GR. Nos. 152613 & 152628 APEX MINING CO., INC., vs.

Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining

Corp.,(SEM) et. al

FACTS:
A motion for reconsideration was filed by SEM. The Assailed Decision held that the assignment
of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 in favor of SEM violated one of the conditions stipulated in the
permit. It also ruled that the transfer of EP 133 violated Presidential Decree No. 463, which
requires that the assignment of a mining right be made with the prior approval of the Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Moreover, the Assailed
Decision pointed out that EP 133 expired by non-renewal since it was not renewed before or
after its expiration. It likewise upheld the validity of Proclamation No. 297 absent any question
against its validity. In view of this, and considering that under Section 5 of Republic Act No.
7942, otherwise known as the “Mining Act of 1995,” mining operations in mineral re
servations may be undertaken directly by the State or through a contractor, the Court deemed
the issue of ownership of priority right over the contested Diwalwal Gold Rush Area as having
been overtaken by the said proclamation. Thus, it was held in the Assailed Decision that it is
now within the prerogative of the Executive Department to undertake directly the mining
operations of the disputed area or to award the operations to private entities including
petitioners Apex and Balite, subject to applicable laws, rules and regulations, and provided that
these private entities are qualified. Apex, for its part, filed a Motion for Clarification of the
Assailed Decision, praying that the Court elucidate on the Decision’s pronouncement that
“mining operations, are now, therefore within the full control of the State through the executive
branch.” Moreover, Apex asks this Court to order the Mines and Geosciences Board (MGB) to
accept its application for an exploration permit. Balite echoes the same concern as that of Apex
on the actual takeover by the State of the mining industry in the disputed area to the exclusion
of the private sector. In addition, Balite prays for this Court to direct MGB to accept its
application for an exploration permit. CamiloBanad, et al., likewise filed a motion for
reconsideration and prayed that the disputed area be awarded to them. In the Resolution, the
Court En Banc resolved to accept the instant cases.
 Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest: Director of Lands v. IAC (1986)

G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986

Lessons Applicable: Sec. 3 Art. XII, 1987 Constitution (Land Titles and Deeds)

FACTS:
 Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from
Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land possession of the
Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan
 land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership
to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands,
whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain
 Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements
 ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the
government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela
 donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela
 IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of
ISSUES:
1. W/N the land is already a private land - YES
2. W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or
associations applies- NO
HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc
1. YES
 already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government,
for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient
 it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption
 The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued
upon the strength of said patent.
 The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law
2. NO
 If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a
legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said
owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition
 The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public
agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares
11. TEN FORTY REALTY and DEV’T CORP v. CRUZ G.R. No.
151212 | September 10, 2003; Panganiban, J.

FACTS

- Ten Forty Realty filed a complaint of ejectment against Marina Cruz who has allegedly occupied
the residential lot in Olongapo City, which they bought from Barbara Galino, by virtue of a Deed
of Absolute Sale. It appears that Barbara sold the same lot to Marina who immediately occupied
the land. (Double Sale) Ten Forty is saying the occupation by Marina was merely tolerated by
them.
- Marina Cruz’s defense: (1) Ten Forty, being a corporation, is not qualified to own the property
which is a public land (Side Note: constitutional ek ek, they can not own public lands, but can lease
it for 25 years: though they can acquire private lands). (2) Barbara Galino did not sell her property
to Ten Forty but merely obtained a loan. (3) Ten Forty never occupied the property before she
did. Barbara Galino was in possession at the time of the sale, and vacated the lot in favor of
Marina. (4) She was the one who caused the cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of
Barbara and a new one was issued in her name. (5) Ten Forty only obtained its tax declaration 7
months after she did.
- MTCC ruled in favor of Ten Forty and ordered Marina to vacate.
- RTC reversed. The RTC ruled as follows: 1) respondent’s entry into the property was not by mere
tolerance of petitioner, but by virtue of a Waiver and Transfer of Possessory Rights and Deed of
Sale in her favor; 2) the execution of the Deed of Sale without actual transfer of the physical
possession did not have the effect of making petitioner the owner of the property, because there
was no delivery of the object of the sale as provided for in Article 1428 of the Civil Code; and 3)
being a corporation, petitioner was disqualified from acquiring the property, which was public
land.

- CA affirmed: Case cannot be unlawful detainer because there has been no prior contract between
the parties. Neither can it be forcibly entry because there is no showing that there was prior
physical possession by the petitioner.

