump administration has taken, such as
reviving the “Quad” (an informal partnership linking the U.S., Japan, Australia and India) and
encouraging European allies to increase their naval activities. The report also breaks with
precedent by describing Taiwan as a country — a designation sure to infuriate Beijing, which
views it as a wayward province.
These innovations aside, however, much of the report seems ripped from the Obama years. The
ideas of countering China’s military buildup while also modernizing, expanding and integrating
U.S. security relationships were at the heart of Obama’s China policy. Indeed, the broad
descriptions of U.S. strategy could have been taken directly from then-Secretary of Defense Ash
Carter’s speeches on China in the last two years of Obama’s presidency.

There is nothing inherently wrong with this: The basic strategic requirements of deterring
Beijing and bolstering the U.S. position in the region haven’t changed much since 2015-2016,
even if China’s challenge has become more severe. The most revealing aspect of the Indo-Pacific
strategy, then, is the way in which the document highlights — sometimes explicitly, sometimes
implicitly — the most daunting problems the U.S. faces in meeting that Chinese challenge.

The first is the question of how to prevent the fait accompli. China still cannot defeat the U.S. in
a long war if America brings all of its power to bear. But Beijing could use the advantages of
surprise and geography to quickly grab key territory — Taiwan or the Senkaku Islands, for
instance — and then force Washington to decide whether to pay the high, perhaps prohibitive,
price of liberation.

The Indo-Pacific report is admirably candid in discussing this problem. Unfortunately, the
Defense Department is only beginning to solve it.

David Ochmanek of the RAND Corporation has argued that defeating a Chinese invasion of
Taiwan would require damaging or destroying more than 300 Chinese naval vessels in the first
72 hours. That, in turn, would require vast stocks of long-range munitions, given that China’s
anti-ship missiles may deter Washington from sending U.S. aircraft carriers into the fight. Yet
despite budgeting funds for an additional 400 extended-range air-to-surface missiles, the
Pentagon is still in the early stages of amassing the capabilities and developing the warfighting
concepts that would allow it to defeat a fait accompli strategy. This looms as the critical military
challenge in the years ahead.

The report also raises more questions than it answers regarding a second issue: “gray-zone”
aggression. In the South China Sea, China has used coercion short of war — island-building,
paramilitary forces asserting control over contested areas — to shift the facts on the ground
incrementally, without triggering a U.S. military response. Over the past decade, China has
thereby strengthened its position on the installment plan.

The Obama administration always struggled to counter these actions; it was only episodically
successful in deterring China from eating away at the sovereignty of its neighbors one bite at a
time. Here, too, the Indo-Pacific strategy clearly identifies the problem, yet it offers few new
ideas on how the U.S. and its allies can frustrate the gray-zone tactics China has used to gain the
upper hand in the South China Sea.

Third, the Indo-Pacific strategy unintentionally underscores the difficulty of deepening America’s
security relationships amid profound upheaval in Washington’s approach to the world. Most of
America’s friends in the Indo-Pacific are pleased that Trump has been willing to introduce some
friction into the relationship with China. But they are simultaneously alarmed by his waffling on
U.S. defense commitments and penchant for using economic coercion against America’s own
allies. They also worry that Trump will ultimately cut a bilateral deal with China, leaving them
exposed. The Pentagon is right that it will take a grand coalition to keep China in check, but the
president’s actions are making that coalition harder to forge.

Fourth, although the report says the right things about the need for a whole-of-government
strategy, in doing so it simply highlights the gaps in American statecraft. By passing the Build
Act, which focuses on catalyzing private investment in infrastructure projects overseas, Congress
put some $60 billion toward countering China’s economic influence in the Indo-Pacific. Yet there
remains an economic void in America’s strategy toward the region, thanks to Trump’s
withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership back in 2017. If anything, the administration has
weakened America’s economic position vis-à-vis China by pursuing tariff wars against U.S. allies.

Finally, the Indo-Pacific strategy underlines the awkward matter of whether that region truly is
America’s priority theater. Because no matter what the strategy documents say, the Trump
administration just can’t seem to maintain strategic focus. Right now, the U.S. risks being
consumed by a deepening diplomatic and military crisis in the Persian Gulf, one caused partially
— although far from entirely — by Trump’s efforts to ratchet up the pressure on Iran. The
administration is saying one thing about its geopolitical priorities, yet it is continually doing
another thing in terms of the fights it picks.

The release of the Indo-Pacific strategy, then, should not be confused with the achievement of
an integrated, effective strategy for maintaining a “free and open” region. But it does at least
illustrate the main obstacles — some of them self-created — that such a strategy will have to
surmount.

China will continue to try to obtain capability control over the SCS
Duttonarrow January 04 2019 (Peter Duttonarrow, Peter Dutton is the director of China
Maritime Studies Institute, US Naval War College. "China doesn’t have the capability for sea
control," Inkstone, https://www.inkstonenews.com/opinion/peter-dutton-china-doesnt-have-
capabilities-control-south-china-sea/article/2180187 )
The premise that China has the capability to control the South China Sea in all circumstances
short of war with the United States is dubious.

The South China Sea is 1.351 million square miles in size, not including the Gulf of Thailand. It is
about 1.4 times the size of the Mediterranean. To patrol this vast space, China has 125 coast
guard vessels over 1,000 tons and 84 maritime militia operating out of Sansha city.

That’s 209 vessels, not including the navy. And since we’re talking about circumstances short of
war, it seems reasonable to exclude the Chinese navy in this case: that’s one vessel for every
6,464 square miles. Even if we say there are a few hundred additional part-time militia vessels
that might have the capacity to meaningfully support complex sea control operations on a
sustained basis, that might make the total of 500 vessels, reducing the problem to one vessel for
every 2,702 square miles. Even with superior air and information control, it’s got to be done on
the sea in the end.

China’s gray zone tactics have had a very hard time achieving sea control even over a very
limited space against a determined adversary. Chinese law enforcement officers pointed out
that it is much easier to attack than to defend. To physically block opponents from obstructing
operations, the Chinese learned they need three or four vessels for every one of the adversaries.

They learned this from having to defend the operations of the oil rig Hai Yang Shi You 981, when
it operated off the Paracels against Vietnamese resistance. It is also important to note that
Vietnamese fishermen are still operating around the Paracels. The Chinese have never been
entirely successful at driving them out with non-military forces since they took the islands in
1974.

While we’re on the topic of control in circumstances short of armed conflict, there is one more
consideration I’d like to raise. That is the deterrent and disruptive role of technology.

Even now, there is something to be said in this regard for the Vietnamese purchase of Kilo-class
submarines. If China did in fact seek to exert control over the South China Sea, it is reasonable
to predict that Vietnam and others would seek to acquire the sort of technologies that would
make Beijing's task even more difficult. No doubt Vietnam would be aided by outside powers.
Japan, India, the United States and Australia have already been active in this regard.

Now to the second question: could China achieve sea control through war with a regional state?
Vietnam again is a key potential opponent in this scenario. They have the most skin in the game,
the greatest ability of any of the claimants to resist, a great history of resisting major powers,
and the determination to do so again if necessary. If China makes war against Vietnam or
another regional state, it might be able to take and hold the Spratlys, but then what?

China would be back in the position of having to play a cat-and-mouse game at sea or to defend
the specific points at great cost. Additionally, considering warmaking against a regional state,
the Chinese must always take into account the potential response of other states. America
might have an interest, for instance, and take advantage of the opportunity to involve itself in
order to weaken China's naval capacity. It is not just the American response: the Chinese must
take into account the responses of other regional states. Would Japan, Singapore, Malaysia,
Indonesia or Australia stand by if Vietnam is attacked? These states have been willing to acquire
largesse through trade with China, but none wants to be dominated by China.

China must consider the non-military costs of conflicts with regional states. China has enough
economic challenges. It’s attempting to raise its economy beyond the middle-income trap, and
has staked its future on the Belt and Road initiative. The Chinese have stated that this initiative
relies heavily on economic cooperation of Southeast Asian states. China’s in a very different
position than it was in 1962 and 1979 when it last waged wars. It’s now much more
economically integrated and therefore much more economically dependent on trade relations
with other countries.

In my view, the best way to conceptualize the value of the American naval presence in the South
China Sea is as a corollary to the American armed forces stationed in Western Europe during the
Cold War. The physical presence of the American Army divisions in Germany served to deter
Soviet advances. American forces were held at risk to deter war between the Soviets and
Western Europeans, because the Soviets knew war would involve the Americans.

Similarly, the active, robust presence of the American navy in the South China Sea serves the
same purpose. The concept of any region that is free from domination must be insured by this
balance of forces between great powers.

For anyone who might be tempted to think the South China Sea and Southeast Asia are not
strategically important to the United States, perhaps a few more statistics will convince you
otherwise. US trade with the South China Sea littoral states in 2017 was $246.9 billion. That’s
more than the US bilateral trade with Japan, or Korea, or Taiwan, or Hong Kong. American
bilateral trade with China was $635 billion in 2017, but the government has already
demonstrated its willingness to sacrifice trade with China in the interest of achieving its strategic
goals.
If China believes it can or should attempt to control the South China Sea through conflict with a
regional state, it must take into account the very salient fact across American history that free
access to trade has been deemed a vital interest, worth protecting by force if necessary.

Increase arms sales to China won’t translate closer relations

Zhen 26 July 2019 (Liu Zhen, Liu Zhen joined the Post in 2015 as a reporter on the China desk.
She previously worked with Reuters in Beijing., “Chinese shipbuilder touts warships amid push
to expand arms sales In Southeast Asia”
https://www.scmp.com/print/news/china/military/article/3020299/chinese-shipbuilder-touts-
warships-amid-push-expand-arms-sales )

A Chinese state-owned shipbuilder is promoting its warships in Southeast Asia as part of

Beijing’s increased efforts to expand arms sales in the region.

As China Shipbuilding Industry Corp (CSIC) launched a second littoral mission ship – a large
patrol vessel – for the Royal Malaysian Navy at its shipyard in central China last week, the
company’s deputy general manager Wu Xiaoguang went on a week-long tour.

Wu visited the Philippines and Indonesia, meeting defence officials from the two countries, the
company said in a statement titled, “Put [China’s] ‘going out’ strategy into practice and make
great efforts to expand arms sales”.

According to the statement, Wu expressed an interest in cooperating with the Philippine navy
when he met Jesus Avilla, the country’s assistant defence secretary.

In Indonesia, Wu discussed deepening the relationship with the defence ministry and navy
during a meeting with a special envoy of the defence minister.

It came as CSIC launched the Sundang, the second of four Keris-class littoral mission ships being
built by the company’s Wuchang shipyard in Wuhan, Hubei province for the Royal Malaysian
Navy. The Sundang is expected to be delivered next year.

CSIC is China’s main warship manufacturer, responsible for retrofitting the unfinished Soviet
vessel that became the Liaoning [1], the country’s first aircraft carrier.

CSIC is also building the nation’s first home-grown aircraft carrier, as well as nuclear-powered
submarines. It will merge with another state-owned giant, China State Shipbuilding Corp, to
form the world’s largest shipbuilder.

The littoral mission ship deal, signed in 2017 at a cost of 1.05 billion ringgit (US$254 million), has
underscored China’s rising status as a key player in the arms market in Southeast Asia. Apart
from traditional buyer Myanmar, which bought US$1.3 billion worth of weapons from China
from 2010 to 2018, Thailand has in recent years significantly increased its purchases of Chinese
arms – from US$2 million in 2011 to US$131 million in 2017, according to the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute.
Indonesia has also spent tens of millions of dollars on Chinese weapons annually since 2012.

Chinese military supplies to Thailand include powerful VT-4 tanks, VN-1 armoured vehicles and
an S-26T submarine. Myanmar, meanwhile, has purchased JF-17M fighter jets, 053H frigates,
and air-defence missiles. China has also sold missiles, radars and a close-in weapons system for
Indonesia’s warships.

Chinese navy tests new Z-20 helicopter for use on its warships

[2]

Beijing is also actively courting the Philippines, a traditional ally of the United States, by
donating guns and ammunition, as well as patrol boats, to support President Rodrigo Duterte’s
“war on terror”.

In addition to the arms sales, the People’s Liberation Army has also strengthened ties with the
militaries of the buyer countries. In October, China held a trilateral naval exercise with Thailand
and Malaysia, and took part in its first joint exercise with Asean.

That was also the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ first such drill with an individual
country and was followed by another exercise between Asean and the PLA Navy in April.

12 years behind bars for corrupt former boss of Chinese shipbuilder

[3]

But increased arms sales may not automatically translate into closer relationships with client
countries, especially the Philippines, since some are in maritime or territorial disputes with
China, according to Zhang Mingliang, who specialises in Southeast Asian studies at Jinan
University in Guangzhou.

“Buying arms from China can be a measure to diversify their source of weapons and lower the
defence cost, but that won’t reduce the existing negative factors in the relationships,” he said.
 2ac at: NFU
BID links to NFU
Lodgaard 02 (Sverre Lodgaard, 15-17 November 2002, Obstacles to No-First-Use,
https://pugwashconferences.files.wordpress.com/2018/02/200211_london_nws_paper_lo
dgaard.pdf, BJ)
NFU is not a static proposition. It is more than a doctrine: it is also a strategy to curb and
constrain the nuclear sector and pave the way for nuclear disarmament. For if the role
of nuclear weapons were confined to that of deterring others from using theirs, the
prognosis for nuclear weapons research, development, maintenance and production -
currently thriving on extended deterrence - would be bleaker. This is what the
proponents would like to achieve, and this is what the material interests in nuclear
weaponry oppose. NFU confronts the nuclear industry in the widest sense of the term.
Therefore, the opposition to it is not limited to considerations of national security and
political weight in international affairs, but comprises powerful economic interests as
well.
 1ar at: NFU
Perception is key NFU can’t solve
David Logan, 17, "Hard Constraints on China’s Nuclear Forces," War on the Rocks,
https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/china-nuclear-weapons-breakout/,
accessed 7-29-2019 (Kent Denver--EA)
Finally, policymakers should recognize that Chinese nuclear policies are driven in part by
perceived threats from the United States itself. Expanding conventional prompt global
strike, ballistic missile defense, and the role of U.S. nuclear forces could exacerbate
Chinese threat perceptions and trigger just the kind of nuclear breakout scenarios that
observers fear. Calls to develop so-called tailored nuclear options based on assumptions of an
impending Chinese nuclear breakout should be met with skepticism. Rather than exacerbating
these dynamics, the U.S.-China nuclear relationship might be best served by a dose of
strategic restraint.

A United States NFU policy would hurt assurance links to nb

John R. Harvey, 7-5-2019, "Assessing the Risks of a Nuclear ‘No First Use’ Policy,"
War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2019/07/assessing-the-risks-of-a-
nuclear-no-first-use-policy/, accessed 7-29-2019 (Kent Denver--EA)
Assurance and Nonproliferation Risks Building and maintaining strong alliances has been a
centerpiece of America’s effort to produce and sustain a more peaceful world. Critical to this is
assuring U.S. allies of America’s commitment to their defense by extending to them the full
range of U.S. military power. Many countries, including those that share a border with an
adversary that presents a threat to their very existence, see no-first-use as a weakening,
symbolic or otherwise, of U.S. extended deterrence. In response to Chinese provocations in
the western Pacific and North Korea’s nuclear tests and missile launches, Japan regularly
seeks, both in official consultations and ongoing military cooperation, assurances that
America will continue to fulfill its security commitments to protect the island nation .
Some in South Korea have already pressed to explore an increased U.S. nuclear presence in
their country to further deter regional threats. Loss of confidence in U.S. security
commitments could cause some allies to seek accommodation with regional adversaries
in ways that run counter to U.S. interests. Moreover, both South Korea and Japan, similar to
many NATO allies, have latent nuclear weapons capabilities characteristic of advanced industrial
economies with commercial nuclear power. Any perceived wavering of U.S. security
commitments could cause allies to develop and field their own nuclear weapons. Further,
America’s allies have made their feelings about America adopting a no-first-use policy known.
U.S. officials consulted America’s allies extensively in the lead up to the 2010 and 2018 nuclear
posture reviews. This dialogue has been rich and productive and, in some ways, surprising in its
candor. For example, in 2009, Japanese officials briefed the Perry-Schlesinger Commission,
established by Congress to seek a bipartisan approach to the U.S. nuclear posture, on specific
features and capabilities of the U.S. nuclear deterrent that Japan viewed as critical to its
security. In related dialogue, many foreign counterparts to U.S. officials, including those of
Japan, have urged the United States not to adopt a no-first-use policy.
 2ac at: First Strike – escalation turn
US first strike guarantees China and Russia escalation
Mehl march 10, 2016 (Annie Mehl, Detail-oriented Journalist with a Bachelor’s of Science in
Journalism, investigate articles about nuclear weapons, artificial intelligence and climate
change, “The Increasing Risk of Nuclear War”, https://futureoflife.org/2016/03/10/the-
increasing-risk-of-nuclear-war/?cn-reloaded=1 )

On Saturday, February 27, thousands of activists marched through London in opposition to the
country’s nuclear weapons policy. Meanwhile, in the United States, Russia, and now China,
nuclear tensions may be escalating.

“It takes about 30 minutes for a missile to fly between the United States and Russia,” a recent
report by the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) reminded readers. The U.S. and Russia keep
their missiles on hair-trigger alerts which allow them to be launched within minutes, and both
countries have been investing in upgrading their nuclear arsenals.

Another recent UCS report, China’s Military Calls for Putting Its Nuclear Forces on Alert, analyzes
the risk that China’s military leaders may also soon call for putting their own nuclear weapons
on high-alert. Gregory Kulacki, author of the China report, argues that this could be incredibly
dangerous. He explains:

“The experience with U.S. and Soviet/Russian warning systems, especially early in their
deployment and operation when hardware and procedures were not yet reliable, illustrates the
dangers of maintaining the option to launch on warning. Such risks are especially acute in a
crisis.”

In fact, there have been over two dozen known nuclear close calls involving the U.S. and Russia,
and likely many more that haven’t been declassified. One of the scariest examples occurred in
1980, during a time of tension between Russia and the U.S. A Soviet satellite showed five land-
based missiles heading straight for the Soviet Union, and Stanislav Petrov, the officer on duty,
had only a few minutes to decide whether or not it was a false alarm. Fortunately, he
disregarded all evidence to the contrary and concluded it was false. Investigations later found
that the sun’s reflection off the clouds had tricked the satellite into detecting a missile launch.
Hair-trigger alert policies only increase the chances that accidents like this could occur,
inadvertently triggering a nuclear war.
These policies were originally put in place as an act of deterrence. However, as information
about more of these close calls has been released, many are concerned about the Cold-War
policies that are still in effect.

As David Wright with the UCS says, “Twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War, the United
Sates and Russia continue to keep nearly 2,000 nuclear weapons constantly on high alert, ready
to be launched in minutes.”

Given the concerns associated with the hair-trigger alert policies of the U.S. and Russia, it’s no
surprise that adding a third country to the mix would only exacerbate the situation.

More surprising might be why China’s military leaders are reconsidering their policy. According
to Kulacki,

“The nuclear weapons policies of the United States are the most prominent external factors
influencing Chinese advocates for raising the alert level of China’s nuclear forces.”

The risks that could potentially arise if China changes its policy are hard to measure, but with the
close calls already seen between the U.S. and Soviet Russia, a third country with similar policies
would only further increase the risk of a devastating, accidental nuclear exchange.

When they originally began their nuclear program, Chinese leaders committed to a no-first-use
policy, and they’ve stuck to that, keeping their nuclear warheads separate from their missiles.
Only if they’re attacked first, will the Chinese assemble their nuclear weapons and strike back.
However, the Chinese are becoming increasingly concerned with what they perceive the U.S.
nuclear stance against them to be. Kulacki explains:

“The authors of the 2013 Academy of Military Sciences’ textbook The Science of Military
Strategy clearly believe U.S. actions are calling into question the credibility of China’s ability to
retaliate after a U.S. nuclear attack, and that an effective way to respond would be to raise the
alert level of China’s nuclear forces so they can be launched on warning of an incoming nuclear
attack.”

With the recent developments of U.S. high-precision conventional and nuclear weapons, along
with the Chinese belief that the U.S. is unwilling to recognize joint vulnerability, China’s leaders
may decide to change their own policies to match those of the U.S. In the China report, Kulacki
recommends five steps for the United States to take to improve their relationship with China:

“Acknowledge mutual vulnerability with China.”

“Reject rapid-launch options.”

“Adopt a ‘sole purpose’ nuclear doctrine.”

“Limit ballistic missile defenses.”

“Discuss impacts of new conventional capabilities.”

“U.S. officials have to realize that China is contemplating these changes because it believes the
United States is unwilling to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its national security
strategy— what President Obama promised to do in his famous speech in Prague in 2009,”
Kulacki added. “What the U.S. says and does regarding nuclear weapons has a profound effect
on Chinese thinking. And right now, we’re pushing China in the wrong direction.”
 1ar at: First Strike ext – escalation turn
Nuclear posturing guarantees escalation in the event of a first strike.
NTI, February 1, 2018(NTI, "U.S. Nuclear Policy and Posture: Increasing Warning and Decision
Time," No Publication, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/us-nuclear-policy-and-posture-
increasing-warning-and-decision-time/ )

True progress on reducing nuclear risks—and true cooperation necessary to prevent

proliferation and nuclear terrorism—is not possible when both Washington and Moscow are
postured for mutually assured destruction on a massive scale. If leaders cannot see and act on
this premise, the United States and Russia will remain trapped in a costly and risky nuclear
posture—and other nations may follow in their footsteps, making probable that Hiroshima and
Nagasaki are not the last cities to suffer a nuclear attack.

Today, U.S. and Russian ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads deployed on prompt-
launch can be fired and hit their targets within minutes. Once fired, a nuclear ballistic missile
unfortunately cannot be recalled before it reaches its target. Leaders may have only minutes
between warning of an attack and nuclear detonations on their territory planned to eliminate
their capacity to respond. This puts enormous pressure on leaders to maintain “launch on
warning/launch under attack” options, which—when mutual tensions persist or in a crisis—
increases the risk that a decision to use nuclear weapons will be made in haste after a false
warning and multiplies the risk of an accidental, mistaken, or unauthorized launch—blundering
into nuclear catastrophe.

Magnifying risks of a nuclear mistake are cyber threats to warning and command and control
systems. Issues surrounding decision time become more acute in a world of increased cyber
risks and little communication or cooperation between political and military leaders. Malicious
hackers today may insert the same message that panicked Hawaiians in January 2018—“Ballistic
missile threat inbound … seek immediate shelter. This is not a drill”—into national warning and
alert systems. How would the leaders of Pakistan, India, North Korea, the United States, Russia,
China, Britain, France, or Israel respond?

Washington should work with Moscow to eliminate Cold War-era capabilities and force postures
that generate fears of a disarming first-strike. Working with Russia to take nuclear missiles off
prompt launch status would increase time for leaders to assess their options and make a more
considered decision in response to a suspected or actual nuclear attack. This would significantly
reduce the risk of an accidental, mistaken, or unauthorized launch of a nuclear ballistic missile,
and set an example for all states with nuclear weapons. Ideally, this could be extended to China,
and then to India and Pakistan.
This initiative would be widely understood by publics as a step away from the still-prevailing
concept of mutually assured destruction, and could serve as a building block in a broader effort
to improve relations between the West and Russia. Importantly, disengaging the Cold War
autopilot would in no way diminish the U.S.’ military capability to deter and defend against any
nation or combination of nations; even with these steps, the United States will continue to have
sufficient if not excessive capacity in its nuclear arsenal.
 2ac at: LRDR – Block IIA deficit
The US and Japan codeveloped the Block IIA – they both have export rights
Herman 16 (Arthur, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, “The Awakening Giant: Risks and
Opportunities for Japan's New Defense Export Policy,” Hudson Institute, December 19, 2016,
https://www.hudson.org/research/13145-the-awakening-giant-risks-and-opportunities-for-
japan-s-new-defense-export-policy)///JP

In 2008, Japan began codevelopment of the SM-3 Block IIA with the United States. The twenty-one-foot
SM-3 missile, designated RIM-161A in the United States, is a major part of the US Navy’s Aegis BMD system and is a complement to
the shorter-range Patriot missile. The intercept velocity of the latest SM-3 is around 6,000 mph, with a ceiling of 100 miles and a
range of 270 nautical miles.

The missile’s kinetic warhead is a Lightweight Exo-Atmospheric Projectile, a non-explosive hit-to-kill device. According to non-
classified sources, Japan
is overseeing development of the nose cone, which protects an infrared ray
sensor from heat generated by air friction, as well as the second- and third-stage rocket motors
and the staging assembly and steering control section for the missile.51 As for the rest of the missile, the
booster is the United Technologies MK 72 solid-fuel rocket, and the sustainer is the Atlantic Research Corp. MK 104 dual-thrust solid-
fuel rocket. The third stage is the Alliant Techsystems MK 136 solid-fuel rocket.

Cooperation on the Block IIA proceeded smoothly, but when the United States was set to export
it to other countries, including Qatar, Japan’s Foreign Ministry noted that this would be a
technical violation of the long-standing ban on defense exports. After considerable discussion
and considerable prompting from the US Department of Defense, then-prime minister Yoshihiko
Noda decided to make an exception for weapons systems produced as part of bilateral defense
agreements. Indeed, it was this decision that opened the door to other bilateral defense agreements and to the Abe
government’s revising the entire export policy, leading ultimately to the three principles promulgated in 2014.52

The reasons why the SM-3 Block IIA has been a relative success for Japan’s new export policy
compared to submarines and seaplanes—indeed, has heralded the new export policy itself—are
many.

First, instead
of trying to export an entire Japanese-made system, Japan conducted this venture in
complete cooperation with the US government and US defense companies, which not only served as
technical partners, but because they were more experienced in the vicissitudes of the international defense trade, were able to
arrange for sale to Qatar.

Second, Japan
was working in cooperation with the United States in ballistic missile defense, an
area in which it faces few clear competitors, and indeed, an area in which the opportunities for
more cooperation and codevelopment are relatively expansive. These include, for example, airborne boost-
phase intercept ballistic missile defense. The United States already had a laser airborne system, which it is currently working to
upgrade using unmanned platforms. However, there is currently a proposal involving two Japanese companies and a US technology
firm for developing an unmanned boost phase interceptor using a conventional anti-missile missile. This could target and destroy
missiles fired from North Korea while they are still in their boost phase, whereas land-based systems such as THAAD (Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense) and Aegis Ashore do so only in the terminal phase.

If Japan moved ahead with this boost-phase interceptor, or BPI project, it would actually enjoy an advantage over the Pentagon and
its usual US defense contractors. This is because development and deployment of BPI will be relatively inexpensive (less than $10
million by recent estimates), and if existing technologies are used, relatively near term. Indeed, it could become an export package
system that other countries threatened by rogue nations’ ballistic missiles will want to purchase, and thus lead to a made-in-Japan
ballistic missile defense system.53
Third, the SM-3 joint development project was underpinned by very clear formal agreements
between the two countries. The first was in August 1999, when the Japanese government
agreed to conduct cooperative research on four components of the interceptor missile being
developed for the US Navy Theater-Wide (NTW) anti-missile system, for use against short- and medium-range
missiles up to 3,500 kilometers.54 In 2007 came the signing of the General Security of Military
Information Agreement, or GSOMIA, between Japan and the United States, followed (after
considerable delay) by a formal Reciprocal Defense Procurement Memorandum of Understanding, or
RDPMOU, in 2016. The United States has similar RDPMOUs with twenty-two other nations, but this was the first such
agreement signed with Japan, and it points the way to further defense industrial cooperation down the road.

Fourth, the
SM-3 project was undergirded by an American desire to encourage Japan’s more
proactive defense and defense-trade posture to benefit the United States as well as Japan. Then-
secretary of defense Robert Gates was a prime mover in getting the joint development of SM-3 underway and promoting its
export sales as an important adjunct to US-Japanese strategic cooperation at the broadest level.

The Aegis Ashore battery is sold separately from other parts – Japan will buy
and equip systems post CP
O’Rourke 16 (Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service,
October 25, 2016, https://www.defensedaily.com/wp-
content/uploads/post_attachment/148136.pdf)///JP

The Japanese Defense Ministry is interested in acquiring Lockheed Martin’s Aegis Ashore
ballistic missile defense (BMD) battery, according to an August report from the Japanese newspaper, Mainichi
Shimbun.

The paper reported the Defense Ministry is expected to spend “tens of millions of yen” as part of
the Fiscal Year 2015 state budget for research into Aegis Ashore—which combines the Lockheed Martin
SPY-1D radar with a battery of Raytheon Standard Missile-3 missiles.

The paper reported the Defense Ministry is expected to spend “tens of millions of yen” as part
of the Fiscal Year 2015 state budget for research into Aegis Ashore—which combines the
Lockheed Martin SPY-1D radar with a battery of Raytheon Standard Missile-3 missiles.

Currently, Japan uses a combination of four Kongo-class Aegis-equipped guided missile

destroyers armed with SM-3s for longer-range ballistic missile threats and Lockheed Martin
Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) mobile ground based interceptors for missiles closer to
their targets.

“There are concerns that PAC3s could not respond if a massive number of ballistic missiles were
to be simultaneously launched toward Japan,” read the Mainichi report.

Japan intends to double the amount of BMD destroyers to eight by 2018, according to local
press reports.

The Kongos ships use a legacy Aegis BMD configuration that do not allow the Aegis combat
system to operate as BMD defense platforms and as anti-air warfare ships simultaneously.
Japan is also exploring upgrading at least some of its ships to a more advanced Baseline 9
configuration that would allow the ships to simultaneously act as a BMD and AAW platform.

Aegis Ashore operates with a version of Baseline 9 that doesn’t include an AAW component, but
given the similarities of the ground based system and the Aegis combat system onboard U.S.
and Japanese ships, those capabilities could expand.

“This is the Aegis weapon from a ship. It can do AAW, terminal defense and mid-course
intercept,” Navy Capt. Jeff Weston, the Aegis Ashore program manager for the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA) said last year during a USNI News interview at Lockheed Martin’s Aegis testing
facility in Moorestown, N.J.

At the time, Weston said an U.S. Aegis Ashore battery would only concentrate on BMD. “We’re
not going to do anti-air warfare in someone else’s country,” he said.

However, a Japanese run installation could expand the missile offerings beyond the BMD
optimized SM-3s.

Depending on the configuration of the Aegis Ashore installation, the site could conceivably be
expanded to include other AAW capabilities that would allow the site to handle multiple air
threats in addition to a BMD mission.91
 1ar at: LRDR – Block IIA deficit
The Block IIA was funded and developed in part by Japan
CRS 19 (Congressional Research Service, “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress,” July 24, 2019,
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20190724_RL33745_77d130a964514150727bac8dfd736
d3a6afae250.html)///JP

Japan cooperated with the United States on development the SM-3 Block IIA missile. Japan
developed certain technologies for the missile, and paid for the development of those
technologies, reducing the missile's development costs for the United States.

Block IIA is a cooperative program

Rogoway 17 (Tyler, editor of Time Inc's The War Zone. “Navy's New SM-3 Block IIA Ballistic
Missile Interceptor Fails In Live Test,” The Drive, June 22, 2017, https://www.thedrive.com/the-
war-zone/11794/navys-new-sm-3-block-iia-ballistic-missile-interceptor-fails-in-live-test)///JP

Another big element of the SM-3 Block IIA is that it is a cooperative program between Japan and the US. The idea
behind this risk sharing arrangement is that once operational, the missile will equip Japan's Aegis BMD capable

destroyers and possibly Aegis ashore installations in Japan itself. This is in addition to being provided to the US Aegis BMD
capable surface combatants and Aegis Ashore batteries in Eastern Europe.
 2ac at: Japan Says No: Turn
Japan saying no to BMD undermines the U.S.-Japan alliance– risks a security
crisis.
Van 14 (Shanelle Van Sanford School of Public Policy – Duke University, “Ballistic Missile
Defense in Japan: Process-Tracing a Historical Trajectory” Undergraduate Honors Thesis,
December 2014, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/37750459.pdf - BIB)

As one of only two countries (the other being the United States) with both the lower- and upper-level capabilities for intercepting incoming missiles, Japan now has one of the
most sophisticated missile defense systems in the entire world. Conventional wisdom and the existing literature consider this success along a historical trajectory that started

achievement of missile defense capability in

the day of the 1998 North Korean Taepodong launch. But the narrative shows that the

Japan was in fact the result of an uphill struggle begun in the late 1980s. Though the Taepodong incident
was indeed important, numerous other factors – including alliance pressures, bureaucrats, and the defense industry among them – also played a

role in Japan’s decision to deploy BMD. Incorrectly folding Japan’s commitment to BMD
in with “Taepodong shock” threatens to rewrite the actual history of the US-Japan
alliance. This, in turn, generates unrealistic expectations of what Japan can and will do
militarily together with the United States. The disconnect between Japan and the US has
already taken its toll on the alliance. Relations between the partners in recent years
have been described as “anything but warm” 118– in part, as this thesis shows, because Japan’s tendency
to move at a frigid pace on security issues like missile defense has led to doubt on the
US side about whether Japan will ever reach a satisfying point in holding its own within
the alliance. If there is one commonality amongst those who negotiated with the
Japanese on missile defense in the 1990s, it is their frustration with the sluggishness and the
lack of coherence that characterized the Japanese side. Negotiations such as these color
the United States’ perception of its alliance with Japan. Whereas every Japanese delegation was welcomed with open
arms in the 20th century, it has become increasingly difficult to convince Washington of why Japan is

very important. Its story has “diminished,” and expectations that Japan will step up have dwindled.119 Neither Japan nor the United
States can afford to hold such doubts about the alliance these days. Relations in East
Asia have deteriorated in recent years, with a number of issues – the rise of China,
territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas, the conflict between India and
Pakistan, and North Korea’s irrational behavior – cropping up. Japan will need the
assurance of the United States’ nuclear umbrella. As the United States transitions
towards a greater emphasis on East Asia, it will need Japan to be – as former Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro
Nakasone put it in the 1980s – its “unsinkable aircraft carrier” in the Pacific. It will need Japan to take

on a leadership role in East Asia. The United States can only do this if it enters the bargain with a full understanding of how far Japan will go. Such an
understanding only comes with knowing the history of the US-Japan alliance. Taken as a whole, the historical narrative holds significant lessons for what the United States can

even a missile flying over the

reasonably ask of Japan within the alliance. Although the Taepodong launch was a significant event in this history,

islands was not reason enough for Japan to pursue BMD. What Japan needed was not only
downward pressure from the United States, but also reassurance from its longest-standing
ally that it was truly committed to the security of Japan. It had to first agree with the security assessment that there were
neighboring countries to worry about, and to then find ways around its legal complications. The US’ strongest allies in this were the bureaucrats and the defense industry, who
were able to demonstrate to the rest that, because missile defense was technologically feasible, it was worth the cost of investment. In order to convince its ally to join in its
initiatives, the United States must do more than simply expect of Japan when it has little more than words and unformed ideas to offer. The results here also tie into a deeper
body of theoretical literature that could drive further research into Japan’s security strategy. As previously noted, work on defensive and offensive dominance led to the correct
intuition that Japan needed to clarify its legal restrictions before pursuing missile defense. So what led to these reinterpretations? And where does Japan draw the line between
offensive and defensive weaponry? These are but two of the many questions about Japan that still need examination, and they become more important with every passing year.
US policymakers must continue to ask questions that go to the heart of how and why Japan makes national security decisions. Otherwise, they risk jeopardizing an alliance that
has served as the cornerstone of security in East Asia for over 50 years.
 2ac at: PICs – perm do the CP
Perm do the CP - Reduce doesn’t mean eliminate
Michigan District Court 11
(“SAGINAW OFFICE SERVICE, INC., Plaintiff, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Defendant. Civil Action
No. 09-CV-13889 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN,
SOUTHERN DIVISION,” Lexis)

In determining whether the words "reduce" and "adjust" are ambiguous, the Court is
directed to consider the ordinary meanings of the words, Rory, 703 N.W.2d at 28, and to harmonize [*11] the
disputed terms with other parts of the contract, Royal, 706 N.W.2d at 432 ("construction should be avoided that would render any part of the contract
surplusage or nugatory"). "When determining the common, ordinary meaning of a word or phrase, consulting a dictionary is appropriate." Stanton v. City of Battle Creek,
466 Mich. 611, 647 N.W.2d 508 (Mich. 2002). The Court finds that the plain meanings of these terms do not unambiguously support the Bank's position. The dictionary
definition of "adjust" is to "adapt" or "to bring to a more satisfactory state." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 27 (2002) ("Webster's"). This is a fairly

To say that the complete elimination

broad definition, which may be subject to, alternatively, narrower or more expansive scope.

of a schedule brings it to a more satisfactory state is undoubtedly an expansive view of adjustment. It is the Court's duty to
determine the intent of the contracting parties from the language of the contract itself, Rory, 703 N.W.2d at 30 ("the intent of the contracting parties is
best discerned by the language actually used in the contract"), and in this case, it cannot unambiguously be said that the sense in which the parties used these
"reduce" means "to diminish in size, amount,
[*12] terms embraces the Bank's more expansive definition. Likewise,

extent, or number," Webster's, at 1905, but the term does not, in the context of the TSA, unambiguously
embody an expansive scope that views complete deletion as a subset of diminution.
 2ac at: PICs – no solvency
1. If pic out of the radar -The Panda card from the 1ac indicates that China
views the radar component as a threat to their deterrence – the CP can’t
solve case.
2. The efficacy of Aegis Ashore depends on both the missile and radar
system – they’re interconnected.
Daigle, No Date (Lisa Daigle, Assistant Managing Editor at Military Embedded Systems, Aegis
Ashore system, long-range radar paired to boost intelligence, situational awareness, Military
Embedded Systems, http://mil-embedded.com/news/aegis-ashore-system-long-range-radar-
paired-to-boost-intelligence-situational-awareness/)

BETHESDA, Md. Lockheed Martin reports that it has connected key components of its
Aegis Ashore and Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) technologies, with a
demonstration of the technologies' joint ability to increase the operational
performance, efficiency, and reliability of Aegis Ashore.
Aegis Ashore is the land-based ballistic-missile defense version of the Aegis Combat System; it is
currently fielded in Romania and will soon be deployed in Poland.

According to Lockheed Martin documents, the U.S. Department of Defense's newest ballistic
missile defense sensor, LRDR, will use thousands of Lockheed Martin Solid State Radar (SSR)
gallium nitride (GaN)-based radar building blocks to provide enhanced target acquisition,
tracking, and discrimination data to the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System.

