Filing # 59602062 E-Filed 07/27/2017 01:49:19 PM

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

THE FLORIDA BAR, Supreme Court Case

No. SC-
Complainant,
The Florida Bar File
v. Nos. 2016-10,630 (6B)
2017-10,772 (6B)
MARK P. STOPA,

Respondent.
RECEIVED, 07/27/2017 01:53:29 PM, Clerk, Supreme Court

___________________________/

COMPLAINT

The Florida Bar, Complainant, files this Complaint against Mark P. Stopa,

Respondent, pursuant to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar and alleges:

1. Respondent is, and at all times mentioned in the Complaint was, a

member of The Florida Bar, admitted on April 3, 2002, and is subject to the

jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida.

2. The Sixth Judicial Circuit Grievance Committee “B” found probable

cause to file this Complaint pursuant to Rule 3-7.4, of the Rules Regulating The

Florida Bar, and this Complaint has been approved by the presiding member of

that committee.

COUNT I: TFB FILE NO. 2016-10,630 (6B)

3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference.

 4. On April 18, 2008, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as the initial bank lender,

initiated foreclosure proceedings against Nootan Patel and Shree Patel in the

matter, Wells Fargo Bank. N.A. v. Patel, et al., Case No. 08-CA-008480,

Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Hillsborough County, Florida, wherein the

lender sought to foreclose upon a promissory note and mortgage.

5. Both Nootan Patel and Shree Patel executed the Mortgage and

Warranty Deed for the subject property.

6. At all times relevant, the subject property was occupied by Prakash

Patel, who was Nootan Patel’s former-husband, and Yolanda Valdez.

7. Shree Patel is the daughter of Nootan Patel and Prakash Patel.

8. Prakash Patel was not a party in the foreclosure action, did not hold

title to the subject property when the foreclosure action was initiated, and was not a

signatory on the mortgage for the subject property.

9. Stephen K. Hachey, Esq. represented Nootan Patel, and filed a notice

of appearance on her behalf on or about October 27, 2008.

10. On or about October 18, 2010, Respondent filed a Notice of

Appearance as purported counsel for Shree Patel and Nootan Patel.

11. Respondent filed his appearance as purported counsel for Shree Patel

and Nootan Patel without their knowledge or consent, and while Nootan Patel was

still represented by Mr. Hachey.

 12. Respondent did not notify Mr. Hachey that he had entered a notice of

appearance in the case.

13. Respondent never entered into a substitution of counsel with Mr.

Hachey for the representation of Nootan Patel.

14. Respondent did not communicate with Nootan Patel or Shree Patel

concerning his representation of them.

15. Prior to filing his Notice of Appearance, Respondent had never met

Nootan Patel or Shree Patel.

16. Respondent contended that his point-of-contact in the purported

representation of Nootan Patel and Shree Patel was Prakash Patel.

17. At the time of the foreclosure proceeding, Nootan Patel and Prakash

Patel, as ex-husband and wife, had an acrimonious relationship.

18. On or about November 24, 2010, Respondent filed Notices of

Appearance as counsel for Prakash Patel and Yolanda Valdez, the tenants of the

property.

19. On September 6, 2011, the late Henry W. Hicks, Esq. was substituted

in as counsel for Nootan Patel.

20. Respondent did not notify Mr. Hicks that Respondent had filed a

notice of appearance as counsel for Nootan Patel.

 21. Respondent never entered into a substitution of counsel with Mr.

Hicks for the representation of Nootan Patel.

22. On or about July 25, 2013, Nootan Patel filed for Chapter 7

bankruptcy relief in order to help resolve the pending foreclosure matter.

23. On or about September 23, 2014, Respondent sent a representation

agreement addressed to Nootan Patel regarding Respondent’s representation in the

foreclosure proceeding going forward, and charging a $1,575 nonrefundable fee.

24. The September 23, 2014, representation agreement purportedly bears

the signature of Nootan Patel as well as Prakesh Patel and Yolanda Valdez.

