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VILLAGE GOVERNMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN

INDONESIA: THE NEW DEMOCRATIC FRAMEWORK
a
Hans Antlöv
a
Ford Foundation , Jakarta
Published online: 17 Jun 2010.

To cite this article: Hans Antlöv (2003) VILLAGE GOVERNMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN INDONESIA: THE NEW
DEMOCRATIC FRAMEWORK, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 39:2, 193-214, DOI: 10.1080/00074910302013

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 Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 39, No. 2, 2003: 193–214

VILLAGE GOVERNMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN

INDONESIA: THE NEW DEMOCRATIC FRAMEWORK

Hans Antlöv

Ford Foundation, Jakarta

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The political reforms that began in Indonesia in 1998 have created new opportuni-
ties for a revised relationship between state and community, replacing the New Or-
der’s centralistic and uniform framework with local-level institutions that are strong
and responsive. This paper presents the new legal framework for the democratisa-
tion of local-level politics and village institutions. Representative councils have been
elected in all Indonesian villages, and the village head is no longer the sole authority
in the community. Village governments are provided with far-reaching autonomy
and do not need the approval of higher authorities to take decisions and implement
policies. However, decentralisation and democratisation are necessary but not suffi-
cient preconditions for developing the countryside and alleviating poverty. An ac-
tive government and civil society engagement must ensure that regulations are not
distorted during implementation, and that ordinary people are included in public
policy making and local governance.

One need not underestimate the real eco-
nomic progress of Soeharto’s rural de-
velopment programs to recognise the
negative social, political and cultural
impact his New Order regime had on
village communities. Hand in hand with
the emphasis on development went a
political imperative, the need to main-
tain order and political control in the
countryside. Thus village elites were
cultivated by economic and political
means, and recruited as loyal clients of
the New Order regime. A thumbnail
description of development strategy
under the New Order would include an
‘opening up’ of the economy to foreign
investment and capitalist development,
a ‘reaching out’ of the state into almost
all aspects of village life, and a ‘closing
down’ of politics, allowing no ideology
other than that sponsored by the state.
It was a fine example of top-down de-
velopment (Schulte Nordholt 1981;
Hardjono 1983; MacAndrews 1986; Hart
1986; Maurer 1986; Quarles van Ufford
1987; Booth 1988; Hüsken 1988; Hart
1989; Hüsken and White 1989; Schweiz-
er 1989; Antlöv 1995; and Cederroth
1995).
The price of state intervention in peo-
ple’s lives and of this managerial ap-
proach to economic development was
high. Uniformity and standardisation,
destruction and twisting of the social
fabric, distortion of local leadership,
abuse of power, and widespread rent
seeking and corruption were but some
of the more acute and obvious costs
(Antlöv 2003a). The political scene
became tightly monopolised and con-
trolled by state-backed leaders. Commu-
nity-based institutions were coopted
and corrupted, and lost their credibili-
ty. The New Order’s seemingly well in-
tegrated system of ideology, legal
formalism, administration and develop-

ISSN 0007-4918 print/ISSN 1472-7234 online/03/020193-22 © 2003 Indonesia Project ANU

 194
mentalism provided little room for pub-
lic shows of dissatisfaction.
Given the negative social conse-
quences of past policies—and the ulti-
mate failure of the New Order regime
to hold on to power—it would seem safe
to conclude that Indonesia will not en-
gage in centralised and interventionist
programs of rural development in the
foreseeable future. Nor is this the time
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to do so; the country’s main aid do-
nors—the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank—have left these
large-scale state-sponsored projects be-
hind. There will probably not be any
grand schemes at all to develop the In-
donesian countryside. Instead, the
present government is promoting a
far-reaching and radical process of de-
centralisation and regional autonomy—
codified in Law 22 of 1999 on Regional
Governance and Law 25 of 1999 on the
Fiscal Balance between the Centre and
the Regions—which is pushing poverty
alleviation and rural development
schemes down to provinces and districts
(Hidayat and Antlöv forthcoming; Daly
and Fane 2002).
The reforms that began in 1998 have
created new opportunities for a revised
relationship between state and commu-
nity. There is today a momentum to re-
place the New Order’s centralistic and
uniform framework with local-level in-
stitutions that are strong, responsive and
effective. People across Indonesia are
promoting a new paradigm, based on
local knowledge, autonomy, and sus-
tainable and equitable development.
This article investigates the emerging
new democratic framework for local
governance and autonomy in Indo-
nesia’s 62,500-odd villages, and consid-
ers the consequences this will have for
future rural development programs. It
argues that decentralisation and democ-
ratisation are necessary but not suffi-
Hans Antlöv
cient preconditions for developing the
countryside and alleviating poverty.
There must also be active government
and civil society engagement to ensure
that regulations are not distorted dur-
ing implementation, and there must be
regulations and practices that ensure
that ordinary people, and not only the
elite, are included in public policy mak-
ing and local governance at community
level.
THE NEW ORDER LEGAL FRAME-
WORK FOR VILLAGE
GOVERNANCE
The late colonial and early indepen-
dence period was characterised by what
John Legge (1961: 21) called ‘a rather
confusing body of legislation’. Colonial
legislation recognised village govern-
ments but did not actually regulate
them—it encouraged self-rule and thus
reinforced the diversity of existing
forms.1 Its aim was to incorporate vil-
lages into the state administration,
preserving their right to organise in tra-
ditional ways but making them the low-
est administrative unit and allowing
them to be taxed (Breman 1980).
This diversity of government forms
was later incorporated into the young
Republic through the 1945 Constitution,
in which the government recognised
‘the approximately 250 self administer-
ing units and communities … such as
the desa in Java and Bali, the nagari in
Minangkabau [West Sumatra], the
dusun and marga in Palembang [South
Sumatra] …’. The Constitution went on
to say: ‘The Republic of Indonesia re-
spects the status of said special regions
and all State regulations regarding them
shall pay heed to [mengingati] their his-
torical rights [hak asal-usul].’2 This view
became the official position of subse-
quent legislation during the Soekarno
period. Law 22 of 1948 on Regional Gov-
 Village Government and Rural Development: The New Democratic Framework
ernment, Law 1 of 1957 on Basic Region-
al Government, and finally Law 19 of
1965 on Village Government [Desapra-
ja] reinforced the right of villages to or-
ganise themselves within a unitary
Republic of Indonesia.
Coming into the New Order, there
was thus a confusing mixture of more
or less autonomous government struc-
tures often coexisting with strong re-
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gional sentiment (as exemplified by the
regional rebellions of the 1950s). Fur-
thermore, the village was to a large ex-
tent beyond the reach of the central
government (as illustrated in the East
Java study of Jay 1969). This was not
conducive to the control and access
needed by Soeharto: he wished to de-
sign a uniform structure and a clear hi-
erarchy giving the central government
power over local communities. The ex-
isting legislation was therefore insuffi-
cient. The new framework was outlined
in Law 5 of 1979 on Village Governance
and its subsequent implementing de-
crees, regulations and technical guide-
lines.
According to the logic of Law 5/1979,
the two pillars of the New Order—
economic development and national
stability—could be achieved only if the
centre was in full control of the coun-
tryside, supervising village government.