Lockheed Martin officials say that connecting the two mature systems effectively results in
a low-risk "technology refresh" of the legacy SPY-1 antenna, resulting in such benefits as
the ability to detect targets at longer distances, the ability to combat larger numbers of
targets simultaneously, enhanced target engagement opportunities, higher-quality
performance in complicated land environments, and owered possibility of interference
with civilian or military radio emitters and receivers.
"Connecting these systems is more than a technological advantage -- it's a way to
provide the warfighter with earlier intelligence and expanded situational awareness,"
said Dr. Tony DeSimone, vice president and chief engineer of Lockheed Martin Integrated
Warfare Systems and Sensors. "Integration of these technologies allows us to deliver the
most advanced solid state radar system in LRDR with the proven tested capability of
Aegis. For the warfighter this combination provides an increased capability, in terms of
additional performance and reaction time, to safely protect the people and nations they
defend."
LRDR completed its critical design review in 2017 and is on track to be operational in Alaska in
2020.
 2ac at: Russia Leverage CP –say no (General)
Russia won’t agree to a quid-pro-quo deal over Aegis Ashore – they’d require
many more concessions from the U.S.
Stratfor Intelligence Report 3/4/2009 (“Russia’s Sleight of Hand,” Stratfor,
https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2009/03/russias_sleight_of_hand.html)

it was “not productive” to link talks

Speaking at a press conference in Madrid on Tuesday, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev said that

over a U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in Europe with the perceived security
threat from Iran, as proposed by Washington. The topic came up as Medvedev spoke alongside Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis
Rodriguez Zapatero at a press conference about a number of unrelated topics. The question he was responding to seemed to come out of left field, suggesting that the Kremlin
planted the question, and perhaps the journalist. The question concerned a secret letter exchange between U.S. President Barack Obama and Medvedev — an exchange that

was made public on Tuesday after a leak to The New York Times. For the Russians, a quid pro quo on BMD and Iran is
simply unacceptable. It isn’t because the Russians have heightened sensibilities — they are the masters of linking otherwise unrelated topics together for
discussion and action — but because they are thinking much bigger these days. They want a grand bargain

with the Americans, and they want it now. Ever since it became clear in late 2003 that the war in Iraq would serve as more of a sandbag than a springboard
for U.S. policy, the Russians have enjoyed the light streaming through a window of opportunity. Pretty much all U.S. ground forces are spoken for by the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Even if both wars were declared over today, it would be more than two years before all forces could be withdrawn, rested and re-equipped for future deployments.
U.S. expeditionary capability is currently limited to the Air Force and naval aviation – tools that are hardly small fry, especially when you are on the receiving end, but which are
not particularly useful for blocking Russian moves in states that were part of the Soviet Union, like Ukraine or Georgia. Blocking such actions can be done only with ground

rom the Russian perspective, the time to negotiate

forces, and those forces simply are not available right now. Thus, f

with the Americans about the broad spectrum of relations is now. They do not want a
short list of quid pro quo arrangements that will let the Americans push off the bigger
issues until another day. They want everything — and they mean everything — settled
now, when their power is at a relative high compared to that of the United States. The Russians do not want
a simple rejiggering of existing disarmament treaties; they want fundamentally new
ones that extend the current nuclear parity with the United States , codifying it to the finest detail possible.
They want to shoot down the plans for BMD, a technology that one day could render the Russian nuclear deterrent obsolete.
They want the United States to publicly recognize Russian dominance throughout the
former Soviet Union, and — again, publicly — put an end to Western military, political and
economic encroachment into Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Central Asia. Part of
the ability to get such a grand bargain at such a fortuitous time, of course, rests in the ability to convince the other side that your own tools are even more robust than they may
seem. You must convince the other side your rise to power is inevitable. It comes to shaping perceptions, and in this the Russians are peerless. Remember Cold War
propaganda? It was certainly on parade in Spain, not just in the shaping of a press conference where the quid pro quo comments garnered such attention, but in a phalanx of
“deals” that the Russian delegation signed.
 1ar at: Russia Leverage CP – say no (General)
Russia doesn’t trust the US to negotiate on arms control – INF proves
Troianovsky ’19 (Anton Troianovski, Moscow bureau chief covering Russia, “Following U.S.,
Putin suspends nuclear pact and promises new weapons,” The Washington Post, 2/2/19,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/following-us-putin-suspends-nuclear-pact-and-
promises-new-weapons/2019/02/02/8160c78e-26e3-11e9-ad53-
824486280311_story.html?utm_term=.d8e9f180f0db)

Putin ordered his military to start developing land-based missiles that could deliver nuclear
warheads in the range prohibited by the treaty, including a hypersonic version. He also directed
his diplomats to stop initiating any arms control talks with the West, claiming Washington
hadn’t negotiated in good faith.

Putin’s move came a day after the Trump administration announced it was pulling out of the
agreement and underscored analysts’ fears that a budding arms race between Russia and the
United States is about to intensify.

“Our answer will be symmetrical,” Putin said in a televised meeting with his defense and foreign
ministers. “Our American partners declared that they will suspend their participation in the
treaty, so we will suspend ours as well. They said they would start research and development,
and we will do the same.”

The United States and its allies have said for years that Russia is violating the 1987 pact between
Washington and Moscow, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, by developing and
fielding a banned missile. Russia denies the allegation.

Critics of U.S. withdrawal from the treaty say that, despite Russia’s violation, the best way to
keep Russian arms in check would be to negotiate while keeping the treaty intact. Trump
administration officials say the treaty threatens U.S. national security by preventing the country
from responding to missile threats, not just from Russia but also from China, which isn’t a
signatory to the INF Treaty.

Putin’s directive on Saturday to start new development referred to missiles that would be
different from the prohibited one the United States accuses Russia of already having deployed.
He approved a request from Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to create a land-based version of
existing sea-launched missiles and to start developing a new, hypersonic medium-range ballistic
missile.

Both of those missiles would be capable of a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, or 311
and 3,418 miles, which is banned by the INF Treaty. The pact, signed near the close of the Cold
War by President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, eliminated more than
2,600 missiles and ended a years-long standoff with nuclear missiles in Europe.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said on Friday that, effective Saturday, the United States will
suspend participation in the agreement, starting a six-month countdown to a final U.S.
withdrawal. Pompeo said Russia could salvage the treaty by ending its banned missile programs,
but Putin’s remarks Saturday underscored the very low likelihood Russia will make such a move.

In the televised meeting, the Russian president directed officials to stop initiating any talks
related to arms control. Putin had previously been eager to negotiate with the United States on
the matter — in part because, analysts say, discussion of nuclear arsenals is one of the only
issues on which Moscow can engage on near-equal diplomatic footing with Washington.

“I’m asking both ministries to no longer initiate any negotiations on this issue,” Putin said,
referring to his foreign and defense ministries. “Let’s wait until our partners are ready to hold an
equal, meaningful dialogue on this extremely important topic.”

Russia won’t negotiate on arms control

Baev ’18 (Pavel Baev is a nonresident senior fellow in the Center on the United States and
Europe at Brookings and a research professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). He
specializes in Russian military reform, Russia’s conflict management in the Caucasus and Central
Asia, and energy interests in Russia’s foreign and security policies, as well as Russia’s relations
with Europe and NATO, “Missiles of March: A political means of last resort for Putin,” Brookings,
3/7/18, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/03/07/missiles-of-march-a-
political-means-of-last-resort-for-putin/)

Putin’s emotional comment in his speech that “nobody wanted to listen to us…so listen now”
contains yet another part of the answer, though it doesn’t mean that Russia is ready to talk.
Moscow has shown no inclination to resume meaningful negotiations on strategic arms control,
and Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov cancelled scheduled consultations on strategic
stability with U.S. Under Secretary of State Thomas Shannon this week. Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov’s remarks at the recent Conference on Disarmament in Geneva amounted to accusing
the United States of preparing for a nuclear war in Europe. And Putin’s address did nothing to
dispel persistent U.S. accusations that Russia is in violation of the 1988 Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

It is not that Putin strives to start negotiations, but rather that he wants to arrest the decline of
Russia’s relevance on the international arena. First of all, he needs to reinforce the delusion of
“greatness” in the eyes of his domestic audience, and his speech’s emphasis on missiles indeed
induced a standing ovation. Another important addressee, quite possibly, was China, which is
inclined to take the “strategic partnership” with Russia for granted and was mentioned only
once in Putin’s speech. Sustained joint efforts by the United States and China in managing the
North Korean crisis (which Putin didn’t find opportune to mention at all) upsets Moscow, which
cannot contribute meaningfully to this counter-proliferation work but resents the neglect.

Russia’s economic weakness is so profound that Russia cannot possibly engage in anything
resembling a real arms race with the United States and NATO. Putin’s enthusiastic rollout of
Russia’s missile program scored many good points domestically but produced a mixed
impression among his key international audiences. It doesn’t take a shrewd strategic mind to
conclude that Russia can only proceed with these entirely unnecessary weapon programs at the
expense of addressing its more pressing economic needs and acute security challenges,
including Syria. Putin’s posturing cannot meet many strict reality checks, but it is nevertheless,
dangerous because it damages the norm of owning nuclear weapons responsibly.

Putin won’t negotiate – BMDs distract from domestic issues

Lilly ’15 (Bilyana Lilly is author of the book, Russian Foreign Policy toward Missile Defense:
Actors, Motivations, and Influence, “How Putin uses missile defence in Europe to distract
Russian voters,” NATO Review Magazine, 2015,
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/Russia/Ballistic-Missile-Defence-Putin/EN/index.htm)

Moscow’s confrontational position on missile defence has proven politically expedient for a
Russian government that has built its legitimacy on the necessity to defend Russia from external
enemies. Now, when Russia is entering a full-fledged economic crisis that could affect the
political allegiances of the Russian population, the Kremlin needs to revive the issue of BMD – a
welcome enemy that contributes to the justification for government survival.

The Kremlin has been formally opposing the deployment of BMD on the basis that it would pose
a threat to Russia’s nuclear deterrent and Russian security. Moscow has been using this strategy
to prove Russia is a besieged nation surrounded by hostile powers. Putin used the example of
missile defence in his February 2007 speech at the G8 Security Conference in Munich, while
Medvedev referred to missile defence as a justification for military upgrades in 2011.

However, Russia’s security-based objections to the construction of ballistic missile defence in

Europe appear unjustified given the array of countermeasures that Russia could employ to
overcome NATO’s BMD. As of September 1, 2014, following its obligations under the New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), Russia reported to be in possession of a total of 1,643
warheads and 528 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched
ballistic missile (SLBMs) and heavy bombers. Additionally, Russia possesses tactical missiles,
decoys and chaff, and multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles.

These are among the many countermeasures that Russia can use to negate the effect of missile
defence. Given Russia’s offensive capabilities, Russia’s argument that missile defence in Europe
poses a security threat to Moscow appears exaggerated. Then, why does the Russian leadership
keep bringing it up?

The Political Usefulness of Ballistic Missile Defence

Russia’s objections seem more logical when examining the domestic utility of hostile rhetoric
towards missile defence in Europe. Describing NATO’s missile defence as a threat to Russia feeds
into the currently-promoted narrative. This paints the West as an aggressive force which aims to
change Russia’s regime and negate its nuclear deterrent, which Moscow regards as the ultimate
guarantee of its sovereignty. The justification that Russia has to protect itself from the external
threat strengthens the need to maintain a strong, centralised government, endure economic
woes, and continue to invest in military modernisation.

In his December 4 annual address, Putin used this logic by pointing to missile defence to justify
the need to maintain and likely strengthen Russia’s defence. He insisted that Russia’s policy is
reactive, forced by external factors: “We have no intention of becoming involved in a costly
arms race - but at the same time we will reliably and dependably guarantee our country’s
defence under the new conditions. There are absolutely no doubts about this. This will be
done.”

The strategy to portray BMD as a threat to the Russian population seems effective. A survey
conducted by the Russian polling organisation Levada centre in 2007 and again in 2010 revealed
that the majority of the Russian constituency believed that the US construction of BMD in
Europe presents a larger threat to Russia than the acquisition of offensive military capabilities by
Iran or North Korea.

The 2010 Levada poll showed that 55 per cent of the respondents believed that the number one
threat to Russian security was the deployment of US BMD in neighbouring states. Only 13 per
cent of the respondents stated that Iran’s nuclear programme represented the main threat to
Russia and 13 per cent indicated that the main threat was North Korea’s possession of nuclear
weapons.

The 2010 Levada survey could be analysed together with another 2010 Levada poll that
confirmed the deeply engrained perception of America’s hostile intentions among Russians.
Some 73 per cent of the polled Russians indicated that the United States was an aggressor that
sought to establish control over all states. In November 2014, another survey showed that 74
per cent of Russians had a negative opinion of the United States – an unprecedented peak in the
post-Cold War period.

In this context, the portrayal of missile defence in Europe as a threat to Russia was important to
strengthen Putin’s image among the Russian population and elites. A confrontational approach
to BMD was, for example, useful before the 2012 presidential election when Putin built his
platform on the image of defending a besieged state. Reconstructing the image of the United
States as a Cold War type aggressor facilitated this perception and justified running again on the
basis of the need to protect the Russian people from external enemies.

Hence, castigating the United States and NATO again became an effective strategy to win votes.

As a part of his 2012 presidential campaign, Putin published seven articles in various Russian
newspapers on seven major issues. In the sixth article, entitled “Be Strong: Guarantees of
National Security for Russia,” Putin focused on military issues and linked the construction of
missile defence in Europe to strengthening Russia’s nuclear arsenal. The soon-to-be again
president argued that as missile defence in Europe threatens Russia’s security, Russia has to
invest in improving the capability of its nuclear forces to overcome the BMD threat.

This policy entails investing more in weapons modernisation, in Russia’s air and space
defence,as well as in the military industrial sector. These policies would most likely appeal to the
large group of Russian voters with a military outlook and Russians employed in the defence
industry and the military bureaucracy. Some reports estimate that these voters could constitute
as much as 40% of Russia’s voting population – quite a significant portion of the population to
appeal to.

Russia’s return to a confrontational BMD position as a tool to distract domestic audiences and
contribute to Putin’s approval ratings is therefore, a logical manoeuvre. Russia is in the midst of
a currency crisis, with the Russian rouble hitting record low exchange rates. Under pressure by
Western sanctions and low oil prices, the Kremlin’s energy-dependent coffers may find it
challenging to slow the current rates of domestic policy problems that will likely affect public
confidence in the Russian leadership. As another Levada survey showed, 80 percent of Russians
expect a worsening of Russia’s economic performance.

For all of these reasons, BMD has become a political, rather than military, tool for distraction
that helps to convince the Russian population of the need to focus on protecting the Russian
state, rather than their economic livelihoods.

U.S. BMD concessions are a prereq to any negotiations

Arbatov ’18 (Alexey G. Arbatov has worked at IMEMO (the Institute of World Economy and
International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences) since 1976, with an interval from
1994 to 2003, when he was a member of Russian parliament (State Duma), where he was
deputy chair of the Defense Committee. Since 2004 he has been the head of the Center for
International Security at IMEMO. From 2004 to 2017, he also worked part-time at the Carnegie
Moscow Center as a head of its program on nuclear non-proliferation, “The vicissitudes of
Russian missile defense,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 74, Issue 4, pg 227-237,
6/28/18, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2018.1486595)

At present, deep political conflicts, profound mutual mistrust and disrespect, and reciprocal
historic grievances prevent any constructive dialogue on missile defense between the United
States and Russia. Moreover, neither the Putin nor the Trump administration considers nuclear
(or any other) arms control a serious policy priority. For Moscow, nuclear arms and deterrence
constitute a “sacred cow,” and the same could be said about nuclear weapons and missile
defense for the current Republican administration in Washington.

Nonetheless, if the political environment improves or some arms control venues are considered
important enough to be made a “safe haven” from other Russian-American controversies, a
number of strategic changes now under way might actually be conducive to new arms control
agreements:

The massive American nuclear modernization program envisioned by the most recent US
Nuclear Posture Review may revive Russia’s interest in strategic arms limitations after 2021,
when the New START arms control agreement expires (or after 2026 if the treaty term is
extended).

The new Russian ballistic and hypersonic systems advertized in Putin’s statement earlier this
year to the Federal Assembly may alleviate Russia’s real or self-inspired alarm about US ballistic
missile defenses. Those Russian systems could also serve to politically justify a shift of Moscow’s
position on the BMD issue (as artificial as the linkage may actually be).

Expansion of Russia’s air-space defense program and system may make its position on BMD
limitation more flexible.

The United States may be motivated to continue strategic talks with Russia by an interest in
limitation of and transparency on Russia’s new ballistic, hypersonic, and underwater nuclear
weapon programs.
The growing nuclear potential of China may make both Washington and Moscow more
interested in limiting their bilateral offensive-defensive arms race and corresponding expenses.

If and when ballistic missile defense returns as a subject of US-Russian negotiations, the two
countries will start from quite distant points of view. Most probably Washington would like to
enjoy the right for free deployment of global and regional BMD systems without any
quantitative or qualitative limitations. At a maximum, the United States might find some
transparency provisions and confidence-building measures acceptable.

It is impossible to know whether Russia presently even wants a new agreement with the United
States and, if one were sought, what kind of agreement it could be. In fact, while vehemently
protesting against US defense systems, Moscow has never formulated its position on BMD
limitation in any practical manner, and it is not at all clear whether it has any such framework in
mind now. Theoretically, Moscow would find a new version of the ABM Treaty (just one
permitted deployment area, holding up to 100 missile-interceptors) preferable. It would
probably also strive for a prohibition on strategic BMD deployment beyond national borders, or
at least for a limitation on US Aegis (including Aegis Ashore) systems that includes antimissiles’
numbers, technical characteristics and deployment geography. At the same time, Russia would
insist on free deployment of S-400 and S-500 systems across its and its allies’ national territories
and on surface ships.

If both presidents showed enough determination, and there were a US domestic political
environment that permitted it, a compromise on missile defense might be reached. The basis of
such compromise may consist in agreeing on definitions that separate the class of ballistic
missile defenses that could tangibly affect strategic stability by intercepting a large number of
US or Russian ICBMs and SLBMs from those missile defenses that are aimed against other states
and rogue regimes. The first class of BMD would be restricted, but the second – which would
enhance US-Russian mutual security – could be given a “green light.”

An illustration of a possible deal: An agreement could limit strategic BMD systems to two to
three deployment areas inside each country, with no more than 200 to 300 long-range missile
interceptors (of the ground-based missile defense and Nudol’ types) in total. Such arrays would
be enough to deal with other nuclear states, rogue regimes, or accidental launches. Regional
BMD systems (Aegis or S-500 types) might be limited as to the speed of their interceptors (for
instance, to 5 km/sec27

Washington may also want to repeat its proposal of 2011 to allow Russia to monitor Aegis
missiles tests, which could provide assurance that the system is not intended for boost-phase
intercept. A boost-phase capability is exactly what most concerns Moscow regarding the US
BMD deployments close to Russian territory (i.e. on land in Rumania and Poland, and on ships, if
deployed in the Black, Baltic, and Northern seas). If, however, the United States decides to
enhance the Aegis-type system for boost-phase intercepts of ballistic missiles of third states or
rogue regimes, then certain limits on deployment geography would be needed to alleviate
Russia’s concerns.29

Putin says no – he needs to bluster on ballistic missiles for domestic politics

MacFarquhar & Sanger ‘18
(Neil MacFarquhar, is the Moscow bureau chief for The New York Times, and was part of the
team awarded the 2017 Pulitzer Prize in international reporting for a series on Russia’s covert
projection of power, David E. Sanger is a national security correspondent and a senior writer. In
a 36-year reporting career for The New York Times, he has been on three teams that have won
Pulitzer Prizes, most recently in 2017 for international reporting, “Putin’s ‘Invincible’ Missile Is
Aimed at U.S. Vulnerabilities,” New York Times, 3/1/18,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/01/world/europe/russia-putin-speech.html)

MOSCOW — President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia threatened the West with a new generation
of nuclear weapons Thursday, including what he described as an “invincible” intercontinental
cruise missile and a nuclear torpedo that could outsmart all American defenses.

The presentation by Mr. Putin, which included animation videos depicting multiple warheads
aimed at Florida, where President Trump often stays at his Mar-a-Lago resort, sharply escalated
the military invective in the tense relationship between the United States and Russia, which has
led to predictions of a costly new nuclear arms race.

While Mr. Putin may have been bluffing about these weapons, as some experts suggested, he
cleverly focused on a vulnerability of American-designed defenses: They are based on the
assumption that enemy nuclear missiles fly high and can be destroyed well before they reach
their targets.

The new class of Russian weapons, he said, travel low, stealthily, far and fast — too fast for
defenders to react.

Mr. Putin’s announcement, in his annual state of the nation address, seemed intended chiefly to
stir the patriotic passions of Russians at a moment when he is heading into a re-election
campaign, even though his victory is assured in what amounts to a one-candidate race.

He also used the speech to reassure Russians that the military buildup was taking place even as
the government was spending big sums to improve the quality of their lives.

But the main attention grabber in the speech was the weapons, which Mr. Putin described as a
response to what he called the repudiation of arms control by the United States and its plans for
a major weapons buildup.

The Trump administration has said that countering the world’s two other superpowers, Russia
and China, was becoming its No. 1 national security mission, ahead of counterterrorism.

It has largely blamed Russia’s military modernization for that shift and has justified new work on
nuclear weapons and bolstered missile defenses as the appropriate answer.

Mr. Putin may have further fueled the tension on Thursday by essentially declaring that Russia’s
military brains had made America’s response obsolete.

He said a team of young, high-tech specialists had labored secretly and assiduously to develop
and test the new weapons, including a nuclear-powered missile that could reach anywhere and
evade interception.
“With the missile launched and a set of ground tests completed, we can now proceed with the
construction of a fundamentally new type of weapon,” Mr. Putin said.

He showed a video that illustrated the weapon flying over a mountain range, then slaloming
around obstacles in the southern Atlantic before rounding Cape Horn at the tip of South
America and heading north toward the West Coast of the United States.

Given that deception lies at the heart of current Russian military doctrine, questions arose about
whether these weapons existed. American officials said that the nuclear cruise missile is not yet
operational, despite Mr. Putin’s claims, and that it had crashed during testing in the Arctic.
The threats evoked the bombast of the Cold War. But this time they are not based on greater numbers of bombs but
increased capabilities, stealth and guile.

Mr. Putin’s boasts about undersea nuclear torpedoes and earth-hugging cruise missiles emphasized the uselessness
of American defenses against such weapons.

Oddly, apart from a reference to renewing the American nuclear arms enterprise in his State of the Union address,
Mr. Trump has said almost nothing about the new era of competition with Mr. Putin or Russia. With multiple
investigations into whether his campaign’s connections to Russians had influenced policy, he has neither protested
the Russian buildup nor publicly endorsed, in any detail, his own administration’s plans to counter it.

The cruise missile was among five weapons introduced by Mr. Putin, each shown in video mock-ups on giant screens
flanking him onstage. He threatened to use the weapons, as well as Russia’s older-generation nuclear arms, against
the United States and Europe if Russia were attacked.

“We would consider any use of nuclear weapons against Russia or its allies to be a nuclear attack on our country,” he
said.

Mr. Putin said he could not show the actual weapons publicly, but assured his audience of Russia’s main political and
prominent cultural figures that they had all been developed.

If Mr. Putin was not bluffing, said Aleksandr M. Golts, an independent Russian military analyst, then “these weapons
are definitely new, absolutely new.”

“If we’re talking about nuclear-armed cruise missiles, that’s a technological breakthrough and a gigantic
achievement,” he said in an interview. But, he added, “The question is, is this true?”

Several analysts writing on Facebook and elsewhere leaned toward the bluff theory. Given the recent history of
Russian launch failures or premature crashes, the idea that Russia suddenly possessed a new generation of flying
weapons strained credulity.

“The real surprise in among all of this is a nuclear-powered cruise missile,” said Douglas Barrie, a senior fellow for
military aerospace at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. “It was talked about in the ’60s, but it
ran into a lot of obstacles. To the extent that the Russians are seriously revisiting this is pretty interesting.”

Such technology could alter the balance of power, but Mr. Barrie questioned whether Russia was even close to
deploying it.

“Does reality mean you have an item in the budget saying, ‘Develop nuclear propulsion for a missile?’” he said. “Or
does it mean, ‘We’re going to have one ready to use soon’? I’d certainly want to see more evidence to believe that.”

Mr. Putin said Russia had developed the weaponry because the United States had rejected established arms control
treaties and was deploying new missile defense systems in Europe and Asia.

President Barack Obama said that he was willing to negotiate cuts deeper than the 1,550 arms that Washington and
Moscow are permitted to deploy under the 2010 New Start treaty, which took full effect last month. But it expires in a
few years, and neither Mr. Putin nor Mr. Trump has shown interest in renewing it.
The United States has also accused Russia of violating the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty. After Mr. Putin’s
speech, Heather Nauert, the State Department’s spokeswoman, said Mr. Putin essentially confirmed that by
trumpeting the country’s development of new nuclear weapons.

Mr. Putin was correct that the United States is investing in expanding missile defenses. But
those were not meant to counter Russia’s huge arsenals, but rather the launching of a few
missiles by a state like North Korea.

The new Russian weapons would render such defenses obsolete, Mr. Putin gloated, and if
anyone found a workaround, “our boys will think of something new.”

Other weapons the Russian leader discussed included a ballistic missile called Sarmat that could
round either pole and overcome any defense system; hypersonic nuclear weaponry that fly at
20 times the speed of sound; and unmanned deepwater submarines that could go huge
distances at enormous speed.

Mr. Putin said that some of the weapons were so new that they had yet to be named, and
announced a naming contest on the Ministry of Defense website.

Political analysts said it was an effective campaign ploy whether the weapons existed or not.
“He’s giving people the image of a desired future, of a future for Russia, and that’s appealing for
his domestic audience,” said Aleksei V. Makarkin, the deputy head of the Center for Political
Technologies, a Moscow think tank.

Mr. Putin’s guns-and-butter, Russia-can-do-it-all speech came 17 days before the March 18
election. It seemed intended to reassure voters that expanded social spending would help solve
the economic problems of the past four years, while sending the message that Mr. Putin was
their best hope in protecting a Russia portrayed as a besieged fortress.
 2ac at: Russia Leverage CP – say no (Syria)
Russia won’t pull out of Syria – key to grand strategy and status
Frolovskiy 19 (Dmitriy Frolovskiy is a political analyst and independent journalist. He also works
as a consultant on policy and strategy in the Middle East and Central Asia, “What Putin Really
Wants In Syrai,” Foreign Policy, 2/1/19, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/01/what-putin-
really-wants-in-syria-russia-assad-strategy-kremlin/)

Russia received the best possible gift from the Trump administration right before Christmas and
now has a free hand to determine the future of its troubled Middle Eastern ally. With the United
States preparing to exit the Syrian conflict, the Kremlin’s strategy won’t change much. That’s
because it was never about Syria from the beginning.

Projecting the effects of Russia’s Syria campaign beyond the Middle East was always the
Kremlin’s goal. Projecting the effects of Russia’s Syria campaign beyond the Middle East was
always the Kremlin’s goal. The conflict was always perceived as a tool to showcase ambitions
that assert Russia as a global power. Moscow perceives U.S. President Donald Trump’s
abandonment of Syria as a victory that adds greatly to its political capital. It could also allow
Moscow to reach out to European leaders in France and Germany, as well as the European
Union’s foreign-policy chief, by persuading them to embrace their own version of a political
settlement.

Russia officially launched its airstrikes in Syria in September 2015. At the same time, Moscow’s
heavy-handed attempts to tighten its grip over eastern Ukraine were accompanied by waves of
sanctions that quickly sent the Kremlin’s international political capital plummeting. Despite
trying hard to appear as the world’s biggest disruptor and antagonizing the Western world at
every turn, Moscow’s true objective was to gain enough influence to re-engage with it as an
equal.

Ukraine was a lost cause. According to Mikhail Zygar, the former editor of Russia’s independent
TV news channel, Rain, Russian President Vladimir Putin had informed George W. Bush in 2008
at the NATO Summit: “If Ukraine joins NATO, it will do so without Crimea and the eastern
regions. It will simply fall apart.” The Kremlin was never in a position to compromise over its
former Soviet satellite, and its international ambitions always went well beyond being a
“regional power”—an insult once uttered by U.S. President Barack Obama.

When Russia intervened in the Middle East, Syria found itself in a Hobbesian state of nature
with thousands of groups fighting each other and the Islamic State emerging as the world’s
biggest bogeyman. Moscow, however, still suffered from the so-called Afghan syndrome that
preceded the collapse of the Soviet empire. The ghosts of the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s
still haunt the corridors of the Kremlin; few want to end up in another quagmire in the Islamic
world. Despite hoping for a quick victory after overthrowing Afghan President Hafizullah Amin
and reinstalling the communist leadership in 1979, the Soviet military ended up in a decadelong
debacle and lost about 15,000 troops. As a result, any possible military campaign in Syria was
met with an extreme caution. Although it was a gamble to intervene, the possible benefits
eventually outweighed the risks in the eyes of the Kremlin’s strategists.Although it was a gamble
to intervene, the possible benefits eventually outweighed the risks in the eyes of the Kremlin’s
strategists.

They saw defeating the Islamic State and playing first fiddle in directing a political settlement in
Syria as an opportunity to assert Russia’s status as a global power. The chance to fight together
with Western nations, combined with Moscow’s special relations with the Syrian regime and
Iran, which carried out most of fighting on the ground, meant that the Kremlin could present
itself as fighting against a universal evil in the form of the Islamic State while also securing a
comparative edge.

Emerging as a regional power was another objective. Speaking in the plenary meeting of the
United Nations General Assembly that took place just two days before the aerial campaign,
Putin endowed Russia with a “fixer role” by famously addressing the United States with the
question: “Do you at least realize now what you’ve done?” Moscow sensed the opportunity to
fill a vacuum in a metastasizing conflict zone that only grew as American disillusionment with an
interventionist U.S. Middle East policy deepened. The fixer role has delivered its benefits, but
Russia didn’t enter Syria to fix it. Putin always intended to be much more than a fixer; he wanted
Moscow to be an indispensable actor.

Russia’s actions were not simply opportunistic and dictated by short-term tactical thinking. The
goal in Syria was not to grab what was left but to flex its muscle and showcase power. Moscow’s
approach turned out to be a blessing in disguise within the turbulent setting of the Middle East.
When one man in the Kremlin and a cohort of few chosen aides decide everything in the course
of a phone call, it’s a familiar way of doing business that resonates with authoritarian regimes
across the region.

After three years of nonstop bombing and throughout the previous year’s summits in Sochi,
Russia, and Astana, Kazakhstan, it became obvious that Russia was championing a political
settlement. Its foreign adventures seemed to have paid off. The Kremlin’s actions helped it to
secure access to all conflicting parties in the region, and its voice is now heard from the
corridors of power in Tehran and Cairo to the ritzy palaces of the Gulf monarchies.
 1ar at: Russia Leverage CP – say no (Syria)
Syria is strategically key for Putin
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/25/magazine/russia-united-states-world-politics.html

It was in Syria where Putin challenged his country’s post-Cold War identity, as well as how the
West had perceived it for so long. His decision to commit Russian forces has been portrayed as
the first step in an effort to realign the region, but the strategy was largely a result of luck and
timing, its tactics born partly of a lack of resources.

After protests against the government of President Bashar al-Assad began in 2011, Moscow
blocked United Nations resolutions that would have paved the way for future intervention and
continued shipping weapons to the Syrian Army. Russia’s drive to protect Assad dovetailed with
the American administration’s regional disengagement. Obama had no interest in entangling
America in another war. He said the “red line” would be the use of chemical weapons, yet as
evidence of their use piled up, Washington did little. After the emergence of the Islamic State in
2013, the United States quickly became fixated on fighting the group itself, with little more than
vague words of support for the Syrian opposition.

By 2015, Assad’s regime was on the precipice of collapse, losing territory to ISIS and the anti-
government militias simultaneously. The Middle East is far closer to Moscow than to
Washington; Syria’s nearest border with Russia is roughly as far away as Washington is from
Boston. Moscow feared the spread of unrest and terrorism like a contagion. On Sept. 30, 2015,
Assad sent a formal request for assistance based on a 1980 military cooperation treaty, which
the Russian Parliament rubber-stamped. Russian armed forces officially went in. (Many Russians
I spoke to quickly pointed out that because of this process, Putin’s military presence in Syria,
unlike the U.S. invasion of Iraq, is permissible.)

After years of “covert” war by Russia in Ukraine and the legacy of a decade-long Soviet
embroilment in Afghanistan, which killed 14,000 Soviet troops and one million civilians, the
Russian population was genuinely wary about the intervention in Syria. In a poll by the Levada
Center, Russia’s only major independent polling center, 69 percent of Russians were against
direct military involvement. In terms of technical support, opinions were split — only 43 percent
believed Russia should advise and arm Assad, while 41 percent were against it. Analysts and
opposition politicians pointed out a host of risks from Russian “adventurism.” Dmitry Gudkov,
Russia’s most vocal opposition member of Parliament, warned about potential repercussions. “It
is not known how this will end,” he cautioned during an interview with Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty. Russia has its own large Muslim minority, roughly 10 percent of the population, and ex-
Soviet countries contributed the largest cadre of foreign ISIS fighters, estimated at up to 8,500
people. Gudkov cautioned that troops on the ground in Syria risked inflaming ethnic tensions
within Russia’s own borders.

The Kremlin cares deeply about domestic opinion and set about selling the intervention on
television and through pro-war op-eds. “The entire Middle East, due to internal reasons and the
stupid, unceremonious and irresponsible intervention of the West, entered a period of decades
of instability,” Sergei Karaganov, honorary chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense
Policy, explained on a popular Saturday political-affairs show. “And this instability will have to be
controlled.”

The Russian incursion began with a volley of airstrikes “targeting ISIS” in an area where there
were no records of its activity. It was instead home to anti-Assad militias and at least one C.I.A.-
trained group. The following day, Lavrov clarified that the Russian air campaign was targeting
“all terrorists.” Over the coming weeks, Russia surprised Western officials with its modernized
military. After the country’s disastrous war with Georgia in 2008, Putin had embarked on an
extensive modernization program. Russia deployed 215 new weapons, showcasing them to
potential buyers. Strikes utilized the relatively untested Sukhoi Su-34 strike fighter and a ship-
based cruise missile fired more than 900 miles from the Caspian Sea, which, according to some
analysts, exceeded American capabilities. Putin was open about Russia’s intended message. “It
is one thing for the experts to be aware that Russia supposedly has these weapons, and another
thing for them to see for the first time that they do really exist,” he said on state television.

The payoff was immediate: Russia’s international isolation was over. The afternoon Russia
struck, Secretary of State John Kerry and Lavrov met at the United Nations and agreed to begin
talks on avoiding unintended confrontations. “Obama didn’t give a hoot about Syria by 2015,”
Robert Ford, America’s former ambassador to Syria, told me. “All he was interested in was the
fight against ISIS.” He went on: “I think the Americans at that point, the White House, had
washed their hands of it, and Kerry, kind of operating almost solo, was pleading with the
Russians.”

Russia’s official military death toll has remained relatively low throughout the conflict. The brunt
of the casualty count, which the state suppresses, has been borne by private contractors,
including the Wagner Group, a firm said to be run by Putin’s close friend Yevgeny Prigozhin,
known as “Putin’s chef,” though mercenaries are technically illegal in Russia.

As Michelle Dunne, director of the Middle East program at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, told me: “Putin has played a clever hand on the cheap, without really
investing that much in it.” Russia’s economy is 10 times smaller than America’s, and Trenin
estimated the cost at roughly $4 million per day, which is “reasonably affordable” for the state
budget. (By comparison, the United States’ mission in Syria, part of Operation Inherent Resolve,
cost $54 billion from 2014 to 2019, or $25 million a day.)

By 2017, Russia had embarked on its own diplomatic solution to the conflict, outside the United
Nations process, holding conferences in Astana and Sochi alongside Turkey (a NATO member)
and Iran. “The Russians transformed the Syrian rebellion from one actively fighting Bashar al-
Assad to one giving up on the fall of Bashar al-Assad and trying to preserve their areas of
influence,” Hassan Hassan, director of the nonstate actors program at the Center for Global
Policy, told me. Hassan explained that Turkey’s place alongside Moscow in the Astana
conference gave Russia credibility in the eyes of the anti-Assad militias. Yet they knew full well
whom they were dealing with. Under the guise of supporting Assad against ISIS, Moscow
assisted and looked the other way as the regime dropped barrel bombs on hospitals, starved
civilian population centers and set up massive domestic detention and torture facilities. More
than half a million people have been killed in the fighting. Russia has also successfully
obfuscated the most egregious Assad crimes — the use of chemical weapons. In Sochi and
Astana, those fighting the dictator are now sitting down with the same power breathing life into
his despotic government. “The fighters trusted Turkey more than they trusted Russia,” Hassan
told me. “But Russia was the leader.”

In many ways, Moscow’s assertive foreign policy came as a result of earlier decisions made in
Washington. Both Putin and the Obama administration were responding to the same thing:
George W. Bush’s aggressive foreign policy. America’s withdrawal from the Middle East and
elsewhere was the result of an American imperial hangover. Russia and the United States had
moved in opposite directions, creating an appearance of one power rising and the other falling.
The outcome was ultimately the same: “Whatever people think about Russia’s role, everybody
acknowledges that it is the key state there,” Lukyanov told me. “It’s not because of Russian
strength; it’s because of American weakness, it’s because of European geopolitical collapse. But
that’s a fact of life now.”
DAs
 2ac at: Assurance - Uq
Non UQ - The US-Japan alliance is at a historic low and Japan has already
perceived signals of abandonment – Trump actions with North Korea, remarks
about commitment to allies, and trade deficit.
The Economist 18 (The Economist, 9-6-2018, "Japan is worried about its alliance with
America," The Economist, https://www.economist.com/asia/2018/09/06/japan-is-worried-
about-its-alliance-with-america, Accessed: 7-12-2019 //kent - wh)

At the same time, the alliance between Japan and America is under unprecedented stress,
mainly because of America’s president, Donald Trump (pictured with Japan’s prime minister, Shinzo Abe,
in Tokyo last November). There are worries in Tokyo that Mr Trump might strike a deal with North Korea’s
leader, Kim Jong Un, that protects America but leaves Japan exposed to a North Korean
attack. Japan has been feeling largely sidelined during the recent high-level diplomacy
surrounding North Korea’s nukes. Indeed, Katsuyuki Kawai, an adviser to Mr Abe, describes the Trump-Kim
summit in June in Singapore as a wake-up call for Japan. After the meeting, Mr Trump
announced a suspension of exercises with South Korea and aired the idea of
withdrawing American troops from the Korean peninsula. “We have decisively entered
a new security environment,” says Mr Kawai.
Few observers go quite that far, but Japanese
and American officials wince at Mr Trump’s casual
raising of doubts about his commitment to allies and about his belief in the global
economic order that has allowed Japan to prosper. They still prefer not to air their worries publicly. For
example, Taro Kono, the foreign minister, praises the alliance as “stronger than ever”. He points to the personal rapport between Mr
Abe and Mr Trump, who has spent more time talking to Japan’s prime minister than to any other country’s leader. On February 14th
the two men spoke by telephone for more than an hour about North Korea and other matters. Mr Kono jokes that having such a
long chat on Valentine’s Day is something he would not do with his wife.

Yet in private some Japanese officials say that Mr Trump unnerves them when he says
that America is being taken advantage of by other countries, including allies, and that he
resents spending so much on deployments abroad. Japan-hands in America say he does not seem to
understand that the 54,000 American troops in Japan are there to defend not just Japan, but also American primacy in the region.

Most imminently, a storm is looming over trade. Mr Trump is obsessed with America’s trade
deficits, and one of its largest is with Japan. It was nearly $70bn last year (see chart). Mr Trump wants
a deal with Japan that could oblige it to reduce tariffs on agricultural imports. Japan is
resisting. It says that Mr Trump should look not just at trade but also at the scale of Japanese investment in America. Japanese
firms make 3.8m cars there annually, more than double the number they send to America from Japan.

But Mr Blair, the former Pacific forces chief (who also served as President Barack Obama’s director of national
intelligence), describes Mr Trump’s refusal to exempt Japan from his tariffs on steel and
aluminium as “a dress rehearsal” for things to come. Unlike China, Japan has refrained from
retaliating against Mr Trump’s assaults on free trade. But if America applies tariffs of
25% on cars, as he has threatened, Mr Abe would find it hard not to respond in kind.
Japan’s exports of cars to America have doubled in the past six years, to $40bn. Extra tariffs on them could be an
embarrassment too far for Mr Abe, on top of the humiliation he has already suffered as
a result of Mr Trump’s Japan-neglecting diplomacy in the region.
These developments together have major implications for U.S. deterrence strategy, with its
separate dimensions of extended deterrence, central deterrence, and strategic stability.
Changes in one or all of these dimensions have important implications for Japan, which has
opted to continue to depend upon the United States as a security guarantor, specifically on U.S.
extended nuclear deterrence. A strong anti-nuclear weapons sentiment prevails among
both the Japanese public and its political leadership, and the sentiment has only grown
stronger with the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident of 2011. Japan’s commitment
to its non-nuclear policy remains firm despite North Korea’s nuclear weapons and
missile development, which have become increasingly provocative with increased tests
of missiles and nuclear explosions. More significantly in the context of deterrence, the
increased North Korean threat has moved Japan to further strengthen defense cooperation with
the United States for the purpose of enhancing the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence.
Japan’s non-nuclear policy will not change until and unless the U.S. nuclear umbrella
loses its credibility in Japanese eyes. There are also important practical reasons for
Japan not to pursue an independent nuclear deterrent, to be discussed later.

Non UQ - Trump has already undermined US-Japan security alliance through

comments about the security treaty - the key issue in the US-Japan alliance.
Bass 6/28 (Gary J. Bass, professor of politics and international affairs, Trumps Ignorant
Comments about Japan were Bad, Even for Him, New York Times,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/28/opinion/trump-japan.html)

President Trump reserves some of his worst behavior for foreign trips, such as abasing himself
before President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia in Helsinki a year ago, skipping a ceremony in France
last fall to honor American soldiers killed in World War I (too rainy, the White House said) and
insulting the mayor of London earlier this month. Yet even by Mr. Trump’s dismal standards, his
performance this week before the G-20 summit in Osaka, Japan, should take everyone’s breath
away. More than yet another demonstration of his erratic behavior, this was also an object
lesson in the dangers of his context-free hostility to the world beyond the United States.

