FINAL EXAMS: CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
It alleged that
LAST NA TO!!!!!!!!! PAPASA KA!!!
PROPERTY LAW
(1) Distinguish “Title” under Civil Law from “Title” under
PD 1529.
ANSWER (answer ko lang):
Title under the Civil Law, the law on property in particular,
refers to ownership, which may be exercised over things or
rights, while Title under PD 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, refers to a certificate of title
which merely records or confirms title already existing and
vested. It is broad enough to cover occupation and
possession, while that under PD 1529 pertains only to
evidence or proof of ownership. It may be legal or equitable
title, or interest in the property, under the Civil Law, which
does not apply to that in PD 1529 because title therein
merely refers to an instrument or document proving
ownership as provided by the Civil Code. Registration of
title under PD 1529 is not a mode of acquiring ownership
under the Civil Code.
(2) What are the attributes of ownership?
ANSWER (Tolentino):
The attributes of ownership are (1) jus utendi, (2) jus fruendi,
(3) jus abutendi, (4) jus disponendi, and (5) just vindicandi.
Jus utendi is the right to use and receive from the thing what
it produces. Jus fruendi is the right to the income or fruits
derived from the property. Jus abutendi is the right to
consume the thing by its use. Jus disponendi is the power of
the owner to alienate, encumber, transform, and even destroy
the thing owned. Just vindicandi is the right to exclude from
the possession of the thing owned by any other person to
whom the owner has not transmitted such thing.
What are the fundamental elements in an action to
recover property?
ANSWER (per Atty. Legaspi):
In an action to recover, the fundamental elements are (1) the
property must be identified, and (2) the plaintiff must rely
on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the
defendant’s claim. (Article 434, Civil Code)
Case of Republic v. Rovency Realty and Development Corp.
G.R. No. 190817, January 10, 2018
Martires
Facts: RRDC filed an application for original registration of title
to land with a total land area of 31.8 hectares.
RRDC and its predecessor-in-interest (P.N. Roa Enterprises, Inc.)
have been in open, continuous, adverse, and notorious possession
in the concept of owner since time immemorial, or for more than
thirty (30) years. The Republic opposed contending that RRDC
nor its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
adverse, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in
question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the subject
land exceeds the 12-hectare limit for confirmation of imperfect
title set by Section 47 of CA 141, as amended by RA 6940; and
that the subject land forms part of the public domain belonging to
the Republic and, thus, not subject to private appropriation.
Issues/Questions: (1) Whether RRDC meets the requirements
for original registration of title to land under Section 14 (1) or (2)
of PD 1529.
(2) Whether the prohibition under Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution on 12-hectare limit applies.
Held/Answer:
(1) No. Section 14 of PD 1529 states: Who may apply. The
following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
(now RTC) an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provision of existing laws.
Under Section 14 (1), applicants for registration of title must
sufficiently establish the following requisites:
(1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and
alienable lands of the public domain;
(2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the same; and
(3) that the possession is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 12 June 1945, or earlier.
The property/land must be alienable and disposable at the time of
the filing of the application for registration. To prove, the present
rule is that the application for original registration must be
accompanied by:
(1) a CENRO or PENRO Certification; and
(2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary, and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the
records. RRDC failed to present the second requirement.
As to the second requisite, it has been held that possession is
OPEN when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious, and not
clandestine; it is CONTINUOUS when uninterrupted, unbroken,
and not intermittent or occasional; it is EXCLUSIVE when the
adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land
and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and
NOTORIOUS when it is so conspicuous, that it is generally
known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighbourhood. RRDC did not present any evidence which
would show that its predecessors-in-interest actually exercised
acts of dominion over the subject property even before the cut-off
period.
Consequently, the subject land cannot be registered in the name
of RRDC under Section 14 (1) of PD 1529.
RRDC also failed to establish compliance with the requirements
for registration under Section 14 (2). In Heirs of Malabanan v.
Republic, the declaration of alienability and disposability is not
enough – there must be an express declaration that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. The classification of the land as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not
change its status as property of the public dominion under Article
420 (2) of the Civil Code. As such, said land, although classified
as alienable and disposable, is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
Note: Section 14 (1) mandates registration on the basis of
POSSESSION, while Section 14 (2) entitles registration on the
basis of PRESCRIPTION.
(2) Yes. RRDC failed to establish that when it or P.N. Roa
Enterprises, Inc., also a corporation and its predecessor-in-
interest, acquired the subject land, it had already been converted
to private property, thus, the prohibition on the corporation’s
acquisition of agricultural lands of the public domain under
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution applies.
Art. 414. All things which are or may be the object of
appropriation are considered either:
(1) Immovable or real property; or
(2) Movable or personal property.
Article 415 enumerates immoveable property under the acronym
NIDA or immovable property by NATURE, INCORPORATION,
DESTINATION and ANALOGY or LAW.
Article 416 enumerates things which are deemed to be personal
property. The three tests applied successively to determine
whether an object is movable are:
(1) whether it can be carried from place to place;
(2) whether the change of location can be effected without injury
to an immovable to which the object may be attached, and
(3) whether the object is not included in any of the ten paragraphs
of Article 415. (Tolentino)
REGALIAN DOCTRINE
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.
XPN: Treaty of Paris
Friar Lands
CA 141, SEC. 2
The provision of this Act shall apply to the lands of the public
domain; but timber and mineral lands shall be governed by
special laws and nothing in this Act provided shall be understood
or construed to change or modify the administration and
disposition of the lands commonly called ‘friar lands’ and those
which being privately owned, have reverted to or become the
property of the commonwealth of the PH, which administration
and disposition shall be governed by the laws at present in force
or which may hereafter be enacted.
Private Property
• Quieting of Title (if in possession)
• Recovery with Cancellation
CASES:
Republic v. MIC (laches)
FACTS: Petitioner Republic, represented by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources - Region IV (DENR) filed a
petition before the Court of Appeals for annulment of judgment,
cancellation of title, and reversion against the respondents
including the R egister of Deeds for the Province of Batangas
(Tanauan, Batangas), and the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City.
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
alleges that respondents Marjens and Villanueva appear as
registered owners of a land identified as Lot 1 (LRC) Pcs-943,
which is a portion of Lots 1 and 2, plan Psu-114430 LRC
(G.L.R.O.) Record No. N-3454, with an area of five thousand
(5,000) square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-18592 issued on April 7, 1976 by the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas.
In Land Registration Case No. 52, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 3454, the
then Court of First Instance of Batangas rendered a Decision
dated March 30, 1951 x x x granting the application for
registration of several parcels of land in favor of the applicants
therein, Hammon H. Buck, et al. It was established that the lands
described in Plans Psu-118922 and 114430 were originally
owned by Rita Vda. de Ilustre since 1890.
The OSG among others alleges that the land in question cannot
be the subject of disposition or registration, and the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over said property, much less to decree
the same as private property. Therefore, the registration
proceedings, the judgment in the subject case, the OCT No.
O-669 issued pursuant thereto, and all subsequent titles are null
and void. The land covered by TCT No. T-18592, not having
been legally registered, remains and forms part of the public
domain of the State.
Respondents claim that their titles, their predecessors' titles, and
their mother title are issued in accordance with law, and that the
property was registered and brought under the Torrens system.
Respondents contend that the subject property was already
private property even before the Spanish Crown ceded
sovereignty over the Philippine Islands to the United States of
America. They assert that the government has lost its rights by
laches and estoppel to question the validity of the OCT No.
0-669, the proceedings in LRC Case No. 52, G.L.R.O. Record
No. N-3454, and the corresponding decree (Decree 6610) issued
after almost 50 years have lapsed.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition applying the case
of Cariho v. Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, which
recognized private ownership of lands already possessed or held
by individuals under claim of ownership as far back as testimony
or memory goes and therefore never to have been public land that
Spain could bequeath to the United States of America. Hence,
this case.
ISSUE:(1) Whether or not the subject property covered by TCT
No. T-18592 is a private property or part of the public domain.
HELD: It is a private property.
The records did not categorically state that Rita Vda. de Ilustre
had Spanish title over the subject property. But by virtue of her
long continued, open, public, adverse possession and cultivation
of the property in the concept of owner as against the whole
world she is deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject
property.
As for respondents, it is undisputed that the property covered by
TCT No. T-18592 traces its title to the property originally owned
by Rita Vda. de Ilustre since 1890. From her it passed on to
several hands until it was transferred to Hammon H. Buck, who
successfully registered it in his name on February 18, 1952. From
1890, respondents' predecessors in interest had been in peaceful,
open, continuous, exclusive, adverse, and notorious possession in
the concept of an owner of the subject property including the
p o r t i o n c o v e r e d b y T C T N o . T- 1 8 5 9 2 . F o l l o w i n g
the Cariño ruling, the subject property had been a private land
and excluded from the public domain since 1890 prior to the
signing of the Treaty of Paris on December 10, 1898. Therefore,
it is not part of the public domain that passed on from Spain to
the United States of America.
For the same reason, it is also not part of the unclassified public
forest as petitioner claims. In Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Cosalan,29 the Court held that "[d]espite the general rule that
forest lands cannot be appropriated by private ownership, it has
been previously held that 'while the Government has the right to
classify portions of public land, the primary right of a private
individual who possessed and cultivated the land in good faith
much prior to such classification must be recognized and should
not be prejudiced by after-events which could not have been
anticipated...Government in the first instance may, by reservation,
decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered
forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such
reservation is made'"
The map (LC Map No. 3013), which is the basis of petitioner's
claim, is inexistent at the time Hammon H. Buck was issued an
original certificate of title. Therefore, the subject property had
been a private property before it was classified. Thus, the Court
agrees with the Court of Appeals' findings and upholds the
private character of the subject property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the government is barred by laches
and estoppel.
HELD: YES. Laches has been defined as the "failure or neglect
for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which, by observance of due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the
party entitled to assert his right either has abandoned or declined
to assert it.”
The following elements must be present in order to constitute
laches: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under
whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; (b)
delay in asserting complainant's rights after he had knowledge of
defendant's acts and after he has had the opportunity to sue; (c)
lack of knowledge or notice by defendant that the complainant
will assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (d) injury or
prejudice to the defendant in the event the relief is accorded to
the complainant.
We find it unnecessary to discuss further this issue in view of our
ruling that Decree No. 6610, OCT No. 0-669, and TCT No.
T-18592 registered in the name of respondents were validly
issued.
WHAT CONSTITUTES PUBLIC DOMAIN?
• Public Use
• Patrimonial Property
ART. XII, SEC. 2-3 — Legal Classification over actual use
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision
of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it
may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-
sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned
by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-
five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be
provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water
supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant.
The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its
archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone,
and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of
natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish
farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers
in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms
and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to
the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of
local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered
into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its
execution.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks.
Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified
by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted.
Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not
hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease,
for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand
hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more
than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve
hectares thereof, by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain.
Article 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private
ownership. (338)
Article 420. The following things are property of public
dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks,
shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use,
and are intended for some public service or for the development
of the national wealth. (339a)
Article 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the
character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.
(340a)
Article 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of
the patrimonial property of the State. (341a)
Article 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities
is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property.
(343)
Article 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and
municipalities, consist of the provincial roads, city streets,
municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters,
promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said
provinces, cities, or municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and
shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the
provisions of special laws. (344a)
Article 425. Property of private ownership, besides the
patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities, and
municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private
persons, either individually or collectively. (345a)
ON POINT: Judicial Declaration of Imperfect Title (14.1)
SECTION 14, PD 1529 — those who may apply for
registration
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
1. Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in0interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12,1945, or earlier.
2. Those who have acquired ownership of private land by
prescription under the provision of existing laws.
• sec. 14(1) — Possession & Occupation
• sec. 14(2) — Prescription
• taking possession as to GF 10yrs and BF 30yrs.
See also: Section 48: Judicial Confirmation of Title (CA 141)
SECTION 48. The following-described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have
not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefor, under the Land Registration Act , to wit:
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to
the prior United States have applied for the purchase,
composition or other form of grant of lands of the public domain
under the laws and royal decrees then in force and have instituted
and prosecuted the proceedings in connection therewith, but have
with or without default upon their part, or for any other cause,
not received title therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their
heirs have occupied and cultivated said lands continuously since
the filing of their applications.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture,
whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership
for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in sub-
section (b) hereof.
Re: Possession is at the time of application
To secure title:
- Secretary of DENR
- President
- Legislature
CASE:
Proof: Declarations as valid claim of ownership
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
This case is a resolution of the Motions for Reconsideration, filed
by the parties who both assail the decision of the Court
promulgated on April 29, 2009. In the decision, the Court upheld
the ruling of the Court of Appeals which denied the application of
the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated in
Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite, on the ground that they had
not established by sufficient evidence their right to the
registration in accordance with either section 14 (1) or 14 (2)
of the Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529).
On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an
application for land registration covering the property in the RTC
in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part
of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and
that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and
occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling
him to the judicial confirmation of his title. To prove such,
Malabanan presented during trial a certification issued by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the DENR. The RTC rendered judgment granting
Malabanan’s application for land registration. The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA,
arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property
belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in
possession of the property in the manner and for the length of
time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. The CA
promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the
application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in
Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto), the CA declared that under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of
possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession. Noting that the
CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been
declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982,
Velazco’s possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked
for purposes of computing Malabanan’s period of possession.
DISCUSSION:
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land may be classified as either of public dominion or of private
ownership. It is of public dominion if it: (a) is intended for
public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public
use, and is intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth. Land belonging to the State
that is not of such character, or although of such character but no
longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of
the patrimonial property of the State. Land that is other than
part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and
municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private
individual. Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia),
all lands of the public domain belong to the State. All lands not
appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the
inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to
have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.
Classifications of public lands according to alienability
1935 Constitution: lands of the public domain were classified
into - agricultural, timber and mineral.
Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution: lands of the
public domain were classified into - agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest,
and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might provide
other classifications.
Juridical Persons can be a Petitioner in an Original Petition
CASES:
Republic v. Northern Cement
FACTS: On June 16, 2000, Northern Cement filed with the RTC
an application for the registration of title over the Subject Lot
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529) and to have
the title thereto registered and confirmed under its name
(Application). In its Application, Northern Cement alleged, inter
alia, that: (1) it is the owner in fee simple of the Subject Lot
which it acquired by way of a Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed of
Sale) from the former owner, Rodolfo Chichioco (Chichioco);[9]
(2) the Subject Lot was last assessed at P17,630.00 per Tax
Declaration No. 023-01677;[10] and (3) Northern Cement is
occupying said lot. To support its Application, Northern Cement
offered, inter alia, the following documents: (1) Deed of Sale
dated December 28, 1968[12] executed by Chichioco in favor of
Northern Cement; (2) Affidavits[13] of alleged adjoining
landowners Eugenia Batnag and Placido Saro attesting that
Northern Cement is the owner and possessor of the Subject Lot;
(3) seven (7) Tax Declarations[14] for various years from 1971 to
2003 in the name of Northern Cement and a Tax Declaration[15]
for year 1970 in the name of Chichioco; (4) Tax Clearance
Certificate[16] dated May 21, 2007; (5) Technical Description[17]
of the Subject Lot; (6) Approved Plan[18] certified by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
stating that the Subject Lot is "x x x inside alienable and
disposable area as per project No. 63, L.C. Map No. 698,
certified on November 21, 1927 x x x.”
ISSUE: The Republic raised the sole issue of whether the CA
erred in affirming the RTC's Decision granting the application for
registration of title in favor of Northern Cement despite non-
compliance with the requirements under PD 1529.
HELD: The Republic, in its Petition, alleges that Northern
Cement is not qualified to have the Subject Lot registered in its
name under Section 14 of PD 1529, whether under (1) or (2),
which states,
SECTION 14. Who may apply. XXX
At the outset, the Court notes that while the Republic makes a
fairly lengthy disquisition on compliance by Northern Cement
with the requirements of Section 14(1) of PD 1529 and while the
RTC quoted[34] in passing this provision of the law, nowhere else
in the records does it appear that Northern Cement's case is
specifically hinged thereon. The Application itself does not
enlighten as to whether it was filed under Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of PD 1529. Northern Cement made no allegation
nor presented evidence that it had been in possession of the
subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. At any rate, the
evidence presented, the allegations in the pleadings as well as the
discussion of the CA and the RTC in their respective decisions
and resolutions, reveal that the present controversy was filed and
tried based on Section 14(2) of PD 1529. Thus, the Petition shall
be resolved on Northern Cement's proof of its acquisition of the
Subject Lot by prescription.