To ‘sustain development in all sections
across Indonesia and to achieve the na-
tional aspirations of Pancasila—a just
and prosperous society, material as well
as spiritual, for the people of Indo-
nesia—there is a need to strengthen
village government’ (Law 5/1979, Elu-
cidation, section 1.3). The architects of
the New Order used local communities
as vehicles to achieve development and
stability and, indirectly (by delivering
these ‘goods’), legitimacy. Local com-
munities had to be made ‘legible’ and
simplified so that the New Order gov-
195
ernment could achieve its aims of con-
trol and manipulation.3
With the passage of the 1979 law, vil-
lage affairs were brought firmly under
the supervision and control of higher
authorities, and village structures were
recast within a single homogeneous
mould, designed by the Department of
Home Affairs in Jakarta and tightly pre-
served by an army of loyal extension
officers and village branches of state
organisations. Communities were stan-
dardised (penyeragaman bentuk—
Elucidation, section 4), effectively dis-
allowing—and in the process virtually
destroying—traditional governance
structures. It was a regimentation of
village life that would deeply and neg-
atively affect communities for decades—
it destroyed community institutions and
traditional social security mechanisms.
The first paragraph of Law 5/1979
clearly defined the subordinate nature
of the village: it was ‘the lowest level of
the government structure directly under
the subdistrict head’ (organisasi pemerin-
tah terendah langsung di bawah Camat,
paragraph 1). While the law stated that
the village had ‘the right to manage its
own affairs’, it immediately noted that
this ‘does not mean autonomy’ (Eluci-
dation, section 7). The village head was
‘positioned as the instrument of the cen-
tral government, of the regional govern-
ment and of the village government’
(Law 5/1979, paragraph 3.1). Village
heads owed their power to higher au-
thorities, and could do little without the
approval of subdistrict and district gov-
ernments. Village decisions and the vil-
lage budget required approval (pengesahan)
by the district chair (Elucidation, para-
graph 19). This meant the total submis-
sion of the village heads and, through
them, the village population, in which
there was no room for innovation from
below or for aspirations (political or oth-
 196
erwise) that did not accord with those
of higher authorities (Schulte Nordholt
1981; Hüsken 1988; Antlöv 1995; Hol-
land 1999). Village administrations
became for all practical purposes min-
iature replicas of the central govern-
ment, enforcing decrees and policies
determined from above. A myriad of
government agencies were present in
the countryside and various ministries
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set up programs and institutions in ev-
ery village. ‘Electricity Comes to the Vil-
lage’ (Listrik Masuk Desa), ‘The Military
Comes to the Village’ (ABRI Masuk
Desa), ‘Television Comes to the Village’
(TV Masuk Desa), ‘Student Community
Service’ (Kuliah Kerja Nyata) and a vari-
ety of other government programs firm-
ly incorporated the village into the
Indonesian state. Although this was part
of a modernisation process that took
place simultaneously in other Asian
countries, rural development in Indo-
nesia was intricately connected with the
New Order state. In a variety of ways,
citizens learnt that economic progress
was the product of the New Order and,
ultimately, of President Soeharto, on
whom the People’s Consultative Assem-
bly (MPR) in 1983 bestowed the official
title of ‘Bapak Pembangunan Indonesia’
or ‘Father of Indonesian Development’.4
The authority and power of village
leaders came from their contacts with
higher authorities, and they became
what I have described elsewhere as
‘clients of the state’ (Antlöv 1995: ch.
7–8). Whether lured by privileged access
to funds or forced by intimidation, vir-
tually all leaders, local notables and
people with prestige and authority in-
evitably became state clients. Signifi-
cantly, these state clients were not
foreign officials arriving in government
jeeps: they were community leaders,
people’s neighbours. Their presence in
everyday life—praying next to you at
the mosque, sharing a meal at the local
Hans Antlöv
food stall, cheering the same team at a
soccer match—was an important factor
in explaining the stability and legitima-
cy of the New Order. Since these lead-
ers represented multiple forms of power
(as religious teachers, as local notables,
as landlords, as village officials), if one
source of authority dried up they could
always rely on other sources. The struc-
ture of local politics built by the New
Order government was thus based on
intimate personal relations and on pa-
tronage.
Two government decrees codified
this system of state monopoly and pa-
tronage. An MPR decision in 1971 out-
lined the principle of the ‘floating mass’
(massa mengambang). This decision (lat-
er codified in Law 3 of 1975 on Political
Organisations) banned political activi-
ties below the district level, signalling
the end of political pluralism and the last
hope of democracy under the New Or-
der—only the state party, Golkar (Soe-
harto’s electoral machine), was allowed
to organise in the countryside. A second
piece of legislation, a 1970 Presidential
Instruction (Inpres No. 6/1970), intro-
duced the principle of ‘singular loyalty’
(mono-loyalitas), forcing all civil ser-
vants—and this in practice also includ-
ed village officials—to support Golkar
(Reeve 1985: 288). Members of the vil-
lage elite were thus forced to focus on
maintaining good relations with higher
authorities, at the expense of relations
with the local population who were their
neighbours.
Village leaders, the loyal state clients,
became the axis around which gover-
nance, politics and funds circulated. So
while heads were powerless in relation
to higher authorities, they were, in ex-
change for their subordination and loy-
alty, endowed with almost unlimited
powers within their community. Each
became the ‘sole authority’ (kuasa tung-
gal) and the most powerful figure in the
 Village Government and Rural Development: The New Democratic Framework
village. Paragraph 3 of Law 5/1979 de-
fined the village government as consist-
ing of two parts: the head (and his staff)
and the Village Consultative Assembly
(Lembaga Musyawarah Desa, LMD).
However, there was no separation of
powers between the head and the LMD.
The head was ex officio the chair of the
LMD, and the village secretary was ex
officio LMD secretary (as was the case
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with the Village Community Resilience
Board, the Lembaga Ketahanan Ma-
syarakat Desa, LKMD).5 Other members
were appointed directly by the head, in
consultation with the subdistrict govern-
ment and, typically, the Babinsa (Bint-
ara Pembina Desa, the Village Guidance
Army Officer). The LMD had no impor-
tance in the village, beyond ‘rubber-
stamping’ the head’s decisions. The
village government was responsible
only to higher authorities, represented
by the subdistrict chair (Law 5/1979,
paragraph 10.2). There were no mecha-
nisms for the village population to hold
the village head accountable. The head
was in a very paradoxical situation: ex-
tremely powerful in the village but vir-
tually powerless in relation to higher
authorities.6 The result was a village
leadership that was both weak and
coopted (seen from above) and strong
and authoritarian (seen from below),
and one that certainly was not respon-
sive to the village population.
THE POST-1999 LEGAL FRAME-
WORK FOR VILLAGE
GOVERNANCE
This was the situation during the two
decades between 1979 and 1999. There
have been a number of far-reaching
changes since—not only democratisa-
tion but, equally importantly, a process
of decentralisation, providing autono-
mous decision making to districts and
villages through Law 22 of 1999. Else-
where I have discussed in more detail
197
the decentralisation aspects of Law 22/
1999 (Hidayat and Antlöv forthcoming);
I here note only some of its more prom-
inent features. The first is the autonomy
given to district governments. In the
past, services were deconcentrated to
local governments, but decision making
was retained in Jakarta. With Law 22
and its sister Law 25 on financial devo-
lution, districts and municipalities have
the leverage to raise their own revenues,
deliver services and decide upon local
policies without interference from high-
er authorities (this includes policies on
villages). The other new feature of Law
22/1999 is the separation of powers be-
tween the executive and legislative
branches of government, and the em-
powerment of local people’s represen-
tative councils (DPR-D), which are no
longer merely ‘rubber-stamping’ deci-
sions taken by the executive.
