Fall of Dacca: Why Pakistan Lost Its East Wing

Naya Daur December 16, 2019

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Historian Ilhan Niaz, in a vlog for Naya Daur as part of a series on the 1971 debacle,
explains the separation of East Pakistan and the underlying causes of the tragedy. He is of
the view that the reasons that led to the fall of Dakka include include political factors,
economic factors, military and strategic factors and the mishandling of the political crisis in
East Pakistan in 1969-1970.

When we look at the political causes, we can see that there are three main ones. The first is
that Pakistan comes into existence as a constitutional federation of different provinces. The
constitution making process is to produce a final constitution for the country. Unfortunately,
this process gets delayed and then gets disrupted owing to the fear in the ruling circles of the
western wing of the country that a democratic system will lead to a permanent majority of the
eastern wing because that is where the majority of Pakistanis happen to live at the time of
independence. So, Pakistan’s military and bureaucratic leadership intervene in the political
process and as a result of these interventions, they introduce various steps that undermine
the democratic majority of the East Pakistanis. These steps include the creation of the One
Unit in West Pakistan, the imposition of artificial parity of representation between the two
wings and the intervention in politics in order to remove Prime Ministers from the Eastern
Wing, like Khawaja Nazimuddin, Mohammad Ali Bogra and Hussain Suhrawardy, who are
not willing to do the bidding or have fallen out with the leadership of the military and the civil
service.

Ultimately this also leads to the disruption of the constitutional process when in 1958 the
President of Pakistan, in conjunction with the Army Chief, General Ayub Khan, decides to
abrogate the constitution and this of course leads to first Isknader Mirza overthrowing the
constitution. And a few weeks later, Ayub Khan overthrowing Iskander Mirza.

Once there is military rule in the country, then any hope that the Eastern wing might’ve had
for fair play or for due representation is no longer there. There are of course elections that
are held under Ayub Khan’s military government, such as the 1964 election, but in those
elections, universal franchise is denied because of the Basic Democracies, there is massive
rigging that leads to a very predictable outcome and Fatima Jinnah defeated by Ayub Khan
in the 1964 presidential elections. So, by the mid-1960s people in East Pakistan have
realized that they cannot win through any fair political process. And this of course sets the
stage for the radicalization of opinion in the eastern wing and the articulation of Mujib Ur
Rehman’s radical six points which would turn Pakistan into a very loose confederation, if
adopted.
These political factors were reinforced by very important economic trends. In British India,
the revenue share of the provinces and the central government was about even, roughly
55-45, in the late 1930s. After Pakistan comes into existence, the central government
federalizes most of the revenues leading to a situation where the central government is
collecting 90% of the revenues and the provinces are getting only 10%.

READ Top lies children tell their parents

The problem from the perspective of East Pakistan was that they were producing much of
the country’s foreign exchange and also producing much of the country’s revenues.
However, they got far less in return for their revenue contributions. In fact, between 1948
and 1961, around 80% of federal government expenditure and 70% of all development
expenditure took place in the western wing of the country. And this was in spite of the fact
that the eastern wing was responsible for Pakistan’s positive balance of trade, foreign
exchange and earnings and contributed a larger share of the total revenue. So, there was a
growing sense of alienation in the eastern wing owing to the economic policies, which as
they saw it, were draining resources from East Pakistan for the purpose of investing them in
them western wing.

This is also seen in terms of the divergence in per capita income. By the 1960s, West
Pakistan was enjoying a per capita income of about 20% to 30% more than the eastern
wing. And it was also enjoying much faster economic growth rates.

Then we can also come to certain military causes and particularly important in this regard is
the 1965 War. Until 1965, Pakistan’s military leadership said that the defense of East
Pakistan lies in the west. And what they meant by this was that in the event of a military
conflict with India, West Pakistan, with its heavy concentration of military power, will be able
to effectively neutralize India’s superiority on the eastern border i.e. East Pakistan. When the
war happened, West Pakistan was barely able to defend itself and East Pakistan was left
completely defenseless. This is one of the reasons why in his six points Mujib also wanted
there to be a separate military force for East Pakistan and for the naval headquarters to be
shifted there as well. This doctrine was exposed as unviable owing the 1965 war. But
Pakistan’s military leadership and its political leadership did not actually rethink their
strategic policy.

All of these factors contributed to the alienation of the eastern wing. The disruption of the
democratic process, the denial of the democratic majority of East Pakistan, the various
unconstitutional interventions in Pakistan’s politics that further deprived the political
leadership of its role in government and the economic causes that created inequality i.e.
West Pakistan was getting wealthier as compared to East Pakistan using the resources that
East Pakistan was providing. All of these came together and contributed to growing
disaffection in the country.

The Ayub Khan military regime was unable to cope with the rise of left-wing populist parties
like the People’s Party in the west and the Awami League in the east. However, rather than
stepping down and handing over power to the national assemble, Ayub Khan stepped down
and handed over power to Yahya Khan, who was the Army Chief. He then takes over as
Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) and as the President of the country.

Now, as the CMLA and as the president of the country, Yahya Khan presents himself as a
popular figure who’s going to make concessions to the popular sentiment in the country.
What does he do? He does away with One Unit, abolishes inter wing parity, declares that
there will be fresh elections on the basis of universal franchise and he promises that in the
next constituent assemble that he will convene there will be a simple majority provision
through which the constitution bill would be approved.

READ Imran Khan Grills Modi At UNGA: Mimicry By Shafaat Ali Shah
Yahya and his advisors were of the view that the elections, if they take place, would have a
highly fracture outcome. That is one of the reasons why they didn’t meddle too much in the
electoral process. However, once the votes were counted and the results were out it became
clear that the Awami League had emerged as the majority party with about 160 seats while
in the west, the People’s Party had emerged as the single biggest party with more than 80
seats.

Faced with this situation, the logical step would have been to convene a meeting of the
National Assembly. However, if a meeting of the Assembly was convened, then Yahya
Khan’s earlier provisions, a simple majority would be enough to pass constitutional changes,
would mean that the Awami League would be able to have its way. This set the stage for the
final crisis of secession for the eastern wing because political parties in the western wing
refused to participate, in large measure, in a National Assembly where they would have no
role. The military was able to use this as an excuse to launch a crackdown on the 25th of
March, 1971.

Once the crackdown was launched, a humanitarian crisis was created, which gave India an
ideal opportunity to not only arm and facilitate the opposition to the Pakistani government in
East Pakistan, but it also allowed India to take full advantage of the humanitarian crisis due
to the influx of refugees into Indian territory. To paint itself as a champion of humanitarian
intervention.

When India finally intervened militarily to end the East Pakistan crisis and end Pakistan’s
control there, the international response was very limited and all of the major powers,
including the Soviet Union and the United States, accepted the change in the realities on the
ground. Leaving Pakistan, as far the United States is concerned, out in the lurch…

The blood and tears of 1971

IKRAM SEHGAL/ DR BETTINA ROBOTKA

DECEMBER 15, 2019

16th December revives the gruesome memories of an important event in subcontinental
history. For some of us memories are personal but most of us know about the fall-out ofthe
events of 1971 from history books. The civil war that broke out in March 1971 lasted for
almost nine months and broke our country into two, taking the lives of tens and may be of
hundreds of thousand people, Bengali and otherwise. The number of the victims killed has
never been finally and satisfactorily established, no doubt some gruesome atrocities have
been committed. Today we dedicated this article to those who lost their lives in East
Pakistan.

The violence in 1971 has had lasting impact not only on the political landscape of our
country but on the psyche of our society as well as on that of the Bangladeshis. No real
rehabilitation has taken place between Pakistan and Bangladesh and that is why Pakistan
finds itself accused by both Bangladesh and India of having been solely responsible for all
the death and destruction in the war alone. So far Pakistani academia and politicians have
not done much to contradict this accusation effectively.

The central accusation that Bangladesh and India launched right after the end of the war
which they are upholding until today is of accusing the Pakistani Army of systematic
genocide by killing three million Bengalis. The war did take a heavy toll on the East Pakistani
population, however the way these events have been depicted in the nationalist history
writing of Bangladesh as well as in Indian history writing is utterly exaggerated and
disproportionate and needs further investigation. Rather for political reasons than for the
search of truth the Bangladeshi and the Indian governments have been repeating this
unbelievable canard about the number of civilian victims of the war.

Why do numbers matter so much when even a single civilian killed or woman raped in a war
is inexcusable. However the numbers do matter, because they make the difference between
seeing the war as a tragedy and seeing it as a terrible crime, indeed as a genocide. Let us
start with examining the allegation that the Pakistan Army has been committing genocide in
East Pakistan by killing about 3 million Bengalis during the war.

The violence in 1971 has had lasting impact not only on the political landscape of our
country but on the psyche of our society as well as on that of the Bangladeshis

Extensive killings did take place in 1971 in East Pakistan and not all the bodies have yet
been recovered, the number of the killed could not have been even close to three million.
This number seems to have been brought up by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in a speech that he
gave on arrival from jail in Pakistan via London in January 1972. Sheikh Mujib had been held
in prison for almost all of the war in West Pakistan and did not have an idea what exactly
had been going on in East Pakistan during his detention. Still he had brought the number up.
Already soon after that several sources started contradicting this number as impossible,
among them William Drummond in a report published in The Guardian in 1972 wrote ‘This
figure of three million deaths, which the Sheikh has repeated several times since he returned
to Bangladesh in early January, has been carried uncritically in sections of the world press.
Through repetition of such a claim it gains a validity of its own and gradually evolves from
assertion to fact needing no attribution. My judgement based on numerous trips around
Bangladesh and extensive discussions with many people at the village level as well as in the
government, is that the three million deaths figure is an exaggeration so gross as to be
absurd”. Moreover, as Drummond pointed out in 1972, the finding of someone’s remains
cannot clarify, unless scientifically demonstrated, whether the person was Bengali or
non-Bengali, combatant or non-combatant, whether the death took place in 1971 or whether
it was caused by the Pakistan Army. So from where did Shaikh Mujibur Rahman get this
number of three million? Certainly he was briefed by his comrades in London and one of the
explanations is that in the process of translating an estimated three lakhs into English it
became three million, a number that was later never revised in order to placate the atrocities
that had taken place.