Unlike Section 14(1) which requires an open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious manner of possession and occupation
since June 12, 1945 or earlier, Section 14(2) is silent as to the
nature and period of such possession and occupation necessary.
This necessitates a reference to the relevant provisions of the
Civil Code on prescription - in this case, Articles 1137[35] and
1118 thereof, to wit:
Article 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables
also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof
for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
Article 1118. Possession has to be in the concept of an owner,
public, peaceful and uninterrupted. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The Court, in the case of Heirs of Crisologo v. Rañon,[36] stated:
Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and other
real rights over immovable property. It is concerned with lapse of
time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law,
namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an
owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse.
Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent,
notorious and not clandestine.It is continuous when
uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional;
exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive
dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own
use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that
it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people
in the neighborhood x x x.
Applying the foregoing to the present case, the Court is
unconvinced by the pieces of evidence submitted by Northern
Cement to prove compliance with the requirement of possession
under Section 14(2) of PD 1529 in relation to Articles 1137 and
1118 of the Civil Code for original registration of land. The RTC
erred in haphazardly concluding otherwise and the CA, in turn,
erred in affirming the RTC.
First, the seven (7) tax declarations do not qualify as competent
evidence to prove the required possession. It has been held that
this type of intermittent and sporadic assertion of alleged
ownership does not prove open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation.[38] The Court has, in a
catena of cases, found as lacking, episodic and random payments
of realty taxes including five (5) Tax Declarations for a claimed
possession of forty-five (45) years,[39] twenty-three (23) Tax
Declarations on two (2) areas for a claimed possession of forty-
six (46) years[40] and twenty (20) Tax Declarations on three (3)
areas for a claimed possession of sixty-five (65) years.
Moreover, Tax Declarations are not conclusive evidence of
ownership but only a basis for inferring possession.[42] It is only
when these tax declarations are coupled with proof of actual
possession of the property that they may become the basis of a
claim of ownership.[43]
Second, even if it be assumed that Northern Cement had been in
possession of the subject property since 1968, it still failed to
sufficiently demonstrate that its supposed possession was of the
nature and character contemplated by law.
PETITION DENIED.
Padayhag v. Director of Lands
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529 SEC. 23. Notice of initial
hearing, publication, etc. - x x x
The public shall be given notice of the initial hearing of the
application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2)
mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication. -
2. By mailing. -
(a) Mailing of notice to persons named in the application. -
(b) Mailing of notice to the Secretary of Public Highways, the
Provincial Governor and the Mayor. -(c) Mailing of notice to the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, the Solicitor General, the Director
of Lands, the Director of Public Works, the Director of Forest
Development, the Director of Mines and the Director of Fisheries
and Aquatic Resources. -3. By posting. -
The Commissioner of Land Registration shall also cause a duly
attested copy of the notice of initial hearing to be posted by the
sheriff of the province or city, as the case may be, or by his
deputy, in a conspicuous place on each parcel of land included in
the application and also in a conspicuous place on the bulletin
board of the municipal building of the municipality or city in
which the land or portion thereof is situated, fourteen days at
least before the date of initial hearing.
The court may also cause notice to be served to such other
persons and in such manner as it may deem proper.
QUIZ:
1. Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title
2. Jus Accession, Accession Discreta and Accession
Continua
3. CASE: Daclison v. Baytion
Daclison v. Baytion
G.R. No. 219811, April 6, 2016
Facts: Respondent Eduardo Baytion alleged that he was a co-
owner of a parcel of land with a one-storey building divided into
seven units or stalls. He leased these stalls as administrator, one
to Leonida Dela Cruz who used it for her business of selling
rocks, pebbles and similar construction materials. When
Leonida’s lease expired, petitioner Rex Daclison took over.
Baytion filed a complaint for forcible entry and damages against
Daclison. Daclison answered that what he occupied is not the
leased portion of Baytion’s property, but a filled-up portion and
plane-leveled property which Antonio Dela Cruz had the down-
slope filled up until it was levelled with the leased portion which
Dela Cruz himself paid for the right to possess the same.
Daclison insists that what is really in dispute is the filled-up
portion, between the riprap constructed by the government and
the property of Baytion and, therefore, outside of the land co-
owned by Baytion. It is a property separate and distinct from the
leased property. Baytion posits that although the disputed portion
is outside the description of the property covered by TCT No.
221507, it forms an integral part of the latter because it is an
accretion or anything built thereon belongs to him and his co-
owners.
Issues: (a) Whether Baytion’s contention that he owns the filled-
up portion by reason of accretion is correct.
(b) Whether the disputed property can be considered an
improvement or accession.
Held: (a) No. Article 457 of the Civil Code provides: “To the
owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters.” In other words, the following requisites
must concur in order for an accretion to be considered, namely:
(1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;
(2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water;
and
(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the
banks of rivers.
In the case at bench, this contested portion cannot be considered
an accretion. To begin with, the land came about not by reason of
a gradual and imperceptible deposit. The deposits were artificial
and man-made and not the exclusive result of the current from
the creek adjacent to his property. Baytion failed to prove the
attendance of the indispensable requirement that the deposit was
due to the effect of the current of the river or creek. Alluvion must
be the exclusive work of nature and not a result of human
intervention.
(b) No. The disputed property cannot also be considered an
improvement or accession. Article 445 of the Civil Code
provides: “Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of
another and the improvements or repairs made thereon, belong
to the owner of the land, subject to the provisions of the following
articles.” The supposed improvements must be made, constructed
or introduced within or on the property and not outside so as to
qualify as an improvement contemplated by law. Otherwise, it
would just be very convenient for land owners to expand or
widen their properties in the guise of improvements.
SEC. 58, PD 1067 in connection with SEC. 14(1) 3rd requisite
• change in the course of river may result in the automatic loss
of ones owned property
• law gives the automatic recognition of ownership not title
• any other means allowed by law
QUIETING OF TITLE
• imprescriptible
• no longer subject to collateral attack (SEC. 48, PD 1529)
Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or
any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective
but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may
be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast
upon title to real property or any interest therein.
Article 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or
interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the
action. He need not be in possession of said property.
NUISANCE — has there been cases that the Court has declared
title void?
Article 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment,
business, condition of property, or anything else which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public
highway or street, or any body of water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.
Article 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public
nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any
considerable number of persons, although the extent of the
annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal.
A private nuisance is one that is not included in the foregoing
definition.
Article 696. Every successive owner or possessor of property
who fails or refuses to abate a nuisance in that property started
by a former owner or possessor is liable therefor in the same
manner as the one who created it.
Article 697. The abatement of a nuisance does not preclude the
right of any person injured to recover damages for its past
existence.
CASE:
Case of Spouses Yu Hwa Ping and Mary Gaw v. Ayala Land,
Inc. G.R. No. 173120, July 26, 2017 (MAHABANG KASO!)
Mendoza
Facts: Spouses Yu filed a complaint before the RTC of Las Pinas
against ALI for declaration of nullity of TCTs issued in the name
of ALI because of the spurious, manipulated and void surveys of
OCT Nos. 242, 244 and 1609 issued in favour of Dominador
Mayuga who sold the lots to CPJ Corporation which also sold
later to ALI. They sought the recovery of possession of the
property covered by ALI’s title that overlapped their land alleging
that their predecessors, Spouses Diaz, had open, uninterrupted
and adverse possession of the land since 1921 until it was
transferred to Cabautan in 1976. Spouses Yu alleged that in 1995
they discovered that ALI clandestinely fenced their property and
prevented them from occupying the same. ALI countered that
spouses Yu’s complaint was barred by prescription because it was
filed beyond the one-year period under section 38 of Act No. 496.
Spouses Yu asserted that their action was imprescriptible because
they sought to set aside the titles that were obtained through void
surveys and that the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title
does not apply where fraud attended the issuance of the title.
Issues/Questions: (1) Was the complaint of Spouses Yu barred
by prescription under Section 38, Act No. 496 (Section 32, PD
1529).
(2) What is the prescriptive period in this case?
Held/Answers: (1) No. The action is not barred by Section 38,
Act No. 496 / Section 32, PD 1529 on one-year after the entry of
the decree. Such provision is not the only remedy of an aggrieved
party who was deprived of land by fraudulent means. Another
remedy for the landowner is to bring an ordinary action in the
ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has
passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for
damages. In acomplaint for reconveyance, the decree of
registration is respected as incontrovertible and is not being
questioned. What is being sought is the transfer of the property
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s name to its
rightful owner or to the one with a better right. If the registration
of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is
registered holds it as a mere trustee, and the real owner is entitled
to file an action for reconveyance of the property.
Whether an action for recoveyance had prescribed or not would
depend on the nature of the action. If based on claim of existence
of implied or constructive trust, the prescriptive period is: (1) ten
(10) years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the
certificate of title (Section 53 (3), PD 1529 in relation to Article
1456 and 1144 of the Civil Code) or (2) imprescriptible if the
movant is in actual, continuous and peaceful possession of the
property involved. If based on a void deed or contract, the action
is imprescriptible under Article 1410 of the Civil Code.
(2) The case filed by spouses Yu involves an action for
reconveyance based on a void deed or contract which is
imprescriptible under Article 1410 of the Civil Code. Spouses
Yu’s complaint reveals that they are seeking to declare void ab
initio the titles of ALI and their predecessors-in-interest as these
were based on spurious, manipulated and void surveys. If void,
the original titles of ALI’s predecessors-in-interest shall be
declared void as well. It would result to a void contract or deed
because the subject properties did not belong to the said
predecessors-in-interest.
ACTION FOR NULLIFICATION OF TITLE
Q: Is it equivalent under action for cancellation of title under PD
1529?
Reconveyance & Reinvidicatoria — not an attack on title but of
ownership
CASE:
Catholic Bishop of Balanga v. CA
SC: Laches is never barred by the fact that title is
indivisible or indefeasible, laches is by common law, as
title can be attacked by laches, they are also based on
equity and fairness.
It is the cardinal principle in Land Registration that a torrens title
is indefeasible and imprescriptible. Considering that private
respondent in this case, by himself and through his predecessor-
in-interest, had been in uninterrupted, open and adverse
possession of a portion of the land covered by said title for 49
years, by virtue of a duly accepted donation, although
unregistered, will private respondent, under this circumstance,
prevail over the titled owner?
The parties do not dispute that the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila was the owner of a parcel of land. succeeded by . . .
Catholic Bishop of Balanga — registered as a corporation on 15
December 1975. Prior thereto, or on 23 August 1936, by virtue of
the authority given him by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila to donate a portion of Lot No. 1272, the then parish priest
and administrator of all the properties of the said church in the
Municipality of Balanga Bataan, Rev. Fr. Mariano Sarili,
executed an Escritura De Donacion donating to Ana de los Reyes
and her heirs, as a reward for her long and satisfactory service to
the church. Her acceptance of the donation, as well as her
possession of the subject property, is indicated in the deed of
donation, which deed, for unknown reasons, was refused
registration by the Register of Deeds. Nevertheless, before her
death, she had given the subject property to her nephew who had
been living with her, the herein defendant-appellant [private
respondent]. The latter immediately took possession of the
property in the concept of owner, built his house thereon and,
through the years, declared the land for taxation purposes as well
as paid the taxes due thereon. His possession of the subject
property was never disturbed by anybody until PET filed the
instant complaint.
HELD: The CA ultimately ruled that under the doctrine of
laches, the consequence of petitioner's inaction for 49 years since
the execution of the deed of donation, despite its apparently
undeniable knowledge of private respondent's adverse, peaceful
and continuous possession of the subject property in the concept
of an owner from 1936 to the institution of the recovery suit in
1985, is that it has lost its rights to the subject property and can
no longer recover the same due to its own inexcusable negligence
and grave lack of vigilance in protecting its rights over a
tremendously long period of time.
Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting
the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned or declined to assert it.25 It has also been defined as
such neglect or omission to assert a right taken in conjunction
with the lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice
to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity.26
The principle of laches is a creation of equity which, as such, is
applied not really to penalize neglect or sleeping upon one's right,
but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result
in a clearly inequitable situation.27 As an equitable defense,
laches does not concern itself with the character of the
defendant's title, but only with whether or not by reason of the
plaintiff's long in action or inexcusable neglect, he should be
barred from asserting this claim at all, because to allow him to do
so would be inequitable and unjust to the defendant.28
The doctrine of laches or of stale demands is based upon grounds
of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the
discouragement of stale claims and . . . is principally a question
of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be
enforced or asserted.
Finally, we agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that,
while petitioner is admittedly still the registered owner of the
donated property, and jurisprudence is settled as to the
imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of a Torrens Title, there is
equally an abundance of cases in the annals of our jurisprudence
where we categorically ruled that a registered landowner may
lose his right to recover the possession of his registered property
by reason of leaches.
SEC. 109, RA 26 Proceeding
Section 109 is the applicable law in petitions for the issuance of
new owner’s duplicate certificate which are lost or stolen or
destroyed.
RA 26 applies only in cases of reconstitution of lost or destroyed
original certificates of title on file with the RD.
CASE:
Cusi v. Domingo
ISSUE: Which title would prevail? Owner’s duplicate or
titled declared supposedly lost?
See Curtain Principle — inquire
— Reconstituted Title
Cusi v. Domingo
G.R. No. 195825, February 27, 2013
Facts: Domingo is the registered owner of a vacant lot situated in
White Plains, QC. One day she learned that construction
activities were being undertaken on her property. She later found
out that one Radelia Sy (Sy) secured an owner’s copy of
Domingo’s TCT, subdivided the property into two, and sold the
same to spouses De Vera and spouses Cusi for P1,000,000 each.
Domingo then filed a complaint seeking the annulment or
cancellation of titles, injunction and damages against Sy, the De
Veras and the Cusis. The spouses interposed a defense of
purchasers for value and in good faith.
Issue: Whether spouses De Vera and Cusi are purchasers in good
faith and for value under the circumstances obtaining in this case.
Held: No. As the purchasers of the property, they also came
under the clear obligation to purchase the property not only in
good faith, but also for value. It was not enough for them to show
that the property was unfenced and vacant; otherwise, it would be
easy for any registered owner to lose her property, including its
possession, through illegal occupation.
Comment: How about just relying on the curtain principle which
the De Veras and the Cusis evidently did here? It was not enough!
Under the principle, one does not need to go behind the
certificate of title because it contains all the information about the
title of its owner. They did not find any encumbrance being
annotated on Sy’s TCT. However, the Court opined that it was
not safe for them to simply rely on the face of Sy’s TCT because:
(1) her TCT was derived from a duplicate owner’s copy; (2)
almost simultaneous transactions affecting the property within a
short span of time; (3) gross undervaluation of the property in the
deeds of sale. These circumstances should have excited
suspicion!
CASE:
Manotok v. Barque
FACTS: Petitioners, (respondents herein) as the surviving heirs
of the late Homer Barque, filed a petition with the LRA for
administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No.
210177 issued in the name of Homer L. Barque, which was
destroyed in the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall, including
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, sometime in
1988. In support of the petition, petitioners submitted the owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177, real estate tax receipts, tax
declarations and the Plan FLS 3168 D covering the property.
Upon being notified of the petition for administrative
reconstitution, private respondents (petitioners herein) filed their
opposition thereto claiming that the lot covered by the title under
reconstitution forms part of the land covered by their
reconstituted title TCT No. RT-22481, and alleging that TCT No.
210177 in the name of petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest is
spurious.
HELD: The Court of Appeals properly applied the doctrine laid
down in Ortigas in refusing to remand the case to the trial court.
As expressly declared in Ortigas & Company Limited
Partnership v. Velasco:39
Ordinarily, the relief indicated by the material facts would be the
remand of the reconstitution case (LRC No. Q-5405) to the Court
of origin with instructions that Ortigas’ and the Solicitor
General’s appeals from the judgment rendered therein, which
were wrongly disallowed, be given due course and the records
forthwith transmitted to the appellate tribunal. This, in fact, is a
relief alternatively prayed for by petitioner Ortigas. Considering
however the fatal infirmities afflicting Molina’s theory or cause
of action, evident from the records before this Court, such a
remand and subsequent appeal proceedings would be pointless
and unduly circuitous. Upon the facts, it is not possible for
Molina’s cause to prosper. To defer adjudication thereon would
be unwarranted and unjust.
The same rationale should apply in the instant case. As
already discussed, the validity of respondents’ and petitioners’
title have been squarely passed upon by the LRA and reviewed
and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which factual findings are
no longer reviewable by this Court.
A careful examination of the case of Spouses Cayetano, et al. v.
