A NEOPLATONIC REFUTATION OF ISLAM

FROM THE TIME OF THE KOMNENI*

MICHELE TRIZIO (Bari)

The commentary of Eustratios of Nicaea on book VI of

Aristotle's ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ contains a five-page
autonomous digression refuting Islam that has remained
curiously unstudied1. The text lies within a commentary on
Aristotle and not within a theological refutation of a ‘heresy’, a
fact which might explain why it has been ignored by specialists in
Byzantine anti-Muslim apologetics2. It only explicitly declares its
target at the very end of the digression 3. Eustratios does not
address the traditional theological topics discussed by the other
Byzantine polemicists in response to Muslim criticisms – such as
the Trinity or the Qur'an as ‘holy scripture’; nor does he follow his
predecessors’ usual reconstruction of the history of the Muslim

*
I would like to acknowledge my gratitude to Guy Guldentops, Yannis
Demetracopoulos and Antonio Rigo for their thoughtful suggestions in the
writing of the present paper.
1
On Eustratios' biography and bibliography see M. Cacouros, Eustrate de
Nicée, in: R. Goulet (ed.), Dictionnaire de Philosophes Antiques, III, Paris 2000,
378–388. The text is found in Eustratii et Michaeli et Anonyma, in: Ethica
Nicomachea commentaria, ed. G. Heylbut (Commentaria in Aristotelem
Graeca 20), Berlin 1892, 272,9–277,17. I will refer to this text and to other
passages from Eustratios’ commentary on book I and VI of the Nicomachean
Ethics contained in this volume only by quoting the page and line numbers.
2
I shall mention only the most relevant and consequential contribution to
this topic: G. Güterbock, Der Islam im Lichte der byzantinischen Polemik,
Berlin 1912; W. Eichner, Die Nachrichten über den Islam bei den Byzantinern,
in: Der Islam 23 (1936), 133–162, 197–244; E. Trapp, Manuel II. Palaiologos.
Dialoge mit einem ‘Perser’, Wien 1966; A.T. Khoury, Les théologiens byzantins
et l'Islam. Textes et auteurs (VIIIe–XIIIe s.), Louvain–Paris 1968; Id., Polémique
byzantine contre l'Islam (VIIIe–XIIIe s.), Leiden 21972. None of these
contributions mentions Eustratios’ refutation of Islam contained in his
commentary on book VI of the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’. It seems that the
forthcoming D. Thomas/A. Mallett, A History of Christian Muslim Relations, 3
(1050–1200), Leiden, does not mention it either. The only reference I could find
to Eustratios’ refutation of Islam is the prefatory introduction to the volumes of
the “Ancient Commentators on Aristotle” series, like in Dexippus, On Aristotle's
Categories, translated by John Dillon (The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle,
5), London 1990, 135.
3
Eustratios’ refutation of Islam is not contained in the main manuscripts
collecting most of the Byzantine anti-Muslim works, such as the Lavra Ω 44
(1854). On this manuscript and the related bibliography see A. Rigo, Niceta
Byzantios, la sua opera e il monaco Evodio, in: G. Fiaccadori (ed.), In Partibus
Clius. Studi in onore di Giovanni Pugliese Carratelli, Napoli 2006, 147–187,
164–167.
faith and Mohamed’s life4. His approach is revealing of a more
subtle, if not unique, rejection of Islam through a philosophical
argument. Thus, this digression does not only represent a
missing piece in Byzantine anti-Muslim apologetics, but mirrors
the intellectual trends of Eustratios’ time.

I. The Structure of the Text

The digression begins: “if the discussion will be prolonged
towards the investigation of this topic, no-one would mind” 5. It
ends some five pages later with a rhetorical question: “what can
be added to what has been said up to now, for enough has been
yet said to refute the irrationality of the dogma, since discussing
this issue does not fit in with the scope we settled at the
beginning?”6. The whole text is introduced by an aporia that
takes its cue from an Aristotelian passage that Eustratios
encountered while commenting on book VI of the ‘Nicomachean
Ethics’. Here, Aristotle writes that “we have therefore to ascertain
what disposition of each of these faculties, i.e. the scientific and
the deliberative one, is the best, for that will be the special virtue
of each” (1139a15-16), and concludes that “the virtue of a
faculty is related to the special function which that faculty
performs” (1139a16-17). While commenting on this latter
passage, Eustratios writes:

“Yet, there is an aporia. In fact, if each potency must

proceed into a disposition, and each disposition into its
proper act, so that each thing obtains in such a way its
perfection, on what basis the intemperate (οἱ
ἀκολασταίνοντες), those who do wrong, the cheaters and
those who perform other things of this kind are to be
judged as worthy of punishment? In fact, while using the

4
E.g. Niketas Byzantios, Refutatio Mohamedis, ed. K. Förstel, Niketas von
Byzanz, Schriften zum Islam I, Würzburg–Altenberge 2000, xxvii, 2–3, 138,18–
140,64; Georgios Hamartolos, Chronicon, ed. C. de Boor, Georgii monachi
Chronicon, vol. II, Leipzig 1904, 705,22–706,20; Euthymios Zigabenos,
Panoplia Dogmatica, Patrologia Graeca 130, 1133A–D. Cf. Khoury, Polémique
(nt. 2), 60–71; A. Rigo, Gli Ismaeliti e la discendenza di Abramo nella
Refutazione del Corano di Niceta Byzantios (metà del IX secolo), in: G. Ruggeri
(ed.), L’immagine del nemico, Bologna 1997, 83–104. In the present paper I
shall compare Eustratios’ refutation of Islam only with those anti-Muslim works
written before or during Eustratios’ life.
5
Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 272,12–13
6
Ibid., 277,13–15
 corresponding potency and acting accordingly, each of
these acquires a habit and performs actions according to
that habit, and in such a way gains the perfection of that
potency, so that his proper potency is not wasted.”7

Clearly, Eustratios uses this argument as a pretext for

introducing his criticism because he must have known that,
according to Aristotle's book VI of the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’
(1144a9-11), not every faculty or part of the soul has a virtue
that contributes to the proper function of man. For example,
there is no virtue of the nutritive faculty. A close look at the
structure of this digression, however, shows that it is aporematic
as it reproduces the scheme of the philosophical treatises by
Michael Psellos and John Italos, two of Eustratios' predecessors.
Starting from the more general the author proceeds to the more
particular, first by clarifying the main points of the problem and
its basic notions, and then providing the reader with the solution
to the problem. In so doing, Eustratios repeatedly addresses an
imaginary opponent, whose foolishness and ignorance are
revealed by his repeated denials of what any educated person
would know. The structure of the text consists of four main
points: (1) the division of the faculties of the soul into cognitive
and appetitive, and into rational and irrational (272,17-274,14);
(2) the cardinal virtues: a refutation of those who believe that
bodily pleasures are good (274,14-275,1); (3) why God endowed
man with irrational potencies or faculties (275,1-276,20); and (4)
solution (276,20-277,17).

II. The Anti-Muslim Vocabulary

Apparently, the vocabulary of Eustratios’ anti-Muslim
digression reveals elements that might be traced back to earlier
Byzantine polemicists. The introductory formulas were widely
used by the Greek Fathers and the later Byzantine theologians to
address the heretics. In fact, Eustratios refers to “those who
babble these idle things”8 as the target of his digression, and
identifies them as “those who talk this non-sense 9. The latter is
an expression used by George Hamartolos to refer to Mohamed
in his ‘Chronicon’10. Yet much of Eustratios’ vocabulary is only