ISSUE/S: A. WHAT IS THE REAL NATURE OF THE EJECTMENT SUIT (Forcible Entry or Unlawful
Detainer?) --> Nature of Complaint was really Forcible Entry, but action prescribed; fBUT; in
essence, S.C said, that since Ten Forty did not really have prior possession, which is a requirement
in forcible entry case, wala talaga siyang karapatan. NADA, as said by CA. Kaya petition dismissed.
HEHE. (see also Doctrine)

On the basis of the facts found by the CA and the RTC, we find that petitioner failed to substantiate its
case for unlawful detainer. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties. Not shown
either was the corporation’s alleged tolerance of respondent’s possession. While possession by
tolerance may initially be lawful, it ceases to be so upon the owner’s demand that the possessor by
tolerance vacate the property. To justify an action for unlawful detainer, the permission or tolerance
must have been present at the beginning of the possession. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful
from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.

SIDE NOTE: Ten Forty failed to substantiate its unlawful detainer claim -- mere bare allegations. Its
theories are also in a way contradicting. He was claiming that there was tolerance/lawful
possession allowed by it (Unlawful Detainer, then later it says that the possession was illegal from
the beginning (Forcible Entry)

As the bare allegation of petitioner’s tolerance of respondent’s occupation of the premises has not been
proven, the possession should be deemed illegal from the beginning. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that
the ejectment case should have been for forcible entry—an action that had already prescribed,
however, when the Complaint was filed on May 12, 1999. The prescriptive period of one year for
forcible entry cases is reckoned from the date of respondent’s actual entry into the land, which in this
case was on April 24, 1998.

In its Complaint,

petitioner alleged that, having acquired the subject property from Barbara Galino on December
5, 1996, it was the true and absolute owner thereof; that Galino had sold the property to
Respondent Cruz on April 24, 1998 that after the sale, the latter immediately occupied the property,
an action that was merely tolerated by petitioner; and that, in a letter given to respondent on April
12, 1999, petitioner had demanded that the former vacate the property, but that she refused to do
so. Petitioner thereupon prayed for judgment ordering her to vacate the property and to pay
reasonable rentals for the use of the premises, attorney’s fees and the costs of the suit.

The above allegations appeared to show the elements of unlawful detainer. They also conferred
initiatory jurisdiction on the MTCC, because the case was filed a month after the last demand to
vacate—hence, within the one-year prescriptive period.

However, what was actually proven by petitioner was that possession by respondent had been illegal
from the beginning. While the Complaint was crafted to be an unlawful detainer suit, petitioner’s real
cause of action was for forcible entry, which had already prescribed.

Consequently, the MTCC had no more jurisdiction over the action.

The appellate court, therefore, did not err when it ruled that petitioner’s Complaint for unlawful
detainer was a mere subterfuge or a disguised substitute action for forcible entry, which had already
prescribed. To repeat, to maintain a viable action for forcible entry, plaintiff must have been in prior
physical possession of the property; this is an essential element of the suit. (Which Ten Forty Realty
never had)

B. WON Marina Cruz may be validly ejected from the property  NO

 RULING:

1. In a contract of sale, the buyer acquires the thing sold only upon its delivery. The execution
of a public instrument gives rise to a presumption of delivery, but this presumption is
destroyed when delivery is not effected because of a legal impediment. Constructive delivery
is deemed negated upon failure of vendee to take actual possession of the land.

Ten Forty was not able to take possession and the SC found it highly unlikely that they
allowed occupation of Marina by mere tolerance. (Why did you allow her to build
improvements and repairs knowing that it was also sold to her?)

2. In cases of double sale, the person who first recorded it in the Registry of Property shall be
considered the lawful owner. In this case, however, petitioner was unable to establish that
the Deed was recorded in the Registry of Deeds of Olongapo. An unverified notation on the
Deed is not equivalent to a registration. In the absence of this requirement, the law gives
preferential right to the buyer who in good faith is first in possession.
3. To determine who is first in possession, the following parameters have been established:
a. Possession includes not only material but also symbolic possession
b. Possessors in good faith are not aware of any flaw in their title or mode of acquisition
c. Buyers of property that is in possession of persons other than the seller must be wary –
they must investigate
d. Good faith is always presumed. Burden of proof rests on the one alleging bad faith.

Property has not been delivered, hence Ten Forty did not acquire possession either materially or
symbolically. Petitioner has not proven that respondent was aware of any defect to her title. At the
time, the property had not been registered which was why Marina relied on tax declarations.
Galino was actually occupying the property when respondent took possession. Thus, there was no
circumstance that could have required her to investigate further.

4. Further, private corporations are disqualified from acquiring lands of public domain. At the
time of the sale, there is no evidence that the property had already ceased to be of public
domain.

