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Necessito v. Paras G.R. No.

L-10605, 30 June 1958, 104 Phil 75

FACTS: Mother, Severina Garces and her son, Precillano Necesito boarded passenger auto truck of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. On its way from
Pangasinan to Manila, the bus entered a wooden bridge but the driver lost control because of the broken steering knuckle. The truck fell into the
creek. The mother was drowned and the son was injured.


1. Whether or not carrier is liable for damages caused by mechanical defect?

2. Whether or not the carrier has exercised the required extraordinary diligence in handling the passengers.


1. Yes. A carrier is liable to its passengers caused by mechanical defects of the conveyance. The carrier, while it is not an insurer of the safety of the
passengers, should nevertheless be held to answer for the flaws of its equipment if such flaws were at all discoverable. In this connection, the
manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability. The rationale of the carrier’s liability is the fact that the passenger has no privity with the
manufacturer of the defective equipment; hence, he has no remedy against him, while the carrier usually has.

2. No. The liability of the carrier depends on its negligence, his failure to exercise the “utmost” degree of diligence that the law requires, and by Art.
1756, in case of a passenger’s death or injury the carrier bears the burden of satisfying the court that he has duly discharged the duty of prudence
required. In this case, the monthly visual inspection of the steering knuckle by the carrier did not measure up to the required legal standard of
“utmost diligence of very cautious person.

DOCTRINE: Mechanical defects are not force majeure if the same were discoverable by regular and adequate inspections. The prevailing rule in this
jursdiction is that the carrier is liable to its passengers for damages caused by mechanical defects of the conveyance. For the purposes of this
doctrine, the manufacturer is considered the agent of the carrier.

Agcaoili v. GSIS G.R. No. L-30056 August 30, 1988

FACTS: Petitioner was awarded the house by GSIS on the condition that he should reside on it immediately. As the house is uninhabitable,
petitioner vacated the area after 1 day and refused to pay further installments until respondent make it habitable. Respondent cancelled the

ISSUE: W/n the petitioner incurred delay in fulfilling his obligations

HELD: In reciprocal obligations, a party incurs delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is
incumbent upon him. Respondent did not fulfill its obligation to deliver the house in a habitable state, therefore, it cannot invoke the petitioner’s
suspension of payment as a cause to cancel the contract between them. There was a perfected contract of sale, it was the duty of GSIS as seller to
deliver the thing sold in a condition suitable for its enjoyment by the buyer and for the purpose contemplated. The house contemplated was one
that could be occupied for purpose of residence in reasonable comfort and convenience.

Francisco Lao Lim vs Court of Appeals and Benito Villavicencio Dy G.R.No. 87047 31October1990

This case is with regard to Art 1182 of the NCC- Potestative Condition- Stipulation dependent upon the sole will of the debtor

FACTS: Records show that Francisco Lim, entered into a contract of lease with Benito Dy for a period of 3 years, from 1976 to 1979. After the
stipulated term expired the respondent refused to leave the premises, so Francisco Lim filed an ejectment suit against Benito Dy. This case was
then taken over by a judicially approved compromise agreement which provides an automatic increase in rent of 20% every 3 years. On 1985 Dy,
informed Lim of his intention to renew the lease up to 1988, Lim did not agree to the renewal. In 1987 another ejectment suit was filed by Lim
after the failure of Dy to vacate the premises. It was dismissed by the RTC and later affirmed by the CA for the following reasons: (1) the stipulation
in the compromise agreement which allows the lessee (Benito Dy) to stay on the premises as long as he needs it and can pay rents is valid, being a
resolutory condition, and therefore beyond the ambit of art 1308 of the NCC; and (2) the compromise agreement has the effect of res judicata.

ISSUE: Was the stipulation in the compromise agreement which allows the lessee to stay on the premises as long as he needs it and can pay rents
is valid?
- No, since the stipulation “for as long as the defendant needed the premises and can meet and pay said increases” is a purely potestative
condition because it leaves the effectivity and enjoyment of leasehold rights to the sole and exclusive will of the lessee.

- The continuance, effectivity, and fulfillment of a contract of lease cannot be made to depend exclusively upon the free and uncontrolled choice of
the lessee between continuing payment of the rentals or not, completely depriving the owner of any say in the matter. Mutuality does not obtain
in such a contract of lease and no equality exists between the lessor and the lessee.