CA, et al.,40 where this Court, as claimed by petitioners, have
affirmed their title over the disputed property, would reveal that
the sole issue resolved therein is whether or not a tenancy
relationship exists between the parties.41 There was no
adjudication on ownership. In fact, it cannot even be discerned if
the property subject of the Spouses Cayetano case refers to the
property subject of the instant controversy.
There is no basis in the allegation that petitioners were deprived
of "their property" without due process of law when the Court of
Appeals ordered the cancellation of their Torrens title, even
without a direct proceeding in the RTC. As already discussed,
there is no need to remand the case to the RTC for a re-
determination on the validity of the titles of respondents and
petitioners as the same has been squarely passed upon by the
LRA and affirmed by the appellate court. By opposing the
petition for reconstitution and submitting their administratively
reconstituted title, petitioners acquiesced to the authority and
jurisdiction of the reconstituting officer, the LRA and the Court
of Appeals, and recognized their authority to pass judgment on
their title. All the evidence presented was duly considered by
these tribunals. There is thus no basis to petitioners’ claim that
they were deprived of their right to be heard and present
evidence, which is the essence of due process.
As held in Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian:42
Therefore, it appearing from the records that in the previous
petition for reconstitution of certificates of title, the parties
acquiesced in submitting the issue of ownership for
determination in the said petition, and they were given the full
opportunity to present their respective sides of the issues and
evidence in support thereof, and that the evidence presented was
sufficient and adequate for rendering a proper decision upon the
issue, the adjudication of the issue of ownership was valid and
binding.
The reconstitution would not constitute a collateral attack on
petitioners’ title which was irregularly and illegally issued in the
first place.43 As pertinently held in Dolfo v. Register of Deeds for
the Province of Cavite:44
The rule that a title issued under the Torrens System is presumed
valid and, hence, is the best proof of ownership of a piece of land
does not apply where the certificate itself is faulty as to its
purported origin.
In this case, petitioner anchors her arguments on the premise that
her title to the subject property is indefeasible because of the
presumption that her certificate of title is authentic. However, this
presumption is overcome by the evidence presented, consisting of
the LRA report … that TCT No. T-320601 was issued without
legal basis …
….
Thus, petitioner cannot invoke the indefeasibility of her
certificate of title. It bears emphasis that the Torrens system does
not create or vest title but only confirms and records one already
existing and vested. Thus, while it may be true, as petitioner
argues, that a land registration court has no jurisdiction over
parcels of land already covered by a certificate of title, it is
equally true that this rule applies only where there exists no
serious controversy as to the authenticity of the certificate.
Under similar circumstances, this Court has ruled that wrongly
reconstituted certificates of title secured through fraud and
misrepresentation cannot be the source of legitimate rights and
benefits.
IMPRESCRIPTIBLE:
—Abatement of Nuisance
— Right of Way
— Act of Partition
NOTE: Title does not remain the same, it grows old
CO-OWNERSHIP
ART. 493, NCC
• Every co-owner is the absolute co-owner of his share
• Sale of an heir of his share is valid without the consent of the
others
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his
part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership. (399)
ART. 494, NCC — Right to Partition, See also Rule 69, ROC
— imprescriptible
Article 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-
ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition
of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a
certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid.
This term may be extended by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which
shall not exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir
against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. (400a)
CASE:
Ureta v. Ureta (An example of what is NOT a mode of acquiring
title under ART. 712)
Article 712. Ownership is acquired by occupation and by
intellectual creation.
Ownership and other real rights over property are acquired and
transmitted by law, by donation, by testate and intestate
succession, and in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition.
They may also be acquired by means of prescription. (609a)
Facts:
• In his lifetime, Alfonso Ureta begot 14 children. Among
these 14 belong the ascendants of the parties in this case
– Policronio and Liberato. Here, the descendants of
Policronio are up against the rest of Alfonso’s children
and their descendants (including those of Liberato)
• When he was alive, Alfonso was well-off – he owned
several fishpens, a fishpond and a sari-sari store, among
others.
o On October 1969, four of Alfonso’s children
(Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and Francisco), together
with their father met in Liberato’s house. Francisco, who
was then a municipal judge suggested that to reduce the
inheritance taxes, their father should make it appear that
he sold some of his lands to his children. As such,
Alfonso executed 4 deeds of sale covering parcels of land
in favour of Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and his
common-law wife, Valeriana dela Cruz.
• The dispute of this case is centered on the deed of sale in
favour of Policronio which covered six parcels of land.
• Since the sale was only made to avoid taxes and that no
monetary consideration was received, Alfonso continued
to enjoy the lands.
• When Alfonso died, except for a portion of parcel 5, the
rest of the parcels “transferred” to Policronio were never
turned over to him. Instead, these were turned over to the
administrators of Alfonso’s estate – Liberato, succeeded
by Prudencia, and then by her daughter Carmencita
Perlas.
• Subsequently, Alfonso’s heirs executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition, which included all the lands
covered by the 4 deeds of sale executed by Alfonso for
“tax purposes.”
• When the heirs of Policronio learned about the extra-
judicial partition involving Alfonso’s estate (Conrado, the
Policronio heirs representative avers that he did not
understand the partition’s terms when he signed it) which
“excludes” them, they sought to amicably settle the
matter with the rest of the heirs of Alfonso.
• Given the futility of these talks, the heirs of Policronio
filed a complaint for declaration of ownership, recovery
of possession, annulment of documents, partition, and
damages.
• Note: a will was never mentioned in this case - RTC
Judgment
• In favour of the Heirs of Alfonso. According to the court,
it was clearly established that the deed of sale was null
and void. Policronio’s heirs never took possession of the
involved lots and not even a single centavo was paid for
consideration of the sale. Even assuming there was, the
2000 pesos for the six parcels of land the heirs of
Policronio claimed that was paid to Alfonso was grossly
inadequate.
• The deed of extrajudicial partition was declared valid by
the RTC. The Court considered Conrado’s (the
representative of the heirs of Policronio) claim that he did
not understand the full significance of his signature when
he signed in behalf of his co-heirs, as a gratuitous
assertion. The RTC said that given his signature in all the
pages of the extrajudicial partition and having appeared
personally before the notary public, he is presumed to
have understood the contents.
 • Court of Appeals Judgment
o Partially Granted – the CA, disagreeing with the RTC,
declared that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition was
void. This decision of the CA was predicated on the
incapacity of one of the parties to give his consent to the
contract. It held that for Conrado to bind his co-heirs to
the partition, it was necessary that he acquired special
powers of attorney from them pursuant to Article 1878 of
the Civil Code.
• The CA said that the case should be remanded to
determine the proper portions to be awarded to the heirs
Issue (relevant to preterition): WON the defense of ratification
and/or preterition raised for the first time on appeal may be
entertained
Held: No preterition in this case
Ratio: The heirs of Alfonso were of the position that the absence
of the Heirs of Policronio in the partition or the lack of authority
of their representative results, at the very least, in the preterition
and not the invalidity of the entire deed of partition. They argue
that remanding the case to determine proper inheritance is no
longer necessary since the issue is purely legal. Conrado then,
according to them, should just fully account for what he received
and deliver to his co-heirs their respective shares in the
inheritance.
This cannot be given credence AT ALL
Their posited theory on preterition is no longer viable. Why?
BECAUSE THERE WAS NO WILL IN THIS CASE
Preterition has been defined as “the total omission of a
compulsory heir from the disinheritance. It consists in the silence
of the testator with regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in
the testatment, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not
giving him anything in the hereditary property buy without
expressly disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in the will in
the latter case” Thus, PRETERITION IS A CONCEPT OF
TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION. In the absence of a will,
there can be no preterition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was
valid.
RULING: Yes. It has been held in several cases that partition
among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real property
resulting in change of ownership. It is not a transfer of property
from one to the other, but rather, it is a confirmation or
ratification of title or right of property that an heir is renouncing
in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance.
It is merely a designation and segregation of that part which
belongs to each heir. The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition cannot,
therefore, be considered as an act of strict dominion. Hence, a
special power of attorney is not necessary.
In fact, as between the parties, even an oral partition by the heirs
is valid if no creditors are affected. The requirement of a written
memorandum under the statute of frauds does not apply to
partitions effected by the heirs where no creditors are involved
considering that such transaction is not a conveyance of property
resulting in change of ownership but merely a designation and
segregation of that part which belongs to each heir.
A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no
authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his
powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or
impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed,
before it is revoked by the other contracting party.
Therefore, Conrado’s failure to obtain authority from his co-heirs
to sign the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in their behalf did not
result in his incapacity to give consent so as to render the contract
voidable, but rather, it rendered the contract valid but
unenforceable against Conrado’s co-heirs for having been entered
into without their authority.
ART. 1082, NCC
Article 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to
indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to
be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, and
exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. (n)
Q: Pwede band yung partition is verbal?
A: YES. Partition does not convey ownership, it is a mere
recognition of ownership. It is also a mode of termination of
ownership.
Caveat: ART. 1080, 1081 — legitime must not be impaired
Agreement on Partition Inter Vivos (mode) — Q: if signed by all
heirs and then the parent died, can the former contravene the
agreement?
A: NO. It is enforceable (ART. 1080)
Article 1080. Should a person make partition of his estate by an
act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected,
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory
heirs.
A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, desires to keep
any agricultural, industrial, or manufacturing enterprise intact,
may avail himself of the right granted him in this article, by
ordering that the legitime of the other children to whom the
property is not assigned, be paid in cash. (1056a)
Article 1081. A person may, by an act inter vivos or mortis causa,
intrust the mere power to make the partition after his death to
any person who is not one of the co-heirs.
ART. 1061 — COLLATION (pwedeng oo or hindi?)
• Bring back the value
• Charging whether on the inheritance or free portion
• Excessive or inofficious impairs the legitime of the heirs
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other
compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he may have received from the decedent,
during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of
the partition. (1035a)
Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory
heirs if the donor should have so expressly provided, or if the
donee should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation
should be reduced as inofficious. (1036)
Rules under ART. 494, NCC
1. Partition does not prescribe
2. Discourage co-ownership: Max 10yrs.
3. Donor/Testator can impose co-ownership for a term up to
20yrs. only
Variations of Co-ownership
1. ART. 147, FC — spouse cannot sell/alienate the property
without the consent of the other spouse. (Relate to ART.
498, NCC)
Article 147. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the
rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict
with what is expressly determined in this Chapter. (1395)
Article 498. Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the
co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who
shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds
distributed. (404)
2. ART. 148 — ACP & CPG
Mode of CPG
Article 148. The following shall be the exclusive property of each
spouse:
(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;
(2) That which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative
title;
(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption or by exchange
with other property belonging to only one of the spouses;
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or
of the husband. (1396)
3. Partnership — power to dissolve, may continue at the
will/option of the goodwill partner
4. ART. 1080, Supra, Succession
5. ACP and Civil Law Partnership Combination
6. Condominium Act: Unit owners an co-owners
• When Suing: HLURB or the agency in charge in
condominium corporations
• Co-owned but governed by its own rules
REMEDIES:
1. Quieting of Title
2. Reinvidicatoria
3. Publiciana
4. Replevin
5. Other Special Remedies
6. Reversion
7. SEC. 14, PD 1529
8. ART. 493, 494, 433, 434, NCC — consistent with ART. 527,
GF is always presumed
ART. 544 — entitilement to fruits, possessor in
GF
GR: Legitime cannot be impaired
XPN: Partition - Donation and Disnheritance
(Since “property” in general, it may be real or personal)
The remedies or actions for the recovery of possession of
property, real or personal/immovable or movable, are the
following:
1. Accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding which may be
either that of forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer
(desahucio), which is a summary action for recovery of physical
possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more than
one year, and should be brought in the proper inferior court;
2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action for the recovery of
the real right of possession, which should be brought in the
proper Regional Trial Court when the dispossession lasted for
more than one year;
3. Accion reinvindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion, which
is an action for the recovery of ownership which must be brought
in the proper Regional Trial Court. (1, 2 and 3 from Encarnacion
v. Amigo, G.R. No. 169793 September 15, 2006)
4. Replevin or the manual delivery of personal property which is
governed by Rule 60 of the Rules of Court.
5. Complaint for reconveyance which sought the transfer of the
property wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s name.
What are the different kinds of possession? Which kind of
possession ripens into ownership by acquisitive prescription?
ANSWER (Tolentino):
The different kinds or classes of possession are as follows:
1. Possession in the concept of owner and possession in the
concept of holder;
2. Possession by oneself and possession in the name of another;
and
3. Possession in good faith and possession in bad faith.
A possessor in the concept of owner may be the owner himself or
one who claims to be so. This is the kind of possession that ripens
into ownership under Article 450 of the Civil Code. One who
possesses as a mere holder, or not in the concept of owner,
acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be
ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong. A lessee on the
land, a mere casual cultivator, and administrator, are not
possessors in concept of owner.
Possession by oneself is exercised by the owner himself
personally. But it is not necessary that the owner or holder of the
thing exercise personally the rights of possession. The rights of
possession may be exercised through agents, in such case, it is
possession in the name of another.
He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that
there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which
invalidates it. He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who
possesses in any case contrary to the foregoing. Mistake upon a
doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good
faith. (Article 526, Civil Code)
CASE:
Seangio v. CA (disinheritance)
Facts: In 1988, Respondents filed for the petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Segundo Seangio and praying
for the appointment private respondent Elisa Seangio as special
administrator and guardian ad litem of Dy Yieng.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia opposed the petition
on the following grounds:
1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her
faculties;
2) the deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in
favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise
control and supervision over his business in the Philippines;
3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as the
administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified
public accountant; and,
4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995,
disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for
cause.
In 1999, a petition for the probate of holographic will of Segundo
was filed before the RTC. Reiterating that probate proceedings
take precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate
proceedings primarily on the ground that eh will only show
disinheritance of this eldest son, hence there is preterition.
RTC denied the Motion to suspend proceedings for lack of merit.
MR was likewise denied.
Petitioners argue the following:
1. Respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of
Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which respectively mandate the
court to: a) fix the time and place for proving the will when all
concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause
notice of such time and place to be published three weeks
successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of
general circulation; and,
b) cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatees and
devisees of the testator Segundo;
2. The holographic will does not contain any institution of an
heir, but rather, as its title clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis
ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir.
Thus, there is no preterition in the decedent’s will and the
holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void;
3. No one in the direct line of compulsory heirs was omitted
4. Respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing
of the testate case
5. The continuation of the intestate proceeding will work injustice
to petitioners and will render nugatory the disinheritance of
Alfredo
Issue:
1. Whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered
as a holographic will?
2. Whether the holographic will pretirated or omitted an heir?
3. Was there a valid disinheritance?
Ruling: A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the
Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the
hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and
may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be
witnessed.
Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a
mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a
holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed
by the hand of Segundo himself.
It is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the
testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by
law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All
rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to
that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is
contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given
effect.
The Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line
were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court’s opinion,
Segundo’s last expression to bequeath his estate to all his
compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also,
Segundo did not institute an heir to the exclusion of his other
compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the
petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute
her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a
witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana,
unmistakably showed Segundo’s intention of excluding his eldest
son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited
therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo. For
disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires
that the same must be effected through a will wherein the legal
cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for
the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document,
the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be
considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son,
Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the
disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the
Civil Code. Petition is granted.
GR: Right to demand partition does not prescribe
XPN: For partition to run, there must be express? (see case)
CASE:
Ariola v. Ariola (GR. 177703, Jan 8. 2008)
FACTS: As the parties failed to agree on how to partition among
them the land covered by TCT No. 383714 (subject land),
respondent sought its sale through public auction, and petitioners
acceded to it. Accordingly, the RTC ordered the public auction of
the subject land. The public auction sale was scheduled on May
31, 2003 but it had to be reset when petitioners refused to include
in the auction the house (subject house) standing on the subject
land.
ISSUE: WON the house or improvement erected on the property
should not be included in the auction sale?
HELD: We agree that the subject house is covered by the
judgment of partition for reasons postulated by the CA. We
qualify, however, that this ruling does not necessarily
countenance the immediate and actual partition of the subject
house by way of public auction in view of the suspensive
proscription imposed under Article 159 of The Family Code
which will be discussed forthwith.
It is true that the existence of the subject house was not
specifically alleged in the complaint for partition. Such omission
notwithstanding, the subject house is deemed part of the
judgment of partition for two compelling reasons.
First, as correctly held by the CA, under the provisions of the
Civil Code, the subject house is deemed part of the subject land.