7
Ibid., 272,3–9.
8
Ibid., 272,13: “πρὸς τοὺς λαλοῦντας τὰ μάταια”.
9
Ibid., 272,23–24: “τοὺς ἐκεῖνα τὰ ληρήματα λέγοντας”.
10
Georgios Hamartolos, Chronicon, 703,18.
vaguely reminiscent of the Byzantine apologists’ allegations
against the Muslim faith and Mohamed.
Only at the very end of the digression does Eustratios declare
his target explicitly, which, given the original character of the
whole text, complicates the relationship between the conclusion
and the preceding five pages. Nevertheless, when Robert
Grosseteste (†1253) translated Eustratios’ commentaries on the
‘Ethics’ into Medieval Latin he demonstrated remarkable alacrity
in recognizing the Anti-Muslim overtones of the text. When
rendering the Greek word ψευδοπροφήτης as “pseudopropheta” he
records in the margin of the text: “scil. Machometus” (277,6)11.
Thus, the first Latin reader of Grosseteste’s translation, Albert the
Great, comments on Eustratios’ digression: “et quia
Commentator disputat hic multum contra Machumetum” 12. As a
matter of fact, the word ‘pseudoprophet’ to refer to Mohamed
was common among the Byzantine authors, especially among
the apologists’ allegations and histories13.
Likewise, Eustratios regards the mistaken interpretation of
Aristotle’s text as a heresy of Islam, attributing the relativistic
idea that man’s perfection can be achieved through actualizing
any faculty of the soul, and introduces the digression with the
formula “τοιαῦτα καὶ πολλοὺς οἶδα προτεινομένους τῶν μοχθηρῶν
καὶ δόξας τοιαύτας κατὰ θρησκείας κρατούσας καὶ εἰς ἔθνη
ἐξαπλουμένας ὁλόκληρα” (“I came to know that many wicked
people support such views and I am aware that similar opinions
that go against religion are prevailing and spreading through
11
Robertus Grossatesta, Eustratii Metropolitani Nicaeae enarratio in sextum
Aristotelis Moralium ad Nicomachum, Vat. Lat. 2171, fol. 1r–211v, 101rb.
12
Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica, ed. W. Kübel, Opera Omnia XIV,2, Münster
1987, 404, 63–64.
13
See e.g. Joannes Damascenus, De haeresibus, 100, ed. P.B. Kotter, Die
Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos, vol. 4 (Patristische Texte und Studien
22), Berlin 1981, 60, 11; Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. C. de Boor,
Theophanis Chronographia, vol. 1, Leipzig 1883, 333,1–2, 417,4–5 (quotation
from Joannes Damascenus, De haeresibus, 100, 60, 1–2); 424,18; 429,9;
Theodoros Stoudites, Ἐκ τῶν στιχιστικῶν λόγων θεοδώρου στουδιώτου τῶν κατὰ
αἱρέσεων, ed. A. Rigo, La sezione sui musulmani nell’opera di Teodoro Studita
contro le eresie, in: Revue des études byzantines 56 (1998), 213–230, 228,17.
Georgios Hamartolos, Chronicon, 697,12–13; Arethas (dub.), Πρὸς τὸν ἐν
Δαμασκῷ ἀμηρᾶν, προτροπῇ Ῥωμανοῦ βασιλέως, ed. L.G. Westerink, Arethae
archiepiscopi Caesariensis scripta minora, 26, vol. 1, Leipzig 1968/1972,
243,2–3; Konstantinos VII Porphyrogenitos, De administrando imperio, ed. G.
Moravcsik, Constantine Porphyrogenitus. De administrando imperio
(Dumbarton Oaks Texts 1), Washington, D.C. 21967, 80,3–4 (taken from
Theophanes); Georgios Kedrenos, Compendium historiarum, ed. I. Bekker,
Georgius Cedrenus Ioannis Scylitzae ope, vol. I (Corpus Scriptorum Historiae
Byzantinae), Bonn 1838, 175,13; Euthymios Zigabenos, Panoplia Dogmatica,
Patrologia Graeca 130, 1133AB.
entire peoples”)14. This is a paraphrase of the beginning of
chapter 100/101 of John of Damascus’ ‘De haeresibus’ where the
author famously writes “Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ μέχρι τοῦ νῦν κρατοῦσα
λαοπλανὴς θρησκεία τῶν Ἰσμαηλιτῶν πρόδρομος οὖσα τοῦ
ἀντιχρίστου” (“There is also the deceiving religion of the
Ishmaelites prevailing until now as forerunner of the
Antichrist”)15.
Although the target of Eustratios’ attack is only explicitly
declared at the very end of the text, as indicated above, there is
no doubt whatsoever about the anti-Muslim intent of the whole
digression. In fact, while avoiding any reference to the Muslims
as Agarens, Ishmaelites or Saracens, the author addresses
himself to the ‘pseudoprophet’,

