KARLO ANGELO DABALOS Y SAN DIEGO v. RTC, GR No.

193960, 2013-01-07
Facts:
13th day of July, 2009... the above- named accused, being then the boyfriend of the complainant... use personal
violence [on] the complainant, by pulling her hair, punching complainant's back, shoulder and left eye, thereby
demeaning and degrading the complainant's intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, in violation of Section 5(a)
of the Republic Act 9262. RTC found probable cause and consequently, issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner
on November 19, 2009.
Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged incident on July 13, 2009, he was no longer in a dating relationship
with private respondent; hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable. Private respondent admitted that her relationship with
petitioner had ended prior to the subject incident. She narrated that on July 13, 2009, she sought payment of the
money she had lent to petitioner but the latter could not pay. Inquired from petitioner if he was responsible for
spreading rumors about her which he admitted. Thereupon, private respondent slapped petitioner causing the latter
to inflict on her the physical injuries
Petitioner insists that the act which resulted in physical injuries to private respondent is not covered by RA 9262
because its proximate cause was not their dating relationship. Instead, he claims that the offense committed was only
slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code which falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
Issues:

1. whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the offense; 2) whether RA 9262 should be construed in a manner that
will favor the accused; and 3) whether the Information alleging a fact contrary to what has been admitted...
should be quashed

Ruling:
The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to be considered as a
crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child and
the woman is the offender's... wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom
he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering. It is required that the
offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not
indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation
be... inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should
the courts... it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing
the past or present existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was
committed. Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of lenity[7] because there is
no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any construction.
Information having sufficiently alleged the necessary elements of the crime, such as: a dating relationship between
the petitioner and the private respondent; the act of violence committed by the petitioner; and the resulting physical
harm to private respondent, the offense is covered by RA 9262 which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC i
Principles:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or
a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with
whom the person has or... had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her
child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse... including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment, to wit:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the
woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.[6]
THE COURT’S RULING

At the outset, we rule that the consolidated Petitions are immediately dismissible because petitioners resorted
to a wrongful mode of appeal by filing the instant Rule 45 Petitions directly with this Court.

Section 60 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law provides:

Section 60. Appeals. – An appeal may be taken from the decision of the Special Agrarian Courts by filing a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the decision;
otherwise, the decision shall become final.

An appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals, or from any order, ruling or decision of the DAR, as the
case may be, shall be by a petition for review with the Supreme Court within a non-extendible period of fifteen
(15) days from receipt of a copy of said decision. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, following the letter of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, petitioners should have appealed the SAC-RTC Decision to the Court of
Appeals. Petitioners propose to carve out an exception to this rule by arguing that because the instant Petitions
raise only pure questions of law, the proper mode of appeal is via a Rule 45 Petition to this Court.16 We do not
agree. While the general rule is that appeals raising pure questions of law from decisions of RTCs are taken to
this Court via a Rule 45 petition, decisions of trial courtsdesignated as SACs are only appealable to the Court
of Appeals. We have repeatedly ruled that the right to appeal is a remedy of statutory origin. As such, this right
must be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law authorizing its
exercise.17 The special jurisdiction of the SAC-RTC is conferred and regulated by the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law, and appeals therefrom are governed by Section 60 thereof. That law expressly states that
appeals from SACs must be taken to the Court of Appeals without making a distinction between appeals
raising questions of fact and those dealing purely with questions of law. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemus. Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we. Consequently, we rule that the
only mode of appeal from decisions of the SAC-RTC is via a Rule 42 petition for review18 to the Court of
Appeals, without any distinction as to whether the appeal raises questions of fact, questions of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law. Furthermore, even if we were to allow the appeals to prosper, we find that the
Petitions before the SAC-RTC were filed out of time. Under the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure (1994
DARAB Rules), which were effective during the pendency of this case before the PARAD, the decision of the
adjudicator on land valuation and on the preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall be
brought directly to the SAC within 15 days from receipt of the notice thereof.19 Parties aggrieved by the
adjudicator’s decision are allowed to file one motion for reconsideration.20 In the event of a denial of the motion
for reconsideration, the 1994 DARAB Rules provide: SECTION 12. x x x. The filing of a motion for
reconsideration shall suspend the running of the period within which the appeal must be perfected. If a motion
for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall have the right to perfect his appeal during the remainder of the
period for appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial. If the decision is reversed on
reconsideration, the aggrieved party shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution of reversal within
which to perfect his appeal. 21 While a petition for the fixing of just compensation filed with the RTC-SAC is not
an appeal from the PARAD’s decision, but an original action before the court a quo,22 the rule in Section 12 of
the 1994 DARAB Rules should find analogous application. A party aggrieved by the PARAD’s decision is given
15 days to file the original petition before the SAC-RTC. The pendency of a motion for reconsideration of the
decision suspends the running of the period within which the petition may be filed before the RTC-SAC.
Consequently, upon receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration, the reglementary period for
filing the petition before the RTC-SAC again commences to run. In this case, petitioners received a copy of the
PAIZAD Decision on 27 September 2002. 23 They filed their Motion for Reconsideration thereof on 11 October
2002, or 14 days from their receipt of a copy of the Decision. 24 On 21 December 2002, they received the Order
denying their motion. 25 Hence, petitioners only had one more day within which to file their Petitions with the
SAC-RTC for the determination of just compensation for their respective properties. Since 22 December 2002
tell on a Sunday, they had until 23 December 2002 to file their Petitions. However, they only filed their Petitions
on 6 January 2001, or 16 days after they received the Order denying their Motion for Reconsideration. Clea1ly,
the Petitions before the SAC-RTC were filed out of time. From the foregoing discussion, \W therefore find that
the instant Petitions should be denied. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the consolidated Petitions for
Review are hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decisions and Orders of the Special Agrarian Court-Regional
Trial Court, Branch 23, Naga City in Civil Case Nos. 2003-007 and 2003-2004 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. vs. IAC [G.R. No. L-72005. May 29, 1987]

Ponente: GANCAYCO, J.
FACTS:
[P]rivate respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a complaint for collection of
a sum of money against Varian Industrial Corporation before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. During the pendency of the suit, private respondent
succeeded in attaching some of the properties of Varian Industrial Corporation upon
the posting of a supersedeas bond. The latter in turn posted a counterbond in the
sum of P1,400,000.00 thru petitioner Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc., so the
attached properties were released. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
Sycwin. Varian Industrial Corporation appealed the decision to the respondent
Court. Sycwin then filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the
properties of Varian in respondent Court. The respondent Court granted the petition
of Sycwin. Varian, thru its insurer and petitioner herein, raised the issue to the
Supreme Court. A temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
enforcing the order complaint of was issued.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an order of execution pending appeal of any judgment maybe
enforced on the counterbond of the petitioner.
HELD:
YES. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit and the restraining order dissolved
with costs against petitioner.

RATIO:
It is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. The rule,
founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general words and phrases in a
statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance. The rule
requires that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one
part distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of
the law. In other words, there should be no distinction in the application of a statute
where none is indicated. For courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law
makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it
ought to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences.
The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in
accordance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall be
charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not
only a final and executory judgment but also the execution of a judgment pending
appeal.
Pilar vs. Comelec [G.R. No. 115245. July 11, 1995]

Ponente: QUIASON, J.

FACTS:
On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. On
March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy. In M.R. Nos. 93-2654
and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the
COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for
failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. In M.R. No. 94-0594
dated February 24, 1994, the COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of
petitioner and deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065. Petitioner went to the
COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition in a Resolution
dated April 28, 1994. Petition for certiorari was subsequently filed to the Supreme
Court.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of
contributions and expenditures because he was a “non-candidate,” having withdrawn
his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner posits that “it is . . .
clear from the law that candidate must have entered the political contest, and should
have either won or lost” under Section 14 of R.A. 7166 entitled “An Act Providing for
Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing
Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes”.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 excludes candidates who already withdrew
their candidacy for election.