However, Law 22/1999 not only out-
lines district-level decentralisation; im-
portantly it also replaces Law 5/1979 on
Village Governance. The sections of Law
22/1999 outlining village governance
are in paragraphs 93 to 111. Table 1 sum-
marises the important differences be-
tween Laws 5/1979 and 22/1999.
This comparison between the two
laws conveys their different character
and intent. Law 22/1999 clearly states
(Elucidation, section 9.1) that the basis
for the new regulations on village gov-
ernment is ‘diversity, participation, gen-
uine autonomy, democratisation and
people’s empowerment’. Even though
these concepts reflect high moral prin-
ciples whose practice may be fairly shal-
low, there is a sense of real change in
the law. The preamble (point ‘e’) says
that ‘Law 5 of 1979 … was not in accor-
dance with the spirit of the 1945 Consti-
tution, and it is necessary to recognise
and respect the right to uphold specific
regional origins’. The law was passed in
May 1999, one month before the demo-
 198
TABLE 1 Village Governance in the 1979 and 1999 Laws
Law 5/1979
Definition of village A territorial entity
Terms for village Mandatory use of desa and kepala
and village head desa throughout Indonesia
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Establishment of Initiated by subdistrict, approved Initiated by villagers, approved
new village by district
Village institutions Appointed Village Consultative
Assembly (LMD) and Village
Community Resilience Board
(LKMD) under the authority of
the village head; no other institu-
tions permitted
Village Head and LMD, inseparably
government
Village head Appointed by and accountable
to the district; maximum term of
office 16 years
Village officials Appointed by village head,
approved by district
Dismissal of head Proposed by subdistrict,
approved by district
Village legislation Drafted by village head and
LMD, approved by subdistrict
Village budget Drafted by village head and
LMD, approved by district
Village funding Block grant from district
Village-owned Not allowed
enterprises
Indices of None: villages strictly under the
autonomy authority of the subdistrict
Implementation Ministry of Home Affairs
and oversight
Hans Antlöv
Law 22/1999
A legal community
Districts can legislate for the use
of traditional terms
by district head and district
People’s Representative Council
Elected Village Representative
Boards (BPD, Badan Perwakilan
Desa) with far-reaching rights
and autonomy, plus other
institutions that the village or
district sees fit to establish
Head and BPD as separate
entities, but ‘partners’
Appointed by and accountable
to BPD, after approval from
district; maximum term of office
10 years
Elected or appointed, approved
by BPD
Proposed by BPD, approved by
district
Drafted and approved by BPD
together with village head
Drafted and approved by BPD
together with village head
Block grant and local sources
Allowed
Villagers have the right to reject
governmental programs not
accompanied by funds, person-
nel or infrastructure, and to
draft regulations
District government and
People’s Representative Council
 Village Government and Rural Development: The New Democratic Framework
cratic national elections, and hence the
People’s Representative Council (DPR)
that passed it was still that elected in
1997; this New Order-era DPR thus pub-
licly acknowledged that Law 5/1979 vi-
olated the spirit of the Constitution. (The
same criticism is raised against Law 5/
1974 in point ‘d’ of the preamble). It had
become clear that Law 5/1974 and Law
5/1979 provided a framework that was
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too narrow, rigid and authoritarian.
Aspirations from
below, diversity and local conditions
were not accommodated. Law 5/1979
had become part of the problem it was
originally intended to solve: how to reg-
ulate villages and structure their govern-
ment in the most efficient way. So
although there was very little public
pressure to revise Law 5/1979, the Min-
istry of Home Affairs decided to aban-
don it and replace it with the new Law
on Regional Governance.
The section of Law 22/1999 on village
government appears fairly favourable to
local democracy—more so than most
people expected of the Ministry of Home
Affairs and the Soeharto-era DPR. The
law has four major democratic features.
First it ‘liberates’ the village from the
authority of higher levels of govern-
ment. The village is no longer under the
authority of the subdistrict, but is an
autonomous level of government. 7
Importantly, a village is a legal commu-
nity (kesatuan masyarakat hukum, para-
graph 1.o), rather than a territorial entity
(suatu wilayah yang ditempati oleh sejum-
lah penduduk sebagai kesatuan masyarakat,
Law 5/1979, paragraph 1.o). It has the
right to raise funds, and does not need
to consult with or have approval from
higher authorities to pass village regu-
lations or budgets. Villages even have
the right to reject projects from other
levels of government if they are not ac-
companied by funds, personnel and in-
frastructure (Elucidation, paragraph
199
100), and to act as entities in legal mat-
ters (Elucidation, general section 9.3).
Second, Law 22/1999 provides space
for diversity and responsiveness to lo-
cal aspirations. According to paragraph
1.o, a village can be called by any tradi-
tional name (desa atau yang disebut den-
gan nama lain): in West Sumatra nagari,
in Central Sulawesi lembang, in South
Sumatra marga, and so on (paragraph
1.o).8 The village is to be ‘based on local
origins and customs’ (berdasarkan asal-
usul dan adat-istiadat setempat) (para-
graph 1.o). The same is true for the
position of village head: whatever tra-
ditional concept was in use before the
old law came into effect can again be
used. (The right to change the name is
devolved to local DPR-Ds.)9
The third democratic feature is the
introduction of village councils (Badan
Perwakilan Desa, BPD), replacing the ill-
reputed LMD. The BPD is a democratic
village organisation, consisting of 5–13
members, depending on village size,
elected ‘by and from villagers’ (para-
graphs 104–5). The BPD has the power
to draft village legislation, to approve
the village budget, and to monitor vil-
lage government. It even has the right
to propose to the district chair that the
village head be removed (though the
decision is taken by the district govern-
ment). This is a clear departure from the
past, when higher authorities, through
the village head, decided what the vil-
lage needed and wanted. Local regula-
tions and budgets are now to be decided
jointly by the BPD and the village head,
and higher authorities need only to be
informed of their decisions.
Fourth, and related to the above, is
the accountability of the village govern-
ment (Bennett 2002). While Law 5/1979
stated that the village government
consisted jointly of the village head and
the LMD, and that they were account-
able only to the subdistrict office, Law
 200
22/1999 provides for a separation of
powers. The reformed village govern-
ment consists of the head and his staff,
and the BPD (paragraph 94). The village
head is responsible to the village popu-
lation through the BPD; he must submit
an annual accountability report, which
the BPD can contest. He must also pro-
vide a report each year to the district
chair, but this report is only an admin-
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istrative matter and cannot be contest-
ed (paragraph 94). The village head is
thus not primarily oriented upwards;
rather he is accountable to the village
population and must answer questions
at BPD meetings.
These regulations constitute nothing
less than a quiet revolution in the coun-
tryside, not only providing a mechanism
for checks and balances in village
government, but also revising the old
paradigm of villagers as objects of
development to one in which villagers
have the right to exercise their demo-
cratic authority over public matters. The
authority and autonomy of the BPD is
far greater than that of the former LMD.
The BPD is nothing short of a village par-
liament, the community-level legislative
body, with all the democratic expecta-
tions that come with such a function.
There is to be no political screening of
candidates to the village headship or the
BPD, although candidates must fulfil
certain criteria, including a minimum
education level and a maximum age
(and they must adhere to the 1945 Con-
stitution and the state ideology, Panca-
sila). The previously mandatory (and
controversial) LKMD (note 5) has an un-
certain future. Law 22/1999 states that
the village has the right to establish in-
dependent organisations as it sees fit.
The LKMD is not referred to in the law,
although, as we shall see, an implement-
ing regulation mentions it and the equal-
ly discredited women’s organisation
Hans Antlöv
PKK (Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluar-
ga, the Family Welfare Association) as
examples of such organisations (Kep-
men 64/1999, paragraph 45).