“Whom the Arabs, Egyptians, Persians, and all those who

live a similar life deem their prophet and law-maker
(προφήτην ἑαυτῶν καὶ νομοθέτην), a shameful manikin full of
licentiousness who was not ashamed of doing things that
took place in Sodom and Gomorrah, which were burnt by
the God-sent fire, for they used to perform the very same
thing that he ordained by law, so that also the earth upon
which their inhabitants walked in licentiousness was burnt
and reduced to ash.”16

In referring to Mohamed as prophet and legislator, this

passage shows similarities with the Byzantine anti-Muslim
apologetics17. Interestingly, Eustratios’ commentaries seem to
assimilate the biblical and Aristotelian notion of legislation. In his
commentary on book I of the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ (4,3-7; 109,5-
9) Eustratios deems that Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and Job as
exemplified the practice of Aristotelian oikonomia, i.e. the care of
the house and its inhabitants, whereas Moses and Jesus the son
of Naue for the Hebrews, and Minos, Lycourgos, Solon for the
Greeks practiced Aristotelian political science, i.e. the care of the
city or community of people. Eustratios, who elaborates on
Clement of Alexandria’s ‘Stromata’, does not consider Mohamed
as one of these wise law-makers18.
14
Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 272,9–11.
15
On this passage see D.J. Sahas, John of Damascus on Islam. The ‘Heresy of
the Ishmaelites’, Leiden 1972, 68–69.
16
Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 277,6–13
17
See e.g. Euodios, Vita Martyrum XLII Amoriensum, ed. P. Nikitin/V.
Vasilievskij, Skazanija o 42 amorijskich mucenikach, St. Petersburg 1906,
70,15–16.
18
See e.g. Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromata, 1,21, ed. L. Früchtel/O. Stählin/U.
Treu, Clemens Alexandrinus, vol. 2, (Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller
 More importantly, while referring to Sodom and Gomorrah,
Eustratios hints at the depravity of Muslim sexual habits – a
traditional topic of anti-Muslim apologetics. Unlike his
predecessors, however, he avoids discussing the issues in great
detail and does not include references, for example, to the
Byzantine criticism of polygamy19. Elsewhere in the same text,
however, Eustratios’ arguments foreshadow the specific issues
present in previous apologists’ works. Consider, for example, the
genitivi absoluti “γάμων τε καὶ ἀλλοτρίων ἐξορυττομένων διὰ τὸ
πρὸς θηλυμανίαν ἀκόρεστον καὶ τῆς φύσεως ἀδικουμένης αὐτῆς διὰ τὸ
τοῖς ἄρρεσι χρῆσθαι ἴσα καὶ θήλεσι“ (“since other people’s
marriages are destroyed by the insatiate desire for women, and
nature itself is violated because of indiscriminate sexual
intercourses both with men and women”)20. Eustratios' reference
to θηλυμανία echoes his own notes (35,19-21) on the Aristotelian
reference to Sardanapalus (1095b21-22), where he writes
“βασιλεὺς δὲ Περσῶν ὁ Σαρδανάπαλος, ἀνὴρ θηλυμανὴς καὶ
ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἀσελγέστατος, οὗ τῶν τῆς τρυφῆς διηγημάτων τὰ τῶν
παλαιῶν γέμει συγγράμματα”21. More importantly, θηλυμανία, and in
general adultery, as the cause for destruction of other people’s
marriages is reminiscent of the episode of Mohamed’s life
reported by several apologists, in primis by John of Damascus,
concerning his marriage with Zaid’s wife that caused the
breaking of relations between Zaid and his spouse Zainab 22.
Other references to sexual perversion, like Eustratios’ claim that

52 (15), 17), Berlin 31960, 107,5, 2–3; 1,25, 165,1,1–3.

