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Although Henry Ford only needed a one-liner to express a sceptical view about
history ( History is bunk“), since the 1980ies the critique of history has tur-
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ned into a booming intellectual industry. Since the international rise of post-
modernism volume-length doubts have been raised concerning history that is
more than just subjective. The idea that history has little to do with the past,
but much to do with the present and with power, has gained a remarkable
popularity, so there are good reasons for taking seriously the rising tide of
scepticism about the possibility of historical knowledge.1
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I would like to thank Allan Megill (University of Virginia), Christoph Conrad (Centre for
Comparative History of Europe, Berlin) and Tannelie Blom (University of Maastricht) for
their helpful comments on an earlier version of this article.
1 See, for instance, the new journal Rethinking History (first issue spring 1997), edited by
Keith Jenkins and Alan Munslow, and the volumes in the Routledge series History and
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theory‘. By post-modernism I refer to intellectual positions that combine two fundamental
ideas: 1. the incredulity towards meta-narratives“ of history (Lyotard), such as Marxism,
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liberalism and modernism. This amounts to a rejection of all material philosophy of history
and to a fundamental rejection of reducing any plurality to a unity, i. e., anti-reductionism
and anti-unitarism; 2. the rejection of the idea that there is a reality independent of subject-
positions, that is: anti-objectivism. Anti-objectivism results in a rejection of the discussion of
reality independent of its symbolic representations, especially its linguistic representations.
All the relevant ideas have been developed independently by a wide range of modern thin-
kers, only their post-modern combination is original. Therefore Wolfgang Welsch’s proposal
to view postmodernism as a recent and radical form of modernism makes sense. The same
goes for his proposal to distinguish between the vulgar and the interesting variants of postmo-
dern thought. Alas, in history we often encounter the vulgar variant. See: Wolfgang Welsch,
Unsere postmoderne Moderne, Berlin 1997, 1–8. See also the editors’ introduction to: Chri-
stoph Conrad and Martina Kessel (eds.), Geschichte schreiben in der Postmoderne. Beiträge
zur aktuellen Diskussion, Stuttgart 1994, 9–36, and the special issue Klios Texte“ of the
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Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften 4 (1993), Nr. 3. For a compilation of
articles concerning the debate on postmodernism and history, see also: Keith Jenkins, ed.,
The postmodern history reader, London 1997. Jenkins himself, as I shall argue, represents
vulgar‘ postmodernism in Welsch’s terminology.
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2 Cf. Richard J. Evans, In defence of history, London 1997; Keith Windschuttle, The kil-
ling of history. How literary critics and social theorists are murdering our past, New York
1997; C. Behan McCullagh, The truth of history, London and New York 1998; Chris Lorenz,
Konstruktion der Vergangenheit, Köln, Weimar and Wien 1997.
3 On White see Chris Lorenz, Can histories be true? Narrativism, positivism and the me-
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taphorical turn“, in: History and Theory 37 (1998), 309–329, and Herta Nagl-Docekal, Läßt
sich die Geschichtsphilosophie tropologisch fundieren? Kritische Anmerkungen zu Hayden
White, in: Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften 4 (1993), 466–476. See
also Michel de Certeau, The writing of history, New York 1988. On Foucault, see below.
I shall begin by analysing the argument which states that it is impossible for
historians to give a true account of past reality. This argument is often borro-
wed from two famous thinkers who originally developed this train of thought.5
According to Hayden White (whose intellectual origins lie in structuralism) hi-
storians do not present true accounts of the past, but fictions of factual repre-
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sentation“ which are akin to literary accounts. For Michel Foucault, whatever
truth a historical account may claim is the product of a specific discourse‘ with
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its own politics of truth‘ and regime of truth‘. Therefore, truth is not constitu-
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ted by the correspondence between language and reality, but is a socio-political
construct, dependent on a specific regime of truth‘ and characterized by speci-
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fic power relations. Authors who use this sceptical argument thus tend to put
the terms reality‘, fact‘ and truth‘ in italics or between quotation marks.6
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All these authors emphasize that knowledge of reality presupposes some
kind of linguistic construction, because the concepts, statements, and stories
in which our knowledge of reality is formulated, are not found in reality itself;
they first have to be constructed. Even the past is not found as such and
has to be conceptually constructed. Reality as represented, and as known, is
7 What is meant by the term fiction‘ is the crucial issue. See Ann Rigney, Semantic slides:
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history and the concept of fiction, in: Rolf Thorstendahl and Irmline Veit-Brause (eds.),
History-making: the intellectual and social formation of a discipline, Stockholm 1996, 31–47.