Second, respondent has repeatedly claimed that the subject house
was built by the deceased.24 Petitioners never controverted such
claim. There is then no dispute that the subject house is part of
the estate of the deceased; as such, it is owned in common by the
latter's heirs, the parties herein,25 any one of whom, under Article
49426 of the Civil Code, may, at any time, demand the partition of
the subject house.27 Therefore, respondent's recourse to the
partition of the subject house cannot be hindered, least of all by
the mere technical omission of said common property from the
complaint for partition.
That said notwithstanding, we must emphasize that, while we
treat the subject house as part of the co-ownership of the
parties, we stop short of authorizing its actual partition by
public auction at this time. It bears emphasis that an action for
partition involves two phases: first, the declaration of the
existence of a state of co-ownership; and second, the actual
termination of that state of co-ownership through the segregation
of the common property.28 What is settled thus far is only the fact
that the subject house is under the co-ownership of the parties,
and therefore susceptible of partition among them.
Whether the subject house should be sold at public auction as
ordered by the RTC is an entirely different matter, depending on
the exact nature of the subject house.
Respondent claims that the subject house was built by decedent
Fidel on his exclusive property.29 Petitioners add that said house
has been their residence for 20 years.
The Court ruled in Honrado v. Court of Appeals33 that a claim for
exception from execution or forced sale under Article 153 should
be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property
at public auction. Herein petitioners timely objected to the
inclusion of the subject house although for a different reason.
To recapitulate, the evidence of record sustain the CA ruling that
the subject house is part of the judgment of co-ownership and
partition. The same evidence also establishes that the subject
house and the portion of the subject land on which it is standing
have been constituted as the family home of decedent Fidel and
his heirs. Consequently, its actual and immediate partition cannot
be sanctioned until the lapse of a period of 10 years from the
death of Fidel Arriola, or until March 10, 2013.
ACCESSION
Art. 440. The ownership of property gives the right by
accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is
incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially.
(i) Right of accession with respect to what is produced by
property
Art. 441. To the owner belongs:
(1) The natural fruits;
(2) The industrial fruits;
(3) The civil fruits.
Exceptions to the rule that to the owner belongs the fruits:
(1) possession in good faith by another – the fruits belong to the
possessor in good faith.
(2) building, planting and sowing in good faith – the builder,
planter or sower in good faith is entitled to the fruits.
(3) usufruct – the usufructuary gets the fruits.
(4) lease – lessee gets the fruits (civil) from the property directly.
(5) antichresis – the creditor receives the fruits.
(ii) Right of accession with respect to immovable property.
Art. 445. Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of
another and the improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to
the owner of the land, subject to the provisions of the following
articles.
(iii) Right of accession with respect to movable property.
Art. 466. Whenever two movable things belonging to different
owners are, without bad faith, united in such a way that they form
a single object, the owner of the principal thing acquires the
accessory, indemnifying the former owner thereof for its value.
JUS ACCESSIONIS — ART. 440, NCC
ACCESSION DISCRETA — relate to ART. 396
Article 396. Those who may have entered upon the inheritance
shall appropriate the fruits received in good faith so long as the
absentee does not appear, or while his representatives or
successors in interest do not bring the proper actions. (198)
NOTE: Kung nagre-appear, kung ano inabutan niya, yun yung
kanya (ART. 392)
Article 392. If the absentee appears, or without appearing his
existence is proved, he shall recover his property in the condition
in which it may be found, and the price of any property that may
have been alienated or the property acquired therewith; but he
cannot claim either fruits or rents. (194)
Effects
Article 443. He who receives the fruits has the obligation to pay
the expenses made by a third person in their production,
gathering, and preservation. (356)
FRUITS:
ART. 527, 392, Supra
Article 527. Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who
alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of
proof. (434)
ACCESSION CONTINUA
• Real or Personal Property
• BPS — ART. 448 that every person is presumed to be in GF
- ART. 444,447, 449, 450
a. Accession discreta is the extension of the right of ownership to
the products of a thing. It has three (3) divisions: natural fruits,
industrial fruits, and civil fruits. It is based on principles of
justice; it is only just that the owner of a thing should also own
whatever it produces, unless there is some special reason for a
contrary solution.
b. Accession continua is the acquisition of ownership over a
thing incorporated to that which belongs to the owner. It may
refer to immovable or to movables. It is generally based on
necessity and utility, it being more practical that the owner of the
principal thing should own the new things instead of a co-
ownership being established.
b.1 Accession as to Immovables may consist of:
1. Alluvion
2. Force of river
3. Change of river bed
4. Formation of islands
5. Building, planting, and sowing (BPS)
b.2 Accession as to Movables may be:
1. Conjunction or adjunction – the union of two things
belonging to different owners, in such a manner that they cannot
be separated without injury, thereby forming a single object.
2. Spefication – the giving of a new form to material belonging
to another, such as when grapes belonging to one person are
converted to wine by another
3. Commixtion – the mixture of things, solid or liquid, belonging
to different owners, the mixture of liquids being more specifically
called confusion.
Adjunction may take place by:
1. Inclusion – when a diamond is attached to a gold ring
belonging to another.
2. Soldering – when an accessory object is fused to another made
of metal, like an arm or a foot of a statue.
- Ferruminatio = when the objects are of the same
metal
- Plumbatura = when the objects are of different metals
3. Weaving – when material belonging to different owners are
used in weaving a textile
4. Painting – when a painter uses his own paint on board or
canvas belonging to another.
5. Writing – when a person writes on paper or parchment
belonging to another.
CASES:
Pecson v. CA (Take note of this case!) ART. 448
G.R. No. 115814, May 26, 1995
Facts: Pedro P. Pecson was the owner of a commercial lot
located in Kamias, QC, on which he built a four-door two-storey
apartment building. For his failure to pay RPT, the lot was sold at
public auction to Mamerto Nepomuceno who in turn sold it to
private respondets spouses Nuguid. Pecson challenged the
validity of the auction sale. It was denied, but the court said that
there was no legal basis for the contention that the apartment
building was included in the sale. Spouses Nugid then filed with
the trial court a motion for delivery of possession of the lot and
the apartment building, citing Article 546 of the Civil Code. It
was granted and a writ of possession was issued directing the
sherrif to place Nuguid in possession of subject property with all
the improvements and to eject therefrom all occupants therein,
their agents, assignees, heirs and representatives. The CA
affirmed in part the trial court order citing Article 448 of the Civil
Code.
Issues: (1) Whether petitioner Pecson is a builder in good faith
insofar as the apartment building.
(2) Whether Article 448 and 546 may be applied in favor of
Pecson.
Held: (1) No. Where the true owner himself is the builder or
works on his own land, the issue of good faith or bad faith is
entirely different. Article 448 does not apply to a case where the
owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later
loses ownership of the land by sale or donation.
(2) Yes. In strict point of law, Article 448 is not apposite to the
case at bar. Nevertheless, the provision therein on indemnity may
be applied by analogy considering that the primary intent of
Article 448 is to avoid a state of forced co-ownership and that the
parties, including the RTC and CA, in the main agree that Article
448 and 546 of the Civil Code are applicable and indemnity for
the improvements may be paid although they differ as to the basis
of indemnity. The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to
administer justice between the parties involved.
Comment: Atty. Legaspi asked during recitation whether in a
case similar to Pecson, to which property one has a right of
retention/possession: over an apartment, or over a land, or both?
Definitely not over the land if ownership is at issue because
Pecson is not anymore the owner of the land where the apartment
is built by virtue of the auction sale. But Pecson answers that is
BOTH! “Since the private respondents (Spouses Nuguid) have
opted to appropriate the apartment building, the petitioner
(Pecson) is thus entitled to the possession and enjoyment of the
apartment building, until he is paid the proper indemnity, as well
as of the portion of the lot where the building has been
constructed. This is so because the right to retain the
improvements while the corresponding indemnity is not paid
implies the tenancy or possession in fact of the land on which it is
built, planted or sown. The petitioner not having been so paid, he
was entitled to retain ownership of the building and, necessarily,
the income therefrom.”
Take note that it is only the portion of the land, not the entire lot,
in case it is malaking lote! Unless paid the proper indemnity,
Pecson is entitled to retain: (1) ownership and possession of the
building and (2) income from the apartment building. So Spouses
Nuguid cannot simply claim any proprietary rights over the
apartment building and eject the occupants with haste. Lesson
learned is that, magbayad ng real property taxes!
Vda. De Roxas v. Our Lady’s Foundation
G.R. No. 182378, March 6, 2013
Facts: Roxas occupied a total of 112 square meters of Latosa’s
lots which caused the latter to file a complaint for recovery of
ownership of said portion of her residential land located in Our
Lady’s Village. He imputed the blame to respondent OLFI which
made him file a third-party complaint against OLFI claiming that
he only occupied the adjoining portion in order to get the
equivalent area of what he had lost when OLFI trimmed his
property for subdivision road by 92 square meters. The RTC
pegged the reimbursable amount at P1,800 per square meter to
reflect the current value of the property, while the CA maintained
the original amount of the lot at P40.00 per square meter based
on the Deed of sale.
Issue: What is the reckoning period for valuing the property in
cases of encroachment?
Held: In Ballatan v. Court of Appeals, the price must be fixed at
the prevailing market value at the time of payment. The
reckoning period for valuing the property is thus at the time of
payment pursuant to Ballatan. In the recent case of Tuatis v.
Spouses Escol, the present or current fair value of the land is to
be reckoned at the time that the landowner elected the choice,
and not at the time the property was purchased. In Sarmiento v.
Agana, the valuation of property was reckoned at the time the
real owner of the land asked the builder to vacate the
property encroached upon.
Comment: What is clear is that the reckoning period is not at the
time of sale because the rights and obligations here are not
anymore contractual per the contract of sale, but statutory as
provided in Article 448 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, that would
be prejudicial to property owners.
Right of Retention — ART. 546, 548
Article 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every
possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the
thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good
faith with the same right of retention, the person who has
defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the
amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which
the thing may have acquired by reason thereof. (453a)
Article 547. If the useful improvements can be removed without
damage to the principal thing, the possessor in good faith may
remove them, unless the person who recovers the possession
exercises the option under paragraph 2 of the preceding article.
(n)
ARTICLE 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall
not be refunded to the possessor in good faith; but he may remove
the ornaments with which he has embellished the principal thing
if it suffers no injury thereby, and if his successor in the
possession does not prefer to refund the amount expended. (454)
Lessee — cannot be a BPS in GF
CASE:
Cheng v. Donini
To be entitled to full reimbursement for useful improvements
introduced on the property, one must be considered a builder in
good faith
FACTS . The subject of this petition is an oral lease
agreement that went sour. Petitioner Serafin Cheng agreed to
lease his property located at Mandaluyong City to respondents,
Spouses Vittorio and Ma. Helen Donini, who intended to put up a
restaurant thereon. They agreed to a monthly rental of P17,000,
to commence in December 1990. Respondents proceeded to
introduce improvements in the premises through the Interim
Grant of Authority executed by petitioner.
However, before respondents' business could take off
and before any final lease agreement could be drafted and signed,
the parties began to have serious disagreements regarding its
terms and conditions. Petitioner thus wrote respondents on
January 28, 1991, demanding payment of the deposit and rentals,
and signifying that he had no intention to continue with the
agreement should respondents fail to pay. Respondents, however,
ignored petitioner's demand and continued to occupy the
premises until April 17, 1991.
Respondents then filed an action for specific
performance and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City. It prayed that petitioner be ordered to execute a
written lease contract for five years, deducting from the deposit
and rent the cost of repairs in the amount of P445,000, or to order
petitioner to return their investment in the amount of P964,000
and compensate for their unearned net income of P200,000 with
interest, plus attorney's fees. Petitioner, in his answer, denied
respondents' claims.
 RESPONDENT’s CONTENTION. They were
possessors in good faith, hence, Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil
Code applied and they should be indemnified for the
improvements introduced on the leased premises. Respondents
contend that petitioner was going to benefit from these
improvements.
RTC rendered its decision in favor of petitioner. The CA
reversed the trial court decision.
ISSUE. Did the CA err in ordering the petitioner to
reimburse respondents the full value of expenses for their alleged
repairs and improvements of the leased premises?
RULING. YES.
Contrary to respondents' position, Articles 448 and 546
of the Civil Code did not apply. Under these provisions, to be
entitled to full reimbursement for useful improvements
introduced on the property, respondents must be considered
builders in good faith. A builder in good faith is one who is
unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at the time he builds
on it. But respondents cannot be considered possessors or
builders in good faith. Being mere lessees, respondents knew that
their right to occupy the premises existed only for the duration of
the lease.
The fact that petitioner will benefit from the
improvements introduced by respondents is of no moment.
Respondents introduced these improvements at their own risk as
lessees. Respondents were not forced or obliged to splurge on the
leased premises as it was a matter of necessity as well as a
business strategy. In fact, had respondents only complied with
their obligation to pay the deposit/rent, there would have been no
dispute to begin with. If they were able to shell out more than a
million pesos to improve the property, the P34,000 deposit
demanded by petitioner was a mere "drop in the bucket”.
Petitioner is ordered to pay only the amount of
P171,650.95 to respondents as indemnity for the useful
improvements.
Q: In what situation may a person who is not an owner may have
possession over the fruits?
A:
1. Possessor in GF
2. Builder in GF
3. Lessee
4. Usufructuary
5. Antichresis
NOTE: Ownership by itself does not entitle you to the fruits
LEASE — ART. 1687, NCC
SECTION 108, PD 1529
EASEMENTS
See Water Code, ART. 51 (subject to the easement of public
use)
Article 51. The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the
seas and lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone of
three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in
agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along
their margins are subject to the easement of public use in the
interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage.
No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what
is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or
salvage or to build structures of any kind.
Negative Restrictions
CASE:
La Vista Association v. CA (GR. 95252, Sept. 5, 1997)
Case Points:
• There was an agreement, it was a voluntary right of way, it
not compulsory
• Easement is a burden of the servient and in favor of the
dominant estate, whose favor the easement was created.
Facts: Mangyan Road is the boundary between the La Vista
Subdivision on one side and Ateneo and Maryknoll (Miriam) on
the other. The road extends to the entrance gate of Loyola Grand
Villas. The area comprising the 15-meter wide roadway was
originally part of a vast tract of land owned by the Tuasons. The
Tuasons sold to Philippine Building Corporation a portion of
their landholdings. The Philippine Building Corporation
transferred, with the consent of the Tuasons, the subject parcel of
land to Ateneo. The Tuasons developed a part of the estate
adjoining the portion sold to Philippine Building Corporation into
La Vista Subdivision. La Vista seeks the issuance of a writ of
injunction to finally enjoin private respondents Solid Homes,
Inc., developers of Loyola Grand Villas Subdivision, the latter’s
predecessor-in-interest, Ateneo, and the residents of the said
subdivision from enjoying an easement of right-of-way over
Mangyan Road. La Vista contends that “mere convenience for the
dominant estate is not enough to serve as its (the easement of
right-of-way) basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude,
there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it”
Issue: Whether or not La Vista may withhold from the private
respondents the use of the Mangyan Road.
Ruling: The rule cited by La Vista, enunciated in Ramos,
Sr., v. Gatchalian Realty, Inc., concerns a legal or compulsory
easement of right-of-way. A legal or compulsory easement is that
which is constituted by law for public use or for private interest.
A voluntary easement on the other hand is constituted simply by
will or agreement of the parties. From the facts of the instant case
it is very apparent that the parties and their respective
predecessors-in-interest intended to establish an easement of
right-of-way over Mangyan Road for their mutual benefit, both
as dominant and servient estates. This is quite evident when:
(a) the Tuasons and the Philippine Building
Corporation stipulated in par. 3 of their Deed of
Sale with Mortgage that the "boundary line between
the property herein sold and the adjoining property
 of the VENDORS shall be a road fifteen (15)
meters wide, one-half of which shall be taken from
the property herein sold to the VENDEE and the
other half from the portion adjoining belonging to
the vendors;"
(b) the Tuasons expressly agreed and consented to the
assignment of the land to, and the assumption of all
the rights and obligations by Ateneo, including the
obligation to contribute seven and one-half meters
of the property sold to form part of the 15-meter
wide roadway;
(c) the Tuasons filed a complaint against Maryknoll
and Ateneo for breach of contract and the
enforcement of the reciprocal easement on
Mangyan Road, and demanded that Maryknoll set
back its wall to restore Mangyan Road to its
original width of 15 meters, after Maryknoll
constructed a wall in the middle of the 15-meter
wide roadway;
(d) La Vista President Manuel J. Gonzales admitted and
clarified, in a letter to Ateneo President Fr. Jose A.
