AFRICAN

SWINE
FEVER
Submitted by: Zoey Gabriel M. Estepa
Grade VI

Submitted to: Ms. Mae Justine La Madrid

November 29, 2019

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 1. DEFINITION

African swine fever (ASF) is a severe viral disease of pigs that can spread very rapidly in pig
herds. The disease occurs in many African countries; outbreaks have also occurred in other
parts of the world, including Central and Eastern Europe, Eurasia (Russia and the Caucasus
region), and China. Cases have occurred in the Western Hemisphere (South America, the
Caribbean), but are now eradicated. ASF has never occurred in the U.S. ASF has serious
animal health and economic consequences, including export bans on pigs and pork
products. Movement restriction, herd depopulation, and other strict control measures are
necessary to eliminate the disease in affected areas

2. TRANSMISSION AND SPREAD

The ASF virus persists in distinct cycles – traditionally, the sylvatic cycle, the tick-pig cycle and
the domestic (pig-pig) cycle. More recently, a wild boar cycle has been described, which may
sometimes be involved in the latter. The sylvatic cycle occurs only in parts of Africa and
involves warthogs and ticks of the Ornithodoros moubata complex. The tick-pig cycle
involves pigs and Ornithodoros spp. ticks, which have been described as infesting parts of
Africa and the Iberian Peninsula. Transmission from the sylvatic cycle (African wild suids) to
the domestic cycle (farmed pigs) occurs via indirect transmission by ticks. This can happen
where pigs and warthogs share common grounds, particularly when warthogs establish
burrows on farms, or when ticks are brought back to villages through the carcasses of
warthogs killed for food.

Sylvatic Cycle

This cycle involves the natural hosts of the ASFV, i.e. warthogs and soft ticks of the
Ornithodoros moubata complex, which act as biological vectors in Southern and Eastern
Africa. However, information is scarce for other African regions. Also, the precise role of
other African wild suids, e.g. bushpigs, still needs to be clarified. The ASFV is maintained by
tick-to-warthog transmission (Figure 7). Warthogs are infected by Ornithodoros bites in the
first 6-8 weeks of life, while in the burrow (Figure 8).

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They subsequently develop sufficient viraemia to infect other ticks. Following a short period
when the virus is present in their bloodstream (2-3 weeks), the young warthogs recover,
showing no clinical signs. In endemic areas, up to 100 percent of warthogs may have
antibodies to ASFV. Virus can usually be recovered from the lymph nodes of warthogs of any
age, although viraemia sufficient to infect ticks has only been found in neonates from
burrows. It is likely that warthogs experience repeated infections when ticks feed on them,
with low levels of virus remaining latent in the lymph nodes. Tick populations can remain
infected and infective for long periods due to transstadial, venereal and transovarial
transmission of the virus in the tick population, allowing the virus to persist even in the
absence of viraemic hosts. Infected ticks play an important role in the long-term
maintenance of the disease, surviving for months in burrows and up to several years after
feeding on an infected host.

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Tick-Pig Cycle

In the Iberian Peninsula, ASFV readily found a suitable host in Ornithodoros erraticus, local
ticks that lived in pig shelters. The ticks then became involved in the maintenance of ASFV
and its transmission to pigs, despite the absence of African wild pigs. The cycle has also been
described in parts of Africa, where it is well documented in Malawi, Madagascar and
Mozambique, although ticks probably do not play a prominent role in virus transmission
within pig populations (Haresnape & Mamu, 1986; Quembo et al., 2015; Ravaomanana et al.,
2010). Several Ornithodoros tick species have been shown to be competent vectors of ASFV
both in the field and experimentally. However, what happens in the laboratory does not
necessarily reflect what happens under field conditions. For Ornithodoros ticks to become
competent vectors under field conditions, they need pigs as their preferred hosts, failing
which natural transmission is likely to remain limited. Vector competence may also vary
greatly inside species, or groups of closely related species, according to distinct population
features. Although Ornithodoros ticks have been reported in currently infected areas in the
Caucasus and southern parts of Eastern Europe, there is no indication of their involvement in
the ASF epidemic cycle or of whether they could actually transmit the disease.