DECI: Petition DENIED

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY, GR No. 133250, 2002-07-09

Facts:

On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed
a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP" for
brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Ba... y

On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084
creating PEA.

On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to
PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay"[2] under the Manila-
Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).

April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with AMARI, a
private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands.

Issues:

WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT FOR

THE TRANSFER TO AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS, RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE
RECLAIMED, VIOLATE THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

The threshold issue is whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own under the
Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay in
view of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which state that:

"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the... exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated.

Section 3. x x x Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.
Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease, x x x."(Emphasis... supplied)

Ruling:

In the instant case, AMARI seeks to acquire from PEA, a public corporation, reclaimed lands
and submerged areas for... non-agricultural purposes by purchase under PD No. 1084 (charter
of PEA) and Title III of CA No. 141. Certain undertakings by AMARI under the Amended JVA
constitute the consideration for the purchase.

Neither AMARI nor PEA can claim... judicial confirmation of their titles because the lands
covered by the Amended JVA are newly reclaimed or still to be reclaimed.

The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 and the Civil Code of 1889
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or
by the provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission, shall become the property
of the party constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the... terms of the grant of
authority."

Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows:

"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is

1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character;

2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is
employed in some public service, or in the development of the national wealth, such as walls,
fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and... mines, until granted to private
individuals."

This provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the executive department
pursuant to law, must declare the property no longer needed for public use or territorial defense
before the government could lease or alienate the property to private... parties

Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission

On May 8, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which regulated the lease of
reclaimed and foreshore lands. The salient provisions of this law were as follows:

"Section 1. The control and disposition of the foreshore as defined in existing law, and the title
to all Government or public lands made or reclaimed by the Government by dredging or filling or
otherwise throughout the

Philippine Islands, shall be retained by the Government without prejudice to vested rights and
without prejudice to rights conceded to the City of Manila in the Luneta Extension.

Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should retain title to all lands reclaimed by the
government.

Act No. 1654, however, did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.

Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature

On November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2874, the Public Land
Act.[46] The salient provisions of Act No. 2874, on reclaimed lands, were as follows:

"Sec. 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into

(a)Alienable or disposable

(b) Timber, and

(c) Mineral lands, x x x.

Sec. 7. For the purposes of the government and disposition of alienable or disposable public
lands, the Governor-General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, shall from time to time... declare what lands are open to disposition or concession
under this Act."

Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been
officially delimited or classified

Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land,
shall be classified as suitable for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other
productive purposes other than agricultural purposes,... and shall be open to disposition or
concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.

Sec. 56. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:

(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means;

(b) Foreshore;

(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable
lakes or rivers;

(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.

Sec. 58. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-six shall be disposed of
to private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the Governor-General, upon
recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and

Natural Resources, shall declare that the same are not necessary for the public service and are
open to disposition under this chapter. The lands included in class (d) may be disposed of by
sale or lease under the provisions of this Act."

(Emphasis supplied)

These provisions vested upon the Governor-General the power to classify inalienable lands of
the public domain into disposable lands of the public domain

Section 58 of Act No. 2874 categorically mandated that disposable lands of the public domain
classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands "shall be disposed of to private
parties by lease only and not otherwise."

The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
public lands for non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for public
service.

Dispositions under the 1935 Constitution

The 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural
lands, which were the only natural resources the State could alienate.

Thus, foreshore lands, considered part of the State's natural resources, became inalienable
by... constitutional fiat, available only for lease for 25 years, renewable for another 25 years.

The prohibition on private parties from acquiring ownership of government reclaimed and
marshy lands of the public domain was only a statutory prohibition and the legislature could
therefore remove such prohibition. The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit individuals and...
corporations from acquiring government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain that
were classified as agricultural lands under existing public land laws.

Still, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the legislature did not repeal Section 58 of Act
No. 2874 to open for sale to private parties government reclaimed and marshy lands of the
public domain.

Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Philippine National Assembly

CA No. 141, as amended, remains to this day the existing general law... governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands

Section 6 of CA No. 141 empowers the President to classify lands of the public domain into
"alienable or disposable

Thus, before the government could alienate or dispose of lands of the public domain, the
President must first officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable, and then declare
them open to disposition or concession. There must be no law reserving these lands... for public
or quasi-public uses.

Section 61 of CA No. 141 readopted, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, Section 58 of
Act No. 2874 prohibiting the sale of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable
lands of the public domain.

Foreshore lands are lands of public dominion intended for public use. So too are lands
reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means. Act 1654 mandated that the
control and disposition of the foreshore and lands under water remained in the... national
government.

Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to private parties government
reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain is for the legislature to pass a law
authorizing such sale.