Before arriving in Japan, Mr. Trump had reportedly been musing about withdrawing the
United States from the security treaty with Japan signed in 1951 and revised in 1960 —
the cornerstone of the alliance between the United States and Japan and a pillar of
American foreign policy. On Wednesday, asked about the treaty on Fox News, Mr. Trump
sneered, “If Japan is attacked, we will fight World War III.” Then he added: “But if we’re
attacked, Japan doesn’t have to help us at all. They can watch it on a Sony television.”
Mr. Trump’s comment demonstrates a strategic cluelessness and historical ignorance that
would disqualify a person from even a modest desk job at the State Department.

Though Mr. Trump implied that the security treaty favors Japan, it was largely dictated by the
United States. After Imperial Japan surrendered to the Allies in August 1945, ending World War
II, the country was placed under an American-led occupation overseen by the domineering Gen.
Douglas MacArthur. When that occupation ended in April 1952, Japan had turned away from
militarism to embrace ideals of pacifism and democracy. Under Article 9 of a new Constitution
that was originally drafted in English at MacArthur’s headquarters, Japan renounced war and
pledged never to maintain land, sea or air forces.

In the 1951 security treaty that Mr. Trump apparently disparages, the United States, from a
position of extraordinary dominance over Japan, got pretty much what it wanted. Japan granted
the United States the exclusive right to post land, air and sea forces in and around Japan, which
the United States could use to defend Japan against armed attack or against Soviet-instigated
riots. In a revised 1960 treaty, it was made clear that if Japan was attacked, the United States
would defend it. For much of the Cold War, a democratic Japan became the core of American
alliances in Asia, a bulwark against Communism in the Soviet Union and China. Furthermore,
Mr. Trump insults his Japanese hosts by overlooking how Japan actually responded
when the United States was attacked on Sept. 11, 2001. The Japanese public grieved for
their American allies after the terrorist attacks, which also killed some Japanese citizens. Japan’s
conservative and pro-American prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi, took the massacre as an
opportunity to reconsider Article 9 and urge his country to shoulder more international
responsibilities. His government rammed through an antiterrorism law which enabled Japan’s
Self-Defense Force to provide support for the American campaign in Afghanistan, although —
because of the country’s official pacifism — without fighting or directly supporting combat
operations.

When President George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003, Mr. Koizumi was one of his staunchest
foreign supporters. Although Japan remained constitutionally forbidden from joining in the
invasion or taking a direct military role, Mr. Koizumi’s government passed a special law allowing
the Self-Defense Force to help in humanitarian support missions in postwar Iraq. Hundreds of
Japanese ground troops in Iraq provided water and medical help, and fixed roads and buildings.
One might reasonably fault Mr. Koizumi, as plenty of Japanese do, for going along with Mr.
Bush’s disastrous invasion — but it is far harder to blame Japan, as Mr. Trump does, for not
standing alongside the United States.

Mr. Trump’s words are also a pointless slap to Japan’s right-wing prime minister, Shinzo
Abe, who has ardently sought to cultivate a relationship with Mr. Trump and is trying to
mediate a way out of the crisis between the United States and Iran . The 1960 treaty was
signed by Mr. Abe’s grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi, another prime minister. During a four-day
state visit to Japan in May, Mr. Abe flattered Mr. Trump with an extraordinary meeting with
Japan’s new emperor, a sumo wrestling match and a lavish state banquet at the Imperial Palace.
Yet standing next to Mr. Abe at a news conference in Tokyo, Mr. Trump shrugged off
Japanese fears about North Korea’s recent tests of short-range ballistic missiles that
could kill thousands of Japanese civilians.
What could Mr. Trump possibly hope to gain from his ignorant, ungrateful and antagonistic
behavior? He is unlikely to withdraw from the security treaty. Yet by questioning the alliance
with Japan, Mr. Trump encourages North Korea and a rising China to test that bond. His words
undercut an essential alliance for no evident reason and erode the stability of a strategic
region torn by rivalry.
And we are all so used to it by now that it barely registers.

Japan assurances low now – TPP, North Korea

Kevin KNODELL 9/17/18, “Don’t Let the US-Japanese Alliance Get Out of
Shape,” Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/17/u-s-
japan-military-exercise-rising-thunder/, CS
YAKIMA, Washington—Gunfire rang out as U.S. and Japanese troops descended on a small
village. Unloading from their armored vehicles, they poured into alleyways and set up
security positions. The soldiers moved carefully, methodically clearing out buildings before
going to the next position as they looked for enemy forces. The maneuvers felt real, but in
truth, they were part of the annual training exercise, Rising Thunder, that brings U.S.
soldiers and members of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) to the Yakima
Training Center in Washington state.
The U.S. Army first began using these training grounds in the 1940s, when it leased the land
to prepare soldiers to fight against the Japanese military. In those days, the wide-open
terrain was ideal for artillery drills for U.S. troops training to defend the United States’
coastlines and fight Japanese forces in the Pacific.
This time around, the two nations were working together as allies. As soldiers cleared
buildings, officers explained that the U.S. Army has been putting increasing attention on
training for potential battles in densely populated megacities, which military planners
worry could pose major challenges in future wars. The exercise wrapped up on Sept. 14, and
each side hopefully left with a better understanding of the other’s tactics and equipment for
such future missions.
For many decades, Japan, which is home to several U.S. military bases and is a key trading
partner, has been one of Washington’s closest allies. They share common concerns about
China’s territorial assertiveness and North Korean nuclear ambitious.
But things have been more strained since U.S. President Donald Trump was elected and
could grow even more so after Trump meets with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe this
month to discuss trade policy. In a recent call with a Wall Street Journal columnist,
Trump claimed to have a good relationship with the Japanese leader but added: “Of course
that will end as soon as I tell them how much they have to pay.”
This wouldn’t be the first time a meeting between the two men ended in discomfort.
According to the Washington Post, Trump surprised Abe during an otherwise pleasant
meeting in June when he declared, “I remember Pearl Harbor,” before launching into a
tirade about trade relations between the two countries. During the 2016 campaign, Trump
questioned the value of the U.S.-Japanese alliance and suggested withdrawing all U.S. troops
from country unless Tokyo agreed to pay vast sums of money.
On the flip side, Japanese officials have also expressed frustration with the White House’s
approach to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Abe reportedly told Trump that it
would be unwise to suspend joint training between U.S. and South Korean troops, a
concession that Trump readily made in his face-to-face meeting with North Korean leader
Kim Jong Un. Japanese officials have also been exasperated with the White House’s decision
to pull out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and impose stiff tariffs on steel and other goods.
 2ac at: Assurance – link turn
Link turn – alliance pressures is what caused Japanese acquisition of BMDs –
they don’t want Aegis.
Van 14 (Shanelle Van Sanford School of Public Policy – Duke University, “Ballistic Missile
Defense in Japan: Process-Tracing a Historical Trajectory” Undergraduate Honors Thesis,
December 2014, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/37750459.pdf - BIB)

As one of only two countries (the other being the United States) with both the lower- and upper-level capabilities for intercepting incoming missiles, Japan now has one of the
most sophisticated missile defense systems in the entire world. Conventional wisdom and the existing literature consider this success along a historical trajectory that started

achievement of missile defense capability in

the day of the 1998 North Korean Taepodong launch. But the narrative shows that the

Japan was in fact the result of an uphill struggle begun in the late 1980s. Though the Taepodong incident
was indeed important, numerous other factors – including alliance pressures, bureaucrats, and the defense industry among them – also played a

role in Japan’s decision to deploy BMD.

Incorrectly folding Japan’s commitment to BMD in with “Taepodong shock” threatens to
rewrite the actual history of the US-Japan alliance. This, in turn, generates unrealistic
expectations of what Japan can and will do militarily together with the United States. The
disconnect between Japan and the US has already taken its toll on the alliance. Relations
between the partners in recent years have been described as “anything but warm” 118– in
part, as this thesis shows, because Japan’s tendency to move at a frigid pace on security issues like

missile defense has led to doubt on the US side about whether Japan will ever reach a
satisfying point in holding its own within the alliance. If there is one commonality
amongst those who negotiated with the Japanese on missile defense in the 1990s, it is their
frustration with the sluggishness and the lack of coherence that characterized the
Japanese side. Negotiations such as these color the United States’ perception of its
alliance with Japan. Whereas every Japanese delegation was welcomed with open arms in the 20th century, it has become
increasingly difficult to convince Washington of why Japan is very important. Its story has “diminished,”
and expectations that Japan will step up have dwindled.119
 1ar at: Assurance – link turn
Japan was pressured into buying Aegis or else Trump would impose auto tarrifs
Nicholas Kamm, 17, “Japan’s military seeks record spending to reinforce N.Korea
missile defenses,” https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/31/japan-to-spend-billions-
on-us-missile-defense-to-deter-north-korea.html, accessed 7-28-2019 (Kent
Denver--EA)
Japan’s military wants record spending next year to help pay for major upgrades to defenses
designed to shoot down North Korean ballistic missiles that Tokyo sees as a continued threat
despite Pyongyang’s promise to abandon nuclear weapons. The Ministry of Defence budget
proposal released on Friday calls for defense spending to rise 2.1 percent to 5.3 trillion yen ($48
billion) for the year starting April 1. If approved, it will be the seventh straight annual increase as
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reinforces Japan’s military to respond to any North Korea missile
strike and counter China’s growing air and sea power in the waters around Japan. The proposed
defense budget still has to face scrutiny by Ministry of Finance officials who may seek to curtail
any rise in military outlays to secure funds for Japan’s burgeoning health and welfare spending.
The biggest proposed outlay in the military budget will be on ballistic missile defense, with a
request for 235 billion yen for two new powerful ground-based Aegis Ashore radar missile
tracking stations built by Lockheed Martin Corp. Japan’s military also wants funds to buy longer-
range Raytheon Co SM-3 interceptor missiles designed to strike enemy missiles in space and
money to improve the range and accuracy of its PAC-3 missiles batteries that are the last line of
defense against incoming warheads. Premium: Japanese F-15 jets 131027 Mounting threat:
Japanese F-15 jets are intercepting Chinese military planes daily. Toru Yamanaka | AFP | Getty
Images Japan remains wary of North Korean promises to abandon its nuclear weapons and
ballistic missile programs. The Ministry of Defense said in a white paper published on Tuesday
Pyongyang remained Japan’s “most serious and pressing threat”. Other big buys include six
Lockheed Martin F-35 stealth fighters for 91.6 billion yen and two E-2D Hawkeye early warning
patrol planes built by Northrop Grumman. Japan’s Maritime Self Defense Force also wants
funding to build two new destroyers and a submarine worth a combined 171 billion yen.
Purchases of American-made equipment could help Tokyo ease trade friction with
Washington as U.S. President Donald Trump pushes Japan to buy more American goods,
including military gear, while threatening to impose tariffs on Japanese auto imports to
cut a trade imbalance with Tokyo. The defense ministry’s latest budget request comes
ahead of a possible meeting between Abe and Trump in September, when the Japanese
leader is expected to attend the United Nations in New York.
 2ac at: Assurance – no il
No internal link - There is no risk of Japanese proliferation – cost is too high,
and unwillingness to risk collapse the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and US-
Japan Security Treaty.
Satoh 17 (Yukio Satoh, vice chairman of the Japan Institute of International Affairs, “U.S.
Extended Deterrence and Japan’s Security”, Livemore Papers on Global Security No. 2, Lawrence
Livemore National Laboratory Center for Global Security Research, October 2017,
https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/satoh-report-final.pdf)

There are additional reasons that Japan is highly unlikely to consider a nuclear option.
First, there is the financial factor. Japan lacks strategic depth, as its population is heavily
concentrated in a few major cities along the coasts. Thus, the only credible deterrent it
might consider would be one deployed at sea—nuclear submarines carrying nuclear tipped
ballistic missiles. This would be hugely expensive. It would also take many years to create
such a force, during which time its security position would likely erode considerably—
especially if it were to seek such a capability over Washington’s objections. Given Japan’s need
for a credible conventional defense posture—and the rising costs of fielding advanced defensive
systems—it makes far more sense for Japan to invest toward that end. A related objective, as
discussed further below, should be to help strengthen the capacity of the Southeast Asian
countries for maritime security.

There is also a diplomatic factor. A Japanese decision to embark upon nuclear weapons
development would no doubt deal a shattering blow to the nonproliferation regime and
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which would likely result in the emergence of
additional threats to Japan. It would also lead immediately to the country’s political
isolation. Among the many consequences of this would be the damaging effects on the
country’s economy.
Strategically, a Japanese decision to create an independent nuclear deterrent would
make the Americans question the continued value to the United States of the Japan–
U.S. Security Treaty. After all, from a U.S. perspective, such a Japanese decision would reflect a
loss of Japanese confidence in the willingness and/or ability of the United States to make good
on its promise to defend Japan.
 2ac at: Assurance - alliance resilient
alliance resilient – abe willing to do anything to maintain alliance for military
and diplomatic assistance
Crowley 5-24-2019 (Michael Crowley, White House and national security editor for Politico,
“‘Absolutely Unprecedented’: Why Japan’s Leader Tries So Hard to Court Trump”, Politico
Magazine, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/05/24/shinzo-abe-trump-japan-
226985)
TOKYO—Flying nearly 7,000 miles is not President Donald Trump’s idea of a good time. But he departed for Japan on Friday giddily
anticipating what he promised a day earlier would be “the biggest event they’ve had in over 200 years”: that is, his own meeting
with the country’s new emperor.

While his hosts may not view Trump’s visit as quite so momentous, it is a crescendo in the remarkable campaign of flattery and
cajoling waged by Japan’s prime minister, Shinzo Abe.

Trump had not yet been inaugurated when Abe hopped on a plane, uninvited, to meet
with the president-elect at Trump Tower. Since then, Abe has golfed with Trump three
times; visited Mar-a-Lago twice; gifted him a golf club worth nearly $3,800; dropped in
on First Lady Melania Trump’s birthday dinner; and even, according to Trump himself,
nominated Trump for a Nobel Prize. The two leaders have had 10 personal meetings and
spoken 30 other times. “That is absolutely unprecedented,” says a senior Trump administration official. Speaking to
reporters on Thursday, Trump boasted that Abe had assured him of his state visit: “I am the guest, meaning the United States is the
guest, but Prime Minister Abe said to me, very specifically, ‘You are the guest of honor. There’s only one guest of honor.’”

The Japanese media has taken copious note of the camaraderie. A Friday article in the Japan Times noted that on his last trip to
Washington, Abe “was even offered the use of Trump’s personal restroom in the White House.”

Abe no doubt appreciates the bathroom privileges. But his relentless courtship of Trump seems—to say
the least—off-brand for a leader who came to power by presenting himself as a resolute
nationalist, retailing a vision of a strong Japan more than any leader in decades. Prostrating
himself before Trump has put him in an awkward position. Trump is personally unpopular in Japan, and
even apart from that, no one likes to see Japan’s prime minister bend his behavior, or
travel schedule, around other leaders. “The Japanese public does not like our leader to entertain another
country’s leader,” said Koji Murata, a professor of political science at Doshisha University in Kyoto.

So why the desperate overtures to the U.S. president? To understand Abe’s surprising
relationship to Trump is to understand the deep insecurity that has developed in Japan
in recent years. With its once-powerhouse economy long-stagnant, the world-historical rise of China, which Japan’s imperial
army badly abused during the war, has stoked deep alarm. North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons and missiles capable
of delivering them to Japan—and relations with South Korea, the regional power best positioned to help Tokyo counterbalance
these threats, are at their lowest point in many years. Even Russia harasses Japanese airspace as part of a dispute over contested
northern islands.

Trump has only made this situation more precarious for Abe and his compatriots. With its pacifist constitution and a military far
smaller than its status as the world’s third-largest economy would imply, Japan needs America’s protection—and finds itself staring
across the Pacific at an erratic partner easily dismissive of longtime global commitments. The
fear that the U.S.-Japan
alliance could be in jeopardy was one I heard from numerous government officials and
academics I met during a weeklong visit to Japan earlier this year. And, they say, Abe
will do what he must to maintain it, whatever the cost to his personal pride.
“People in Japan understand that Mr. Trump is quite unpredictable, and that we need to treat him in a different way,” said Murata.

“They need the relationship for their own protection,” adds Jeffrey Prescott, a former Obama White House national security council
aide who served as senior Asia adviser to former Vice President Joe Biden. “They’re worried about being caught out in the cold.”

When Abe visited the U.S. last year, Trump startled him with a blunt historical reference: “I remember Pearl Harbor,” Trump
cracked, reportedly launching into a complaint about Japan’s economic policies. However impolitic his remark may have been,
Trump is right to think that World War II continues to rule America’s relationship with Japan. But a more defining moment than the
1941 surprise attack on America’s Pacific fleet is what happened four years later in Hiroshima, when the U.S. punctuated the final
days of the war by dropping an atomic bomb on the city, raising ground temperatures nearby to 5,000 degrees and instantly killing
up to 80,000 people.

Today, the modest port city, also known for baseball and its symphony orchestra, has become a living monument to the horror of
war, and also a place to contemplate the oddity of Japan’s continued dependency on the country that crushed it in anger nearly 75
years ago. Nine days after the blast, and after the U.S. dropped another atomic bomb, this time on Nagasaki, Emperor Hirohito—
whose grandson, Naruhito, Trump will visit in Tokyo on Monday—announced his country’s unconditional surrender to America. Thus
began a long and fraught dependency that continues to this day.

It was an incredible twist of history when the conquered nation, emerging from a fascist nightmare, actually welcomed its new
occupiers after the war. “The Americans arrived anticipating, many of them, a traumatic confrontation with fanatical emperor
worshippers. They were accosted instead by women who called ‘yoo hoo’ to the first troops landing on the beaches in full battle
gear, and men who bowed and asked what their conquerors wished,” writes John W. Dower in his Pulitzer Prize-wining history of
postwar Japan, Embracing Defeat. William Manchester’s epic biography of Douglas MacArthur recounts the moment one of the
general’s aides first stepped off a plane in a freshly-defeated Japan, which MacArther was tasked with running and rebuilding after
the war: “Instantly, a mob of howling Japanese headed for him. He was reaching for his weapon when they braked to a halt, bowed,
smiled, and offered him a cup of orangeade.”

Those events occurred a few months before Trump was born, so he does not actually “remember” any of them.
But even
though Japan has been remade since, it remains conspicuously eager to please
American leaders. In large measure that is because Japan cannot properly defend itself.
After World War II, Japan was demilitarized to prevent a repeat of the fascist militarism
that led to its brutal conquest of much of East Asia. The U.S. oversaw the adoption of a
peace constitution prohibiting a standing military—Japan technically maintains modest
“self-defense forces”—and declaring that its people “forever renounce war” and “the
threat or use of force as a means of settling disputes.” And in the only country to experience an atomic
attack, nuclear weapons have been out of the question. Conveniently, the U.S. was happy to station troops in the country as a way
of projecting power into the Asia-Pacific region, first as a check against the Soviet Union and more recently against China.
America has also explicitly covered Japan with its “nuclear umbrella,” shielding it from
attack with the ultimate form of deterrence.
For several decades, the arrangement made sense for a Japan that faced few credible
military threats. But the 21st century has changed past assumptions with startling speed. China’s explosion of
growth has led to alarming new territorial claims; Tokyo’s historic rival, which Japan
raped and pillaged in the 1930s and 1940s, now has a defense budget about 10 times
larger than Japan’s. Meanwhile, North Korea, whose state media has branded Abe an
“Asian Hitler” has developed a large nuclear arsenal and ever-more sophisticated
missiles, which it sometimes fires over Japan’s territory.
Japan’s relations with South Korea, an important political and economic power, are also
at what regional experts call a 50-year low, poisoned by an ongoing dispute over what
Japan owes to forced laborers and so-called “comfort women” during its wartime
occupation of the Korean peninsula. Japan was scandalized in February when a South Korean legislator referred to
Japan’s then-emperor, since succeeded by Naruhito, as the son of a war criminal. (One long-term nightmare here: a unified, hostile
Korea.) Even relations with Russia are tense, also thanks to the legacy of World War II, in the form of a territorial dispute over
remote islands most of the world has never heard of; a Japanese legislator was recently expelled from the country’s Diet after
suggesting (albeit drunkenly) that war with Russia might be necessary to reclaim them.

In sum, Japan looks around and sees enemies and rivals that recall brutal Japanese
occupation, and too few close friends. That leaves it as dependent on the U.S. as it has
been in years.
At the same time, it is as worried as it’s ever been about whether America can be relied
upon. In the Trump era, the U.S. has become inscrutable, unpredictable and potentially
unreliable.
People here are keenly aware of Trump’s complaints about the cost of American bases
overseas and his questions about long-standing alliances. “We’re basically protecting
Japan,” Trump said as a candidate. “If we’re attacked, they do not have to come to our defense. If they’re attacked,
we have to come totally to their defense. And … that’s a real problem.” Trump hasn’t spoken that way in a while, but Japanese
officials have watched his continued skepticism about the costs and mission of the NATO alliance, and ongoing complaints about the
expense of maintaining U.S. troops in South Korea, with great unease. In meetings with diplomats and military strategists, most of
whom would only speak off the record, I was told repeatedly that a scaled back U.S. presence in Asia, perhaps as a concession in a
nuclear deal with North Korea, would be a “disaster” or “nightmare.” Never mind the 50,000 troops now stationed in Japan itself.

Japan isn’t totally defenseless without its American military bodyguard. Thanks to
China’s muscle-flexing, the passage of time and Abe’s nationalistic leadership, Japan in
recent years has gradually been expanding its military’s size and legal capabilities. Trump
officials, more than Obama ones before them, have wholeheartedly embraced the shift, which Trump will implicitly endorse this
weekend when he visits a Japanese navy helicopter carrier set for an upgrade that will allow it to carry advanced American-made F-
35B fighter jets.

But Japan also needs American in other ways. Its diplomats have urged the U.S. to help
mediate its dispute with South Korea—though to little avail. (“In somewhat more normal times,” says
Mike Green, a former top Asia official in the George W. Bush White House now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
a big question around Trump’s trip would be, “What is the administration doing to patch up ties between our two closest allies,
whose fight is weakening our position in Asia?”) Meanwhile Japan’s huge but deeply troubled economy, which struggles with slow
growth and an aging population, is highly vulnerable to Trump’s whims on tariffs.

That’s why it’s a coup for Abe and Japan that Trump, who does not love long trips, has made the 14-hour flight to become the first
foreign leader to meet the country’s newly-enthroned emperor. In recent public remarks, Trump has demonstrated only a vague
understanding of the honor, while boasting that Abe has assured him it will be “100 times bigger” than the Super Bowl.

While there, Trump will award a specially-made trophy to the winner of a national sumo wrestling championship, for which he will
be given a special chair in an area where even dignitaries typically sit on the floor, cross-legged, reportedly to the annoyance of
some of the sport’s diehards. In a signal of U.S. military support, Trump will also deliver a speech at the U.S. Navy base at Yokosuka,
in southern Japan.

Abe’s flatter-Trump campaign is more than a personal whim, it is the result of extensive analysis. “The Japanese have studied Trump
as thoroughly as any government, probably in the world, to try to understand him, because the U.S.-Japan alliance is so critical,” says
Green. But it has involved some cost at home. During
my visit, the lead headline in the Japan Times
described a “grilling” the prime minister had received in the Diet over Trump’s public
claim a few days earlier that Abe had written “the most beautiful five-page letter”
nominating him to the Nobel Prize committee for his nuclear diplomacy with North
Korean dictator Kim Jong Un. Abe couldn’t quite bring himself to confirm the notion, which seemed strange given that
the talks had made little real progress, and that Abe had been a past skeptic of talking to Kim. “I’m not saying it’s untrue,” was all he
would allow. According to the Washington Post, Abe has more than once been referred to as “poochi” in the country’s left-leaning
Asahi Shimbun newspaper.

Many Japanese officials argue, though, that Abe has made the best of an awkward situation. Trump has stopped complaining about
America’s security agreement with Tokyo and—unlike the case of South Korea—hasn’t made references lately to the cost of
stationing troops and equipment in Japan. Abe
has helped explain to Trump how important American
assets in Japan are to containing China; U.S. Navy patrols into the contested South China
Sea often originate from the Japan’s Yokosuka base. Although Abe wasn’t able to
prevent Trump from slapping tariffs on Japanese steel and aluminum exports, he has
helped to delay potential U.S. tariffs on automobiles that Japanese officials say would
create a crisis in their relationship with Washington.
Still, there is a sense of real disquiet here about what may lie ahead. One Japanese official told me that Trump is an effect, not a
cause, of eroding American public support for overseas alliances and adventurism. Moreover, some Japanese worry that the
character of the U.S. might be changing. Japan is coming to see America “rather differently,” said Ichiro Fujisaki, a former Japanese
ambassador to Washington who now chairs the America-Japan Society in Tokyo. “The popularity of the U.S. is decreasing,” he said,
as Japanese people see an erosion of “values, respect for international institutions, and commitment to allies.”

It is unclear whether Trump will know or care about such sentiments when he greets Emperor Naruhito on Monday. But it was those
values that America spent decades instilling in Japan as the U.S. rebuilt the nation it had conquered after World War II. It was a
process that began in earnest when the MacArthur, having arrived in Tokyo for what would be a seven-year term as its de facto
viceroy, met with Hirohito for the first time. President Harry Truman and MacArthur had decided by then that the emperor had to
be preserved to help earn the trust of the defeated Japanese people. But at that point, Hirohito wasn’t sure that MacArthur
wouldn’t have him executed. MacArthur later recalled giving Hirohito an American cigarette, “which he took with thanks. I noticed
how his hands shook as I lighted it for him. I tried to make it as easy for him as I could, but I knew how deep and dreadful must be his
agony of humiliation.”

Trump will meets Hirohito’s grandson under dramatically different circumstances. It may be that, far from humiliation, Naruhito and
Abe will enjoy a sense of triumph at how skillfully they are playing to the president’s vanity. But something essential about the
relationship between the U.S. will be unchanged, one that will be a source of both comfort and insecurity here for the forseeable
future.

“Japan is always under the influence of the U.S.,” Murara told me. “It is always treated to be the junior partner of the U.S.”
 2ac at: Assurance - il turn
Aegis causes Japanese remilitarization
Hughes 5/2013 (Christopher W. Hughes, University of Warwick Professor of International
Relations, “Japan, Ballistic Missile Defence and remilitarization,” Science Direct, https://www-
sciencedirect-com.dartmouth.idm.oclc.org/science/article/pii/S0265964613000258)
Japan's future trajectory in security policy and the extent of deviation from the post-war course of a constrained military stance have been the source
of constant academic and policy debate. Japanese policy-makers have maintained that national security policy has shown no fundamental deviation,

The advent of BMD, however, poses

and that this can be benchmarked against a range of constant anti-militaristic principles.

significant questions over whether Japan is continuing to follow a similar security

trajectory. This article examines how BMD has challenged four key anti-militaristic principles—the
non-exercise of collective self-defence, the non-military use of space, the ban on the
export of weapons technology, and strict civilian control of the military—and uses this assessment to
judge how BMD is driving remilitarisation. It concludes that BMD's impact is highly significant in

transgressing these anti-militaristic principles and is thus indicating a more remilitarised

security path for Japan developing now and in the future. Japan's extent of change and trajectory in its security
policy, and specifically the degree of its remilitarisation, has been a source of major contention throughout the post-war era. Japanese policy-makers—
wrestling with the particularly difficult defence problématique of seeking to safeguard national security against a perceived range of increasingly
complex regional and international security challenges, whilst at the same time strongly constrained in this effort by the need to manage associated
external risks and internal counter-pressures—have tended towards emphasising a low-profile national security posture and denial of the language of
remilitarisation. Externally, policy-makers have remained wary of the need not to push forward too boldly the build-up of Japan Self-Defence Force
(JSDF) capabilities in order to avoid a counter-reaction from East Asian states fearful of Japanese remilitarisation. In addition, Japan's leaders have
eschewed a more proactive defence posture so as to hedge against the risk of the US–Japan alliance and being seen as too forthcoming militarily and
becoming embroiled in US military strategy in the Asia-Pacific. Meanwhile, internally, Japan's policy-makers have been especially conscious of the need
to avoid stimulating domestic political suspicions of remilitarisation, and how domestic opposition to changes in defence policy may be compounded by
any intensification of frictions with East Asian neighbours and rising US expectations for Japan to expand bilateral military cooperation.1 Japan's policy-
makers have thus propagated a discourse to stress above all continuities in defence policy. This has generally been centred around arguments that
Japan has shown no essential deviation from the foundations of its post-war national security policy which emphasise it will never again become a
‘great military power’ and instead maintain an ‘exclusively defence-oriented’ security posture.2 More specifically, Japanese policy-makers have cited
strict continuing adherence to the prohibitions on the use of force derived from Article 9, or so-called ‘peace clause’ of the Constitution, and a range of
other anti-militaristic principles developed from the spirit of Article 9, as evidence of essential continuities and constraints in national defence policy
and the management of the US–Japan alliance. However, ranged against this discourse of continuity is a counter-discourse, involving Japanese and
external academics' and policy-makers’ analysis. These point to the empirically observable and very considerable changes in the Japan Self-Defence
Forces' (JSDF) doctrines and capabilities, combined with developments in US–Japan alliance cooperation, and argue that these thus indicate the growth
of significant discontinuities and remilitarisation in national security policy.3 Japan's official government commitment since the early and mid-2000s to
go beyond previous technical research and to introduce and procure Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) programmes has added further momentum to the
controversy over the future course of remilitarisation. The Japanese government, as is the case in the entire gamut of national security policy, remains
insistent that BMD is fully in line with the past precepts of defence-oriented planning and marks no deviation towards a more remilitarised policy. BMD
is held to raise no particular concerns for domestic political or external neighbours in terms of undermining constitutional prohibitions and anti-
militaristic principles or opening the way towards tighter US–Japan alliance cooperation beyond the existing scope of the US–Japan security treaty. But
once again ranged against this view of BMD as reinforcing the essential status quo in Japanese defence policy are questions about the potential

that BMD has involved a massive redirection of

discontinuities, pointed to by the straight empirical facts

Japanese defence budget resources and a decade long effort in US–Japan alliance
restructuring to accommodate the new systems. The objective of this article, given these controversies over Japan's
remilitarisation in general and BMD's potential position within this process, is to begin to make headway in presenting an in-depth analysis of the
arguments on either side for continuities and discontinuities and how this may inform the larger debate on remilitarisation. The vast scale of the BMD
project and the relatively short format of this article do not provide for the scope to analyse the entirety of implications of BMD for Japan's national
security policy. However, in order to gain a firmer analysis of the degree to which BMD is contributing to potential transformation in Japan's security
policy, this article interrogates change within those very factors which are usually cited by Japanese policy-makers as marking continuities in defence
policy. Specifically, the analysis focuses on the means by which BMD is acting upon the continuing solidity of interpretations of Article 9 as prohibiting
the exercise of collective-self defence, and the three key anti-militaristic principles of the non-military use of space, ban on the export of arms

If the continuing integrity of these anti-militaristic

technology, and strict civilian control of the military.

prohibitions and principles under the conditions of the introduction of BMD is tested
and found to be strong or wanting, then clearly this will serve as a key set of indicators for
the degree of remilitarisation triggered by this new weapons system. In turn, by
investigating the degree of continuity or erosion of these prohibitions and principles,
which are presented by Japanese policy-makers as the essential underpinnings for the entire national security policy, this article

positions itself to comment more widely beyond BMD on the overall trajectory of
Japan's potential remilitarisation.
 2ac at: Assurance – il alt causes
Alt causes – proposal to force Japan to pay for security in cash and of American
Troop collapse security commitment and are the biggest internal links to
Japanese proliferation.
Beauchamp 2016 (Zack Beauchamp, senior reporter at Vox, BA from Brown University in
philosophy and political science, Trump’s comments on Japanese nukes are worrisome — even
by Trump standards, Vox, https://www.vox.com/2016/3/31/11339040/trump-nukes-japan-
south-korea)

Donald Trump's proposed South Korea and Japan policy would fundamentally alter the
security situation in northeast Asia in ways that experts warn could lead Japan and/or
South Korea to develop nuclear weapons.

The main goal of Trump's East Asia policy, according to Trump, is to limit the costs to America of
protecting its allies. He wants to make the Japanese and South Koreans pay the US a cash
tribute in exchange for the security guarantee; if they don't pay, Trump would withdraw
American troops and protection.
"I would not do so happily, but I would be willing to do it," Trump said of pulling out to the New
York Times. "We cannot afford to be losing vast amounts of billions of dollars on all of this."

This policy would have the effect of dramatically weakening the US security guarantee.
Even if South Korea and Japan decided to pay up, they would know that the previously
ironclad guarantee of American support was now more conditional. They would have to
start thinking about taking steps to protect themselves from China and North Korea.
Steps like, for example, acquiring nuclear weapons.
Normally, the US would put all available pressure on these countries to make sure that didn't
happen. But Trump has suggested otherwise — implying that he'd support Japan and South
Korea developing nukes as a way to lower costs to the United States. As he put it in an
interview with Anderson Cooper on Tuesday evening:

COOPER: It has been a U.S. policy for decades to prevent Japan from getting a nuclear weapon.

TRUMP: That might be policy, but maybe...

COOPER: South Korea as well.

TRUMP: Can I be honest are you? Maybe it's going to have to be time to change, because so
many people, you have Pakistan has it, you have China has it. You have so many other countries
are now having it.s
 1ar at Assurance ext – non UQ
Non UQ - international differences, defense treaty withdrawal and tariff
threats
Akaha July 8th 2019 (Tsuneo Akaha, has received a PhD in International Relations at USC,
teached at USC, Kansas State University, and Bowling Green State University, co-edited “The
U.S.-Japan Alliance: Balancing Soft and Hard Power in East Asia”, “Abe’s gamble on Trump
threatens to backfire”, East Asia Forum, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/07/08/abes-
gamble-on-trump-threatens-to-backfire/)
Even before US President Donald Trump’s inauguration in 2017, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe took steps to develop a
personalised relationship with the new leader to put Japan–US relations on a sustainable trajectory. He has since held more than 40
face-to-face meetings and phone conversations with Trump — but has little to show for it.

Abe is concerned about the shifting balance of power in Asia — China’s spectacular rise, the United States’ relative decline, and
Japan’s ‘lost decades’. Another element of change is Russia’s ‘pivot to the east’, a reaction to its deteriorating relations with the
West over Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Against this backdrop, Tokyo wants to ensure that the United States will be a stabilising
regional force.

After gambling on Trump to help stabilise Japan’s security environment and protect its foreign
policy and national security interests, Abe now faces the disturbing consequences of Trump’s
unpredictable and disruptive character. The Trump administration has undergone top-level
personnel changes of unprecedented frequency. The very legitimacy of his presidency is under question due to
evidence of pro-Trump Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election and the Trump administration’s attempts to obstruct
justice during subsequent FBI investigations.

Trump’s major policy decisions are equally unsettling. Under the banner of ‘America
First’, Washington has unilaterally withdrawn from the Trans-Pacific Trade Partnership,
the Paris Climate Accord, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the Iran
nuclear deal, as well as renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement — all
international agreements supported by Tokyo.
Unilateralism also characterises Washington’s approach toward Pyongyang, one of the most pressing problems for Tokyo. Trump has
held three meetings with Kim Jong-un — in Singapore in June 2018, Hanoi in February 2019, and Panmunjom in June 2019 — but the
two sides remain far apart on the core issue of denuclearisation. Abe stands alone as the only regional leader yet to meet the North
Korean leader.

Abe is also taking steps to strengthen the Japan–US security alliance. Tokyo revised its long-established interpretation of Article 9 of
its constitution so that Japan can engage in limited forms of collective self-defence in areas beyond Japan’s homeland, and lifted a
ban on weapons and weapons technology exports. It has also agreed to expand purchases of US military equipment. This includes an
additional 105 F-35 fighter jets, 42 of which are set to be deployed on a new aircraft carrier. Tokyo even deployed a US-made land-
based ballistic missile defence system — ostensibly to defend Japan from North Korean missiles — that triggered Chinese and
Russian protests.

These decisions are clearly in line with Abe’s long-held desire to strengthen Japan’s defence capabilities and play an international
security role. They are also meant to bolster Japanese defences against China’s growing military power in maritime East Asia, a goal
that underpins Japan’s partnership with the United States in pursuing ‘peace and freedom in the Indo-Pacific’.

But Trump has reportedly recently mused about ending the Japan–US security treaty, calling it
an unfair agreement requiring the United States to come to Japan’s defence but not the other
way around. The report alarmed and perplexed Japan, but Abe reportedly did not bring it up in
his last summit with Trump on the sidelines of the G20 in June, nor did Trump volunteer any
information on his remark.
On the trade front, the Trump administration unilaterally imposed tariffs on steel and
aluminium imports — unleashing a trade war with China — and is pressing protectionist
demands on Japan and other major trading partners. Japan currently enjoys a surplus of about US$68
billion in its bilateral trade with the United States, accounting for 7.7 per cent of the latter’s total trade deficit. China’s trade surplus
with the United States stands at a whopping US$419 billion, or 47.7 per cent of US total deficit.

Tokyo stresses that its trade surplus is declining and that Japanese investment contributes significantly to the US economy. Japan’s
investment in the United States in 2017 amounted to US$470 billion, second only to the UK’s US$541 billion. Japanese
multinationals also generated 861,000 jobs in the United States, again second to the UK with 1,238,000.

Tokyo opposes unilateral protectionist moves and stresses the importance of

multilateral negotiations for trade liberalisation, such as the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), to which Tokyo hopes
Washington will eventually return. Tokyo tried to deflect Washington’s demand for
bilateral trade negotiations, but in April 2017 it reluctantly agreed to enter into bilateral
talks. Japan has much to lose if these talks fail and the United States imposes its
threatened tariffs on Japanese imports and demands further defence build-up.
Trump is likely to follow his instinct for transactional victories and, as the 2020
presidential election approaches, he will be tempted to seek any trade victory.
Washington has postponed a decision on tariffs on Japanese automobile imports until
after Japan’s Upper House elections on 21 July. But regardless of the outcome of the
elections, it is likely that Trump will abandon this seemingly benevolent gesture after
the Japanese parliamentary elections. Trump has tweeted that he is expecting his tariff
threat will succeed in compelling Japan to make a major concession, particularly on
Japanese imports of US agricultural products.
If this does happen, there is a good chance that Abe will be criticised as a misguided leader who gambled his nation’s key economic
interests on the goodwill of an unpredictable partner across the Pacific.

What can Abe do to deflect such criticism? He could argue that Japan’s concessions are similar to the compromise his government
had already made in the CPTPP. And if the LDP-led coalition achieves its expected victory in the July elections, he can continue with
no serious challenger within his own party and ride out the criticism from the defeated opposition. In short, despite the
unpredictable politics in Washington, Tokyo will remain a stable anchor of the bilateral alliance.