Domestic Cycle

In this cycle, the most commonly reported scenario in domestic pigs, the virus is maintained
in pigs in the absence of wild suids and ticks (Figure 9). The virus may spread through direct
contact via the oro-nasal route after contact with excretions from infected pigs, through
ingestion of pork or other contaminated products, or indirectly through fomites. The virus is
transmitted from one farm to the next almost exclusively due to human intervention, e.g.
movement of animals or equipment, the feeding of infected materials, etc. This transmission
route requires the existence of large, continuous populations of pigs for the virus to remain
in circulation. However, even in the absence of infected pigs, sometimes the persistence of
the virus in refrigerated or frozen meat allows it to persist for long periods of time, and
reappear once those meat products are fed as swill.

Wild Boar Cycle

In Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Sardinia, wild boar populations play an important role
in the maintenance of viral circulation and infection, particularly where there are free-
ranging or scavenging populations of pigs in the area, or through some other biosecurity
breaches, such as infected feed or leftovers being dumped, fences that allow nose-to-nose
contact, etc. Some role may also be played by transportation of wild boar to hunting ranches
and/or for management purposes, as well as by hunters (Figure 9).

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The exact role of wild boar is, however, still not completely understood. In the Caucasus and
the Russian Federation, where wild boar densities are relatively low, their infection was not
sustained for long periods, and mainly stemmed from spillover from domestic pigs.
However, as ASF progressed westward into the dense wild boar populations of Poland and
the Baltic States (Figure 9B), sustained transmission and continuous outbreaks were
observed throughout the year. In these areas, wild boar are believed to be the true
epidemiological reservoir of the virus, with most cases detected in the summer months. In
parts of Eastern Europe, where temperatures remain below 0 °C for much of the winter, a
new, previously unseen epidemiological pattern is unfolding. The virus, present in infected
carcasses in fields or forests, remains infective until the spring, when wild boar (and
potentially free-ranging pigs, although uncommon) may scavenge on such remains and
become infected (Figure 9A). Human interventions, such as hunting, supplementary feeding,
fencing, etc., have profound consequences on how epidemics evolve in wild boar
populations. Hunting may lead to wild boar spreading ASF while escaping to other areas, but
it can be also very useful in regulating the density of animals (and thus virus transmission).
Different types of hunting also have different effects, e.g. driven hunts, targeting of
females, etc. Similarly, supplementary feeding may increase transmission by encouraging
high numbers of wild boar to congregate in feeding areas, while also allowing more wild
boar to survive harsh winter conditions.

3. RISKS IT POSES

African swine fever causes severe illness and high death rates in pigs. All ages of pigs are
affected. Signs of illness include high fever, decreased appetite, and weakness. The skin may
be reddened, blotchy, or have blackened lesions, especially on the ears, tail, and lower legs.
Other signs may include diarrhea, abortion, and respiratory illness (nasal discharge,

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coughing, difficulty breathing). Death usually occurs within 7 to 10 days, but sudden death is
possible in newly exposed herds. Animals that recover from the illness can be carriers of the
virus for several months

4. HOW CAN IT BE TRANSMITTED?

The incubation period represents the time from infection (i.e. when the virus enters the
animal) to disease (i.e. when the animal shows clinical signs). For ASF, it is between four and
19 days, depending on the virus, host and route. Virus excretion can begin up to two days
prior to the appearance of clinical signs. The period when the pig is shedding virus can vary
depending on the virulence of the ASFV strain involved – pigs infected with less virulent
ASFV strains could be persistently infectious for more than 70 days post-infection. The virus
is shed in saliva, tears, nasal secretions, urine, faeces, and secretions from the genital tract.
Blood, in particular, contains large amounts of virus. Pigs can therefore become infected by
contact with many different infected sources, mainly infected pigs, pork, and other pig-
derived products (e.g. swill), and fomites (e.g. bedding). These infected animals and
contaminated materials can be transported over long distances by vehicles and people.
Although ASF is associated with high lethality (most animals infected die), it is not as
infectious as some other transboundary animal diseases such as foot-and-mouth disease.
That means ASF usually spreads slowly within the herd, and some animals may not be
affected. In a suitable, protein-rich environment, the ASFV is stable over wide ranges of
temperatures and pH levels for long periods, as well as resistant to autolysis and various
disinfectants. Thus neither putrefaction, nor the maturing process, nor freezing of meat
inactivates the agent. Consequently, the virus survives in excretions, carcasses, fresh meat,
and certain meat products for varying periods of time. It may remain infective for at least 11
days in faeces, for 15 weeks in chilled meat (and probably longer in frozen meat), and for
months in bone marrow or cured hams and sausages unless they have been cooked or
smoked at high temperature (Table 2). This has very important implications for ASF spread.
Undercooked, insufficiently smoked, dried, and salted pork, as well as blood, carcasses, and
carcass meal can be infective if fed to pigs or discarded in communal waste sites where pigs
or wild boar may feed. Cooking at 70 °C for 30 minutes inactivates the virus (Figure 10). The
introduction of new pigs into a herd or piggery often results in individuals fighting and biting
each other. In the case of free-ranging or scavenging animals, infection can result from
contact with infected roaming pigs, wild boar, their carcasses, or food leftovers.
Additionally, using the same needle to vaccinate or treat several pigs can transmit the virus.
Transmission via artificial insemination has not been proven, but may take place.