Authors who have introduced the term recently into historical discourse – especially White
and de Certeau – all contrast fiction‘ to factuality‘. For White’s (shifting) positions on this
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issue see Lorenz, Can histories, as footnote 3, esp. 319.
8 Since Wittgenstein’s later work, it has become obvious that correspondence cannot be
interpreted as a simple relationship between language and uninterpreted reality. The corre-
spondence relation can only be conceived of as a – constructed – relation within the lingui-
stic framework, in which reality is described. My point is, therefore, that constructing is not
identical to fictionalizing, but a legitimate and necessary cognitive activity. See Chris Lorenz,
Historical knowledge and historical reality. A plea for internal realism‘, in: Brian Fay et al.
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(eds.), History and Theory. Contemporary readings, Oxford 1998, 342–377. See also Martin
Bunzl, Real history. Reflections on historical practice, London and New York 1997, 77: To
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speak of the categories of experience as constructed is not to say that we cannot ask questions
about the circumstances of that construction. Nor that we cannot answer these questions in
terms about which there is no fact of the matter.“ For Wittgenstein’s notion of truth see:
Matthias Kross, Klarheit statt Wahrheit. Evidenz und Gewißheit bei Ludwig Wittgenstein,
in: Matthias Kross and Gary Smith (eds.), Die ungewisse Evidenz. Für eine Kulturgeschichte
des Beweises, Berlin 1998, 95–139.
9 Some – like Foucault – defend this idea for all types of linguistic constructs, from statements
to stories. Others, such as White and Ankersmit, only defend this idea for more complex
linguistic constructs, like complete stories, and exempt singular statements.
10 This line of argument is exemplified by Michel de Certeau, who invokes the authority
of Roland Barthes. Although he defines historiography as a relation between the real and
discourse which is controlled by methodical operations, at the same time he opposes the real‘
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to its historiographical representations and characterizes the products of historiographical
discourse as fictional‘ and ideological‘. See de Certeau, Writing, as footnote 3, 75, where
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he refers to an ideology of real‘ or true‘ historical facts‘“ in history. At the same time, he
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uncouples meaning from reality and couples meaning to the construction of models; ibidem,
79: Research ascribes objects for itself that take the shape of its practice“; ibidem, 81: The
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relation with the real becomes a relation among the terms of an operation“. The objects
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that he (Braudel, CL) proposed for research were determined in relation to an operation
to be undertaken (not a reality to be rejoined), and in respect to existing models. A result
of this enterprise, the fact‘ is the designation of a relation“. Hence, 41–42: Historians are
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those who assemble not so much facts as signifiers. They seem to tell of facts while, in
effect, they express meanings which moreover refer what is noted (what historians hold to
be relevant) to a conception of whatever is notable. The signified of historical discourse is
made from ideological or imaginary structures; but they are effected by a referent outside of
the discourse that is inaccessible in itself“. Cf. ibidem, 10: Thus the past is the fiction of
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the present“. A similar line of argument is defended by Jenkins, Introduction, as footnote
6, who also identifies all constructive‘ activity as non-cognitive and therefore as ideological‘
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and interested‘. For a far more illuminating analysis of the constructive‘ dimensions of
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language and its relation to the referential dimensions see: Charles Taylor, Human agency
and language. Philosophical papers, Vol. 1, Cambridge 1985, 213–293.
11 I subscribe to Mary Hesse’s theory of metaphor. Hesse analyses the distinction between
literal and metaphorical language as an analogue of the distinction between observational
and theoretical language in (the philosophy of) science. See Mary Hesse, Models, metaphor
and truth, in: Frank R. Ankersmit and Jan J. Mooij, (eds.), Knowledge and language, vol.
3: Metaphor and knowledge, Dordrecht, Boston and London 1993, 50–67. A similar position
is developed by McCullagh, Truth, as footnote 2, 75–82.