There are two further regulations
that carry significant consequences for
village democracy and autonomy. Pres-
idential Decree 5/1999, signed by then
President B.J. Habibie on 26 January
1999, is a little known regulation that
soberly states that civil servants may not
be active members of political parties.
This was part of the revision of the elec-
toral system ahead of the 1999 elections,
but it has had consequences far beyond
that. In effect, it means that the princi-
ple of mono-loyalitas is abolished. At
around the same time, the ‘floating
mass’ principle was also abandoned,
through Law 2 of 1999 on Political Par-
ties, which states (paragraph 11) that po-
litical parties may have branches at
subdistrict and village levels. Together,
these provisions mean that the control
that Golkar and the government once
held over civil servants and village lead-
ers has been dismantled. Golkar is no
longer the sole political authority in the
village, and village officials are no long-
er ‘clients of the state’. A plurality of
voices, leaders and parties has emerged.
THE IMPLEMENTING
REGULATIONS
A law provides the framework for what
is legally possible, but it is only in its
implementation that we can know
whether the possibilities are realised. I
now move beyond the national-level
legislation to the implementing regula-
tions—the ministerial decrees, technical
instructions and district regulations. I
then discuss how these have been exe-
cuted in practice in a village in West
Java.
As one of the first implementing reg-
ulations of Law 22/1999, Ministerial
 Village Government and Rural Development: The New Democratic Framework
Decision (Kepmen) 64/1999 on General
Guidelines for Village Regulations, is-
sued by the Minister of Home Affairs,
was adopted by the Habibie cabinet in
September 1999. Unfortunately, this reg-
ulation introduced some quite serious
distortions of the spirit of the law. For
instance, while Law 22 (paragraph 104)
states that village regulations are pro-
duced by the BPD, Kepmen 64 (para-
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graph 48) mentions ‘village regulations
produced by the village head and/or the
BPD’. Nor is the regulation internally
consistent: paragraph 16.1.g states that
village regulations are created jointly by
the head and the BPD. The democratic
distortion continues in the references to
the annual budget. According to Law
22/1999 (paragraph 107.3), ‘the village
headman together with [bersama] the BPD
determines the village budget’ (my em-
phasis). In Kepmen 64 (paragraph 60)
this right is given to the village head,
without mention of the BPD; the only
right given to the BPD in relation to the
budget is one of supervision (paragraph
36.c). Given the strong powers of the
village government under the New Or-
der, such weak formulations could in
practice allow the village head effective-
ly to bypass the BPD. Furthermore, the
separation of powers between the vil-
lage head and the BPD is muddled in
Kepmen 64. While Law 22 clearly states
that the village head is responsible to the
BPD through an annual accountability
report, the interpretation given in Kep-
men 64 is that the BPD ‘sits on the same
level [as] and as a partner to the Village
Government’ [BPD berkedudukan sejajar
dan menjadi mitra dari Pemerintah Desa]
(paragraph 35). Kepmen 64 also states
that the ‘other institutions’ [Lembaga
Lain] that are allowed under Law 22 , to
develop community life in the country-
side (paragraph 106), must have a
development planning focus, and
201
mentions the (discredited) New Order
LKMD and PKK as examples of such
institutions (Kepmen 64, paragraph
45–47). I could continue, but the gener-
al point about distortion of the intent of
Law 22/1999 has been made.
Critics have argued that the imple-
menting regulations, and particularly
Kepmen 64, depart from the spirit of
Law 22/1999 by elaborating too much
on the structure of village government
(FPPM 2001; Zacharia 2000; Juliantara
2002). Rather than allowing for local
variation, Kepmen 64/1999 details what
the village government should look like,
stipulating, for example, the 13 require-
ments of a candidate for village head.10
What the regulation should have done,
commentators have argued, is provide
the general regulations for the establish-
ment of various village institutions and
leave the details of the institutions them-
selves for local governments to deter-
mine (see, for example, FPPM 2001, the
Academic White Paper produced by the
Forum for Popular Participation [Forum
Pengembangan Partisipasi Masyarakat],
a non-governmental network of com-
munity activists and village governance
researchers).
These distortions become even stark-
er in the 13 implementing regulations
that each of Indonesia’s 288 districts (the
2003 figure) is required by Kepmen
64/1999 to draft, on subjects ranging
from BPD elections to village enterpris-
es. Even by late 2002, more than three
years after Law 22/1999 and Kepmen
64 were passed and two years after the
legislation came into effect, many dis-
tricts, according to Home Affairs offi-
cials, had yet to complete all the decrees.
We cannot look systematically at even a
fraction of what might eventually be
close to 3,000 district decrees, but it may
be interesting to investigate one partic-
ular case.
 202
The 13 district decrees (Peraturan
Daerah—Perda) in the West Java high-
land district of Sumedang were signed
by the district chair on 4 March 2000,
after having been drafted by the district
secretariat and approved by the local
DPR-D. The decrees begin by repeating
the basic text of Kepmen 64 word by
word, including the inconsistencies with
Law 22/1999, such as that the BPD is a
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partner to the local government and that
village regulations are formulated joint-
ly by consensus between these two par-
ties. In their elaboration, many decrees
introduce further potential conflicts
with Law 22/1999. For instance, Perda
30/2000, on the establishment, election
and duties of the BPD, introduces a re-
quirement for ‘administrative selection’
of candidates. This might sound like a
harmless formula, but because elections
for village head during the New Order
were tightly controlled, in part through
political screening of candidates, men-
tion of ‘selection’ in Indonesia evokes
memories of a not too distant past in
which higher authorities could control
who was to be elected.
The Decree on Community Organi-
sations (38/2000) distorts even further
the intent of Law 22/1999. After repeat-
ing the misinterpretation that other
village-level institutions can be active
only in development planning, and de-
tailing their internal structure, para-
graph 8 states that existing community
organisations (and LKMD and PKK are
again specifically mentioned) should ‘be
made to conform [disesuaikan] with these
regulations’. In practice, this means that
the ‘community organisations’ in Su-
medang are the unpopular LKMD and
PKK, and little more than this. A further
example is Perda 39/1999 on the
‘Empowerment, Preservation and De-
velopment of Tradition, Customs and
Traditional Institutions’. Paragraph 4.4
Hans Antlöv
of this decree states that the ‘objective
of developing traditions and customs is
to raise their roles to support the process
of economic development and national sta-
bility’ (my emphasis). This carries more
than a hint of the New Order spirit of
cultural engineering—social institutions
are instrumental in character and they
must be developed with certain politi-
cal aims in mind. Nothing of the kind is
found in Law 22/1999.
One weakness in Law 22/1999 is that
a number of paragraphs are very loose-
ly worded and thus open to more than
one interpretation. For example, in the
section on BPD elections, Law 22/1999
states simply that ‘members of the BPD
should be elected from and by villagers’
(paragraph 105). This is a great improve-
ment on Law 5/1979 in which the vil-
lage head, who chaired the LMD, also
appointed its members. But since Law
22/1999 does not specify how the elec-
tions should be organised, local govern-
ment has at times interpreted this (in
particular, the word ‘elected’) in ways
that are less than democratic (Antlöv
forthcoming). Some districts are using
what they call formatur or electoral col-
leges (in the US sense), appointed by
hamlets, to elect village heads. Other
districts allow only household heads to
vote in the BPD election, thus disenfran-
chising the majority of women. Most
districts use direct elections (similar to
the kind used to elect the village head),
but the vagueness of Law 22/1999 has
nonetheless allowed a degree of vari-
ance in practice.