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Vector-borne transmission is also possible through bites from infected Ornithodoros species.
Certain blood-sucking insects, namely Stomoxys calcitrans, have been shown to be able to
retain and transmit ASFV for at least 24 hours after feeding on a sick pig (Mellor et al., 1987),
which is particularly relevant for transmission within herds. Infection via large bodies of
water such as lakes and rivers is unlikely as the virus rapidly becomes diluted and will not be
present at infective levels.

5. WHAT COUNTRIES ARE AFFECTED?

Hazard: African swine fever (ASF) is a fatal animal disease affecting pigs and wild boars with
up to 100% case fatality rate.

Affected provinces:
China: Anhui, Heilongjiang, Henan, Jilin, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shanxi, Yunnan, Hunan
and Guizhou, Hubei, Jiangxi, Fujian, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Qinghai, Guangdong, Gansu,

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Shandong and Hainan Provinces, Tianjin, Chongqing, Shanghai and Beijing Municipalities,
Inner Mongolia, Ningxia Hui, Guangxi Zhuang, Xinjiang Uygur and Tibet (Xizang)
Autonomous Regions and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR).
Mongolia: Bulgan, Darkhan-Uul, Dundgovi, Orkhon, Selenge, Töv Provinces and Ulaanbaatar.
Viet Nam: Hung Yen, Thai Binh, Thanh Hoa, Ha Nam, Hai Duong, Dien Bien, Hoa Binh, Thai
Nguyen, Quang Ninh, Ninh Binh, Nam Dinh, Bac Kan, Lang Son, Nghe An, Son La, Bac Ninh,
Thua Thien-Hue, Bac Giang, Lai Chau, Quang Tri, Vinh Phuc, Cao Bang, Khanh Hoa, Hau Giang,
Vinh Long, Dong Nai, Phu Thọ, Yen Bai, Binh Phuoc, Lao Cai, An Giang, Ha Tinh, Quang Nam,
Dak Nong, Kien Giang, Soc Trang, Dong Thap, Gia Lai, Ha Giang, Tuyen Quang, Binh Duong,
Ca Mau, Quang Ngai, Dak Lak, Tien Giang, Kon Tum, Bac Lieu, Bình Định, Tra Vinh, Binh
Thuan, Quang Binh, Long An, Phu Yen, Ba Ria - Vung Tau, Lam Dong, Ben Tre Provinces, Tay
Ninh, Ninh Thuan Provinces, Hai Phong, Ha Noi, Can Tho, Da Nang and Ho Chi Minh Cities.
Cambodia: Ratanakiri, Tboung Khmum, Svay Rieng, Takeo and Kandal Provinces.
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Chagang-Do.
Lao People’s Democratic Republic: Salavan, Savannakhét, Xékong, Xaisomboun,
Xiangkhouang, Houaphan, Phôngsali, Bolikhamxai, Louangphabang, Khammouan,
Oudômxai, Vientiane, Luang Namtha, Attapeu, Bokèo, Champasak, Sainyabuli Provinces, and
Vientiane Capital.
Myanmar: Shan State.
The Philippines: Rizal, Bulacan, Pampanga, Pangasinan, Nueva Ecija, Cavite Provinces and
Metro Manila (Caloocan, Malabon and Quezon Cities).
Republic of Korea: Gyeonggi-do, Gangwon-do* and Incheon City. (* wild boar only)
Timor-Leste: Dili City.