HELD:
NO. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

RATIO:
Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish, ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the
candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term “every candidate”
must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also
to one who withdrew his candidacy. Also, under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of
the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that
“[t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil,
criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred.” Petitioner’s
withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine.
Colgate-Palmolive Phils. Inc. vs. Hon. Gimenez [G.R. No. L-14787 January 28 1961]

Ponente: GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.

FACTS:
The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines imported from abroad various materials such as
irish moss extract, sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate precipitated calcium carbonate and
dicalcium phosphate, for use as stabilizers and flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures.
For every importation made of these materials, the petitioner paid to the Central Bank of the
Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the
cost, transportation and other charges incident thereto, pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as
amended, commonly known as the Exchange Tax Law. The petitioner filed with the Central
Bank three applications for refund of the 17% special excise tax it had paid. The auditor of the
Central Bank, refused to pass in audit its claims for refund fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of
the Exchange Tax Administration, on the theory that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not
exempt under section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law.

Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter affirmed the ruling of the auditor of
the Central Bank, maintaining that the term “stabilizer and flavors” mentioned in section 2 of
the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the preparation or manufacture of food or
food products. Not satisfied, the petitioner brought the case to the Supreme Court thru the
present petition for review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of dental cream
stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange
Tax Law (Republic Act No. 601).

HELD:
YES. The decision under review was reversed.

RATIO:
General and special terms. The ruling of the Auditor General that the term “stabilizer and
flavors” as used in the law refers only to those materials actually used in the preparation or
manufacture of food and food products is based, apparently, on the principle of statutory
construction that “general terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result that
the general language will be limited by the specific language which indicates the statute’s
object and purpose.” The rule, however, is applicable only to cases where, except for one
general term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific
class (ejusdem generis). In the case at bar, it is true that the term “stabilizer and flavors” is
preceded by a number of articles that may be classified as food or food products, but it is
likewise true that the other items immediately following it do not belong to the same
classification.
The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by
particular recitals when used in connection with them, does not require the rejection of
general terms entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the
legislature and is to be taken in connection with other rules of construction.
Petitioner raises this lone issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER A CASE INVOLVING A

SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD MEMBER WHERE THE CRIME CHARGED IS ONE COMMITTED IN
RELATION TO OFFICE, BUT NOT FOR VIOLATION OF RA 3019, RA 1379 OR ANY OF THE FELONIES
MENTIONED IN CHAPTER II, SECTION 2, TITLE VII OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
In claiming that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case in question, petitioner disputes the former's
appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan.[7] According to petitioner, Inding did not
categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section
4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A.
No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the
enumeration in Section (a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, which was
made applicable to cases concerning violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in relation to public office.

Respondent Amante, in her Comment[8] dated January 16, 2006, averred that, with the way the law was
phrased in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, it is obvious that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was
defined first, enumerating the several exceptions to the general rule, while the exceptions to the general rule
are provided in the rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Section 4. Therefore, according to respondent
Amante, the Sandiganbayan was correct in ruling that the latter has original jurisdiction only over cases where
the accused is a public official with salary grade 27 and higher; and in cases where the accused is public official
below grade 27 but his position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g) of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended and his offense involves a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and if the indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the
three aforementioned statutes, the general rule that a public official must occupy a position with salary grade
27 and higher in order that the Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction over him must apply. The same
respondent proceeded to cite a decision[9] of this Court where it was held that jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred only by the Constitution or law; it cannot be fixed by the will of the parties; it cannot be
acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the parties, neither is it
conferred by acquiescence of the court. In its Reply[10] dated March 23, 2006, the OSP reiterated that the
enumeration of public officials in Section 4(a)(1) to (a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as falling within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan should include their commission of other offenses in relation to office under
Section 4(b) of the same P.D. No. 1606. It cited the case of Esteban v. Sandiganbayan, et al.[11] wherein this
Court ruled that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if the offense is "intimately
connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official
functions. The petition is meritorious. The focal issue raised in the petition is the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. As a background, this Court had thoroughly discussed the history of the conferment of
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,[12] thus: The Sandiganbayan was created
by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to
attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the concept
that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.[13]

Specifically, the question that needs to be resolved is whether or not a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who was charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines
falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

This Court rules in the affirmative.