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was aware of the missing creditability of his claims; as a matter of
fact he did try to prove that number by instituting in January 1972 an inquiry committee that
on the basis of information that had to be provided by Awami League members in the
different districts should calculate and prove the number of deaths and submit the report by
April 1972. But other than expected by Mujib and his government the report duly submitted
in April was not able to prove the exaggerated numbers and was because of that never
published. Choudhury M. Abdul Mu’min Chowdhury, a native of Sylhet and a Bengali
nationalist who as a teacher at Dhaka University actively participated in the separatist cause,
had to leave Bangladesh in 1973 for London in orderto be able to speak out and tell his story
of what went on during that war from his perspective. In his book BEHIND THE MYTH OF
THREE MILLION he mentions that a draft of the report that had leaked out showed an
overall casualty figure of 56,743. He further writes that “When a copy of this draft report was
shown to the Prime Minister, “he lost his temper and threw it on the floor, saying in angry
voice ‘I have declared three million dead, and your report could not come up with three score
thousand! What report you have prepared? Keep your report to yourself. What I have said
once shall prevail.” Today it amounts to high treason in Bangladesh to doubt this number of
three million.

There is another source of information about the possible number of victims as well. In
January 1972 Mujib also announced a compensation scheme for the families of those who
had been killed at the hands of the Pakistan Army and their collaborators. Under the
scheme, every victim’s family was promised TK 2,000 as compensation but only 72,000
claims were ever received. Even if we consider that some undeserving also were
compensated and that some families had lost more than only one member the estimated
number of killed would never come close to even half a million and it would include all
killings including those by the razakars, Indians, the Awami League itself.
Also the genocide claim cannot be upheld. Genocide is defined as the systematic elimination
of all or a significant part of a racial, ethnic, religious, cultural or national group. The Pakistan
Army never decided to kill all Bengalis. At the very most they targeted adult men who were
proven or suspected of anti-Pakistani activities. Not always women and children were
spared. The Pakistan Army was fighting a secessionist movement can be accused of
committing political killings, not attempting genocide by trying to exterminate the whole
Bengali community.

Together with genocide the claim of rape and sexual abuse of Bengali women during the
civil war in 1971 by the Pakistan Army has been made repeatedly and is upheld until today
by Bangladesh; the numbers that are quoted are that about 200.000 to 400.000 women that
allegedly have been raped or sexually abused. Again, there is no doubt that rape and sexual
abuse has taken place during the war and are to be deplored but the numbers seem grossly
exaggerated. For an army of little over 34,000 men to rape on this scale in eight or nine
months (while fighting insurgency, guerrilla war and an invasion by India), it would have
meant that each would-be-perpetrator would have had to commit rape at an incredible
rate.

While war and civil war always include violence the atrocities committed during the nine
months in 1971 were neither a decided war strategy nor a one-sided occurrence. It was
initiated by the emotional break-down of established psychological and societal limits fired by
disparate nationalist theories and feelings. The enduring silence about what happened in
East Pakistan in 1971 by political circles and for political reasons in Bangladesh, Pakistan
and India is not only preventing forgiveness to be sought and obtained by the people
involved on all sides but it is hampering the process of historical rehabilitation between the
countries and nations involved and in the subcontinent as such.

As soon as in 2021 it will be 50 years, half a century, that this war has taken place and
disrupted the country that had come into existence in 1947. Now would be a worthy occasion
for Pakistan to start a meaningful re-evaluation of this crucial event in our national history
(Ikram Sehgal is a defence and security analyst and Dr Bettina Robotka is formerly of
Department of South Asian Studies, Humboldt University, Berlin. Extracts are quoted from
the book being published by OUP on 1971).

Mr Sehgal is a defence and security analyst / Dr Bettina Rorobtka is a retired historian of

Humboldt University, Berlin

Time For Pakistan To Apologize To Bangladesh

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Muhammad Ziauddin argues that Pakistan needs to apologise to the people of Bangladesh
for the mistreatment they were subjected to and start seeing it as an independent country.
Pakistan’s reluctance to do so is unnecessarily adversely impacting normal relations
between the two independent countries, and India is benefiting from this hostility.

Now is just the right time for us to tender our heartfelt, sincere apologies to the people of
Bangladesh for all the discrimination they were made to suffer during the 25 years they were
part of Pakistan. Special forgiveness needs also to be sought from them for the bloody
atrocities that were let loose against them in the last nine months that had led the
dismemberment.

The matter as to who actually started the drift would always remain a matter of chicken and
egg mired in history. The questions as to why do we need to apoligise for something that
was ‘crafted’ by Indian military or even about the extent of human and material losses
suffered during the military action in East Pakistan are now in the hands of impartial
historians. Both of us need to accept their verdict.

In a couple of years, Bangladesh would be celebrating its 50th birthday. Time enough for
Pakistanis to recall sans any acrimony or heartburn the circumstances under which our
brothers from eastern wing departed Pakistan on December 16, 1971. Indian chicanery and
its army though did exploit an already tenuous political link between the two wings in the final
show down but it certainly was not what had actually caused the final split. On its part, India
thought it was militarily debunking the raison deter of Pakistan. But what it actually did was
to re-enforce Jinnah’s two-nation theory by helping one more Pakistan to emerge on the
map of the subcontinent as a result of its military folly.

Let us take a pause here to delve a little deeper into British Raj’s history to throw into bold
relief one of the major triggers that had set the stage for the passage of 1940 Lahore
resolution which was moved by one of subcontinent’s greatest Muslim leaders, Maulvi
Fazal-ul-Haq, well-known as the Sher-e-Bengal (lion of Bengal).

The then British Viceroy Lord Curzon partitioned Bengal on October 16, 1905 for
administrative purposes, but the move actually separated the largely Muslim eastern areas
from the largely Hindu western areas. The Hindus of West Bengal, who dominated Bengal’s
business and rural life, were outraged. The partition animated the Muslims to form their own
national organisation and as a follow up emerged Pakistan’s mother party, the All India
Muslim League in Dhaka in 1906. However, in order to appease the majority Hindu
sentiment, Bengal was reunited by Lord Hardinge in 1911 as he annulled the partition in
response to the Swadeshi movement’s riots in protest against the growing belief among
Hindus that East Bengal would have its own courts and policies.

READ Abandoned And Forgotten: The Stranded Biharis In Bangladesh

This act of reunification of Bengal at the behest of its Hindu majority added one more
argument to the prediction of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan of Aligarh Movement fame that the
majority would one day thrust its policies down the throats of the minority.

So, the seed of Pakistan movement was first sowed in what is Bangladesh today. But
Pakistan’s history since the very first day of its emergence on 14th August 1947 is replete
with events and developments that steadily pushed our brethren in the eastern wing to the
point of no return. The quota system introduced in the early years of independence had
excluded from the country’s governance the voice and participation of those who had worked
and sacrificed relatively more for the liberation of Pakistan. This was immediately followed up
by what was known as language movement which was a genuine struggle for recognizing
Bangla as one of the two national languages along with Urdu.

Soon, the politically unpopular system of parity was introduced which brought the relatively
more populated eastern wing politically at par with the western wing. Ayub Khan’s basic
democracy further reduced the political presence of the people of eastern wing in the
national scheme of things.

In due course of time, the eastern wing was turned into a captive market for the goods made
in western wing. Most of the foreign exchange earned by exporting jute, the golden fibre of
the eastern wing which compared to cotton, the silver fibre of western wing was much in
demand the world over during the 1950s and 1960s, especially during the Korean war was
being spent on boosting the economy of West Pakistan.

Most of the multilateral and bilateral assistance and the fruits of country’s economic growth
were being spent on the development of western wing with a paltry share going to the
eastern wing. And in the armed forces the presence of people from eastern wing was
negligible because of the eligibility criteria of physical measurements (more suited to the
physic of people of western wing) fixed for qualifying for entering the armed forces.

Even in civil services as well, the quota system had worked against the relatively more
brilliant citizens of the eastern wing.

Indeed, if one were to study from a distance of almost 50 years and without discriminatory
blinkers, the six points of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman would appear to be closer to the 18th
Constitutional amendment which perhaps the Sheikh’s victorious party in the 1970 elections
would have agreed to if the West Pakistani political leaders plus the then Army leadership
had the willingness and the sagacity to sit across the table with the Sheikh. They could have
negotiated as civilised people rather than ordering military action against our own people
seemingly fed up of the ‘drain’ on our economy due mainly to what we perhaps mistakenly
thought to be the perpetual backwardness and poverty of the people of the eastern wing.

READ SP Dawar’s Family Losing Hope Of Justice, Says They No Longer Trust The Govt
From one historical angle the whole episode of the dismemberment appears to be a
pre-arranged move by West Pakistan to what at that time we thought of ‘good riddance’ of
an extraordinarily heavy burden!

‘Ugly’ Pakistan

After having tendered a formal apology, the government of Pakistan should, on urgent
footings, remove the ‘ugly’ Pakistan that is located right in the heart of Dhaka. The people
living in this ghetto claim that they are Pakistanis who had in the bloody imbroglio of 1970-71
supported the elements which were opposed to the eastern wing going its separate way. But
following independence of Bangladesh they were left behind by Pakistan unclaimed. Though
in the early years, a good number of them was brought home but as the residual Pakistan
got engrossed even more deeply in sorting out its new problems, these Pakistanis began
receding from our memory.

We must, therefore, immediately do something about the issue. In fact, had we done this in
time, perhaps we could have persuaded the Bangladesh government to spare the lives of
those who were subsequently tried and hanged for helping the Pakistan Army during the civil
war that preceded the emergence of Bangladesh.

As of today, Pakistan has no apparent conflict with Bangladesh except the ‘apology’ proviso
hanging unnecessarily adversely impacting normal relations between the two independent
countries. But since we had failed to follow up with all the political and diplomatic needful
that could have helped bring the two nations back in a friendly embrace, Pakistan and
Bangladesh drifted away from each other enhancing further our historic misunderstandings.
This has created the needed space for India to use a willing Dhaka in its move to isolate
Pakistan in South Asia.