We now go one step further down the
legal hierarchy, to the Technical Instruc-
tions (Petunjuk Pelaksanaan, or Juklak)
that are distributed by a district govern-
ment to villages to provide technical
assistance in executing a district decree.
In Petunjuk Pelaksanaan 2/2000 on BPD
Elections in Sumedang, the inconsisten-
 Village Government and Rural Development: The New Democratic Framework
cies with Law 22/1999 continue: the
Sumedang decree on BPD elections
states that ‘a BPD Electoral Commission
shall be established’ (a commission not
mentioned in Law 22 or Kepmen 64); the
technical instruction takes this one step
further, stating that the electoral com-
mission ‘shall be established by the Vil-
lage Government’. The Juklak repeats
that the commission has the right to ‘se-
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lect administratively’ who can be a BPD
candidate. It also states that the various
‘village powers’ must ‘consult’ with the
village government to identify potential
candidates. This provides the legal
framework for the village head to reject
electoral commission candidates on ad-
ministrative grounds, and to appoint
loyal followers to the commission,
which then decides who may stand for
election to the BPD.
We have in this section noted the
gradual deterioration of the democratic
character of village government regula-
tion as it moves down the administra-
tive ladder. While Law 22 outlined the
legal framework for a more democratic
and responsive village government, the
end result, as the law has been imple-
mented, is an overregulated and, in im-
portant respects, pseudo-democratic
body of regulations, decrees and instruc-
tions that outline in detail what village
government must look like, and do not
acknowledge local variation and self-de-
termination. Since we can expect that
village governments will implement
whatever technical instructions they re-
ceive from higher authorities (whether
district or central government), rather
than the ‘spirit’ of the law itself, which
few village heads will read, this is a se-
rious distortion.
There is a technical legal issue here.
Since Law 22/1999 is the higher-level
law, implementing regulations may not
contradict it. There are at the Depart-
203
ment of Home Affairs today hundreds
of Perda that appear to contradict Law
22. Reviewing these is a time consum-
ing and messy process and, to this
author’s knowledge, none of the regu-
lations on village governance has yet
been challenged.
These distortions and the practices
they allow have to a certain extent been
recognised by the Ministry of Home Af-
fairs, and Kepmen 64/1999 has been re-
vised. It was replaced in November 2001
by Government Regulation (PP) 76 of
2001, ‘General Guidelines for Village
Regulations’.11 Unfortunately, only mi-
nor details have been changed; the ba-
sic distortions remain. Meanwhile, the
thousands of District Regulations intro-
duced under Kepmen 64/1999 are still
in force.
Many civil society groups, communi-
ty activists and researchers are urging
that mechanisms of public participation
and transparency should be put at the
forefront of a possible revision of Law
22/1999. At a meeting on 23 August
2001 organised by the Ministry of Home
Affairs and FPPM, the above mentioned
draft White Paper presented by FPPM
described the ideal village community
(FPPM 2001). The term used by this civil
society consortium is ‘village commu-
nity autonomy’ (otonomi masyarakat
desa), not ‘village autonomy’ (otonomi
desa) as the government proposes. This
is a crucial distinction, since it locates
governance issues at the lowest level, in
communities, empowering people and
not government. It is the people of the
village that should be given the right to
decide their own future, not the village
government. In order to achieve this,
FPPM has suggested quite radical
changes to Law 22/1999. Rather than
introducing forms, such as the BPD and
village head, the draft White Paper
proposes that the revised law should in-
 204
troduce the functions of a village govern-
ment and a legislative body, and allow
regions, or perhaps even villages, to de-
cide the forms for themselves. The cen-
tral government should only make sure
that the functions mentioned in the law,
which include mechanisms of transpar-
ency, power sharing and accountabili-
ty, are properly carried out by villages.
In arguing this, FPPM is placing the
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emphasis on the method by which the
institutions of village governance are
put in place, rather than the form that
those institutions take.
THE REGULATIONS IN PRACTICE:
A CASE STUDY FROM WEST JAVA
Law 22/1999 came into effect on 1 Jan-
uary 2001. Elections to BPDs have been
held across the country from mid 2000,
and new governance and leadership
structures are slowly emerging, replac-
ing the institutions of the New Order.
This section discusses the workings of
the BPD and post-reformasi rural lead-
ership as I have observed them in the
village of ‘Sariendah’ (not its real name),
just outside the town of Majalaya in the
West Java district of Bandung. This is a
community that I have followed for the
past 15 years (see Antlöv 1995 for a full
monograph on the village).
Sariendah is a modern, semi-urban
village some 20 minutes by frequent
minibus from Majalaya, the former tex-
tile centre of Indonesia, with hundreds
of small factories still producing woven
cloth for domestic consumption. More
than half the population of Sariendah
works in textile factories, some in Maja-
laya, others in Sariendah. During the
past two decades, impressive economic
growth has created an incipient middle
class in the village (Antlöv 1999). Some
15 years ago, Sariendah had no electric-
ity. Today, there is a video rental shop
and a computer software stall. Govern-
ment programs in agriculture, credit
Hans Antlöv
schemes, family planning and education
have been implemented fairly success-
fully. Sariendah has more than once won
the ‘Best Village’ competition held each
year in the subdistrict.
Until 1998 Sariendah was a Golkar
stronghold. Almost all local notables
were recruited—encouraged, persuad-
ed, coopted or coerced—into the village
bureaucracy. In the mid 1980s, the vil-
lage administration consisted of some
178 official positions in 18 organisations,
including the LMD, the LKMD, the Is-
lamic Teachers Council (Majelis Ulama),
the Association of Active Youth (Karang
Taruna), and the neighbourhood admin-
istrative units, Rukun Warga and Rukun
Tetangga (Antlöv 1995: 51–5). But there
was not a fair distribution of public of-
fices in Sariendah. With few exceptions,
leaders were from the village elite, and
important political offices were distrib-
uted among a restricted number of fam-
ilies: the 178 offices were occupied by
95 persons; of these, 49 persons held one
position, 30 held two positions and 12
held three or four positions. At the cen-
tre there were four individuals, led by
the village head, who between them
held a total of 29 offices. In spite of their
power, however, they had little autono-
my, and the head strictly enforced de-
crees and policies determined from
above, visiting Majalaya almost daily to
meet with government agencies on this
or that policy or decision. It was a typi-
cal New Order village (for other good
village studies, see Hart 1986; Hardjono
1987; Hüsken 1988; Schweizer 1989;
Warren 1993; Cederroth 1995; and Su-
wondo 1997).
How much of this has changed today,
with the implementation of Law 22/
1999 and the introduction of the BPD?
The Bandung district government
passed the implementing regulations on
village governance quite early, in May–
June 2000. The two decrees on the BPD
 Village Government and Rural Development: The New Democratic Framework
(relating to elections and functions) are
fairly straightforward and in line with
Law 22 and Kepmen 64. Candidates for
the BPD can be proposed by individu-
als or organisations, and all residents 18
years and older have the right to vote
through universal and secret balloting.
Sariendah is a large village (approxi-
mately 10,000 people), so there are 13
members in the BPD. There were 25 can-
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didates who passed the eligibility
screening and two who did not: criteria
include completion of secondary educa-
tion, that candidates have lived in the
village for five years, and that they are
‘loyal and faithful to Pancasila and the
1945 Constitution’. Village head elec-
tions have always been very competi-
tive events, and so was the BPD election
in 2000. Candidates campaigned in their
home hamlets for votes, and posters
were seen all around the village with
photos of candidates. Some of the more
energetic candidates provided meals
and cigarettes to potential voters.