The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which
took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. The alleged
commission of the offense, as shown in the Information was on or about December 19, 1995 and the filing of
the Information was on May 21, 2004. The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at
the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.[15] The exception
contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved
herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of
paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states:
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS v. CTA, GR Nos. L-48886-88, 1993-07-21
Facts:
This refers to a petition for review of the decision dated July 28, 1978 of the Court of Tax Appeals in
C.T.A. Cases No. 2785, 2831 and 2832 which was promulgated prior to the issuance on February 27,
1991, of Circular No. 1-91 to the effect that appeals from a final order or... decision of the Court of Tax
Appeals shall be to the Court of Appeals.
The berthing facilities of Iligan Bay Express Corporation at Kiwalan were constructed and improved and
are operated and maintained solely by and at the expense of Iligan Express Corporation, a private
corporation.
The MS "Chozan Maru", MS "Samuel S", MS "Ero", MS "Messinia", MS "Pavel Rybin", MS "Caledonia",
and MS "Leonidas" are vessels engaged in foreign trade and represented in the Philippines by private
respondent Litonjua Shipping Company with Granexport Corporation as its... sub-agent.
On various dates, the berthing facilities of the Iligan Bay Express Corporation at Kiwalan, Iligan City were
used by the above vessels and were assessed berthing fees by the Collector of Customs which were paid
by private respondent under protest, to wit:
Issues:
Whether a vessel engaged in foreign trade, which berths at a privately owned wharf or pier, is liable to the
payment of the berthing charge under Section 2901 of the Tariff and Customs Code, which, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 34
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the decisions appealed from are hereby reversed and respondent Commissioner of
Customs is ordered to refund to petitioner the amount of P40,551.00. No costs. (p. 51, Rollo)
The subject vessels, not having berthed at a national port but at the Port of Kiwalan, which was
constructed, operated, and continues to be maintained by private respondent Iligan Express Corporation,
are not subject to berthing charges, and petitioner should refund the... berthing fees paid by private
respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals AFFIRMED.
Principles:
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unjus est
exclusio alterius. Where a statute,... by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the
legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to...
restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned (Agpalo, Statutory Construction,
2nd Ed., 1990, pp. 160-161, and the cases therein cited). The port of Kiwalan not being included in the list
of national ports appended to Customs
Memorandum Circular No. 33-73 nor in Executive Order No. 72, it follows inevitably as a matter of law
and legal principle that this Court may not properly consider said port as a national port. To do otherwise
would be to legislate on our part and to arrogate unto ourselves... powers not conferred on us by the
Constitution.
Amadora vs. CA
GR No. L47745, April 15, 1988

FACTS:

Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a gun by Pablito Daffon
resulting to the former’s death. Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence. The
victim’s parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for damages against Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon
and 2 other students. Complaints against the students were dropped. Respondent Court absolved
the defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebu’s decision for the following reasons: 1. Since the
school was an academic institution of learning and not a school of arts and trades 2. That students
were not in the custody of the school since the semester has already ended 3. There was no clear
identification of the fatal gun, and 4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence
through enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining discipline. Petitioners on othe other
hand claimed their son was under school custody because he went to school to comply with a
requirement for graduation (submission of Physics reports).

ISSUE: WON Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable.