We must, therefore, look at today’s Bangladesh with new glasses – as an independent

country in the neighbourhood whose presence on our side would be more helpful than
having it remain fixated in our 1971 memory. Today, Bangladesh is certainly a more
advanced country than Pakistan itself in economic and social terms. Its political presence in
the region as well in the comity of nations is more pronounced than many of its neighbours.
So if we were to adopt a politically more pragmatic approach rather than looking at it from
not -so -savory historical perspective we would certainly come to the conclusion that a
friendly Bangladesh is a political and diplomatic necessity of Pakistan today..

Remembering 1971, APS

National
Mazhar AbbasDecember 16, 2019
From December 16, 1971 to Dec 16, 2014, what lesson we have learnt from the two big
tragedies as every year we mourn the day. While the massacre of 150 children and teachers
of Army Public School, Peshawar, by the terrorists remind us of challenges ahead to
overcome rising religious extremism, the tragedy of the fall of East Pakistan 50 years ago
was the outcome of post-Independence politics of depriving majority right to rule.

Pakistan can still be put on the right path through ‘meaningful democracy’ without political
engineering. Pakistan cannot afford another 1971 or APS. While there is still much to be
done, which required political maturity, the passage of the unanimous Constitution of 1973,
the 18th Amendment, which to large extent settled the issue of provincial autonomy, holding
elections under neutral setup and independent and autonomous Election Commission are
measures which could be regarded as the way forward after 1971. The present crisis of not
reaching any consensus on the three members of Election Commission of Pakistan,
including its chairman, both, government and Opposition had shown political immaturity.
Similarly, the concept of independent ECP, independent Pemra and independent NAB, also
need more clarity in the definition. People appointed on these positions should be judged on
‘merit’ rather which side has proposed the names. Now what lesson establishment has learnt
from 1971 and APS? The two martial laws after 1971 did not go well for Pakistan, but there
is more or less consensus that there is no other alternate to democracy.

Uninterrupted elections since 2008, and transfer of power from one party to another is a way
forward but question mark remains when it come to pre-poll developments like making and
breaking of parties or during the formation of governments.

But the biggest lesson which the establishment has learnt and which will have far-reaching
impact on the society is the ‘war against terrorism’ and ‘extremism’. APS incident has jolted
the whole nation. Pakistan suffered most due to past policies and the decision to eradicate
all kind of terrorism after 2008 that resulted in massive military operation in Swat, South
Waziristan, North Waziristan, Malakand and Karachi.

The whole nation came on ‘one page’ after APS, and never looked back. But the fight
against extremism still looked a big challenge. Disbanding terror networks and Jihadi outfits,
declaring groups outlawed may go a long way in regaining confidence of the world on
Pakistan as a democratic country.

Pakistan is in the process of rebuilding institutions and independence of judiciary and

independent media considered as essential part and two strongest pillars of the State. Thus,
it is important that to accept their independence. There is always a room for improvement,
which can come with the passage of time. Both these institutions also need to show more
responsible behaviour as well.

Fall of Dhaka was the ultimate outcome of our continued failure to allow democracy to
flourish from 1947 to 1971 and both civil and military leadership were responsible. While
former prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto could have laid the foundation of a new democratic
order had he accepted Awami League (AL) and Sheikh Mujeebur Rehman’s right to rule.
The then military establishment should have handed over power to Mujeeb, come what may.
After all Gen Yahya Khan and not Bhutto was the ruler during the crisis.

It is also important to assess the politics during the first 25 years after independence and
how Pakistan’s ruling elite pushed Bengalis to the position which they never wanted. They
were in majority from day one and had the right to govern the country.

Perhaps we would not have witnessed back-to-back martial law had the basic concept of
democracy been accepted ie majority’s right to rule. Instead we allowed and gave legitimacy
to one martial law after another.

Even after the tragedy of 1971, the third martial law was imposed on July 5, 1977 and that
too when both government and Opposition had reached an ‘accord’ on fresh elections. Gen
Zia could have further saved country from political turmoil had army went back to barracks
after holding elections within 90-days on Oct 16, 1977 as promised. His lust for power
resulted not only in the longest martial law but it led to the hanging of the first elected prime
minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on April 4, 1979. Had we learnt any lesson from 1971, the then
military establishment would not have allowed Gen Zia either to prolong martial law or to
hang Bhutto.

In his 11 years of rule, he took Pakistan to a path which ultimately resulted in extremist
mindset, one which massacred children of APS in 2014.

Had we learnt any lesson from 1971, Zia would not have damaged country’s political
narrative. He first got himself elected through an established fraud referendum in 1981, and
later laid the foundation of ‘corrupt practices’ in politics through non-party based elections in
1985, which damaged our political culture. The ideological politics was replaced by ‘Karobari
politics’. He also made controversial amendments in the 1973 Constitution at will as the PCO
judiciary legitimised him and justified his rule. According to veteran bureaucrat Roedad
Khan, the Bengalis lost the confidence in West Pakistan after imposition of Gen Ayub’s
martial law. “Bengali bureaucrats started losing confidence in West Pakistan after the
imposition of martial law and found no friends in Rawalpindi,” he recently told me on phone
from Islamabad.

The first batch of Pakistan Civil Service of 1949 had 12 each from West Pakistan and East
Pakistan and I myself was from the first batch, he added. Pakistan paid a heavy price as a
result of two Afghan wars and the blame for these controversial decisions also go to the two
military dictators Gen Ziaul Haq and Gen Pervez Musharraf.

If Zia’s policies brought narcotics and Kalashnikov culture, corrupt practices in politics,
sectarian and ethnic hatred, the post 9/11 policy of Gen Musharraf allowed global and local
terror networks to attack Pakistani forces and people.

Had we not made Pakistani soil ‘hub’ for thousands of ‘mujahideen’ in the name of Afghan
Jihad, we would not have faced the kind of pressure we are facing today, because the same
‘mujahideen’ were now branded as ‘terrorists’ and Pakistan was being blamed for making its
soil hub for terror network. The meaningful democracy was never allowed to take roots and
whatever system we have today, need much improvement but democracy cannot flourish
without meaningful accountability and power to the grassroots level ie local governments.
The writer is a senior columnist and analyst of Geo, The News and Jang.

Twitter: @MazharAbbasGEO

The Great Tragedy Of 1971 And Lessons Still Left Unlearned

Ahmad Faruqui December 16, 2019

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Ahmad Faruqui writes about the fall of Dacca and the leadership failures that led to the great
debacle. Pakistan learned no lessons from the defeat because any attempt to derive lessons
from the tragedy is regarded treason.

In Dhaka, on December 16, 1971, under clear skies, and in front of a restless crowd of
nearly a million Bengalis, Lt.-Gen. A. A. K. Niazi surrendered first his pistol, then his sword,
and then half his country to Lt.-Gen. Jagjit Singh Aurora of the Indian Army.

Niazi was one of the most highly decorated officers of the army. Just a few days prior to the
surrender, he had avowed that Dacca would only fall over his dead body. He had puffed up
his chest and boasted that Indians would have to drive a tank over it in order to win the war.

The war began when Pakistan launched bombing raids on Indian air fields in the west on the
3rd of December, consistent with Ayub’s dictum that the “defense of the east lies in the
west.” The Indian Air Force emerged unscathed from the attacks.

But the air raids gave India the justification to launch a full-scale invasion of East Pakistan.
The pros and cons of the invasion had been assessed in New Delhi. Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi had asked General Manekshaw, the supreme Indian commander, whether an
invasion of East Pakistan might trigger a nuclear attack by the US on New Delhi, given
President Nixon’s “tilt” toward Pakistan. Manekshaw replied, “In that case, we will have
nothing to worry about.”

Niazi’s forces, outnumbered and out gunned, with no air cover, and drained by months of
fighting an insurgency, had no chance of winning. The noted historian John Keegan wrote,
“Although the outcome of the campaign was a foregone conclusion after the first week,
General Niazi’s largely undamaged force could have held on in Dacca and other strong
defensive positions for weeks, perhaps months.” But their will to fight had vanished.

Paratroopers began to descend on Dhaka as the end neared. Niazi asked Captain Salim
Salik if they were “blue” from the south or “red” from the north. Those were code words for
the Americans who had anchored the USS Enterprise in the Bay of Bengal and the Chinese
who had threatened to intervene in the conflict. Captain Salik said they were brown.

Niazi knew the game was over. After the surrender, the military president, Gen. Yahya Khan,
came on the radio and reassured the nation that the war would go on. However, the army
deposed him a couple of days later.

READ Where Are The Entertainers?

How did this unthinkable event come to pass? First, Yahya’s sheer arrogance led him to
annual the results of the national elections. He could not countenance the thought of
handing over power to the Awami League in the East. Second, his decision to launch an
offensive against the Awami League which turned the entire province against the military.
Refugees in the millions fled to India forcing India to think of retaliating. Third, instead of
negotiating either with its civilian population or with India, he attacked India in the West.

Henry Kissinger said he could not figure out why Pakistan’s high command, located entirely
in the West, thought that a beleaguered force of 45,000 men, fighting without the full
complement of armor and artillery in the East, and consisting mostly of soldiers who had
been hastily flown in from the west, and thus had little knowledge of either the terrain or the
local culture of East Pakistan, could have first taken on a population of 75 million that rose in
arms against the military regime and then fight an Indian force that was five-times larger
Indian force which had not been worn down by an insurgency.

And it was the ultimate folly to appoint Niazi, a recently promoted three-star general with no
knowledge of the East, as the theater commander in the East. He lacked the strategic
leadership qualities. In his memoirs, Niazi does not accept any blame for what happened. He
says he challenged the Pakistan Army to court-martial him, but they refused.

True, the blame does not just fall on Niazi’s shoulders. It was Yahya and the high command
who annulled the results of the general election. It was Yahya who told the army to attack
“miscreants” in the East thereby turning the entire population against the army. He had once
been posted to the command of the 14th Division which was the sole division in the East.
When war seemed imminent, he boasted that he knew East Pakistan like the back of his
hand. What good was his knowledge when he refused to visit the East once the military
operation was launched in March?