Us-japan relations deteriorating now – ignorance towards north korea,

economic competition and domestic opposition towards us military
Denmark 12-4-18 (Abraham Denmark, Director of the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, a Senior Fellow at the Center’s Kissinger Institute on China and
the United States and an Adjunct Associate Professor at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign
Service at Georgetown University, “Turbulence Ahead in U.S.-Japan Relations”, Asian
Dispatches, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/turbulence-ahead-us-japan-relations)
President Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s recent meeting in Buenos Aires on the sidelines of the G-20 presented an image
of two allies pleased with the progress they had made. The President praised Japan for reducing the bilateral trade deficit and for
making significant military acquisitions from the United States. Yet
looking ahead, Alliance managers on both
sides should be concerned about several issues that threaten to shake up this close and
critical relationship.
Most pressing is the issue of North Korea. A year ago, Tokyo was nervous that President
Trump’s previous “fire and fury” rhetoric could lead to a large-scale military conflict on
the Korean peninsula. Today–although the potential for war has been replaced by
remarkable summitry, “love letters,” and the potential for inter-Korean peace–Tokyo is
as nervous as ever. This is because North Korea continues to produce nuclear weapons
and ballistic missiles, and President Trump seems willing to overlook these continued
violations of international sanctions. Some of Japan’s leaders believe this signals
Washington’s implicit acceptance of North Korea as a de facto nuclear power, which
they fear could eventually limit the willingness of the United States to come to the
defense of Japan in a crisis with North Korea.
Secondly, some in Tokyo are concerned that Japan may be “next” now that negotiations to replace NAFTA with the USMCA have
been concluded. President
Trump has made no secret of his concerns that Japan’s trade
arrangements with the United States are exploitative and unfair, and may now focus on
Japan as the newest economic challenge to conquer. While some in Tokyo have taken heart that China
seems to be captivating the president’s attention for now, others fear that the president may see Japan as a more tempting target
because he has more leverage over Tokyo than he does over Beijing. This
is especially true in the automotive
market, although Japan may be somewhat inoculated on that front because many of its
car manufacturers have factories in the United States.
Finally, the issue of U.S. military presence in Okinawa has the potential to return to the fore. Three
months ago,
Okinawa elected a new Governor who opposes the large U.S. military footprint on the
island. This will complicate plans by Washington and Tokyo to realign U.S. basing on the island, which in recent years had made
significant progress toward completion. In late February, Okinawa will hold a referendum on the relocation of a U.S. base that is
critical to the overall realignment plan. The
referendum, if successful, will give the new Governor an
explicit mandate to oppose Tokyo and Washington. While not legally binding, a
successful referendum may diminish Tokyo’s willingness to move ahead with
realignment and throw the decades-old realignment plan into doubt.
The Alliance with Japan is one of the United States’ most valuable and robust. Our
interests and values are closely aligned, and the personal connections between the two
nations is difficult to overestimate. Yet, as with any relationship, continued success will require careful attention.
Looking ahead, it would be prudent for Alliance managers on each side to address these issues directly and carefully before they
threaten to upset the broader relationship.
 2ac at: China Deterrence – il turn
1. Internal link turn – Deployment of Aegis Ashore causes China prolif–
a. Modernization – Aegis’ offensive potential, higher interception
speeds, and advanced radar make Chinese weapons systems less
effective which causes China to prolif to compensate, that’s the
Gronning, Šimalčík, Zhang, and Lewis cards.
b. US first strike capabilities – China perceives US Aegis capabilities as
an indication that the US feels protected which incentives them to be
aggressive and causes China to proliferate to protect against
irrational US action – that’s Lewis.
c. China first strike incentives – Aegis wrecks China’s second strike
capabilities which causes them to adopt launch on warning policies
and build up their nuclear arsenal in order to maintain strategic
stability – that’s Lewis.
 1ar at: China Deterrence – ext il turn
Chinese deterrence is destroyed by US missile defense developments and
systems deployed against North Korea.
Riqiang, 2015 (Wu, Associate Professor in the School of International Studies at Renmin
University of China., STABILIZING CHINA-U.S. NUCLEAR DYNAMICS, Bureau the National Bureau
of Asian Research, https://www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/US-
China_brief_Wu_Sept2015.pdf)

Maintaining stable nuclear relations between China and the United States is critical to
both sides as well as the rest of the world. Although current nuclear dynamics are
considered stable, there are serious risks in this domain that require cooperation from the
leaders of both countries. China’s paramount interest is to maintain a safe, secure, and
reliable second-strike nuclear capability that can survive an adversary’s disarming strike
and penetrate enemy defenses. This is the foundation of China’s nuclear deterrence strategy.
CHINA’S CHALLENGES IN THE NUCLEAR DOMAIN U.S. missile defense systems are the
biggest challenge facing China’s nuclear deterrent for three reasons. First, the United States
argues that its homeland missile defense system is directed against North Korea, not China. But
a U.S. missile defense system arrayed against North Korea could undermine China’s own
capabilities due to proximity. Given China’s small intercontinental-range nuclear arsenal,
even a small-scale U.S. missile defense system has the potential to neutralize China’s
nuclear deterrent. Second, despite some arguments that the current U.S. missile defense
architecture is not very effective due to the difficulty of distinguishing real warheads from
decoys, China is concerned with the unpredictable future of missile defense . The United
States does not accept limits on missile defense on the basis of a perceived need to maintain its
defensive capabilities. Despite Washington’s frequent expressions of willingness to discuss this
issue with Beijing, this point remains an area of divergence.

Third, the expansion of U.S. missile defense, in both scale and effectiveness, is also a
concern. This growth has been evident in quantitative developments, such as an increase
in groundbased interceptors from 30 to 44, and qualitative improvements in terms of
effectiveness, such deployment of X-band radar in Japan and possibly South Korea as well as the
construction of a new land-based radar in Alaska. Additionally, the United States is developing a
new “kill vehicle” capable of transmitting photographs in support of “shoot, look, shoot”
capabilities.

China’s current nuclear modernization remains modest now – better missile

defense causes dramatic expansion of nuclear arsenals, proliferation, and
reversal of the No First Use Policy
Jones 2009 (Chris Jones, Center for Strategic and International Studies Research Assistant,
“Managing the Goldilocks Dilemma: Missile Defense and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia,”
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Stratcom)
While “regional threats” like Iran and North Korea are cited by the United States as the justification for long-range missile defense, the Chinese continue to remain very
concerned about the system. Both the Bush and Obama administrations stated publicly that missile defense is not meant to deal with China. Similarly, the BMDR tried to make

reassurances,
clear that China’s “capability to conduct a large-scale ballistic missile attack on the territory of the United States” is “not the focus of U.S. BMD.” Such

however, have done little to allay Chinese fears that missile defense could undermine their

second-strike capability. China continues to deploy a relatively small nuclear force in

comparison to the United States and Russia. Therefore, United States efforts to pursue missile defenses against ICBM threats can sow significant
doubts in China’s mind about the effectiveness of their second-strike capability. According to Hui Zhang: China continues to

modernize its nuclear force in order to maintain, and only to maintain, a reliable
second-strike retaliatory capability. Its actions are driven mainly by U.S. advances in
precision-strike weaponry and missile defenses. China’s nuclear modernization has
aimed more at improving quality than quantity. The current effort focuses mainly on
enhancing the survivability of its strategic nuclear force through greater mobility,
including deploying solid-fuel and road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and a new generation of
ballistic missile submarines. By contrast, the size of the force has grown quite modestly.
China’s plans could change significantly, however, were the United States to deploy a
more comprehensive or more operationally successful missile defense. A significant
change in China’s plans could lead them to undertake a number of qualitative and
quantitative modernization efforts to ensure the reliability of their second-strike. Some
examples include building more ICBM’s, MIRVing warheads to decrease interception
probably, increasing deployment of mobile ICBM’s which provide faster launch times
that complicate radar detection and tracking, and investment in countermeasures to
overwhelm the system. These efforts could also be complimented by changes in
doctrine, such as backsliding on China’s longstanding No First Use Doctrine, or
diplomatic backlash by increasing unwillingness to join international nonproliferation efforts
like the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 28 These
responses are not mutually exclusive and will be considered based on China’s perception of the degree to
which missile defense can undermine their second-strike capability.
 2ac at: China Deterrence – no link
BMD wouldn’t stop a Chinese nuclear attack
Kazianis, 6/7 – (Harry J. Harry J. Kazianis serves as Director of Korea Studies at the Center for the
National Interest and as Executive Editor of The National Interest. Kazianis is also a Senior Fellow at the
China Policy Institute, fellow for National Security at the Potomac Foundation as well as a former national
security adviser to the 2016 Presidential campaign of Senator Ted Cruz. He is the former Editor of The
Diplomat. He has been cited in major media outlets (TV, Radio and Print) such as The Wall Street
Journal, CNN, FT, AP, Fox News, USA Today, Newsweek, MSNBC, The Washington Post, CNBC, Reuters,
Fox Business, Slate, CBS, Foreign Policy, The Hill, ABC News and many others across the political spectrum.
He has penned over 400 op-eds on national security issues as well as many monographs and reports. , 6-
7-2019, "The Details: The Bloody Way China Would Try to Win a War Against America," National
Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/details-bloody-way-china-would-try-win-war-against-
america-61387) NL

For years I worshipped at the altar of missile defense, and I still do in many situations (think a North Korean or Iranian
single or small missile strike against the U.S. or an ally), however, this is not one of them. And while I do feel missile defense has role

to play in the above scenario, it would only slow Chinese saturation strikes— not stop them. The challenge here is as

simple as math itself. If China launched a massive missile strike against allied forces across the Pacific,

there would simply not be enough interceptors, even assuming a 100% hit-to-kill ratio, to make
a dent in the problem. You say make more interceptors? These are extremely expensive and
China could simply make even more missiles to counter them, exacerbating the problem.
 2ac at: China/Russia Deterrence
Aegis ashore isn’t key to deterring China or Russia
Hempel June 3, 2019 (Alex Hempel, “Could American Missile Defenses Threaten Nuclear
Deterrent? Russia and China Seem to Think So” https://whitefleet.net/2018/06/03/could-
american-missile-defenses-threaten-nuclear-deterrent-russia-and-china-seem-to-think-so/ )

While military programs rarely capture the attention of the mainstream

public, North Korea’s recent string of missile tests helped bring American
homeland ballistic missile defense (BMD) to the forefront. Amidst
heightened awareness of the nuclear threat, major news outlets picked up
on a number of missile-defense-related events, including the deployment
of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries to South Korea
and the first ever interception of an intercontinental ballistic missile by a
Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI). Along with this increased coverage came
questions surrounding the effectiveness of American BMD — a matter
tackled by publications such as The New York Times. In most cases,
mainstream observers assert that homeland missile defenses are not
currently effective and probably will not be effective in the near future. The
New York Times article, for example, cites GBI’s ostensible 50% success rate
and concludes that missile defenses “will not save the country from a North
Korean nuclear attack.”

Nobody denies that there are problems with current American missile
defenses. The more-ambitious systems — namely, the GBI and the
Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) — have less-than-perfect test records and have
not demonstrated their capabilities in combat. These are the two systems
with the largest coverage and thus the most potential for usage against
strategic weapons. Moreover, there are far too few GBIs deployed now to
seriously threaten Russian or Chinese deterrent.

However, it is worthwhile to consider the potential for improved

performance in the future. After all, long research and development cycles
are quite common in the defense industry, and American BMD systems are
constantly improving. Though there are a relatively few interceptors
deployed at the moment, a drastic ramp-up in production could change
the equation going forward.

The problem with assessing American BMD’s potential performance is that

most of the relevant information is classified. Given limits of public domain
sources, it is worth looking at an unconventional barometer: the actions of
American adversaries. Both Russia and China have sophisticated
intelligence agencies with analytical capabilities that undoubtedly exceed
those of independent defense analysts. As such, the degree to which Russia
and China are investing in missile-defense-thwarting technologies can tell
us something about how rapidly American missile defenses are progressing
and whether they may eventually threaten strategic deterrence.

This perspective problematizes the prevailing narrative that America’s

missile defenses have no strategic significance. Russia and China have
recently rushed to introduce a number of novel long-range delivery
vehicles, all of which are — in some capacity — intended to evade (or
entirely negate) missile defenses. In March 2018, Putin held a press
conference and discussed a number of “next-generation” weapons: the
Avanguard hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), Kinzhal air-launched ballistic
missile, Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile, RS-28 Sarmat heavy
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), and Status-6 nuclear-powered
underwater vehicle. China has also invested in (and tested) new ICBMs and
HGVs. In order to understand how these weapons signal a fear of American
missile defenses, it is worth briefly considering their hypothetical
capabilities.

The Avangaard HGV is perhaps the most important weapon unveiled by

Putin — unlike many of the other systems discussed on March 1st, which
are novelties and may or may not see deployment, the Avangard is a
feasible weapon with American and Chinese counterparts. Hypersonic glide
vehicles are designed to replace traditional ballistic missile reentry vehicles,
which follow a ballistic trajectory and cannot perform evasive maneuvers.
HGVs, in contrast, generate aerodynamic lift and have control surfaces,
allowing them to adopt non-ballistic flight paths and maneuver
aggressively at hypersonic speeds (Putin claimed Mach 20 in his address).
Traditional missile defense systems rely on the fact that ballistic missile
warheads follow a predictable flight path, but Avangard would negate
this and be essentially invulnerable to current systems.

China, for its part, recently conducted HGV tests with its new DF-17 ballistic
missile, according to DoD intelligence sources. These operational tests,
which involved an HGV successfully striking its target, demonstrate a
relatively mature capability. Although the DF-17 is an intermediate-range
ballistic missile, the HGV itself adds substantial range thanks to its glide
capabilities. Moreover, it’s possible that the HGV design tested with the
DF-17 could be employed aboard ICBMs as well.

Russia’s Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile appears to be an air-launched

derivative of the 9K720 Iskander short-range ballistic missile, which
features a maneuverable warhead. Not only is the Kinzhal deployed from
the MiG-31, an interceptor with an impressive combat radius, but it should
also enjoy a range increase over the Iskander thanks to its higher launch
altitude and velocity. This gives the Kinzhal+MiG-31 combo a presumptive
range in excess of 2,000 km, although the duo would be vulnerable before
the Kinzhal is deployed. The weapon would excel in the anti-shipping role,
where it could help overcome advanced American defenses such as Aegis
BMD. Though Aegis BMD has successfully intercepted traditional anti-ship
cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, maneuvering hypersonic threats such
as the Kinzhal pose a unique challenge and it does not appear that Aegis
BMD has ever been tested against such a threat.

Perhaps the most unorthodox weapon discussed by Putin was the

Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile. Scant details are available on
this system, which would be the first of its kind ever deployed. Nuclear
powerplants are common on large vessels such as submarines and aircraft
carriers but have not been particularly successful aboard aircraft. These past
failures have been partially due to the weight of the required shielding; of
course, cruise missiles have no crewmembers, so radiation leakage is less of
a concern. Should the effort prove successful, the resulting missile would
have excellent endurance at the expense of high costs and complexity.
Since the Burevestnik’s engine would release radioactive materials upon
impact, the weapon would likely be restricted to strategic use.

The Burevestnik’s main appeal is stellar survivability in the strategic role.

Whereas homeland BMD is proceeding apace, there are no plans to create
a comprehensive anti-cruise-missile network for Europe or North America.
Due to their high trajectories, ballistic missiles can be countered by a few
radars and interceptor bases. In contrast, cruise missiles fly low and slow,
complicating detection. Providing persistent defense against a strategic
cruise missile attack would require a massive air defense network.

Even though the nuclear cruise missile would be a potent strategic weapon,
its cost-effectiveness seems dubious. The Avangard (should it prove
successful) would fulfill the same role, fly much faster, be deployable from
conventional rocketry, and would not require the development,
manufacture, and maintenance of small reactors.

Russia’s much-hyped Status-6 is a long-range, nuclear-powered unmanned

underwater vehicle designed to carry a nuclear payload. Such a weapon
would have several advantages over the aerial delivery methods commonly
employed for nuclear weapons. Bombs and missiles are high-commitment
weapons — once they are launched, they cannot be recalled. In contrast, a
nuclear underwater delivery vehicle could be maneuvered to its target and
loiter there for a considerable period, able to detonate within a moment’s
notice. Alternatively, the system could be sent on patrol in the open ocean,
where survivability would be all but guaranteed in the event of a nuclear
exchange.

Like the other weapons mentioned by Putin, the Status-6 would also
bypass current and projected American missile defenses; the ports and
harbors of major American cities have no system in place to detect a small,
stealthy underwater vehicle like the Status-6 since no threat of this nature
existed previously. However, Status-6 development could pose serious
engineering challenges, as it would be the first unmanned underwater
vehicle with such formidable range and endurance. There is also the
potential that American anti-submarine assets or listening posts could
detect the system. And, of course, Status-6 would only be useful against
coastal targets.

The RS-28 Sarmat, a heavy intercontinental ballistic missile, is the most

conventional of Russia’s “next-generation” weapons systems. It is intended
to replace older intercontinental ballistic missiles and will be capable of
carrying numerous multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles
(MIRVs) and decoys. While existing missile defenses are effective against
simple targets, the high quantity of MIRVs combined with numerous
advanced decoys could thwart missile defenses by overwhelming them
with targets. Since it incorporates pre-existing technologies and reentry
vehicles, the RS-28 is certainly less risky than the Avangard and Burevestnik
but would be vulnerable to improvements in midcourse discrimination.

It is certainly noteworthy that all these “next-generation” weapons touted

by Putin are geared towards thwarting or avoiding BMD. That Russia has
relied on traditional ballistic missiles for more than half a century but
began developing a number of unconventional delivery systems right as
America made key breakthroughs in missile defense is probably not a
coincidence. In fact, Putin explicitly mentioned missile defenses as the
impetus for the new systems. In contrast, America’s next generation of
nuclear weapons will be delivered by conventional ballistic missiles+reentry
vehicles, cruise missiles, and bombs. This is not surprising — militaries tend
to follow the philosophy of “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” Since Russia’s
missile defenses are far less credible than those of the United States,
American planners are not concerned with the survivability of their nuclear
forces.

In addition to the DF-17 and its associated HGV, China has also taken steps
to stay ahead of American missile defenses by introducing the DF-41, a
road-mobile ICBM capable of carrying MIRVs and decoys. Like the Sarmat,
the DF-41 would present missile defense radars with a large number of
potential targets, greatly complicating interception. Chinese defense
analysts have publicly stated that the DF-41 is intended to safeguard the
PRC’s deterrent against strategic missile defenses. To be sure, China’s new
missile systems and HGVs have not been flaunted to the degree of Russia’s
new weapons systems. Nevertheless, it does appear that the PRC is quietly
incorporating missile-defense-penetrating features into its strategic
portfolio.

In summary, it appears that both Russia and China have assessed America’s
strategic BMD capabilities as a threat to their deterrence and responded
with new weapons systems. This contradicts the prevailing narrative that
strategic missile defense is unfeasible and a non-starter. Even though some
of the Russian systems are relatively outlandish and may not enter service,
the effort invested in developing them to a conceptual stage is nonetheless
important. Moreover, that Russia has envisioned such a diverse array of
delivery vehicles signals to American officials that they have considered
numerous ways in which to thwart future BMD improvements. Of course, it
is possible that Russia and China are playing it safe and developing missile-
defense-penetrating weapons out of an abundance of caution. However,
even this explanation suggests a genuine fear that American ballistic
missile defenses could pose a strategic threat, which is more than most
missile defense naysayers would grant. Given the formidable intelligence
resources of both these American adversaries, their apparent concerns are
worthy of consideration in discussions of BMD’s future.
 2ac at: Assurance – no impact
Japan won’t develop nukes—their national identity is against it,
Japanese politicians will block it, and national security interests prevent
it.
- THIS CARD ANSWERS THE LINK—ARM SALES NOT KEY DUE TO US TROOPS AND
WEAPONS IN JAPAN

Mochizuki 17 (Mike Michizuki, holds the Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston
Sigur at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington Universitya and co-
author of the book “Nuclear Debates in Asia: The Role of Geopolitics and Domestic
Processes.”, “Three reasons why Japan will likely continue to reject nuclear weapons”,
11/6/17, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/11/06/japan-
is-likely-to-retain-its-non-nuclear-principles-heres-why/?utm_term=.c62edee38172, RKK)
President Trump is visiting Tokyo on Monday at a time of renewed national security debates within Japan. North Korea’s
recent missile launches and nuclear tests have again prompted discussion in Tokyo on Japan’s policy against becoming a
nuclear state.
Although Japan has long had the technical ability to develop nuclear weapons —
its “nuclear hedge” — it has refrained from doing so. Japan instead remains firmly
committed to its 1967 Three Non-Nuclear Principles of not developing, not possessing and
not introducing nuclear weapons. This is not the first time that Japan has reexamined those principles. Similar
debates transpired after China’s hydrogen bomb test in 1967, the Soviet Union’s deployment of medium-range nuclear
missiles in Siberia during the 1980s and North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006. Is this time different? Reacting to North
Korea’s threatening behavior, former Japanese defense minister Shigeru Ishiba stated in September that Japan should at least
debate the decision not to permit the introduction of nuclear weapons on Japanese territory. Ishiba implied that Tokyo should
consider asking Washington to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Japan. Trump: 'I don't think we've ever been closer to Japan'
President Trump spoke to the press after arriving in Japan and meeting with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on Nov. 5. (The
Washington Post) This latest debate is likely to end in the same way as previous debates,
however. Japan will continue to adhere to its Three Non-Nuclear Principles and forswear
nuclear weapons. Here are three reasons for that: 1) Staying non-nuclear is part of
Japan’s national identity: The Three Non-Nuclear Principles are a clear part of Japan’s
national identity, not simply a policy preference. Repeated polls indicate overwhelming
popular support for the three principles in Japan. A 2014 Asahi newspaper poll revealed
that support for the principles had risen to 82 percent, compared with 78 percent in a 1988
poll. Despite growing concerns about North Korea’s nuclear program and China’s military power during this period,
Japanese support for remaining non-nuclear actually increased. Even after the provocative North
Korean missile launches over Japan in August and September, a Fuji News Network poll showed that nearly 80 percent of the
Japanese population remained opposed to Japan becoming a nuclear weapons state. And nearly 69 percent
opposed having the United States bring nuclear weapons into Japan. The legacy of the
Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings leave many Japanese convinced that their
country has a moral responsibility to promote global nuclear disarmament — as well as to
forgo nuclear weapons of its own. The 2011 Fukushima nuclear plant disaster has
reinforced this view. In fact, increasing numbers of Japanese believe that the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” is unnecessary for
Japanese security. A June 2010 NHK survey revealed that 20.8 percent felt that U.S. nuclear deterrence is necessary for Japan’s
security in both the present and future, while 34.8 percent believed it unnecessary. The June 2015 NHK poll showed that only
10.3 percent thought the U.S. nuclear umbrella is necessary for both the present and the future — 48.9 percent responded that
it is unnecessary now and later. 2) Powerful players in Japanese politics can block nuclear
acquisition: In addition to public opposition to nuclear weapons, Japan has significant “veto
players” — crucial political or economic actors that are likely to block efforts to develop
nuclear weapons. Japan has a robust nuclear energy industry. But public acceptance of nuclear energy in the 1950s
resulted from a fundamental political bargain: nuclear energy, but no nuclear weapons. As security scholar Jacques Hymans
argues, the development of nuclear energy in Japan boosted the number of Japanese
government agencies and private-sector actors that are committed to the peaceful use of
nuclear power — and can serve as a formidable opposition to any political move toward
acquiring nuclear weapons. These veto players include powerful economic ministries,
regulatory commissions, industrial groups and prefectural governments. The
international nonproliferation regime and public opposition to nuclear weapons give
these veto players leverage in Japan’s policy process. The International Atomic Energy Agency has
closely monitored Japan’s reprocessing programs, for instance . Japan’s nuclear energy program is also tied to
bilateral agreements and multilateral bodies such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group that
embody nonproliferation principles. 3) Japan has good national security reasons to stay non-nuclear:
There’s also a realist security calculation to consider. North Korean nuclearization is alarming, but it does
not pose such an acute danger that Japanese leaders will be motivated to pay the high political costs necessary to weaken,
much less revoke, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. North Korea acquiring the ability to deliver a nuclear weapon against the
United States may weaken the protective U.S. nuclear umbrella somewhat, but U.S. nuclear and conventional military
capabilities should be adequate to deter a North Korean nuclear attack on Japan. North Korean test missiles flew over northern
Japan in September, prompting Japanese government alerts telling citizens to seek shelter underground or in a building.
(Courtesy of Kate Whitcomb) During the 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump criticized several U.S. alliances and
mused that it might be desirable for Japan to develop nuclear weapons. But after
assuming office, President
Trump and his foreign policy team have repeatedly confirmed the U.S. defense commitment
to Japan. The continuing presence of U.S. military forces in Japan, South Korea and the
Western Pacific makes this commitment credible to deter potential aggressors and to
reassure Japan. Given the powerful U.S. nuclear arsenal, including ballistic missiles
deployed on nuclear submarines, any U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Japan itself
would constitute a marginal increase in deterrence. But the political cost of rescinding the third non-
nuclear principle would be high. Japanese defense policymakers are more likely to focus on other ways to respond to the
North Korea threat, such as acquiring the Aegis Ashore missile defense system and perhaps a conventional strike capability. A
realistic review of Japanese security requirements is likely to conclude that the best way to counter the North Korea threat is
to promote defense cooperation with the United States, invest in conventional defense capabilities and increase pressure on
North Korea — while looking for an opportunity for constructive negotiations with Pyongyang. And there’s a final
consideration: A Japanese bomb would probably destabilize the country’s relations with China
and South Korea. At a time when North Korea is making the international politics of the region complicated, Japan is
likely to stay its non-nuclear course rather than make a disruptive nuclear move of its own.
 2ac at: Japanese Ptx - Aegis Causes Political Turmoil
Local political leaders don’t want the Aegis system, it’s unnecessary and only
serves to create turmoil in the Japanese political system
Julian Ryall, 6-29-2018, "Were Japan’s missile defense plans for North Korea or China?," South China Morning
Post, https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/2152553/were-japans-missile-defence-plans-made-china-
instead-north-korea//DeepStateSsico
“Developments towards detente have begun,” the governor said in this year’s annual peace declaration marking the end of fighting in the prefecture.
He said continuing to build new facilities at the US Marine Corps’ Camp Schwab in the northeast
of the prefecture – including two runways on reclaimed land – “goes against the present trend”.

The governors of two other prefectures – Yamaguchi, in southwest Japan, and Akita, in the far
north of the country – expressed similar sentiments to Itsunori Onodera, the defence minister.

Both prefectures host training areas for Japan’s military, face the Korean Peninsula and have
been identified as the most appropriate sites for the deployment of Aegis missile defence
systems.

Tsuhumasa Muraoka, the governor of Yamaguchi, asked the minister to provide “a more
convincing explanation” of why Aegis is still required, given the recent easing of tensions in the
region.
Although Onodera never mentioned China as a potential threat to national security, it is clear that Tokyo’s thinking is that while the threat posed by
Pyongyang may have eased, the longer-term challenge from Beijing has not dissipated.

“The threat from North Korea has not changed at all,” Onodera told the governor, according to Kyodo News. “North Korea has deployed several
hundred ballistic missiles capable of reaching Japan and it is very likely that it also possesses a number of nuclear warheads.”

Jun Okumura, a political analyst at the Meiji Institute for Global Affairs, said the governors’
comments reflect the opinions of a certain number of their constituents and are therefore
“understandable” – but he added that there is no likelihood of Tokyo stopping its plans to deploy Aegis systems.
 1ar at: Japanese Ptx ext- Aegis Causes Political Turmoil
Aegis is causing turmoil inside the Japanese political system, and destroying
local trust in the government
Elizabeth Shim, 6-6-2019, "'Flaws' in data for Aegis Ashore deployment rile Japan's politicians," UPI,
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2019/06/06/Flaws-in-data-for-Aegis-Ashore-deployment-rile-Japans-
politicians/1891559837436//DeepStateSisco
Controversy began soon after Defense Minister Takeshi Iwaya told a parliamentary committee on national security there were several mistakes in the
survey documents that supported the need to deploy missile interceptors in Akita, Kyodo News reported Thursday.=

"I am extremely sorry this ruins the credibility of the entire investigation," Iwaya said Thursday.

Japan's military is admitting fault after it had stated a training site for the nation's self-defense
force, located near the city of Akita and Yamaguchi prefecture, would be most suitable for Aegis Ashore deployment.
The defense ministry said on May 27 that 19 other candidate sites were "unfit" for Aegis Ashore deployment, Jiji Press reported.

The government survey in question included errors for terrain data on nine other areas that
provided comparisons to the designated site.

Gov. Norihisa Satake of Akita Prefecture said the mistakes "significantly damage trust" with the
central government.

Japan plans to deploy two Aegis Ashore interceptors, largely to prepare for possible North Korea
ballistic missile attacks. In May, Pyongyang tested several short-range missiles.
The Aegis Ashore systems were approved for purchase in January by U.S. State Department. Total cost of the system is estimated at more than $2
billion.

Chinese internal militarization politics based of US militarization

Blanchard 7-5-19 (Ben Blanchard, Senior Correspondent for Reuters, “China denies U.S.
accusations of South China Sea missile tests”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
china-usa-southchinasea/china-denies-us-accusations-of-south-china-sea-missile-tests-
idUSKCN1U01QN)

BEIJING (Reuters) - China's top newspaper, decrying Washington as a trouble-maker, said

on Monday U.S. moves in the South China Sea like last week's freedom of navigation
operation will only cause China to strengthen its deployments in the disputed waterway.
China's foreign ministry said the USS Hopper, a destroyer, came within 12 nautical miles of
Huangyan island, which is better known as the Scarborough Shoal and is subject to a rival claim
by the Philippines, a historic ally of the United States.

It was the latest U.S. naval operation challenging extensive Chinese claims in the South China
Sea and came even as President Donald Trump's administration seeks Chinese cooperation in
dealing with North Korea's missile and nuclear programs.

The ruling Communist Party's official People's Daily said in a commentary that, with the situation
generally improving in the South China Sea, it was clear that the United States was the one
militarizing the region.
"Against this backdrop of peace and cooperation, a U.S. ship wantonly provoking trouble is
singleminded to the point of recklessness," the paper said.

"If the relevant party once more makes trouble out of nothing and causes tensions, then it will
only cause China to reach this conclusion: in order to earnestly protect peace in the South China
Sea, China must strengthen and speed up the building of its abilities there," it said.

The commentary was published under the pen name "Zhong Sheng", meaning "Voice of China",
which is often used to give the paper's view on foreign policy issues.

The widely read Global Times tabloid, published by the People's Daily, said in an editorial on
Monday China's control of the South China Sea is only growing and it is well placed to react to
U.S. "provocations".

"As China's military size and quality improve, so does its control of the South China Sea," it said.
"China is able to send more naval vessels as a response and can take steps like militarizing
islands."

The Scarborough Shoal is located within the Philippines' 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic
Zone but an international tribunal in 2016 ruled that it is a traditional fishing ground that no one
country has sole rights to exploit.

The U.S. military says it carries out "freedom of navigation" operations throughout the world,
including in areas claimed by allies, and that they are separate from political considerations.

The Pentagon has not commented directly on the latest patrol but said such operations are
routine.
 2ac at: Japanese Ptx - Status Of The CCP is Bad
The CCP is losing legitimacy-due to corruption and domestic politics
Bo Zhiyue, The Diplomat, 3-30-2015, "The End of CCP Rule and the Collapse of
China," Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2015/03/the-end-of-ccp-rule-and-
the-collapse-of-china/, accessed 7-12-2019 (Kent Denver--EA) Professor BO
Zhiyue, a leading authority on Chinese elite politics, is Director of the New
Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre (NZCCRC) and Professor of Political
Science at Victoria University of Wellington.

Ever since the publication of David Shambaugh’s controversial essay “The Coming Chinese
Crackup” on March 6, 2015, China scholars have been debating the demise of communist
rule in China. Shambaugh made two basic points in the essay: the endgame of
communist rule in China has begun and Xi Jinping’s ruthless measures have accelerated
the demise of the CCP’s rule in China. His critics hardly challenged his first point but mostly
disagreed with him on his second point. By world communist standards, the CCP has indeed
entered its endgame. After 70 years, for instance, communist rule in the Soviet Union
ended on December 26, 1991. In six months, the Chinese Communist Party will have
ruled the People’s Republic of China for 66 years. With rampant corruption at all levels
of the party and the government — where a typist has taken bribes in the amount of four
million yuan and a vice chairman of the Central Military Commission took cash bribes weighing
more than one ton — the CCP seems unlikely to outlive its Soviet counterpart by a large
margin. Nevertheless, by Chinese dynastic standards, the CCP’s rule is not in its endgame.
Instead, it might very well be in its beginning. The last dynasty, the Qing, lasted for 267 years; by
that standard, CCP rule is still in its infancy. In 1710, 66 years into the Qing Dynasty’s rule in
China, the country was at its peak as a prosperous and powerful nation under the wise
leadership of Emperor Kangxi. The dynasty would last another 200 years. As a ruling dynasty, the
CCP has had a mixed record so far. While it is true that the CCP under Mao Zedong unified
most of the country, Mao’s policies did not make China more prosperous and stronger.
Tens of millions perished in the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward, and the entire
population suffered during the decade-long power struggles of the Cultural Revolution.
Deng Xiaoping heralded a new era of economic prosperity, but his GDP-oriented policies have
severely strained China’s environmental capacities. China witnessed the best performance in
terms of economic growth in the decade from 2002 to 2012 under the leadership of Hu Jintao.
Yet corruption and environmental degradation worsened in the same period , in spite of
Hu’s signature slogan of a “scientific outlook on development.” In the past two and a half years,
Xi Jinping’s leadership has been long on anti-corruption campaigns but short on anti-pollution
efforts. One hundred officials at the rank of vice minister and above have been investigated for
corruption, but there is no sign that the central leadership is taking environmental issues more
seriously. A series of new leading small groups have been created to manage national security,
internet issues, reforms, and military modernization, but no central leading small group on
environmental protection has been set up. Given these mixed results, Xi Jinping could very likely
be the last ruler in China as a communist. Yet he could also start another new era of prosperity
and strength as a new emperor of the CCP Dynasty. Whether the People’s Republic of China will
end up like the Soviet Union or follow the footsteps of Manchus on its way to international
prominence will depend on what this new leadership will do (or will not do) in the next seven
years.
 1ar at: Japanese Ptx ext- Status Of The CCP is Bad
Xi is an illegitimate leader and can’t unify china-corruption and purges make
him and the CCP increasingly worse
Ho-Fung Hung, Arthur R. Kroeber, Howard W. French, Suisheng Zhao, 3-13-2015,
"When Will China's Government Collapse?," Foreign Policy,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/13/china_communist_party_collapse_downf
all/, accessed 7-12-2019 (Kent Denver--EA)
Ho-fung Hung is an associate professor of sociology at Johns Hopkins University.
Arthur R. Kroeber is managing director of GaveKal Dragonomics, an independent
global economic research firm, and editor of its journal, China Economic
Quarterly. Howard W. French is the author of China's Second Continent: How a
Million Migrants are Building a New Empire in Africa. An associate professor at
the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, he is working on a book
about the future of Chinese power.
“The endgame of Chinese communist rule has now begun,” influential China scholar David
Shambaugh wrote in a March 7 article in the Wall Street Journal. “And it has progressed further
than many think.” Is the ruling China’s Communist Party (CCP) on the brink of collapse? We
asked several China hands for their take: Trending Articles Assad Hasn’t Won Anything After
years of bloody warfare, it’s time to recognize what the Syrian dictator rules over: a chronically
violent and… Powered By Ho-fung Hung, Associate Professor of Sociology, Johns Hopkins
University: I agree with Shambaugh that there are serious cracks in the CCP regime, not
only because of his arguments and evidence but also because of his deep knowledge
about and long-time access to the party’s elite. Whether these cracks will lead to the end of
CCP rule, nevertheless, is difficult to predict. The prediction about a CCP endgame this time
might end up like the many unrealized predictions before. It may also be like the story of boy
crying wolf: The wolf didn’t come the first two times, but it finally came when nobody believed it
would come. The bottom line is, the CCP is facing very tough challenges. Whether and how it
can weather them is uncertain. Xi is a leader who came to power with very few sources of
legitimacy. Mao and Deng were among the founding fathers of the People’s Republic of
China. Deng handpicked his successors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao — both of whom got
the backing of party elders when they came to power. Xi, despite his princeling background,
is the first leader chosen out of a delicate compromise among party factions. Amidst Xi’s rise to
power, the mysterious Wang Lijun incident occurred, followed by the unusual downfalls of
former top leaders Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang. What Wang actually told the American
diplomats during his sleepover in the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu, and what sensitive information
he eventually conveyed to Beijing is still unknown. But the rumor that he revealed a plot by
other princelings to get rid of Xi through a coup does not sound too crazy. If this is true,
then Xi’s frenetic purge of other factions in his anti-corruption campaign makes sense as
a desperate move to whip the disrespectful elite to submission through creating a
culture of terror within the Party. Xi’s purges surely make new enemies and make most
of the Party elite feel deeply anxious about their fortunes. It won’t be so surprising if
some of those anxious elite conspire to depose Xi. Such internal coup against unpopular
leaders is not alien to the CCP — it happened with the downfall of the Gang of Four in 1976, and
former party chairman Hua Guofeng a few years later. Second, the party’s internal rift is
unfolding at the worst possible time, as far as the economy is concerned . Yes, a 7.4
percent annual growth rate is an enviable number to many other emerging economies. But with
the soaring indebtedness of the Chinese economy and the ever aggravating unemployment
problem, the Chinese economy needs higher-speed growth to stay above water. The debt
hangover of the 2008-09 stimulus is worrying. China’s debt to GDP ratio jumped from 147
percent in 2008 to 282 percent now, and is still growing. It is at a dangerously high level
compared to other emerging economies. The economic slowdown will lead to profit decline for
companies and revenue shortfall for local governments, increasing their difficulty in servicing
and repaying debts. A vicious cycle of defaults and further growth deceleration could turn a
slowdown into something uglier.A vicious cycle of defaults and further growth deceleration
could turn a slowdown into something uglier. It is possible that the CCP elite, no matter how
much they dislike Xi and his anti-corruption campaign, will still prefer not to rock the boat. They
are aware that they are nobody without the protection of the party-state, and their privileges
will be under far greater threat in the wake of a regime collapse. It is also possible that in the
years of pacification and domestication following the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown,
China’s civil society and dissidents have become so timid and cornered that they are incapable
of taking advantage of any cracks in the regime. Is Xi successfully increasing his grip of power
through the anti-corruption campaign, or does his rule still suffer from inadequate legitimacy
behind the mask of invincibility? Only time can tell. But besides the endgame of CCP rule, we
should also ponder another possible scenario: the rise of a hysteric and suffocating dictatorial
regime which maintains its draconian control over a society gradually losing its dynamism.
Perhaps we can call this hypothetical regime North Korea lite. Arthur Kroeber, Editor, China
Economic Quarterly: Neither China nor its Communist Party is cracking up. I have three reasons
for this judgment. First, none of the factors Shambaugh cites strongly supports the crackup case.
Second, the balance of evidence suggests that Xi’s government is not weak and desperate, but forceful
and adaptable. Third, the forces that might push for systemic political change are far weaker than the party. Shambaugh thinks the system is on its last legs because rich people are moving assets abroad, Xi is
cracking down on the media and academia, officials look bored in meetings, corruption is rife, and the economy is at an impasse. This is not a persuasive case. True, many rich Chinese are moving money abroad,
both to find safe havens and to diversify their portfolios as China’s growth slows. But in aggregate, capital outflows are modest, and plenty of rich Chinese are still investing in their own economy. Following an
easing of rules, new private business registrations rose 45 percent in 2014 — scarcely a sign that the entrepreneurial class has given up hope. The crackdown on free expression and civil society is deeply
distressing, but not necessarily a sign of weakness. It could equally be seen as an assertion of confidence in the success of China’s authoritarian-capitalist model, and a rejection of the idea that China needs to
make concessions to liberal-democratic ideas to keep on going. It is also related to the crackdown on corruption, which Shambaugh wrongly dismisses as a cynical power play. Corruption at the end of the era of
Xi’s predecessor Hu Jintao had got out of control, and posed a real risk of bringing down the regime. A relentless drive to limit corruption was essential to stabilize the system, and this is precisely what Xi has
delivered.A relentless drive to limit corruption was essential to stabilize the system, and this is precisely what Xi has delivered. It cannot work unless Xi can demonstrate complete control over all aspects of the
political system, including ideology. As for the economy and the reform program, it is first worth pointing out that despite its severe slowdown, China’s economy continues to grow faster than that of any other
major country in the world. And claims that the reform program is sputtering simply do not square with the facts. 2014 saw the start of a crucial program to revamp the fiscal system, which led to the start of
restructuring local government debt; first steps to liberalize the one-child policy and the hukou, or household registration system (discussed for years but never achieved by previous governments); important
changes in energy pricing; and linkage of the Shanghai and Hong Kong stock markets. News reports suggest that we will soon see a program to reorganize big SOEs under Temasek-like holding companies that will
focus on improving their flagging financial returns. These are all material achievements and compare favorably to, for instance, the utter failure of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to progress on any of the
reform agenda he outlined for his country two years ago. Finally, there is no evidence that the biggest and most important political constituency in China — the rising urban bourgeoisie — has much interest in
changing the system. In my conversations with members of this class, I hear many complaints, but more generally a satisfaction with the material progress China has made in the last two decades. Except for a tiny
group of brave dissidents, this group in general displays little interest in political reform and none in democracy. One reason may be that they find uninspiring the record of democratic governance in other big
Asian countries, such as India. More important is probably the fear that in a representative system, the interests of the urban bourgeoisie (at most 25 percent of the population) would lose out to those of the rural
masses. The party may well be somewhat insecure, but the only force that might plausibly unseat it is more insecure still.The party may well be somewhat insecure, but the only force that might plausibly unseat it
is more insecure still. Predictions of Chinese political collapse have a long and futile history. Their persistent failure stems from a basic conceptual fault. Instead of facing the Chinese system on its own terms and
understanding why it works — which could create insights into why it might stop working — critics judge the system against what they would like it to be, and find it wanting. This embeds an assumption of fragility
that makes every societal problem look like an existential crisis. As a long-term resident of China, I would love the government to become more open, pluralistic and tolerant of creativity. That it refuses to do so is
disappointing to me and many others, but offers no grounds for a judgment of its weakness. Seven years ago, in his excellent book China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation, Shambaugh described the
Party as “a reasonably strong and resilient institution…. To be sure, it has its problems and challenges, but none present the real possibility of systemic collapse.” That was a good judgment then, and it remains a
good judgment now. Howard French, Associate Professor, Columbia Journalism School: With respect to Shambaugh, what has interested me most in this matter is the response to what amounts to a carefully
hedged prognostication, rather than his specific arguments in and of themselves. It has been fascinating to watch what strikes this observer, at least, as a certain betrayal of anxiety in the efforts of some of those
who have rushed to take Shambaugh down, or at least refute and discredit his arguments. The notes have ranged from “how dare he?” to “who does this person think he is?” to, in some of the more breathless
reactions, attacks on his motives: he is a pawn — or at least an unwitting agent of this or that occult force. Along the way, Shambaugh’s good faith has been questioned; he becomes an actor on behalf of America,
or the West, which is said to be always trying bring China down, or cast its political and economic model in doubt. (This extends, of course, to the limited Chinese responses we have seen so far, such as that of the
Global Times, which has responded with vilification, forgetting perhaps that for decades a cherished recurrent theme in Chinese propaganda has been the fundamentally flawed nature of Western democracy or
capitalism, and, of course, its inevitable demise.) Before getting down to details, perhaps the first thing to be said is that it is impossible to appreciate Shambaugh’s perspective without understanding where he
comes from. Few among the first wave of critics credited him for his scholarship, other than to note that he is prominent or respected within the academy. Few have explored the actual nature of his work over the
years, or the findings he has made in previous writings, such as the 2008 book China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation, a careful study of how the party responded to the shock of the fall of the Soviet
Union and began reinventing itself. Shambaugh gives enormous credit to the CCP for these efforts, but it is clear that by the time he published his 2013 book, China Goes Global: The Partial Power, he had
concluded that we have overestimated China’s strengths and underestimated its weaknesses. This is all worth spelling out because even if Shambaugh’s “crackup” theory surprised you, it has clearly not come out
of thin air; rather, it is the latest wrinkle in the evolving views of an earnest scholar. Perhaps the next most important point to be made — and it has not been heard enough in this discussion — is that no one
knows where China (or the world) is heading 20, or even 10, years down the road. Mao oversaw rapprochement with the United States in order to counter the Soviet Union, and this can be said to have brought
capitalism to his country, which was clearly not his aim. Former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping embraced capitalism, and that can be said to have led to a near existential crisis for the party around the issue of
democratization. The United States embraced China also in order to balance the Soviet Union, as well as, a bit later, to seek markets. This ended up creating what now appears ever more like a peer rival, after a
brief period of unipolarity. Unintended, even undesirable consequences are the name of the game in matters of state and in international affairs, and however assertive and determined Xi may appear to us in the
early phases of his rule, it is a safe bet that his drive to realize a Chinese dream will produce many things he could never have dreamed of—or desired. It is also at least plausible that Xi’s remarkable apparent
confidence is a kind of compensation for deep anxiety at the top in China: a recognition that the country is walking a tightrope. I defer to others on the specifics of China’s known challenges, but a few points seem
fairly obvious. The early, and one might say easy, phase of China’s takeoff is over.The early, and one might say easy, phase of China’s takeoff is over. That period consisted in large measure of stopping doing stupid
things and inflicting damage on oneself. Moving forward now from here becomes exponentially more difficult. This means finding a way to sustain relatively high growth rates, when almost everything points to a
natural, secular slowdown. It means coping with environmental challenges on a scale never seen before. It means dealing with the emergence of a middle class, and everything that political science suggests about
the difficulties that this poses for authoritarian regimes. It means finding a way through the middle-income trap. It means restraining corruption that is, if anything, even worse, meaning more systemic, than
commonly recognized. It means coping with the accelerating balancing of nervous neighbors. It means coping with issues of ethnic and regional tensions and stark inequality. It means drastic and mostly
unfavorable changes in demography. And it means doing all of these things, and facing any number of other serious challenges that space doesn’t allow one to detail here, without the benefit of a coherent or
appealing ideology other than nationalism and, tentatively, budding personality cult-style leadership. We don’t know how this is going to turn out. For every success one can point to involving China, it is easy to
point to at least one stark and serious problem, or potential failing. I don’t share Shambaugh’s confidence in predicting the demise of the party, but it does not strike this reader as a reckless prediction. It should
not surprise us, and neither should its opposite, China’s continued relative success. Such is the degree of uncertainty we must all live with. Suisheng Zhao, Professor, University of Denver: Yes, the CCP regime is in
crisis. But it has muddled through one crisis after another, including the catastrophes of the chaotic, decade-long Cultural Revolution and the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, by tackling its symptoms. It is too difficult
to predict the arrival of the cracking up moment now. This current crisis comes after more than three decades of market-oriented economic reform under one-party rule, which has produced a corruptive brand of
state capitalism in which power and money ally. The government officials and senior managers in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have formed strong and exclusive interest groups to pursue economic gains. China
ranks among the countries of the highest income inequality in the world at a time when China has dismantled its social welfare state, leaving hundreds of millions of citizens without any or adequate provision of
healthcare, unemployment insurance, and a variety of other social services. Meanwhile, China has become one of the world’s most polluted countries. The crisis has worsened as China’s economic growth is
slowing. As the worsening economic, social, and environmental problems cause deep discontent across society and lead many people to take to the streets in protest, China has entered a period of deepening
social tensions. Apparently, Beijing is frightened and has relied more and more on coercive forces. The cracking up moment could come when economic growth has significantly slowed, and Beijing is unable to
sustain the regime’s legitimacy with its economic performance. While scholars such as Shambaugh are warning of this cracking up, President Xi Jinping is likely aware of the danger of possible collapse and has
been trying to prevent it from happening. Opposite from the prescription by liberal scholars and Western leaders, Xi has seen that the key to keeping the CCP in power is to further empower the authoritarian state
led by the Communist Party, reflecting the long struggle of the Chinese political elites in building and maintaining a powerful state to lead China’s modernization. China scholar Lucian Pye famously observed that
China suffered a “crisis of authority” — a deep craving for the decisive power of effective authority ever since the 19th-century collapse of the Chinese empire. Chinese elite attributed China’s modern decline
partially to the weakening of the state authority. The authority crisis called for the creation of an authoritarian state through revolution and nationalism.The authority crisis called for the creation of an
authoritarian state through revolution and nationalism. The Chinese communist revolution was a collective assertion for the new form of authority and a strong state to build a prosperous Chinese nation. The very
essence of CCP legitimacy was partly based upon its ability to establish a powerful state as an organizing and mobilizing force to defend the national independence and launch modernization programs. To rectify
his predecessors’ overemphasis on the transformation of China through reforms that weakened the state’s authority and the CCP central leadership, Xi has made concentrated efforts to over-empower the
authoritarian state. Repeatedly warning against “Westernization,” Xi emphasizes a unified national ideal of the “China Dream” and has allowed the security/propaganda axis to tighten up controls on expression of
different political ideologies and opinions. Taking strong measures to strengthen central Party and government authority, he set up new and powerful small leadership groups, such as the Central National Security
Commission and the Comprehensive Deepening Economic Reform Small Group, with himself as the head. Looking to Mao for inspiration to manage the country, he launched the largest rectification and mass line
campaigns in decades to fight corruption. Describing Mao as “a great figure who changed the face of the nation and led the Chinese people to a new destiny,” Xi has emerged as a champion of the party-state
power, with himself at the top as a strongman. Whether or not empowering the authoritarian state is a long-term solution to the current crisis, it seems to have targeted some of its symptoms and temporarily
silenced its liberal critics inside China. As a result, it may help postpone the arrival of a cracking up moment — at least for now.
 2ac at: Japanese Ptx - Public Opposition to Aegis
The Japanese Public oppose the Aegis Ashore system because of costs of
maintaining it and its adverse health effects
Hornung, Jeffrey W. 08,14,18, "Japan's Aegis Ashore Defense System," No
Publication, https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/08/japans-aegis-ashore-defense-
system.html, accessed 7-10-2019 (Kent Denver--EA)
Jeffrey W. Hornung is a political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND
Corporation