HELD:

The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school
notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident happened. It was immaterial if he was
in the school auditorium to finish his physics requirement. What was important is that he was there
for a legitimate purpose. On the other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys
cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the
provision. Each was exercising only a general authority over the students and not direct control and
influence exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of particular classes.
In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held liable considering that he
had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and later returned to him without taking
disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher authorities. Though it was clear negligence
on his part, no proof was shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident.
Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision because only the teacher
of the head of school of arts and trade is made responsible for the damage caused by the
student. Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the injury
inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his death.
Petition was denied.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Hon. Migrinio and Troadio Tecson [G.R. No. 89483.
August 30, 1990]

Ponente: CORTES, J.
FACTS:
The New Armed Forces Anti-Graft Board (Board) under the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) recommended that private respondent Lt. Col. Troadio
Tecson (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended,
and Rep. Act No. 1379, as amended. Private respondent moved to dismiss. The Board
opposed. Private respondent filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction
with the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Metro Manila. According to petitioners, the PCGG
has the power to investigate and cause the prosecution of private respondent because
he is a “subordinate” of former President Marcos. Respondent alleged that he is not one
of the subordinates contemplated in Executive Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-A as the alleged
illegal acts being imputed to him, that of alleged amassing wealth beyond his legal
means while Finance Officer of the Philippine Constabulary, are acts of his own alone,
not connected with his being a crony, business associate, etc. or subordinate as the
petition does not allege so. Hence the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent acted as a “subordinate” under E.O. No.1 and related
executive orders.

HELD:
NO. Civil Case decision dismissed and nullified. TRO was made permanent.

RATIO:
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, that is – [w]here
general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and
specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but
are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those
specifically mentioned. The term “subordinate” as used in E.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would refer
to one who enjoys a close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his
wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in E.O. No. 1
and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in E.O. No. 2.
The PCGG is ENJOINED from proceeding with the investigation and prosecution of
private respondent, without prejudice to his investigation and prosecution by the
appropriate prosecution agency.
Vera v. Cuevas
Facts:
Private respondents herein, are engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of filled milk
products throughout the Philippines. The products of private respondent, Consolidated Philippines
Inc. are marketed and sold under the brand Darigold whereas those of private respondent, General
Milk Company (Phil.), Inc., under the brand "Liberty;" and those of private respondent, Milk Industries
Inc., under the brand "Dutch Baby." Private respondent, Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk
Manufacturers of the Philippines, is a corporation organized for the principal purpose of upholding
and maintaining at its highest the standards of local filled milk industry, of which all the other private
respondents are members.
CIR required the respondents to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk products which do not
bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
the order. Failure to comply will result to penalties. Section 169 talks of the inscription to be placed in
skimmed milk wherein all condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form, from which the fatty
part has been removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale in the Philippines shall be clearly and
legibly marked on its immediate containers, and in all the language in which such containers are
marked, with the words, "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of
age," or with other equivalent words.
The CFI Manila ordered the CIR to perpetually restrain from requiring the respondents to print on the
labels of their product the words "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one
year of age.". Also, it ordered the Fair Trade Board to perpetually restrain from investigating the
respondents related to the manufacture/sale of their filled milk products.

Issue:
Whether or not skimmed milk is included in the scope of Section 169 of the Tax Code.

Held:
No, Section 169 of the Tax Code is not applicable to filled milk. The use of specific and qualifying
terms "skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed skimmed milk" in the text of the cited
section, would restrict the scope of the general clause "all milk, in whatever form, from which the fatty
pat has been removed totally or in part." In other words, the general clause is restricted by the
specific term "skimmed milk" under the familiar rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited
terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute.
The difference, therefore, between skimmed milk and filled milk is that in the former, the fatty part has
been removed while in the latter, the fatty part is likewise removed but is substituted with refined
coconut oil or corn oil or both. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies
both to skimmed milk and filled milk. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169
applies both to skimmed milk and filled milk. Also, it has been found out that "the filled milk products
of the petitioners (now private respondents) are safe, nutritious, wholesome and suitable for feeding
infants of all ages" (p. 44, Rollo) and that "up to the present, Filipino infants fed since birth with filled
milk have not suffered any defects, illness or disease attributable to their having been fed with filled
milk."
Hence, applying Section 169 to it would cause a deprivation of property without due process of law.
Dra. Brigida Buenaseda et. al. vs. Sec. Juan Flavier et. al. [G.R. No.
106719. September 21, 1993]
Ponente: QUIASON, J.
FACTS:
The petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court,
seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman directing the preventive suspension of
petitioners Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda et.al. The questioned order was issued in
connection with the administrative complaint filed with the Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-0-
91-0151) by the private respondents against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. The Supreme Court required respondent Secretary to comply
with the aforestated status quo order. The Solicitor General, in his comment, stated that
(a) “The authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension and he has no
direct power to suspend;” and (b) “Assuming the Ombudsman has the power to directly
suspend a government official or employee, there are conditions required by law for the
exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions have not been met in the instant case”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and
employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the
investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees.