When the war began, he retreated to his office and kept mumbling that all he could do about
East Pakistan was to pray. His deputy, General Hamid, visited the troops in the East just
twice. Lt.-Gen. Gul Hassan, Chief of the General Staff, would not answer Niazi’s phone calls.
The top brass of the Pakistan army had abandoned their “most decorated officer” to his own
devices.
READ Stop Invading Countries In Women's Name
Since India had deployed a very large force in the East, for the first time in history there was
near parity of forces in the West. But Pakistan did not prevail on the western front. There
was poor coordination among the three services. The naval chief heard on the radio that war
had broken out. Yahya and the air chief had chemistry problems.

When the war ended, Yahya said that he had always maintained that wars solve no
problems. The victors in Dacca knew otherwise. Later he blamed the loss on the “treachery
of the Indians.” Blaming the enemy for his defeat qualifies him for a special place in military
history.

Professor Michael Howard has averred, “The vanquished are likely to learn more from their
defeat than the victors from their victory. Their histories, also, are often fuller and more
reliable…the catastrophe is there plain for all to see.”

But that is not the case in Pakistan where the army reigns supreme. Any attempt to analyze
defeat and derive lessons is regarded as an act of treason. But coups which are a clear act
of treason are justified by the law of necessity. When he was the military ruler in the 2000’s,
Gen. Musharraf was asked about the loss of East Pakistan. He dismissed the questioner,
saying why we should concern ourselves with something that happened a long time ago.

The Hamoodur Rehman Commission’s report on the debacle was never published in
Pakistan. It appeared in India almost two decades later. It put the blame squarely on the
army. It had failed to anticipate the enemy’s reactions, under-estimated the enemy’s skills,
and failed to learn from prior wars.

Global Village Space | News Web Portal

Home South Asia India India’s nefarious role to break up Pakistan in 1971
India’s nefarious role to break up Pakistan in 1971
News Desk -April 22, 2017

Dr. Junaid Ahmad |

The genesis of the creation of Bangladesh can be traced back to the feeling in the entire
Indian leadership, be it the Indian National Congress or the Hindu rightist (communalist)
parties that believed and/or still believe that the partition of British India would be a
temporary and a short-lived event.

“India accepted the partition with the conviction that the new state was not viable and would
collapse in a short time”.
– Jawaharlal Nehru

This was not even a hidden desire but was openly expressed on many occasions. Gandhi in
his address of July 1947 to Congress Party of Bengal said, “Congress was opposed to
Pakistan” and that he was one of those who had “steadfastly opposed the division of India”.

Read more: Breakup of Pakistan & creation of Bangladesh; rethinking after 40 years of the
fall of Dacca?

Similarly, Nehru, on the eve of partition remarked, “India accepted the partition with the
conviction that the new state was not viable and would collapse in a short time”. Similar
sentiments were expressed by other leaders such as Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Acharya
Kirplani, Sardar Valebhai Patel and a lot of other leaders and organizations like All India
Congress Committee, Hindu Mahasabha, etc. These initial desires of the Indian leadership,
were later put into policy to breakdown Pakistan; undo partition both through political and
belligerent (military) levels.

Distrust between the East and West wings of Pakistan

However, Indian machinations alone could not have achieved this dismemberment of
Pakistan. West Pakistan itself is responsible for the fact that India got fertile ground for
furthering its intrigues against Pakistan. The hegemonic attitude of West Pakistani politicians
sowed the seeds of marginalization and alienation in the Bengali population of East
Pakistan. The issues between the two parts started from the early days due to mishandling
of the national language issue by the central government of Pakistan, which instituted Urdu
as the national language, despite knowing that very few Bengalis spoke the language and
that they constituted the majority ethnicity in the country. The question of official language
was finally settled constitutionally as late as in 1956, but it already created huge discontent
in East Pakistan.

Sheikh Mujib, back in 1950, threw a question to Prime Minister of Pakistan, Huseyn
Shaheed Suharwardy, that “Was it not possible for East Pakistan to become independent
someday?”

With time an increased sense of deprivation and exploitation was felt in East Pakistan and a
general feeling that they were being systematically colonized by West Pakistani imperialism
grew as did complaints about unequal growth and development between both the wings.

Read more: Hasina Sheikh’s Politics: Where the fantastic Fig of Three Million came…
India cleverly capitalized on the above-mentioned discontentment of East Pakistanis and
chose Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the Awami League Leader, as their tool to accomplish their
desire to dissect Pakistan. It would be pertinent to mention that Mujib, even in 1950,
according to Bengali intellectual Syed Badrul Islam, threw a question to Prime Minister of
Pakistan, Huseyn Shaheed Suharwardy that “Was it not possible for East Pakistan to
become independent someday?” at which Prime Minister admonished him.

Mujib’s desires fueled by the Indian Government

India, knowing fully well Mujib’s desire for achieving independence of East Pakistan,
wholeheartedly endorsed Mujib’s approach. By 1963, India established successfully relations
with Mujib and encouraged and supported him in his quest for separation of East Pakistan.
Mujib continued meetings with Indian officials frequently and had regular meetings with
Indira. One such meeting was held at Agartala (India), where the germ of the idea how to
dismember of Pakistan was conceived in an organized manner.

It was in July 1967, that ISI came to know about the conspiracy, hatched up at Agartala
between R&AW and about 35 Awami League members including Mujib to work for the
breakup of Pakistan.

The Agartala case was delayed because of Indo-China war of 1962 and Indo-Pakistan war
of 1965. The Agartala Conspiracy case was filed in 1967 but it was, however, withdrawn in
1969 due to immense country-wide political pressure generated by Bhutto. As a result, all
Awani League leaders, who had remained in contact with Indian intelligence, escaped to
India, except Mujib and Kamal Hussain.

Read more: “Heroes” of 1971: Bloodthirsty Video Game Killing Pakistani Soldiers Goes
Viral…

Agartala Conspiracy skyrocketed Mujib and Awami League’s popularity and Awami League
(AL) entered the general elections of December 1970 on the basis of hatred against West
Pakistan. It may well be said that entire Awami League was united on the basis of organized
hatred against West Pakistan. Additionally, Awami League’s militant wing had been
established in July 1970 with Indian assistance. Amid the hatred of West Pakistan and AL’s
terrorism, Pakistan went to polls on 7th December 1970 in which Awami League scored a
resounding victory in East Pakistan by securing 160 out of 162 seats, with no seats in West
Pakistan. While Bhutto’s Peoples Party, had a majority with 81 seats and that only in the
Western Wing.

India, in the meantime, took practical steps to isolate East Pakistan from West Pakistan.
India staged the drama of hijacking of its plane in January 1971 to isolate East Pakistan from
West Pakistan by suspending all air routes communication between East and West Pakistan
over its air space.
Bhutto successfully manipulated the weak government of Yahya Khan and prevailed upon
him not to hold sessions of the newly elected National Assembly in Dhaka. This led to further
bitterness amongst the Awami League leadership and their followers. On the third
postponement, Mujib ordered a non-cooperation movement on 1st March 1971, and ordered
AL’s miscreants to burn the national flag and create chaos and rioting all over the province
and on March 25, 1971, he declared independence of Bangladesh.

Eighty-five percent of those Bengalis who left East Pakistan were Hindus who would have
gone away to West Bengal after partition in 1947 in any case.

On 25th March 1971, Pakistan took military action, Operation Searchlight, to stop ongoing
riots and chaos created by the militant wing of Awami League. India created refugee camps
along the border of East Pakistan, in order to attract international support. The refugee card
was widely played by Indian media to provide a humanistic shield to her vicious aims.
According to a noted Indian journalist, Kuldip Nayar’s version in his book “Distant
Neighbours”, “Eighty-five percent of those Bengalis who left East Pakistan were Hindus who
would have gone away to West Bengal after partition in 1947 in any case”.

Indian physical support to create Bangladesh

India, however, throughout the next nine months persuaded the world powers that it was
trying for a political solution through her intervention. However, the Indian intervention, in
reality, was not political but was a vicious, planned attack on Pakistan’s sovereignty.

Indira Gandhi openly confessed in a television interview on French television on 8th

November 1971, that “Independence of Bangladesh, Free Bangladesh, was inevitable. India
would not permit the return of refugees until Sheikh Mujib was released.

Thus, the refugee’s conundrum was a more Indian construct not only to win international
support but also to organize and train the Mukti Bahini to effectively carry out terrorist
activities and later on support Indian Army in the war in East Pakistan.

Read more: 93,000 Pakistani soldiers did not surrender in 1971 because….?

In pursuance of her goal to isolate Pakistan diplomatically, India approached almost all major
powers, pursuing them to support its policies and on 7th August 1971 signed with USSR
treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation. The treaty entailed USSR’s support to India in
the event of war with a third party. The Indo-USSR treaty was followed by the Indian Army
Chief Sam Manekshaw’s visit to USSR to procure armament. Manekshaw said in an
interview that “I got the money, went to the Soviet Union and bought the tanks.”

In pursuance of the orders of Indira Gandhi, it was decided to set-up a provincial exile
government of East Pakistan/Bangladesh in Calcutta. It was 14th April 1971 that the exile
Bangladeshi Government was formed in a house at ‘8 Theatre Road Calcutta’ with its name
as ‘Mujib Nagar’ giving an impression that it was a separate territory. To propagate the
stance of the provincial government of Bangladesh, a separate Bangladesh radio ‘Free
Bengal
To propagate the stance of the provincial government of Bangladesh, a separate
Bangladesh radio ‘Free Bengal Betal Kendra’ was also established under the supervision of
R&AW. Tajjudin Ahmad was nominated as the prime minister and Syed Nazarul Islam as the
president in Mujib’s absence. B Raman the ex R&AW official in his book, The Kaobays of
R&AW confessed that “Indira Gandhi decided to assist the Bengali-speaking people of East
Pakistan to separate it from Pakistan and achieve an independent state to be called
Bangladesh….. the Indian armed forces under the leadership of Field Marshal Manekshaw
and Border Security Force (BSF) headed by the late K. F. Rustomji overtly and the R&AW
and the IB covertly ensured this.”