The congressional authority required in Section 60 of CA No. 141 mirrors the legislative
authority required in Section 56 of Act No. 2874.

Again, the government must formally declare that the property of public dominion is no longer
needed for public use or public service, before the same could be classified as patrimonial
property of the State
The 1973 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources with the exception of
"agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain."

The 1973 Constitution, however, limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to
individuals who were citizens of the Philippines. Private corporations, even if wholly owned by
Philippine citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public... domain
unlike in the 1935 Constitution.

Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations could hold alienable lands of the public
domain only through lease

PD No. 1084 authorizes PEA to reclaim both foreshore and submerged areas of the public
domain. Foreshore areas are those covered and uncovered by the ebb and flow of the tide

Submerged areas are those... permanently under water regardless of the ebb and flow of the
tide.

Thus, PEA can hold title to private lands, as well as... title to lands of the public domain.

In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public
domain, there must be legislative authority empowering PEA to sell these lands.

Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its reclaimed foreshore and
submerged alienable lands of the public domain.

Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain would be... subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain.

Dispositions under the 1987 Constitution... he 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions before it, has adopted the Regalian doctrine.

The Rationale behind the Constitutional Ban

Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of public agricultural
lands by private corporations is to equitably diffuse land ownership or to encourage 'owner-
cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm' and to prevent a... recurrence of cases like the
instant case. Huge landholdings by corporations or private persons had spawned social unrest.

The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only
a limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual. This constitutional
intent is safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations from... acquiring alienable lands
of the public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent is removed.

The Amended Joint Venture Agreement

In short, the Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of
the 750-hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the 592.15 hectares
are still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay.
Indisputably, under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire and own a maximum of 367.5
hectares of reclaimed land which will be titled in its name.

Classification of Reclaimed Foreshore and Submerged Areas

PEA readily concedes that lands reclaimed from foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay
are alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.

Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged areas of
Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the public domain, waters x x x and other natural resources"
and consequently "owned by the State."

As such, foreshore and submerged areas

"shall not be alienated," unless they are classified as "agricultural lands" of the public domain.
The mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural
resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain

Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that "only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or
concession which have been officially delimited and classified."[72] The President has the...
authority to classify inalienable lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain, pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141.

PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent covering the
Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.

The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open to
disposition or concession to qualified... parties.

Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read together with laws subsequently enacted
on the disposition of public lands. In particular, CA No. 141 requires that lands of the public
domain must first be classified as alienable or disposable before the government... can alienate
them.

PD No. 3-A repealed Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 because reclamation of
areas under water could now be undertaken only by the National Government or by a person
contracted by the National Government.

The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional 592.15 hectares
which are still submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. There is no legislative or Presidential
act classifying these submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of... the public domain
open to disposition.

Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be
owned by the PEA," could not automatically operate to classify inalienable lands into alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain.
As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the State, DENR exercises
"supervision and control over alienable and disposable public lands." DENR also exercises
"exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public... domain."

DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all lands of the public domain.

In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under water,
while PEA is vested with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under water,
whether directly or through private contractors.

Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not
make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less
patrimonial lands of PEA.

Absent two official acts a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to
disposition and a declaration that these lands are not needed for public service, lands reclaimed
by PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain.

PEA contends that PD No. 1085 and EO No. 525 constitute the legislative authority allowing
PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977,... There is no
express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed lands.
PD No. 1085 merely transferred "ownership and administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila
Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525 declared that lands reclaimed by PEA

"shall belong to or be owned by PEA."

PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in,
subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands x x x owned, managed, controlled
and/or operated by the government."

There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or
alienable lands of the public domain.

PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial... properties in accordance with the PEA charter
free from constitutional limitations.

The constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.

PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private individuals
since, with the legislative authority, there is no longer any statutory prohibition against such
sales and the constitutional ban does not apply to individuals.

PEA, however, cannot sell any of its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to
private corporations since Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits such
sales.

Registration of lands of the public domain

Finally, PEA theorizes that the "act of conveying the ownership of the reclaimed lands to public
respondent PEA transformed such lands of the public domain to private lands."

In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title issued are those in the name of PEA,
a wholly government owned corporation performing public as well as proprietary functions.

Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the registrant private or
public ownership of the land.

Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of ownership

previously conferred by any of the recognized modes of... acquiring ownership.

We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:

The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by
certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain.

PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not... sell or transfer ownership of
these lands to private corporations.

The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of
the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and
declared no longer needed for public service.

In their present state, the 592.15... hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the
commerce of man.

Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34
hectares[110] of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3,...
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind
of alienable land of the public domain.

Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares[111] of
still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2,...
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than
agricultural lands of the public domain.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended
Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab... initio.

Principles:

The Regalian doctrine is the foundation of the time-honored principle of land ownership... that
"all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to
the public domain."

Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889, which is now Article 420 of the Civil Code of 1950,...
incorporated the Regalian doctrine.
Sections 6, 7 and 8 of CA No. 141 read as follows

"Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into

(a) Alienable or disposable,... (b) Timber, and

(c) Mineral lands,... and may at any time and in like manner transfer such lands from one class
to another,[53] for the purpose of their administration and disposition.

Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable public
lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce,
shall from time to time declare what lands are open to... disposition or concession under this
Act.

Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been
officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been
reserved for public or quasi-public... uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any
manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized
by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or
appropriated, have ceased to be so. x x... x."

The salient provisions of CA No. 141, on government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of
the public domain, are as follows:

"Sec. 58. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land, is
intended to be used for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive
purposes other than agricultural, and is open... to disposition or concession, shall be disposed
of under the provisions of this chapter and not otherwise.

Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:

(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means;

(b) Foreshore;

(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable
lakes or rivers;

(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.

Sec. 60. Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as the case may be,
to any person, corporation, or association authorized to purchase or lease public lands for
agricultural purposes. x x x

Sec. 61. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-nine shall be disposed
of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the President, upon
recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture,... shall declare that the same are not
necessary for the public service and are open to disposition under this chapter. The lands
included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease under the provisions of this Act."

Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution state that

"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State.

With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The
exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. x x x.

Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by
law according to the uses which they may be devoted.

Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five... years, and
not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more
than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase,
homestead, or grant.

aking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to
the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of
the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased... and the conditions
therefor."

Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold... alienable
lands of the public domain only through lease.

REPUBLIC V.S. T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC., GR No. 154953, 2008-06-26

Facts:

This case originated from an Application for Original Registration of Title filed by T.A.N.
Properties, Inc. covering Lot 10705-B of the subdivision plan Csd-04-019741 which is a portion
of the consolidated Lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre

All adjoining owners and all government agencies and offices concerned were notified of the
initial hearing.

On 15 November 1999, the trial court issued... an Order [8] of General Default against the whole
world except as against petitioner.

In its 16 December 1999 Decision, the trial court adjudicated the land in favor of respondent.
Petitioner appealed from the trial court's Decision. Petitioner alleged that the trial court erred in
granting the application for registration absent clear evidence that the applicant and its
predecessors-in-interest have complied with the period of possession and occupation as...
required by law.

In its 21 August 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court's Decision.

Issues:

The issues may be summarized as follows:

Whether the land is alienable and disposable;

Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and

notorious possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner since June 1945 or
earlier; and

Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the land under the Public Land Act.

Ruling:

Respondent Failed to Prove... that the Land is Alienable and Disposable

Petitioner argues that anyone who applies for registration has the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the land forms part of the public domain. Petitioner insists that respondent
failed to prove that the land is no longer part of the public domain.

In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR). The 3 June 1997 Certification by the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO), Batangas City,[16] certified that

"lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre situated at Barangay San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas,
Batangas with an area of 596,116 square meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project No. 30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31
December 1925." The... second certification [17] in the form of a memorandum to the trial court,
which was issued by the Regional Technical Director, Forest Management Services of the
DENR (FMS-DENR), stated "that the subject area falls within an alienable and disposable
land,... Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582."

The certifications are not sufficient.

the CENRO issues certificates of land... classification status for areas below 50 hectares.

The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land
classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares.

In this case, respondent applied for registration of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot 10705-
B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot
10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which,... as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is
beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.

Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a
memorandum to the trial court, has no probative value.

Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable.

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot
10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary.
Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein.

The DENR Secretary certified that based on Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became
alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925. However, the certificate on the... blue print
plan states that it became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985.

There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious

Possession and Occupation in the Concept of an Owner

Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been in possession of the land before 1945. Yet,
Evangelista only worked on the land for three years.

he admitted that he did not know the exact relationship between Kabesang Puroy and
Fortunato, which is rather unusual for neighbors in a small community.

in this case, we find Evangelista's uncorroborated testimony insufficient to prove that

respondent's predecessors-in-interest had been in possession... of the land in the concept of an
owner for more than 30 years.

Land Application by a Corporation

Petitioner asserts that respondent, a private corporation, cannot apply for registration of the land
of the public domain in this case.

The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.

SET ASIDE the 21 August 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658 and
the 16 December 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in
Land Registration Case No. T-635. We DENY the application for... registration filed by T.A.N.
Properties, Inc.