Map 1. ASF situation in Asia (August 2018 to date)

Source: China: MARA, Viet Nam: WAHIS & media information, Other: WAHIS.

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 6. HOW DOES IT AFFECT INFECTED COUNTRIES?

Situation update

Mongolia
Since its first report on 15 January 2019, 11 outbreaks in 6 provinces and in Ulaanbaatar have
been reported, involving 105 farms/households. More than 3,115 pigs, more than 10 percent
of the total pig population in Mongolia, have died/been destroyed due to the ASF outbreaks.

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

The Ministry of Agriculture confirmed the occurrence of the first ASF outbreak in Chagang-
do on 23 May 2019 [reference].

Republic of Korea
On 20 November, a dead wild boar was found at Jinhyeon-ri, Wonnam-myeon Village,
Cheorwon County, Gangwon-do, and tested positive for ASF virus. The location was within
the fences which have been installed around the areas where outbreaks/infected wild pigs
were detected. Since the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs (MAFRA) confirmed
the first ASF outbreak on 17 September 2019, ASF was detected in domestic pigs in 14 farms
(Gyeonggi-do (9), Incheon City (5)); and in 26 wild pigs from Gangwon-do (12) and Gyeonggi-
do (14) [reference].

China
Since the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (MARA) confirmed its first ASF outbreak in
Liaoning Province on 3 August 2018, 163 outbreaks detected in 32 Provinces / Autonomous
Regions / Municipalities / Special Administrative Region, about 1,192,000 pigs have been
culled.

The Philippines
Since the Department of Agriculture confirmed the first ASF outbreak started on 25 July
2019, there have been a total of 24 ASF outbreaks in nine provinces/cities on Luzon Island;
nearly 70,000 pigs have been culled, with new cases found in Caloocan City and Malabon
City in Metro Manila.

Viet Nam
Since the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) confirmed its first ASF
outbreak on 19 February 2019, all 63 provinces/cities reported outbreaks, more than
5,880,000 pigs have been culled.

Lao People’s Democratic Republic

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Since the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry confirmed the first ASF outbreak in Salavan
Province on 20 June 2019, more than 165 ASF outbreaks were reported, in all 18 Provinces /
city; 39,000 pigs have died or been destroyed due to the ASF.

Cambodia
Since the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) confirmed the first ASF
outbreak in Ratanakiri Province on 2 April 2019, ASF outbreaks were detected in 5 Provinces.

Myanmar
Since the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation confirmed the first ASF outbreak
on 1 August 2019, a total of 4 ASF outbreaks were reported in Shan State.

Timor-Leste
The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries announced the confirmation of ASF outbreak on 27
September 2019. The disease started on 9 September, a total of 100 outbreaks in
smallholder pig farms has been recorded in the Capital City, Dili.

Actions taken by China

MARA released the 2019 edition of the ‘ASF Epidemic Emergency Implementation Plan’.
MARA updated regulations on pig slaughterhouses: It task pig slaughter enterprises to
conduct self-inspection by using PCR. If ASF is detected, the slaughtering enterprise should
stop production for 48 hours, then apply for evaluation to resume production. MARA
released a comprehensive “Technical guideline for restocking of the African swine fever
affected pig farms” on 10 September 2019. MARA released a notice on the illegalproduction
and use of ASF vaccines on 18 November. MARA is to investigate producers, distributers,
and sellers of illegal ASF vaccines. Pigs immunized with illegal vaccines are considered
infected once tested positive, and are to be culled without compensation.
Figure 1. Number of ASF reported village by region by onset month* in China

* Including detection in live pigs in intercepted vehicles. For cases with unknown onset
date, detection date, confirmation date or reporting date was used.
Source: Veterinary Bureau, MARA, China.