Read more: ‘Let Us Bury the Past, Not the Future’: Pakistan and Bangladesh

India creates pretext to stop West Pakistani flights to East Pakistan over its airspace
Thus, India had effectively equipped herself before entering into war with Pakistan; it had
made the ground favourable in East Pakistan, whose population largely was full of venom
and hatred against West Pakistan; two wings of Pakistan were separated from air space as
India banned their air space, for Pakistani flights; created para-military force, Mukti Bahini to
fight against Pakistan; used refugee camps to attract international and diplomatic support on
humanitarian ground and train guerillas; and so on.

Finally, on the night of 20th and 21st November 1971 India attacked East Pakistan which
was already isolated from West Pakistan as stated above. Indian forces comprising 3 Corps
and 9 divisions from the west and another 2 Corps of 6 divisions from the east moved into
East Pakistan from all directions and Pakistani forces comprising only one Corps with three
divisions and a total of only 34,000 fighting troops surrendered on December 16, 1971 as it
was not possible for 34,000 Pakistani troops to fight against the combined strength of
200,000 Indian Army and more than 150,000 India-trained Makti Bahini guerillas.

Read more: Has anyone been held accountable for the catastrophe that created
Bangladesh

India’s strategy/actions to break up Pakistan is now on historical record

From the above narrative, it can fairly be concluded that India followed a multipronged
strategy to dismember Pakistan by utilizing political, economic, social and geographical gap
between the two wings and by preparing Mukhti Bahini militarily and by military intervention
in East Pakistan.

Senior Bangladeshi politicians and military officials have already accepted on various
occasions that their independence was achieved with help from India. Major General (retd)
Z. A. Khan, former Director, DGFI of Bangladesh in March 2005 stated “There is no doubt
that R&AW played a vital role during our liberation war, but their motive was to divide
Pakistan at any cost to weaken their arch rival [Pakistan]. Their hidden objective is to
establish undivided India, which they call ‘Akhand Bharat Mata”. Shawkat Ali, Deputy
Speaker of Bangladesh parliament said on 17th December 2011, “I would give 100% credit
to India for the liberation of Bangladesh”.
Indian Prime Minister Modi’ himself last year stated that “We fought for Bangladesh’s
‘swabhimaan’ (honor), Alongside Mukhti Jodha (Mukhti Bahini) for Bangladesh”. Indians
were fighting side-by-side with them and in a way helped realize the dream of Bangladesh’;
and that, “Indian soldiers fought alongside Bengali Guerillas and regular armed resistance
forces during the nine-month war.”

The dismemberment of Pakistan in the way it was done by India is a scar on the collective
consciousness of great powers, but perhaps the cynical statement of a wayward character of
“Jean Christophe” (French Nobel Laureate, Romain Rolland’s novel) explains the morality
norms of the present age that “if great men (powers) have no morals, morality is not a great
Thing….

The 1971 trauma — global dimension!

By khalid saleem
Dec.16,2019

One does not need an Aesop to educe a moral out of this tale!

When two elephants fight, the grass gets trampled; the same happens when they make love
— African saying

An over-the-shoulder look at the global dimension of the traumatic events — culminating in

December 1971 — that convulsed this country would be in order. On a broader canvas
these developments resulted in a thorough realignment of forces in Asia. South Asia, in
particular, was shaken to the core.

If one were to single out the one crucial event around which all the others revolved, it would
be Henry Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing (July 1971). This history-making event, which was
facilitated by Pakistan, had a profound bearing on the developments that were to follow.
Kissinger described it as, “When we completed drafting the communiqué announcing my
secret visit to China in July 1971, Zhou Enlai remarked that the announcement would shake
the world. He was right… overnight it transformed the structure of international politics.”

Understandably, Kissinger and Zhou Enlai were viewing the development from the vantage
point of their respective countries — one an acknowledged superpower and the other on its
way to becoming a major player in its own right. It was Pakistan that was destined to bear
the brunt.

Since 1969, when Brezhnev propounded his Asian Collective Security “doctrine”, the USSR
had been trying assiduously to woo the South Asian countries in favour of its own scheme of
things. These efforts were dictated by the Soviet preoccupation at the time, aimed at “the
containment of China”. Looking at the broader perspective, the one state crucial to this
scheme of things was Pakistan, which had developed friendly links with China.

For quite some time, the Soviet attitude remained circumspect despite a close and growing
friendship with India. During his visit to Algeria in 1971, Alexei Kosygin made pointed
reference to “Pakistan’s territorial integrity”.

Kissinger’s visit to China tipped the applecart to the detriment of Pakistan. While busy tying
up loose ends to firm up an arrangement aimed to contain China, the USSR was suddenly
confronted with the spectre of “US-China collusion”. Pakistan’s role in arranging the
Sino-American dialogue piqued Moscow apparently prompting USSR to engage in what
president Nixon termed, a “fanciful speculation of a US-China alignment”.

Exactly a month to the day (August 9) after Kissinger’s “secret” flight to Beijing, the infamous
Indo-Soviet Treaty was signed. Kissinger summed up the Soviet strategic decision thus:
“There was… an ominous side to Soviet Policy. In the growing India-Pakistan conflict, the
Soviet Union discovered an opportunity to humiliate China and to punish Pakistan for having
served as intermediary.” The Soviet green-light appears to have, subsequently, facilitated
India in its fateful decision to send its regular forces into then East Pakistan.

Pakistan’s establishment on its part appears to have not calculated the ominous
consequences of the forces it had (inadvertently?) set in motion. On October 1, 1971, a
senior official of the Soviet foreign ministry told (a somewhat mystified?) Pakistani
ambassador in Moscow: “You are the victims of what we call an objective situation. Just now
a game is being played for very high stakes and it has not got so much to do with you… You
should understand the situation, as well as our position.” This conversation was duly
reported to Islamabad which apparently — though surprisingly — took it in its stride.

On its part the US, for reasons of its own, made no serious effort to save Pakistan from
dismemberment. In effect, the US appeared to have conveniently looked the other way. In
Kissinger’s words, “There was no question of ‘saving’ East Pakistan. Both Nixon and I had
recognized for months that its independence was inevitable.” So much for taking a
sympathetic view of the travails of an “ally” in deep trouble!

The US though was not oblivious to the repercussions of this turn of events in the overall
global strategic context. Pakistan could be conveniently thrown to the wolves; not so
America’s strategic interests. The rest is history. One does not need an Aesop to educe a
moral out of this tale!

Published in The Express Tribune, December 16th, 2019.

Like Opinion & Editorial on Facebook, follow @ETOpEd on Twitter to receive all updates on
all our daily pieces.
Fall of Dhaka: A debacle borne of self-censorship and lies
By azmat ansari
Dec.16,2019

Western media has long upheld a biased narrative of the situation in East Pakistan

KARACHI: The East Pakistan debacle was prompted by a biased press. The series of grand
lies that have been perpetuated through ceaseless repetition resulted in a biased and
distorted vision among audiences in both the East and West. It is a sad story of self-imposed
censorship by the western media.

The responsible media and investigative journalists could never see that it is physically
impossible to carry out one million rapes in a span of two years by an army of 60,000. Even
if we include rapes committed by Mukti Bahini and the Indian Army, the figure of one million
is impossible to reach.

For almost 50 years, not a word was printed in the western press about the rapes committed
by the Indian troops and the rebel militia. Thanks to some brave Bangladeshi investigators,
we have come to know that both their hands are soiled.

The editors of Western newspapers and those working in TV channels never thought for a
while that they were giving a false and concocted figure. But the story of self-censorship
does not end here. The Western media was completely blind in seeing the worst imaginable
kind of atrocities committed by Bengalis on non-Bengalis. Even this scribe who was a part of
the whole story after a lapse of fifty years is shaky in telling the truth. Such is the power of
propaganda and brainwashing. But the fear that people will not believe you should not stop
one from stating facts.

Yahya Khan, who is blamed for massacring Bengalis was actually their greatest friend. It
was he who ordered that no news of the atrocities of Bengalis on non-Bengalis will be
printed. You can imagine my frustration when a press release I drafted which showed that
several West Pakistanis were killed by Bengalis was stopped.

I was then on a two-month war correspondent’s course in Dacca working in the ISPR cell in
the Eastern Command. I protested to my senior officer, insisting that if we impose a blackout
on all atrocities of Bengalis, we would appear to be the culprits. The Western and the Indian
media is ever-hungry to capitalise on every mistake we make. My senior said: “Whatever.
These are orders of General Yahya Khan. Any news of the Bengali atrocity that trickles out
would put the whole of Pakistan on fire. All Bengalis living in West Pakistan would be killed
to a man.”

This order of ‘Do not fire, no matter what’ did not produce the desired effect. On the contrary,
groups fed and funded by India became bolder. The head of a Pakistan Army major was cut
off and paraded on the streets of Dinajpur.
Fall of Dhaka: The genocide debate that wasn’t

On many occasions the drivers and other security staff beseeched and implored “For God’s
sake allow us to open fire,” but the officers always said ‘No’. Thus it was because of Yahya
Khan that hundreds of lives were spared .

West Pakistani womenfolk often said ‘the army should wear bangles’. Some of them even
sent sets of bangles to the GHQ. This rebuke was something Pakistani forces heard again
and again, in Dinajpur and in the rest of East Pakistan. Constraint was entirely
misunderstood and taken as a sign of weakness. The jawans and officers of the army could
have killed in self-defence, but their restraint was not taken as an act of magnanimity.

West Pakistanis heaved a sigh of relief when Tikka Khan arrived. They knew that senseless
killings of innocent people would stop. The killers on the other side who had shown the most
horrendous kind of brutality towards people from West Pakistan had shut off all doors for
negotiation. Tikka Khan’s frame of mind seems to suggest that he was thinking: “The killers
have exceeded all limits. I will pay them in the same coin.”

The Western press and media were thoroughly one-sided and compromised. Despite
trumpeting the freedom of the press, the West’s own media imposed strong self-censorship.
I searched hard on the internet for any story on the brutality in Dinajpur and elsewhere, but I
did not find much.

