G.R. No. 190809. February 13, 2017.

*
DE LA SALLE-ARANETA UNIVERSITY, petitioner, vs.
JUANITO C. BERNARDO, respondent.

FACTS:

 Bernardo filed a complaint against DLSAU and its owner/manager, Dr. Oscar Bautista (Dr. Bautista), for the
payment of retirement benefits. Bernardo alleged that he started working as a part-time professional lecturer at
DLS-AU and his teaching contract was renewed at the start of every semester and summer. However, on
November 8, 2003, DLS-AU informed Bernardo that he could not teach at the school anymore as the school was
implementing the retirement age limit for its faculty members. As he was already 75 years old, Bernardo had no
choice but to retire. Bernardo immediately sought advice from the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
regarding his entitlement to retirement benefits after 27 years of employment under Republic Act No. 7641,
otherwise known as the “New Retirement Law,” and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Yet, Dr. Bautista, in
a letter dated February 12, 2004, stated that Bernardo was not entitled to any kind of separation pay or benefits.
Dr. Bautista explained to Bernardo that as mandated by the DLSAU’s policy and Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA), only fulltime permanent faculty of DLS-AU for at least five years immediately preceeding the termination
of their employment could avail themselves of the post -employment benefits. Aggrieved by the repeated
denials of his claim for retirement benefits, Bernardo filed before the NLRC, National Capital Region, a complaint
for nonpayment of retirement benefits and damages against DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista. The Labor Arbiter
rendered its Decision dismissing Bernardo’s complaint on the ground of prescription while the NLRC reversed the
abor Arbiter’s ruling and found that Bernardo timely filed his complaint for retirement benefits. DLS-AU filed
before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, imputing grave abuse of discretion onthe
part of the NLRC. However, The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the NLRC judgment.

ISSUES:

1. WHETHER PART-TIME EMPLOYEES ARE EXCLUDED FROM THE COVERAGE OF THOSE ENTITLED TO RETIREMENT
BENEFITS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. [7641].

2. WHETHER A CLAIM FOR RETIREMENT BENEFITS FILED BEYOND THE PERIOD PROVIDED FOR UNDER ART. 291 OF
THE LABOR CODE HAS PRESCRIBED.

HELD:

1. NO. The general coverage of Republic Act No. 7641 is broad enough to encompass all private sector employees,
and part-time employees are not among those specifically exempted from the law. The only exemptions
specifically identified by Republic Act No. 7641 and its Implementing Rules are: (1) employees of the National
Government and its political subdivisions, including government-owned and/or -controlled corporations, if they
are covered by the Civil Service Law and its regulations; and (2) employees of retail, service and agricultural
establishments or operations regularly employing not more than 10 employees.

2. NO. The cause of action for Bernardo’s retirement benefits only accrued after the refusal of DLS-AU to pay him
the same, clearly expressed in Dr. Bautista’s letter dated February 12, 2004. Hence, Bernardo’s complaint, filed
with the NLRC on February 26, 2004, was filed within the three-year prescriptive period provided under Article
291 of the Labor Code.

Art. 306 [291]. Money claims.—All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the
effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they
shall be forever barred.

Inaction or silence may under some circumstances amount to a misrepresentation, so as to raise an equitable
estoppel. When the silence is of such a character and under such circumstances that it would become a fraud on
the other party to permit the party who has kept silent to deny what his silence has induced the other to believe
and act on, it will operate as an estoppel. This doctrine rests on the principle that if one maintains silence, when
in conscience he ought to speak, equity will debar him from speaking when in conscience he ought to remain
silent. DLS-AU, in this case, not only kept its silence that Bernardo had already reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years old, but even continuously offered him contracts of employment for the next 10
years. It should not be allowed to escape its obligation to pay Bernardo’s retirement benefits by putting entirely
the blame for the deferred claim on Ber nar do’s shoulders.
G.R. No. 204422. November 21, 2016.*
JESUS B. VILLAMOR, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES’
COMPENSATION COMMISSION (ECC) and SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner was employed by Valle Verde Country Club, Inc. (VVCCI). On November 3, 2006, he was brought to Our Lady of
Lourdes Hospital, Manila, due to dizziness associated with numbness and weakness on his left arm and leg. After more
than a week of confinement, petitioner was discharged from the said hospital with diagnoses of Hypertension Stage 1;
Cerebro-Vascular Disease (CVD) Acute, Non-Hemorrhagic Infarct Right Pons and Right Basal Ganglia. Petitioner filed
before respondent SSS, claims for sickness benefits under the SSS law and the EC TTD benefits under the EC law for his
CVD or stroke, Infarct Hypertension. Respondent SSS granted his claim for sickness benefits under the SSS law. However,
it denied his claim for EC TTD benefits on the ground that there is no causal relationship between his illness and his
working conditions. Petitioner appealed the denial of his claim to respondent Employees’ Compensation Commission
(ECC) and rendered a Decision affirming the denial of petitioner’s claim due to his failure to adduce substantial evidence
that his stroke was work-related. Respondent ECC ruled that petitioner’s illness was a ‘‘result of complications expected
from a progressive disease, atherosclerosis, enhanced by major risk factors such as history of cigarette smoking. The CA
affirmed the denial of petitioner’s claim for EC TTD benefits under PD No. 626, as amended.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the CA erred in denying his claim for EC TTD.