Cruz, S.J., that "Mangyan Road is a road fifteen
meters wide, one-half of which is taken from your
property and the other half from the La Vista
Subdivision. So that the easement of a right-of-way
on your 7 1/2 m. portion was created in our favor
and likewise an easement of right-of-way was
created on our 7 1/2 m. portion of the road in your
favor;"
(e) La Vista, in its offer to buy the hillside portion of
the Ateneo property, acknowledged the existence of
the contractual right-of-way as it manifested that the
mutual right-of-way between the Ateneo de Manila
University and La Vista Homeowners' Association
would be extinguished if it bought the adjacent
ATENEO property and would thus become the
owner of both the dominant and servient estates;
and,
(f) La Vista President Luis G. Quimson, in a letter
addressed to the Chief Justice, acknowledged that
"one-half of the whole length of (Mangyan Road)
belongs to La Vista Assn., Inc. The other half is
owned by Miriam (Maryknoll) and the Ateneo in
equal portions;"
These certainly are indubitable proofs that the parties
concerned had indeed constituted a voluntary easement of right-
of-way over Mangyan Road and, like any other contract, the
same could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by
renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate. The argument
of petitioner that there are other routes to Loyola Grand Villas
from Mangyan Road is meritless. The opening of an adequate
outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory
easements, not voluntary easements. That there is no contract
between La Vista and Solid Homes, Inc., and thus the court could
not have declared the existence of an easement created by the
manifest will of the parties, is devoid of merit. The predecessors-
in-interest of both La Vista and Solid Homes, Inc., i.e., the
Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation, respectively,
clearly established a contractual easement of right-of-way over
Mangyan Road.
DOCTRINE OF APPARENT EASEMENT
CASE:
Salimbangan v. Tan (GR. 185240, Jan. 20, 2010)
FACTS: Petitioner Victoria Salimbangon, together with her
brothers and sister, inherited the subject property from her father.
They divided the lot into Lot A, B, C, D, and E. Lots A, B, and C
were adjacent to a city street while D and E were interior lots. To
give these interior lots access to the street, the heirs established in
their extrajudicial partition an easement of right of way that ran
exclusively along the southwest boundary of Lot B from Lots D
and E to the street. Petitioner Victoria became the owner of Lot A
and constructed therein a residential house and two garages. The
other portions were sold by petitioner’s co-heirs to the Tan’s. The
Tans built improvements on Lot B that spilled into the easement
area. They also closed the gate that the Salimbangons built.
Unable to use the old right of way, the Salimbangons lodged a
complaint with the City Engineer of Mandaue against the Tans,
while the Tan’s filed an action with the Regional Trial Court for
the extinguishment of the easement on Lot B and damages with
application for preliminary injunction.
The RTC upheld the Salimbangons easement of right of
way over the alley on Lot B, the lot that belonged to the Tans.
The court pointed out that the easement was established by
agreement of the parties, hence only by mutual agreement of the
parties could such easement be extinguished. Both parties
appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the RTC
decision on the ground that when ownership of Lots B, D, and E
was consolidated into the Tans, the easement ceased to have any
purpose and became extinct.
ISSUE: Whether or not the easement of right of way established
by the partition agreement among the heirs for the benefit of Lot
A has been extinguished.
HELD: Yes. An easement established by agreement of the parties
could be extinguished only by mutual agreement. However, since
the agreement of the heirs was to give Lots D and E access to the
street, the easement of right of way on Lot B became extinct by
operation of law when the ownership of Lots B, D, and E was
consolidated in a common owner, namely, the Tans. The
existence of a dominant estate and a servient estate is
incompatible with the idea that both estates belong to the same
person.
EDCA Publishing v. Santos (GR. 80298, April 26, 1990)
FACTS: The movable property in this case consists of books,
which were bought from the petitioner by an impostor who sold it
to the private respondents. One Professor Jose Cruz ordered 450
books from herein petitioner EDCA Publishing and issued check
as payment but later dishonored by the bank. Cruz sold 120
books to private respondent Leonor Santos and paid him the
amount of 1,700 after an issuance of a sales invoice. After series
of investigation, Cruz was arrested and disclosed his real name as
Tomas dela Pena and his sale of books to respondent Santos.
EDCA through the assistance of the police threatened Santos of
buying stolen property. They seized the 120 books without
warrant, loading them in a van belonging to EDCA, and
thereafter turned them over to the petitioner. The private
respondents sued for recovery of the books after demand for their
return was rejected by EDCA. A writ of preliminary attachment
was issued and the petitioner, after initial refusal, finally
surrendered the books to the private respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent has the right of ownership
of the (books) movable property in question.
HELD: Yes. Santos acted in good faith when he bought the book
for Dela Pena aka Professor Cruz.
ANALYSIS: The contract of sale is consensual and is perfected
once agreement is reached between the parties on the subject
matter and the consideration.
According to the Civil Code: ART. 1475. The contract of sale is
perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the
thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. From
that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance,
subject to the provisions of the law governing the form of
contracts.
ART. 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred
to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof.
ART. 1478. The parties may stipulate that ownership in the thing
shall not pass to the purchaser until he has fully paid the price.
It is clear from the above provisions, particularly the last one
quoted, that ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the
buyer until full payment of the purchase price only if there is a
stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is
that such ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee
upon the actual or constructive delivery of the thing sold even if
the purchase price has not yet been paid.
Nonpayment only creates a right to demand payment or to
rescind the contract, or to criminal prosecution in the case of
bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation above noted, delivery
of the thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to the buyer
who can in turn transfer it to another.
Yet the defendant invoked Article 464 of the Civil Code
providing, among other things that “one who has been unlawfully
deprived of personal property may recover it from any person
possessing it.”
CONCLUSION: Actual delivery of the books having been
made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books which he could
the validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he
had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him
and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the private
respondents to the books. It is clear that its remedy is not against
the private respondents but against Tomas de la Peña, who has
apparently caused all this trouble. The private respondents have
themselves been unduly inconvenienced, and for merely
transacting a customary deal not really unusual in their kind of
business. It is they and not EDCA who have a right to complaint.
DONATIONS
1. GRATUITOUS
2. ONEROUS — transactional
3. REMUNERATORY
VOID DONATIONS (PUBLIC POLICY)
(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same
criminal offense, in consideration thereof
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and
ascendants, by reason of his office.
GR: There must always be an express acceptance in donation,
however, can also be implied
XPN: Wedding gifts
RE: Repudiation — cannot be implied, must always be express,
as it requires court approval
See Ground for Revocation of Donation (Memorize!)
Relate to: ART. 19, NCC
CASE:
Villanueva v. Branco (GR. 172804, Jan. 24, 2011)
Facts: Petitioner Gonzalo Villanueva (petitioner), here
represented by his heirs, sued spouses Froilan and Leonila
Branoco (respondents), in the Regional Trial Court of Naval,
Biliran to recover a 3,492 square-meter parcel of land in
Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte and collect damages. Petitioner
claimed ownership over the Property through purchase in July
1971 from Casimiro Vere, who, in turn, bought the Property from
Alvegia Rodrigo in August 1970. Petitioner declared the Property
in his name for tax purposes soon after acquiring it. Respondents
similarly claimed ownership over the Property through purchase
in July 1983 from Eufracia Rodriguez to whom Rodrigo donated
the Property in May 1965.
The trial court rejected respondents' claim of ownership after
treating the Deed as a donation mortis causa which Rodrigo
effectively cancelled by selling the Property to Vere in
1970.Thus, by the time Rodriguez sold the Property to
respondents in 1983, she had no title to transfer. Respondents
appealed to the Court of Appeals, where the CA found that the
Deed as a testamentary disposition was instead a donation inter
vivos. Accordingly, the CA upheld the sale between Rodriguez
and respondents, and, conversely found the sale between Rodrigo
and petitioner's predecessor-in-interest, Vere, void for Rodrigo's
lack of title.
Issue: Whether or not the contract between Rodrigo and
Rodriguez was a donation or a devise
Held: It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title
to Rodriguez under a perfected donation inter vivos. First.
Rodrigo stipulated that "if the herein Donee predeceases me, the
Property will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited
by the heirs of x xx Rodriguez," signaling the irrevocability of
the passage of title to Rodriguez's estate, waiving Rodrigo's right
to reclaim title. This transfer of title was perfected the moment
Rodrigo learned of Rodriguez's acceptance of the disposition
which, being reflected in the Deed, took place on the day of its
execution on 3 May 1965. Rodrigo's acceptance of the transfer
underscores its essence as a gift in presenti, not in futuro, as only
donations inter vivos need acceptance by the recipient.
Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the
beneficial title to the Property, evident from Rodriguez's
undertaking to "give one half x xx of the produce of the land to
Apoy Alve during her lifetime." Thus, the Deed's stipulation that
"the ownership shall be vested on Rodriguez upon my demise,"
taking into account the non-reversion clause, could only refer to
Rodrigo's beneficial title.
Third. The existence of consideration other than the donor's
death, such as the donor's love and affection to the donee and the
services the latter rendered, while also true of devises,
nevertheless "corroborates the express irrevocability of x xx inter
vivos transfers."Thus, the CA committed no error in giving
weight to Rodrigo's statement of "love and affection" for
Rodriguez, her niece, as consideration for the gift, to underscore
its finding
The petitioner cannot capitalize on Rodrigo's post-donation
transfer of the Property to Vere as proof of her retention of
ownership. If such were the barometer in interpreting deeds of
donation, not only will great legal uncertainty be visited on
gratuitous dispositions, this will give license to rogue property
owners to set at naught perfected transfers of titles, which, while
founded on liberality, is a valid mode of passing ownership. The
interest of settled property dispositions counsels against licensing
such practice.
Accordingly, having irrevocably transferred naked title over the
Property to Rodriguez in 1965, Rodrigo "cannot afterwards
revoke the donation nor dispose of the said property in favor of
another."Thus, Rodrigo's post-donation sale of the Property
vested no title to Vere. As Vere's successor-in-interest, petitioner
acquired no better right than him. On the other hand, respondents
bought the Property from Rodriguez, thus acquiring the latter's
title which they may invoke against all adverse claimants,
including petitioner.
Related ARTS: ART. 748, 749 and 739 compare with ART. 81 &
87, FC
ART. 1027, 1028 in relation to ART. 739
Article 739. The following donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same
criminal offense, in consideration thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and
ascendants, by reason of his office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of
nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and
the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by
preponderance of evidence in the same action. (n)
Article 748. The donation of a movable may be made orally or in
writing.
An oral donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the thing
or of the document representing the right donated.
If the value of the personal property donated exceeds five
thousand pesos, the donation and the acceptance shall be made
in writing. Otherwise, the donation shall be void. (632a)
Article 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be
valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein
the property donated and the value of the charges which the
donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in
a separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is
done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor
shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall
be noted in both instruments. (633)
Article 1027. The following are incapable of succeeding:
(1) The priest who heard the confession of the testator during his
last illness, or the minister of the gospel who extended spiritual
aid to him during the same period;
(2) The relatives of such priest or minister of the gospel within
the fourth degree, the church, order, chapter, community,
organization, or institution to which such priest or minister may
belong;
(3) A guardian with respect to testamentary dispositions given by
a ward in his favor before the final accounts of the guardianship
have been approved, even if the testator should die after the
approval thereof; nevertheless, any provision made by the ward
in favor of the guardian when the latter is his ascendant,
descendant, brother, sister, or spouse, shall be valid;
(4) Any attesting witness to the execution of a will, the spouse,
parents, or children, or any one claiming under such witness,
spouse, parents, or children;
(5) Any physician, surgeon, nurse, health officer or druggist who
took care of the testator during his last illness;
(6) Individuals, associations and corporations not permitted by
law to inherit. (745, 752, 753, 754a)
Article 1028. The prohibitions mentioned in article 739,
concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary
provisions. (n)
DONATION INTER VIVOS
DONATION MORTIS CAUSA — NW: ART. 805/806 or HW:
810, if not both = invalid
DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS — ART. 87, FC compare
with ART. 81, FC
1. VOID by reason of:
• Public Policy — ART. 739
• Non-compliance — ART. 748 & 749
2. MAY BE REVOKED
• Revocable - valid until revoked — ART. 87, FC
• By operation of law
3. BY OPERATION OF LAW — ART. 43 & 44: already
revoked even before the filing of an action
• Effect: entitlement to the fruits kase BPS in GF ka
NOTE: Legal Separation
- ART. 64 & 65: May be revoked by filing of an action,
prescription is 5yrs
- ART. 760: 4yrs
- Ingratitude: 1yr.
4. INOFFICIOUS — ART. 908, 909, 912,1060 & 1061
- Prescription: 4yrs
- ART. 771 in relation to ART. 752: reckoned at the
time of death
COLLATION — done only when there is compulsory
succession, you bring back the value and add it to the Net
Hereditary Estate (NHE)
CASE:
Noveras v. Noveras (XPN to the rule on legitimes) — ART. 51
Facts: David and Leticia Noveras are US citizens who acquired
properties in the USA and in the Philippines during the marriage.
They have 2 children. According to Leticia, sometime in
September 2003, David abandoned his family and lived with his
mistress. Further, she claimed that they executed a joint affidavit
where he renounced all his rights and interest in the conjugal and
real properties situated in the Philippines.
After learning of David’s extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a
petition for divorce before the Superior Court of California.
Divorce was granted and judgment was duly entered on 29 June
2005. The California court granted to Leticia the custody of her
two children, as well as all the couple’s properties in the USA.
Leticia then filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal
Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3
December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David’s failure to comply
with his obligation under the same. David demanded that the
conjugal partnership properties, which also include the USA
properties, be liquidated since a divorce decree was already
entered.
The RTC regarded that since the parties are US citizens, their
marriage is hereby declared DISSOLVED pursuant to the divorce
decree. Thus, the trial court considered the petition filed by
Leticia as one for liquidation of the absolute community of
property instead of an action for judicial separation of conjugal
property. Their property was classified as absolute community
because they did not execute any marriage settlement before the
solemnization of their marriage pursuant to Article 75 of the
Family Code.
Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of
processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because the
court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties
did not submit any proof of their national law. The court
adjudicated the Philippine properties to David subject to the
payment of the children’s legitimes.
On appeal, the CA modified the decision and directed the equal
division of the Philippine properties between the spouses and
both should pay their children the amount of P520,000.00.
In the present petition, David insists that CA should have
recognized the California Judgment which awarded the
Philippine properties to him and allowing Leticia to share in the
Philippine properties is tantamount to unjust enrichment
considering that she was already granted all US properties by the
California court.
Issues 1. Whether the marriage between David and Leticia has
been dissolved pursuant to the divorce decree issued by the
Superior Court of California;2. Whether the filing of the judicial
separation of property is proper in accordance with the Family
Code
Held: 1. The trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree
which severed the bond of marriage between the parties. Foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our
rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national
law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself. A copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in
evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of
a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official
publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must be
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof.
The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine
embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, asthe case
may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer.
Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy
of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer,
if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under
the seal of such court.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in
evidence. The required certificates to prove its authenticity, as
well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not
presented. Even if we apply the doctrine of processual
presumption,divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens
in the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce
decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the
Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to
liquidation.
2. Yes. Art 135 of the Family Code provides that: Any of the
following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial
separation of property: Xxxx (6) That at the time of the petition,
the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and
reconciliation is highly improbable.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that both
parties had indeed separated for more than a year and that
reconciliation is highly improbable. First, it is undisputed that the
spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David
decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business.
Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been
cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as
Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital
where David was once confined, testified that she saw the name
of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for
Operation form. Third and more significantly, they had filed for
divorce and it was granted by the California court in June 2005.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated
for at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of
absolute community of property should be granted.
Arellano v. Pascual (GR. 189776, Dec. 15, 2010)
SUMMARY: Angel Pascual Jr. died intestate, leaving his
siblings as heirs. A parcel of land was allegedly donated by the
decedent to petitioners. Respondents filed for Judicial Settlement
of Intestate Estate contending that such land should form part of
the decedent’s estate which should be equally distributed. The
probate court held that the donation was valid and that it is
subject to collation. CA affirmed such finding. The SC discusses
at length the meaning and application of collation, and rules that
the property is NOT subject to collation, but should have been
ordered equally distributed among the heirs, thus granting the
petition.
