STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DOCTRINES such is incongruent with the clear language of the law.
such is incongruent with the clear language of the law. To insist on such ruling, no matter how practical and noble, would
Construction, defined
Caltex v. Palomar
 Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and the intention of the authors of the law
with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the
fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
Legislative Intent/Ratio Legis – Dura Lex Sed Lex – when the law is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for interpretation/Plain
Meaning Rule/Spirit and Purpose of Law
RCBC v. IAC
 When the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. Only when
the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court interpret or construe its true intent. A statute is ambiguous if it
is admissible of two or more possible meanings, in which case, the Court is called upon to exercise one of its judicial
functions, which is to interpret the law according to its true intent.
Regalado v. Yulo
 The intent of the Legislature is to be ascertained and enforced is the intent expressed in the words of the statute. The
courts cannot assume some purpose in no way expressed and then construe the statute to accomplish this supposed
intention.
Matabuena v. Cervantes
 The principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written;
whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedial by an
adherence to its avowed objective.
Del Mar v. Pagcor
 In the interpretation of statutes, it is not proper or permissible to inquire into the motives which influenced the legislative
body, except insofar as such motives are disclosed by the statute itself.
Cecilleville Realty and Service Corp. v. Court of Appeals
 Where the law is unambiguous and clear, it must be applied according to its plain and obvious meaning, according to its
express terms.
Ursua v. Court of Appeals
 There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a
construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,
indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences.
Garcia v. Social Security Commission Legal and Collection
 The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines construction of a provision of law – it is a cardinal rule in statutory
construction that in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used in the law, a careful review of the whole law
involved, as well as the intendment of the law, must be made.
Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
 If the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. The proper interpretation of a
constitutional provision depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than the framers’
understanding thereof.
Ut res magis valeat quam pereat
JMM Promotions and Management Inc., v. NLRC
 In interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part be given effect. Construction that would render a provision
inoperative should be avoided and inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of the
harmonious whole.
Wisdom/Practicality of Law
RCBC v. IAC
 The holding that suspension of actions for claims against a corporation under rehabilitation takes effect as soon as the
application or a petition for rehabilitation is filed with the SEC – may, to some, be more logical and wise but unfortunately,
be to encroach upon legislative prerogative to define the wisdom of the law – plainly judicial legislation.
Lacson v. Roque, et al.
 Mere silence of the statute with respect to notice and hearing will not justify the removal of such an officer without
knowledge of the charges and an opportunity to be heard.
Quintos v. Lacson, et al.
 As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, it is the duty of the courts to interpret and apply them
regardless of whether or not they are wise and salutary. If the law is deemed unwise and detrimental to the discipline and
efficiency of public officers, proper representations and requests may be made to the Legislature.
Executive/Administrative Interpretation
UP v. Court of Appeals
 The previous uncontested acts of the Civil Service authorities in endorsing to the University for action the administrative
cases of Hospital employees Fernandez and Gorospe, and declaring that “the Bureau had no disciplinary jurisdiction over
said employees in view of the provisions of the University charter,” constitutes contemporary interpretation of highly
persuasive character.
Enrique v. Court of Appeals
 Great weight accorded to interpretation or construction of a statute by the government agency called upon to implement
the same.
Literal Interpretation
Bello v. CA
 This Court has cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the purpose of the legislator and stressed that
it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such deplorable result (of injustice or absurdity) and
that therefore a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. In the construction of
its own Rules of Court, this Court is all the more so bound to liberally construe them to avoid injustice, discrimination and
unfairness and to supply the void – that is certainly within the spirit and purpose of the Rule to eliminate repugnancy and
inconsistency.
Salaria v. Buenviaje
 Construction by Executive Branch of government of a particular law although not binding upon courts must be given weight
as the construction comes from that branch of government called upon to implement the law.
Valid in part, void in part
Barrameda v. Moir
 The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid
portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced.
Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy
 A separability clause states that if for any reason, any section or provision of the statute is held to be unconstitutional or
(invalid), the other section(s) or provision(s) of the law shall not be affected thereby. It is a legislative expression of intent
that the nullity of one provision shall not invalidate the other provisions of the act. Such a clause is not, however,
controlling and the courts may, in spite of it, invalidate the whole statute where what is left, after the void part, is complete
and workable.
Ambiguity, construed against party who caused it
Reyes v. dela Cruz
 If there is any ambiguity or obscurity in the interpretation and meaning of a contract, the same shall not favour the party
who cause such ambiguity or obscurity.
Ildefonso v. Sibal
 Agreements must be construed according to the intention of the parties.
Qua Chee Gan v. Law Union and Rock Insurance Company Ltd.