HELD:
YES. Petition was dismissed, status quo lifted and set aside.
RATIO:
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power “to recommend the
suspension” of a public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to “suspension,” as
a punitive measure. All the words associated with the word “suspension” in said provision
referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure.
Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, the word “suspension” should be given the same
sense as the other words with which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by
considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated.
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively
suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a
procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance
with the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative
charges.
Fule vs. CA [G.R. No. L-79094. June 22, 1988]
Ponente: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of respondent Appellate Court, which
affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Lucena City, Branch LIV, convicting petitioner
(the accused-appellant) of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (The Bouncing Checks Law)
on the basis of the Stipulation of Facts entered into between the prosecution and the defense
during the pre-trial conference in the Trial Court. At the hearing of August 23, 1985, only the
prosecution presented its evidence. At the subsequent hearing on September 17, 1985,
petitioner-appellant waived the right to present evidence and, in lieu thereof, submitted a
Memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts. The Trial Court convicted petitioner-
appellant.
On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed the
judgment of conviction. Hence, this recourse, with petitioner-appellant contending that the
Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals erred in the decision of the Regional Trial Court
convicting the petitioner of the offense charged, despite the cold fact that the basis of the
conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts made during the pre-trial on August 8,
1985, which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel. In Sec.4 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedures:

SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. — No agreement or admission made or

entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless
reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel. (Rule 118) [Emphasis supplied]
Having been effective since January 01, 1985, the above rule is applicable.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily
required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence.

HELD:
YES. Judgment of respondent Appellate Court is REVERSED and this case is hereby ordered
RE-OPENED and REMANDED to the appropriate Branch of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena
City, for further reception of evidence.

RATIO:
By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction, negative
words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are
merely directory (McGee vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 820 [1954]). The use of the term “shall” further
emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty
which may be enforced (Bersabal vs. Salvador, No. L-35910, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 176).
And more importantly, penal statutes whether substantive and remedial or procedural are, by
consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the
accused (People vs. Terrado No. L-23625, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 648).
Bersabal vs. Hon. Judge Serafin Salvador [G.R. No. L-
35910. July 21, 1978]
Ponente: MAKASIAR, J.
FACTS:
[P]etitioner Purita Bersabal seeks to annul the orders of respondent Judge and to compel said respondent Judge
to decide petitioner’s perfected appeal on the basis of the evidence and records of the case submitted by the
City Court of Caloocan City plus the memorandum already submitted by the petitioner and respondents. The
second paragraph of Section 45 of R.A. No. 296, otherwise known as the Philippine Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended by R.A. No. 6031 provides, in part, as follows:

Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted
from the city or municipal courts: Provided, That the parties may submit memoranda and/or brief with oral
argument if so requested … . (Emphasis supplied).
A decision was rendered by said Court which decision was appealed by the petitioner to the respondent Court.
The respondent Judge dismissed petition on August 4, 1971 upon failure of defendant–appellant to prosecute
her appeal, with costs against her. Petitioner filed her memorandum. The respondent Court denied the motion
for reconsideration on October 30, 1971. Petitioner filed a motion for leave to file second motion for
reconsideration which was likewise denied by the respondent court on March 15, 1972.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the light of the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 45 of Republic Act No. 296, as
amended by R.A. No. 6031, the mere failure of an appellant to submit on time the memorandum mentioned in
the same paragraph would empower the Court of First Instance to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to
Prosecute.