FACTS:
• Jan 2, 1999 – Angel Pascual, Jr. died intestate
- Leavings his siblings as heirs: Amelia Arellano,
Francisco Pascual, and Miguel Pascual
• Apr 28, 2000 – Respondents filed a petition for Judicial
Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of
Administration
- Alleged that a parcel of land in Teresa Village,
Makati, which was transferred by the decedent to
petitioner by Deed of Donation may be considered
as an advanced legitime of petitioner
- Respondents also assail the validity of the donation
• Trial court, acting as a probate court, held that it was
precluded from determining the validity of the donation,
BUT…
- Provisionally passed upon the question of title to
the donated property only for the purpose of
determining whether it formed part of the
decedent’s estate
- Found the Deed of Donation valid in light of the
presumption of validity of notarized documents
- Held that it is subject to collation following Art.
1061 of the New Civil Code
• Probate court partitioned the properties of the intestate
estate
• Petitioners appealed to the CA
- Found appeal party meritorious
- Held: Bearing in mind that in intestate succession,
what governs is the rule on equality of division, We
hold that the property subject of donation inter
vivos in favor of Amelia is subject to
collation. Amelia cannot be considered a creditor of
the decedent and we believe that under the
circumstances, the value of such immovable though
not strictly in the concept of advance legitime,
should be deducted from her share in the net
hereditary estate. The trial court therefore
committed no reversible error when it included the
said property as forming part of the estate of Angel
N. Pascual.
- Also held that contrary to the ruling of the probate
court, herein petitioner was able to submit prima
facie evidence of shares of stocks owned by the
[decedent] which have not been included in the
inventory submitted by the administrator
- Set aside RTC’s Decision insofar as the order of
inclusion of properties of the Intestate Estate of
Angel N. Pascual, Jr. as well as the partition and
distribution of the same to the co-heirs are
concerned
• Petitioners appealed to the SC
ISSUES/RULING
W/N the property donated to petitioners is subject to collation -
NO
1. Discussion: The term collation has two distinct
concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical operation by
the addition of the value of donations made by the
testator to the value of the hereditary estate; and second,
it is the return to the hereditary estate of property
disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his
lifetime.
a. The purposes of collation are to secure equality
among the compulsory heirs in so far as is possible,
and to determine the free portion, after finding the
legitime, so that inofficious donations may be
reduced.
b. C o l l a t i o n t a k e s p l a c e w h e n t h e r e
are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to
determine the legitime and the free portion. If there
 is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be
safeguarded.
2. Application: The records do not show that the decedent
left any primary, secondary, or concurring compulsory
heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are
his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to
any legitime that part of the testator’s property which he
cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it
for compulsory heirs.
a. The decedent not having left any compulsory heir
who is entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to
donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for
his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His
donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is
deemed as donation made to a stranger, chargeable
against the free portion of the estate. There being no
compulsory heir, however, the donated property is
not subject to collation.
W/N the property of the estate should have been ordered equally
distributed among the parties – YES
1. Pursuant to Articles 1003 and 1004 of the New Civil
Code.
Vizconde v. CA (GR. 118449, Feb. 11, 1998)
FACTS: Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita
Nicolas-Vizconde had two children, viz., Carmela and Jennifer.
Petitioner's wife, Estrellita, is one of the five siblings of spouses
Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas.
Estrellita purchased from his father, Rafael, a parcel of
land located at Valenzuela, Bulacan and then sold such to
Spouses Chiu, for P3,405,612.00. Using a portion of the proceeds
of sale of the Valenzuela property, she bought a new parcel of
land with improvements situated at Vinzon St., BF Homes,
Parañaque. The remaining amount of the proceeds was used in
buying a car while the balance was deposited in a bank. The
following year the unfortunate "Vizconde Massacre" came about.
On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. On May 12, 1993,
Ramon filed his own petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1699,
entitled "In The Matter Of The Guardianship Of Salud G. Nicolas
and Ricardo G. Nicolas" and averred that their legitime should
come from the collation of all the properties distributed to his
children by Rafael during his lifetime. Ramon stated that herein
petitioner, Mr. Vizconde, is one of Rafael's children "by right of
representation as the widower of deceased legitimate daughter of
Estrellita."
Ramon also alleged that the transfer of the Valenzuela
property in favor of Estrellita by her father was gratuitous and the
subject property in Parañaque which was purchased out of the
proceeds of the said transfer of the property by the deceased
Rafael Nicolas in favor of Estrellita, is subject to collation.
The Probate Court nullified the transfer of the
Valenzuela property from Rafael to Estrellita, and declaring the
Parañaque property as subject to collation, which was sustained
by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: W/N the Court of Appealscorrectly sustained the order
of the Probate Court
RULING: NO. The attendant facts herein do not make a case of
collation. We find that the probate court, as well as respondent
Court of Appeals, committed reversible errors.
FIRST
The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in
the intestate estate proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael,
is not one of Rafael's compulsory heirs. Article 887 of the Civil
Code is clear on this point:
SECOND
The probate court went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when
it proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the
Valenzuela property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that
the transfer of the subject property between the concerned parties
was gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed and the true intent
of the contracting parties, as well as the presence or absence of
consideration, are matters outside the probate court's jurisdiction.
THIRD
The order of the probate court subjecting the Parañaque property
to collation is premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate
proceedings is still in its initiatory stage. We find nothing herein
to indicate that the legitime of any of Rafael's heirs has been
impaired to warrant collation.
FOURTH
The order of the probate court presupposes that the Parañaque
property was gratuitously conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita.
Records indicate, however, that the Parañaque property was
conveyed for and in consideration of P900,000.00, 37 by Premier
Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has no
participation therein, and petitioner who inherited and is now the
present owner of the Parañaque property is not one of Rafael's
heirs.Moreover, Rafael, in a public instrument, voluntarily and
willfully waived any "claims, rights, ownership and participation
as heir" in the Parañaque property.
FIFTH
Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it
was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an amount more than
the value of the Valenzuela property. Hence, even assuming that
the Valenzuela property may be collated, collation may still not
be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property has long been
returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore, any determination by
the probate court on the matter serves no valid and binding
purpose.
Compare: ART. 764 (4yrs) with 1144 (10yrs) and 1306 (contracts
—imprescriptible) which is the autonomy of the will of the
parties
SUCCESSION
Article 771. Donations which in accordance with the provisions
of article 752, are inofficious, bearing in mind the estimated net
value of the donor's property at the time of his death, shall be
reduced with regard to the excess; but this reduction shall not
prevent the donations from taking effect during the life of the
donor, nor shall it bar the donee from appropriating the fruits.
For the reduction of donations the provisions of this Chapter and
of articles 911 and 912 of this Code shall govern. (654)
TRANSMISSIBLE OBLIGATIONS
CASES:
Reyes v. RTC of Makati (GR. 165744, Aug. 11, 2008)
Is there an intra-corporate relationship between the parties that
would characterize the case as an intra-corporate dispute?
We point out at the outset that while Rodrigo holds shares of
stock in Zenith, he holds them in two capacities: in his own right
with respect to the 4,250 shares registered in his name, and as
one of the heirs of Anastacia Reyes with respect to the 136,598
shares registered in her name. What is material in resolving the
issues of this case under the allegations of the complaint is
Rodrigo’s interest as an heir since the subject matter of the
present controversy centers on the shares of stocks belonging to
Anastacia, not on Rodrigo’s personally-owned shares nor on his
personality as shareholder owning these shares. In this light, all
reference to shares of stocks in this case shall pertain to the
shareholdings of the deceased Anastacia and the parties’ interest
therein as her heirs.
Article 777 of the Civil Code declares that the successional rights
are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
Accordingly, upon Anastacia’s death, her children acquired legal
title to her estate (which title includes her shareholdings in
Zenith), and they are, prior to the estate’s partition, deemed co-
owners thereof.25 This status as co-owners, however, does not
immediately and necessarily make them stockholders of the
corporation. Unless and until there is compliance with Section 63
of the Corporation Code on the manner of transferring shares, the
heirs do not become registered stockholders of the corporation.
Simply stated, the transfer of title by means of succession, though
effective and valid between the parties involved (i.e., between the
decedent’s estate and her heirs), does not bind the corporation
and third parties. The transfer must be registered in the books of
the corporation to make the transferee-heir a stockholder entitled
to recognition as such both by the corporation and by third
parties.26
We note, in relation with the above statement, that in Abejo v.
Dela Cruz27 and TCL Sales Corporation v. Court of Appeals28 we
did not require the registration of the transfer before considering
the transferee a stockholder of the corporation (in effect
upholding the existence of an intra-corporate relation between the
parties and bringing the case within the jurisdiction of the SEC as
an intra-corporate controversy). A marked difference, however,
exists between these cases and the present one.
In Abejo and TCL Sales, the transferees held definite and
uncontested titles to a specific number of shares of the
corporation; after the transferee had established prima facie
ownership over the shares of stocks in question, registration
became a mere formality in confirming their status as
stockholders. In the present case, each of Anastacia’s heirs holds
only an undivided interest in the shares. This interest, at this
point, is still inchoate and subject to the outcome of a settlement
proceeding; the right of the heirs to specific, distributive shares of
inheritance will not be determined until all the debts of the estate
of the decedent are paid. In short, the heirs are only entitled to
what remains after payment of the decedent’s debts;29 whether
there will be residue remains to be seen. Justice Jurado aptly puts
it as follows:
No succession shall be declared unless and until a liquidation of
the assets and debts left by the decedent shall have been made
and all his creditors are fully paid. Until a final liquidation is
made and all the debts are paid, the right of the heirs to inherit
remains inchoate. This is so because under our rules of
procedure, liquidation is necessary in order to determine
whether or not the decedent has left any liquid assets which
may be transmitted to his heirs.30 [Emphasis supplied.]
Rodrigo must, therefore, hurdle two obstacles before he can be
considered a stockholder of Zenith with respect to the
shareholdings originally belonging to Anastacia. First, he must
prove that there are shareholdings that will be left to him and his
co-heirs, and this can be determined only in a settlement of the
decedent’s estate. No such proceeding has been commenced to
date. Second, he must register the transfer of the shares allotted to
him to make it binding against the corporation. He cannot
demand that this be done unless and until he has established his
specific allotment (and prima facie ownership) of the shares.
Without the settlement of Anastacia’s estate, there can be no
definite partition and distribution of the estate to the heirs.
Without the partition and distribution, there can be no registration
of the transfer. And without the registration, we cannot consider
the transferee-heir a stockholder who may invoke the existence of
an intra-corporate relationship as premise for an intra-corporate
controversy within the jurisdiction of a special commercial court.
In sum, we find that – insofar as the subject shares of stock (i.e.,
Anastacia’s shares) are concerned – Rodrigo cannot be
considered a stockholder of Zenith. Consequently, we cannot
declare that an intra-corporate relationship exists that would
serve as basis to bring this case within the special commercial
court’s jurisdiction under Section 5(b) of PD 902-A, as amended.
Rodrigo’s complaint, therefore, fails the relationship test.
Puno v. Puno Enterprises (GR. 177066, Sep. 11, 2009)
Facts: Carlos L. Puno, who died on June 25, 1963, was an
incorporator of respondent Puno Enterprises, Inc. On March 14,
2003, petitioner Joselito Musni Puno, claiming to be an heir of
Carlos L. Puno, initiated a complaint for specific performance
against respondent. Petitioner averred that he is the son of the
deceased with the latter’s common-law wife, Amelia Puno. As
surviving heir, he claimed entitlement to the rights and privileges
of his late
father as stockholder of respondent. The complaint thus prayed
that respondent allow petitioner to inspect its corporate book,
render an accounting of all the transactions it entered into from
1962, and give petitioner all the profits, earnings, dividends, or
income pertaining to the shares of Carlos L. Puno.
Issue: Whether or not Joselito Musni Puno as an heir is
automatically entitled for the stocks upon the death of a
shareholder.
Held: Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not
automatically become stockholders of the corporation and
acquire the rights and privileges of the deceased as shareholder of
the corporation. The stocks must be distributed first to the heirs in
estate proceedings, and the transfer of the stocks must be
recorded in the books of the corporation. Section 63 of the
Corporation Code provides that no transfer shall be valid, except
as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books
of the corporation.During such interim period, the heirs stand as
the equitable owners of the stocks, the executor or administrator
duly appointed by the court being vested with the legal title to the
stock.Until a settlement and division of the estate is effected, the
stocks of the decedent are held by the administrator or executor.
Consequently, during such time, it is the administrator or
executor who is entitled to exercise the rights of the deceased as
stockholder.
3 Ways of Succession:
1. Voluntary — ART. 783: Will of Testator
Article 783. A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with
the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree
the disposition of this estate, to take effect after his death. (667a)
2. Compulsory — ART. 886: Reserved portion of C.H.
Article 886. Legitime is that part of the testator's property which
he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain
heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs. (806)
3. Legal/Intestate — ART. 960: Presumed will
Article 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:
(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one
which has subsequently lost its validity;
(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all
the property belonging to the testator. In such case, legal
succession shall take place only with respect to the property of
which the testator has not disposed;
(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir
does not happen or is not fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the
testator, or repudiates the inheritance, there being no
substitution, and no right of accretion takes place;
(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in
cases provided in this Code. (912a)
NOTE: Kapag CS legitime lang compare ART. 895 and 996
PRETERITION: ART. 854
NOTE: Ommission must always be total and the one preterited is
a C.H.
Article 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of
the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time
of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies
shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the
institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of
representation. (814a)
1. Omission must be total — nothing received by will,
succession, or inter vivos (donation)
2. One omitted is an heir in the direct line
3. Net effect is to annul the institution of heir but will not
affect devisees and legatees in so far as they are not
inofficious
GR: Death is the event that triggers succession — ART. 774 &
777 relate to 712
When it takes place, the heirs becomes the co-owners of the
property even without partition
XPN: ART. 51 — even without death/succession but there is
delivery of presumptive legitimes; right of expectation is
inchoate
CASE:
Carlos v. Sandoval (foolish decision)
• When death happens this is the time to question the validity
of the marriage
FACTS: Spouses Felix Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate.
They left six parcels of land to their compulsory
heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. Teofilo
died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and
their son, Teofilo II. Upon Teofilo’s death, 2 parcel of land were
registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-
respondent, Teofilo II.
An action was instituted by the petitioner against respondents
regarding the shares of the land which lead to compromise
agreements in relation to the divisions of proceeds in the sale of
the lands.
Subsequently, in 1995, petitioner commenced an action against
respondents before the RTC for, among others, declaration of
nullity of marriage of his late brother Teofilo and respondent
Felicidad in view of the absence of the required marriage license.
The reason for the action is that petitioner alleges that the
marriage is null and void, thus the lands should be reconveyed to
him.
Respondents contended in their answer that the lack of details
regarding the requisite marriage license did not invalidate
Felicidad’s marriage to Teofilo. They prayed for the dismissal of
the case on the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction over subject matter.
RTC rendered judgment, granting petitioner’s counter motion for
summary judgment. Declaring the marriage between defendant
Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos null and void ab initio for
lack of the requisite marriage license.
In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that the trial court
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary
judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad.
CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling. Basis: The Civil
Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a
marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos is a real
party interest in the annulment of the marriage between his
brother Teofilo and Felicidad.
RULING: No. Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) which became effective on March 15,
2003, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
may not be filed by any party outside of the
marriage. Exceptions:
1. Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the
effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (or before March
15, 2003); and
2. Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil
Code.
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against
respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was
celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends
upon when the marriage took place.
The marriage having been solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect
on August 3, 1988, the applicable law is the Civil Code which
was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.
But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to
declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can
bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?
SC responded in the negative. The absence of a provision in the
Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any person to
institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to
be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-
interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every action must
be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest.
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or
an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the
case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question
involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material
interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as
plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-
interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of
action.
Noveras v. Noveras, Supra
Ventura v. Militante
FACTS: Private respondent filed a Complaint for a Sum of
Money and Damages against petitioner. However, petitioner
moved to dismiss the foregoing complaint on the ground that “the
estate of Carlos Ngo has no legal personality,” the same being
“neither a natural nor legal person in contemption of law.” The
petitioner then filed an opposition to private respondent’s Motion
to Dismiss. The public respondent then gave private respondent
15 days to make the amendment of the complaint. Petitioner filed
a MR of the order of public respondent. First, she argued that the
action instituted by the private respondent to recover P48,
889.70, representing the unpaid price of the automotive spare
parts purchased by her deceased husband during his lifetime, is a
money claim which, under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court, does not survive, the same having been filed after
Carlos Ngo had already died. Second, she claimed that the public
respondent never acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case which, being an action to recover a sum of money from a
deceased person, may only be heard by a probate court. Private
respondent opposed the foregoing motion. Public respondent then
issued an Order giving private respondent 24 hours to file his
amended complaint. Private respondent then filed his amended
complaint. Petitioner then filed a Comment to Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint. Private respondent then filed A Rejoinder
to Defendant’s Comment. Public respondent then issued the
herein assailed order. Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari
assailing the said Order.
