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MILESTONES: 1937–1945
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https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/atlantic-conf 1/2
2/11/2017 Milestones: 1937–1945 - Office of the Historian
While the meeting was successful in drafting these aims, it failed to produce the desired results for either leader. President Roosevelt had hoped that the
Charter might encourage the American people to back U.S. intervention in World War II on behalf of the Allies; however, public opinion remained adamantly
opposed to such a policy until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Churchill’s primary goal in attending the Atlantic Conference was “to
get the Americans into the war.” Barring that, he hoped that the United States would increase its amount of military aid to Great Britain and warn Japan
against taking any aggressive actions in the Paci c.
Roosevelt, on the other hand, wanted the British Government to a rm publicly that it was not involved in any secret treaties, particularly ones concerning
territorial questions, such as those concluded by the Allies during the First World War concerning the division of enemy territory at war’s end. Roosevelt
also wished to arrange the terms by which Great Britain would repay the United States for its Lend Lease assistance. Roosevelt wanted the British to pay
compensation by dismantling their system of Imperial Preference, which had been established by the British Government during the Great Depression and
was designed to encourage trade within the British Empire by lowering tari rates between members, while maintaining discriminatory tari rates against
outsiders.
Churchill was extremely disappointed by Roosevelt’s refusal to discuss American entry into the war. Furthermore, Churchill understood that several aspects
of the proposed joint declaration might be politically damaging for the Prime Minister. Churchill worried that the abandonment of Imperial Preference
would anger the protectionist wing of his Conservative Party. The Americans also proved unwilling to warn Japan too strongly against any future military
action against British possessions in Southeast Asia. Finally, both Churchill and many members of his Cabinet were alarmed by the third point of the
Charter, which mentions the rights of all peoples to choose their own government. Churchill was concerned that this clause acknowledged the right of
colonial subjects to agitate for decolonization, including those in Great Britain’s empire.
Nevertheless, Churchill realized that the joint declaration was the most he could accomplish during the conference. While the United States would remain
neutral, the declaration would raise the morale of the British public and, most importantly, bind the United States closer to Great Britain. Therefore, when
Churchill forwarded the text of the declaration to his Cabinet on August 11, he warned them that would it be “imprudent” to raise unnecessary di culties.
The Cabinet followed Churchill’s recommendation and approved the Charter.
While the Atlantic Charter of August 1941 was not a binding treaty, it was, nonetheless, signi cant for several reasons. First, it publicly a rmed the sense
of solidarity between the U.S. and Great Britain against Axis aggression. Second, it laid out President Roosevelt’s Wilsonian-vision for the postwar world;
one that would be characterized by freer exchanges of trade, self-determination, disarmament, and collective security. Finally, the Charter ultimately did
serve as an inspiration for colonial subjects throughout the Third World, from Algeria to Vietnam, as they fought for independence.
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/atlantic-conf 2/2