HELD:
NO. The challenged orders of Respondent Judge dated August 4, 1971, October 30, 1971, and March 15, 1972
are set aside as null and void.

RATIO:
The above cited provision is clear and leaves no room for doubt. It cannot be interpreted otherwise than that the
submission of memoranda is optional on the part of the parties. Being optional on the part of the parties, the
latter may so choose to waive submission of the memoranda. And as a logical concomitant of the choice given
to the Parties, the Court cannot dismiss the appeal of the party waiving the submission of said memorandum the
appellant so chooses not to submit the memorandum, the Court of First Instance is left with no alternative but to
decide the case on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts. In other
words, the Court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an appellant to submit
his memorandum, but rather it is the Court’s mandatory duty to decide the case on the basis of the available
evidence and records transmitted to it.

As a general rule, the word “may” when used in a statute is permissive only and operates to confer discretion;
while the word “shall” is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced (Dizon vs. Encarnacion,
L-18615, Dec. 24, 1963, 9 SCRA 714, 716-717). The implication is that the Court is left with no choice but to
decide the appealed case either on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted to it, or on the basis of the
latter plus memoranda and/or brief with oral argument duly submitted and/or made on request.
Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association v. CA
G.R. No. 117188 August 7, 1997

ROMERO, J.:

Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association, Inc. (LGVHAI) was organized on 8 February 1983 as the homeoenwers'
association for Loyola Grand Villas. It was also registered as the sole homeowners' association in the said village with the
Home Financing Corporation (which eventually became Home Insurance Guarantee Corporation ["HIGC"]). However, the
association was not able file its corporate by-laws.

The LGVHAI officers then tried to registered its By-Laws in 1988, but they failed to do so. They then discovered that there
were two other homeowners' organizations within the subdivision - the Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (North)
Association, Inc. [North Association] and herein Petitioner Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association,
Inc.["South Association].

Upon inquiry by the LGVHAI to HIGC, it was discovered that LGVHAI was dissolved for its failure to submit its by-laws
within the period required by the Corporation Code and for its non-user of corporate charter because HIGC had not
received any report on the association's activities. These paved the way for the formation of the North and South
Associations.

LGVHAI then lodged a complaint with HIGC Hearing Officer Danilo Javier, and questioned the revocation of its
registration. Hearing Officer Javier ruled in favor of LGVHAI, revoking the registration of the North and South
Associations.

Petitioner South Association appealed the ruling, contending that LGVHAI's failure to file its by-laws within the period
prescribed by Section 46 of the Corporation Code effectively automatically dissolved the corporation. The Appeals Board
of the HIGC and the Court of Appeals both rejected the contention of the Petitioner affirmed the decision of Hearing
Officer Javier.

Issue: W/N LGVHAI's failure to file its by-laws within the period prescribed by Section 46 of the Corporation Code had the
effect of automatically dissolving the said corporation.

Ruling: No. The pertinent provision of the Corporation Code that is the focal point of controversy in this case states:

Sec. 46. Adoption of by-laws. - Every corporation formed under this Code, must within one (1) month after receipt of
official notice of the issuance of its certificate of incorporation by the Securities and Exchange Commission, adopt a code
of by-laws for its government not inconsistent with this Code.

Ordinarily, the word "must" connotes an imposition of duty which must be enforced. However, the word "must" in a statute,
like "shall," is not always imperative. It may be consistent with an ecercise of discretion. If the language of a statute,
considered as a whole with due regard to its nature and object, reveals that the legislature intended to use the words
"shall" and "must" to be directory, they should be given that meaning. The legislative deliberations of the Corporation
Code reveals that it was not the intention of Congress to automatically dissolve a corporation for failure to file the By-Laws
on time.

Moreover, By-Laws may be necessary to govern the corporation, but By-Laws are still subordinate to the Articles of
Incorporation and the Corporation Code. In fact, there are cases where By-Laws are unnecessary to the corporate
existence and to the valid exercise of corporate powers.