25. Nootan Patel has testified that she did not execute her signature on

this agreement.

26. Nootan Patel did not intend to litigate the underlying foreclosure

proceeding as she had no wish to keep the subject property. In fact, Nootan Patel

wished to surrender the property through bankruptcy.

27. Contrary to Nootan Patel’s intention to surrender the subject property,

and without her knowledge or consent, Respondent proceeded to litigate the

foreclosure proceeding as purported counsel for Nootan Patel.

28. On December 10, 2014, Respondent filed an Answer and Affirmative

Defenses as purported counsel for Nootan Patel and Shree Patel.

 29. Neither Nootan Patel nor Shree Patel were aware that Respondent had

filed an Answer and Affirmative Defenses on their behalf.

30. Neither Nootan Patel nor Shree Patel authorized Respondent to file

the Answer and Affirmative Defenses on their behalf.

31. The Answer and Affirmative Defenses contained fact-specific

defenses with references to conversations between Respondent, Nootan Patel,

Shree Patel, and their mortgage lender.

32. The Affirmative Defenses contained factually inaccurate statements.

33. Respondent did not communicate with Nootan Patel or Shree Patel

regarding the conversations or facts alleged in the Answer and Affirmative

Defenses.

34. On or about February 9, 2015, Respondent filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment and a Notice of Filing Affidavits Regarding Summary

Judgment as purported counsel for Nootan Patel and Shree Patel.

35. The affidavits in support of the motion for summary judgment were

purportedly signed by Nootan Patel and Shree Patel before a notary public with the

last name “Patel” on February 6, 2015.

36. Respondent contended to have received the affidavits, purportedly

signed by Nootan Patel and Shree Patel, from Prakash Patel.

37. Nootan Patel and Shree Patel did not sign their affidavits.

 38. Nootan Patel and Shree Patel did not authorize Respondent to file the

affidavits on their behalf.

39. The affidavits contained factually inaccurate statements.

40. Respondent did not communicate with Nootan Patel or Shree Patel

concerning their affidavits.

41. On or about May 13, 2015, Respondent filed his motion to withdraw

as counsel for Nootan Patel.

42. On or about May 15, 2015, Respondent filed a notice to withdraw the

affidavits of Nootan Patel and Shree Patel.

43. On or about August 3, 2015, Shree Patel was dropped as a party

defendant from the foreclosure proceeding.

44. By acting as counsel for Nootan Patel and Shree Patel in the

foreclosure proceedings without their knowledge or consent, Respondent advanced

unmeritorious claims before the court.

45. By filing unauthorized pleadings containing inaccurate statements as

purported counsel for Nootan Patel and Shree Patel, Respondent made false

statements of fact to a tribunal.

46. By reason of the foregoing, Respondent has violated the following

Rules Regulating The Florida Bar: Rule 4-3.1 (Meritorious Claims and

Contentions) and Rule 4-3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal).

 COUNT II: TFB FILE NO. 2017-10,772 (6B)

47. Paragraphs 1 and 2 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference.

48. Respondent represented Kathryn W. Milliken and Robert B. Milliken,

the Defendants in the mortgage foreclosure matter titled, DiTech Financial, LLC v.

Milliken, et al., Case No. 14-CA-001000, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for

Hillsborough County, Florida.

49. Pursuant to the Residential Foreclosure Amended Order Setting Non-

Jury Trial and Directing Pre-Trial Procedures (“trial order”), all counsel and parties

were required to be present before the court at the pretrial and trial.

50. Respondent has acknowledged that his office received the subject trial

order prior to trial, as indicated by his testimony at the grievance committee’s live

hearing in this matter on June 20, 2017:

Q Now, paragraph 5 of this trial order reads that "All counsel and
parties shall be present before the court at the pretrial and the trial
pursuant to Rule 1.200(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. On failure
of a party and counsel to attend the conference, the court may dismiss
the action, strike the pleadings, limit proof of witnesses."