Principles:

The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion
presumably belong to the State.[14] The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the
presumption that the land subject of an application for... registration is alienable and disposable
rests with the applicant.

The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and... disposable, and that
the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO.

In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification
approved by the

DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
Cruz vs Secretary of DENR
Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine

GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens
and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing
rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on
the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of
the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is
nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their
ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with
the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their
ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the
resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same
time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of
private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of
ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on

Elections, 289 SCRA 337, G.R. No. 132922 April 21, 1998
10Jan
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on
Elections, 289 SCRA 337, G.R. No. 132922 April 21, 1998
10Jan

En Banc

[MENDOZA, J.]
FACTS: Section 92 of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 881, as amended, reads as follows:

Sec. 92. Comelec time. — The commission shall procure radio and television time to be known
as “Comelec Time” which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within
the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio
broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time,
free of charge, during the period of the campaign.

Petitioners contend that §92 of BP Blg. 881 violates the due process clause and the eminent
domain provision of the Constitution by taking airtime from radio and television broadcasting
stations without payment of just compensation. Petitioners claim that the primary source of
revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of airtime to advertisers and that to require
these stations to provide free airtime is to authorize a taking which is not “a de minimis temporary
limitation or restraint upon the use of private property.” According to petitioners, in 1992, the GMA
Network, Inc. lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free airtime of one (1) hour every morning from
Mondays to Fridays and one (1) hour on Tuesdays and Thursdays from 7:00 to 8:00 p.m. (prime
time) and, in this year’s elections, it stands to lose P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s
requirement that radio and television stations provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for
the COMELEC Time.

ISSUE#1: Does GMA Network, Inc. have the standing to bring the constitutional question on the
assailed provision?

HELD#1: YES.

[W]e have decided to take this case since the other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., appears to
have the requisite standing to bring this constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and
television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of §92 of B.P. Blg.
881 requiring radio and television broadcast companies to provide free airtime to the COMELEC
for the use of candidates for campaign and other political purposes. Petitioner claims that it
suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with
the 1992 presidential election and the 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even
more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioner’s allegation that it will suffer losses
again because it is required to provide free airtime is sufficient to give it standing to question the
validity of §92.

ISSUE#2: Is Section 92 of BP. Blg. 881 violative of the due process clause and unlawful taking of
private property for public use without just compensation?

HELD#2: NO.

Petitioners’ argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations,
is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more
individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a
privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by Congress in accordance with the
constitutional provision that “any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to
amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires.”
REPUBLIC v. CA AND SPS. MARIO B. LAPIÑA AND FLOR DE VEGA, GR No. 108998, 1994-
08-24
Facts:
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their
residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo
Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of the purchase, respondent spouses were then natural-born
Filipino citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2)
parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time,
however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian...
citizenship through naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic... court a quo rendered a decision confirming private
respondents' title to the lots in question... petitioner submits that private respondents have not
acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify the registration thereof in their
favor.
It maintains that even privately owned unregistered lands are presumed to be public lands
under the... principle that lands of whatever classification belong to the State under the Regalian
doctrine.
before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true
owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.
Issues:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by
purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the
requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
Ruling:
It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, the law employs the terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or
through his predecessor-in-interest". Thus, it matters not whether the... vendee/applicant has
been in possession of the subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal
requirements for confirmation of title has been complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the
said period is tacked to his possession.
respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the disputed land not only since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937.
Private respondents stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by virtue
thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as
an imperfect title.
open, continuous and exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso
jure converts the same to private property
This means that occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest, vest title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass
of public land
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public
land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial
or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act
Torrens system
It merely confirms, but does not confer ownership.
private... respondents were able to establish the nature of possession of their predecessors-in-
interest.
Evidence was offered to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes on the subject
land and introduced improvements thereon... certified true copy... of the affidavit executed by
Cristeta Dazo and her sister Simplicia was also formally offered to prove that the subject parcels
of land were inherited by vendor Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro Dazo with the conformity
of her only sister Simplicia... a... report from the Bureau of Lands was presented in evidence
together with a letter from the Bureau of Forest Development, to prove that the questioned lots
were part of the alienable and disposable zone of the government and that no forestry interest
was affected... private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of
the acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in
the process, the possession in the concept of... owner and the prescribed period of time held by
their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act.
private respondents have constructed a house of strong materials on the contested property,
now occupied by respondent Lapiña's mother.
"Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a... transferee of private lands,
subject to limitations provided by law."
"Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private land, for use by him
as his residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may provide."
"Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and
who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of
a private land up to a maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the... case of urban
land, or one hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of
married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both
shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the... maximum herein fixed.
what governs the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has
lost his Philippine citizenship remains... to be BP 185.
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for
registration of the properties in question, said properties as discussed above were already
private lands; consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by...
respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains.
The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the public domain. They are
already private in character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous and exclusive... possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership
prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937.
The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a... maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if
urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural-born
citizens of the Philippines.
For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not significant
whether private respondents are no longer Filipino... citizens at the time they purchased or
registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private respondents were
formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could
apply for registration
This decree of registration is the one that is submitted to the office of the register of deeds for
issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the applicant. Prior to... the issuance of the decree
of registration, the register of deeds has no participation in the approval of the application for
registration of title as the decree of registration is yet to be issued.
Principles:
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public
land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial
or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act
When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of
law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued
As such, the land ceases to be a part of the public domain and goes beyond the authority of the
Director of Lands to dispose of.