The Corporation Code does not expressly provide for the effects of non-filing of By-Laws. However, these have been
rectified by Section 6 of PD 902-A which provides that SEC shall possess the power to suspend or revoke, after proper
notice and hearing, the franchise or certificate of registration of corporations upon failure to file By-Laws within the
required period. This shows that there must be notice and hearing before a corporation is dissolved for failure to file its By-
Laws. Even assuming that the existence of a ground, the penalty is not necessarily revocation, but may only be
suspension.

By-Laws are indispensable to corporations, since they are required by law for an orderly management of corporations.
However, failure to file them within the period prescribed does not equate to the automatic dissolution of a corporation.
Title: Gachon v De vera
Nature: Special civil action for certiorari and injunction
Facts: The factual antecedents of this case as found by the Regional Trial Court are undisputed and admitted
as correct by the parties. A complaint for forcible entry 3 was filed by Private Respondent Susana Guevara
against Patricio Guevara and Petitioners Victoria Gachon and Alex Guevara before the Municipal Trial Court for
Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City. Summons was served on and received by petitioners on August 25, 1993, directing
them to file an answer within the reglementary period of ten (10) days. Patricio Guevara was abroad at that time;
hence, the MTCC did not acquire jurisdiction over him. On September 4, 1993, petitioners filed with the MTCC
an urgent motion for extension of time to file an answer. 4 On September 7, 1993, the MTCC denied the motion
on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure. 5 On September 8, 1993,
or more than ten days from their receipt of the summons, petitioner submitted an urgent motion praying for the
admission of their answer, 6 which was attached thereto. Two days later, petitioners filed another motion pleading
for the admission of an amended answer. On September 23, 1993, the MTCC denied the motions and considered
the case submitted for resolution. 7 On October 27, 1993, the MTCC also denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. 8 Thereafter, on November 26, 1993, the MTCC 9 issued a decision 10 resolving the complaint
for forcible entry in favor of herein private respondents. Instead of filing an appeal, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari and injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, 11 Branch 24, praying mainly that
the MTCC be ordered to admit the amended answer and to conduct further proceedings in the civil case for
forcible entry. As prayed for, a temporary restraining order was issued by the RTC.
Issue:I. Are the provisions of the Rules on Summary Procedure on the period of pleadings to be applied strictly
or liberally?
II. What is the legal effect of a belated answer under the Rules on Summary Procedure?
Application of statutory construction: The word "shall" ordinarily connotes an imperative and indicates the
mandatory character of a statute. This, however, is not an absolute rule in statutory construction. The import of
the word ultimately depends upon a consideration of the entire provision, its nature, object and the consequences
that would follow from construing it one way or the other. As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within
which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the
prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature,
these rules are regarded as mandatory.
Ruling: The pertinent provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure are as follows:
Sec. 5. Answer. Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the
complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff . . .Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. Should the defendant
fail to answer the complaint within the period above provided, the Court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff,
shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed
for therein: . . .Private respondent assails petitioners for engaging in forum-shopping by pursuing the present
ejectment suit, notwithstanding the pendency of an action for quieting of title involving the same property and
parties. We are unable to find basis for this charge. For forum-shopping to exist, both actions must involve the
same transactions, essential facts and circumstances; and the actions must raise identical causes of action,
subject matter, and issues. 35 Suffice it to say that an action for quieting of title and partition has a different
cause of action than that in an ejectment suit. As private respondent herself contended, ownership of a certain
portion of the property which is determined in a case of partition does not necessarily mean that the successful
litigant has the right to possess the property adjudged in his favor. In ejectment cases, the only issue for
resolution is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set
forth by any of the party litigants. Anyone of them who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such
possession even from the owner himself. This rule holds true regardless of the character of a party's possession,
provided that he has in his favor priority of time which entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully
ejected by a person having a better right by either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. 36 It has even
been ruled that the institution of a separate action for quieting of title is not a valid reason for defeating the
execution of the summary remedy of ejectment. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED
and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED in toto. Double costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.