19
See e.g. Joannes Damascenus, De Haeresibus (nt. 13), 100, 64, 90–95;
Theodorus Abucara, Op. 24, Patrologia Graeca 97, 1156A; Anonymus, Contra
Muhammed, Patrologia Graeca 104, 1452A; Euthymios Zigabenos, Panopolia
Dogmatica, Patrologia Graeca 130, 1349CD. On this topic see Khoury,
Polémique (nt. 2), 260–265.
20
Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 274,22–24. The
expression ‘γάμων τε καὶ ἀλλοτρίων ἐξορυττομένων’ is quite rare. Yet, in many
Patristic and Post-Patristic works one can find the form διορύττ- instead of
ἐξορυττ- (which literally refers to the idea of mining or digging). See
Theodoretus Cyrrhensis, Interpretatio in Psalmos, Patrologia Graeca 80,
1841CD.
21
The reference to ‘τὰ τῶν παλαιῶν γέμει συγγράμματα’ goes to, among the
many works, Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca Historica, I, ed. K.T. Fischer (post I.
Bekker & L. Dindorf) and F. Vogel, Diodori Bibliotheca historica, Leipzig 31888,
23,1–3 (repr. Stuttgart 1964); Hesychius, Lexicon (Π–Ω), ed. M. Schmidt,
Hesychii Alexandrini Lexicon, vol. 4, n. 200, Halle 1862, 267; Lexicon Suidae,
vol. 4, Σ 122, ed. A. Adler, Suidae lexicon, Leipzig 1935 (repr. 1971)
(Lexicographici Graeci 1.4), 326, 25–27.
22
See Joannes Damascenus, De haeresibus (nt. 13), 100/101, 95–111;
Anonymus, Contra Muhammed, Patrologia Graeca 104, 1452A–D. On
polygamy as a major threat for the marriages and the family see also
Theodorus Abucara, op. 24, Patrologia Graeca 97, 1156BD.
“The immoderate tendency towards sexual intercourses, for
committing adultery with a woman and lusting for a man
indifferently, is totally irrational and unbridled” 23, hint at the
platitudes, widespread among earlier polemicists, about
Mohamed’s sinful way of life24.
Another argument alludes to something found already in
Eustratios’ predecessors: the denial of Mohamed’s prophetic
mission as being derived from God. While stating that the lower
potencies of the soul – sense-perception and imagination – lead
to error and deception, Eustratios writes that it is

therefore is deceitful (πλάνης) the law-maker who

persuades to live according to these (i.e. sense-perception
and imagination) and seeks for pleasures of this kind (i.e.
the sensitive ones), and therefore is far from God.
Therefore, how can someone who is far from Him and is the
cause of such a deception for his followers be a prophet
sent by God?”25

This sentiment is quite common-place among the Byzantine

polemicists, who elaborate it by stating that, contrary to Christ,
Mohamed was neither announced by the other prophets, nor did
he prove himself worthy of the title of prophet 26. In fact,
Eustratios’ denial of Mohamed’s prophetic mission is reminiscent
of a passage found in Niketas of Byzantium’s refutation of Islam
where the author speaks of Mohamed as “deceitful” or as an
“impostor” (πλάνος)27.
As is clear from this overview, the author’s vocabulary hints at
some of the issues traditionally debated by earlier polemicists
concerning the figure of Mohamed. Although Eustratios never
attempts to discuss these issues at length, the denial of
Mohamed’s prophetic mission and the critique of his way of life
and Muslim law concerning sexuality clearly lurk behind his
choice of vocabulary. Interestingly it is only after the critique of
Islam that Eustratios chooses to name his target explicitly.
23
Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 274,4–6: “τὸ δ' ἀμέτρως
φέρεσθαι πρὸς τὰς μίξεις καὶ ἀδιαφόρως πρὸς αὐτὰς ἔχειν ὡς καὶ μοιχεύειν καὶ
ἀνδρομανεῖν, ἄλογον πάντῃ καὶ ἀχαλίνωτον”.
24
On this see the witnesses found in Khoury, Polémique (nt. 2), 90–93; 260–
269.
25
Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 276,8–12.
26
See e.g. Joannes Damascenus, De haeresibus (nt. 13), 100, 61–62, 32–47;
Niketas Byzantios, Refutatio Mohamedis (nt. 4), xii, 100,40–43; Euthymios
Zigabenos, Panopolia Dogmatica, Patrologia Graeca 130, 1356D–1357A. On
this topic see the documents collected by Khoury, Polémique (nt. 2), 21–58.
27
Niketas Byzantios, Refutatio Mohamedis (nt. 4), iii, 70, 42–45.
However, the criticisms were so familiar within the context of
Byzantine anti-Muslim literature that they could have hardly been
overlooked by an educated reader of the time.