  The contract of insurance is one of perfect good faith not for the insured alone, but equally so for the insurer; in fact, it is more so for the latter, since its dominant Mutuc v. COMELEC
bargaining position carries with it stricter responsibility, By reason of the exclusive control of the insurance company over the terms and phraseology of the  Under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to
insurance contract, the ambiguity must be strictly interpreted against the insurer and liberally in favour of the injured, especially to avoid a forfeiture.
things of the same kind or class as those specificially referred to.
Baylon v. Court of Appeals
Statement of Individual Legislator
 If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of
Casco Phil. Chemical Co. v. Gimenez
its stipulation shall control.
 Individual statements made by Senators on the floor of the Senate do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much
less do they indicate the intent of the House of Representatives.
Law does not distinguish, Courts should not distinguish
Colgate Palmolive Phil., Inc. v. Gimenez
Manila Jockey Club Inc. v. Games and Amusement Board
 General terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the general language will be limited by specific
 In the interpretation of a legal document, especially a statute, unlike in the interpretation of an ordinary written document,
language which indicates the statute’s object and purpose. The rule is applicable only to cases where, except for one
it is not enough to obtain information as to the intention or meaning of the author or authors, but also to see whether the
general term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class.
intention or meaning has been expressed in such a way as to give it legal effect and validity. The legal act, so to speak, is
 Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.
made up of two elements – an internal and an external one; it originates in intention and is perfected by expression. Failure
 The rule of construction, that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular recitals, when used in
of the latter may defeat the former.
connection with them, does not require the rejection of the general term entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in
ascertaining the legislative intent and is to be considered in connection with other rules of construction.
Noscitur a sociis
Nagtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.
Phil. British Assurance Co. v. IAC
 Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or pharse should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of,
 There should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated. For courts are not authorized to
words with which it is associated, and, since the word “gambling” is associated with “and other prohibited games of
distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but
chance,” under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, the word should be read as referring only to illegal gambling.
as they find it and without regard to consequences.
 A corollary of the principle is the rule that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something
AND/OR
therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it.
Romulo, Mabanta v. Home Development and Mutual Fund
 The term ‘and/or’ means that the effect shall be given to both the conjunctive “and” and the disjunctive “or;” or that one
Mandatory and Directory
word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the other will best effectuate the purpose intended by the legislature
Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre
as gathered from the whole statute. The term is used to avoid a construction which by the use of the disjunctive “or” alone
 The provision in the Local Government Code providing for such release uses the word “shall” and as a rule, the term “shall”
will exclude the combination of several of the alternatives or by the use of the conjunctive “and” will exclude the efficacy of
is a word of command that must be given compulsory meaning.
any one of the alternatives standing alone.” It is accordingly ordinarily held that the intention of the legislature in using the
term “and/or” is that the word “and” and the word “or” are to be used interchangeably.
Marcelino v. Cruz
 Constitutional provisions are directory, and not mandatory, where they refer to matters merely procedural. Retroactivity
Espiritu v. Cipriano
Brehm v. Republic
 Statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings unless such
 Mandatory provisions prevail over directory ones. intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of enactment.
Expressio unius est exclusion alterius Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est
City Government of San Pablo, Laguna v. Reyes People v. Manantan
 It is a basic precept in statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes  The rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly
all others. established.
People v. Moro Macarandang Computation of Time
 “Peace officers” are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. Viray v. CA
 The rule that excludes the last day of a period, should the same be a holiday, refers to the performance of the act
Peope v. Mapa prescribed or required. But it does not apply where at the end of the period no such act is to be done.
 The fact that a person, found in possession of an unlicensed firearm, is a secret agent of a provincial governor does not
exempt him from criminal liability. The law does not contain any exception for a secret agent. Liberal or strict construction
- statement of a rule when there is ambiguity
People v. Santayama - if procedural: liberal
 At the accused’s apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing is enunciated in the case of People v. Macarandang, holding Holographic wills: Ajero v. CA
that the appointment of a civilian as “secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and  Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably
detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a ‘peace officer’ equivalent even to a member of the handwritten by the testator.
municipal police expressly covered by Section 879.” The case of People v. Mapa revoked the doctrine in Macarandang case
only on August 30, 1967. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of the accused’s appointment as Naturalization Laws: Ong Chia v. Republic
secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for possession of the pistol.  It is settled that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against
the applicant.
Ejusdem Generis
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. SSS Labor Statutes: A.L. Ammen v. Borja
 The rule of ejusdem generis applies only when there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent  Labor: liberal construction in favour of labor statutes.
of the lawmaking body would thereby hindered and defeated.
 Tax Exemptions: Esso Standard v. Acting Commissioner of Customs
  Exemption from taxation is not favored. Exemptions in tax statutes are never presumed. Exceptions from taxation are
construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favour of the taxing authority.
Taxation: Manila Railroad v. Collector of Customs
 It is the general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying taxes or duties not to extend their provisions beyond the clear
import of the language used. In every case of doubt, such statutes are construed most strongly against the Government
and in favour of the citizen, because burdens are not to be imposed, nor presumed to be imposed, beyond what the
statutes expressly and clearly import.