The discussion in Japan about the proposed Aegis Ashore missile system has not been
going well for the government. It may be a sensitive subject, but there are good reasons
the government may want to be steady and firm in its approach. The government's plan
is to install the Aegis Ashore system in the Akita and Yamaguchi prefectures. The
objective is to strengthen Japan's defenses against North Korean missiles, be they nuclear or
conventional. The initial idea was to have the system become operable by fiscal year 2023. Yet,
over the past few weeks, many debates have stalled forward movement on the entire
plan. One concerns cost. Although the government said it will cost 80 billion yen per unit,
taxpayers are concerned the costs will snowball in the coming years, especially as these
are U.S.-made systems. One is rationale. Both leadership and residents in these
prefectures want to know why their prefectures were chosen. Another is health. Many
residents in the areas close to proposed deployment sites have voiced concerns over the
system's radar. Their concern is that the strong radio waves from that radar could be
harmful. These concerns are natural. As a democracy, it is the responsibility of the
government to explain the necessity of the cost, explain the rationale for sites, and
demonstrate the safety of the radar, or move it to an area where there are no humans
within range. And it is the responsibility of the government to gain their acceptance, or
suffer the consequences at the next election. A fourth concern that sits apart from these
can best be called emotional, and one that the government needs to counter more
effectively. Both residents and politicians in the Diet have questioned the need for the
system given the continuing détente on the Korean Peninsula. For them, as tensions
continue to ease on the Peninsula, there is a reduced necessity for the system . This
concern is rash because the ballistic missile threat from North Korea has not dissipated. While
Pyongyang made several vague promises to Seoul and Washington, it has made no
concrete moves to abandon its nuclear or missile programs. For Japan, the threat that it
faced prior to this year's summitry remains the same. Until evidence is obtained of
Pyongyang undertaking complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear
program, as well as its missile program, the system remains a crucial addition to Japan's
defense. For nearly 20 years, Japan has used the North Korea threat as a legitimate
rationale to build its missile defense system and cooperate closely with the U.S. in its
development. This argument remains as true today as it did before the flurry of regional
diplomacy began earlier this year. Japan can still benefit from a reinforced missile shield vis-à-vis
North Korea. At a time when Japanese defense planners are considering the full spectrum
of threats facing Japan and revising Japan's national defense program guidelines and
mid-term defense plan, it is imperative to keep sight of the most immediate threat.
Although there is a current lull in missile launches and bellicose rhetoric from North Korea, the
North Korean threat remains unchanged. While it is tempting to hope for the current trend of
North Korean behavior to continue, until concrete steps are taken by Pyongyang to demonstrate
it is no longer a threat to its neighbors, Japanese leaders must consider all the possible means to
defend Japan from the North Korean threat, including the Aegis Ashore system.
 1ar at: Japanese Ptx ext - Public Opposition to Aegis
Aegis costs taxpayers a lot, destroys regional relations, and people dislike it
Asahai, 18 – (The Asahi Shimbun is one of the five national newspapers in Japan Rising costs
fuel doubts about Aegis Ashore plan’s efficacy,
http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201808020045.html) NL

The government clearly needs to reconsider its plan to introduce the Aegis Ashore land-based missile
defense system. First of all, the two Aegis Ashore installations in Japan would buck the trend of
easing tensions in the region. There are also serious doubts about the cost-effectiveness of the
system. The Defense Ministry has said the missile intercepting system will cost 1.7 times the initial estimate
mainly because of its decision to select Lockheed Martin’s most advanced radar. One Aegis Ashore unit will cost 134 billion

yen ($1.2 billion), instead of the originally estimated 80 billion yen, according to the ministry. The government plans
to deploy the anti-ballistic missile system in Akita and Yamaguchi prefectures. The total cost of installing and operating two Aegis Ashore units

will be 466.4 billion yen over 30 years, the ministry said. But the figure does not include the costs to build
necessary infrastructure, including land development, or to purchase missiles priced at tens of billions of yen

each. Simply put, the amount of taxpayer money used for the system will increase. The ministry plans to secure
funds for the plan in its budget request for the fiscal year that starts in April. But the ministry should not assume that the costly plan is already set to go.
The prices of weapons Japan buys from the United States often soar from the initial estimates. This is more likely now because U.S. President Donald
Trump is pressing Tokyo to buy huge amounts of American-made weapons to cut Japan’s trade surplus with the United States. When
it
decided to introduce the Aegis Ashore system at the end of last year, the government tried to justify the
decision by describing North Korea’s nuclear arms and missile programs as “a grave and urgent
threat in a new stage.” But the security situation in East Asia has since entered a new phase following
such events as the inter-Korea summit and the historic meeting between Trump and North Korean

leader Kim Jong Un. The Japanese government itself has responded to the changing situation by suspending evacuation drills for citizens to
prepare for North Korea’s missile strikes and removing surface-to-air Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile intercepting units deployed in
Hokkaido and four western prefectures. Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera still claims the security threat posed by North Korea “has remained
unchanged.” The rigid adherence to the plan crafted last year will not likely win broad public support. Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe’s administration has been stressing the threat posed to Japan’s security by Pyongyang’s weapons programs. But it is believed that
the real purpose of enhancing Japan’s defense capabilities is to counter China’s military expansion. If Tokyo provides radar information about ballistic
missiles flying toward the United States, Japan will inevitably play a role in the defense of the U.S. mainland. The
government needs to
make a tough-minded analysis of the Aegis Ashore program’s potential impact on Japan’s
relations with neighboring countries. In Akita and Yamaguchi prefectures, which have been chosen as the candidates to host the
system, local criticism is growing about the government’s rush to implement the plan. The government
hopes to start operating the Aegis launch pads in fiscal 2023, but the start of operations is now expected to be pushed back to fiscal 2025 or later,
partly due to reasons on the U.S. side. There
are concerns that the Aegis Ashore units will end up as white
elephants costing Japanese taxpayers enormous amounts of money.

Aegis is facing massive local opposition

Johnston, 18 – (12/11/18, Eric Johnston has worked as a journalist in Japan for more than two
decades. Currently a full-time reporter at The Japan Times, the country's oldest and most prestigous
English-language newspaper, his beat includes local news, features on Japanese politics and society, and
U.S.-Japan issues. Japan's two Aegis Ashore anti-missile candidate sites run into local opposition
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/12/11/national/japans-two-aegis-ashore-anti-missile-
candidate-sites-run-local-opposition/#.XSaP6-hKjIW)

But the
designated site in the city of Akita is only hundreds of meters from schools and homes,
and close to downtown. The choice of location has sparked local anger and opposition, even
among those who say they aren’t automatically opposed in principle — just not in their
backyard, please. The central government is looking at the Ground Self-Defense Force’s Araya training area, about 3 km from the Akita
Prefectural Government offices and 5 km from Akita Station. The potential site for the other Aegis Ashore unit is the GSDF Mutsumi training area in
Hagi, Yamaguchi Prefecture. In its 2018 white paper, the Defense Ministry explained the need for Aegis Ashore by saying it will fundamentally boost
Japan’s ability to protect itself “seamlessly” at all times, something more difficult with ship-based Aegis systems. “The working environment for the
crew onboard an Aegis-equipped destroyer is extremely severe. These ships must make port calls for maintenance and replenishment, creating gaps in
defense posture. This means frequent long-term deployments for the crew to eliminate these undesired intervals. This burden on personnel is
anticipated to be lifted significantly once Aegis Ashore is deployed,” the white paper states. “The upcoming introduction of the land-based Aegis
system, Aegis Ashore, will enable our forces to intercept missiles in the upper tier not just from Aegis destroyers but also from land,” it adds. The
United States and Japan are also jointly developing advanced interceptor missiles called the Standard Missile-3 Block IIA, which will have a better ability
to take out launched missiles earlier than the ones currently in use. Plans call for eight Japanese Aegis-equipped destroyers with ballistic missile
defense capabilities, including the SM-3 Block IIA type. The systems are scheduled for deployment in fiscal 2021 and the aim is to also deploy them at
Aegis Ashore sites. In September, the Defense Ministry released its fiscal 2019 budget request, which included procurement of two Aegis Ashore units
at a cost of ¥123.7 billion each. In October, site
surveys in Yamaguchi and Akita began, even as local opposition
toughened. In Akita, concerns about Aegis Ashore start with the question of why the central
government is looking at a site lying within a city of about 308,000 people. Sixteen resident
associations from the neighborhoods right beside the Araya area, representing about 13,000
people, have all voiced their formal opposition. One resident, Shoichi Kosaka, lives just 300 meters from the Araya
compound. Driving through quiet residential streets within sight of the border fence, he expressed some specific concerns. “ Medical

evacuation flights are very important to Akita, given its elderly population. But if the Aegis Ashore system is
built here, there will be limits on flights around the area. Of course, people may move away as well, because
who wants to live beside an Aegis Ashore installation?” he said. Kozo Kazama, who leads a local group opposed to the
Aegis plan, also questioned the candidate site. “Why the Defense Ministry chose Araya as a site for Aegis Ashore is a mystery. Unlike the other
candidate site in Yamaguchi, which is located away from a major urban center, Araya
is in a major city,” Kazama said. “There are so
many concerns about the effects of the radar on both electronic devices in the area and on stress
levels, as well as all sorts of security concerns related to the presence of missiles so close to so
many people.” Local politicians were also apparently taken by surprise at the central government’s decision to
consider an Aegis Ashore unit in their backyard.

The Public is in opposition to Aegis Ashore in their cities because of the nuclear
health risks and flawed data ultimately fostering distrust in the government
igniting domestic politics
Mina Pollmann, The Diplomat, 7-9-2019, "Japan's Aegis Ashore System Hits a
Roadblock: Domestic Politics," Diplomat,
https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/japans-aegis-ashore-system-hits-a-roadblock-
domestic-politics/, accessed 7-10-201
Mina Erika Pollmann is currently a PhD student at MIT’s Department of Political
Science

Last week, Japan’s minister of defense, Takeshi Iwaya, apologized to the governor of
Yamaguchi prefecture for how poorly the central government handled justifying the
selection of Hagi city as a candidate site for the deployment of one of two land-based
Aegis Ashore systems. Hagi city is one of two cities, along with Akita city in Akita prefecture,
named as candidate sites. At the heart of the matter is the revelation of mistakes in the
geographical survey conducted to select the prefecture as a site for deployment. There
was a discrepancy in the Ministry of Defense’s data, which was based on data taken
from Google Earth, and data from the government’s Geopolitical Information Authority
of Japan. Iwaya had also apologized to the governor of Akita prefecture in mid-June for
erroneous data in explanation materials presented to justify the selection of Akita city.
The survey mistake itself may not be fatal to deploying the Aegis Ashore system to the
locale – the Ministry of Defense (MOD) was off by about 2 meters, and the mistakes
were systematically biased toward making it more difficult to select the given site (the
MOD’s data made the mountains appear steeper than they were, and high mountains
can block the radio waves emitted by the radar of the missile defense system). What is
problematic is the fact that a mistake occurred at all – that this faulty data was presented
as trustworthy. Earning the local residents’ trust and understanding was already an
impossibly difficult task; the central government’s mistakes in marshaling evidence to
explain the site selection only increases the difficulty. Local residents in Hagi city, Abu city
(neighboring Hagi city), and Akita city have been opposed since the sites were named as
candidates in June 2018 due to possible health concerns and fears about becoming a
target of North Korean attack. They want to know why their cities were selected to host the
Aegis systems. It is politically impossible for the MOD to answer that these cities were selected
for convenience, because the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) already owns land there, the
Mutsumi training area in Yamagata and the Araya training area in Akita. However, as local
opposition ramps up, it may be time for the government to consider alternative
locations, even if it means purchasing new land. A new field survey to collect accurate
data is unlikely to cool the opposition once trust in the central government has been
lost. The decision to deploy the system was made hastily by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in
December 2017, partly in reaction to increasing tension with North Korea as Pyongyang
increased the tempo of its missile tests, and partly due to U.S. President Donald Trump’s
pressure to “Buy American.” While the costs may have been grossly underestimated, the
decision itself is a strategically sound decision, and one that the Abe administration should
stick to, even as a superficial diplomatic détente descends on the Korean Peninsula. As
Jeffrey Hornung argued almost a year ago: Japan can still benefit from a reinforced
missile shield vis-à-vis North Korea. … While it is tempting to hope for the current trend
of North Korean behavior to continue, until concrete steps are taken by Pyongyang to
demonstrate it is not longer a threat to its neighbors, Japanese leaders must consider all
the possible means to defend Japan from the North Korean threat, including the Aegis Ashore
system. Despite the summit pageantry of this spring, his warning still holds true. Though
originally scheduled for deployment in 2023, with existing delays, the Aegis Ashore system will
likely not be operational until 2024 or even later.
 2ac at: Japanese Ptx - Xi’s Ambitions Dictate Japanese Ptx
Chinese internal politics controlled by Xi – trying to avoiding conflict
Palmer 2-26-18 (James Palmer, senior editor at Foreign Policy, “China’s Stability Myth Is Dead”,
Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/26/chinas-stability-myth-is-dead/)

The announcement on Sunday that China would abolish the two-term limit for the
presidency, effectively foreshadowing current leader Xi Jinping’s likely status as
president for life, had been predicted ever since Xi failed to nominate a clear successor
at last October’s Communist Party Congress. But it still came as a shock in a country where the collective
leadership established under Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s was once considered inviolable. Xi, like every leader since Deng, combines
a trinity of roles that embody the three pillars of power in China: party chairman, president, and head of the Central Military
Commission. But like every leader since Deng, he was once expected to hand these over after his appointed decade, letting one
generation of leadership pass smoothly on to the next.

It’s virtually impossible to gauge public opinion in China, especially as censorship has gripped
ever tighter online. But among Chinese I know, including those used to defending China’s system, the move caused dismay
and a fair amount of gallows humor involving references to “Emperor Pooh” and “West Korea.”

U.S. President Donald Trump’s electoral victory in 2016 similarly prompted rounds of reflection about and criticism of American
democracy. But the Chinese case merits significantly more alarm. For all the erosion of norms under Trump, he seems unlikely,
despite the fears of some, to fundamentally change the way the United States is governed. Xi,
meanwhile, appears to
have entirely transformed Chinese politics from collective autocracy to what’s looking
increasingly like one-man rule. This switch should leave everyone very worried, both inside and outside China. A
country that once seemed to be clumsily lurching toward new freedoms has regressed
sharply into full-blown dictatorship — of a kind that’s likely to lead to dangerous and
unfixable mistakes.
The Chinese Constitution itself is a largely meaningless document, promising as it does
freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and personal privacy. Amendments are frequent, proposed
by a committee of “experts” and rubber-stamped by the National People’s Congress, China’s annual — and equally meaningless —
parliament. Brave
efforts to give the constitution genuine significance were crushed, as with
any other attempt to curtail party power, in the early years of Xi’s rule.
But the most recent change signals something far deeper than the party’s primacy over the law;
it spotlights the essential instability of the entire political system. For the last two decades,
defenders of China have pointed to collective leadership and the smooth succession from one
leader to another as signs that the country had solved the problem that bedeviled other
autocracies such as the Soviet Union. The new leadership was established five years in advance of taking power,
allowing strong continuity without the upsets of elections. The handover of power from Hu Jintao to Xi was considered a model of
good rule, without the hangovers and struggles that continued for several years after Jiang Zemin reluctantly passed power to Hu in
2002.

Perhaps the system was always doomed, as soon as a cunning enough leader emerged — though Xi was not only skilled but lucky,
utilizing the fall of his likely rival Bo Xilai to consolidate his own supremacy. There
will be a certain grim amusement
in watching intellectual apparatchiks scuttle to explain how their previous arguments in favor of
collective rule have been superseded by the needs of the times and that strongman rule is now
the only answer. As the New York Times’s Chris Buckley pointed out, Hu Angang, a regular and vocal apologist for the
government, made collective rule the centerpiece of his book on the superiority of the Chinese political system — published in 2013,
just after Xi’s initial ascension.
One of the surest signs of the change has been the intensity of propaganda in service of Xi in the
last two years. This contrasts with the lackluster treatment of Hu, his predecessor, who was praised only pro forma. Xi’s virtues,
meanwhile, are talked up in public at every chance, not just by state media but by businesses, local governments, and celebrities, all
of whose continued prosperity depends on signaling their ability to follow the leader. Xi-ism
is inescapable; in Tianjin
this Lunar New Year, the traditional, sweetly cheesy floral zodiac display was replaced with
praise for the Chinese leader.
Errors in depicting Xi, meanwhile, are harshly punished. Chinese media haven’t quite reached the level of Romanian media under
Nicolae Ceausescu’s dictatorship, where newspapers employed people whose only job was to ensure that Ceausescu’s name was
never misprinted — but editors in China now assiduously double-screen every reference to make sure that each title is correct and
no character out of place for fear of heavy fines and internal punishments. A TV host harmlessly mispronouncing the “ping” of
Jinping resulted in footage of the incident being purged from the Chinese internet.

The end of collective leadership at the top, meanwhile, has been mirrored by the destruction of
channels of dissent and disagreement throughout the country. The most obvious form of this is the gigantic
crackdown on media and the internet. Arguments that were permissible in 2009 became impossible to make in newspapers by 2014:
that China could learn from other countries; that political reform was possible; that pluralism, civil society, and adherence to the law
were good things.

Investigative journalism, once tentatively permitted as long as it confined itself to local

corruption, was massively curtailed. The relatively freewheeling atmosphere of Weibo, a Chinese Twitter-alike, was
destroyed. It was replaced with private WeChat groups, only to see a crackdown on those last fall,
with the administrators of groups threatened with imprisonment for any “anti-party” speech. A
mildly insulting reference to Xi in a group message won the sender two years in jail while the lawyer who defended him in court was
struck off the rolls. Universities once saw some degree of open debate; today absolute ideological
rigidity is demanded.
But the destruction of platforms for open discussion has been matched with an equal but much harder to discern crushing of
channels for dissent inside the party and government. Even internal documents are prefaced with the singing of praises for Xi. The
intensity of the political purges initiated by Xi under the guise of anti-corruption efforts has
silenced officials, even behind the doors of their offices, for fear of giving ammunition to their
rivals.
China’s official news agency, Xinhua, has always produced both open copy — for propaganda purposes — and internal reports
distributed at different levels of the hierarchy. These were increasingly candid the more limited their intended readership. In the last
few years, however, they’ve become far more cautious, self-censoring even for an internal audience, according to both provincial
officials and Xinhua reporters. The Chinese equivalent of the U.S. State Department’s “dissent channel” in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, whereby even relatively low-ranking diplomats were able to send reports directly to the minister, was shuttered in 2013.

This bodes poorly for China’s decision-making both domestically and internationally. The
previous system was brutal, repressive, and corrupt — but it also saw reforms, both political and
economic, that made lives better. Most critically, it avoided unforced errors. At home, there was no repeat of the
sweeping ideological madness of Maoism; changes were introduced slowly and carefully, tested at the local and provincial levels
before becoming national policy. Abroad,
China has avoided the waste and blood of foreign wars ever
since the disastrous and brief invasion of Vietnam in 1979, a record of peace that the United
States and Russia can only dream of.
The public record of China’s internal decision-making in those decades is pitifully scanty. But collective rule, and the ability to debate
within the party and to sometimes listen to outside voices, undoubtedly played a powerful role. With power now concentrated in a
single man, and with nobody willing to challenge him, the likelihood of calamitous mistakes has soared. The first great disaster of the
Xi era may have already begun; the carceral archipelago of Tibet and Xinjiang could easily metastasize into the rest of the country in
ways that would, at best, hamstring economic growth and cripple intellectual development.
And the fear that has silenced so many voices in Chinese society will keep spreading. During Lunar New Year this month, traditional
fireworks were banned from Beijing — even down to the firecrackers thrown joyfully by small children. By itself, that could be
passed off as a legitimate health and safety measure. But such was the worry about public gatherings that there were not even any
organized displays of fireworks. For the first time in decades, the sky over China’s capital as spring arrived was dead, black, and
silent.
 2ac at: NoKo Deterrence – link turn
Turn – perceived US encroachment is what causes North Korean proliferation.
Troutman, 2018 (Noelle Troutman, UNI POLITICAL SCIENCE report, Addressing North Korean
Nuclear Aggression: America’s Role in Deterrence and Assurance, US Strategic Command,
https://www.stratcom.mil/Portals/8/Documents/AA_Proceedings/1.pdf?ver=2018-10-04-
141146-977)

The mindset of Kim Jong-un then becomes important to consider when calculating levels of risk
involved in this approach. In order to effectively deter North Korea from becoming
increasingly hostile and therefore uncooperative, the United States must actively
recognize what is motivating our adversary in their choice to engage actors through
unconventional means. The Kim regime has long felt threatened by the influence and
perceived encroachment by the United States within Southeast Asia. This fear has not only
instilled the importance of nuclear weapon development for North Korea, but it has
increased its confidence in pursuing aggressive action despite the potential for
retaliation and antagonization of allies
 2ac at: NoKo Deterrence – impact inev
North Korean prolif inevitable.
Blumenthal, 18 (Dan Blumenthal, Director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise
Institute, senior director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia at the Department of Defense, Time to
refocus on North Korea’s proliferation, American Enterprise Institute,
http://www.aei.org/publication/time-to-refocus-on-north-koreas-proliferation/)

Much of the debate during the period of maximum pressure and “ fire and fury ”
centered on whether or not Kim could be deterred from using his nuclear weapons against
the United States and his allies. That debate was hardly satisfactory, given the fact that a
weaponized ICBM was a new development that requires new thinking about what deterrence
meant. But what we do know is that Kim cannot be deterred from proliferating. The United
States lost a chance to establish such a deterrent when it let Israel strike the Syrian
reactor, rather than doing so itself.
The only strategies short of regime change that have a chance at stemming the tide of
proliferation are maximum pressure, which continues to focus on all proliferation front
companies, threat reduction through reinvigorating programs like the Proliferation
Security Initiative, and diplomacy that hinges on collectively working with other countries to
stop treating North Korea like a normal country when its embassies and diplomatic pouches
have been used for proliferation purposes.

The Trump administration went further than previous administrations in assembling a global-
pressure campaign that, if it were allowed to continue on, could have resulted in the collapse of
Kim. Trump also went further than any president with his personal diplomacy. The
administration is thus on firm ground return to an amplified version of maximum pressure,
global threat reduction, and the general weakening of Kim. It gave peace a chance and
learned that Kim will not give up his weapons or proliferation voluntarily.
 1ar at: NoKo Deterrence – impact inev
North Korea views nuclear weapons as their key to survival – efforts to stop
prolif have all failed.
Albert, 7/16 (Eleanor Albert, dual-degree masters from Sciences Po in Paris, France and Fudan
University in Shanghai, China, and a bachelor's degree from Vassar College., explanatory
journalism arm of the Council on Foreign Relations, What to Know About Sanctions on North
Korea, Council on Forgein Relations, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-know-about-
sanctions-north-korea)

North Korea’s leadership, under successive Kims, considers nuclear weapons the sole
means to guarantee its survival. Pyongyang points to U.S. military bases in the region, as
well as the war games the United States regularly holds with its allies, as a threat to its
existence. The DPRK ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1985 but withdrew in 2003,
citing U.S. aggression. It carried out its first nuclear test three years later. “For Kim, nuclear
weapons are a ‘treasured sword’ and a silver bullet capable of keeping domestic and
international enemies at bay,” writes CFR’s Scott A. Snyder in Forbes.
While these measures have exacted a heavy toll on the North Korean economy, experts say their
effectiveness has been undermined by the failure of some countries to enforce them.

Several rounds of bilateral and multilateral negotiations on denuclearization dating back

to the 1990s have failed. After the June 2018 meeting in Singapore between U.S. President
Donald J. Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un—the first summit between sitting U.S.
and North Korean leaders—the United States suspended a series of high-profile military
exercises with South Korea, but the declaration it signed with North Korea did not produce
tangible steps for denuclearization or sanctions relief. The leaders’ second summit, in
February 2019, ended early after the two sides made incompatible demands.
 2ac at: NoKo Deterrence – no link
Even the tiniest threat of nuclear retaliation is sufficient to deter North Korea.
Kim and Park, 19 (Inwook Kim and Soul Park, Assistant Professor at the Singapore
Management University and Lecturer at the National University of Singapore, THAAD and
Nuclear Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula, Contemporary Security Policy,
http://contemporarysecuritypolicy.org/thaad-and-nuclear-deterrence-on-the-korean-
peninsula/)

Tellingly, as North Korea continued to conduct nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) tests in 2017, it was the logic of massive retaliation and not the logic of denial that
underpinned the Trump administration’s strategic posture. More crucially, credibility does not
necessarily have to operate with 100% assuredness. Pyongyang only need to believe
that the U.S. might respond to an attack for extended deterrence to remain credible. In
fact, the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence has been institutionalized even
further within the U.S.-ROK alliance framework as the Extended Deterrence Strategy
and Consultation Group (EDSCG) was regularized under the Trump and Moon Jae-in’s
administrations.
 2ac at: Russia Deterrence – NATO checks

NATO will inevitably check Russia – unified action is the most important factor
Garamone 7/18 (Jim Garamone, reporter at the United States Department of Defense,
“Secretary General Cites NATO Unity as Alliance's Best Deterrent,” July 18, 2019,
https://www.defense.gov/explore/story/Article/1909715/secretary-general-cites-nato-unity-as-
alliances-best-deterrent/)///JP

Unity is the most effective arrow in NATO's quiver, alliance Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told NBC’s
Courtney Kube at the Aspen Security Forum.

Countering Russia dominated last night's discussion at the Colorado forum , but the alliance
chief also talked about NATO in Afghanistan and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

The secretary general said the alliance is preparing for a world with no INF Treaty and a
world with more Russian missiles. Russia has until Aug. 2 to come into compliance with the treaty, which was signed
between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987. Russia has deployed SSC-8 missiles that violate the terms of the treaty, and
all alliance nations are prepared to respond.

"We will respond," Stoltenberg said. "It will be measured. It will be coordinated. We will not
mirror what Russia is doing — meaning we will not deploy missile defense. We have increased readiness of
forces, and we will also support new initiatives."
The bottom line, he said, is the alliance must deliver credible deterrence and defense from NATO, because that is the best guarantee
of peace in Europe.

The abrogation of the INF Treaty is just one piece of Russian malfeasance. In addition to annexing Crimea from Ukraine, occupying
provinces of Georgia and sparking conflict in the Dombass region of Ukraine, Russia has modernized its nuclear arsenal over a long
period of time.

NATO has responded. For the first time in NATO history, there are combat-ready troops
in the eastern part of the alliance — Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria and
Romania. "These battalions are not very big, but they are multinational NATO troops, meaning that
NATO is already there," the secretary general said. "If any of these countries are attacked, there
is no doubt that it will trigger the response from the full alliance. And we also increased
the readiness of our forces to reinforce if needed. In a way, NATO has already started to
respond in a measured, defensive way."
The "one for all, all for one" nature of the alliance is key to deterrence, he said. "As long as
that is credible — if you attack one ally, the whole alliance will respond — then we are by
far the strongest alliance in the world," he said. "We are 50 percent of the world's military might. We are
stronger than any other potential adversary so long as we stay together. The most
important thing is the resolve, the political will, the unity of the alliance. As long as that is in
place, then we are safe."

The problem is not deterring an actual attack. Russia is involved in cyberattacks, meddling in elections, the chemical agent attack in
Great Britain, and more. "These hybrid attacks blur the line between peace and war," he said.
NATO is truly a North Atlantic organization, Stoltenberg said, noting that the
only time the alliance's Article 5
provision was triggered — the article states that an attack on one ally is an attack on all — was
in response to an attack on the United States. "I think everyone expected that Article 5 was for,
you know, Soviet Union attacking a small NATO ally," he said. "That never happened, because
deterrence worked."

With the 9/11 attacks, all NATO allies stood behind the United States and joined in the
operations in Afghanistan. NATO went in with the United States and will come out with the United States, the secretary
general said.

"Hundreds of thousands of European soldiers and Canadian soldiers have served in Afghanistan
and more than a thousand have paid the ultimate price," Stoltenberg said. "We had — at the peak — we had more than 140,000
troops there in the combat operation. Roughly one third ... of those soldiers were non-U.S. soldiers. So this has been a big operation,
not only for the United States, but for many NATO allies and partners. Therefore, we will decide on the future presence in
Afghanistan together."

The secretary general said NATO is good for Europe, but it is also extremely good for the United
States. "It is extremely good to have friends and allies," he said. "You are privileged to have 28
friends and allies who are together with you. Every time. Not only triggering Article 5 after 9/11, but if you
compare with China or Russia or any other great power, they don't have [those] kinds of friends
and allies as you have. That makes you stronger."
He noted that many in the United States are concerned about China. "If you're concerned about the size of China, then you should
stay in NATO, because as long as you are in NATO, you are terribly big," he said. "If you add all the other allies, we
are 50
percent of world [gross domestic product] and 50 percent of the world's military might."
Stoltenberg said it is easy to be concerned about the world situation, but " we
should also be a bit optimistic,
because despite all these attempts to weaken NATO, NATO is not weak."

Opinion polls
in Europe and North America show tremendous support for the alliance, he said.
"Those who are trying to undermine the public support for NATO have not succeeded," he added.
 2ac at Russia Deterrence – link turn
AEGIS Ashore allows Russian hardliners justify remilitarization
Fedasiuk ’18 (Ryan Fedasiuk, research intern with the Aerospace Security Project at CSIS,
undergraduate senior studying International Relations and Russian, “U.S. Missile Defense and
the Theater-Strategic Nexus”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 17th, 2018,
https://www.csis.org/npfp/us-missile-defense-and-theater-strategic-nexus)

The Pentagon would be wrong to assume it can selectively counter Russian missile threats in
Europe.

The United States is signaling a willingness to compete with its near-peer rivals in the realm of
missile defense. Leaks about the forthcoming Missile Defense Review indicate the Pentagon is
looking to counter burgeoning threats from Russia and China “in regional theaters such as
Europe and Asia,” but not strategic threats to the U.S. homeland.1 There is consensus in Washington that it
would be impossible to defend against the entire arsenal of Russian strategic weapons, because Russia can field warheads and
So instead, the Pentagon
decoys “at dramatically less cost than the United States can add missile defense interceptors.”2
is aiming to defend NATO forces in Eastern Europe that are vulnerable to Russian ballistic and
cruise missile attacks without further fueling a competition for nuclear supremacy. 3 To
accomplish this, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) may expand the role of Aegis Ashore to
include homeland missile defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),4 deliver
THAAD missile batteries to Germany,5 or deploy PAC-3 interceptors in Lithuania and Estonia.6

But any decision to explicitly counter Russian and Chinese missiles would be a substantial break
from past policy. Even after withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, Washington’s ambitions to establish
missile defenses were tempered by concerns over strategic stability. MDA’s most challenging mission has been to prove the merit of
U.S. systems to patrons in Congress while also downplaying their capabilities to foreign ministries in Russia and China. The
contortions reached a climax in 2007 when MDA was tasked with proving to Russian defense agencies that proposed Aegis Ashore
systems could not intercept Russian ICBMs flying over the polar ice cap.7 In 2013, MDA even scrapped the fourth phase of its
European missile defense plan, which would have developed an interceptor capable of chasing Russian ICBMs.8 But all signs indicate
that the forthcoming Missile Defense Review will direct the Pentagon to abandon its policy of assuaging Russia and China.9

Russia has long protested U.S. missile defenses for two reasons: First, Russians argue that
missile defense is destabilizing because it undermines mutual vulnerability afforded by nuclear
weapons.10 Although Russians agree that their full arsenal would overcome most missile
defense deployments, they worry that a U.S. first strike could eliminate enough of their
capabilities that missile defenses would be sufficient to deal with what is left—thus obviating
Russia’s ability to retaliate. Second, some Russians are convinced that the launchers in U.S.
theater missile defense (TMD) systems can be repurposed to launch offensive weapons capable
of threatening Russian troops or even Moscow itself.11 But many in the West have come to see Russian
concerns as disingenuous. Despite U.S. assurances that theater defenses cannot neutralize the Russian
strategic deterrent nor launch offensive missiles, Moscow asserts otherwise and uses this as
justification to build advanced strategic weapons.12 Because of Russia’s apparent willful
ignorance, many in the Trump administration have come to believe that crying foul is part of a
broader Russian strategy to abandon the Eurasian arms control framework.13

Ultimately the authenticity of Russian concerns over missile defense is neither clear nor relevant to U.S. strategy. The
larger
problem is that Russians, willfully or accidentally, have cultivated a disproportionate and deep-
seated fear that conflates all forms of U.S. air and missile defense. In March 2018, Russian Deputy Defense
Minister Alexander Fomin accused the United States of “encircling Russia with 400 anti-ballistic missile systems,” which “significantly
diminish the potential of Russia’s nuclear deterrent.”14 Claims like this erroneously transform the myriad of U.S. missile defenses
into a highly-capable monolith. Russians’
mental homogenization of U.S. missile defenses is important
because it neuters any strategy predicated on the idea of escalation control.