III. The Faculties of the Human Soul

Although vaguely reminiscent of the Byzantine-Muslim
theological debates, Eustratios’ refutation of Islam shows an
originality not found in any of the works of his predecessors. For
instance, the first part of the text contains a discussion of the
faculties of the soul and their function that is not present in any
of the previous refutations of Islam.
While introducing the section of his anti-Muslim digression that
concerns the division of the faculties of the soul, Eustratios writes
“τῆς γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς πολλαὶ δυνάμεις εἰσί” (“many are the
faculties that belong to the human soul”)28, which seems to echo
a passage of Plotinus’ ‘Enneads’29. Then, quite traditionally,
Eustratios divides these faculties into the cognitive and the
appetitive, and distinguishes between them the rational and
irrational faculties30. Among the cognitive faculties αἴσθησις and
φαντασία are the irrational ones, whereas δόξα, διάνοια and νοῦς
are rational. By the same token, among the desiderative ones
βούλησις and προαίρεσις are rational, whilst θυμός and ἐπιθυμία are
irrational31. Seemingly, Eustratios’ description of the cognitive
faculties seems to be borrowed from Philoponus’ commentary on
Aristotle’s ‘De anima’, like, for instance, the author’s claim that
the difference between δόξα and διάνοια lies in the former
knowing things “without the cause” (ἄνευ τῆς αἰτίας), whereas
the latter implies a knowledge “with the cause” ( μετὰ τῆς αἰτίας),
i.e., the middle term of the syllogism32.

28
Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 272,17.
29
Plotinus, Enneades, ed. P. Henry/H.-R. Schwyzer, Plotini opera, vol. 1, Leiden
1951, 1,8,14,24
30
Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 272,17–19.
31
This distinction is the standard one among the Late-Antique Aristotle
commentators, like in Ammonius, In Porphyrii Isagogen, ed. A. Busse,
Ammonius in Porphyrii isagogen sive quinque voces (Commentaria in
Aristotelem Graeca 4.3), Berlin 1891, 11,16–17; Joannes Philoponus, In
Aristotelis libros de anima commentaria, ed. M. Hayduck, Ioannis Philoponi in
Aristotelis de anima libros commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca
15), Berlin 1897, 1,9–15. Among the Byzantine authors, see Joannes Italos,
Quaestiones Quodlibetales, 28 (Εἰς τὸ Περὶ ἑρμηνείας ἔκδοσις ἐπίτομος), ed. P.
Joannou, Joannes Italos. Quaestiones quodlibetales (Ἀπορίαι καὶ λύσεις) (Studia
patristica et Byzantina 4), Ettal 1956, 4, 29,3–30,11.
32
Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 272,29–37. Cf.
Ammonius, In Aristotelis analyticorum priorum librum i commentarium, edidit
 That the tradition of the Late-Antique commentators lies
behind Eustratios’ account of the different cognitive faculties of
the soul and their function becomes evident elsewhere as well. It
can be detected in the author’s claim that the intellect is the
most eminent of all faculties as it “gets an intuition of the
intelligibles above the cause, by grasping them by means of
direct apprehensions (ἀμέσοις ἐπιβολαῖς), and thus it becomes, so
to say, capable of seeing them by itself, and joins them without
any mediation”.33 In fact, Ammonius argues that the intellectual
faculty of the soul “knows what it knows by means of direct
apprehensions, and not by syllogisms”34, whereas in his
commentary on Aristotle’s ‘De anima’, after discussing the
difference between δόξα and διάνοια, Philoponus contends that
“the intellect grasps the intelligibles by means of a direct
apprehension in a better way than the knowledge by
demonstration”35.
One may still fruitfully ponder the purpose of Eustratios’ long
but ‘scholastic’ description of the different faculties of the soul,
and such questioning will lead one to conclude that, according to
Eustratios, the Muslims seem to regard the irrational and lower
faculties as better than the rational ones. Thus, the author
repeatedly asks rhetorical questions to an imaginary opponent:
“Which (of these faculties) seem to you to better, the rational or
the irrational ones?”36; “I ask those who say these absurdities,
whether they regard all the above mentioned faculties as equal
in honour, or whether in evaluating them it is possible to