Voting took place on a Sunday in Sep-
tember 2000, when people were off
work, and most people voted—some
75%, according to official statistics. The
voting process for the BPD was similar
to that for national and village head elec-
tions. The ballot paper had photos of the
25 candidates, and voters had to punch
a hole for the candidate of their choice.
The same polling stations were used as
during the 1999 national general elec-
tions, in 12 places around the village.
No-one complained that voting was
anything but free and fair. As is usually
the case in local politics in Java,
residence and family relations were im-
portant determinants of voting behav-
iour—when people talked about which
candidate they supported, it was some-
one whom they knew or who lived in
their hamlet.
Of the 13 elected candidates, four
were new to the village government,
205
while nine had some kind of previous
experience. They had a variety of back-
grounds: school teacher, religious
leader, factory worker, entrepreneur,
pensioner. Only one was a woman, and
only two were younger than 30 years.
The candidate with the most votes au-
tomatically became chair. He is a prima-
ry school teacher and son of a former
popular village head, and also shares
great-grandparents with the present
head. The runner-up automatically be-
came secretary. She too is a primary
school teacher, but her popularity comes
from the fact that she is the most respect-
ed female Islamic teacher in Sariendah,
holding several classes per week for
women in different hamlets.
The BPD members were sworn in
immediately, and have met twice per
month during the initial two years. Kep-
men 64/1999 requires BPDs to meet at
least once a year, but the Sariendah
members have taken their new task se-
riously. The relationship of the BPD with
the village government—the head and
his staff—is fairly good. The Sariendah
village head was elected after reformasi,
in December 1999, and has proved his
worth. He is energetic, sympathetic and
popular, and consults regularly with the
BPD.
In February 2001, the BPD approved
the village budget for 2001, drafted and
submitted by the village head. The total
budget was Rp 80 million ($8,000), com-
pared with the Rp 8 million Sariendah
received in the past. Rp 50 million comes
from a block grant from the Bandung
government, and the remainder from
local revenues. The most important
sources of local revenue are house-tax,
charges for minibuses passing through
the village and income from a new
marketplace built in 2000 with Social
Safety Net funds.12 Budget funds have
been used for regular infrastructure de-
velopment projects such as road and ir-
 206
rigation improvements, for the village
office, and to build an office for the BPD,
the first in the subdistrict. There has also
been discussion about building a swim-
ming pool, to attract students through
compulsory swimming classes! This
might seem extravagant, but the pool
would be owned by the village, and rev-
enues would go to the village budget.
Not everyone is in favour of this pro-
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posal, however.
The BPD is now the main institution
in the village. The LMD has disap-
peared, and the LKDM exists in a re-
vised form, as the LPMD, the Lembaga
Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa, Vil-
lage Community Empowerment Board
(my emphasis). It is still incorporated
into the state bureaucracy, but much
more loosely: no longer can the Depart-
ment of Home Affairs impose its pro-
grams through its loyal clients. But the
village government and BPD in Sari-
endah still consult with the LPMD in
carrying out development programs.
The women’s equivalent, the PKK, is in
a similar position: it exists as a quasi-
independent organisation but, without
the power to enforce policies from
above, it does not play an important
political role. The same is true of the
Babinsa. Sariendah still has a soldier
placed in the village, but his (informal
and formal) authority is much less pro-
nounced than in the past. Finally, Golkar
has all but disappeared from Sariendah.
It ran second in the 1999 elections, to
everyone’s surprise (Antlöv 2003b), but
the village government has respected
the Habibie regulation that civil servants
may not join political parties, and has
not privileged Golkar. Parties per se are
not very important actors in local poli-
tics in Indonesia today, and Sariendah
is no exception. This will possibly
change during 2003–04, as the country
moves towards the new national elec-
Hans Antlöv
tion. There are no other political organ-
isations in Sariendah, even though they
are permitted by Law 22/1999. With the
presence of the LPMD, there is some
minimal degree of organisational diver-
sity, and people in Sariendah seem to
be satisfied by this.
In the past it was quite a comfortable
task to be a village official, with privi-
leged access to funds and power, and
no checks and balances. It is different
today. On the one hand, the officials
are allocated an increased workload
through decentralisation. On the other,
they are being scrutinised by the BPD,
and are therefore less able to profit from
their positions. Candidates for the vil-
lage headship can no longer be motivat-
ed primarily by the economic benefits
of office. There must be other rewards
for village officials, such as esteem and
popularity. The new head in Sariendah
thus talks about his jasa (‘service-mind-
edness’) and says that he is proud to rep-
resent the village. In this way, a new
type of village leader is being created,
with greater popular support than in the
past. But this is obviously something
that will not change overnight, especial-
ly in a society so characterised by pa-
tronage.
One of the promises of democratic
local governance is that government will
become more attuned to the needs of
local people and allocate funds to those
who need them most (Manor 1998; Blair
2000; Cornwall and Gaventa 2001; Fung
and Wright 2001). This has not yet hap-
pened in Sariendah, as funds have been
used mainly for village infrastructure
projects, such as building the BPD of-
fice. Some people are critical of the
swimming pool plan: they cannot see
how they would benefit. But the new
market is appreciated; residents no long-
er need to travel to dirty, crowded Maja-
laya to do their daily shopping. And
 Village Government and Rural Development: The New Democratic Framework
there is hope that since more people are
involved in decision making, budget
allocations and public policies will bet-
ter reflect popular aspirations. The great-
er competition that politics entails
increases the likelihood that the Sari-
endah elite will seek political support
from disadvantaged groups—diversify-
ing the political arena and giving great-
er importance to pro-poor policies. The
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village head and his staff are no longer
the only authorities in the village: there
is a multiplicity of voices. With the new
office, BPD members will be on call ev-
ery day. Anyone can come to the office
with a complaint or a suggestion. This
is new: the former LMD was monopo-
lised by the village government, and
people knew it was of no use to protest
against official corruption or abuse of
power. It is too early yet to say whether
the Sariendah BPD will manage to bal-
ance the demands of the village head
and those of people critical of his way
of running the village, but the start has
been promising.
IMPLICATIONS FOR RURAL
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
The Indonesian government is search-
ing for a new paradigm to empower vil-
lagers, fight poverty and develop the
countryside. Since it lacks the funds, the
foreign backing and the institutional ap-
paratus to support large-scale rural de-
velopment interventions, solutions of
this kind are probably on their way out.
Rather, as far as we can read from pub-
lic statements (since the government
does not have a detailed plan for this),
rural development will be pursued
through decentralisation of power to the
regions and provision of a transparent
legal and political framework that will
attract foreign and domestic capital.
There are a number of factors that have
a direct impact on how development
207
programs will be implemented in the
future, and I would argue that these to-
gether provide for a paradigmatic shift
in rural development and village gov-
ernance in Indonesia.
The first thing to notice is village au-
tonomy. In the past, higher authorities
could do more or less as they wanted
with villages: the village head and LMD
were not in a position to protest. The
LKMD was the arm of the Department
of Home Affairs in the village, control-
ling the flow of resources and develop-
ment projects. Other ministries had
similar line agencies. During my field-
work in Sariendah in 1986, for example,
large parts of West Java were threatened
by crop failure due to a locust invasion.
The Department of Agriculture issued
an instruction that farmers should use
only three types of pesticide, those
known to kill the locust. Through its dis-
trict and subdistrict branches this mea-
sure was implemented in all villages and
the bad harvest was averted. Today,
with democracy and autonomy, it will
be much more difficult for the govern-
ment to use such ‘firm-hand’ policies.