Actions taken by the Republic of Korea

To prevent ASF spread to southern parts of the country, MAFRA set a buffer zone (outside
the 10km radius of affected farms) that is separating the affected zone from southern free

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zone; controlling the traffic of feed vehicles between zones. On 27 October, an enhanced
emergency measure reinforcement plan was released; including installation of wide-area
fence from west to east side of the country and the use of firearms in the buffer zone to
drive wild boars from south to north. ASF virus gene was detected in pork products
confiscated at Incheon Airport brought by passengers from Shenyang City, China on 6 and 9
November. As of 21 November, ASF virus gene was detected in a total of 26 confiscated pork
product at the port of entry (4 in 2018 and 22 in 2019). On 20 November, the Republic of
Korea completed fencing between Paju and Cheorwon (approx. 200 km, to physically block
wild pig movement) surrounding all areas where ASF outbreak occurred/detected in wild
pigs.

Figure 2. Cumulative number of affected communes/week in Viet Nam

(Calculated figure)

Actions taken by Viet Nam

Viet Nam has implemented movement control of pigs and pig products from affected
communes. The Central Committee of the Communist Party issued the Directive (No.34-
CT/TW, 20 May) to strengthen their leadership and operational instructions for effective ASF
response, control and prevention. National Steering Committee for ASF prevention and
control requested National Steering Committee against smuggling and People's Committees
of provinces to conduct measures to prevent, promptly detect and strictly handle cases of
smuggling, illegal transportation, trafficking of animals, animal products, especially pigs and
pig products into Viet Nam (No.10/BCDDTLCP, 16 October).

Actions taken by Cambodia

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Cambodia implemented movement control of live pigs, pork and pork products, stamping
out, disposal and disinfection in affected villages. Further investigations have been carried
out in neighbouring areas. The authorities are strengthening farm biosecurity and testing
animals at slaughterhouses [reference].

Actions taken by Lao People’s Democratic Republic

The Ministry designates Red Area around an outbreak, to control the movement of pig and
pork products, and prohibits pork consumption; and yellow Area (3 km radius from the red
areas) as designated surveillance zones.

Actions taken by the Philippines

The Philippines has been implementing its 1-7-10 protocol to manage, contain and control
the spread of the disease i.e. all pigs within 1-kilometer radius of infected farms will be
culled; limit animal movement and swine farms will be under strict surveillance and testing
within a 7-kilometer radius; swine farms within a 10-kilometer radius will be required to
submit a mandatory report on the disease [reference1]. A zoning was discussed to divide the
country into five zones: free zone, containment zone, protected zone, surveillance zone,
and infected zone. The infected zone will be only able to trade within their area and Metro
Manila with proper documentation.

Additional news on unusual pig deaths

Indonesia: Unconfirmed information about swine deaths continues. More than 9,000 pigs
were said to have died in North Sumatra. Dead pigs were also found in Kilangan River
flowing from North Sumatra to Aceh Province. FAO is liaising with the Directorate General of
Livestock and Animal Health Services, Indonesia to confirm the cause and explore needs.

7. WHAT ARE THE SYMPTOMS?

According to the virulence of the virus, the disease can vary from a chronic form to an acute
form where there are high levels of morbidity and mortality (approaching 100%). In some
cases all that may be seen are large numbers of dead pigs.

In the acute forms the following symptoms are observed:

 High fever (up to 42°C),

 Depression and loss of appetite,

 Hyperemia and cyanosis (seen as reddening) of the skin, particularly ears and snout

 Coughing and increased respiratory rate

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  Vomiting and diarrhea (sometimes bloody)

 Abortions

 Discharges from the eyes and nose

 Mortality occurs after 1 to 2 weeks, can reach 100% and survivors are life carriers of
the virus.

In the subacute forms the following symptoms are observed:

 Same symptoms than in the acute form but usually less sever.

 Abortion,

 Mortality occurs between 2 and 7 weeks and ranges from 30 to 70%

In the chronic forms the following symptoms are observed:

 Loss of weight,

 Irregular fever,

 Pneumonia-like symptoms

 Pericarditis

 Necrosis and ulcers of the skin

 Low mortality and long disease (over 1 year).

8. IS IT A PUBLIC HEALTH RISK?

Dr. Sharrett says ASF does not affect humans and therefore is not a public health threat
according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

Dr. Sharrett says it is important to know:

– African swine fever is a viral disease impacting only pigs, not people—so it is not a public
health threat.
– ASF cannot be transmitted to humans through contact with pigs or pork.