HELD: The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Benito Dy is ordered to immediately vacate and return the possession of
the premises and pay the monthly rentals due thereon in accordance with the compromise agreement until he shall have actually vacated the
same. This Judgment is immediately executory.

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents. G.R. No. 182835; April 20, 2010

FACTS: After receiving from the accused Rustan via multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with her face superimposed on
the figure, Complainant filed an action against said accused for violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic
Act (R.A.) 9262. The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised
that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003. The accused said to have boasted that it would be
easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her and threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet. The trial court later
found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter rendered a decision
affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present
for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the case

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the CA. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message
constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of
the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).However, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture for the first
time before the Supreme Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time
it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection. Moreover, the rules he cites do not apply to
the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative
proceedings. In conclusion, the Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime charged beyond reasonable

Borromeo v. CA G.R. No. 133643, 6 June 2002

FACTS: Villamor was the distributor of lumber belonging to Mr. Miller and the plaintiff Borromeo being Villamor’s friend and former classmate
borrow a large sum of money for which he mortgaged his property as a security because of his obligation to Mr. Miller. Miller then filed a civil
action against Villamor and attached his properties including the mortgaged property to the plaintiff. Plaintiff then pressed the defendant to settle
his obligation, but the defendant however offered to execute a document promising the plaintiff to pay his debt even after the lapse of 10 years.
Defendant then signed a promissory note to pay his debt and with 12% interest per annum. Despite repeated demands from plaintiff, defendant
still failed to settle his debt. Plaintiff did not file any complaint against the defendant within ten years from the execution of the document as there
was no property registered in defendant’s name, who furthermore assured him that he could collect even after the lapse of ten years. After the
last war, plaintiff made various oral demands, but defendants failed to settle his account, — hence the present complaint for collection.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct in their interpretation.

RULING: It is a fundamental principle in the interpretation of contracts that while ordinarily the literal sense of the words employed is to be
followed, such is not the case where they “appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the contracting parties,” which “intention shall prevail.
However, the above decision, had occasion to reiterate, under the view that such features of the obligation are added to it and do not go to its
essence, a criterion based upon the stability of juridical relations should tend to consider the nullity as confined to the clause or pact suffering
therefrom, except in cases where the latter, by an established connection or by manifest intention of the parties, is inseparable from the principal
obligation, and is a condition, juridically speaking, of that the nullity of which it would also occasion.’ The rule is that a lawful promise made for a
lawful consideration is not invalid merely because an unlawful promise was made at the same time and for the same consideration, and this rule
applies, although the invalidity is due to violation of a statutory provision, unless the statute expressly or necessary implication declares the entire
contract void.
Makati Dev’t Corp. v. Empire Insurance Co. G.R. No. L-21780, 30 June 1967

FACTS: On March 31, 1959, the Makati Development Corporation sold to Rodolfo P. Andal a lot. A so-called “special condition” contained in the
deed of sale provides that “the VENDEE/S shall commence the construction and complete at least 50% of his/her/their/its residence on the
property within two (2) years to the satisfaction of the VENDOR and, in the event of his/her/their/its failure to do so will be forfeited in favor of
the VENDOR by the mere fact of failure of the VENDEE/S to comply with this special condition.” To ensure faithful compliance with this “condition,”
Andal gave a surety bond the sum of P12,000 in case Andal failed to comply with his obligation under the deed of sale. Andal did not build his
house; instead, he sold the lot to Juan Carlos. As neither Andal nor Juan Carlos built a house on the lot within the stipulated period, the Makati
Development Corporation, sent a notice of claim to the Empire Insurance Co. advising it of Andal’s failure to comply with his undertaking. Demand
for the payment was refused, whereupon the Makati Development Corporation filed a complaint against the Empire Insurance Co. to recover on
the bond in the full amount, plus attorney’s fees. In due time, the Empire Insurance Co. filed its answer with a third-party complaint against Andal.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT Andal is entitled to pay the surety bond of Php12,000 as a penal sanction.