12 One of the most disturbing features of some forms of postmodernism is the tendency to
question both argument and rationality as such and to criticize them as interested‘, ideologi-
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cal‘, culturally specific to the West‘ and oppressive‘. See for instance Jenkins, Introduction,
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as footnote 6, who discredits the empirical arguments of academic‘ history as bourgeois‘ and
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thus ideological‘. Cf. also Ghandi on postcolonial theory, below.
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13 The great intellectual masters of suspicion, Marx and Nietzsche, were themselves aware
of the self-destructive potential of their all-encompassing theories of ideology. Unfortunately,
it seems that these lessons in this respect have been forgotten by the majority of those who
posture as their (post)modern pupils. For Marx and Nietzsche on truth see: Hans Barth,
Wahrheit und Ideologie, Frankfurt am Main 1974 (1961).
14 The terms were coined by Hillary Putnam, What is realism?, in: Jarrett Leplin, ed.,
Scientific realism, Berkeley 1984, 140–154. For its application to history see Lorenz, Historical
knowledge, as footnote 8, and Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt and Margaret Jacob, Telling the
truth about history, New York 1994, 247–251.
15 For a discussion of this problem and further references see Lorenz, Konstruktion, as
footnote 2, chapter 2 and 3.
16 Michel de Certeau invokes Popper’s authority, but he seems to miss Popper’s main point.
For Popper, the fact that scientists can never prove the truth of their statements empirically
does not imply that these statements do not claim to be true. On the contrary, the whole
point of science according to Popper’s theory of verisimilitude is that scientific statements
constantly try to get closer to the truth. The only point of falsification is to assure that
false‘ candidates for truth are eliminated. Without the quest for truth, falsification would
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make no sense, just as the exposure of lies would make no sense without the idea of truth.
See Michel de Certeau, Heterologies: discourses on the other, Minneapolis and London 1986,
200–201: Not that it [historiography] speaks the truth; never has the historian pretended to
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do that! Rather, with its apparatus for the critical reading of documents, the scholar effaces
error from the fables‘ of the past. The territory that he occupies is acquired by a diagnosis
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of the false“ (...). His work is oriented to the negative, or, to borrow a more appropriate
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term from Popper, towards falsification‘“. (...) in the past, arguments against false“ gods
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were used to induce belief in a true God. The process repeats itself today in contemporary
historiography: by demonstrating the presence of errors, discourse must pass off as real‘
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whatever is placed in opposition to errors.“ A similar line of argument is found in Jenkins,
Introduction, as footnote 6, 6, according to whom the absence of certain foundations‘ nullifies
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the quest for truth and turns all our cognitive activities into positioned expressions‘: In fact
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(sic! CL), history now appears to be just one more foundationless, positioned expression in
a world of foundationless, positioned expressions.“ Cf. Thomas Haskell’s review of Berkhofer
in: Farewell to fallibilism‘.
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2a. Ethnocentrism
22 See, for instance, Raymond Martin, Progress in historical studies, in: History and Theory
37 (1998), 14–40. This does not, of course, imply that these norms are unequivocal and
function like an algorithm. They too require interpretation, which in turn explains why there
is no guarantee for consensus.
23 Hence there is no need to presuppose instant rationality‘ (Imre Lakatos) in order to
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defend the notion of objectivity‘. For this notion of objectivity see for exampe: Mark Bevir,
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Objectivity in history, in: History and Theory 33 (1994), 3, 328–345, and Thomas Haskell,
Objectivity is not neutrality. Explanatory schemes in history, Baltimore 1998.
24 Charles Taylor, Foucault on freedom and truth, in: Philosophy and the human sciences.
Philosophical Papers, vol. 2, Cambridge 1985, 152–153.
25 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge, Brighton 1980, 114.
26 Ibidem, 131.
27 See Taylor, Foucault, as footnote 24, 152–153.
28 The critique of instrumental rationality has, as is well known, been the major theme of
Critical Theory (alias the Frankfurt School‘) since the 1930ies.
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29 See Alan Megill, Prophets of extremity. Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida, Berkeley
1985, 238: He [Foucault] portrays discourse as something that goes out to do battle“.