Do you recall specifically reading that early in the case?

A I mean, as I sit here today, do I have a specific recollection of

having read that language in the order? No. Did I review the order at
some point after it came in? Yes.

51. Paragraph 5 of the trial order stated that “[a]ll counsel and parties

shall be present before the Court at the pretrial and trial.”

 52. Respondent had an obligation to review and familiarize himself with

the contents and directives of the trial order.

53. A non-jury trial was set in the matter for April 10, 2017.

54. On April 10, 2017, Respondent and Ms. Milliken appeared at the

courthouse for trial.

55. On the same day, at the courthouse, Respondent presented Ms.

Milliken with a verified motion to disqualify the presiding judge, The Honorable

Gregory P. Holder, for her signature.

56. On the same day, at the courthouse, Ms. Milliken executed the

verified motion to disqualify Judge Holder.

57. Thereafter on April 10, 2017, Respondent filed a verified motion to

disqualify Judge Holder, which was denied.

58. During the trial, plaintiff’s counsel called Ms. Milliken as a witness.

59. Thereafter, Respondent advised Judge Holder that Ms. Milliken was

not in the courtroom and that he did not know where either she or Mr. Milliken

were within the courthouse, as indicated by the following exchange between

Respondent, opposing counsel, and the court at the trial on April 10, 2017:

MR. VESCHIO:· I'd like to call Mrs. Milliken.

THE COURT:· Mrs. or Mr.?

MR. VESCHIO:· Mrs. Milliken.

THE COURT:· Mrs. Milliken.

 MR. VESCHIO:· Mrs. Kathryn Milliken.

MR. STOPA:· Judge, she's not in the courtroom; and my

understanding, from communicating with her, she was not under
subpoena.· So, if they didn't subpoena her, then I don't see how they
can call her in their case.
THE COURT:· They can certainly call her. If she's present in the
courthouse, present on this floor, they can call her.
MR. VESCHIO:· I'm concerned because I think the Millikens actually
signed your Verified Motion to Disqualify.

MR. STOPA:· I'm not -- I'm not sure where they are at this point,
Judge. I'd ask for a brief recess.
60. As indicated in the preceding paragraph number 59 above,

Respondent proceeded to argue that since Ms. Milliken was not under a subpoena,

she could not be called to testify.

61. As indicated in the preceding paragraph number 59 above, Judge

Holder advised Respondent that Ms. Milliken could certainly be called to testify if

she was “present in the courthouse, present on this floor. . .”

62. Respondent asked for a brief recess, which was granted by the court.

63. During the recess, Respondent found Ms. Milliken in the hallway

immediately outside the courtroom.

64. In the presence of Judge Holder’s bailiff, Respondent advised Ms.

Milliken that since she was not under subpoena by the plaintiff, Ms. Milliken was

not required to be there and was free to leave.

 65. Thereafter, Ms. Milliken proceeded to make her way toward the

elevator lobby to exit the courthouse.

66. Upon learning from the bailiff that Ms. Milliken was leaving the

courthouse, Judge Holder ordered all parties to return to the courtroom

immediately.

67. Judge Holder specifically summoned the bailiff to retrieve Ms.

Milliken from the elevator lobby.

68. Upon being retrieved by the bailiff, Ms. Milliken reported to the

courtroom and submitted to examination by plaintiff’s counsel.

69. As a necessary party in the foreclosure matter, Ms. Milliken’s

testimony was relevant in the proceeding.

70. Ms. Milliken testified at trial that she had reviewed the trial order

prior to appearing at the trial, and acknowledged that her appearance was required.

71. At the time Respondent advised Ms. Milliken that she was under no

obligation to testify absent a subpoena and could leave, Judge Holder had informed

Respondent that Ms. Milliken could certainly be called to testify if she was present

in the courthouse.

72. By advising his client that that she was under no obligation to testify

absent a subpoena and could leave, Respondent violated Judge Holder’s trial order,

as well as his stated directives at trial.