ISSUE: WON A DEAD PERSON OR HIS ESTATE MAY BE
A PARTY PLAINTIFF IN A COURT ACTION.
HELD: No. Firstly, neither a dead person nor his estate may be a
party plaintiff in a court action. A deceased person does not have
such legal entity as is necessary to bring action so much so that a
motion to substitute cannot lie and should be denied by the
court. An action begun by a decedent's estate cannot be said to
have been begun by a legal person, since an estate is not a legal
entity; such an action is a nullity and a motion to amend the party
plaintiff will not likewise lie, there being nothing before the court
to amend. Considering that capacity to be sued is a correlative of
the capacity to sue, to the same extent, a decedent does not have
the capacity to be sued and may not be named a party defendant
in a court action. .
Secondly, It is clear that the original complaint of private
respondent against the estate of Carlos Ngo was a suit against
Carlos Ngo himself who was already dead at the time of the
filing of said complaint. At that time, and this private respondent
admitted, no special proceeding to settle his estate had been filed
in court. As such, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
either the deceased Carlos Ngo or his estate. It is true that
amendments to pleadings are liberally allowed in furtherance of
justice, in order that every case may so far as possible be
determined on its real facts, and in order to speed the trial of
causes or prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary
expense. But amendments cannot be allowed so as to confer
jurisdiction upon a court that never acquired it in the first
place. When it is evident that the court has no jurisdiction over
the person and the subject matter and that the pleading is so
fatally defective as not to be susceptible of amendment, or that to
permit such amendment would radically alter the theory and the
nature of the action, then the court should refuse the amendment
of the defective pleading and order the dismissal of the case.
Alipio v. CA
Q: if a suit is filed against a couple, when the others is already
dead, will the suit prosper? Will a conjugal obligation still be
enforced to the surviving spouse?
FACTS: Jaring (Romeo) was the lessee of a 14.5 hec fishpond in
Barito, Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. Lease was for 5 yrs ending on
Sep. 12, 1990. June 19, 1987 til the end of the lease period,
Jaring subleased the fishpond to sps Alipio and sps Manuel.
Stipulated rent: P485,600.00 payable in 2 installments of P300k
and P185,600.00. 2nd installment due on June 30, 1989. They all
signed the contract. Sublessees failed to pay entire 2nd
installment, leaving a balance of P50,600.00 w/c they failed to
pay despite Alipio’s demands. Thus, he filed a case against said
sublessees asking for payment of the balance or rescission of the
contract should they fail to pay the balance.
Defense of Purita Alipio: petitioned for the dismissal of the case
invoking Rule 3, Sec. 21 of the 1964 Rules of Court, claiming
that such was applicable since her husband and co-sublessee
passed away prior to the filing of this action. Said rule has been
amended by Rule 3, Sec. 20, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Trial court: denied Alipio’s petition. Ratio: she was a party to the
contract & should be independently impleaded together w/the
Manuel sps. Death of her husband merely resulted in his
exclusion from the case. Petitioner & Manuels ordered to pay
balance + P10k atty’s fees and costs of suit.
CA: dismissed appeal. Rule invoked is not applicable. The action
for recovery of a sum of money does not survive the death of the
defendant, thus the remaining defendants cannot avoid the action
by claiming that such death totally extinguished their obligation.
When the action is solidary, creditor may bring his action against
any of the debtors obligated in solidum. Alipio’s liability is
independent of & separate from her husband’s. (Climaco vs. Siy
Uy, Imperial vs. David, and Agacoili vs. Vda de Agcaoili)
Issues & Ratio:
1. WON a creditor can sue the surviving spouse of a
decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the collection of a
sum of money chargeable against the conjugal
partnership. – NO. Proper remedy would be to file a claim
in the settlement of the decedent’s estate or if none has been
commenced, he can file a petition either for the issuance of
letters of administration or for the allowance of will,
depending on whether its testate/intestate. No shortcut by
lumping claim against Alipios w/those against the Manuels.
Alipio’s husband died before case was instituted. Thus, Rule
3, Sec. 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civ Proc is not applicable
since it only applies to defendants who die during the
pendency of the case. CC Art. 161 (1) provides that the
obligation of the Alipios is chargeable against their conjugal
partnership since it was contracted by the spouses for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. When petitioner’s spouse
died, their CP was dissolved & debts chargeable against it
are to be paid in the settlement of estate proceedings in
accordance w/Rule 73, Sec. 2 w/c provides that the
community property will be inventoried, administered, &
liquidated and debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse. Calma vs.Tanedo: No
complaint for collection of indebtedness chargeable to the
CP can be brought against the surviving spouse. Claim must
be made in the proceedings for the liquidation & settlement
of the CP. Surviving spouse’s powers of admin ceases & is
passed on to court-appointed administrator. Affirmed in
Ventura vs. Militante where Court held that lack of
liquidation proceedings does not mean that the CP continues.
Creditor may apply for letters of admin in his capacity as a
principal creditor. Cases invoked by CA are not applicable,
being based on different set of facts. In Climaco, claim was
not against the CP & it did not survive the death of the
defendant but not as to the remaining defendant. Imperial, on
the other hand, involved spouses who were solidarily liable,
thus, surviving spouse could be independently sued in an
ordinary action for the enforcement of the entire obligation.
Note that for marriages governed by CPG, obligations
entered into by sps are chargeable vs their CP & partnership
is primarily bound for the repayments. They’ll be impleaded
as representatives of the CP and concept of joint/solidary
liability does not apply. At best, it will not be solidary but
joint.
2. WON trial court properly ordered Manuels & petitioner
to pay the balance w/o specifying whether it should be
paid jointly or solidarily. – NO. It should have specified
the debtors’ liability.CC Art. 1207: Concurrence of 2 or
more creditors or 2 or more debtors in one & the same
obligation does not imply a solidary liability. Solidary
liability only arises when the obligation expressly so states
or when the law or nature of the obligation requires
solidarity. Otherwise, it’s presumed to be joint, w/the debt
divided into as many equal shares as there are debtors, each
debt distinct from one another. Should lessees/sublessees
refuse to vacate leased property after expiration of the leased
period despite due demands, they can be held solidarily
liable to pay for the use of the property being joint
tortfeasors. However, there’s’ no allegation that sublessees
refused to vacate the fishpond after the expiration of the
term. Petitioner does not contend that nature of the lease w/
more than 2 sublessees result into a solidary liability. Rather,
contract provides that rent will be paid to the sub-lessor by
the sub-lessees, clearly indicating that liability is merely
joint. Since obligation of both couples is chargeable against
their respective CPs, balance of P50,600.00 should be
divided into 2 so that each couple is liable to pay P25,300.00

PROBATE OF WILLS
• Elements
• Extrinsic and Intrinsic Validity
GR: only cover issues affecting EXTRINSIC validity of will
What are extrinsic:
Testamentary capacity of T
Question – w/ inst is the last will and testament
Compliance with formalities
Genuineness and due execution of will
Decision of court: RES JUDICATA
Ordinarily, court not to pass upon intrinsic
Note: Stages:
Will extrinsically valid
Will intrinsically valid
But rule is not inflexible
All heirs agreed to pass upon intrinsic
Practical consideration dictates, if not, useless ceremony
Ex. Claim of preterition; if +devisees/legacies – NOT pass upon
even if there is preterition; kelangan pa din probate
If no legacies/devisees – pwede, court can pass upon; otherwise,
conduct of probate proceedings be useless ceremony
- Probate mortis causa
- if there are opporition whetehr donation mortis causa/intervivos
patent invalidity on the face of the will
ex. +testamentary provision – “living property to paramour
Imelda”
conduct mandatory: will involves act of disposition of estate -
808
pwede kasi walang disposition eh; 305, 307(?)
if mandatory – cannot be dispensed with by agreement of parties
Conduct of probate – not barred by laches or prescription
if only provision is DISINHERITANCE, still probate – act of
disposing the estate (indirectly) in favour of person recipient of
properties in absence of disinherited heir
ART. 992 — Illegitimate Children
Article 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father
or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child. (943a)
CASE:
Suntay v. Cojuanco
SC: At certain cirsumstances the IC can be an administrator —
Iron Curtain Rule
FACTS: On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-
Suntay (Cristina), married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico),
died intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay
(Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico. At the time of
her death, Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, and
several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M.
Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-
SuntayEmilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot
three children, namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and
Emilio IIEmilio I’s marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was
subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out
of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita, by two different women,
Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos, respectively.
Consequently, respondent and her siblings Margarita and Emilio
II, lived with their mother, separately from their father and
paternal grandparents. After the death of Emilio I, Federico filed
a petition for visitation rights over his grandchildren. It was
altogether stopped because of a manifestation filed by respondent
Isabel, articulating her sentiments on the unwanted visits of her
grandparents. After the death of his spouse, Federico, adopted
their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita On
October 26, 1995, respondent Isabela filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration in her favor. Federico filed
his opposition. Being the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is
capable of administering her estate and he should be the one
appointed as its administrator; that as part owner of the mass of
conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal
preference in the administration After a failed attempt by the
parties to settle the proceedings amicably, Federico filed a
Manifestation, nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as
administrator of the decedent’s estate on his behalf. Subsequently,
the trial court granted Emilio III’s Motion for Leave to Intervene
considering his interest in the outcome of the case. In the course
of the proceedings, Federico died.
ISSUE : Who, as between Emilio III and respondent, is better
qualified to act as administrator of the decedent's estate.
HELD: The Court cannot subscribe to the appellate court’s
ruling excluding Emilio III in the administration of the decedent’s
undivided estate. The underlying philosophy of our law on
intestate succession is to give preference to the wishes and
presumed will of the decedent, absent a valid and effective will.
The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron
curtain bar rule, is quite the opposite scenario in the facts
obtaining herein for the actual relationship between Federico and
Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III. Both spouses
acknowledged Emilio III as their grandchild. Cristina’s properties
forming part of her estate are still commingled with that of her
husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal partnership,
albeit terminated upon her death, remains undetermined and
unliquidated. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico,
entitled to share in the distribution of the latter’s estate as a direct
heir, one degree from Federico, not simply representing his
deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
It is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III from
the administration of the decedent’s estate. As Federico’s adopted
son, Emilio III’s interest in the estate of Cristina is as much as the
interest therein of Isabel. Considering that the CA even declared
that "under the law, Federico, being the surviving spouse, would
have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive
property of the decedent, aside from his share in the conjugal
partnership.”
However, the order of preference in the appointment of an
administrator of an estate found in Section 6, Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court depends on the attendant facts and circumstances
of each case.
Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator
lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. In this case, the
attendant facts and circumstances of this case necessitate, at the
least, a joint administration by both respondent and Emilio III of
their grandmother’s, Cristina’s, estate.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal
consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be
appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the
appointment of co-administrators, especially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
represented in the management of the estates, a situation which
obtains here.
a. The subject estate in this case calls to the
succession other putative heirs, including
another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and
Federico, Nenita Tañedo.
Other issue:
Petitioner argues that Article 992 of the Civil Code, the
successional bar between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives
of a decedent, does not apply in this instance where facts
indubitably demonstrate the contrary – Emilio III, an illegitimate
grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated by the decedent
and her husband as their own son.
Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the
basis of intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the
decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her legitimate and
illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her husband, Federico,
who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from an
illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child.
The peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out
by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in
Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and
antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a
deceased. It must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us
to refrain from making a final declaration of heirship and
distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of
Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on who will
administer the properties of the long deceased couple has yet to
be settled.
NOTARIAL WILLS
• Mandatory Requirements — ART. 805 & 806
Article 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be
subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the
testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and
by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one
another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and
the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as
aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left
margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in
letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which
the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will
and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his
name, under his express direction, in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed
the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator
and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the
witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. (n)
Article 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall
not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with
the office of the Clerk of Court.(n)
Distinguish:
Subscription and Attestation
SUBSCRIPTION — physical act (signing of left margin)
ATTESTATION — attestation clause; memorialize,
remembering what transpired at the time the will was made.
DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE — ART.
809
- Evidence alliunde
- Extraneous evidence
Article 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or
undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and
imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used
therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will
was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with
all the requirements of article 805. (n)
CASE:
Lopez v. Lopez (GR. 189984, Nov. 12, 2012)
Doctrine: The law is clear that the attestation must state the
number of pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose
of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or
omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or
decrease in the pages.
Facts: Enrique S. Lopez (Enrique) died leaving his wife, Wendy
B. Lopez (Lopez), and their four legitimate children, namely,
petitioner Richard, Diana, Marybeth and Victoria as compulsory
heirs. Before Enrique’s death, he executed a Last Will and
Testament and constituted Richard as his executor and
administrator.
Richard filed a petition for the probate of his father's Last Will
and Testament before the RTC with prayer for the issuance of
letters testamentary in his favor. Marybeth opposed the petition
contending that the purported last will and testament was not
executed and attested as required by law, and that it was procured
by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of
Richard. Victoria also adopted the said opposition.
After submitting proofs of compliance with jurisdictional
requirements, Richard presented the attesting witnesses, namely:
Reynaldo Maneja; Romulo Monteiro; Ana Maria Lourdes
Manalo (Manalo); and the notary public who notarized the will,
Atty. Perfecto Nolasco (Atty. Nolasco). The instrumental
witnesses testified that after the late Enrique read and signed the
will on each and every page, they also read and signed the same
in the latter's presence and of one another. Photographs of the
incident were taken and presented during trial. Manalo further
testified that she was the one who prepared the drafts and
revisions from Enrique before the final copy of the will was
made.
Likewise, Atty. Nolasco claimed that Enrique had been his client
for more than 20 years. The latter consulted him in the
preparation of the subject will and furnished him the list of his
properties for distribution among his children. He prepared the
will in accordance with Enrique's instruction and that before the
latter and the attesting witnesses signed it in the presence of one
another, he translated the will, which was written in English to
Filipino and added that Enrique was in good health and of sound
mind at that time.
RTC: disallowed the probate of the will for failure to comply
with Article 805 of the Civil Code which requires a statement in
the attestation clause of the number of pages used upon which the
will is written. It held that while Article 809 of the same Code
requires mere substantial compliance of the form laid down in
Article 805 thereof, the rule only applies if the number of pages
is reflected somewhere else in the will with no evidence aliunde
or extrinsic evidence required. While the acknowledgment
portion stated that the will consists of 7 pages including the page
on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written, the
RTC observed that it has 8 pages including the acknowledgment
portion. As such, it disallowed the will for not having been
executed and attested in accordance with law.
CA: found no valid reason to deviate from the findings of the
RTC that the failure to state the number of pages of the will in the
attestation clause was fatal. It noted that while Article 809 of the
Civil Code sanctions mere substantial compliance with the
formal requirements set forth in Article 805 thereof, there was a
total omission of such fact in the attestation clause. Moreover,
while the acknowledgment of the will made mention of "7 pages
including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment
are written," the will had actually 8 pages including the
acknowledgment portion thus, necessitating the presentation of
evidence aliunde to explain the discrepancy.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision to
disallow the probate of will.
Held: While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for
defects in the form of the attestation clause, Richard likewise
failed in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment
portion of the subject last will and testament that it "consists of 7
pages including the page on which the ratification and
acknowledgment are written" cannot be deemed substantial
compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including its
acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere
examination of the will itself but through the presentation of
evidence aliunde.
The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be
supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all the
pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear
in each and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are
three or the will was notarized. All these are facts that the will
itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them
in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total
number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so
in the presence of each other must substantially appear in the
attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the
probate proceedings. Hence, the CA properly sustained the
disallowance of the will.
Caneda v. CA (GR. 103554, May 28, 1993)
FACTS: On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower
without any children and already in the twilight years of his life,
executed a last will and testament at his residence before 3
witnesses.
He was assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad.
In the will, it was declared that the testator was leaving by way of
legacies and devises his real and personal properties to several
people all of whom do not appear to be related to the testator.
4 months later, Mateo Caballero himself filed a case seeking the
probate of his last will and testament, but numerous
postponements pushed back the initial hearing of the probate
court regarding the will.
On May 29, 1980, the testator passed away before his petition
could finally be heard by the probate court.
Thereafter one of the legatees, Benoni Cabrera, sought his
appointment as special administrator of the testator’s estate.
Thereafter, the petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of
the testator, instituted a second petition for intestate proceedings.
They also opposed the probate of the testator’s will and the
appointment of a special administrator for his estate.
Benoni Cabrera died and was replaced by William Cabrera as
special administrator and gave an order that the testate
proceedings for the probate of the will had to be heard and
resolved first.
