Gabriel H. Piquero.

Philosophy of Science
AB Philo IV

A summary on Heidegger’s “The question concerning technology”

Heidegger was one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century. Technology

was an important element in his work: for Heidegger, technology was the key to understanding

our current time.

Heidegger’s analysis of technology in The Question Concerning Technology consists

of three main claims: technology is “not an instrument”, it is a way of understanding the world;

technology is “not a human activity”, but develops beyond human control; and technology is

“the highest danger”, risking us to only see the world through technological thinking.

First, the essence of technology is not something we make; it is a mode of being, or of

revealing. This means that technological things have their own novel kind of presence,

endurance, and connections among parts and wholes. They have their own way of presenting

themselves and the world in which they operate. The essence of technology is, for Heidegger,

not the best or most characteristic instance of technology, nor is it a nebulous generality, a form

or idea. Rather, to consider technology essentially is to see it as an event to which we belong:

the structuring, ordering, and “requisitioning” of everything around us, and of ourselves.

Technology is not equivalent to the essence of technology. When we are seeking the

essence of “tree,” we have to become aware that that which pervades every tree, as tree, is not

itself a tree that can be encountered among all the other trees. Likewise, the essence of

technology is by no means anything technological. Thus we shall never experience our

relationship to the essence of technology so long as we merely conceive and push forward the

technological, put up with it, or evade it. Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to

technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the
worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral; for this conception of it, to which

today we particularly like to do homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence of technology.

The second point is that technology even holds sway over beings that we do not

normally think of as technological, such as gods and history. The essence of a thing is

considered to be what the thing is. We ask the question concerning technology when we ask

what it is. Everyone knows the two statements that answer our question. One says: Technology

is a means to an end. The other says: Technology is a human activity. The two definitions of

technology belong together. For to posit ends and procure and utilize the means to them is a

human activity. The manufacture and utilization of equipment, tools, and machines, the

manufactured and used things themselves, and the needs and ends that they serve, all belong to

what technology is. The whole complex of these contrivances is technology. Technology itself

is a contrivance, or, in Latin, an instrumentum.

Third, the essence of technology as Heidegger discusses it is primarily a matter of

modern and industrial technology. He is less concerned with the ancient and old tools and

techniques that antedate modernity; the essence of technology is revealed in factories and

industrial processes, not in hammers and plows. The current conception of technology,

according to which it is a means and a human activity, can therefore be called the instrumental

and anthropological definition of technology. It is in obvious conformity with what we are

envisioning when we talk about technology. The instrumental definition of technology is

indeed so uncannily correct that it even holds for modern technology, of which, in other

respects, we maintain with some justification that it is, in contrast to the older handwork

technology, something completely different and therefore new. Even the power plant with its

turbines and generators is a man-made means to an end established by man. Even the jet aircraft

and the high-frequency apparatus are means to ends.

 And fourth, for Heidegger, technology is not simply the practical application of natural

science. Instead, modern natural science can understand nature in the characteristically

scientific manner only because nature has already, in advance, come to light as a set of

calculable, orderable forces — that is to say, technologically. Modern technology too is a

means to an end. That is why the instrumental conception of technology conditions every

attempt to bring man into the right relation to technology. Everything depends on our

manipulating technology in the proper manner as a means. We will, as we say, “get” technology

“spiritually in hand.” We will master it. The will to mastery becomes all the more urgent the

more technology threatens to slip from human control. But suppose now that technology were

no mere means, how would it stand with the will to master it? Yet we said, did we not, that the

instrumental definition of technology is correct? To be sure. The correct always fixes upon

something pertinent in whatever is under consideration.

However, in order to be correct, this fixing by no means needs to uncover the thing in

question in its essence. Only at the point where such an uncovering happens does the true come

to pass. For that reason the merely correct is not yet the true. Only the true brings us into a free

relationship with that which concerns us from out of its essence. Accordingly, the correct

instrumental definition of technology still does not show us technology’s essence. In order that

we may arrive at this, or at least come close to it, we must seek the true by way of the correct.

We must ask: What is the instrumental itself? Within what do such things as means and end

belong?”
Reference:

Blitz Mark. "Understanding Heidegger on Technology". The New Atlantis, Number 41, Winter

2014.