Dr. Ann Garvey, Iowa Public Health Veterinarian, answers questions about African swine
fever (ASF) and if there are any potential impacts on human health.

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According to Garvey and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), ASF is a viral disease
impacting only pigs, not people—so it is not a public health threat, nor a food-safety
concern.

Dr. Garvey says it is important to know:

– African swine fever is a viral disease impacting only pigs, not people—so it is not a public
health threat.
– ASF cannot be transmitted to humans through contact with pigs or pork.

9. CAN IT BE TRANSMITTED TO HUMANS? IF SO, HOW?

ASF is not a threat to human health as it is a non-zoonotic disease, that is, a disease of
animals that does not infect humans. Viruses have surface proteins on the outside which
must bind to a host cell in order to enter and replicate. Different species of animals have
different proteins on the outside of their cells and certain viruses can only bind to the
surface of cells in particular species of animals. The ASF virus can only attach to and enter
specific cells in pigs but not cells in the human body. Since the discovery of ASF, there has so
far been no evidence of mutation causing cross-species transmission to humans in the past
century.

10. PREVENTION AND CONTROL

Introduction can only be prevented by being careful with infected animals and products
from abroad. The significant measures for this are:

 No import of live animals, meat and meat products from regions where African swine
fever occurs. Also bear in mind the meat products that are brought in from affected
regions by individuals, for example by truck drivers on long routes, commuting foreign
workers, hunters hunting abroad and tourists.
 Ban on swill feeding and being alert to exposing pigs and wild boar ‘by accident' to
possibly infected food products (a salami sandwich discarded carelessly outdoors or at a
petting zoo, or wild boar with access to kitchen waste via refuse bins or refuse heaps).
Pig farmers must also be on the alert for visitors bringing food onto their farms.
 Cleaning and disinfection of livestock transports returning from abroad.
 Cleaning and disinfection of materials used when hunting in or in the vicinity of infected
areas.

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 11. WHAT WERE THE MEASURES UNDERTAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT AND HEALTH
DEPARTMENT?

Philippines

The Department of Agriculture (DA) will be spending P78 million in emergency funds to
manage, control, and contain the threat of African swine fever (ASF).

An ASF task force was also created to prevent the spread of the disease. The task force is
chaired by President Rodrigo Duterte, with Agriculture Secretary William Dar as vice
chairman and the DA as the lead agency.

Other members include Finance Secretary Carlos Dominguez III, Foreign Secretary Teodoro
Locsin Jr, Interior and Local Government Secretary Eduardo Año, Health Secretary Francisco
Duque III, Environment Secretary Roy Cimatu, Trade Secretary Ramon Lopez, Defense
Secretary Delfin Lorenzana, Budget Secretary Wendel Avisado, Transportation Secretary
Arthur Tugade, and National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council Executive
Director Ricardo Jalad.

After receiving test results from the World Organization for Animal Health confirming that
ASF has entered the country, all DA regional directors in Luzon were oriented and were
provided with guidelines on how to manage, contain, and control the disease.

The DA is set to meet with concerned governors and their respective veterinary officers to
align local governments' issuances and corresponding actions to manage ASF.

The DA is expected to present a geographic zoning plan to adjust government response to

the developing situation on the ground and effectively prevent the further spread of ASF to
other parts of the country.

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Sources:

http://www.fao.org/3/a-i7228e.pdf

http://www.cfsph.iastate.edu/FastFacts/pdfs/african_swine_fever_F.pdf

http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/programmes/en/empres/ASF/situation_update.html

http://lrd.spc.int/ext/Disease_Manual_Final/a120__african_swine_fever.html

https://www.wur.nl/en/Research-Results/Research-Institutes/Bioveterinary-Research/Animal-
diseases/Virology/African-Swine-Fever-2/Prevention-and-control.htm

https://www.rappler.com/business/240519-agriculture-department-allotment-control-african-
swine-fever

https://www.pork.org/african-swine-fever-need-
know/#:~:targetText=According%20to%20Garvey%20and%20the,nor%20a%20food%2Dsafety%2
0concern.&targetText=%E2%80%93%20ASF%20cannot%20be%20transmitted%20to%20humans,
contact%20with%20pigs%20or%20pork.

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