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 73. By advising his client that that she was under no obligation to testify

absent a subpoena and could leave despite Judge Holder’s trial order and stated

directives at trial, Respondent knowingly disobeyed an obligation under the rules

of a tribunal and engaged in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is

prejudicial to the administration of justice.

74. By advising the court that Respondent did not know the whereabouts

of Ms. Milliken, when Respondent knew she was in the courthouse and hence

could be called to testify, Respondent engaged in conduct that is contrary to

honesty and justice.

75. By reason of the foregoing, Respondent has violated the following

Rules Regulating The Florida Bar: Rule 3-4.3 (Misconduct and Minor

Misconduct); Rule 4-3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel); and Rule 4-

8.4(d) (Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice).

WHEREFORE, The Florida Bar prays Respondent will be appropriately

disciplined in accordance with the provisions of the Rules Regulating The Florida

Bar as amended.

Matthew Ian Flicker, Bar Counsel

Florida Bar No. 87241
Katrina S. Brown, Bar Counsel
Florida Bar No. 85373

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 The Florida Bar, Tampa Branch Office

4200 George J. Bean Pkwy, Ste. 2580
Tampa, Florida 33607-1496
(813) 875-9821
mflicker@floridabar.org -Primary
kschaffhouser@floridabar.org -Primary
pmcbride@floridabar.org -Secondary
nchristopherson@floridabar.org -Secondary
tampaoffice@floridabar.org -Secondary

Adria E. Quintela, Staff Counsel

The Florida Bar
Lakeshore Plaza II, Suite 130
1300 Concord Terrace
Sunrise, Florida 33323
(954) 835-0233
Florida Bar No. 897000
aquintel@floridabar.org

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the foregoing Complaint has been E-filed with The
Honorable John A. Tomasino, Clerk of the Supreme Court of Florida, using the E-
Filing Portal; and that true and correct copies have been furnished via regular U.S.
mail and certified U.S. mail no. 7017 0190 0000 0892 2886, return receipt
requested, to Mark P. Stopa, Respondent, c/o Scott Kevork Tozian, Esquire,
Counsel for Respondent, to his official Bar address of Smith, Tozian, Daniel &
Davis, P.A., 109 N. Brush Street, Suite 200, Tampa, Florida 33602-4116, and via
electronic mail to his official Bar email address of stozian@smithtozian.com; via
electronic mail to Matthew Ian Flicker, Bar Counsel, and Katrina S. Brown, Bar
Counsel, to their designated email addresses of mflicker@floridabar.org,
kschaffhouser@floridabar.org, pmcbride@floridabar.org,
nchristopherson@floridabar.org, and tampaoffice@floridabar.org; all on this 27th
day of July, 2017.

Adria E. Quintela, Staff Counsel

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 NOTICE OF TRIAL COUNSEL AND

DESIGNATION OF PRIMARY EMAIL ADDRESS

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the trial counsel in this matter are Matthew
Ian Flicker, Bar Counsel, and Katrina S. Brown, Bar Counsel, whose address,
telephone number, and primary and secondary email addresses are The Florida
Bar, Tampa Branch Office, 4200 George J. Bean Parkway, Suite 2580, Tampa,
Florida 33607-1496, (813) 875-9821, and mflicker@floridabar.org;
kschaffhouser@floridabar.org; pmcbride@floridabar.org;
nchristopherson@floridabar.org; and tampaoffice@floridabar.org. Respondent
need not address pleadings, correspondence, etc. in this matter to anyone other than
trial counsel and to Adria E. Quintela, Staff Counsel, The Florida Bar, Lakeshore
Plaza II, Suite 130, 1300 Concord Terrace, Sunrise, Florida 33323,
aquintel@floridabar.org.

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 MANDATORY ANSWER NOTICE

RULE 3-7.6(h)(2), RULES OF DISCIPLINE, EFFECTIVE MAY 20, 2004,

PROVIDES THAT A RESPONDENT SHALL ANSWER A COMPLAINT.

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