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30 Michel Foucault, The history of sexuality. Volume 1: An introduction, New York 1980,
95: Should we not turn the expression around, then, and say that politics is war pursued by
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other means?“
31 Ibidem, 93–94: Power is everywhere, not because it embraces everything, but because it
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comes from everywhere“. Power is not an institution, and not a structure, neither is it a
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certain strength we are endowed with: it is a name that one attributes to a complex strategical
situation in a particular society“. Relations of power are not in a position of exteriority with
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respect to other types of relationships (economic processes, knowledge relationships, sexual
relations), but are immanent in the latter“. See also Foucault, Power/Knowledge, as footnote
25, 187: Between every point of the social body, between a man and a woman, between the
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members of a family, between a master and his pupil, between everybody who knows and
everyone who does not, there exist relations of power (...)“
32 On this point I agree again with Taylor, who argues that Foucault’s idea of power without
a subject cannot be upheld. Foucault ends up with a kind of Schopenhauerian will to power,
ungrounded in, and unrelated to, human action. See Taylor, Foucault, as footnote 24, 167 ff.
33 The fact that Foucault introduces the concept of resistance as an opposite to power does
not alter the situation, because resistance too is only defined as a relational attribute of
the social body‘: just as power is everywhere, so is resistance. See Foucault, Sexuality, as
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footnote 30, 95: These points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network.“ It
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is remarkable that Foucault’s analyses of power and politics ultimately converge with the
totalitarian‘ Marxian analyses he set out to criticize, because both suffer from the same
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blind spot‘. Foucault is just as unable as Marxism to discriminate between democracy and
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dictatorship at a conceptual level. While decentering‘ and desubjectivising‘ power and shif-
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ting his focus from macro- to micro- technologies of power‘, his concept of politics remains as
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instrumental as the Marxist conceptions he criticizes. There is more left of Marx in Foucault
than meets the eye.
34 See Jenkins, Introduction, as footnote 6, 13, who even accuses academic‘ historians of
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suppressing‘ alternative conceptions of history by theoretical cleansing‘. On p. 20, ibidem,
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Jenkins asserts in the same vein that normal history orders the past for the sake of the
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present and therefore power“.
35 Because Foucault does not restrict the scope of his power/knowledge theory to a specific
domain (such as the human sciences), its claim to validity appears to be universal.
36 See the analysis of this problem in Bunzl, Real history, as footnote 8, 70–73, and the
following statements in Michel Foucault, Archeology of knowledge, New York 1972, 90: A
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sentence cannot be non-significant; it refers to something by virtue of the fact that it is a
statement“, and 224: It is always possible one could speak the truth in a void (...)“, and 218:
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The division between true and false is neither arbitrary, nor modifiable, nor institutional,
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nor violent.“
37 Here we confront a fundamental problem with Foucault, because he rejects the common
sense (correspondence) meaning of truth without substituting a more meaningful definition.
His provisional specifications circumvent the normal‘ problem of truth, since he refers to
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statements‘ without addressing their representational adequacy and thus their truth. See
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Foucault, Power/Knowledge, as footnote 25, 133: Truth‘ is to be understood as a system
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of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation
of statements. Truth‘ is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce
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and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. A regime‘
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of truth“. In the end, his notion of truth remains as problematic as his notion of power.
Also see Megill, Prophets, as footnote 29, 244: We have already seen that Foucault views
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genealogy as directed against the notions of an objective‘ reality, an objective‘ identity, and
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an objective‘ truth – for he sees these notions as confirming the existant order.“ (...) One
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fictions‘ history on the basis of a political reality that makes it true, one fictions‘ a politics
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not yet in existence on the basis of a historical truth. This statement marks an odd interplay
between truth and lie: a lying history is legitimized by the existence of a true‘ political
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reality; a lying politics is legitimized by the existence of a true‘ history. To expand on this:
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what makes true‘ a representationally inadequate account of, for example, prisons, is the
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truth that we do live in a disciplinary society. In consequence, despite its inadequacies or
even its outright falsehoods, such an account is justified insofar as it enables us to see more
clearly the reality of this disciplinary society.“ One observes the conceptual connection in
Foucault between his theory of (disciplinary) society and his theory of (power/)knowledge:
disciplinary society functions as the observational basis of his theory of power/knowledge and
therefore is beyond the possibility of empirical refutation‘.
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Postcolonial theory
cy is not one of Ghandi major fortes, as she tries to mobilize Habermas’ theory of knowledge
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interests‘ to back up the philosophical credentials of postcolonialism’s critique of ideology.