M. Wallies, Ammonii in Aristotelis analyticorum priorum librum i

commentarium (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 4.6), Berlin 1899, 26,6–
11; Joannes Philoponus, In Aristotelis libros de anima commentaria (nt. 20),
1,16–2,6.
33
Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 273,6–8: “ὅτι καὶ ὑπὲρ
αἰτίαν τῶν γνωστῶν ἐντὸς γίνεται ἀμέσοις ἐπιβολαῖς καταλαμβάνων αὐτά, ὥσπερ
αὐτόπτης αὐτῶν γινόμενος καὶ ἑαυτῷ αὐτοῖς συγγινόμενος μηδενὸς μεσιτεύοντος.”
34
Ammonius, In Aristotelis analyticorum priorum librum i commentarium (nt.
32), 3,18–19: “οὐ διὰ συλλογισμῶν ἀλλ’ ἁπλαῖς ἐπιβολαῖς γινώσκει ἃ γινώσκει”; cf.
also 24,31–25,5.
35
Joannes Philoponus, In Aristotelis libros de anima commentaria (nt. 31),
2,11–12: “ὁ νοῦς ἁπλῇ ἐπιβολῇ γινώσκει τὰ νοητὰ κρειττόνως ἢ κατὰ ἀπόδειξιν”. On
the occurrence of the expression “ἁπλαῖς ἐπιβολαῖς” in Eustratios’ philosophical
commentaries and the author’s doctrine of the intellect, see M. Trizio,
Neoplatonic Source-Material in Eustratios of Nicaea’s Commentary on book VI
of the Nicomachean Ethics, in: C. Barber/D. Jenkins (eds.) Medieval Greek
Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, Leiden – Boston 2009, 71–109, 90–
99. Here I suggest also Proclus as a source for Eustratios’ treatment of the
topic of the intellect.
36
Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 273,14–18
distinguish among these faculties between that which is better
and that which is worse”37; and,

“That the rational faculties are superior to the irrational

ones among both the cognitive and appetitive potencies,
this no-one will deny it, unless he is a fool; nor will he deny
that these faculties are in mutual opposition and that when
reason presides over the irrational appetites and submits
them under its control, man attains the good; on the
contrary, when reason surrenders to these appetites and
follows the related impulses, then the fall towards the vice
will be visibly evident and effective.”38

Elsewhere, such rhetorical questions and statements are more

direct, illuminating Eustratios’ allegation of his Muslim opponent.
He writes:

“How not to regard the temperate well-being (εὐπάθεια) as

preferable to the immoderate impulse and inclination
towards the passions? The immoderate tendency towards
sexual intercourses, for committing adultery with a woman
and lusting for a man indifferently, is totally irrational and
unbridled. How won’t he obtain the worst result and
renounce altogether reason he who in renouncing reason
places himself on the side of the irrational animals? To tell
the truth, he who places reason under the passions has
surpassed in viciousness even the beasts, as he proclaims
that which is superior by nature slave of that which is by
nature worse, always performing actions of this kind in
accordance to an irrational appetite. Therefore, who can
deny that he who ordains by law the worse things and that
which drives human being, who is rational by nature, out of
his mind, and thus renders him worse than the irrational
animals, is utterly evil and ugly?”39

Eustratios keeps attacking the way of life of those who strive

for bodily pleasures and allow θυμός and ἐπιθυμία to overtake
reason and obnubilate the cardinal virtues. “Perfection”, cries the
author, “does not consist in the excess of the irrational faculties’
operation, but in obeying to reason as the right principle that

37
Ibid., 272,23–26.
38
Ibid., 273,29–35.
39
Ibid., 274,3–13.
functions as measure and weight” 40. While combining Aristotle’s
notion of ‘right principle’ (ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος) as that which
determines the mean of excess and defect in moral agency, 41
and the notion of ‘measure and weight’ (μέτρον καὶ σταθμός) used
by the Greek Fathers to describe God as the ruler of the
Universe42, Eustratios rejects the view that perfection consists of
increasing the activity of the irrational faculties. “He is mistaken”,
continues the commentator, “he who believes that the irrational
faculties become perfect by unfolding more and more their
irrational nature”43. And the previously mentioned passage,