2. Whether petitioner is entitled to his claim for EC TTD benefits under PD No. 626, as amended.

HELD:

1. YES. the Court finds that the CA seriously erred in affirming the factual findings of the respondents SSS and ECC
that petitioner is a mere clerk and that the nature of his work did not affect his health; these factual findings are
not supported by the evidence on record and are based on misapprehension of facts.

His duties and responsibilities as Sports Area-In-Charge are obviously laborious and stressful since he is tasked to
cater to the needs of all club members and their guests, and to coordinate with the other departments of the
club regarding their needs. Petitioner is also the President of the VVCCI Employees Union and was subjected to
harassment and unfair labor tactics of the management of the club. In fact, when petitioner suffered a stroke,
there were four pending cases filed by him, on behalf of the union and in his own personal capacity.

2. YES. Cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are considered as occupational diseases under Nos.
19 and 29, respectively, of Annex ‘A’ of the Implementing Rules of P.D. No. 626, as amended. What the law
requires is a reasonable work-connection and not direct causal relation. It is enough that the hypothesis on
which the workmen’s claim is based is probable. As correctly pointed out by the CA, probability, not the ultimate
degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings. For, in interpreting and carrying out the
provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the primordial and paramount
consideration is the employee’s welfare. To safeguard the worker’s rights, any doubt as to the proper
interpretation and application must be resolved in [his] favor.

As to the findings of respondents SSS and ECC that petitioner is a chronic smoker and drinker, the Court finds
that it should not bar petitioner’s claim for compensation, whether or not such findings are true.
G.R. No. 187950. January 11, 2017.*
CRISTINA BARSOLO, petitioner, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY
SYSTEM, respondent.

FACTS:

Cristina Barsolo’s (Cristina) deceased husband, Manuel M. Barsolo (Manuel), “was employed as a seaman by
various Companies from 1988 to 2002. Manuel served as a Riding Gang/Able Seaman onboard MT Polaris Star
with Vela International Marine Ltd., (Vela). Vela was his last employer before he died in 2006. After his separation
from employment with Vela, Manuel was diagnosed with hypertensive cardiovascular disease coronary artery
disease, and osteoarthritis. He was examined and treated at the Philippine Heart Center as an outpatient from
April 2, 2003 to October 22, 2004. When he died on September 24, 2006, the autopsy report listed myocardial
infarction as his cause of death. Cristina filed a claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as
amended, with the Social Security System. The Social Security System denied her claim on the ground that there
was no longer an employer-employee relationship at the time of Manuel’s death and that being a smoker
increased his risk of contracting the illness. Cristina appealed her case to the Employees’ Compensation
Commission, which denied the appeal for lack of merit. Aggrieved, Cristina filed a Petition for Review before the
Court of Appeals which denied for lack of merit and that Cristina failed to prove a causal relationship between
Manuel’s work and the illness that brought about his death.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Court of Appeals erred in finding that “the illness which caused the death of [her] husband[,] had no
relation with his occupation

2. Whether Cristina is entitled to compensation for the death of her husband.

HELD:

1. NO.

Section 1(h), Rule III of the ECC Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation, now considers cardiovascular
disease as compensable occupational disease. Included in Annex “A” is cardiovascular disease, which cover
myocardial infarction. However, it may be considered as compensable occupational disease only when substantial
evidence is adduced to prove any of the following conditions:

a) If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment there must be proof that an acute
exacerbation clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reason of the nature of his work;

b) The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and must be followed within
twenty-four (24) hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac assault to constitute causal relationship;

c) If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before subjecting himself to strain of work showed signs and
symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is
reasonable to claim a causal relationship.