RULING: No. The so-called “special condition” in the deed of sale is, in reality, an obligation1 — to build a house at least 50 percent of which must
be finished within two years. It was to secure the performance of this obligation that a penal clause was inserted. Here the trial court found that
Juan Carlos had finished more than 50 percent of his house or barely a month after the expiration of the stipulated period. There was, therefore, a
partial performance of the obligation within the meaning and intendment of article 1229. The penal clause, in this case, was inserted not to
indemnify the Makati Development Corporation for any damage it might suffer as a result of a breach of the contract but rather compel
performance of the so-called “special condition” and thus encourage home building among lot owners in the Urdaneta Village. Considering that a
house had been built shortly after the period stipulated, the substantial, if tardy, performance of the obligation, having in view the purpose of the
penal clause, fully justified the trial court in reducing the penalty. The stipulation, in this case, to commence the construction and complete at least
50 percent of the vendee’s house within two years cannot be construed as imposing a strictly personal obligation on Andal. To adopt such a
construction would be to limit Andal’s right to dispose of the lot. There is nothing in the deed of sale restricting Andal’s right to sell the lot at least
within the two-year period and we think it plain that a reading of such a limitation on one of the rights of ownership must rest on more explicit
language in the contract. It cannot be left to mere inference.

Culaba v CA G.R. No. 125862 April 15, 2004

Art. 1240 – Payment shall be made to person in whose favor obligation has been constituted.

FACTS: The spouses Francisco and Demetria Culaba were the owners and proprietors of the Culaba Store and were engaged in the sale and
distribution of San Miguel Corporation’s (SMC) beer products. SMC sold beer products on credit to the Culaba. The Culaba spouses made a partial
payment. They failed to pay despite repeated demands. Hence, SMC filed an action for collection of a sum of money against them. In their defense,
Culaba claimed that they had already paid the SMC in full on four separate occasions to an SMC supervisor who issued genuine SMC liquidation
receipts. But SMC countered that the issued LR were part of the lost booklet receipts as evidenced by publisher’s affidavit that SMC duly warned
the public about it through the Notice of Loss.

ISSUE: Won the payments that the petitioners claimed they made were the payments that discharged their obligation to the respondent.

HELD: No, the Court holds that the payments claimed by the Culaba are not the payments that extinguishes an obligation pursuant to Article 1240
of the Civil Code. Under the said law, payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his successor-in-
interest, or any person authorized to receive it. In this case, the payments were purportedly made to a "supervisor" of the private respondent, who
was clad in an SMC uniform and drove an SMC van. He appeared to be authorized to accept payments. Unfortunately, Caluba did not ascertain the
identity and authority of the said supervisor, nor did he ask to be shown any identification to prove that the latter was, indeed, an SMC supervisor.
The petitioners relied solely on the man’s representation that he was collecting payments for SMC. Thus, the payments the petitioners claimed
they made were not the payments that discharged their obligation to the private respondent. Hence, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

Garcia vs. CA

Conception v. Sta. Ana GR No. L-2277, December 29, 1950

FACTS: Perpetua Conception sold her three parcels of land to Paciencia during her lifetime. When Perpetua died, Monico, the only surviving
legitimate brother of the former filed an Action to Annul the Sale. According to the complaint, the deceased, in connivance with the defendant and
with intent to defraud the plaintiff sold and conveyed them to the latter, for false and fictitious consideration. The Court of First Instance dismissed
the complaint. On appeal, Monico added that as an heir of Perpetua, he can bring the action to annul the contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not Perpetua has transmitted to the plaintiff any right in order that he can bring an action herein.

RULING: None. As the deceased had no forced heir, she was free to dispose of all her properties as absolute owner thereof, without further
limitation than those established by law, and the right to dispose of a thing involves the right to give or to convey it to another without any
consideration. The only limitation established by law on her right to convey said properties to the defendant without any consideration is, that she
could not dispose of or transfer her property to another in fraud of her creditors. Also, the court ruled, using the words of Maneas, that forced heir
has the right to institute an action for rescission. The reason is that the right to the legitime is similar to a creditor of a creditor. Plaintiff, being the
brother of the deceased is not among those enumerated in the Civil Code as forced heir of the decedent. The judgment of the lower court was