Apparently, it is enlightening when one side commits rape and murder, but if the victims
retaliate, it is brutality in the eyes of the West. No story about constraint and the extreme
sacrifices that this constraint gave birth to figured ever in the Western press.

The situation of the time is depicted by a Pakistani newspaper : “Between January and April
1971 there was no State writ in East Pakistan. Massive massacre of non-Bengali population
was committed by criminal gangs all over the country. Women were molested and raped
before being killed. Bayonet strength of Pakistan Army was around 12,000 in March 1971
and swelled to 33,000 by the time surrender took place.”

(The writer is a former journalist and broadcaster who served as a military spokesman during
the 1971 crisis)

Separation of East Pakistan

December 20, 2018 in CSS Special, December 2018 Leave a comment

Separation of East Pakistan

An In-depth Analysis of the Causes
In 1971, Pakistan, as a nation, suffered the most terrible shock in its entire history when it
lost its eastern wing due to reasons that are well known but yet not very well understood. In
this article, an effort has been made to revisit those reasons and causes that led to this
national tragedy. Many factors, such as the geographical and socio-cultural differences
between the two wings, the language issue, the economic disparity and exploitation of the
East Pakistan, disparity in civil service and armed forces, differences over
constitution-making, degeneration of Muslim League and the rise of regional Bengali parties,
and the political grievances and alienation of East Pakistan, were responsible for the
process of decay that finally resulted in the dismemberment of the country. Following is a
humble attempt to analyze the fiasco in detail.

Separation of East Pakistan is, undoubtedly, the most tragic episode in the political history of
Pakistan. It not only exposed the failure of our efforts on national integration but also
manifested the institutional poverty of the political system. Unfortunately, it has, hitherto,
been analyzed through myopic approaches which revolve around the whims of certain
personalities whose views have been further inculcated in the minds of the next generations
through textbooks. Therefore, there is a dire need to analyze this whole episode in a much
broader perspective.

1. Historical Structural Reasons

i. Overdeveloped state structure
This theory has been propounded by Hamza Alvi who censures the dominance of
military-bureaucratic oligarchy in Pakistan’s state structure. The theory highlights the
structural roots of dominance of non-political forces in the state system which is embedded
in colonial legacies. The perpetuation of this over-developed state structure obstructed the
prevalence of civilian supremacy. Moreover, it encouraged state authoritarianism that further
widened the gulf between the two federating units. It also consolidated the dominance of
strong centre which was reinforcing under military rule. K.K. Aziz argued, “Only a loose
federation might have sustained. West Pakistan tried to contain Bengalis under very strong
authoritative structure, as they were being colonized.”

2. East-West Differences
i. Geographical distances
While analyzing the causes of the separation of East Pakistan, we cannot ignore the fact that
there was a distance of 1000 miles (1600 kilometres) between the Eastern and Western
wings of the country. The hostile India was separating the two wings.

ii. Linguistic differences

The first landmine planted by the Hindus to shatter the national unity was the issue of the
linguistic difference. Indians had organized demonstrations in support of Bengalis even
during the life of Quaid-e-Azam but their machinations failed. In March 1948, the Quaid had
advised the Bengalis to adopt Bengali as the language of the province but to keep Urdu as
the national language. But, this issue remained unresolved and, thus, got complicated over
the years due to the ineptness of leaders. East Pakistan witnessed a number of Awami
League-sponsored riots. In one instance, Section 144 was imposed in Dhaka so as to curtail
those riots but the members of the left-oriented Youth League and students defied the
restrictive orders. Ultimately, the central leadership accepted Bengali as a second national
language but it was too late a measure.

Read More: THE EAST PAKISTAN DEBACLE

iii. Differences in social structure

West Pakistan had dominant share in military and bureaucracy while Hindus in East
Pakistan dominated the economy and government jobs. East Pakistan’s social structure was
heavily dominated by non-Muslim forces that had inclination towards India.

iv. Demographic differences

There existed a demographic difference between the two wings. East Pakistan had
constituted 56 percent of the total population of the new state while the West Pakistan
hosted the remaining 44 percent.

v. Cultural differences
The people of East Pakistan were radically different from their counterparts in West Pakistan
in a number of cultural traits. There was hardly any interaction between them. Moreover,
Pakistan army almost wholly consisted of Punjabi-Pashtun population who could not
understand the dynamics of the Eastern wing.

3. General Reasons
i. Intra-regional economic disparities
Before the partition of India, the Muslims of East Bengal generally believed that their
economic hardships and miseries were due to the Hindu landlords and industrialists, who
exploited the resources of their land. After the partition, it was hoped that Bengali Muslims
would be able to utilize their own resources but, unfortunately, that did not happen.
Moreover, East Pakistan could not benefit from the rapid industrialization of the country.

ii. Political containment of Bengalis

In the initial years of Pakistan, it was believed that a strong Muslim League was essential for
the construction of the country. But the assertion turned out to be wrong because a
progressive group of Maulana Bhashani and Ataur Rehman broke away from Muslim
League and set up the Awami League. The League became very active and enjoyed a better
status in East Pakistan than Muslim League. The fall of Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din government
also sowed the seeds of discord.

iii. Ayub’s prolonged military rule

The Bengalis could never reconcile themselves to an army-controlled system because of
their negligent share in the armed forces. The era of Ayub Khan curbed the freedom of
expressions. Bengalis’ opposition to martial law was expressed in extremist slogans. Some
Bengali politicians sponsored and encouraged underground organizations like the East
Pakistan Liberty Party which circulated posters and leaflets making demands ranging from
autonomy to independence. The atmosphere and the system created by martial law negated
the impact of some of Ayub’s measures that had benefitted East Pakistan.
iv. Disastrous consequences of One Unit policy
The ruling elites of West Pakistan were in search of a mechanism so as to neutralize the
Bengalis’ role in the political system of Pakistan. This goal was achieved through the
creation of One Unit. According to this formula, 56 percent representation of East Bengal
was brought to 50 percent – at par with West Pakistan. But due to this issue, the aspect of
provincial autonomy remained on the back burner.

v. Political scenario in East Pakistan

In 1954, the leadership of East Pakistan Muslim League lost elections and United Front
leaders, who were all hungry for power, began making every possible attempt to win the
support of the Hindu members of the assembly. For this purpose, the attitude towards
national politics adopted by them was exactly in line with the wishes and desires of the
Hindus. Both groups became more energetic and more enthusiastic in their separatist zeal.

vi. Bureaucracy
With the creation of Pakistan, the high-ranking civil servants gained immense influence and
power. During the British rule, the bureaucracy was meant for enforcing the will of the
government by all means, fair and foul. After the inception of Pakistan, these bureaucratic
trends, unfortunately, became stronger. Moreover, Bengalis’ representation in the Civil
Services was very poor. In August 1947, there was only one Bengali among the eighty civil
servants who opted for Pakistan and constituted the civil services of Pakistan.

Bengalis’ under-representation in other government services, except the Foreign Service,

was equally conspicuous. The non-Bengali civil servants dominated the East Pakistan
services so much so that there was not a single Bengali holding a key position in the Dhaka
secretariat.

vii. Unresolved issue of provincial autonomy

Yahya Khan was not serious in implementation of the Legal Framework Order (LFO) which
he himself had announced prior to the 1970 elections. In the hope of becoming future
president, he accorded preferential treatment to certain politicians. He revived unnecessary
debates over the already decided and agreed upon matters, and thus made the situation
even more precarious and critical. There were talks of partitioning the country in the name of
provincial autonomy and provincial prejudices were deliberately stirred. Elections were won
by regional parties – People’s Party of Mr Bhutto emerged as the largest party in Punjab and
Sindh whereas in Balochistan and the NWFP, Qayyum League, The National Awami Party
and Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam achieved success. But, all these parties were confined only to
West Pakistan and had no popularity in East Pakistan. The Awami League of Sheikh Mujib
won a resounding victory in East Pakistan but it was non-existent in West Pakistan. Before
the elections, Maulana Maudoodi had warned that if regional parties emerged as winners,
even the military would not be able to hold the country together.

4. Immediate political factors

i. Military action
The military action that began on 25th March continued till the fall of Dhaka. Yahya Khan
and his military commanders present in Dhaka took the final decision, endorsed by Bhutto,
for launching a military action. The insurgency erupted that drew support from several
quarters. A bulk of Bengali police also sided with insurgents and there were militant groups
backed by India which was their main supplier of arms and ammunition.

On March 23, 1971, the Awami League marked a Republic day by slaughtering the West
Pakistanis and Bihari Muslims at a number of places — they were burnt alive and even
women and children were not spared. The Bangladeshi flag was hoisted, instead of
Pakistani flag. A plan was prepared to declare the independence of Bangladesh on the night
between March 24th and 25th. Then Yahya Khan nominated Tikka Khan as the governor of
East Pakistan but his administration was totally unaware of the true situation prevailing in the
province.

Military operation failed to control the situation. It instead brought press restrictions and
censorship. The martial law administration expelled all foreign journalists and even the local
journalists also were disillusioned by wrong information.

ii. Indian invasion

Pakistan was in no position to fight an all-out war with India. Geographically, East Pakistan
was surrounded by India and the sea. The Pakistani defence planners had believed in its
indefensibility and formulated a defence policy which stipulated that it could be defended
from West Pakistan. This policy contributed to a virtual exclusion of the Bengalis from the
armed forces. When India invaded, Pakistani troops were without air protection, and despite
demonstrating courage, they had to surrender. Finally, on 16th December 1971, India
recognized Bangladesh and in retaliation, Pakistan cut off diplomatic relations between the
two countries…

Bangladesh and the dismemberment of Pakistan

Ahmad Salim
Updated Apr 01, 2019 04:24pm
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Bitter legacy: General Niazi signs the document of surrender to General Arora | Photo from
The Herald, April 1997
Twenty-six years ago, on March 25,1971, the army was sent in to put down a rebellion in
what was then East Pakistan. The move proved a turning point in this country’s history. By
the end of that year, the Pakistan that had come into being in 1947 was no more. In this
golden jubilee year of Pakistan’s creation, the Herald examines the darkest chapter of our
country’s history, focusing on the ten crucial days leading up to action taken by the army.