We held that for myocardial infarction to be considered a compensable occupational disease, any of the three
conditions must be proven by substantial evidence. Petitioner failed in this regard. There was no showing that her
husband showed any sign or symptom of cardiac injury during the performance of his functions, petitioner clearly
failed to show that her husband’s employment caused the disease or that his working conditions aggravated his
existing heart ailment.

2. NO. Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, Manuel died on September 24, 2006, four years after he
disembarked from MV Polaris Star.38 Other factors have already played a role in aggravating his illness. Due to
the considerable lapse of time, more convincing evidence must be presented in order to attribute the cause of
death to Manuel’s work. In the absence of such evidence and under the circumstances of this case, this Court
cannot assume that the illness that caused Manuel’s death was acquired during his employment with Vela. To
emphasize, it is not refuted that myocardial infarction is a compensable occupational illness. However, it
becomes compensable only when it falls under any of the three conditions, which should be proven by
substantial evidence.
G.R. No. 223035. February 27, 2017.*
REYNALDO Y. SUNIT, petitioner, vs. OSM MARITIME
SERVICES, INC., DOF OSM MARITIME SERVICES A/S, and
CAPT. ADONIS B. DONATO, respondents.

FACTS:

Respondent OSM Maritime hired petitioner Sunit to work onboard the vessel Skandi Texel as Able Body Seaman. During
his employment, petitioner fell from the vessel’s tank and suffered a broken right femur. He was brought to a hospital in
the Netherlands for treatment and was eventually repatriated due to medical reason. Upon his arrival in Manila, he
immediately underwent a post-employment medical examination and treatment for his injury at the Metropolitan
Medical Center, wherein the company-designated physician diagnosed him to be suffering from a “Fractured, Right
Femur; S/P Intramedullary Nailing, Right Femur. After 92 days of treatment, the company designated doctor issued a
Medical Report giving petitioner an interim disability Grade of 10. Dissatisfied with the company doctor, petitioner
sought the opinion of another doctor, Dr. Garduce who recommended a disability grade of three in his Medical Report.
After further medical treatment, petitioner was assessed with a final disability grade of 10 by the company physician of
respondent OSM Maritime, Dr. Chuasuan. Respondents offered petitioner disability benefit of $30,225 in accordance
with the disability Grade 10 that the company designated doctor issued. Petitioner, however, refused the offer and filed a
claim for a disability benefit of USD$150,000.00 based on the POEA-SEC and NIS AMOSUP CBA.The parties agreed to
consult Dr. Bathan for a third opinion. Dr. Bathan issued a Medical Certificate recommending a Grade 9 disability
pursuant to the Schedule of Disabilities and Impediments under the POEA-SEC. In addition, Dr. Bathan stated therein that
petitioner is “not yet fit to work.” The Labor Arbiter awarded petitioner disability benefit in the amount of $13,060. The
NLRC rendered a Decision modifying the LA’s findings and awarded petitioner permanent and total disability benefit in
the amount of $150,000. The NLRC reasoned that petitioner is considered as totally and permanently disabled since Dr.
Bathan, the third doctor, issued the Grade 9 disability recommendation after the lapse of the 240-day period required for
the determination of a seafarer’s fitness to work or degree of disability under the POEA-SEC. The CA granted the
respondents’ petition and reinstated the LA’s Ruling. the appellate court held that the 240-day period for assessing the
degree of disability only applies to the company-designated doctor, and not to the third doctor.

ISSUES:

Whether petitioner is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits of USD$150,000.00

HELD:

YES.

 As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated
physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in
no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his
basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the
company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA-Standard Employment
Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such
declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period
may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a
permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time
such declaration is justified by his medical condition.

 CA, thus, correctly held that the 240-day period for assessing
the degree of disability only applies to the company-designated
doctor, and not the third doctor.