Zaragoza v. CA
G.R. No. 106401 September 29, 2000

On December 9, 1964, Flavio Zaragoza Cano died without a will and was
survived by his four children: Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and Alberta, all surnamed
Zaragoza.

On December 28, 1981, private respondent Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan filed a

complaint with CFI against Spouses Florentino and Erlinda, herein petitioners, for
delivery of her inheritance share, consisting of Lots 943 and 871, and for payment of
damages.

She alleged that her father, in his lifetime, partitioned the aforecited properties
among his four children. The shares of her brothers and sister were given to them in
advance by way of deed of sale, but without valid consideration, while her share, which
consists of lots no. 871 and 943, was not conveyed by way of deed of sale then.
She averred that because of her marriage, she became an American citizen and
was prohibited to acquire lands in the Philippines except by hereditary succession. For
this reason, no formal deed of conveyance was executed in her favor covering these
lots during her father’s lifetime

ISSUE: Whether or not the partition inter vivos by Flavio Zaragoza Cano of his
properties, which include Lots 871 and 943, is valid.

YES. The Court held that it is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter
vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Art. 1080 of the Civil
Code is clear on this.

Thus, the court ruled that that during the lifetime of Flavio, he already partitioned
and distributed his properties among his three children, excepting private respondent,
through deeds of sale. A deed of sale was not executed in favor of private respondent
because she had become an American citizen and the Constitution prohibited a sale in
her favor. Petitioner admitted Lots 871 and 943 were inheritance shares of the private
respondent.

As to the alleged prejudice on legitimes, the Court stated that the legitime of
compulsory heirs is determined after collation, as provided for in Article 1061:
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring
into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous
title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir,
and in the account of the partition.
Unfortunately, collation cannot be done in this case where the original petition for
delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs. The
petition must therefore be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new
proceeding where all the indispensable parties are present for the rightful determination of their
respective legitime and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos.

Testate of Estate of Ramirez v. Ramirez, et al.

GR No. L-27962, February 15, 1982

FACTS:

Jose Eugenio Ramirez died leaving as principal beneficiaries his widow, MarcelleSemoron de
Ramirez, a French woman; his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his
companion Wanda de Wrobleski. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance.
According to the will ½ shall go to Marcelle in full ownership plus usufruct of the 1/3 of the whole
estate; the grandsons shall have the ½ of the whole estate; and a usufruct in favour of Wanda.

ISSUE:

Is the partition according to the will valid?

RULING:
No. As to the usufruct granted to Marcelle, the court ruled that to give Marcelle more than her
legitime will run counter to the testator’s intention for his dispositions even impaired her legitime
and tended to favor Wanda.As to the usufruct in favour of Wanda, the Court upheld its validity.
The Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to
testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any
alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in
exchange for devise of a piece of land. Notwithstanding this, the Court upholds the usufruct in
favour of Wanda because a usufruct does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the
vesting of title to aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.

The court distributed the estate by: ½ to his widow and ½ to the grandsons but the usufruct of the
second half shall go to Wanda.

Halili v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 113539, March 12, 1998

Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving real

properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow private respondent Helen
Meyers Guzman, and his son, private respondent David Rey Guzman, both of whom
are also American citizens. On August 9, 1989, Helen executed a deed of quitclaim,
assigning, transferring and conveying to David Rey all her rights, titles and interests in
and over six parcels of land which the two of them inherited from Simeon.
Among the said parcels of land is that now in litigation Guzman then sold the
parcel of land to Catanaig, who is one of respondents in this case. Petitioners, who are
owners of the adjoining lot, filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, questioning the constitutionality and validity of the two conveyances —
between Helen Guzman and David Rey Guzman, and between the latter and Emiliano
Cataniag — and claiming ownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption
under Art. 1621 of the Civil Code. The trial court dismissed the complaint. The CA
denied the appeal of the Halilis.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of the land is null and void.