In the course of the proceedings, petitioners opposed to the
allowance of the testator’s will on the ground that on the alleged
date of its execution, the testator was already in poor state of
health such that he could not have possibly executed the same.
Also the genuineness of the signature of the testator is in doubt.
On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses and the notary
public testified that the testator executed the will in question in
their presence while he was of sound and disposing mind and that
the testator was in good health and was not unduly influenced in
any way in the execution of his will.
Probate court then rendered a decision declaring the will in
question as the last will and testament of the late Mateo
Caballero.
CA affirmed the probate court’s decision stating that it
substantially complies with Article 805. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N the attestation clause in the will of the testator is
fatally defective or can be cured under the art. 809.
HELD: No. It does not comply with the provisions of the law.
Ordinary or attested wills are governed by Arts. 804 to 809. The
will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the attesting witnesses. The attestation clause need not be
written in a language known to the testator or even to the
attesting witnesses.
It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding
the conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses it
gives affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essential
formalities required by law has been observed.
The attestation clause, therefore, provides strong legal guaranties
for the due execution of a will and to insure the authenticity
thereof.
It is contended by petitioners that the attestation clause in the will
failed to specifically state the fact that the attesting witnesses
witnessed the testator sign the will and all its pages in their
presence and that they, the witnesses, likewise signed the will and
every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each
other. And the Court agrees.
The attestation clause does not expressly state therein the
circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective
signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each
other.
The phrase, “and he has signed the same and every page thereof,
on the space provided for his signature and on the left hand
margin,” obviously refers to the testator and not the instrumental
witnesses as it is immediately preceded by the words” as his last
will and testament.”
Clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed the will
and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another. That the absence of the statement required by law is a
fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily result in the
disallowance of the will that is here sought to be probated.
Also, Art. 809 does not apply to the present case because the
attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses
signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the
testator and of each other. The defect in this case is not only with
respect to the form or the language of the attestation clause. The
defects must be remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the
will itself which is clearly lacking in this case.
Therefore, the probate of the will is set aside and the case for the
intestate proceedings shall be revived.
Article 809 cannot be used to cure the defects of the will when it
does not pertain to the form or language of the will. This is
because there is not substantial compliance with Article 805.
HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS — ART. 810
Article 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must
be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator
himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out
of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. (678, 688a)
CASE:
Kalaw v. Relova — ART. 814
3 points of analysis:
- full signature is required to affect the change re: insertion,
cancellation, erasure or alteration but will not invalidate the
whole will
Doctrine: When the holographic Will in dispute had only one
substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the
original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the
requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator,
the effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked for the
simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which
could remain valid. To state that the Will as first written should
be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of
the testatrix.
Facts: On Sept 1971, herein private respondent, Gregorio
Kalaw, claiming to be the sole heir of his deceased Sister,
Natividad Kalaw, filed a petition for the probate of her
holographic will. But the proceeding was objected by one Rosa
Kalaw. It appears that the holographic will, as first written a)
named her (Rosa), also a sister of the testatrix as sole heir, and
that (b) she was also named as sole executrix. However, the will
appears to contain 2 alterations. First, Rosa's name, designated as
the sole heir was crossed out and instead "Rosario" was written
above it. Such was not initialed. Second, Rosa's name was
crossed out as sole executrix and Gregorio's name was written
above it. This alteration was initialed by the testator. Thus, her
opposition was based on the fact that the will containing
alterations, corrections, and insertion is without the proper
authentication by the fill signature of the testatrix as required by
Art. 814 w/c reads: “In case of any insertion, cancellation,
erasure or alteration in a holographic will the testator must
authenticate the same by his full signature”
She now argues that the holographic will, as first written, should
be given effect and probated so that she could be the sole heir
thereunder. TC denied petition to probate
Issue: WON the original unaltered text after subsequent
alterations and insertions were voided by the TC for lack of
authentication by the full signature of the testatrix, should be
probated or not, with Rosa as sole heir?
Held & Rationale: No. Generally, when a number of erasures,
corrections, cancellation, or insertions are made by the testator in
the will but the same have not been noted or authenticated with
his full signature, only the particular words erased, corrected,
altered will be invalidated, not the entirety of the will. This
general rule has exceptions, as in this case. When the holographic
will had only one substantial provision, which was altered by
substituting the original heir with another, and the same did not
carry the requisite full signature of the testator, or simply put,
where the change affects the essence of the will of the testator,
the entirety of the will is voided or revoked. To rule that the first
will should be given effect is to disregard the testatrix' change of
mind. However, this change of mind cannot be given effect either
as she failed to authenticate it in accordance with Art. 814, or by
affixing her full signature.
Additional Important Note:
General Rules: When a number of erasures, corrections,
cancellation, or insertions are made by the testator in the will but
the same have not been noted or authenticated with his full
signature, only the particular words erased, corrected, altered will
be invalidated, not the entirety of the will.
Exception: 1. Where the change affects the essence of the will of
the testator; Note: When the holographic will had only one
substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the
original heir with another, and the same did not carry the
requisite full signature of the testator, the entirety of the will is
voided or revoked.
Reason: What was cancelled here was the very essence of the
will; it amounted to the revocation of the will. Therefore, neither
the altered text nor the original unaltered text can be given effect.
(Kalaw v. Relova, G.R. No. L-40207, Sept. 28, 1984)
2. Where the alteration affects the date of the will or the signature
of the testator.
3. If the words written by a 3rd person were contemporaneous
with the execution of the will, even though authenticated by the
testator, the entire will is void for violation of the requisite that
the holographic will must be entirely in the testator’s
handwriting.
ART. 841 — a will without deposition is valid
CASE:
Seangio v. Reyes (GR. 140731-72, Nov. 27, 2006), Supra
ART. 842 — no CH, can be given to anyone
CANCELLATION OF WILLS/REVOCATION
1. Implication of Law — ART. 42, 44, 63, FC
2. Physical Destruction with intent
3. Codicil (by another will)
DOCTRINE OF DEPENDENT RELEVANT REVOCATION
applicable only in express; there must be revocatory clause which
is valid; 2nd instrument – must be same formalities of a will;
otherwise, subsequent instreument is invalid; if it is invalid, the
revocatory clause is also invalid; since it is invalid, revocation
also invalid
Implied - Absence of revocatory clause; there can only be
implied revocation – totally incompatible and cannot be
compromised
REVIVAL OF WILLS
SUBSTITUTION v. ACCRETION v. REPRESENTATION
SUBSTITUTION — ART. 857, 859
• Predeceased, incapacity and repudiation
Article 857. Substitution is the appointment of another heir so
that he may enter into the inheritance in default of the heir
originally instituted. (n)
Article 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to
substitute the heir or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs
should die before him, or should not wish, or should be
incapacitated to accept the inheritance.
A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it
refers, shall comprise the three mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise provided. (774)
ACCRETION — ART. 1015, 1016, 1018
• predeceased, incapacity and disinheritane
Article 1015. Accretion is a right by virtue of which, when two or
more persons are called to the same inheritance, devise or
legacy, the part assigned to the one who renounces or cannot
receive his share, or who died before the testator, is added or
incorporated to that of his co-heirs, co-devisees, or co-legatees.
(n)
Article 1016. In order that the right of accretion may take place
in a testamentary succession, it shall be necessary:
(1) That two or more persons be called to the same inheritance,
or to the same portion thereof, pro indiviso; and
(2) That one of the persons thus called die before the testator, or
renounce the inheritance, or be incapacitated to receive it. (928a)
Article 1018. In legal succession the share of the person who
repudiates the inheritance shall always accrue to his co-heirs.
(981)
REPRESENTTION — ART. 970, 923
• compulsory and legal succession only
• no representation on voluntary succession
Article 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by
virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the
degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which
the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited. (942a)
Article 923. The children and descendants of the person
disinherited shall take his or her place and shall preserve the
rights of compulsory heirs with respect to the legitime; but the
disinherited parent shall not have the usufruct or administration
of the property which constitutes the legitime. (857)
RESERVA TRONCAL — ART. 891
Article 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title
from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree
and who belong to the line from which said property came. (871)
Q: How to remove Reserva Troncal?
A: Annotation of Property, go to court
See Notes
3 lines:
1. Origin to Prepositus
Origin is ascendant or bro/sis of prepositus
Prepositus is descendant or bro/sis
How transmitted? Gratuitous title (donation/succession)
2. Prepositus to Reservista
Reservista is another ascendant of the prepositus, other than the
origin
How transmitted? By SUCCESSION by operation of law
3. Reservita to Reservatarios
How transmitted? By transmission
Not from reservita but from prepositus
This is a delayed succession
Req:
1. Origin to Propositus by succession
2. Propositus dies without issue
3. Propositus to Reservista (ascendant outside bloodline)
4. Return to Reservatarios
Reservista becomes owner of property; can dispose of property
subject to RESOLUTORY CONDITION (condition fulfilled,
right extinguished) --- upon the DEATH OF RESERVISTA, there
is LIVING RESERVATARIOS, reservista loses ownership, does
not become part of estate of reservista
If no loving reservatarios, then remains to be property of
reservita, upon death, becomes part of its estate then can be
inherited by reservista’s heirs
Can be transferred; ownership of transferor s/t condition; once
transferred, transferee is also s/t condition;
Pwede walang condition? Yes, if buyer in good faith; no notice
Can reservatario sell interest in property – NO. merely inchoate;
if he does, that is sale of future inheritance
Reservatario no entitled to return of property while reservista
lives
Even if mere inchoate instest, he has right to PROTECT inchoate
interest; because possible to lose the property even if outlive
resrvista if sold to transferee in good faith
How to protect? If RP registered in CR, then annotate; in fact
obligation yan ni reservista; kung di niya gagawin the
reservatario can compel reservista to do it
If not registrable property; protect by demanding SECURITY
from reservista
Reservista makes testamentary disposition of property mortis
causa – yes still s/t resolutory condition; if there will be
reservatarios – disposition becomes ineffective
Who are reservatarios?
1. 3rd degree Blood relative of the propositus (because
reservatarios is inheriting from propositus, not reservista)
No need for reservatarios to be living at the time propositus death
Req: reservatarios living at the time of death of the
RESERVISTA, not propositus
2. same blood line from which property came from
Resrevatario must be the same blood line to the ORIGIN
If there are 2/more reservatarios, apply intestate succession;
between nephew and uncle (collateral blood relative), nephew
prepared
DISINHERITANCE — ART. 915, 916
Article 915. A compulsory heir may, in consequence of
disinheritance, be deprived of his legitime, for causes expressly
stated by law. (848a)
Article 916. Disinheritance can be effected only through a will
wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. (849)
Article 917. The burden of proving the truth of the cause for
disinheritance shall rest upon the other heirs of the testator, if the
disinherited heir should deny it. (850)
Article 918. Disinheritance without a specification of the cause,
or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, is not proved, or
which is not one of those set forth in this Code, shall annul the
institution of heirs insofar as it may prejudice the person
disinherited; but the devises and legacies and other testamentary
dispositions shall be valid to such extent as will not impair the
legitime. (851a)
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the
disinheritance of children and descendants, legitimate as well as
illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an
attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse,
descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a
crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or
more, if the accusation has been found groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or
concubinage with the spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation,
or undue influence causes the testator to make a will or to
change one already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parent or
ascendant who disinherits such child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or
descendant;
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or
disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil
interdiction. (756, 853, 674a)
Article 920. The following shall be sufficient causes for the
disinheritance of parents or ascendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate:
(1) When the parents have abandoned their children or induced
their daughters to live a corrupt or immoral life, or attempted
against their virtue;
(2) When the parent or ascendant has been convicted of an
attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse,
descendants, or ascendants;
(3) When the parent or ascendant has accused the testator of a
crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or
more, if the accusation has been found to be false;
(4) When the parent or ascendant has been convicted of adultery
or concubinage with the spouse of the testator;
(5) When the parent or ascendant by fraud, violence,
intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator to make a
will or to change one already made;
(6) The loss of parental authority for causes specified in this
Code;
(7) The refusal to support the children or descendants without
justifiable cause;
(8) An attempt by one of the parents against the life of the other,
unless there has been a reconciliation between them. (756, 854,
674a)
Article 921. The following shall be sufficient causes for
disinheriting a spouse:
(1) When the spouse has been convicted of an attempt against the
life of the testator, his or her descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When the spouse has accused the testator of a crime for
which the law prescribes imprisonment of six years or more, and
the accusation has been found to be false;
(3) When the spouse by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue
influence cause the testator to make a will or to change one
already made;
(4) When the spouse has given cause for legal separation;
(5) When the spouse has given grounds for the loss of parental
authority;
(6) Unjustifiable refusal to support the children or the other
spouse. (756, 855, 674a)
Article 922. A subsequent reconciliation between the offender
and the offended person deprives the latter of the right to
disinherit, and renders ineffectual any disinheritance that may
have been made. (856)
Article 923. The children and descendants of the person
disinherited shall take his or her place and shall preserve the
rights of compulsory heirs with respect to the legitime; but the
disinherited parent shall not have the usufruct or administration
of the property which constitutes the legitime. (857)
IMPAIRMENT OF LEGITIME
1. Prohibition against partition
2. Distribution may be affected by property
3. Reserva troncal (XPN)
4. Disinheritance (deprivation of the CH of his legitime)
LEGAL/INTESTATE SUCCESSION — ART. 960, Supra
4 BASIC RULES:
1. Relationship
• Jus Consugui — Marriage
• Jus Famili — Parent & Child
• Jus Sanguini — Blood relationship
• Jus Imperiu — State is the last heir by means of Escheat
proceedings under Rule 91
CASE:
Bernabe v. Alejo
2. Preference of Lines
• whether descending or ascending, excluded yung
collateral line
3. Proximity of Degree — direct line over collateral lines
• descending line over ascending line
• prefer the nearer in degree excludes the farthest
• XPN: Spouse who is not in any of those
4. Rules on Equal Division
GR: same degrees, equal share
XPN:
- Representation — brothers and sisters, nephews
(per capita)
- Next in line — inherit in their own right (per
stirpes)
- Legitimate and Illegitimate
- Relatives of full and half blood
How to Count: Go up to common ascendant, then down; pag
persons, minus one; pag line, yun na
CASE:
Republic v. Guzman (GR. 132964. Feb. 18,2000)
FACTS: In 1968 Simeon died leaving to his sole heirs, Helen
and David, his estate. In 1970, Helen and David executed a Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman
dividing and adjudicating to them all the property belonging to
the estate of Simeon. After eleven years from the time the said
deed of extrajudicial settlement was
executed, Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed assigning,
transferring and conveying to her son David her undivided one-
half interest on all the parcels of land subject matter of the said
deed of extrajudicial settlement.

ISSUE: Whether or not Helen validly repudiated her right to

inherit from the decedent

HELD: The inexistence of a donation does not render the

repudiation made by Helen in favor of David valid. There is no
valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already accepted
her share of the inheritance when she, together with David,
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of
Simeon Guzman on 29 December 1970 dividing and adjudicating
between the two (2) of them all the property in Simeon's estate.
By virtue of such extrajudicial settlement the parcels of land were
registered in her and her son's name in undivided equal share and
for eleven (11) years they possessed the lands in the concept of
owner. Article 1056 of the Civil Code provides —
The acceptance or repudiation of an inheritance, once made is
irrevocable and cannot be impugned, except when it was made
through any of the causes that vitiate consent or when an
unknown will appears. Nothing on record shows that Helen's
acceptance of her inheritance from Simeon was made through
any of the causes which vitiated her consent nor is there any
proof of the existence of an unknown will executed by Simeon.
Thus, pursuant to Art. 1056, Helen cannot belatedly execute an
instrument which has the effect of revoking or impugning her
previous acceptance of her one-half (1/2) share of the subject
property from Simeon's estate. Hence, the two (2) quitclaim
deeds which she executed eleven (11) years after she had
accepted the inheritance have no legal force and effect.
Nevertheless, the nullity of the repudiation does not ipso facto
operate to convert the parcels of land into res nullius18 to be
escheated in favor of the Government. The repudiation being of
no effect whatsoever the parcels of land should revert to their
private owner, Helen, who, although being an American citizen,
is qualified by hereditary succession to own the property subject
of the litigation.

REPUDIATION
2 Transactions:
• Extrajudicial Settlement with waiver of rights
• After receiving mu share, waiver, donate to my siblings,
liberality which is subject to donor’s tax

Effects of Repudiation:
• Must be in a public instrument
• Removes the person from inheritace