There will be fewer uniform nation-
wide programs, since local conditions
vary greatly. No longer will Jakarta-
based experts decide what is best for the
country, and carry out the blueprints
through the National Planning Board
(Bappenas).13 The ‘one-size-fits-all’ ap-
proach is of the past. This means that
rural development programs will need
to be designed modularly (rather than
generically) so that they can take into
account local conditions, social structure
and traditional values. People are cher-
ishing their norms, their ‘traditional wis-
dom’ (kearifan lokal) and it may be more
difficult in the future to introduce pro-
grams such as family planning or secu-
lar schooling that conflict with the
values of particular regional popula-
 208
tions. (Unfortunately, this shift is also
bringing about tendencies to intolerance
and ethnic chauvinism.)
However, in spite of the far-reaching
character of regional autonomy, it seems
that in practice many rural development
programs will remain under the author-
ity of the central government. Govern-
ment Regulation 25 of 2000 (PP 25/2000)
details the functions of the central and
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provincial levels of government (by
default leaving the functions not
mentioned to district and municipal
governments) and states explicitly that
agricultural extension and various tech-
nical standards remain under central
government authority. Poverty allevia-
tion per se is not mentioned in PP
25/2000, but a new national body for
poverty alleviation has been established.
Education and health care have been
devolved to the districts, but their capa-
city to manage these services may prove
inadequate, which would allow the
provincial government to resume re-
sponsibility for them (Law 22/1999,
paragraph 9.2).
Another important factor is the
diminishing financial capacity of the
central government. One direct conse-
quence of fiscal devolution is that the
centre will have less money to spend
within all sectors of development. Add-
ed to this are the severe financial con-
straints resulting from the 1997–98 crisis
and the cost of debt from the subsequent
IMF rescue packages. In 2003–04, it is es-
timated that the total funds allocated for
development programs in the national
budget (the dana pembangunan) will be
less than the interest paid on domestic
and international debt.14 We can there-
fore expect that the central government
will spend less on rural development
than in the past. With fiscal devolution
and a huge domestic and international
debt, it cannot afford to do otherwise.
Hans Antlöv
This is both good and bad. It is good
for reasons already mentioned: it signals
the end of the servitude of villages to
the central government and unleashes
long-suppressed creativity and innova-
tion in the regions. It is bad because pov-
erty is on the rise in Indonesia, and local
governments have to date not been very
successful in addressing issues of rural
development. One example of the com-
plex character of rural development and
regional autonomy is Kutai Kertanega-
ra in East Kalimantan, one of the richest
districts in Indonesia, with large oil and
timber resources. Amid much publicity,
the district head (who is also chair of the
Indonesian Association of District
Heads, Apkasi) in early 2001 launched
what he called the ‘One Billion Rupiah
per Village Movement’ (Gerakan Desa
Semilyar), promising to provide each
village in the district with development
projects worth Rp 1 billion ($100,000),
an amount increased in 2002 to Rp 2 bil-
lion! The movement’s promotion flyer
states that villages, especially those in
the interior, in the past received only
limited support from district, province
and central governments, even though
resources raised in Kutai come mainly
from natural resources located in the
interior. (There are few industries in
Kutai and almost no tourism.) These
village funds are divided between
economic enterprises, infrastructural de-
velopment and human resources.
However, the program has been crit-
icised. First, there are allegations that the
district government is misusing or mis-
allocating funds, and that the Gerakan
Desa Semilyar will unnecessarily enrich
companies and agencies that are close
to the upper echelons of the Kutai Kerta-
negara government. But beyond these
accusations, local community workers
are also worried that so much money
‘dropped’ into a village will cause more
 Village Government and Rural Development: The New Democratic Framework
problems than it solves. Such an opin-
ion is based on the somewhat bitter-
sweet experience of the Social Safety Net
programs of recent years. Even though
some funds did reach the countryside
and the poor, the ‘quick and dirty’ na-
ture of these crash programs created
corruption and dependence. If villages
in the past at times could not even use
Rp 10 or 15 million responsibly, how can
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they be expected to manage Rp 1 or 2
billion? And will the funds not merely
create new forms of patronage and de-
pendency?
In order for villages to become more
autonomous and self-sustaining than in
the past, Law 22/1999 allows them to
raise their own revenues for local devel-
opment projects determined by the BPD
and the village head.15 In the past, vil-
lages were dependent on a yearly block
grant from the district government, in
addition to whatever extra projects the
village could get from various line min-
istries. There were no real incentives for
villages to be innovative—in fact, there
were implicit disincentives, since local
innovation might lead to unwanted
questions higher up in the command
chain. Today, however, there are provi-
sions for village enterprises. These are
specified in Kepmen 64/1999 as ‘Vil-
lage-Owned Enterprises’ (Badan Usaha
Milik Desa), and are legal entities un-
der commercial law.
Around the country, this has led to
much experimentation and innovation.
The Sariendah government’s new mar-
ket (run as a village-owned enterprise)
and proposed swimming pool are exam-
ples, and we see more and more of such
local initiatives. In one village I visited
just outside of Bukittinggi in West
Sumatra, the village customary elders,
organised within the revived customary
association known as Ninik Mamak,
collected Rp 6 million ($600) in the vil-
209
lage to purchase a pump that provides
water to 40 hectares of land. This is a
purely village initiative (murni dari ma-
syarakat), as the elders proudly told me,
without interference from higher au-
thorities.
TOWARDS LOCAL DEMOCRACY
AND VILLAGE AUTONOMY
Law 22/1999 on Local Governance has
introduced the possibility of renewal
and self-rule for village institutions that
under the New Order were uniform,
authoritarian, corrupt and often in dis-
repute. It is an enormous task to rebuild
democratic and autonomous communi-
ties after decades of intervention and
often harsh political control. We should
not expect immediate results. It will take
time before the governance structure
becomes more equitable, meaning that
the village government becomes disem-
powered relative to the BPD. Neverthe-
less, the new legislation has been greeted
by villagers across the country as an ex-
citing instrument for democratic revi-
talisation of village leadership and
self-government. The voices of villagers
in running their community are being
strengthened and diversified. A system
of checks and balances has been intro-
duced that counters the power of the
village heads.
How present is the state in Indone-
sian villages today? During the past few
years there has emerged a real measure
of local autonomy. The doctrine of mono-
loyalitas has been abolished, so that
Golkar no longer holds monopoly pow-
er, and members of the local village elite
are not required to support the govern-
ment. Villages can resist proposed de-
velopment projects and take decisions
independently of higher authorities. In-
stitutions can be adapted to local needs
and wisdom. These are real and mean-
ingful changes.
 210
But there are threats.16 It is important
to ensure that the BPD becomes a truly
representative body and can maintain its
present high level of credibility and au-
thority. If the BPD is devalued (as the
implementing regulations seem to indi-
cate), the prospect of genuine village
democracy is greatly weakened. BPDs
in some parts of the country have ini-
tially bowed to the traditional power of
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the executive. Members of councils need
to be trained and empowered: they need
to be reassured that, in the tightly knit
village community, they will not be sub-
ject to social or political sanctions by the
executive or other members of the elite
if they criticise village leaders.