No, because the prohibition in the constitution has already been served. Article
XII, Section 7 provides that Non- Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or
to lands of the public domain, In fine, non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private
lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession. While it
is true that the transfer of Helen of his right to her son who is an American citizen
contradicts the prohibition set forth in the Constitution, the Supreme Court upheld the
subsequent sale of the land to Catanig, a Filipino citizen. Jurisprudence is consistent
that “if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or
transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the
title of the transferee is rendered valid.”
The rationale of this principle was explained in Vasquez vs. Li Seng Giap thus
“[I]f the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as
construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation’s lands for future
generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by
making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by
naturalization. “
Petition was denied.
 Lee v. Director of Lands

G.R. No. 128195

October 3, 2001
Facts:
March 1936
o Rafael, Carmen, et al., all surnamed Dinglasan, sold to Chinese citizen Lee Liong a parcel of
land situated at Roxas City.
1948
o the former owners filed an annulment of sale and recovery of land
o Reason: The Constitution prohibits against aliens owning private lands
o Ruling of Supreme Court: Sale is null and void but the original owners can’t have the title
because they also violated the Constitution. They are in pari delicto.
1993
o Filipino citizens Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu-Lee, who are the widows of the sons of
Lee Liong, filed a petition for reconstitution. Both Elizabeth and Pacita acquired the land from
their husbands.
o They alleged that on December 9, 1948, a certification of a transfer title over the property was
issued in the name of Lee Liong but was burned during the war. However, Elizabeth and Pacita
did not show an evidence of owner’s duplicate copy.
o Ruling of the RTC: Order of reconstitution is granted.
1995
o Solicitor General filed for a petition of judgment in the reconstitution case
o Reason: RTC Roxas had no jurisdiction over the case
o Contention: Petitioners are not the proper party because Lee Liong did not acquire the title of the
land because he is Chinese
o Ruling of the CA: Reconstitution judgment is void.
Issues:
1. Who was the proper party to assail the legality of the sale?
2. Was the Solicitor General estopped because he filed the case 60 years after?
3. Can the Solicitor General escheat the estate now that the land is owned by Filipinos?
4. Was the reconstitution valid?
Ruling:
1. The Solicitor General is the proper party to assail the legality of the sale. Both vendor and
vendee are in pari delicto for violating the Constitution, and the courts will not afford protection
to either party.
2. No. The SolGen is not estopped because prescription never lies against the State.
3. No. The land is now in the hands of Filipinos. If the land was invalidly transferred to an alien
who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is valid.
4. No. The petitioners failed to present the owner’s duplicate of the title. The order of
restitution is void for lack of factual support.

FRENZEL v. CATITO
G.R. No. 143958. July 11, 2003
Ponente: J. CALLEJO Sr.

DOCTRINE:
A contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and void and vests no rights and
creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The petitioner, being a party to an illegal
contract, cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objective carried out

FACTS:

Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent. He was so enamored
with Ederlina that he bought her numerous properties such as house and lot in Quezon City and
in Davao City. He also put up a beauty parlor business in the name of Ederlina. Alfred was
unaware that Ederlina was married until her spouse Klaus Muller wrote a letter to Alfred begging
the latter to leave her wife alone.

When Alfred and Ederlinas relationship started deteriorating. Ederlina had not been able to
secure a divorce from Klaus. The latter could charge her for bigamy and could even involve
Alfred, who himself was still married. To avoid complications, Alfred decided to live separately
from Ederlina and cut off all contacts with her.

On October 15, 1985, Alfred wrote to Ederlinas father, complaining that Ederlina had taken all
his life savings and because of this, he was virtually penniless. He further accused the Catito
family of acquiring for themselves the properties he had purchased with his own money. He
demanded the return of all the amounts that Ederlina and her family had stolen and turn over all
the properties acquired by him and Ederlina during their coverture.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner could recover the money used in purchasing the several properties

HELD:

No, even if, as claimed by the petitioner, the sales in question were entered into by him as the
real vendee, the said transactions are in violation of the Constitution; hence, are null and void
ab initio. A contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and void and vests no
rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The petitioner, being a party
to an illegal contract, cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objective
carried out. One who loses his money or property by knowingly engaging in a contract or
transaction which involves his own moral turpitude may not maintain an action for his losses. To
him who moves in deliberation and premeditation, the law is unyielding. The law will not aid
either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them