On March 25, 1971, General Yahya Khan launched Operation Searchlight, sending in troops
to quell the rebellion in East Pakistan. That year, the idea of a united Pakistan finally faded
into oblivion and, on December 16, 1971, a new state was carved out of the eastern wing of
the country.
The drama unfolded in four stages. The December 1970 general elections saw the Awami
League emerge with a massive victory. Tense political bargaining followed, involving Yahya
Khan, Sheikh Mujib and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who had received a thumping mandate from the
country’s West wing. Meanwhile, Mujib ruled East Pakistan virtually independent from the
centre. Finally, military action was launched against the rebel province, leading to the
massacre of thousands of Bengalis and the eventual surrender of Pakistani forces to the
Indian army.

The Herald travels back in time to re-examine history, tracing the dramatic events of 10
crucial days in March 1971 which led to the dismemberment of Pakistan and the birth of
Bangladesh.

In December 1970, the first-ever free elections were held in Pakistan. The Awami League,
led by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, swept the polls, winning 167 of the 169 seats allocated to
East Pakistan in a combined house of 300. This massive victory gave the Bengali
nationalists an absolute majority throughout the country and entitled them to form the central
government. It also confirmed the worst fears of the establishment, which had for years
maneuvered to deny the East Pakistani majority the right to power.

In the intervening period a tense drama unfolded. Mujb was virtually running the show in the
East and public opinion in West Pakistan was whipped into a frenzy.

On March 2, 1971, the illusion of a united Pakistan was already beginning to fade. On March
6, Yahya Khan declared: Let me make it absolutely clear that no matter what happens, as
long as I am in command of the Pakistan Armed Forces and head of state, I will ensure the
complete and absolute integrity of Pakistan.

As expected, Mujib reacted with equal vehemence. On March 7, he demanded the

immediate withdrawal of martial law and the transfer of power to the elected representatives
of the people, threatening to boycott the National Assembly session. He also bitterly
criticized Zulfikar Ali Bhutto for obstructing the transfer of power. For his part, Bhutto
maintained that majority rule would only be possible if the Awami League agreed to drop its
six-point programme, which demanded much greater autonomy for East Pakistan. Bhutto
insisted that before a new constitution was framed, power should be transferred to the two
majority parties of the country, his own Pakistan People’s Party in West Pakistan and the
Awami League in East Pakistan.

Faced with the Awami League’s legislative strength and Mujib’s de facto assumption of
power, Yahya Khan rushed to Dacca on March 15 to work out a political settlement. By
March 20, the negotiating teams of the Awami League and Yahya Khan had agreed on a
draft proclamation containing the outlines of an interim arrangement for the transfer of
power. But this agreement was not acceptable to Bhutto, he suggested that either the
National Assembly session should be called first, or he should be allowed more time to
negotiate directly with Mujib.
On March 21, having received satisfactory clarifications, Bhutto joined the Dhaka
negotiations. These proved to be inconclusive, and the National Assembly session
scheduled for March 23 was postponed once again.

The horror sets in: scenes from the massacre | Photo from The Herald, April 1997
On March 21, a draft presidential proclamation prepared by Colonel Hassan, a member of
the official negotiating team, was handed over to the Awami League. After examining this
document on March 22, the Awami League team met Yahya’s team the following day. When
they arrived, they were told that the Six Point Scheme could come into effect with some
minor practical adaptations. At this stage, it was proposed that, in order to examine the
implications of the financial and economic provisions of the proposal, M. M. Ahmed should
sit separately with the Awami League team.

The Awami League team members initially refused to accept the proposal because they felt
that Yahya’s advisers were trying to prolong discussions on each clause in order to buy time
for the military crackdown. However, they finally agreed and March 23 was spent in
discussions. By the next evening the Awami League had concluded discussions. However, a
clause-by-clause reading of the entire draft proclamation remained to be finalised.

The Awami League proposed that Mujib’s close aide and respected lawyer, Dr. Kamal
Hosain, and Justice Cornelius, the respected jurist, sit together through the night of March
24 and finalise a draft that could be put before Sheikh Mujib and Yahya the next day. It is on
record that Justice Cornelius agreed but Yahya’s aide Lieutenant-General Peerzada held
him back, saying, “No, we may discuss for a while, then we may meet tomorrow morning.”
When the Bengali team suggested that a time be fixed for the following day, Peerzada again
intervened to say that this could be arranged by contacting him on the telephone. The
Awami League team waited all day for a call from the official team which never came.

With each passing day, the mood of confrontation intensified. The impasse was finally
broken with the decision to employ a military solution to the crisis. Many believe the military
option was part of a well-considered policy. At the time, the general opinion in West Pakistan
was that army action had been a necessary preemptive strike to check the Awami League’s
conspiracy to dismember the country.

However, world opinion widely maintained that Yahya deliberately dragged his feet on the
talks with Mujib in order to prepare for a military operation. On March 24, leaders of the
minority parties, as well as some members of the PPP left Dacca. However, Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto and a few other PPP leaders stayed behind. Bhutto was still in the city when the
holocaust began. He recalled: At about 10.30 at night, after finishing our dinner, we went to
our rooms. An hour later we were awakened by the noise of gunfire. A number of my friends
came to my room and we saw the army in action. We witnessed the military operation from
our hotel room, for about three hours.

A number of places were ablaze and we saw the demolition of the office of the newspaper,
The People. This local English daily had indulged in crude and unrestrained provocation
against the army and West Pakistan. With the horizon ablaze, my thoughts turned to the
past and to the future. I wondered what was in store for us. Here in front of my eyes I saw
the death and destruction of our own people. It was difficult to think straight. Many thoughts
crossed my mind. Had we reached the point of no return or would time heal the wounds and
open a new chapter in the history of Pakistan? How I wished I knew the answer.

Despite his philosophical concerns regarding the move, Bhutto maintained that military
reprisal had been necessary: If the regime had not acted on the night of the 25th, on the
following day the Awami League would have declared the independence of Bangladesh.
Everything was made ready for it the state of their armed preparedness, the concentration of
their forces and the barricades on the streets were visible proof of this. The general strike
called for the 27th was obviously a blind to lead the regime astray. The intention was to
proclaim the independence of Bangladesh on the 26th of March after Friday prayers.

General Yahya Khan: strongarm tactics | Photo from The Herald, April 1997
On March 26, Yahya Khan proclaimed: I have ordered them [the armed forces] to do their
duty and fully restore the authority of the government. Two years to the very day after
proclaiming martial law and pledging, as he put it, to strive to restore democratic institutions
in the country, General Yahya found it necessary to deploy the armed forces against the
people of one province and to ban the political party which had secured an overall majority in
the National Assembly.

It is said that while leaving for West Pakistan, Yahya Khan told General Tikka Khan at the
Dhaka Airport on March 25: Sort them out! In the ensuing weeks this phrase was on the lips
of many army officers.

“Why did you initiate the genocide in Dhaka?”, journalist asked Tikka Khan following the
debacle. His reply was that there was no genocide. “Some terrorists were making
preparations at the Jagannath Hall to attack the patrol force with firearms. After that, I sent
some forces to Jagannath Hall. It is true that some Hindus died on the occasion. When two
groups fight or are in a combat, it can’t be called genocide.”

This article was published in the Herald's April 1997 issue. To read more subscribe to the
Herald in print.

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COMMENTS (10) CLOSED
BESTNEWESTOLDEST

REHANMAR 22, 2019 12:45PM

Lies after lies.."how can it be genocide"!!how can he just say like that.
AMRENDRA KR SRIVASTAVAMAR 22, 2019 01:31PM
"Twenty-six years ago, on March 25,1971" - ????
G GAURMAR 22, 2019 01:46PM
This is history of Pakistan
USRMAR 22, 2019 02:06PM
Good article but ended abruptly.
ZAKMAR 22, 2019 02:29PM
Pakistan is past 1971. PM IK is in charge. This is a stronger more confident pakistan, recent
events should have proven that.
FARANMAR 22, 2019 11:11PM
Hamidur Rehman report is not disclosed to people.
A BYSTANDERMAR 23, 2019 07:29AM
@Zak really?? what a joke!!
SUNNY DEOLMAR 23, 2019 10:21PM
@Amrendra Kr Srivastava
This article was published in the Herald's April 1997 issue. To read more subscribe to the
Herald in print.
SINGHMAR 24, 2019 08:06PM
Shame that the article does not show efforts of the Mukti Bahini fighters.
SHADI KATYALMAR 24, 2019 11:20PM
I do recall well as I was in Calcutta during all that period and spent some dinner and
evenings with Gen. Arora.
It was a sad period of history as Calcutta was full of refugees and reminded me of the 1947
partition.
History moves on and we live with such memories..

Lessons unlearned from the East Pakistan debacle

Imad Zafar
By IMAD ZAFAR
DECEMBER 17, 2018
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December 16 is marked as a black day in the history of Pakistan. On that date in 1971,
Pakistan was divided, as East Pakistan became Bangladesh.

It was a tale of blunders and mismanagement by the authorities of Pakistan coupled with
sheer opportunism by India that resulted in the fall of East Pakistan. Forty-seven years have
gone by since the separation of Pakistan but the report of the Hamoodur Rahman
Commission still has not been released in public.

The commission, set up in December 1971, was supposed to call to account the people who
were responsible for the fall of East Pakistan. India celebrates it to this day as a great victory
as not only did it manage to break Pakistan into two pieces, but it also forced the surrender
of 93,000 Pakistani soldiers. The manipulation of the Indian Army in this saga is not
ignorable, but there were mistakes and blunders committed by West Pakistan that were
disliked by the population of East Pakistan and finally resulted in the fall of Dhaka.

Wise nations always learn from past mistakes so they can avoid suffering the same pain and
loss again.

The background
The question arises: What led to the demise of East Pakistan and was it only a conspiracy of
external hands? For the answer, one needs to go into the background of the chain of events
that resulted in the demise of East Pakistan.

Karachi was chosen as the capital of Pakistan by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and then in 1958,
the garrison city of Rawalpindi was declared the capital. In 1967 the military dictator Ayub
Khan declared Islamabad as the new capital of Pakistan. However, the people of East
Pakistan thought that since they formed 55% of the population of the country, Dhaka should
have been given the status of capital of Pakistan.