How Habermas, as one of the figure-heads of modern Enlightenment, can be claimed for an
anti-Enlightenment project, remains a mystery. See ibidem, 53 and 62.
41 Ibidem, 44.
42 Ibidem, 52, 54.
43 The return of the repressed‘ is also a favourite train of thought in subaltern and postco-
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lonial theory.
44 Ibidem, 63.
Until now, I have argued that the arguments often used by postmodernists
to discredit the possibility of truth and objectivity in history are unfounded.
Nevertheless, I do subscribe to their idea that historical knowledge fulfils im-
portant political and societal functions.
When we start analysing the practical functions of history, it is crucial
to formulate the problem adequately, because discussion of this topic has of-
ten been rather confused. Traditionally, there have been strong correlations
between conceptions of the practical functions of history and conceptions of
objectivity. Defenders of the ideal of objectivity in history tended to play down
its practical functions, and whoever defended history’s practical functions, ten-
ded to play down its objectivity. A neat dividing line between the two camps,
usually labelled as objectivism and relativism, was the result.
While objectivists claimed that history was only, or primarily, guided by
the search for truth ( wie es eigentlich gewesen‘), relativists claimed that hi-
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story was at the same time conditioned by cultural, political and ideological
influences and was therefore relative to specific milieux. In consequence, rela-
tivists were far more inclined than objectivists to argue that history fullfilled
legitimizing and instrumental functions in politics and ideology. In this way, an
opposition was created between a position that emphasized the cognitive drive
of history and a position that downplayed its cognitive drive in favour of its
practical functions. Peter Novick’s recent prize-winning book on the history of
45 The inevitable question, Which interests‘ linger behind postcolonial theory?“ is ans-
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wered by Ghandi – citing Said – as follows: Its social goals are non-coercive knowledge in
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the interests of human freedom“. One recognizes the Marxist echoes of the mission of the
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proletariat‘, but misses the ensuing discussion. Likewise, one recognizes the attempt to free
postcolonial theory itself from the unmoved mover‘ – i. e. Power – to which all other theories
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are subject. As stated before, however, it is very hard for relativists to remain consistent.
46 Cf. Bunzl’s analysis of the inconsistencies of subaltern studies concerning peasant cons-
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ciousness‘ in Bunzl, Real history, as footnote 8, 80–83.
47 Peter Novick, That Noble Dream. The Objectivity Question“ and the American Histo-
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rical Profession, Cambridge 1988.
48 See Lorenz, Historical knowledge, as footnote 8, and Lorenz, Konstruktion, as footnote
2, chapter 14, for more elaborate arguments.
49 See Thomas Haskell, Objectivity is not neutrality: Rhetoric versus practice in Peter
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Novick’s That noble dream‘, in: N. Fay et al. (eds.), History and theory. Contemporary
readings, Cambridge 1998, 303; Herta Nagl-Docekal, Die Objektivität der Geschichtswissen-
schaft. Systematische Untersuchungen zum wissenschaftlichen Status der Historie, München
1982, 227–243; Jürgen Kocka, Legende, Aufklärung und Objektivität in der Geschichtswis-
senschaft. Zu einer Streitschrift von Thomas Nipperdey, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 6
(1980), 449–455.
50 See for Austria the special issue Welches Oesterreich?‘ of the Österreichische Zeitschrift
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für Geschichtswissenschaften 7 (1996), nr. 4. For Canada see, for instance, Ramsay Cook,
Canada, Quebec and the uses of nationalism, Toronto 1995, and the forum Comparative
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historiography: problems and perspectives‘, in: History and Theory 38 (1999), nr. 1, 25–100,
esp. my introduction, 25–40.
51 See Lorenz, Konstruktion, as footnote 2, 400–437. Charles Taylor makes the same point.
See Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the human sciences, New York 1985, 9: (...) the practices
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which make up a society require certain self-descriptions on the part of participants. These
self-descriptions can be called constitutive“. (...) language does not only serve to depict
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ourselves and the world, it also helps to constitute our lives“.
52 Eric Hobsbawm, On history, London 1997, 273. Evans’ book, In defence of history, as
footnote 1, was translated into German with the significant title Fakten und Fiktionen‘,
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Frankfurt am Main 1998.
53 Ibidem, 277.