 The appointed third party physician must likewise arrive at a definite and conclusive assessment of the
seafarer’s disability or fitness to return to work before his or her opinion can be valid and binding between the
parties. In the present case, despite the disability grading that Dr. Bathan issued, petitioner’s medical condition
remained unresolved

 Assessment within the 120/240 day period, and that the said period is inconsequential and has no application on
the third doctor, petitioner’s disability and incapacity to resume working clearly continued for more than 240
days. Applying Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code, petitioner’s disability should be considered permanent and
total despite the Grade 9 disability grading.
G.R. No. 219123. September 11, 2017.*
DESIDERIO C. CUTANDA, petitioner, vs. MARLOW
NAVIGATION PHILS., INC., and/or MARLOW NAVIGATION
CO. LTD. and/or ANTONIO GALVEZ, JR., respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner was hired by respondent Marlow Navigation Phils., Inc. (MNPI) to work as a Key Able Seaman onboard vessel
MV “Malte Rambow”. Prior to his employment, he underwent a medical examination and was declared “fit to work” by
the company-designated physicians. Petitioner had an accident aboard the vessel while performing his duties at the Port
of Malaysia wherein his left index and middle fingers were severely injured and also suffered laceration wounds, when
his left hand was caught and crushed by the tug’s line (rope). After the accident, he was immediately brought to Hospital
in Malaysia for emergency medical treatment. The day after the accident, on October 9, 2012, petitioner was medically
repatriated and arrived in the Philippines on that same day. He immediately reported to the Respondent MNPI’s office
and was referred to Notre Dame Medical Clinic where he was diagnosed with “Lacerated Wounds 2nd & 3rd digits, Left
Hand.” Petitioner was then treated and later referred for rehabilitation/physical therapy. The said accident was
supported by official records of the Social Security System (SSS). However, despite medical intervention and months of
therapy, petitioner’s condition did not improve and he could not return to his work as Key Able Seaman because of the
said injuries. Eventually, petitioner demanded from the respondents that he be paid his disability benefits, but to no
avail. Respondents even stopped providing medical attention to petitioner after the lapse of 120 days despite the
recommendation of PORI that the latter undergo further physical therapy. Respondents also refused to shoulder the
expenses incurred for the medicine of petitioner. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for payment of total disability
benefits, reimbursement of medical expenses, sick allowance, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
Respondents, on the other hand, contended, among other things that when petitioner was eventually repatriated in the
Philippines, he was referred to company-designated physician, Dr. Orlino Hosaka, Jr. for medical care and treatment.
Under Dr. Hosaka’s medical report, a conclusion was made that petitioner was suffering from a disability “Grade 10”
based on POEA-SEC Schedule of Disability Gradings. Labor Arbiter, on January 14, 2014, decided in favor of petitioner.
According to the Labor Arbiter in determining the disability benefits is through POEA-SEC, by medical findings, by
contract and by law. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. They elevated the case to the CA
which reversed the decision of the NLRC. The CA ruled that the company-designated physician, Dr. Hosaka, was able to
make a determination that petitioner has a Grade 10 disability within the 240-day period from the time he suffered his
injury, thus, such declaration effectively prevented petitioner’s temporary disability from becoming permanent.

ISSUES:

Whether petitioner’s illness is compensable as total and permanent disability

HELD:

SC is not a trier of facts but the present issue is essentially a factual issue and falls under one of the exceptions because
the findings of the CA differ with that of the NLRC. Hence, a resolution of the issues presented before the Supreme Court
is necessary.

Petitioner had been unfit to work way beyond the 240 days provided by law, hence, petitioner can be legally considered
as totally and permanently disabled and is entitled to permanent total compensation of US$60,000.00 under Section 32
of the POEA-SEC. As to the award of moral damages and attorney’s fees, this Court, also finds it appropriate to sustain
the ruling of the NLRC.

Under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC, only those injuries or disabilities that are classified as Grade 1 may be considered as
total and permanent. However, if those injuries or disabilities with a disability grading from 2 to 14, hence, partial and
permanent, would incapacitate a seafarer from performing his usual sea duties for a period of more than 120 or 240
days, depending on the need for further medical treatment, then he is, under legal contemplation, totally and
permanently disabled.

The current rule provides: (1) that mere inability to work for a period of 120 days does not entitle a seafarer to
permanent and total disability benefits; (2) that the determination of the fitness of a seafarer for sea duty is within the
province of the company-designated physician, subject to the periods prescribed by law; (3) that the company-
designated physician has an initial 120 days to determine the fitness or disability of the seafarer; and (4) that the period
of treatment may only be extended to 240 days if a sufficient justification exists such as when further medical treatment
is required or when the seafarer is uncooperative.