Urdu was chosen as the national language of Pakistan. That was another reason that
created the rift between East and West Pakistan, as Bengalis felt that their mother tongue
was being deliberately ignored.

Bengalis were also not happy with the distribution of resources. Foreign exchange, for
instance, a vast sum of which was earned from the sale of jute from East Pakistan, was used
on defense expenditures to counter India in Kashmir. The Bengalis disagreed with the huge
amount spent on defense and insisted that the foreign reserves should be spent on
development projects like dams, and on eradicating poverty and promoting literacy.
The Bengalis were also of the view that most white-collar jobs were taken by West Pakistan.

In 1951 the Awami Muslim League was formed, which demanded rights for the Bengalis.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founder of the AML, was a Bengali nationalist, and he
presented a six-point agenda to the authorities. That agenda included autonomy for all the
provinces.

Ayub Khan after imposing the first martial law in the country announced a presidential
election. Fatima Jinnah, the sister of the founding father of the nation, contested against
Ayub, and Sheikh Mujib supported her. Ayub won the 1964 election with the might of the
state machinery.

In 1968 when an agitation movement was launched against Ayub Khan’s dictatorship, Mujib
participated in that movement and was arrested as a result. The movement resulted in the
demise of Ayub Khan’s regime and General Yahya Khan took charge as the new martial-law
administrator in 1969. Yahya was aware of the political instability in Pakistan and announced
general elections for 1970 to transfer power to elected representatives.

The elections
On December 7, 1970, for first time in the history of Pakistan, general elections were held on
the adult franchise. Sheikh Mujib’s Awami League swept the elections from East Pakistan by
winning 160 National Assembly seats out of total of 162. The Pakistan Peoples Party won 84
seats from West Pakistan. The mandate was clear: Mujib had a majority, and it was General
Yahya’s prerogative to call him to form the government.

However, it never happened. Mujib was accused of giving a statement that now no one
could stop the creation of independent Bangladesh. Though Mujib denied the accusation
and said his statement had been twisted by the media, no one believed him in West
Pakistan. Yahya summoned the first session of the National Assembly but Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
stopped his members from participating, and as a result, Yahya canceled the session.

Yahya Khan and Bhutto went to Dhaka for negotiations with Mujib but failed to yield any
result. The delay in calling the session of the National Assembly resulted in mass agitations
in East Pakistan, and soon it turned into a civil war – a war in which the Pakistan Army was
pitted against its own people, and the Bengali militant organization Mukti Bahini, which was
backed by India.

The clash between the Pakistan Army and Mukti Bahini resulted in the deaths of thousands
of Bengalis. On November 23, 1971, the Indian Army penetrated the eastern front and
crossed East Pakistan’s borders to join the Bengali nationalists. War was declared on
December 3 between Pakistan and India, and on December 16, Pakistani troops in East
Pakistan surrendered to the Indian Army. East Pakistan thus became Bangladesh and as a
result, Yahya Khan was asked to resign, and power was transferred to Bhutto in what was
left of Pakistan.

The lessons still not learned

The fall of Dhaka is a reminder that people can never be forced to live with a particular state
with the might of the gun, but have we Pakistanis learned the lesson? To this day, we have
chosen to remain in self-denial by not rectifying the mistakes of that time.

The history taught to children in Pakistan is deprived of the actual facts and events that led
to the creation of Bangladesh. Sheikh Mujib has been presented as a traitor in the textbooks
while there is no mention of the factors and policies that created a sense of deprivation
among the Bengalis and eventually paved the way for the separation of East Pakistan.

As well, the same military establishment that in that era thought it was capable of running the
state still controls state affairs in Pakistan. None of the elected governments of Pakistan
have tried to ask questions about this blunder of the establishment, nor have they made any
effort to call the culprits of the 1971 debacle to account.

The role of Zulfikar Bhutto, who instead of accepting the victory of Sheikh Mujib in East
Pakistan, is still not discussed. The military establishment continues to enjoy hegemony in
state affairs and resources, and it creates and eliminates political parties and political
leaders at its will.

The lesson from the East Pakistan debacle was loud and clear, and it was that states are run
on the mandate given by the masses to the politicians and political parties and not by the
might of guns. One hopes that one day a truth and reconciliation commission will be formed
that eventually will lay the blame for this debacle on the responsible persons and authorities.

After all, hiding facts and not learning from mistakes in the name of patriotism is not going to
help Pakistan move in the right direction. Samuel Johnson said, “Patriotism is the last refuge
of a scoundrel.” Instead of burying facts in the name of patriotism, Pakistan needs to find
remedies for the errors it has made – and is repeating…

The East Pakistan debacle

Opinion
Hussain H ZaidiDecember 16, 2016
The separation of East Pakistan on December 16, 1971 was the culmination of a long
process spreading over two decades. It cannot be put down to the ambition or stubbornness
of a single general, politician or political party.

The federation of Pakistan, which came into being in 1947 had two remarkable features
which contributed a lot to its eventual dismemberment. One was the absence of
geographical contiguity between its two wings – which were separated by the territory that
formed part of India. Thus from the very outset, India was in a position to undermine the
territorial integrity of its smaller eastern neighbour.

Two, culturally and economically, the two wings represented a marked contrast – West
Pakistan was ethnically diverse while East Pakistan was ethnically homogeneous – a fact
that made it easier to make a common cause against a common ‘enemy’. While West
Pakistan was essentially a feudal society, there was only a vestige of feudalism in East
Pakistan. Hence, East Pakistanis were politically more conscious than West Pakistanis.
West Pakistan was economically more prosperous and advanced than East Pakistan which
presented policymakers with the challenge of investing more funds in the region where the
return on capital was bound to be lower. Finally, population wise, the eastern wing was
larger than the western wing.

In the interest of the integrity of the federation, it was imperative that the federating units
were given full autonomy, adequate representation in the state apparatus and equitable
share in economic development. This necessitated holding regular elections and transferring
power to the elected representatives of the people.

It was also important to ensure the various ethnic nationalities in the federation were welded
together. For this, the country needed a strong and stable political party, with an
across-the-nation base. However, as history unfolded itself, both these requirements
remained unfulfilled.

Most of the frontline leaders of the Muslim League hailed from Muslim minority provinces
which after the partition were included in India. Therefore, they lacked a popular base in
Pakistan. Apprehensive of their defeat, those leaders were averse to seeking a popular
mandate and so they became dependent on bureaucracy – both civil and military. Since the
bulk of bureaucracy hailed from the western wing, it was West Pakistan that had the ultimate
say in the exercise of power.

Lack of adequate share in political power also hampered the economic development of the
eastern wing which gave birth to an acute sense of deprivation among its people. East
Pakistan’s discontent with the ruling elite was reflected in the 1954 provincial assembly
elections in which the United Front, an anti-Muslim League alliance, made a clean sweep
and formed government in the province. However, within two months of its formation, the
Front government was sacked and governor rule clamped on the province.

Pakistan’s first constitution provided for parliamentary form of government and provincial
autonomy. But former president Iskandar Mirza continued calling the shots, dismissing or
forcing prime ministers to quit one after the other. Amid all uncertainty, the government
announced to hold general elections in 1959. But the elections which were to be held on the
basis of adult franchise, would have transferred power from West Pakistan to East Pakistan
as population wise the former was smaller than the latter. But in October 1958, the president
abrogated the constitution, declared martial law and asked army chief General Ayub to take
over.

During Ayub’s ten-year rule, things went from bad to worse. The made-for-Ayub 1962
constitution reduced provincial autonomy to a minimum, denied representative government
and concentrated powers in the office of the president. The powers, which were effectively
exercised by West Pakistan-dominated civil service elite, further alienated East Pakistanis.

Political deprivation was accompanied by economic deprivation. When Ayub assumed

power, there was a difference of 30 percent in the per capita income of the two wings. By the
time the general was forced to quit, the gap had more than doubled to 61 percent.

The growing alienation of East Pakistanis was articulated in the famous six points of Mujibur
Rehman, the leader of the eastern wing’s most popular political party the Awami League
(AL). Enunciated in 1966, these pointscalled for separate military and currency for both
regions with a very weak centre. Although those points also demanded a federal form of
government, there is little doubt that if these points were fully implemented, they would have
vitiated the federal character of the constitution and created a confederation.

It was on the basis of the six points that the AL contested the first ever general elections in
Pakistan in 1970. The electoral outcome, which took the then military regime by surprise,
was starkly ethnic. In East Pakistan, the AL won 151 out of 153 seats for the National
Assembly. However, the AL failed to win a single seat in the western wing. Conversely, in
West Pakistan the PPP headed by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, emerged as the single largest party.
However, the PPP could not win a single seat in the eastern wing. It was obvious that neither
party had an across-the-country base – a capital condition for holding a federation together.

The total number of National Assembly seats were 300 which meant that the AL was in a
position to form government at the centre on its own. But since the party had achieved
electoral success on the basis of six points, the government was reluctant to transfer power
to the League. Though during his meetings with President Yahya, Mujib had assured him
that once in the assembly he would try to tone down his six points so as to preserve the
federation, the government was doubtful whether Mujib could be trusted.

On the other hand, Bhutto wanted the six points issue to be settled before the National
Assembly was convened. Ideally, Bhutto and Mujib should have agreed to form a coalition
with Mujib becoming the prime minister and the PPP getting some important ministries.
However that was not to be. Even if Mujib was not willing to share power with Bhutto,
democratic conventions required the president to invite Mujib – the leader of the majority
party – to form government. But no such conventions existed in Pakistan.

The military government’s dilly-dallying over the transfer of power to the AL caused grave
unrest in East Pakistan. There were strikes and riots all over the province and the writ of the
government existed only in cantonment areas. In desperation, the central government
decided to launch a military action to quell the uprisings, which according to popular belief,
was miscalculated. The military action and the subsequent Indian military intervention
proved to be the final nail in the coffin of the united Pakistan.

The writer is a freelance countributor.

Email: hussainhzaidi@gmail.com