Pleadings and Rules: Del Rosario v. Hamoy
 Rules of Court mandates a liberal construction in favour of the rules and pleadings to effect substantial justice.
Domalanta v. CA
 On certain occasions, this Court has allowed liberality in the construction of the rules. The present case, however, does not
warrant such liberality because the decision of respondent CA is satisfactorily supported by the records.
Quibuyen v. CA
 Pleadings, as well as remedial laws, should be construed liberally, in order that the litigants may have ample opportunity to
prove their respective claims, and that a possible denial of substantial justice, due to legal techincalities, may be avoided.
Contracts of Insurance: NPC v. CA
 Contracts of insurance construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer. Thus ambiguity in the
words of an insurance contract should be interpreted in favour of its beneficiary.
Corporation Law: Home Insurance Co. v. Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.
 The objective of the law was to subject the foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of our courts. The Corporation Law must
be given a reasonable, not an unduly harsh, interpretation which does not hamper the development of trade relations and
which fosters friendly commercial intercourse among countries.
Probation: Pablo v. Castillo
 Probation law is not a penal statute and therefore, the principle of liberal interpretation is inapplicable. The Court has
pronounced that the policy of liberality of probation statutes cannot prevail against the categorical provisions of the law.
Retirement Laws: Request of Clerk of Court Tessie L. Gatmaitan
 Retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favour of the retiree.
Interpretation of laws: Buenaseda v. Flavier
 Penal statutes are strictly construed while procedural statutes are liberally construed.
 A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should be liberally construed for the advancement of
the purposes and objectives which it was created.
Interpretation of Peanl Statutes – Retroactivity
U.S. v. Cuna
 Penal laws are to be given retroactive effect only in so far as they favour the defendant charged with a crime or a
misdemeanour, and that, when a penal law is enacted repealing a prior law, such repeal does not have the effect of
relieving the offender in whole or in part of penalties already incurred under the old law, unless the new law favors the
defendant by diminishing the penalty or doing away with it altogether, and then only to the extent to which the new law is
favourable to the offender.
People v. Tamayo
 The doctrine was clearly established that in the Philippines, repeal of a criminal act by its re-enactment, even without a
saving clause, would not destroy criminal liability.
U.S. v. Go Chico
 It is clear from the authorities cited in the Act under consideration that the legislature did not intend that a criminal intent
should be a necessary element of the crime. The statutory definition of the offense embraces no word implying that the
prohibited act shall be done knowingly. The Act means what it says. Nothing is left to interpretation.
U.S. v. Estapia
 All the words of a statute should, when possible, be given some meaning, and when the legislator makes use of words of
limitation, he must be presumed to have intended to limit and restrict, in some way, the word or idea with reference to
which such words of limitation are applied.
State Prosecutors v. Muro
 Judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes effective. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still
inexistent, cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration.
Effects of Repeals and Amendments – General and Special Laws – Implied Repeal
Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty
 Special laws or charters may not be amended, altered, or repealed by a general law, by mere implication.
 Repeal of laws by implication is not favored. The mere repugnancy between two statutes should be very clear in order to
warrant the court in holding that the later in time repeals the former, when it does not in terms purport to do so.
 It is well settled that a special and local statute is not repealed by a subsequent statute unless the intent to repeal or alter it
is manifest, although the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the cases in the special law.
 Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general – the terms of the general broad enough to include
the matter provided for in the special – the fact that one is special and the other general creates a presumption that the
special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general – one as a general law of the land, the other as the law
of a particular case.
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano
 A repealing clause in an Act which provides that “all laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly” is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or
designate the Act or Acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon
the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts. Such being the case, the presumption
against implied repeals and the rule against strict construction regarding implied repeals apply ex proprio vigore.
Almeda v. Florentino
 Repeals by implication are not favored, unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended and courts are duty bound to
adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible.
Sanchez v. Rigos
 In construing different provisions of one and the same law or code, such interpretation should be favored as will reconcile
or harmonize said provisions and avoid a conflict between the same.
 Exceptions are not favored, unless the intention to the contrary is clear.
Mecano v. Commission on Audit
 The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws.
 There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter
are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one.
The second is if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will
operate to repeal the earlier law. Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the two statutes cover
the same subject matter; and both cannot be given effect, that is, that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the
other.
 Lastly, it is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that repeals by statute by implication are not favored. The
presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the
subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.
City of Basilan v. Hechanova
 Whenever there is a conflict of an ordinance with a statute, the former must give way.
Arenas v. City of San Carlos
 The primary purpose of a proviso is to limit the general language of a statute. When there is irreconcilable repugnancy
between the proviso and the body of the statute, the former is given precedence over the latter on the ground that it is the
latest expression of the intent of the legislature.