But the forthcoming Missile Defense Review fails to account for this theater-strategic nexus in missile defense. In
its new
mission to counter Russian missile systems in Europe, the Pentagon assumes that it can
selectively battle and win an arms race at the theater level. But history has repeatedly shown—from the
development of the strategic cruise missile15 to the breakdown of the SALT II agreement—that the politics governing theater missile
defenses and nuclear-capable ICBMs are inextricably bound.16 Defending
against one kind of weapon necessarily
alters the significance of and strategy surrounding the other. Conversely, if an adversary fails to
distinguish between theater and strategic weapon posturing, as Russia does, conflict can easily
breach the nuclear threshold.17
The regional-strategic nexus is made possible mainly because Russian media rarely distinguishes between the capabilities of
different U.S. missile defenses. Although the ranges and roles of U.S. missile defense systems vary drastically, from 20-km point
defenses to 2,500-km regional shields, most news articles and statements from the Russian government do not discriminate
between the two. Russian media almost always refer to a “US global missile defense system,” which the Russian Foreign Ministry
calls “a dangerous global project aimed at establishing omnipresent and overwhelming US military superiority.”18

The White House has in turn lambasted Russia for building “destabilizing weapons systems . . . in direct violation of its treaty
obligations,” but there is no reason to believe that Russia will cease weapons development in response to expanding U.S. TMD.19 In
fact, expanding and repurposing TMD only vindicates Russian concerns about U.S. missile
defense, which threatens U.S. national security in two ways.

First, doubling down on TMD makes it much easier for the Russian defense industry to justify
building even more strategic weapons. Russian and U.S. sources have assessed that many of Russia’s new strategic
weapons unveiled on March 1 are “nowhere near” ready for deployment, and that the threat of their development may be used as a
bargaining chip to negotiate with the United States. 20 Expanding
TMD declines the gambit, ensuring Russia
funnels more resources into threatening strategic capabilities—exactly what the Pentagon had
hoped to avoid.
The Pentagon should tread carefully, lest it invites Russia to develop strategic weapons it has no method or intention of countering.

Second, expanding TMD would contradict U.S. efforts to bring Russia back into compliance with
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a cornerstone arms control agreement. The
Trump administration’s INF strategy is based on coercing Moscow to the negotiating table through economic, diplomatic, and
military measures. However, expanding TMD imperils negotiations in two ways. For one, the entire point of a strategy based on
coercive diplomacy is to change the behavior of an adversary. In this case, the prerequisite for behavior change is to rekindle
dialogue. Vindicating Russian concerns over missile defense only strengthens anti-American resolve and eliminates any incentive to
negotiate by convincing Russian defense hawks that they are right not to trust the United States. Second, expanding TMD removes
the most valuable chit from the negotiating table. Next
to sanctions, U.S. missile defenses in Europe are
probably the top foreign policy concern of the Russian Federation. Refusing to negotiate their
deployment outright removes the incentive to negotiate on other important national security
issues like the INF Treaty, Syria, or chemical weapons.
Rather than expand TMD in Europe at the expense of homeland security, the Pentagon ought to invest more in left-of-launch
capabilities like cyber and electronic warfare, which are just as credible but less escalatory. Alternative defenses for NATO could
include incorporating more U.S. troops in the tripwire force, threatening additional force deployments, or improving civilian
resilience in the Baltics.21 All of these actions would successfully contest Russian forces in Eastern Europe without forcing a strategic
arms race. But as it stands, the planned strategy of forsaking arms control in the name of coercive diplomacy is bound to backfire.
The Pentagon should tread carefully, lest it invites Russia to develop strategic weapons it has no method or intention of countering.
 2ac at: Russia Deterrence – no link
Russian forces makes missile defense irrelevant
Rose, 18 – (Frank A. Rose, this is written testimony of Frank A. Rose, Senior Fellow in Security and
Strategy, to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade hearing 6-21-2018, "Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals: Posture,
proliferation, and the future of arms control," Brookings,
https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/russian-and-chinese-nuclear-arsenals-posture-proliferation-and-
the-future-of-arms-control/) NL

Russia has been modernizing its strategic nuclear forces for over a decade. The most important element of its modernization program
has been the development of new land-based intercontinental missiles (ICBMs) armed with
multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). Overall, sixty percent of Russia’s strategic deterrent is deployed on land-
based systems. The two primary ICBM modernization programs include the road-mobile Yars (SS-27 Mod 2) and the Sarmat (SS-30), which is reportedly
carries up to 10 MIRVs. Russia is also modernizing the sea- and air-based elements of its deterrent. For
example, it is building eight new Borei-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), modernizing its aging fleet of strategic TU-160 and TU-95 bombers, and
deploying a new nuclear-armed cruise missile, the KH-101. In addition to aforementioned systems, the
2018 NPR notes that Russia is
also developing at least two new intercontinental range systems: a hypersonic glide vehicle; and
a new intercontinental, nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered, undersea autonomous torpedo. It appears
that these new systems are designed to ensure that Russian nuclear forces can penetrate any

future U.S. missile defense system.

 1ar at: Russia Deterrence – NATO checks
NATO will deter Russia
Glasse 7/18 (Jennifer Glasse, international correspondent for Al Jazeera since 1993, “NATO to
maintain credible deterrence against Russia: Stoltenberg,” Al Jazeera, July 18, 2019,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07/nato-maintain-credible-deterrence-russia-
stoltenberg-190718054240986.html)///JP

Aspen, United States -

NATO is preparing for a world without a key nuclear arms control treaty
and with more Russian missiles, the alliance's secretary-general has said.
Jens Stoltenberg's comments on Wednesday at the opening of the annual Aspen Security Forum came just weeks before an August 2
deadline the United States has given to Russia to come back into compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
treaty.

Washington said in February it would suspend in six months its participation in the Cold War-era treaty unless Moscow destroyed a
new missile system, which the US and its NATO allies alleges violates the accord. Russia denied the accusation and also gave notice
that it would pull out of the 1987 treaty, which banned all ground-based missiles with ranges between 500km and 5,500km.

Stoltenberg said Russia still had time to save what he called the "cornerstone of arms control in Europe", adding that NATO had
been calling the government of Russian President Vladimir Putin to move back into compliance. He noted, however, that there
was no indication that Moscow was doing anything towards that direction.

"Now Russia has started deploying these missiles again," referring to the SSC-8 ground-launched cruise missiles. "They are mobile,
hard to detect, can reach all European cities within minutes reducing the warning time," Stoltenberg added.

If Russia does not come into compliance by the deadline, Stoltenberg said NATO will
respond in a "measured" and "coordinated" manner, with no bilateral actions.
He added NATO's
29 members would not deploy missile defence systems but could
strengthen the integrated air and missile defence already in place in Europe.
 1ar at: Russia Deterrence ext – no link
Russia would obliterate it
Thompson, 19 – (Loren Thompson focuses on the strategic, economic and business implications of
defense spending as the Chief Operating Officer of the non-profit Lexington Institute and Chief Executive
Officer of Source Associates. Prior to holding my present positions, I was Deputy Director of the Security
Studies Program at Georgetown University and taught graduate-level courses in strategy, technology and
media affairs at Georgetown. I have also taught at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. I
hold doctoral and master’s degrees in government from Georgetown University and a Bachelor of Science
degree in political science from Northeastern University. Why The Pentagon's Missile Defense Plan Leaves
The U.S. Unprotected From Russian Nuclear Attack
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2019/01/17/why-the-pentagons-missile-defense-plan-
leaves-the-u-s-unprotected-from-russian-nuclear-attack/#58e747a234d2) NL

The thinkingreflected in the plan unveiled Thursday is that 30 years of modest investment in
defensive technologies has gotten us to a point where we might be able to defeat a small,
unsophisticated attack by countries like North Korea. If, for example, the U.S. constructs a defensive system with
two layers of interceptors that attacking missiles must penetrate, and each layer is 80% effective, then in theory only one in 25
attacking warheads will reach their intended targets. North Korea probably doesn’t have that many warheads, and at the moment it
can’t fit them on long-range missiles anyway. In
the case of Russia, though, there are over a thousand
nuclear warheads aimed at America, and that’s not even counting all the shorter-range nuclear
weapons that might be used to attack our allies and overseas troops. Nothing in the current U.S.
defensive arsenal, or likely to be built in the near future, could cope with an attack on that scale.
Even a few dozen incoming warheads would overwhelm the existing “ground-based midcourse
defense” system, given the penetration aids and other features of a sophisticated attack. Like the Reagan plan, the Pentagon
plan unveiled Thursday envisions space-based sensors and interceptor systems might improve the “cost-exchange” calculus between
offense and defense, but that would take a decade or longer to implement.
 2ac at: Drug prices – non-unique
Drug prices won’t pass – low chance in the Senate
Emmarie Huetteman, 7-25-2019, "GOP Senators Distance Themselves from Grassley And Trump’s Efforts To
Cut Drug Prices," Kaiser Health News, https://khn.org/news/gop-senators-distance-themselves-from-grassley-and-
trumps-efforts-to-cut-drug-prices//DeepStateSisco

a
The fight between policymaker’s intent on lowering prescription drug prices and the drug makers who keep raising them intensified Thursday, as

slew of Republican senators threatened to side with manufacturers against legislation supported
by their own committee chairman and president.
After months of closed-door meetings and high-profile hearings, the Senate Finance Committee voted 19-9 to advance legislation introduced by Sens.
Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) and Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) to rein in drug costs in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.

But even some Republicans who supported it warned they may not back the sweeping package
of proposals in a full Senate vote. They object in particular to a provision that would cap drug prices paid by Medicare based on the
rate of inflation.

Other obstacles have piled up. Wyden announced that Democrats, who provided most of the bill’s
support in committee, would not allow a Senate vote without the Republicans agreeing to hold
votes on cementing insurance protections for people with preexisting conditions. Democrats have
complained for months that GOP efforts to kill the Affordable Care Act will leave people with these medical problems without any recourse to get
affordable health care. Democrats also want to empower federal health officials to negotiate drug prices.

Here are the three major problems revealed in Thursday’s hearing.

Many Senate Republicans disagree with President Donald Trump about how to lower drug
prices.
Some of Trump’s efforts to reduce Americans’ drug costs took a beating Thursday. They were criticized — by members of his own party — for putting
too much power in the hands of government.

13 of the committee’s 15 Republicans

Despite urging from White House and federal health officials to support the legislation,

voted to remove its controversial proposal to prevent drug prices from rising faster than
inflation under Medicare. Their attempt failed, barely.
Medicaid already uses this strategy, requiring drug makers to pay the government a rebate if the prices it pays outpace inflation, and Medicaid tends to
pay lower prices on drugs than Medicare. The HHS inspector general has said Medicare could collect billions of dollars from the drug industry if it did
the same. But many Republicans strongly oppose any government interference in private markets or price setting.

Sen. Patrick Toomey (R-Pa.), who introduced the amendment to remove the proposal, said it wasn’t necessary because seniors would be protected
from paying too much by another proposal in the bill to cap out-of-pocket expenses.

“It’s my view that we should not use this sledgehammer of a universal price control, imported
from Medicaid, to deal with that relatively narrow problem and to disrupt a program that’s
working very well,” Toomey said, mentioning Medicare’s popularity.
Grassley said the inflation caps would help relieve taxpayers from covering Medicare’s skyrocketing drug costs.

And having played a key role in 2003 creating Medicare’s prescription drug program, called Medicare Part D, he took issue with the idea that his latest
bill would harm the program: “I wrote it, so you ought to know that I want to protect it,” Grassley said.

Most of the Republicans also backed an amendment to block a proposal being considered by the
Trump administration to tie drug prices here to those paid in other developed nations, which narrowly
failed. While Grassley said he, too, opposes the administration’s proposal, he did not want the issue to hold up his own bill and so voted against the
amendment.
Grassley also said he is not comfortable with empowering federal health officials to negotiate
drug prices, as Wyden said he would like to see considered. But Grassley noted that the issue isn’t going away: Trump campaigned on the idea,
which White House officials have been discussing with House Democratic leaders as part of a plan expected to be released in September.

Grassley suggested: “I don’t think that you’re going to get 60 votes in the
But that may not be enough,

United States Senate.”

Ks
 2ac: china security strategy assumptions good
Our analysis of China’s deterrent strategy is useful and necessary in this
instance based on a political and ideological history of Chinese modernization
policy.
Fravel & Medeiros, 10 (M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, M. Taylor Fravelm Cecil and
Ida Green Career Development Associate Professor of Political Science and a member of the
Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and Evan S.
Medeiros was a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation until August 2009, and is
currently the director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolian Affairs at the National Security
Council,“China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and
Force Structure,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 48–87,
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Chinas_Search_for_Assured_Retali
ation.pdf)

Answers to these questions about China’s nuclear posture are important for several reasons.
First, China’s behavior highlights an important gap in structural realist approaches to
international politics.2 On the one hand, structural realism arguably is indeterminate and
has few clear predictions about variation in the nuclear strategies and forces that states
adopt, as such questions lie beyond the scope of the theory. On the other hand, given the
assumption of security maximization and Kenneth Waltz’s socialization mechanism, a structural
realist might expect states to highly prize the credibility of their nuclear deterrent,
especially when faced with more powerful nuclear opponents that pose a clear threat to
national survival, the basic goal of states in all structural theories.3 Although China
engaged in security competition with the United States and the Soviet Union during the
Cold War, it never sought to match their nuclear capabilities or strategies, even partially,
despite possessing enough fissile material with which to build a larger, more capable
arsenal.4
Second, examination of China’s willingness to endure real nuclear vulnerability for
several decades can illuminate the sources of Chinese thinking about nuclear weapons
and deterrence. Such analysis is critical because China is substantially altering its nuclear
force structure with the recent deployment—for the first time—of road-mobile
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) systems and the pending deployment of a nuclear-
powered ballistic missile submarine force, both of which will increase the number of
warheads capable of striking the United States. These changes raise important questions:
some scholars and analysts argue that China may be moving toward nuclear war-fighting
strategies and a major increase in the size of its arsenal;5 others emphasize the challenge that
these new forces may pose to crisis stability.6 We argue that the notion of assured
retaliation, or deterring an adversary with the threat of unacceptable damage through a
retaliatory nuclear strike, offers a useful framework for understanding the evolution of
China’s nuclear strategy and force structure.
In the literature on China’s nuclear weapons, however, few scholars have explored the
origins of Chinese beliefs about the roles and missions of nuclear weapons and, as a
consequence, the drivers of nuclear force development. One line of inquiry examines
China’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons, including the seminal works by Alice Hsieh as well
as John Lewis and Xue Litai on the history of China’s strategic weapons programs.7 Another line
of inquiry probes how best to characterize China’s nuclear strategy. Much of the debate
revolves around whether China pursues either minimum deterrence or limited
deterrence.8 Minimum deterrence refers to “threatening the lowest level of damage necessary
to prevent attack, with the fewest number of nuclear weapons possible.”9 Similarly, limited
deterrence “requires a limited war-ªghting capability to inºict costly damage on the adversary at
every rung on the escalation ladder, thus denying the adversary victory in a nuclear war.”10 The
mainstream view remains that minimum deterrence best captures the essence of China’s
approach.11 Finally, other scholars argue that China has adopted a distinctively Chinese
approach heavily influenced by China’s strategic tradition associated with Sun Zi and
traditional strategic thought.12
Conclusions about China’s approach to nuclear strategy are often grounded in
assessments of China’s force structure, not in Chinese beliefs or authoritative military
writings about the contribution of nuclear weapons to deterrence. In a 2007 study, for
example, Jeffrey Lewis claims that China possesses a unique view of deterrence in which
Chinese leaders believe that deterrence is a relatively easy objective that can be
achieved with few nuclear weapons.13 The basis for Lewis’s argument, however, is not
the beliefs and attitudes of Chinese leaders and strategists. Instead, he infers this
strategic preference from the small size of China’s force, writing that “Chinese policy makers
have tended to make decisions about China’s strategic forces that suggest a widespread belief
that deterrence is achieved early and with a small number of forces.”14

We offer two explanations for the slow pace and shallow trajectory in the development of
China’s nuclear strategy and forces until the mid-1990s. The first explanation is ideational. The
views and beliefs of China’s top leaders, mainly Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, had a
consistently dominant influence on Chinese nuclear strategy. The salience of their views
continued well after their deaths in 1976 and 1997, respectively. Both leaders viewed nuclear
weapons, primarily and probably exclusively, as tools for deterring nuclear aggression and
countering coercion, not as weapons to be used in combat to accomplish discrete
military objectives. Both leaders embraced the idea of deterrence through assured
retaliation, in which a small number of survivable weapons would be enough to retaliate and
impose unacceptable damage on an adversary, even if the concepts of survivability and
unacceptable damage were left undefined for decades.15 No evidence exists that either Mao or
Deng possessed views on the operational requirements of credible deterrence vis-à-vis China’s
potential adversaries. One important implication of these beliefs is that the concept of
assured retaliation, not minimum deterrence, best captures China’s approach to nuclear
weapons.
Our second explanation points to multiple organizational and political constraints on the ability
of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to develop nuclear strategy and an associated operational
doctrine. As a result of the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), the PLA for two decades after
testing its first weapon lacked the experience and the expertise to do so; the military began to
formulate its nuclear strategy and operational doctrine only in the mid-1980s, with the
further advances coming in the 1990s. Also, China’s political environment was not
conducive to such work on strategy and doctrine. Nuclear issues were treated with
intense secrecy, limiting knowledge of them and, thus, opportunities for interagency
deliberations. Party-led civil-military relations in China and the strength of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) meant that Mao’s and Deng’s views on military strategy,
including nuclear weapons, were not questioned for decades.
Despite major changes in China’s external security environment, economic resources, and
technological capabilities, its approach to nuclear strategy and force structure has been
relatively consistent since the 1960s. As China developed and revised its operational
doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons beginning in the mid-1980s, it continued to
stress deterring nuclear attacks against China and has not shifted to pursue nuclear war
fighting. Changes in the composition of China’s nuclear forces have, on balance,
emphasized increasing quality over quantity in an effort to achieve a secure second-
strike capability—albeit with an understanding that quantity matters in a world in which
nuclear powers also possess strategic defenses. Indeed, such constant policies are perhaps rare,
not just in the military arena but in national security policy more generally.

Before proceeding, we must mention one caveat. Any assessment of Chinese leaders’ beliefs
about the utility of nuclear weapons and the requirements of deterrence must begin
with the observation that primary source data remain scarce but are growing. Within the
study of contemporary China, military and security issues are among the most challenging
because of the limited access to government documents and leadership statements. And within
the study of Chinese military and security affairs, problems of data availability are most acute
regarding nuclear issues, in part a reelection of China’s decision to maintain ambiguity regarding
multiple attributes of its force.16 To overcome these challenges, we tap a range of
Chinese-language materials, some of which have become available only in the past
decade. One set of materials includes publications by military academies and scholars on
questions of military strategy and doctrine, such as multiple editions of Zhanlue Xue (The
Science of Strategy) and Zhanyi Xue (The Science of Campaigns) as well as Zhanyi Lilun Xuexi
Zhinan (Campaign Theory Study Guide). A second set of materials includes party history
documents, such as the memoirs (huiyilu), chronologies (nianpu), and selected military works
(junshi wenxuan) of key political elites involved in China’s nuclear weapons programs, especially
Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Nie Rongzhen, and Zhang Aiping.
 1ar: ext china security strategy assumptions good
Linking modernization to BMD is the best lens for understanding PLA policy –
military voices are increasingly powerful and modernization decisions rely on
the assessment of US capabilities.
Fravel & Medeiros, 10 (M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, M. Taylor Fravelm Cecil and
Ida Green Career Development Associate Professor of Political Science and a member of the
Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and Evan S.
Medeiros was a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation until August 2009, and is
currently the director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolian Affairs at the National Security
Council,“China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and
Force Structure,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 48–87,
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Chinas_Search_for_Assured_Retali
ation.pdf)

The Future Direction of China’s Nuclear Posture The puzzle addressed in this article and our
explanations of it raise the obvious follow-on question: How will China’s nuclear strategy and
forces evolve in the future? Will they continue on their current trajectories or assume new
ones? And what are the factors that will influence either possibility? In general, the drivers of
China’s future nuclear strategy have two main attributes: they are principally linked to
advances in U.S. military capabilities (as opposed to those of other nations) and to U.S.
strategic defenses and conventional strike capabilities in addition to the United States’
nuclear forces. More specifically, the PLA’s main concerns about maintaining a credible
second-strike force are driven by the U.S. military’s development of a trifecta of
nonnuclear strategic capabilities: (1) missile defenses, (2) long-range conventional strike,
and (3) sophisticated command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4 ISR) assets to locate and target China’s nuclear
forces. The combination of these three capabilities, in the eyes of the Chinese, provides the
United States with the ability to eliminate China’s deterrent in a crisis without crossing the
nuclear threshold, reopening the door to U.S. coercion of China. The PLA fears that the
United States could use its C4 ISR assets to locate Chinese nuclear forces and destroy
most of them with long-range conventional strikes. U.S. missile defenses would then allow
the United States to “catch” China’s ragged retaliation.129 It is this scenario that
motivated the debate about the viability of China’s no first-use pledge, and it is now
motivating multiple dimensions of nuclear and missile procurement addressed above.
As China’s nuclear strategy and forces evolve, an important consideration is that the Second
Artillery does not determine either one. Instead, it represents only one of a growing number of
voices in internal discussions on nuclear issues. Moreover, the influence of the Second Artillery
in these debates, including those related to the size of China’s nuclear forces, is unclear. For
decades, nuclear strategy and doctrine in China has been the purview of the weapons scientists
who developed China’s nuclear and missile capabilities by dint of their positions both within the
PLA as well as within China’s military research and development complex.130 Based on Mao’s
and Deng’s views on the limited utility of nuclear weapons, these military scientists
made recommendations about the capabilities China should pursue. In the last ten to
fifteen years, this appears to have changed, a bit. The PLA has begun to play a larger role in
internal discussions about China’s nuclear strategy by virtue of several factors: its
accumulated expertise on military doctrine, its successful renovation of overall PLA
doctrine, its greater role in defense procurement (following key reforms in the late 1990s),
its greater professionalization, and a changed political environment that has allowed discussion
of such sensitive topics. As a result, the PLA increasingly has a voice in such issues. The
Second Artillery, however, is one voice within a broader collection of PLA strategists and
operators, including those in the General Staff Department and in the General Armaments
Department (responsible for procurement for the entire PLA). So, the Second Artillery likely may
advance recommendations about changes in doctrine and capabilities (including changes in
capabilities that have a direct impact on doctrine), but these issues are ultimately decided at the
national level of the civilian leadership, in which actors outside of the PLA have a strong voice,
including the scientific establishment, civilian experts, and the ministry of foreign affairs. Even
though more debate is likely, the increased number of actors involved in decisions about China’s
overall nuclear posture creates an additional barrier to building a consensus around a rapid and
significant shift from its current strategy and force structure.

Looking forward, this situation suggests that two aspects of modernization should be
monitored, as they might signal a change in China’s nuclear posture. First, in response to
missile defense programs in the United States and other countries, the Second Artillery
is researching and developing a variety of technologies to defeat such systems , including
maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs), multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles
(MIRVs), decoys, chaff, jamming, thermal shielding, and ASAT weapons.131 If deployed, MaRV
and MIRV warheads could affect China’s strategic relationships with other nuclear powers by
increasing the options available to China for using its nuclear weapons, including providing it
with additional options against smaller nuclear powers such as India. This shift could undermine
strategic stability in China’s relationships with India and Russia because MIRV’d missiles, in
particular, have a first-strike potential. Arming the silo-based missiles such as the DF-5 with
MIRV’d warheads might also further undermine crisis stability by presenting a potentially
vulnerable target for an opponent’s ªrst strike against China.

Second, another aspect to monitor is whether China’s new MRBMs, IRBMs, and land-attack and
air-launched cruise missiles will be armed with nuclear warheads. To date, these systems appear
to have conventional missions. If these new systems assumed nuclear roles, beyond just
replacing the aging DF-21, DF-3A and DF-4 systems, this could indicate an important shift in
China’s approach to nuclear weapons. Such developments could indicate, for example, that
China seeks to develop a more ºexible nuclear posture to deter a broader range of threats
across a wider set of contingencies. This could lead to a greater willingness to countenance
using nuclear weapons for discrete military purposes, moving China down the slippery slope of
nuclear war-ªghting strategies and away from a strict emphasis on assured retaliation. These are
important areas of PLA operational doctrine and weapons procurement to monitor.
This article began with a simple puzzle: Why was China willing to accept such a high degree of
vulnerability of its nuclear arsenal for more than four decades? Structural realism and the
practices of other nuclear-armed states might have predicted that China would develop
a larger and more diverse nuclear force and a more detailed strategy for using it.
Instead, China gradually built a modest-sized arsenal and articulated a basic nuclear
strategy that stressed development of a secure second-strike capability for achieving
deterrence through assured retaliation, including an arsenal large enough to overcome
a potential adversary’s strategic defenses.
To explain this puzzle, we advanced two explanations. First, China’s top leaders and military
strategists held simple views about the role and missions of nuclear weapons: to deter
nuclear aggression, to prevent coercion by other nuclear armed states, and to confer a
diffuse sense of great power status on China. Perhaps more important, they embraced the
idea of deterrence through assured retaliation and believed that a small number of
survivable weapons was sufficient to accomplish these goals, with these conditions left
up to technical experts to interpret. These simple ideas provided a consistent and persistent
strategic logic that drove only a very gradual development of strategy and forces. Second, for
decades, China’s military lacked expertise on nuclear strat egy and devoted little attention to it,
leading to an underspeciªed strategy and underdeveloped operational doctrine. China’s political
culture created an environment in which Mao’s and Deng’s beliefs predominated, especially in a
CCP-controlled military with a tradition of land-based conventional warfare. Over time, this
situation evolved as expertise and attention to nuclear issues grew and as external
events required China’s response. This change led China to examine, systematically, the
requirements of a credible second-strike capability, which it appears to have achieved.

Theories of strategic stability shape Chinese decision making and is the

cornerstone of their nuclear policy.
Zhao, 17 (Tong Zhao, PhD, Science, Technology, and International Affairs, Georgia Institute of
Technology MA, International Relations, Tsinghua University BS, Physics, Tsinghua University,
U.S.-China Strategic Stability and the Impact of Japan: A Chinese Perspective, Carnegie-Tsinghua
Center for Golbal Policy, https://carnegietsinghua.org/2017/11/07/u.s.-china-strategic-stability-
and-impact-of-japan-chinese-perspective-pub-74630)

When China’s nuclear and strategic communities were introduced to Western literature on
deterrence and strategic stability, they found the Western analytical framework useful in
academic and policy research and began to incorporate it into China’s domestic
discussions. Since then, Chinese analysts have written and published a relatively large
number of papers to apply and promote the new analytical framework for
understanding nuclear stability. These authors include experts from nuclear defense
industry,5 the military,6 the foreign ministry’s research institutes,7 think tanks,8 and
university research centers.9
Today, although there is still debate about the precise definitions of certain terms,10 many
Chinese analysts are comfortable examining the security implications of specific nuclear
policies by looking at their potential impact on crisis stability and arms control
stability—the two main components of strategic stability in Western literature .11 As
these concepts are accepted and embraced by a wider circle of policymakers and academic
analysts, more Chinese experts are using them to study the security implications of new
military developments—both in the United States and elsewhere—on Chinese nuclear
deterrence and regional stability, including the impact of missile defense on nuclear
relationships.12 In previous debates on deep nuclear reductions, Chinese experts have also
used these concepts to formulate policy recommendations and to explore how strategic
stability will change as global nuclear stockpiles continue to decrease.13
Chinese nuclear experts view the maintenance of a secure second-strike capability as
the cornerstone of China’s deterrent and the fundamental guarantee of national
security. Accordingly, China appears fully committed to maintaining a mutual vulnerability
relationship with its nuclear rivals,14 and views it as a necessary condition for achieving
strategic stability.15

After this narrower concept of strategic stability was accepted by the Chinese nuclear
community, it began to be incorporated into official Chinese rhetoric. Starting in the late
2000s, Chinese official statements and documents began to refer to strategic stability in
the same manner.16
 2ac: specific policy approaches good
Examining specific decisions surrounding military presence in Asia is the best
way to approach policy – a contextual approach avoids essentializing theories
and challenges dominant security narratives.
Mustapha, ‘13
(Jennifer, Assistant Professor Political Science @ Western University, Canada, “Writing
Southeast Asian Security: The “War On Terror” As A Hegemonic Security Narrative and its Effects
in Southeast Asia: A (Critical) Security Analysis,”
https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/bitstream/11375/13115/1/fulltext.pdf)

Significantly, it would have been difficult to draw the conclusions that I have drawn without
deploying the particular critical security approach that has been articulated in this dissertation.
This is a critical security approach with post-structuralist underpinnings, but is an approach that
demurs from postmodern tendencies to eschew any and all foundational assumptions. Instead, I
have articulated and deployed a promising method of “immanent critique,” informed by
Stephen K. White’s notion of “weak ontology,” which calls for a thoughtful engagement
with complex security questions using a case-based examination of empirical “realities.”
This exercise is about contingently situating one’s theorizations of security in response to
particular cases and in particular contexts. This creates opportunities to still engage in
the types of foundational ontologizing that is required to cope with the political and
ethical problematics of security, but to do so in ways that can help us avoid reifying or
essentializing any particular security structure. As such, my analysis of the many-layered
critical security effects of the WOT on East and Southeast Asia is predicated on the
presupposition that it is not only desirable, but necessary, to situate critical security
perspectives within particular empirical contexts- historical, geographical, and
discursive.
This is the key to bridging the divide between a postmodern “post-ponism” (Connolly
1989) that is disengaged from the “realities” of security/insecurity and the pragmatic
need to move from deconstruction towards a practical engagement with the world in
the hopes of creating the space for re-visioning alternative security futures contingent
upon the empirical realities of specific places and times. As mentioned, this exercise is not
about trying to operate without ever making foundational claims, but rather calls on us to be
very careful not to naturalize particular security logics as being timeless and inevitable.
In revealing the silences that are inherent in a mainstream security analysis of this specific
region during this specific historical period and under this specific security narrative, I was able
to bring forward important ways of seeing and understanding the many insecurities engendered
by the US WOT in East and Southeast Asia.

Notably, a critical security analysis can “see” the causes and the implications of the
misconstrued threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia that continues to be propagated by the
various “experts” who employ narrow visions of security in their analyses (see Chapter IV); the
gendered insecurities that will only increase with the strengthened return of US military
interests in the region along with the complex issues around post-colonial sovereignties and
identities that East and Southeast Asian actors must continue to navigate (see Chapter V); the
co-optation of the WOT discourse and security practices by governing regimes in the region in
order to help legitimize various forms of state repression employed in pursuit of “national
resilience” (see Chapter V); and the different ways in which regional multilateral fora have been
influenced and hijacked by the WOT agenda (see Chapter VI). And once again, the whole point
of this project was never to discount the threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia or the existence of
more “traditional” security problems as far as they do exist. Rather, the point has been to ask an
alternative set of questions about terrorism and state responses to terrorism- different
questions than ones traditionally asked by the “experts”- in order to reveal some of the less
obvious ways that terrorism, along with reactions to terrorism vis-à-vis the WOT, can influence
the security/insecurity of groups and individuals.

In terms of my contributions to security literature pertaining to East and Southeast Asia, with
this project I have added to the growing field of CSS as it pertains to this region in particular. As I
have outlined, much of the existing “critical” literature on the region (for example, see Foot
2005; Hamilton-Hart 2005, 2009; Caballero-Anthony 2005) though very valuable in its own right,
is not the “critical” edge of security theory that I am particularly interested in due mainly to
continuing adherences to different manifestations of strong ontology and presumed realist-
based security logics. There is still then, a want for more approaches that emphasize
critical post-structuralist ways of understanding security- ones that emphasize the
importance of intertextuality and intersubjectivity, as well as the constitutive effects of a larger
security narrative. They are starting to emerge (see Burke and McDonald 2007; Tan 2006 for
example) and what is promising about them is that they ask fundamental ontological
questions about “security/insecurity” itself. Who or what is being “secured” and does a
“secure” state necessarily translate into a “secure” population? Can “security” and “insecurity”
exist simultaneously? What questions have yet to be asked about “security/insecurity” in East
Asia, and what questions are unable to be asked under the statist rubric of either realism or
constructivism, both of which rely on “strong” ontological theorizations of security? These are
the types of questions that I have been interested in exploring, and that I have explored in this
dissertation in the regional context of East and Southeast Asia. Importantly, these are also the
types of questions that can only be asked- and answered within a critical security
studies framework that allows for the weak ontologizing necessary for grappling with an
immanent critique of actually occurring security logics.
 2ac: ____ turn
Their corrective of throwing out research is bad – a weak ontological position
solves their links and is better for political contestation.
Mustapha, ‘09
(Jennifer, PhD, Assistant Professor Political Science @ Western University, Canada “An Analytical
Survey of Critical Security Studies: Making the Case for a (Modified) Post-structuralist
Approach,” Paper presented at the 2009 CPSA, Ottawa)

White points out that strong ontology is a feature of much of pre-modern and modern thought
(6). The idea that there is a First Cause of what is moral and good which exists “out
there,” combined with the assumption that this First Cause can be known, is the lynchpin
of ancient Greek philosophy, the philosophies of the Abrahamic faiths, and Enlightenment
thinking. However, these unquestioned assumptions about what is and what can be
known comprise a double move that fails to problematize the limits to our knowledge
and the confines of our discourse. What White is interested in, is an “ontological turn” that is
perceptible in what he calls “late-modern” thinking (4). This late-modern thinking can be
observed in “a growing propensity to interrogate more carefully those ‘entities’ presupposed by
our typical ways of seeing and doing in the modern world” (White 2000, 4). In other words,
recognition of the contingency and indeterminacy of what is known and how it is known. This
understanding of ontology is an important feature of my analysis of security studies. As I will
demonstrate shortly, the movement from realist security studies to critical security studies, and
the divisions within critical security studies can be better understood using this helpful
distinction between the strong ontology of modernity and the late-modern “ontological turn,”
which brings to the fore the “strengths of weak ontology” (White 2000).

“Weak ontology” does not refer to the (lack of) persuasiveness of a theory’s ontological
commitments so much as it refers to the process of arriving at those commitments and
an acknowledgement of their contestability. Weak ontology sees that the costs of
bracketing out contingency and indeterminacy, which a strong ontology must do, far
outweigh the benefits of doing so. Furthermore, a weak ontology approach recognizes
that rejecting new ontological commitments, as some postmodern and antiessentialist
views are wont to do, is profoundly problematic. Importantly then, weak ontologies
respond to two basic concerns:

First, there is the acceptance of the idea that all fundamental conceptualizations of self,
other and world are contestable. Second, there is the sense that such conceptualizations
are nevertheless necessary or unavoidable for an adequately reflective ethical and
political life. The latter insight demands from us an affirmative gesture of constructing
foundations, the former prevents us from carrying out this task in a traditional fashion. (White
2007, 8. Emphasis added).

This “affirmative gesture of constructing foundations” is crucial to debunking the simplistic

reconstructive/deconstructive and modern/postmodern binaries as they are often evoked. Such
labels can be limiting and are too often used in “disciplinary mudslinging matches, which can
close down discussion and inquiry before a close reading of specific arguments or consideration
of the issues involved” (Fierke 2007, 3).

For some, post-structuralist commitments necessitate a permanent state of

deconstruction; while for others these commitments are modes of inquiry and
interrogation that do not necessarily foreclose acts of re-construction (Hay 2002).
Importantly then, this ontological turn can be observed in a variety of forms, and White cautions
against it being over-identified with anti-essentialist postmodernism in particular, as it often is.
This is because postmodernism is only one manifestation of this late-modern ontological turn,
and some postmodern thinkers have “failed to attend sufficiently to problems related to
articulating and affirming the very reconceptualizations toward which they gesture” (White
2000 5-6). White argues that there appears to be an unconscious tendency on the part of some
postmodern thinkers to …reproduce in a new guise the problem of frictionless subjectivity
within their own stance… the affirmed mode of individual agency becomes one of continuous
critical motion, incessantly and disruptively unmasking the ways in which the modern subject
engenders, marginalizes and disciplines the others of its background and foreground…the
potential, ironic danger here is that the former image of subjectivity comes to look
uncomfortably like the latter. (White 2000, 6)

White’s critique is a fair one, and weak ontology is a useful concept for unpacking these
tensions. This is because it is meant to “shift the intellectual burden… from a
preoccupation with what is opposed and deconstructed, to an engagement with what
must be articulated, cultivated and affirmed in its wake” (White 2000, 8).
As such, in (re)constructing foundations it is important to explicitly acknowledge the
contestability and indeterminacy of those foundational claims and “involves the
embodiment within them of some signaling of their own limits” (ibid). Importantly it is
not enough to “simply declare their contestability, fallibility, or partiality at the start and
then proceed pretty much as before” (ibid), since this can encourage a propensity towards
naturalization and reification, which weak ontologies seek to avoid. What is crucial in a weak
ontology, is that such an acknowledgement of epistemological limitations 4 necessarily
changes the very nature of the assertions being made. Therefore, unlike in a strong
ontology where foundational claims are asserted unproblematically and unreflexively, in a
weak ontology foundational claims need to be constantly affirmed, and the ethical
function of theorizing resides in its goal of critically sustaining one’s affirmations . As an
important corrective to the modernist-traditionalist critiques of latemodern (and postmodern)
thinking, “the affirmation of weak ontology should not be confused with a stance of
continual indecisiveness” (White 2000, 14).
 2ac: ____ turn
Rejections of IR theory that includes Western perspectives creates a harmful
and homogenizing form of Asian exceptionalism – multiple perspectives are key
to generate effective understandings of foreign policy.
Acharya, ‘07
(Amitav, UNESCO Chair in Transnational Challenges and Governance and Professor of
International Relations at the School of International Service, American University, “Theoretical
Perspectives on International Relations in Asia,” Conference on International Relations in Asia:
The New Regional System,” George Washington University, 27-29 September,
http://www.amitavacharya.com/sites/default/files/Theoretical%20Perspectives%20on%20Inter
national%20Relations%20in%20Asia.pdf)

More importantly, with the growing interest in theory, the debate over the relevance of
Western theory to analyze Asia has intensified. Perspectives that view IR theory as a
fundamentally ethnocentric enterprise that does a poor job of analyzing Asian IR are becoming
commonplace in Asian writings on the region’s IR. And this view is shared by a number of
leading Western scholars. This debate has also led to a search for an “Asian IR theory”, akin
to the English School or the Copenhagen School. But there is little movement in the direction of
an Asian IR theory in the regional sense. This is not surprising, given Asia’s subregional and
national differences. 36 There is a great scope for national perspectives, even that in a highly
contested manner.37 For example, some Chinese scholars are attempting to develop a Chinese
School of IR, derived either from Chinese historical practices such as the warring states period
and the tributary system, or from the metaphysical Chinese worldview.38 But an equally vocal
group of Chinese scholars rejects this approach, insisting that IR theory must have a
universal frame. According to this group, attempts to develop IR theory should be
guided by “scientific” universalism, rather than cultural specificity.39 Going by this
immensely helpful and exciting debate, the challenge, then, is to broaden the horizons of
existing IR theory by including the Asian experience, rather than either to reject IR
theory or to develop a Chinese or Asian School that will better capture and explain
China’s or Asia’s unique historical experience, but have little relevance elsewhere, even
though such universalism would still require deeper investigations into Asian history.