However, the main threat to grass-
roots democracy and village autonomy
comes from outside the communities,
from the state and from district elites. I
am referring to the half-hearted mea-
sures through which central and district
governments support village autonomy,
and the way local elites have captured
the fruits of decentralisation. To what
extent higher authorities will allow vil-
lages to maintain their autonomy is still
very uncertain. The army’s Babinsa are
still present in most villages, even
though they have become less power-
ful. There is a wish to revise Law
22/1999;17 certainly there are powerful
forces in Jakarta who would want to re-
centralise and maintain control over the
countryside. There is no guarantee that
higher levels of government will sup-
port the BPD vis-à-vis the village head.
District governments will continue to
want a loyal head and village govern-
ment, and might therefore in the future
continue to support the executive rath-
er than the legislative branch.
Given this uncertain context, it is not
sufficient merely to have laws support-
ing democratisation and decentralisa-
tion—there must also be clear policies
Hans Antlöv
to include the disadvantaged. A roman-
ticising of villages and communities
might lead to a side-stepping of basic
democratic principles. Concepts like ‘lo-
cal wisdom’, ‘village autonomy’ and
‘customary values’ are often used naïve-
ly—in fact such concepts could provide
for highly patrimonial and authoritari-
an government structures (Benda-
Beckmann and Benda-Beckmann 2001).
If the quest for regional autonomy al-
lows traditional and aristocratic elites to
regain the authority they lost in the im-
mediate post-independence period, this
might not necessarily be conducive to
democracy and pro-poor policies.
We do not yet know the future of lo-
cal democracy and rural development
in Indonesia. But fundamental changes
in the leadership and institutional struc-
ture of villages offer considerable hope
that new local organisations will be built
that can protect and articulate the peo-
ple’s interests. This is why hundreds of
thousands of villagers around the coun-
try invest considerable time and energy
in the BPDs. The changes are a major
democratic breakthrough and have
great potential to open up decision mak-
ing and popular participation. As the
brief discussion of the Sariendah case
shows, villagers have more trust in the
local government today than before de-
centralisation, simply because it is per-
forming better under scrutiny and
supervision. It is much more difficult for
village officials to be corrupt. More peo-
ple are learning about democratic pro-
cesses of decision making. There is hope
that the village will be governed by peo-
ple who are committed and well inten-
tioned, rather than by the rent seekers
of the past. This is good for rural devel-
opment, and good for Indonesia.
 Village Government and Rural Development: The New Democratic Framework
NOTES
1 Zacharia (2000: ch. 3) provides a fuller
discussion of these regulations.
2 1945 Constitution, section 4, paragraph
18, Elucidation, translated in Simor-
angkir and Mang Reng Say (1980: 61–2).
3 James Scott has argued (1998: 2) that
states need to make each community leg-
ible in order to ‘get a handle on its sub-
jects and their environment … Whatever
their other purposes, the design of scien-
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tific forestry and agriculture and the lay-
outs of plantations, collective farms,
[Tanzanian] ujamaa villages, and [Viet-
namese] strategic hamlets all seemed cal-
culated to make the terrain, its product,
and its workforce more legible—and
hence manipulable—from above and
from the center’.
4 Ketetapan MPR RI Nomor V/MPR/1983
tentang Pertanggung-jawaban Presiden
Republik Indonesia Soeharto selaku
Mandataris Majelis Permusyawaratan
Rakyat serta Pengukuhan Pemberian
Penghargaan sebagai Bapak Pembangu-
nan Indonesia [MPR Decision No. V/
MPR/1983 on the Responsibilities of
President Soeharto of the Republic of
Indonesia as Mandated by the People’s
Consultative Assembly and on the Be-
stowal of the Title of Father of Indone-
sian Development].
5 The LKMD was introduced in 1980 as the
state’s vehicle for rural development
(Schulte Nordholt 1987). It was the low-
est level of a complex planning frame-
work for national development. It was
originally intended that villagers’ voices
would be heard in the LKMD and
forwarded upwards through the bureau-
cracy. But the LKMD was not a demo-
cratic institution, because its members
were appointed by the village head, so it
was soon captured by village elites to
further their own interests. The LKMD
rather became the main channel for lo-
cal-level corruption, since development
projects and their funds were routed
through it.
6 Under Law 5/1979 village heads were
elected. In fact, the system of village head
elections has remained stable over a long
period, at least on Java. It was institution-
211
alised by the Dutch colonial government,
beginning in Central Java in the early
19th century. Some self-ruling govern-
ments in the outer islands had elected
heads, but the majority had hereditary
leaders. In most cases, and certainly on
Java, heads before 1979 were appointed
or elected for life. But although under
Law 5/1979 village heads were elected
by universal suffrage, elections were
tightly controlled by the government
(Schulte Nordholt 1982; Keeler 1985; Kar-
todirdjo 1992; Hüsken 1994; Antlöv 1995;
Syahbudin Latief 2000). Because of the
privileges that came with the office, elec-
tions were highly competitive, in Java
sometimes involving tens of thousands
of dollars in campaign expenses (for one
such case, see Hüsken 1994). Neverthe-
less, through a compulsory screening
process, authorities could weed out un-
wanted candidates and, through intimi-
dation and privileged treatment, ensure
that the favoured candidate would win.
7 The subdistrict (kecamatan) is conspicu-
ously absent in Law 22/1999 and its im-
plementing regulations. It is mentioned
only briefly in paragraph 1.m of the law,
as the extended arm of the district gov-
ernment [wilayah kerja Camat sebagai per-
angkat Daerah Kabupaten dan Daerah Kota],
with no autonomy.
8 Administrative villages (desa) exist only
within districts (kabupaten) and not with-
in municipalities (kota). Even though Law
22/1999 also covers kota, this does not
concern us here, since urban communi-
ties (kelurahan) are not regulated under
the section on village governance—the
kelurahan have no autonomy and no dem-
ocratic institutions, and remain under the
firm authority of the subdistrict and
municipal government (paragraph 1.n).
In the past, there were some desa in cit-
ies, but with Law 22 they have been con-
verted to kelurahan (or should have
been—this has been resisted in some ar-
eas).
9 For a case study of the way such regula-
tions have been implemented in West
Sumatra, see Benda-Beckmann and
Benda-Beckmann (2001).
 212
10 These requirements are reminiscent of
those in Law 5/1979; for instance, the
candidate must not have been a member
of the Indonesian Communist Party,
must be loyal to Pancasila, and must be-
lieve in God.
11 Both Kepmen 64/1999 and PP 76/2001
are available at www.gtzsfdm.or.id.
12 After the Asian financial crisis, the gov-
ernment replaced its regular develop-
ment programs with so-called Social
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Safety Net projects, infusing cash into the
countryside through a number of food-
for-work projects, subsidised rice and
public health care programs and micro-
credit schemes (Daly and Fane 2002).
13 This has direct consequences for foreign
consultants and experts: their tasks will
be more complex and localised but, it is
hoped, also more in conformity with lo-
cal conditions.
14 Personal communication, Sugeng Ba-
hagijo, deputy director, International
NGO Forum on Indonesian Develop-
ment (INFID), 20/12/2002.
15 Villages are not mentioned in Law 25/
1999 on the Fiscal Balance between Cen-
tral and Local Governments, and this law
need not concern us here.
16 I have discussed in a separate essay some
of the challenges for village institutions
in the coming years (Antlöv forthcom-
ing). They include the resilience of the
village elite, the absence of full central
government support for village auto-
nomy, and the lack of district–village fis-
cal balance.
17 The latest development (June 2003) is that
the Department of Home Affairs has
again initiated the revision (the word
used is penyempurnaan, lit. ‘perfecting’),
aiming to submit the bill to the DPR in
late 2003 and pass it before the 2004 na-
tional election. At the time of writing, the
content is not publicly known.
Hans Antlöv
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