There is thus a growing space for an Asian universalism in IR theory. I use the term “Asian
universalism” since it is in direct juxtaposition to the Asian exceptionalism found in the extreme
form in the notion of Asian values (Mahbubani), Asian conception of human rights, Asian
democracy (Neher), or in a more moderate strain in claims about an Asian form of capitalism
(“third form of capitalism”, Richard Stubbs) or an Asian mode of globalization (Mahbubani
again). Asian exceptionalism, especially in its extreme form, refers to the tendency to
view Asia as a unique and relatively homogenous entity which rejects ideas, such as
human rights and democracy, which lay a claim to universality, but which are in reality
constructed and exported by the West. Such ideas are to be contested because of their
lack of fit with local cultural, historical and political realities in Asia . Asian universalism by
contrast refers to the fit, often constructed by local idea entrepreneurs, between external
and Asian ideas and practices with a view to give a wider dissemination to the latter . This
involves the simultaneous reconstruction of outside ideas in accordance with local beliefs and
practices and the transmission and diffusion of the preexisting and localized forms of knowledge
beyond the region. Whereas Asian exceptionalism is relevant only in analyzing and
explaining local patterns of IR, Asian universalism would use local knowledge to
understand and explain both local and foreign IR.
The impetus for Asian universalism comes from several sources. The first is a historical
shift from economic nationalism, security bilateralism, and authoritarian politics in the post-war
period to economic interdependence, security multilateralism and democratic politics of the
post-Cold War era. This shift is far from linear, but it is occurring and having a substantial impact
on studies of Asian IR. And this need not be seen as a purely or mainly liberal trend, as it would
be mediated by local historical, cultural and ideational frameworks which have their roots in
local conceptions of power politics, utilitarianism and normative transformation. This shift
challenges the distinction between Asian and universal knowledge claims and expands
the scope for grafting outside theoretical concepts onto Asian local discourses.
The region also abounds in historical forms of local knowledge with a universal reach. Examples
include the ideas of Asian thinkers such as Rabindranath Tagore’s critique of nationalism,
Nehru’s neutralism and non-alignment, and Gandhi’s satyagraha. 40 There are many Japanese
writings which were developed either in association with, or in reaction against, Western
concepts of nationalism, internationalism and international order.41 Although some of these
Indian and Japanese contributions were either critiques of Western ideas (like nationalism) or
were borrowed forms of Western ideas (such as Gandhi’s borrowing of passive resistance), they
were sufficiently infused with a local content to be deemed as a form of local knowledge.
Moreover, the outcome of this interaction between Western and Asian ideas was
“constitutive” in the sense that it redefined both the Western ideas and the local
identities. And while the localization of Western ideas might have been originally intended for
domestic or regional audiences, the resulting concepts and practices did possess a wider
conceptual frame to have relevance beyond Asia. Such ideas deserve a place alongside
existing theories of IR. Historical patterns of inter-state and inter-civilizational relations in Asia,
including the tributary system, also do have their place, if they can be conceptualized in a
manner that would extend their analytical utility and normative purpose (present in any theory)
beyond China or East Asia.

Asian practices of international relations are another rich source of Asian universalism in
IR theory.43 Asian regionalism, which both manages the balance of power and expans the
potential for a regional community, also provides a good potential avenue for such universalism.
Instead of drawing sharp distinction between what is European and what is Asian, theoretical
perspectives on Asian regionalism should explore commonalities which are quite substantial and
would constitute the core of a universal corpus of knowledge about regionalism in world
politics.
While Asia’s “distinctive” history, ideas, and approaches will condition the way Western
theoretical ideas are understood and make their impact, elements of the former will find their
way into a wider arena influencing global discourses about international order in the 21st
century. The challenge for theoretical writings on Asian IR is to reflect on and
conceptualize this dynamic44, whereby scholars do not stop at testing Western
concepts and theories in the Asian context, but generalize from the latter on its own
terms in order to enrich an hitherto Western-centric IR theory.
 2ac: ____ turn
They oversimplify security politics – abandoning strategic imperatives leads to
arbitrary intervention – turns the k.
Chandler, ‘09
(David, Professor of International Relations at the Department of Politics and International
Relations, University of Westminster, “War Without End(s): Grounding the Discourse of ‘Global
War’,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 40(3): 243–26,2
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0967010609336204)

Rethinking Global War Western governments appear to portray some of the distinctive
characteristics that Schmitt attributed to ‘motorized partisans’, in that the shift from narrowly
strategic concepts of security to more abstract concerns reflects the fact that Western
states have tended to fight free-floating and non-strategic wars of aggression without
real enemies at the same time as professing to have the highest values and the absolute
enmity that accompanies these. The government policy documents and critical frameworks
of ‘global war’ have been so accepted that it is assumed that it is the strategic interests of
Western actors that lie behind the often irrational policy responses, with ‘global war’
thereby being understood as merely the extension of instrumental struggles for control. This
perspective seems unable to contemplate the possibility that it is the lack of a strategic
desire for control that drives and defines ‘global’ war today.
Very few studies of the ‘war on terror’ start from a study of the Western actors
themselves rather than from their declarations of intent with regard to the international
sphere itself. This methodological framing inevitably makes assumptions about strategic
interactions and grounded interests of domestic or international regulation and control,
which are then revealed to explain the proliferation of enemies and the abstract and
metaphysical discourse of the ‘war on terror’ (Chandler, 2009a). For its radical critics, the
abstract, global discourse merely reveals the global intent of the hegemonizing designs of
biopower or neoliberal empire, as critiques of liberal projections of power are ‘scaled up’ from
the international to the global.

Radical critics working within a broadly Foucauldian problematic have no problem grounding
global war in the needs of neoliberal or biopolitical governance or US hegemonic designs. These
critics have produced numerous frameworks, which seek to assert that global war is somehow
inevitable, based on their view of the needs of late capitalism, late modernity, neoliberalism or
biopolitical frameworks of rule or domination. From the declarations of global war and
practices of military intervention, rationality, instrumentality and strategic interests are
read in a variety of ways (Chandler, 2007). Global war is taken very much on its own
terms, with the declarations of Western governments explaining and giving power to
radical abstract theories of the global power and regulatory might of the new global
order of domination, hegemony or empire.
The alternative reading of ‘global war’ rendered here seeks to clarify that the declarations of
global war are a sign of the lack of political stakes and strategic structuring of the
international sphere rather than frameworks for asserting global domination . We
increasingly see Western diplomatic and military interventions presented as justified on
the basis of value-based declarations, rather than in traditional terms of interest-based
outcomes. This was as apparent in the wars of humanitarian intervention in Bosnia, Somalia
and Kosovo – where there was no clarity of objectives and therefore little possibility of strategic
planning in terms of the military intervention or the post-conflict political outcomes – as it is in
the ‘war on terror’ campaigns, still ongoing, in Afghanistan and Iraq.

There would appear to be a direct relationship between the lack of strategic clarity
shaping and structuring interventions and the lack of political stakes involved in their
outcome. In fact, the globalization of security discourses seems to reflect the lack of
political stakes rather than the urgency of the security threat or of the intervention .
Since the end of the Cold War, the central problematic could well be grasped as one of
withdrawal and the emptying of contestation from the international sphere rather than as
intervention and the contestation for control. The disengagement of the USA and Russia from
sub-Saharan Africa and the Balkans forms the backdrop to the policy debates about sharing
responsibility for stability and the management of failed or failing states (see, for example, Deng
et al., 1996). It is the lack of political stakes in the international sphere that has meant
that the latter has become more open to ad hoc and arbitrary interventions as states
and international institutions use the lack of strategic imperatives to construct their own
meaning through intervention. As Zaki Laïdi (1998: 95) explains:
war is not waged necessarily to achieve predefined objectives, and it is in waging war
that the motivation needed to continue it is found. In these cases – of which there are very
many – war is no longer a continuation of politics by other means, as in Clausewitz’s classic
model – but sometimes the initial expression of forms of activity or organization in search of
meaning. . . . War becomes not the ultimate means to achieve an objective, but the most
‘efficient’ way of finding one.
The lack of political stakes in the international sphere would appear to be the
precondition for the globalization of security discourses and the ad hoc and often
arbitrary decisions to go to ‘war’. In this sense, global wars reflect the fact that the
international sphere has been reduced to little more than a vanity mirror for globalized
actors who are freed from strategic necessities and whose concerns are no longer
structured in the form of political struggles against ‘real enemies’. The mainstream critical
approaches to global wars, with their heavy reliance on recycling the work of Foucault, Schmitt
and Agamben, appear to invert this reality, portraying the use of military firepower and the
implosion of international law as a product of the high stakes involved in global struggle, rather
than the lack of clear contestation involving the strategic accommodation of diverse powers and
interests.
Conclusion International law evolved on the basis of the ever-present possibility of real war
between real enemies. Today’s global wars of humanitarian intervention and the ‘war on terror’
appear to be bypassing or dismantling this framework of international order. Taken out of
historical context, today’s period might seem to be analogous to that of the imperial and
colonial wars of the last century, which evaded or undermined frameworks of international law,
which sought to treat the enemy as a justus hostis – a legitimate opponent to be treated with
reciprocal relations of equality. Such analogies have enabled critical theorists to read the
present through past frameworks of strategic political contestation, explaining the lack of
respect for international law and seemingly arbitrary and ad hoc use of military force on the
basis of the high political stakes involved. Agamben’s argument that classical international law
has dissipated into a ‘permanent state of exception’, suggesting that we are witnessing a global
war machine – constructing the world in the image of the camp and reducing its enemies to
bare life to be annihilated at will – appears to be given force by Guantánamo Bay, extraordinary
rendition and Abu Ghraib.

Yet, once we go beyond the level of declarations of policy values and security stakes, the
practices of Western militarism fit uneasily with the policy discourses and suggest a
different dynamic: one where the lack of political stakes in the international sphere
means that there is little connection between military intervention and strategic
planning. In fact, as Laïdi suggests, it would be more useful to understand the projection of
violence as a search for meaning and strategy rather than as an instrumental outcome .
To take one leading example of the ‘unlimited’ nature of liberal global war: the treatment of
terrorist suspects held at Guantánamo Bay, in legal suspension as ‘illegal 260 Security Dialogue
vol. 40, no. 3, June 2009 combatants’ and denied Geneva Red Cross conventions and prisoner-
of-war status. The ‘criminalization’ of the captives in Guantánamo Bay is not a case of reducing
their status to criminals but the development of an exceptional legal category. In fact, far from
criminalizing fundamentalist terrorists, the USA has politically glorified them, talking up their
political importance.
 2ac: perm
The perm solves best – identifications with a singular international relations
paradigm fail to accurately reflect the world
Jackson and Nexon, ‘13
(Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel Nexon, Professor of International Relations and Associate
Dean for Undergraduate Education in the School of International Service at American University,
USA , and Associate Professor in the Department of Government and the School of Foreign
Service at Georgetown University, USA, “International theory in a post-paradigmatic era: From
substantive wagers to scientific ontologies,” European Journal of International Relations 19(3)
543– 565, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354066113495482)

Recall our discussion of attempts to constitute the field as a three-cornered fight among
liberals, realists, and constructivists. This effort suffered, as we have argued, from
significant intellectual problems. It excluded many approaches — such as world-systems
theories. Much to the consternation of many scholars, the term ‘constructivism’ often became a
catch-all for everything from linguistic-turn theories to sociological institutionalism. At the same
time, it also opened new doors for marginalized approaches. In fact, scholars did not need to
self-identify with any of the three camps to use their theoretical claims as a springboard
to bring additional voices into the conversation.
Still, the ‘isms’ were far too constraining to handle the myriad theories found in the field,
which helps explain their decline. But if IR theory benefits from the existence of a few clearly
defined positions with widely recognized stakes, then this raises a question: ‘Where do we go
from here?’

Some combination of intellectual developments and extra-disciplinary events may create a new
‘great debate’ that benefits, rather than inhibits, robust IR theorizing. But we believe that we
neither ought to look for, nor are likely to find, something along the lines of the
‘paradigm wars’ between ‘isms.’ Instead, if we want to construct maps of international
theory that draw our attention to field-wide disputes with important stakes, then we
should adopt topographies that: • reconstruct already-existing terms of debate; • deal
with more fundamental — and therefore much broader — concerns of scientific
ontology than did the ‘isms’; and • involve gradations of disagreement rather that
purport to describe self-contained theoretical aggregates.
Describing the state of IR theory along these lines involves two additional implications. First, the
axes of contention we identify will never capture the entirety of existing international
theorizing. In our view, this is not a cause for excessive concern. No framework will likely
exhaust the totality of IR theory around the world. What matters is that a mapping
capture an important set of disputes with significant field-wide stakes, and that it also
provide hooks for even those theories that do not fit into it very well.
 2ac: at Pan/orientalism
Pan agrees that the aff’s analysis of crisis stability and security dilemmas is true.
Pan 04
(Chengxin Pan, IR Prof at Australia National University, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political,
2004, “ The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other
as Power Politics”, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 305-331,
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/030437540402900304)

Not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of understanding
China as a dynamic, multifaceted country but it leads inevitably to a policy of
containment that, in turn, tends to enhance the influence of realpolitik thinking,
nationalist extremism, and hard-line stance in today's China. Even a small dose of the
containment strategy is likely to have a highly dramatic impact on U.S.-China relations,
as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident have vividly attested. In this
respect, Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that "a policy of containment toward China
implies the possibility of war, just as it did during the Cold War vis-à-vis the former Soviet Union.
The balance of terror prevented war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but this
may not work in the case of China."93 For instance, as the United States presses ahead with
a missiledefence shield to "guarantee" its invulnerability from rather unlikely sources of
missile attacks, it would be almost certain to intensify China's sense of vulnerability and
compel it to expand its current small nuclear arsenal so as to maintain the efficiency of
its limited deterrence. In consequence, it is not impossible that the two countries, and
possibly the whole region, might be dragged into an escalating arms race that would
eventually make war more likely.
T
 2ac at: T FMS/DCS – we meet
The Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System is FMS - the deal with Japan went
through the standard FMS process
Partan 4/1/2019 (Sasha Partan, ACA Writer, U.S. Approves Missile Defense Sale to Japan, Arms
Control Association, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-03/news-briefs/us-approves-
missile-defense-sale-japan)

The Trump administration gave its final approval Jan. 29 for a $2.2 billion sale of missile
defense systems to Japan. Congress received notification of the deal, including two Aegis Ashore
missile interceptor batteries, from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, triggering a 30-day opportunity for

Congress to object, which happens rarely. The sale notification was delayed by the 35-day U.S.
government partial shutdown, which slowed the Foreign Military Sales approval process,
including a necessary green light from the U.S. State Department.
 2ac at: T Arms - Interp -SIPRI
“Arms” includes armoured vehicles, military aircraft, air defense systems, anti-
submarine warfare weapons, artillery with a caliber above or equal to 100 mm,
certain types of engines, missiles, reconnaissance satellites, military ships,
turrets, tanker aircraft refueling systems, and some sensors
STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE undated (“SIPRI Arms Transfers
Database – Methodology,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/background)

SIPRI statistical data on arms transfers relates to actual deliveries of major conventional
weapons. To permit comparison between the data on such deliveries of different weapons and
to identify general trends, SIPRI has developed a unique system to measure the volume of
international transfers of major conventional weapons using a common unit, the trend-indicator
value (TIV).

The TIV is based on the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons and is intended to
represent the transfer of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer.
Weapons for which a production cost is not known are compared with core weapons based on:
size and performance characteristics (weight, speed, range and payload); type of electronics,
loading or unloading arrangements, engine, tracks or wheels, armament and materials; and the
year in which the weapon was produced. A weapon that has been in service in another armed
force is given a value 40 per cent of that of a new weapon. A used weapon that has been
significantly refurbished or modified by the supplier before delivery is given a value of 66 per
cent of that of a new weapon.

SIPRI calculates the volume of transfers to, from and between all parties using the TIV and the
number of weapon systems or subsystems delivered in a given year. This data is intended to
provide a common unit to allow the measurement if trends in the flow of arms to particular
countries and regions over time. Therefore, the main priority is to ensure that the TIV system
remains consistent over time, and that any changes introduced are backdated.

In cases where deliveries are identified but it is not possible to identify either the supplier or the
recipient with an acceptable degree of certainty, transfers are registered as coming from
'unknown' suppliers or going to 'unknown' recipients. In cases where there is an arms transfer
agreement for weapons that are produced by two or more cooperating countries, and if it is not
clear which country will make the final delivery, the suppliers is listed as 'multiple'.

SIPRI TIV figures do not represent sales prices for arms transfers. They should therefore not be
directly compared with gross domestic product (GDP), military expenditure, sales values or the
financial value of export licences in an attempt to measure the economic burden of arms
imports or the economic benefits of exports. They are best used as the raw data for calculating
trends in international arms transfers over periods of time, global percentages for suppliers and
recipients, and percentages for the volume of transfers to or from particular states.

Examples of SIPRI TIV

To better illustrate how the SIPRI TIV is constructed/calculated, four types of transfer are
outlined below using actual SIPRI TIV: transfer of a newly produced complete weapons system; a
transfer of surplus weapons; a transfer of significant components for a major conventional
weapons system; and a licensed production arrangement. All of the examples given are for
items delivered or ordered from Germany in 2009.

The transfer of newly produced complete weapons systems: In 2009, Germany delivered 6
Eurofighter combat aircraft to Austria. One Eurofighter is valued at 55 million SIPRI TIV.
Therefore the delivery is valued at 330 million SIPRI TIV.

Transfer of surplus weapons: In 2009, Germany delivered 43 surplus Leopard-2A4 tanks to Chile.
One Leopard-2A4 tank is valued at 4 million SIPRI TIV and a used version is valued at 1.6 million
SIPRI TIV (40 per cent of the value of a new version). Therefore, the delivery is valued at 68.8
million SIPRI TIV.

Transfer of significant components for major conventional weapons systems: In 2009, Germany
delivered 8 MTU-8000 diesel engines for frigates to Singapore. One MTU-8000 diesel engine is
valued at 4 million SIPRI TIV. Therefore the delivery is valued at 32 million SIPRI TIV.

Licensed production arrangement: In 2009 the Republic of Korea was granted a license to
produce one Type-209PN submarine. One Type-209PN submarine is valued at 275 million SIPRI
TIV. Therefore the delivery is valued at 275 million SIPRI TIV.

3.Coverage

Types of weapons

Since publicly available information is inadequate for the tracking of all weapons and
other military equipment, SIPRI covers only what it terms major weapons. These are
defined by SIPRI as the following:
Aircraft: all fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, including unmanned aircraft (UAV/UCAV)
with a minimum loaded weight of 20 kg. Exceptions are microlight aircraft, powered and
unpowered gliders and target drones.
Air defence systems: (a) all land-based surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, and (b) all
anti-aircraft guns with a calibre of more than 40 mm or with multiple barrels with a
combined caliber of at least 70 mm. This includes self-propelled systems on armoured
or unarmoured chassis.
Anti-submarine warfare weapons: rocket launchers, multiple rocket launchers and mortars
for use against submarines, with a calibre equal to or above 100 mm.

Armoured vehicles: all vehicles with integral armour protection, including all types of tank,
tank destroyer, armoured car, armoured personnel carrier, armoured support vehicle and
infantry fighting vehicle. Vehicles with very light armour protection (such as trucks with an
integral but lightly armoured cabin) are excluded.
Artillery: naval, fixed, self-propelled and towed guns, howitzers, multiple rocket launchers and
mortars, with a calibre equal to or above 100 mm.

Engines: (a) engines for military aircraft, for example, combat-capable aircraft, larger military
transport and support aircraft, including large helicopters; (b) engines for combat ships - fast
attack craft, corvettes, frigates, destroyers, cruisers, aircraft carriers and submarines; (c) engines
for most armoured vehicles - generally engines of more than 200 horsepower output*.
Missiles: (a) all powered, guided missiles and torpedoes, and (b) all unpowered but
guided bombs and shells. This includes man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS)
and portable guided anti-tank missiles. Unguided rockets, free-fall aerial munitions, anti-
submarine rockets and target drones are excluded.
Sensors: (a) all land-, aircraft- and ship-based active (radar) and passive (e.g. electro-
optical) surveillance systems with a range of at least 25 kilometres, with the exception
of navigation and weather radars, (b) all fire-control radars, with the exception of range-
only radars, and (c) anti-submarine warfare and anti-ship sonar systems for ships and
helicopters*.
Satellites: Reconnaissance satellites.

Ships: (a) all ships with a standard tonnage of 100 tonnes or more, and (b) all ships
armed with artillery of 100-mm calibre or more, torpedoes or guided missiles, and (c) all
ships below 100 tonnes where the maximum speed (in kmh) multiplied with the full
tonnage equals 3500 or more. Exceptions are most survey ships, tugs and some
transport ships.
Other: (a) all turrets for armoured vehicles fitted with a gun of at least 12.7 mm calibre
or with guided anti-tank missiles, (b) all turrets for ships fitted with a gun of at least 57-
mm calibre, and (c) all turrets for ships fitted with multiple guns with a combined calibre
of at least 57 mm, and (d) air refueling systems as used on tanker aircraft*.
*In cases where the system is fitted on a platform (vehicle, aircraft or ship), the database only
includes those systems that come from a different supplier from the supplier of the platform.

The Arms Transfers Database does not cover other military equipment such as small arms
and light weapons (SALW) other than portable guided missiles such as man-portable air
defence systems (MANPADS) and guided anti-tank missiles. Trucks, artillery under 100-
mm calibre, ammunition, support equipment and components (other than those
mentioned above), repair and support services or technology transfers are also not
included in the database.
 2ac at: T Arms – we meet SIPRI ci
Aegis Ashore is just a land version of navy technology - all we are selling to
Japan is SM-3 missiles
Missile Threat ND Missile Threat, Catalog of U.S missile technology with descriptions, ND,
https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/aegis-ashore//DeepStateSisco

Aegis Ashore is the land-based variant of the Navy’s Aegis Weapons System and the centerpiece of Phases II
and III of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). The system incorporates land-based versions of the

various components used on Aegis ships, including the deckhouse, AN/SPY-1 radar, the Mark 41
Vertical Launching System (VLS), and Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors. It is intended to
serve as a midcourse defense against medium and intermediate-range missiles. 1 The first two planned
Aegis Ashore sites are at Deveselu, Romania and Redzikowo, Poland. The AN/TPY-2 X-band Radar in Turkey provides early tracking data to the Aegis
Ashore sites on missiles launched from the Middle East.

After announcing the EPAA in 2009, the United States negotiated a hosting agreement for Aegis Ashore with Romania and broke ground in 2013. 2 The
Missile Defense Agency successfully tested the configuration of the Romania site for the first time in December 2015. 3 That same month, the United
States and Romania made a “Technical Capability Declaration” for the Deveselu site, which was followed by a declaration of Initial Operating Capacity in
May 2016. 4 Groundbreaking for the site in Poland took place in 2016 with initial operations planned for 2018. 5

Each Aegis Ashore site include three MK 41 VLS tubes with eight cells apiece for a total of 24
interceptors per site. 6 The Romania site will use the SM-3 Block IB initially, but both sites are slated to include the SM-3 Block IIA once it
becomes operational.

Aegis Ahsore is an air defense system.

Military Watch 2018 (Japanese Navy to Induct U.S. Aegis Air Defence Systems by 2020,
Military Watch, https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/japanese-navy-to-induct-u-s-aegis-
air-defence-systems-by-2020)

Japan's Navy is set to induct U.S. made Aegis air defence systems for its destroyers. The
Aegis is widely considered to be the most sophisticated Western designed air defence
system, and is specialised in countering ballistic missiles. The system was initially intended as a
defence for the U.S. Navy but has since been developed into a land based variant, the Aegis
Ashore. Amid growing tensions with China and North Korea, Japan is set to deploy both the
Aegis Ashore and the weapons system's Naval variant as a means of countering the missile
forces of its potential adversaries.
 2ac at: T Arms - Interp - Munitions List
“Arms” means items specified in the US Munitions List
Boren 85, 4-24-1985, “S. 986 - A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to disallow
any deduction for advertising or other promotion expenses with respect to arms sales,”
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1985-pt7/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1985-pt7-3-1.pdf

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That part IX of subchapter B of chapter 1 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 GENERAL RULE.-No deduction shall be allowed under this chapter for any arms sale promotion expense. "(b) ARMS SALE PROMOTION EXPENSE.-For
purposes of this section- "(1) IN GENERAL.-The term 'arms sale promotion expense' means any amount otherwise allowable as a deduction under this chapter with respect to-
"<A> any advertisement primarily for purposes of- "(i) promoting the sale of arms, or "(ii) informing or influencing the general public (or any segment thereof) with respect to
defense expenditures, or “(B) any of the following incurred or provided primarily for purposes described in subparagraph (A)—“(i) travel expenses (including meals and lodging),
“(ii) any amount attributable to goods or services of a type generally considered to constitute entertainment, amusement, or recreation or to the use of a facility in connection

The term 'arms' means any arm,

with the providing of such goods or services, “(iii) gifts, or “(iv) other promotion expenses. "(2) ARMS.-

ammunition, or implement of war designated in the munitions list published pursuant

to the Military Security Act of 1954.
 2ac at: T Arms – we meet Munitions List ci
We meet our counter interp - Ballistic Missile Radars are included in the USML
United States Municions List (United States Municions List, 22 CFR § 121.1 - The United
States Munitions List., Legal Information Institute,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/22/121.1)

Category XI - Military Electronics

(a) Electronic equipment and systems not included in Category XII of the U.S. Munitions List, as
follows:

*(1) Underwater hardware, equipment, or systems, as follows:

(i) Active or passive acoustic array sensing systems or acoustic array equipment capable of real-
time processing that survey or detect, and also track, localize (i.e., determine range and
bearing), classify, or identify, surface vessels, submarines, other undersea vehicles, torpedoes,
or mines, having any of the following:

(A) Multi-static capability;

(B) Operating frequency less than 20 kHz; or

(C) Operating bandwidth greater than 10 kHz;

(ii) Underwater single acoustic sensor system that distinguishes non-biologic tonals and locates
the origin of the sound;

Note to paragraph(a)(1)(ii): The term tonals implies discrete frequencies in the broadband and
narrowband spectra, emanating from man-made objects.

(iii) Non-acoustic systems that survey or detect, and also track, localize (i.e., determine range
and bearing), classify, or identify, surface vessels, submarines, other undersea vehicles,
torpedoes, or mines;

(iv) Acoustic modems, networks, and communications equipment with real-time adaptive
compensation or employing Low Probability of Intercept (LPI);

Note to paragraph (a)(1)(iv): Adaptive compensation is the capability of an underwater modem

to assess the water conditions to select the best algorithm to receive and transmit data.

(v) Low Frequency/Very Low Frequency (LF/VLF) electronic modems, routers, interfaces, and
communications equipment, specially designed for submarine communications; or

(vi) Autonomous systems and equipment that enable cooperative sensing and engagement by
fixed (bottom mounted/seabed) or mobile Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs);

*(2) Underwater acoustic countermeasures or counter-countermeasures systems or equipment;

*(3) Radar systems and equipment, as follows:

(i) Airborne radar that maintains positional state of an object or objects of interest, other than
weather phenomena, in a received radar signal through time;

Note to paragraph (A)(3)(I):

This paragraph does not control radars that: (1) Are incapable of free space detection of 1
square meter Radar Cross Section (RCS) target beyond 8 nautical miles (nmi); (2) contain a radar
update rate of not more than 1Hz; and (3) employ a design determined to be subject to the EAR
via a commodity jurisdiction determination (see § 120.4 of this subchapter).

(ii) Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) incorporating image resolution less than (better than) 0.3 m,
or incorporating Coherent Change Detection (CCD) with geo-registration accuracy less than
(better than) 0.3 m, not including concealed object detection equipment operating in the
frequency range from 30 GHz to 3,000 GHz and having a spatial resolution of 0.1 milliradians up
to and including 1 milliradians at a standoff distance of 100 m;

(iii) Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR);

(iv) Radar that geodetically-locates (i.e., geodetic latitude, geodetic longitude, and geodetic
height) with a target location error 50 (TLE50) less than or equal to 10 m at ranges greater than
1 km;

(v) Any Ocean Surveillance Radar with an average-power-aperture product of greater than 50
Wm 2;

(vi) Any ocean surveillance radar that transmits a waveform with an instantaneous bandwidth
greater than 100 MHz and has an antenna rotation rate greater than 60 revolutions per minute
(RPM);

(vii) Air surveillance radar with free space detection of 1 square meter RCS target at 85 nmi or
greater range, scaled to RCS values as RCS to the 1/4 power;

(viii) Air surveillance radar with free space detection of 1 square meter RCS target at an altitude
of 65,000 feet and an elevation angle greater than 20 degrees (i.e., counter-battery);

(ix) Air surveillance radar with multiple elevation beams, phase or amplitude monopulse
estimation, or 3D height-finding;

(x) Air surveillance radar with a beam solid angle less than or equal to 16 degrees 2 that
performs free space tracking of 1 square meter RCS target at a range greater or equal to 25 nmi
with revisit rate greater or equal to 1/3 Hz;

(xi) Instrumentation radar for anechoic test facility or outdoor range that maintains positional
state of an object of interest in a received radar signal through time or provides measurement of
RCS of a static target less than or equal to minus 10dBsm, or RCS of a dynamic target;

(xii) Radar incorporating pulsed operation with electronics steering of transmit beam in
elevation and azimuth;

Note to paragraph (A)(3)(XII):

This paragraph does not control radars not otherwise controlled in this subchapter, operating
with a peak transmit power less than or equal to 550 watts, and employing a design determined
to be subject to the EAR via a commodity jurisdiction determination (see § 120.4 of this
subchapter).

(xiii) Radar with mode(s) for ballistic tracking or ballistic extrapolation to source of
launch or impact point of articles controlled in USML Categories III, IV, or XV;
(xiv) Active protection radar and missile warning radar with mode(s) implemented for detection
of incoming munitions;

(xv) Over the horizon high frequency sky-wave (ionosphere) radar;

(xvi) Radar that detects a moving object through a physical obstruction at distance greater than
0.2 m from the obstruction;

(xvii) Radar having moving target indicator (MTI) or pulse-Doppler processing where any single
Doppler filter provides a normalized clutter attenuation of greater than 60dB;
 2ac at: T Arms – we meet Munitions List ci
We meet our counter interp – Missiles are included in the USML.
United States Municions List (United States Municions List, 22 CFR § 121.1 - The United
States Munitions List., Legal Information Institute,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/22/121.1)

Category IV - Launch Vehicles, Guided Missiles, Ballistic Missiles, Rockets, Torpedoes, Bombs,
and Mines

* (a) Rockets, space launch vehicles (SLVs), missiles, bombs, torpedoes, depth charges, mines,
and grenades, as follows:

(1) Rockets, SLVs, and missiles capable of delivering at least a 500-kg payload to a range of at
least 300 km (MT);

(2) Rockets, SLVs, and missiles capable of delivering less than a 500-kg payload to a range of at
least 300 km (MT);

(3) Man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS);

(4) Anti-tank missiles and rockets;

(5) Rockets, SLVs, and missiles not meeting the criteria of paragraphs (a)(1) through
(a)(4) of this category;
(6) Bombs;

(7) Torpedoes;

(8) Depth charges;

(9) Anti-personnel, anti-vehicle, or anti-armor land mines (e.g., area denial devices);

(10) Anti-helicopter mines;

(11) Naval mines; or

(12) Fragmentation and high explosive hand grenades.

Misc.
Potential Add-Ons
 Drug Trafficking Security Impact
Drug trafficking in Central Asia endangers regional insecurity.
Mubarik and Singh 2016 (Mubarik, Mudasir; Singh, Bawa., PHD Assistant Professor at the
Centre for South and Central Asian Studies, Research Scholar Central University of Punjab,
Security Syndrome in Central Asia: Russia a Protective Shield, IUP Journal of International
Relations;, https://search.proquest.com/docview/1814062750?pq-origsite=gscholar)

According to Williams,29 a contributor to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC), organized crime reveals that the networks in Central Asia are involved in
trafficking of drugs, humans, explosives, and precious materials through the region. The silk
route-turned-heroin route is carving out a path of death and violence through one of
the world's most strategic yet volatile regions. UNODC (2009) also exposes that the perfect
storm of drugs, crime and insurgency that has swirled around the Afghanistan/Pakistan
border for years is heading for Central Asia. Central Asia is an important corridor for the
smuggling of illegal narcotics produced in Afghanistan through Russia to European markets.
The problem is most acute in Tajikistan which shares a long, porous border with
Afghanistan, but it is present in all of the other Central Asian countries as well.
Afghanistan produces about 90% of the global supply of opium and nearly about 30% of it
transits through

Central Asia (UNODC, 2015). Cornell and Swanström30 reported that there are links between
state actors and drug traffickers in all the five states, with impacts, to a lesser or greater
degree, on domestic politics in all cases. Leijonmarck and Asyrankulova31 depict the role of
organized crime and drug trafficking in Kyrgyzstan's Ethnic Crisis in 2010. Violence indicates that
criminal gangs played a significant role, and suggests that they are unlikely to support a transfer
of political power that would undermine their influence in the region. The sporadic violence in
eastern Tajikistan's Gorno-Badakhshan region since 2012 is allegedly related to
competition between government forces and local warlords over control of smuggling
routes.32 The crimestate nexus heightens the likelihood of political instability becoming
violent, because of these groups' access to weapons and muscle, also undermining the
prospects of governance reform.
Lopour33 holds that narco-trafficking literally can overturn governments as the instigators
of the Kyrgyz revolution in 2005 were financed by drug money. Officials of all levels, from
high to low-paid administrative bureaucrats and law enforcement officers, are lured by
high-profit margins. Also, an increasing number of terrorist and insurgent groups rely on
drug trafficking as a source of funding.34 Drug trafficking also impacts other security
areas, because traffickers take advantage of established drug routes to transfer other
contraband, including weapons, natural resources, nuclear waste and trafficked humans
(UNODC, 2015). This has resulted in rising rates of HIV/AIDS, with the use of
contaminated needles, the most common means of viral infection . Daniel Kimmage
therefore admits that UN has warned that if the spread of HIV/AIDS is not contained, a serious
public health crisis could emerge in the coming years.

Drug trafficking in Central Asia endangers security in the region.

Nichol, 2010 (Jim Nichol, Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs for the Congressional
Research Service, Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests,
Congressional Research Service, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30294.pdf)

The trafficking and use of illegal narcotics in Central Asia endanger the security,
independence, and development of the states by stunting economic and political
reforms and exacerbating terrorism, crime, corruption, and health problems. As a
conduit, the region has been used as a transit route by criminal groups smuggling
narcotics from Afghanistan, mainly to markets in Russia and Europe, although drug use
within the region also is accelerating. The increased use of shared needles for drug injection
has contributed to rising rates of HIV/AIDS in the region. Although the bulk of opiates from
Afghanistan continue to be transported through Pakistan and Iran, rising quantities—
currently estimated at between 19%-25%—are trafficked through Central Asia, mainly
through Tajikistan.80 In February 2010, President Berdimuhamedow stated that drug
trafficking and drug addiction rates had become “alarming” in Turkmenistan, and called for an
“uncompromising” war on drugs. Despite this call for a punitive war, however, the State
Department reports that although “drug addiction is a prosecutable crime [in Turkmenistan] and
persons convicted are subject to jail sentences ... judicial officials usually sentence addicts to
treatment.”81
 Kurils Russia Far East Scenario
Dispute over US military presence on the Kuril Islands is the key issue
preventing Japan and Russia resolving the Kuril Island disputes.
Majumdar ’17 (Dave Majumdar is the former Defense Editor for the National Interest, “Could
Russia and China Finally End Their Island Dispute?” The National Interest, 12/12/17,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/could-russia-japan-finally-settle-their-island-dispute-
23630)

Russia and Japan are moving towards a rapprochement after a long period of mutual
antipathy. In recent days, Moscow and Tokyo have started to discuss increased
cooperation in the naval arena. And, in time, there could be a settlement between the
two powers over the Kuril Islands, which came under Soviet jurisdiction after the end of the
Second World War, but which Japan wants returned.

“The countries are ready to enhance cooperation between defense departments on the
basis of high-level agreements reached over the last year,” Russia’s chief of the general
staff, Gen. Valery Gerasimov said during his visit to Tokyo to meet his Japanese counterpart
Adm. Katsutoshi Kawano.

The Russians and Japanese will hold more than 30 joint exercises during the coming year,
according to the Russian Defense Ministry. But cooperation between Russia and Japan is not
limited to just the military realm, the Kremlin might be attempting to reach a more
comprehensive deal with Tokyo that could eventually see the dispute over the Kuril
Islands finally resolved.
“We had a strategic dialogue with Japan before the Ukrainian crisis (defense and foreign
ministers), but now it is being renewed,” Vasily Kashin, a senior fellow at the Center for
Comprehensive European and International Studies at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics
told The National Interest. “It is a part of a general rapprochement with Japan. There are real
hopes to resolve the territorial issues in the coming years and at the same time there are
efforts to boost economic cooperation.”

There are ongoing negotiations between Russia and Japan on the status of the Kurils to
finally resolving the dispute. “There are hopes for this,” Kashin said. “Maybe they might fail,
but for now, they are trying seriously, I mean both sides. But the negotiations are being kept
secret.”

One possible outcome is that Russia returns the Kurils Islands to Japan in return for greatly
expanded economic and technological cooperation, but on the condition that no U.S. forces
ever set foot on those territories. The Russians have learned the lessons of history where Soviet
leader Mikhail Gorbachev withdrew from Eastern Europe without securing a written guarantee
that NATO would not expand into those regions to fill the void. “The disputed territory—part
or all of it—would be transferred to Japan with some limitations,” Kashin said. “One of
them is that there should be no U.S. military presence on the territory transferred by
Russia, ever.”
That condition, however, is a sticking point for Tokyo, which fears that accepting such a
deal would undermine its alliance with the United States. “That is a problem —the
Japanese fear that this undermines their alliance with the U.S. and the U.S. will in this case
exclude Senkaku from the alliance obligations,” Kashin said.

Resolving Russia-Japan relations is key to development of the Russian Far East.

Korybko 2018 (Andrew Korybko, US political commentator currently working for the Sputnik
agency, Geopolitics of The Russian Far East, Centre For Research on Globalization,
https://www.globalresearch.ca/geopolitics-of-the-russian-far-east/5655452)

Despite being a far-flung and underdeveloped region, the Russian Far East might turn out to
be the country’s most promising one if several visionary connectivity proposals are
implemented.
Russia has been prioritizing the development of its far-flung and long-neglected Far
Eastern region for the past three years now ever since it commenced the now-annual
Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) in September 2015, but despite the plethora of deals that
were signed during the last four such gatherings, what’s urgently needed is the
implementation of four visionary connectivity projects in order to turn this part of the
country into the next frontier of the emerging Multipolar World Order. In the order of
their prospectively phased implementation, these initiatives are:

The Northern Islands Socio-Economic Condominium (NISEC);

The Korean Corridor (KC);
The Tikhi-to-Tiksi Corridor (TTC, via the hub city of Yakutsk);
and the InterContinental Railway (ICRR).
The TSR already exists, and a rail link between Yakutsk, Tynda, and Skovorodino forms
part of the TTC, but the rest of this ambitious connectivity vision still has to be
constructed. It’s hampered, however, by three geopolitical impediments that affect the
following projects:
no Russian-Japanese World War II peace treaty (NISEC);
no Korean War peace treaty (KC);

and poor Russian-American relations (TCRR).

Another obvious obstacle is the capital needed to fund everything, though that could
potentially be unleashed after the peaceful resolution of the three aforementioned
issues. All the related parties have an enduring strategic interest in strengthening their
complex interdependency with one another in order to reap the mutually beneficial
dividends associated with multilateral integration projects, reduced transportation
costs, and quicker shipment times brought about by these overland shortcuts.
Although the Northern Sea Route will undoubtedly become an important transit route in the
future, it’s nowhere near as time-efficient as if exports were made across the highlighted
rail routes. The grand strategic vision is to use these connectivity corridors as avenues
for comprehensively expanding each partner’s relations with one another, with the final
goal being the creation of a new large-scale integrational platform between them that
could be relied upon to stabilize the region and bring wealth to its people through the
improved access to previously untapped natural resources that it’ll provide.
For this far-reaching series of ideas to become a reality, however, the three previously
mentioned impediments must be resolved. NISEC is in and of itself both a sub-regional
integrational platform and a proposal for solving the long-running dilemma that’s thus far
prevented Russia and Japan from signing a World War II peace treaty. As for the KC, the US is
working very hard to denuclearize North Korea and promised its leadership plenty of American
investments if this process is ultimately completed, which could in turn make a South Korean-
Russian rail route feasible. Regarding Russian-American relations, these might be improved
through a so-called “New Détente”.

So long as the political will is there, then the capital can be found, though Russia could greatly
facilitate this by requesting to join the joint Indo-Japanese “Asia-Africa Growth Corridor” (AAGC)
as its third strategic partner following the conclusion of a peace treaty with Tokyo. Furthermore,
North Korea’s successful denuclearization and America’s promised investments to it afterward
could conceivably see both of them and South Korea joining in the AAGC too, with all parties
pooling their resources to participate in the Russian Far East’s integrational development as the
crucial link connecting each of them. Russian-American relations would have to remarkably
improve, but this isn’t impossible.

Even in the event that they don’t, however, then Russia, Japan, the Koreas, and India could
cooperate in developing the Far East together without the US’ participation. These leading
Asian economies might also having an interest in funding the remaining portion of the
TTC in order to offset any speculative future disruptions across the Bering Strait if they
forecast that Russian-American tensions will continue to endure across the decades. This
overland shortcut to the Arctic might be expensive but it would more than pay for its cost
through the investor states’ access to the region’s untapped mineral and energy
resources, as well as their reliable access to the Arctic Ocean.
Altogether, the ambitious grand strategic vision put forth in this policy proposal aims to
transform the Russian Far East from the country’s domestic backwater to its
international showcase, and in the process make it the next frontier for multipolarity.
The solely economic nature of this series of initiatives makes it so that they holistically
complement China’s own One Belt One Road (OBOR) global vision of New Silk Road
connectivity and thus enable Russia to “balance” between it and the AAGC, which can
bring about enormous economic benefits if it can encourage them to engage in an intense
“friendly competition” over developing the Far East.
 Entrapment Adv
BMD’s are the key to Japanese national security capabilities and defense
programs.
Hughes, 2006 (Christopher W., senior research fellow at the Center for the Study of
Globalization and Regionalization, University of Warwick, UK, Ballistic Missile Defence and US-
Japan and US-UK Alliances Compared,
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/csgr/garnet/workingpapers/1106.
pdf)

Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) is now a reality for Japan’s security policy and the management
of US-Japan alliance relations. Japan from 2006 onwards has started to deploy the terminal
phase Patriot Advance Capability (PAC)-3, and aims by 2011 to roll out the full panoply of BMD
systems, consisting of sixteen PAC-3 fire units, six Aegis destroyers equipped with mid-course
phase interceptors, and upgraded sensors and command and control functions. The Japanese
Cabinet first officially committed to the acquisition of BMD in December 2003. Since then, BMD
has begun to force major changes in Japan’s national security capabilities and doctrines. BMD
sits squarely at the forefront of Japan’s response to ‘new threats’ in the revised National
Defence Programme Guidelines (NDPG) of December 2004; and it is the major procurement
item in the Mid-Term Defence Programme for 2005- 2009—BMD’s huge costs squeezing the
overall defence budget and obliging the Japan Self Defence Forces (JSDF) to tailor, and in some
cases curtail, plans for continued post-Cold War restructuring and other equipment
procurement around the priority attached to BMD.1 Moreover, the JSDF, in response to the
introduction of BMD and its related demands for enhanced integration of command and control
systems, has embarked on a restructuring programme that enables for the first time joint tri-
service operational capabilities. Furthermore, BMD’s impact on Japan’s defence policy has been
manifested in the government’s need to introduce legislation since February 2005 that begins to
fundamentally redesign measures for civilian control over the military in place since the start of
the post-war period.

Japanese overreliance on US BMDs causes Japanese entrapment with the US.

Cronin, March 19th, 2002 (Richard P. Cronin, Specialist in Asian Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense,
and Trade Division, Japan-US Cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defense: Issues and Prospects,
Congressional Research Service, https://heinonline-
org.dartmouth.idm.oclc.org/HOL/Page?collection=congrec&handle=hein.crs/crsacky0001&id=1
&men_tab=srchresults#)

Nevertheless, even in the transition to the Bush administration, Japanese fears of abandonment
in relation to missile defence have not entirely disappeared. In particular, and as will be further
elucidated below, Japan’s dependence on bilateral technological cooperation with the US for
the deployment of BMD has meant that it has been faced with the choice of either following the
US in each stage of progression of the BMD project or to face the prospect of the US dropping
plans for cooperation and thereby undoing all of Japan’s BMD efforts to date. This type of
scenario was very much behind Japan’s being ‘bounced’ into finally committing to BMD in 2003,
fearing that if it not remain close to the US as it advanced with missile defence deployments
that it would be abandoned as an ally in this field of bilateral cooperation.

Japan’s principal fear, though, as always, has been the risks of entrapment resulting from close
bilateral cooperation with the US on BMD, especially due to the fashion in which BMD closes
down many of its traditional hedging strategies against this eventuality. In turn, Japan’s alliance
dilemmas vis-à-vis the US generated by BMD, are themselves compounded by BMD’s generation
of security dilemmas in East Asia which force ever greater reliance on the US-Japan alliance.
Japan’s existing security dilemma vis-à-vis North Korea is well known. Japan’s participation in
BMD, although not likely to stimulate the North’s already on-going missile programme which is
so vital to its diplomatic and military campaign to break out of its international isolation, is also
unlikely to curb the North’s build-up of its missile forces, and this is despite opinions which see
BMD as a means to convince the North of the futility of threatening Japan and the US.

Japanese relies too heavily on US BMDs that require a short reaction time,
which draws Japan into conflict.
Hughes, 2006 (Christopher W., senior research fellow at the Center for the Study of
Globalization and Regionalization, University of Warwick, UK, Ballistic Missile Defence and US-
Japan and US-UK Alliances Compared,
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/csgr/garnet/workingpapers/1106.
pdf)

Firstly, Japan’s ability to evade and temporise is a limited option under participation in BMD.
Japan during the uncertainties of the Clinton administration certainly practiced a type of wait
and see option before committing itself to any specific project or architecture that might mean
it entering into BMD on terms that overly strategically disadvantaged it against the US. Japanese
policy-makers held to their scheme of breaking decisions about BMD into the stages of research,
development, production and deployment, contrasting with the US two stage process of
development and deployment, thus attempting to reserve the right to work to Japan’s own
schedule and take considered political decisions at stage. Japan has persevered with this scheme
during the Bush administration as well—for instance, still insisting, despite agreeing to joint
development with the US of the SM-3 interceptor in 2006, that a further decision is still
necessary on actual production. Nevertheless, despite Japan’s subtle hedging to buy time in the
BMD project, in the end, as seen above, it was effectively ‘bounced’ into the project by the US
unilateral decision to move ahead with MD deployment, obliging Japan to follow.

Moreover, once the BMD system is actually deployed, there will clearly be no opportunity for
temporisation in its operation. In past regional and global contingencies, Japan has been able to
work through its convoluted decision-making processes to take a decision on the necessary
action. In certain cases, this has taken weeks or months, and even Koizumi’s unprecedented
swift response to 9/11 took a matter of days. By contrast, BMD’s timeframe of less than ten
minutes being available to launch missile interceptors, means that Japanese policy-makers and
military commanders will have to respond in real-time and nearly instantaneously to missile
attacks and participation in a conflict that may spell an active commitment to military
cooperation with the US.
Japan’s total dependence on the U.S. when it comes to BMDs is bad – makes
Japan reliant on an unpredictable U.S. military strategy and angers China
unnecessarily
Watai 11/27/2018 (Yuki Watai, PhD Canidate in International Relations at the University of
Warwick, “Is Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense Too Integrated With the US?,” The Diplomat,
https://search-proquest-
com.dartmouth.idm.oclc.org/docview/2138056959?accountid=10422&rfr_id=info%3Axri%2Fsid
%3Aprimo)
Japan was among the first countries to participate in the U.S.-led Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) project and decided to introduce its own BMD system
in 2003. BMD is a highly integrated system with satellite radars to detect a missile and address it using a multilayered anti-ballistic missile system.

However, so far Japan’s BMD cannot possibly function without U.S. technological and
military capabilities, and most of Japan’s BMD developments are predicated on the
assumption that the U.S. military will remain a key partner. Over the course of 15 years since the system’s
introduction, not only has BMD been an effective tool to strengthen the U.S. alliance and internal defensive capabilities, but also it has

created a platform resulting in a highly complex integration of the two militaries. Japan
can no longer say no to the United States — not just because of the broader alliance relationship but because of
overreliance on and integration with the U.S. military when it comes to defending Japan
against ballistic missiles. BMD has served Japan’s strategy very conveniently, enabling Japan to join the regional offense-defense arms
race despite its pacifist constitution. The nature of BMD as a defensive system is a perfect fit for Japan’s strategy of “exclusively defense-oriented
defense,” under which Japan has focused on defensive capabilities while relying on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. In a similar vein, BMD also strengthens
the architecture of the U.S.-Japan security alliance – known as the “Sword and Shield System.” Along with Japan’s long-standing emphasis on the
alliance as a crucial part of its security policy, BMD serves not only maintain the alliance but also strengthen it. This is all the more crucial because, since
the 1990s, Japanese policymakers have been concerned about potential “abandonment” by the United States after the end of the Cold War and the
seeming decline in the U.S. geopolitical interests in the Asia-Pacific. As Daniel C. Sneider, an associate director of research for Stanford University’s
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, told Asia Times, “the Japanese have this fear of abandonment. It’s deep-seated in Japanese

BMD in Japan cannot function without U.S. military

strategic thinking.” Given this fear, it’s interesting to note that

capabilities. The United States possesses Early Warning Satellites with the Space-Based
Infrared System (SBRIS), operating in earth orbit, which cost more than $11 billion. The SBIRS allows the United States
to constantly monitor the Asia-Pacific region, including North Korea, and detect any sign
of potential launches. Japan does not yet possess such capabilities and hence receives
information from the United States. Japan thus far has developed only ground-based radars, Aegis Destroyers’ radar, and
Airborne Early Warning, which are helpful only in tracking missiles after a missile is launched. Thanks to the very short action time after a missile
launch, a swift exchange of information to detect and track the missile is crucial, which necessitates both the use of U.S. satellites and enhanced
interoperability to a substantial degree. To ensure effective functionality of BMD and serve the ever-growing necessity of maintaining the security
alliance, Japan has made substantial efforts, leading to a seemingly excessive degree of military integration. First, with the revision of the U.S.-Japan
Roadmap for Realignment Implementation in 2006, the limitation on the number of annual joint military training and exercises was eliminated,

In terms of
increasing the number of joint exercises. This goes in tandem with widening and deepening consultations and coordination.

BMD, the strategy is now almost jointly planned, consulted, and implemented if
necessary. While the so-called two-plus-two meeting (where the defense and foreign affairs ministers from each country meet) has long a major
platform for the alliance, now military official-level meeting occurs regularly. Within the framework of the Alliance Coordination Group (ACG), director
general, director, and action officer-level meetings take place for military policy coordination. This possible after Japan established its own National
Security Council with a similar structure to the U.S. NSC. The underlying legal framework to share classified information was strengthened through
Japan’s Secrecy Law, substantially increasing the punishment for leaking classified information. There are various consultation forums under the two-
plus-two framework — such as the Security Subcommittee, Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation and Japan-U.S. Joint Committee — which are
responsible for planning a strategy and its implementation with a particular focus on North Korea and BMD. Now the two militaries even have a
physical platform to consult on a daily basis with the establishment of the Bilateral and Joint Operations Coordination Center at Yokota Air Base for the
purpose of enhancing interoperability regarding air defense and BMD through sharing information between the headquarters of the Japan Self-Defense

There have been a variety of developments and frameworks to

Forces (JSDF) and the U.S. forces.

enhance interoperability specifically in terms of BMD. Most notably, Japan recently enacted legislation to allow
the right of collective self-defense, which includes 10 provisions in the existing legal framework of the JSDF. The most significant part is arguably the
addition of the JSDF’s mission to “take necessary measures to destroy ballistic missiles” headed for Japan’s allies as well as the protection of U.S.
military equipment such as Navy vessels. These changes suggest Japan’s readiness to address a missile attack directed toward U.S. military bases in
Guam and elsewhere. Furthermore, the decision to intercept missile is not unilaterally made by Japan, as the provision states “when the request is

It is no
made by the armed forces of the United States.” This was also confirmed by former Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera.

longer easy to tell the difference between the two militaries regarding BMD, apart from
the flag. Japan even repairs and maintains the U.S. military equipment within Japan . At the
same time, Japan and the United States jointly develop and use some of the core BMD equipment such as Standard Missile 3 Block IIA (SAM-IIA). Japan

recently announced that Aegis destroyers will be equipped with the so-called Cooperative
Engagement Capability by 2020, which makes it possible to share information
simultaneously with the U.S. sensor and radar network. A Nikkei Asian report says that “CEC will be central to
the plans for integrated air-and-missile defense capabilities that the Defense Ministry is drawing up.” This further blurs the

distinction between Japan and the U.S. military regarding BMD. Japan’s adherence to BMD is seemingly
deep-rooted in Japanese policymakers’ minds. Concerned by the absence of any effective defense mechanism against long-range missiles, Japanese
policymakers have a history of convincing the Ministry of Finance to squeeze out a substantial sum – even in the midst of the long-term economic
recession. The JSDF in general has faced severe difficulty legitimizing itself due to Japan’s pacifist constitution. The JSDF has thus long been the target of
budget reductions. Amid a long-term economic recession, the budget battle has continued to this day, as seen in the recent tussling over the new
fighter jet project. However, BMD proves an exception to this rule, given Japan’s expected purchase of Aegis Ashore for $5.4 billion. The BMD budget
has virtually never been reduced, even when the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was the ruling party (2009-2012) and had the principal objective of
reducing the government’s expenses. Another reason for the aggressive pursuit of BMD, at least in the eyes of hawkish lawmakers, is the system’s
substantial impact on the constraints on Japanese security. As Christopher, W. Hughes argues, “BMD has challenged four key anti-militaristic principles
— the non-exercise of collective self-defense, the non-military use of space, the ban on the export of weapons technology, and strict civilian control of
the military.” It goes without saying that developing BMD simultaneously contributes to “burden-sharing” as an effective mechanism to maintain the

The nature of BMD structure between the United States and Japan – namely,
U.S.-Japan alliance.

Japan’s reliance on the United States – will not change as long as Washington possesses
critical components such as early warning satellites. While there was an initiative to
develop Japan’s own early warning satellite, only technological research had been
conducted with a budget of merely 6 million yen. Given the U.S. defense spending on
BMD, its technological progress far exceeds that of Japan, and the chances of Japan possessing even an
equivalent level of technology are probably slim to none. This is not only about the budget but also Japan’s absence of technological cooperation with
the United States in this area, probably due to the U.S. intention to maintain technological bargaining power. The Japanese legislation to allow the right
of collective self-defense, is tantamount to admitting that any danger for the U.S. military forces around Japan is a danger for Japan’s national security.

Too much integration between the U.S.-Japan military, in the end, resulted in the
inclusion of the United States as part of Japan’s self-defense mandate. Looking at the significant
development of Japan’s defense capability and efforts to maintain the U.S. alliance, with the cruciality of BMD as a major defense system for Tokyo,
there is no turning back now for Japan. This suggests that policymakers in Japan may seek a “threat” to justify the military spending on BMD in the

Japan’s clinging
future – whether that is China or Russia, or possibly continues to be North Korea, despite the recent thaw on the peninsula.

to BMD will have a destabilizing impact on the Asia-Pacific as this behavior unnecessarily
agitates China. U.S.-Japan military relations have been highly integrated and
intertwined, meaning that Japan’s security policy risks being in flux depending on U.S.
initiatives. This situation is all the more uncertain under the Trump administration.
Japan may need to seek a way out of this incremental integration.
With the advent of Aegis Ashore, Japan just looks more to the United States to
supply them with weapons and defend them instead of trying to establish their
own defense infrastructure. Japan will become aggressive and try to entrap the
US into a war with China or North Korea
Doug Bandow, 10-29-2017, "Time to Let Japan Be a Regular Military Power," Cato
Institute, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-let-japan-be-
regular-military-power, accessed 7-9-2019 (Kent Denver--EA)
Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former Special
Assistant to President Ronald Reagan.
The Japanese people don’t much like Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. In fact, a majority of them
want someone else as premier. Yet his coalition just retained its two-thirds majority in snap
parliamentary elections. He should use his reinforced authority to end his nation’s defense
dependence on America. More than seventy years after World War II, that conflict still
burdens Japan, limiting its role in the world. But an increasingly aggressive China and
threatening North Korea caused Tokyo to adopt a more active foreign and defense
policy. Nevertheless, the U.S.-imposed “peace constitution” still constrains Tokyo. Indeed, by
its literal terms Article Nine forbids possession of a military. However, the breakdown of
the wartime alliance with the Soviet Union and creation of the People’s Republic of
China caused Washington to flip-flop and favor a rearmed Japan. Japanese policymakers
relied on creative constitutional interpretation to establish a “Self-Defense Force.” Still,
Tokyo relied on its constitution as well as popular revulsion to war to both cap military outlays
and restrict the SDF’s role—which, conveniently, helped ensure continued American protection.
Japan’s neighbors, many of which suffered under Tokyo’s brutal wartime occupation,
were happy to have Washington forestall full Japanese rearmament. America served as
the “cap in the bottle,” famously said Marine Corps Gen. Henry Stackpole. Japan was not
without friends, such as Taiwan, but South Korea, Philippines, China and Australia were
particularly antagonistic to an expanded security role for Japan. Moreover, in the last two
decades Tokyo’s economic difficulties much increase in military—sorry, SDF—outlays. Even so,
Tokyo created competent armed forces. Outlays were close to $50 billion last year.
While Japan’s army is small, its air force and navy are capable and modern . Still,
potential threats outrange existing resources. The PRC has sprinted past Japan and now
spends upwards of four times as much on the military. Moreover, Beijing possesses a
modest nuclear arsenal. Although in a war between the two Japan would be no pushover, its
defense outlays have remained roughly constant in real terms, ensuring a growing bilateral gap.
Warned Jeff Kingston of Temple University in Tokyo: “There is right now a one-sided arms
race that China is winning.” (Without irony, China Daily USA editorialized against the
“bellicose Abe” for increasing military outlays even though Japan “certainly doesn’t need such
military equipment for national security.”) North Korea adds another challenge. Although
Pyongyang’s conventional forces have little reach beyond the Korean Peninsula, the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea possesses a nascent nuclear capacity as well as
chemical and likely biological weapons. Missiles make Japan a possible target as an ally
of the United States or victim of extortion. The worsening security environment creates
increasing pressure on Tokyo to do more. Since becoming premier in late 2012, Abe has
pushed his country into a more active role. He proposed increased military outlays,
acquisition of new weapons and broader SDF responsibilities. The military is particularly
interested in adding Aegis Ashore missile defense systems, Tomahawk cruise missiles
and F-35 fighters. In 2014 the Abe government changed its interpretation of Article Nine
to allow a limited form of “collective security,” including assisting American personnel under
attack. Tokyo followed with legislation and revised Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense
Cooperation the following year. These changes, though controversial, were modest. Although
collective self-defense finally is considered legitimate under the constitution, such
action is authorized only under extremely narrow circumstances. Japan’s Professor
Narushige Michishita observed that the new rules would not allow Japan to defend a U.S. ship if
Japan’s security was not directly threatened. Moreover, the government failed to move forward
with its plan to revise Article Nine. The failure to do so limits his military options. Argued Indiana
University’s Adam P. Liff: “Without formal constitutional revision (at a minimum), however,
more ambitious efforts to fundamentally transform Article 9’s interpretation or the scope of
scenarios in which Japan can use force overseas are unlikely without major domestic political
realignments.” Abe pushed for such a change by running against North Korea, playing on voters’
fears. With his newly enhanced election mandate, he may move further and faster on security
issues. Liff noted that “Strategic and domestic political vicissitudes have been the major drivers
of changing interpretations of Article 9.” Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera indicated that
the government is considering revising military guidelines to acquire and use weapons,
such as cruise missiles, capable of hitting foreign bases. The government also is likely to
revive proposals to amend the constitution. There even is some support among elites to
consider the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Still, opposition to such changes remains fierce. In
fact, Abe’s coalition partner, the Komeito Party, has been reluctant to join his effort. The
Finance Ministry pointed to the government’s massive debt in opposing accelerated
military spending. The prime minister’s effort to change the constitution diminished his poll
ratings, before Kim Jong-un’s misbehavior helped revive them. Popular sentiment has been
shifting, but perhaps not enough. “The Japanese public is still not so sure about this,”
observed Richard Samuels of MIT’s Center for International Studies. Moreover, loosening
constitutional restrictions would not be enough. The government would have to accept more
cost and risk by adjusting its force structure and foreign policy accordingly. And dramatic change
remains unlikely. The Abe government has been hedging, perhaps feeling greater uncertainty
over Washington’s continued security commitment. But Tokyo does not want to take over
responsibility for its defense. Indeed, Yoichi Funabashi of the Asia Pacific Initiative warned
that doing more might “induce or tempt the United States to lessen U.S. commitments to
Japan’s defense.” In contrast, Abe’s government is pushing for an ever-stronger U.S.
commitment. One unnamed foreign-ministry official said: “The strategic environment is
becoming harsher and we need to discuss how we will respond to that” (emphasis added).
Which primarily means Washington. “We will look for the U.S. to reaffirm its defense
commitment, including the nuclear deterrent,” declared Onodera as American and
Japanese ministers met: “In light of the threat of North Korea, [they] confirmed the
importance of the unwavering U.S. commitment to extended deterrence.” Washington
reciprocates such sentiments. The joint statement of the August meeting of the U.S.-Japan
Security Consultative Committee confirmed the ministers’ “shared intent to develop specific
measures and actions to further strengthen the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” including
“maintaining a robust U.S. force presence in Japan.” At the time Secretary Tillerson
explained that the two countries “stressed the critical role that U.S. extended deterrence plays
in ensuring the security of Japan, as well as the peace and stability of the Asia Pacific region.”
While working to increase America’s entanglement, Japan is pushing an aggressive
international response to the North. Foreign Minister Taro Kono said there “should be no
dialogue” absent a North Korean demonstration of “a clear intent with regard to
denuclearization.” Abe advocated applying “an unprecedented higher level of pressure on North
Korea to force it to change policy.” He said countries should unite to deny the North access to
“the goods, funds, people and technology for nuclear and missile development.” What is
needed, he added, “is not dialogue, but pressure,” and even backed the Washington mantra
that “all options” are on the table, meaning war. In advocating such aggressive policies, it
would seem appropriate for Japan to possess commensurate military capabilities.
However, Narushige Michishita of Japan’s National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies worried
that “defense is all about hedging risk and if you seek perfect defense, the cost would be
enormous.” From Tokyo’s perspective, why pay the bill when you can hand it off to
Washington? Tokyo’s strategy is good for Japan, not America. Yet U.S. officials enjoy playing
hegemony even as the American people pay the bill. Donald Trump once took a different
perspective. Two years ago Trump, when asked about China’s threat to the region, observed, “If
we step back, [America’s allies] will protect themselves very well.” He asked: “Why are we
defending them at all?” Since then, however, he has turned into his predecessors, including the
hated Barack Obama. Of course, some argue that the United States occupies East Asia for
its own security. That was the case at the end of World War II. But the Cold War is over, Russia
is a shadow of the Soviet Union and Japan has recovered economically. Tokyo is well able to
defend itself, as well as cooperate with its neighbors to ensure regional security. Some analysts
look beyond Japan. Argued David Feith of the Wall Street Journal: America’s fifty thousand
personnel in Japan are “Washington’s most valuable asset for deterring conflict across the
region.” Others make the same claim, but never offer any convincing support. What war are U.S.
troops supposedly preventing? China and Japan, though at odds over the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands, don’t appear to be at the brink of war. Could conflict erupt? Anything is possible, but
there’s still no reason why wealthy Japan should not do the deterring. The Marine
Expeditionary Force based on Okinawa is directed more at a Korean than a China-Japan war, and
Seoul should provide the cannon fodder for any war there. Even more so, Washington should
avoid a China-Taiwan confrontation: Taipei is a good friend, but not worth conflict with a
nuclear-armed great power. Better to arm than defend the island nation. Beyond these major
contingencies are smaller potential conflicts in which the United States should stay entirely
clear: some mix of wars/strife/collapse involving Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam,
Indonesia, Malaysia and perhaps others. While such contingencies would be tragic and might be
destabilizing, none would involve America’s vital interests and justify military intervention. Not
every problem is America’s to solve. Tokyo should take over its own defense. But shifting
responsibility for Japan’s conventional defense is not enough. The United States should
reconsider its nuclear umbrella as well. In defending Japan, Washington already is risking Los
Angeles to protect Tokyo. If North Korea acquires the ability to hit the U.S. homeland, Uncle Sam
will be doing the same again, only against a potentially more reckless power. Obviously,
Washington expects the threat of retaliation to deter attack. But if deterrence fails, as it often
has in history, then war could invade the American homeland. And there’s no good reason to
take that risk given Japan’s capability to arm itself. The Japanese people might be reluctant to go
nuclear, but they can underinvest in defense with little ill consequence only so long as
Washington is willing to impose the cost on the American people. If the Japanese realized they
had to do more or live (and potentially die) with the consequences, they might act differently.
Unfortunately, American officials have forgotten the purpose of alliances: defense, not welfare.
Washington should enter into security pacts to help protect America, not other states. After
World War II, the United States properly shielded friendly states from attack by a totalitarian
power. That strategy succeeded—decades ago. Washington should adjust its foreign policy and
force structure accordingly. Now America’s prosperous and populous allies can take over. The
United States should cooperate with them when interests coincide, and watch for possible
hegemonic threats which they could not contain. Americans no longer should do what other
countries can do for themselves. Then U.S. officials could stop telling Tokyo what to do. The
Japanese people should decide on defense and foreign policies to advance their own interest,
not satisfy America’s demands. Washington should simply explain what it would, and most
importantly, would not do. That would mean no security guarantee, no troop deployments, no
promise of war on Japan’s behalf. Washington has spent more than seven decades playing
globocop. The world has changed. So should U.S. policy—including toward Japan. Prime
Minister Abe appears determined to make Japan a more capable security dependent of
America. Washington should insist that he make his nation security independent.
 Deterrence DA
BMDs are not uniquely k2 U.S-Japan Alliance-Under the Nuclear Umbrella Japan
has no incentive to proliferate
Masakatsu Ota, 11-14-2017, "Conceptual Twist of Japanese Nuclear Policy: Its
Ambivalence and Coherence Under the US Umbrella," Taylor & Francis,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2018.1459286,
accessed 7-15-2019 (Kent Denver--EA)

the u.s. extended nuclear deterrent to japan and japan’s nuclear policy The U.S.
extended nuclear deterrent is the supreme guarantor of Japan’s security and a central
component of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Japan’s protection under the U.S. extended nuclear
deterrent has assured Tokyo when China and North Korea have engaged in provocative actions
that threatened Japan’s security. Moreover, the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent has been a
key factor in dissuading Japan from developing its own nuclear weapons capability ,
which it has considered on several occasions since the end of World War II. Moving
forward, the importance of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent to Japan will be crucial
in assuring Tokyo and deterring adversaries. While the unique value of nuclear
deterrence is irreplacable, the integration and expansion of advanced conventional
weapons into the U.S.-Japan alliance can complement the U.S. extended nuclear
deterrent. As the only state to be the victim of nuclear weapons use, Japan adopted anti-
nuclear policies at the end of World War II. While the constitution does not explicitly
mention nuclear weapons, it is widely interpreted as prohibiting their development.
Moreover, in 1967, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato announced the “Three No’s,” renouncing the
manufacture, possession, or introduction of nuclear weapons in Japan. Sato later changed the
three “no’s” to the four pillars of nuclear policy: “1) promotion of the peaceful use of
nuclear energy; 2) efforts toward global nuclear disarmament; 3) reliance and
dependence on U.S. extended deterrence, based on the 1960 Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security; and 4) support for the three non-nuclear principles under the
circumstances where Japan’s national security is guaranteed by the other three
policies.”8 During the Cold War, the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent was used in part to project
power in the Asia-Pacific, in the face of the Soviet threat. Tokyo’s willingness to allow
deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on Japanese territory demonstrated the Japanese
government’s historically conflicted attitude towards nuclear policy matters. The U.S. military
forward deployed nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon components on the U.S.-
occupied islands of Iwo Jima, Chichi Jima, and Okinawa, where it also deployed strategic
bombers.9 Additionally, the U.S. military stored nuclear bombs (without their fissile cores)
at several Japanese airbases. U.S. aircraft carriers and strategic bombers with nuclear
weapons onboard were occasionally stationed at Japanese ports and air bases for short periods
of time.10 During the mid-1960s, the United States withdrew nuclear weapons and components
from Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima. In 1972, Okinawa reverted to Japanese rule, and all nuclear
weapons were removed to comply with Japan’s “no introduction” policy. Though stationing of
nuclear weapons on the U.S.-occupied islands did not violate the constitution or Sato’s three
no’s, the legality of the U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons systems at air bases or port
facilities on the Japanese mainland is less clear. While not confirmed by either state, it is
widely believed that in the 1960s the United States and Japan concluded two
agreements on nuclear weapons policy. The first allowed U.S. ships and aircraft carrying
nuclear weapons to transit Japanese territory. The second secret deal, completed in 1969,
allowed for deployment of nuclear weapons to Okinawa even after its return to Japanese rule in
1972.11 With the end of the Cold War, the United States withdrew all nuclear weapons from
naval surface vessels and general-purpose submarines. However, the U.S. government has
argued that its extended nuclear deterrent to Japan remains strong.12 Today, as noted in the
2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the United States relies on its intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bomber
force for deterrence, in addition to its ability to redeploy advanced conventional weapons,
deterrence and the u.s.-japan alliance 5 tactical nuclear forces in the event of a crisis.13 Since
2003, the U.S. Air Force has rotated nuclear capable B-52 and B-2 aircraft from the continental
United States to Guam as part of a “continuous presence mission.”14 The United States has
periodically flown these unarmed aircraft in the Asia-Pacific region to signal its
commitment to its allies. One such flight occurred in November 2013, when the U.S. Air
Force, without prior notice, flew unarmed B-52 bombers over the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands following China’s declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) which
extends over the islands. As the U.S. military has altered its deployment of nuclear weapons and
delivery systems in Asia, Japan has expressed particular concern over the retirement of the
Tomahawk Land Attack Missile-Nuclear variant (TLAM-N), a nuclear-tipped cruise missile
deployed on Los Angeles-class attack submarines during the Cold War. Under the 1991-92
“presidential nuclear initiatives,” a set of reciprocal unilateral nuclear arms reduction steps
taken by the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia, TLAM-N was removed from
deployment, but remained in storage at the U.S. Strategic Weapons Facility, Pacific, in Bangor,
Washington and the U.S. Strategic Weapons Facility, Atlantic in Kings Bay, Georgia.15 Many
Japanese officials argued that, though the system was not deployed, it still provided a
visible symbol of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent to Japan, analogous to the role of
the B61 tactical nuclear bomb in NATO. The 2010 NPR formally announced the
retirement of the TLAM-N, and though the decision reportedly raised concern on the
part of a number of Japanese officials, the Japanese government ultimately did not
protest. Outside of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent, Japan maintains one of the world’s
largest atomic energy programs, considered by many to be a strategic hedge. Prior to the 2011
Fukishima disaster, Japan received around 30 percent of its electricity from nuclear power.
While Japan has idled its reactors in response to Fukishima, it hopes to maintain a
robust nuclear energy program. In contrast to most other non-nuclear weapon states
with large nuclear energy programs, Japan has both uranium enrichment and
reprocessing capabilities, as well as vast stocks of separated reactor-grade plutonium
that could be used in nuclear weapons.16 Right-wing Japanese officials have referred to the
large stocks of weapons-usable plutonium as a deterrent, and some states, including South
Korea and China, have expressed concern that Japan is allowed to possess weapons-usable
materials. Japan maintains policy restrictions on nuclear energy. Japan’s 1955 Atomic Basic
Energy Law states that “The research, development, and utilization of nuclear energy shall be
limited to peaceful purposes, shall aim at ensuring safety, and shall be performed independently
under democratic administration, and the results obtained shall be made public so as to actively
contribute to international cooperation.”17 In 2012, this article was amended to add
“national security” as a justification for preserving a civil nuclear energy program.
Responses to the amendment are varied. Some Japanese officials argue that the
addition of “national security” does not conflict with the commitment to only pursue
nuclear energy for peaceful reasons. Others are more skeptical, claiming that this change
directly conflicts with the constitution.18 If Japan were to decide to pursue an indigenous
nuclear weapons capability, some estimates suggest that it could create a nuclear weapon in
two years.19 Given this, Japan’s nuclear energy program is considered by some to be a hedge
against potential security threats. This hedge is supplemented by Japan’s investment in space-
launch vehicles (SLVs), including the H-11 and Epilson-1, which were developed for Japan’s civil
space program.20 The technology of SLVs is very similar to that of ballistic missiles, and SLVs
could be modified to deliver nuclear weapons. Additionally, Japan has secretly debated the
utility of an indigenous nuclear weapons capability on several occasions, though each time it
concluded that the U.S. extended deterrent was robust enough to meet Tokyo’s security needs.
At the same time that Sato advanced conventional weapons, deterrence and the u.s.-japan
alliance 6 was introducing the “three non-nuclear principles,” he was conducting a secret
internal review of the utility of acquiring nuclear weapons. In 1968, Sato’s Cabinet Information
Research Office commissioned a study on the costs and benefits of nuclear weapons acquisition,
which came to be known as the 1968/1970 Internal Report. When the report was leaked to the
press in 1994, the reaction was overwhelmingly negative. Powerful media sources, such as Asahi
Shimbun, claimed that Japan’s nuclear policy was two-faced: renouncing nuclear weapons
production in public, while privately considering their utility.21 In the early 1990s, international
concern over North Korea’s nascent nuclear weapons programs increased. In 1995, Japan
concluded a second internal report on the utility of nuclear weapons, which was made public by
a prominent Japanese newspaper in 2003. The report concluded that the development of
nuclear weapons would ultimately be too costly for Japan, due to its potential to spark a
regional arms race in Asia.22 Although Japan could acquire an indigenous nuclear weapons
capability fairly quickly, and has contemplated doing so, it remains unlikely that Japan will
decide to develop such a capability. Because of the harrowing legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
public opinion is vehemently anti-nuclear. Instead, Japan is investing in conventional
capabilities, which are better suited to the current environment, to enhance Tokyo’s security
and bolster the U.S.-Japan alliance.
 Assurance DA
The United states-Japan alliance should exercise troop presence and not have
missile defense as a bargaining chip
CSIS October 2018 (CSIS, More Important than Ever Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for
the 21st Century, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/181003_MorethanEver_WEB_revised.pdf )

The United States and Japan share the goal that North Korea should abandon
permanently and irreversibly all of its nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other
weapons of mass destruction. Despite the recent summit diplomacy with the United
States and South Korea, North Korea’s nuclear weapons and spectrum of ballistic
missiles remain an extant threat to the security of all three allies. Regardless of the
direction of future talks between the United States and North Korea, or between the two
Koreas, proactive and regularized trilateral policy coordination among Washington,
Tokyo, and Seoul at the most senior levels of government will ensure more effective
diplomacy and protect the interests of all three allies. Pyongyang seeks to break these
alliances, so we should endeavor to demonstrate that they remain strong politically and
capable militarily.

To better prepare for contingencies, bilateral defense cooperation between Japan and
South Korea should focus on improving information sharing and servicing of military
equipment, which also strengthens each country’s bilateral alliance with the United
States. The three allies should expand trilateral exercises to counter North Korea’s
nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and proliferation threats. Most important, if the
negotiations with North Korea go forward into uncharted territory, including a possible
peace treaty, it will be critical that the United States, Japan, and South Korea maintain a
united position and avoid sacrificing any core alliance equities. Exercises, troop
presence, and missile defense should not be bargaining chips for unverifiable and
incomplete denuclearization promises from the North because this, in the end, will not
make the United States, Japan, or South Korea more secure.

9) Launch a Regional Infrastructure Fund

Perhaps the greatest regional challenge for the United States and Japan is China’s
growing political and economic influence throughout the Indo-Pacific region. In particular,
China’s Belt and Road Initiative is providing Beijing with substantial leverage, particularly
over smaller states in Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific Islands. The
fact is that Asia needs much more investment in infrastructure, and business is by its
nature competitive, but the competition must be open and rules-based. China’s
investment in regional infrastructure is often welcome, but the coercive political and
economic leverage it is creating—and sometimes using—is not. The U.S.-Japan alliance
must demonstrate that it can present an attractive alternative. American and Japanese
support for open societies—functioning legislative bodies, good governance, and a free
press—will help to ensure that states in the region are free to choose infrastructure
investments in an open and non-coercive environment. In doing so, the United States
and Japan should not seek to match the scope or scale of China’s investments—
variously advertised as $1 trillion to $8 trillion. After all, the allies’ foreign direct
investment in the region is substantial, but it is primarily driven by private companies and
commercial logic, which is only partly true of China’s approach.

For the greatest impact, the United States and Japan should choose to invest in the
most attractive projects and partners in the region. Regional players want investment,
but they also want to avoid debt traps, corruption, and coercion. Therefore, the allies’
commitment to high-standard investments, employment of local labor, social and
environmental safeguards, open procurement practices, and consistent return on

10 | More Important than Ever: Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century

investment will remain attractive. The allies should promote these high standards by
utilizing and investing in existing multilateral institutions—such as the World Bank, Asian
Development Bank (ADB), and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)—where the
United States and Japan retain disproportionate influence. One option for demonstrating
this value would be to launch a regional fund for infrastructure and capacity building,
which would allow the United States, Japan, and others to better coordinate and target
their respective investments throughout the Indo-Pacific. Key partners in such an
endeavor should include Australia, South Korea, India, and New Zealand, among others.

U.S-Japanese relations are resilient – not even Trump could mess them up, the
strategic value is too high
James Carafano, 9-2-2018, James Jay Carafano is a leading expert in national security and foreign policy
challenges. "Why the Japan-America Alliance Works," Heritage Foundation,
https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/why-the-japan-america-alliance-works//DeepStateSisco

There are still ups and down, though assessments that the Trump-Abe “bromance” is over are way
overblown.

The Japanese government expressed serious concerns after Trump’s meeting in Singapore with
North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un on June 12, 2018, fearing the United States would compromise too much, too
quickly. Those concerns have largely subsided.

The Japanese were also wary about U.S. trade, particularly Trump’s refusal of the Transpacific
Trade Partnership (TPP) and the White House tariff policies. On the other hand, Tokyo viewed
progress on U.S. trade negotiations with Mexico and Canada as a promising sign. They are
starting to think Trump could well win his trade war with China. Tokyo now thinks that through the U.S.-Japan
Economic Dialogue, in the long-run, the two countries will find a path forward for pro-growth policies for both nations.

Today, the U.S.-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of the effort sustain a free and open Indo-
Pacific in the face of disruptive Chinese expansion. The just-released annual Defense of Japan
white paper (2018) concluded that strengthening the alliance is “more important than ever.”
Critics looking for evidence that the U.S. is withdrawing from the world stage or doesn’t value
allies, trade, partnerships and institutions will need to look elsewhere. The state of the
Japanese-U.S. relationship suggests just the opposite.
This may be bigger than Trump. The two nations have forged bonds beyond those of just allies. Maybe Trump just knows a good thing when sees it.