“therefore is deceitful the law-maker who persuades to live

according to these (i.e. sense-perception and imagination)
and seeks for pleasures of this kind (i.e. the sensitive
ones), and therefore is far from God. Therefore, how can
someone who is far from Him and is the cause of such a
deception for his followers be a prophet sent by God?”44

As demonstrated above, this latter claim is reminiscent of the

denial of Mohamed’s prophetic and divine mission stated by the
earlier polemicists. Yet, Eustratios’ discussion of reason as the
right principle and measure of the irrational impulses that derive
from θυμός and ἐπιθυμία stems from a similar discussion found in
his commentary on book I of the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’45.
Eustratios’ commentary on Aristotle’s distinction between among
those who identify the good life with pleasure, against either the
political life or the contemplative one, is revealing. He notes that,
after describing the life of enjoyment, Aristotle continues an
investigation of the political life, which includes the following
passage: “From the life affected by the passions to the
moderation of these, for the political life allows the passions only
to a certain extent and under the rule of reason, which acts as
both measure and weight” (ἐκ τοῦ ἐμπαθοῦς εἰς τὸν μετριοπαθῆ,
ἐνδιδόντα μέν πῃ τοῖς πάθεσι, πλὴν κανόνι τοῦ λόγου, μέτρῳ τε καὶ
σταθμῷ) (1095b14-18). Likewise, in his anti-Muslim digression

40
Ibid., 275,20–22; cf. also Eustratios, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1),
303,8–9, where reason as the right principle is said to be the “measure and
weight of the actions”.
41
Cf. e.g. Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea, VI, 11, 1138b18–20.
42
Cf. e.g. Clemens Alexandrinus, Protrepticus, 69, ed. M. Marcovich, Clementis
Alexandrini Protrepticus, Leiden 1995 (Vigiliae Christianae/Supplements 34),
105,10–12 ; Basilius Caesariensis, Epistulae, ep. 219, ed. Y. Courtonne, Saint
Basile. Lettres, vol. III, Paris 1966, 1, 1.
43
Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 275,26–27.
44
Ibid., 276,9–12.
45
Ibid., 34,14–23.
Eustratios positions himself against “the things lightly said by
those who are in such a way affected by the passions” 46, and
regards the Muslims as those “who posit the Good in the life
according to pleasure and bless the excess in the enjoyment of
this way of life”47. This suggests that Eustratios combines some
of the traditional concerns of the earlier anti-Muslim polemicists
with the Aristotelian discussion of the life of enjoyment and its
related vocabulary.
The structure of the whole text is, as I said before, quite
original, insofar as Eustratios’ description of the faculties of the
soul can hardly be traced back to any of the earlier polemicists.
Yet the aim of this description is traditional, in that it emphasises
the alleged sinful and perverse nature of the Muslim law.
Eustratios goes so far as to say that Muslims live according to the
lower faculties. Thus, the ‘mistake’ of the Muslims, which
Eustratios identifies as a mis-interpretation of Aristotle’s text,
consists of regarding the irrational faculties as better than the
rational ones, and in the related belief that one can achieve
perfection by increasing or stretching the activity and operation
of the former, rather than by relying on the latter. As I showed
earlier, Eustratios summarizes this allegation as follows: “He is
mistaken he who believes that the irrational faculties becomes
perfect by unfolding more and more their irrational nature”48.
Interestingly, the allegation at stake is not shorn of logical
argumentations since immediately afterwards Eustratios writes:

“Furthermore, if the irrational faculties’ perfection consists

in stretching up to the maximum their irrational nature ( ἐν
τῷ ἐπὶ πλέον τὴν ἀλογίαν ἐκτείνεσθαι ), then their
imperfection will consist in doing away with reason and
reducing its irrational element. In fact, if the one is the
contrary to the other, the one contrary correspond to the
other, and if this is the case, the lack of rationality will be
more preferable than reason.”49

Here, Eustratios elaborates, in a paradoxical form, on

Aristotle’s discussion of contradictory postulates present in the

46
Ibid., 272,16–17: “τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἐμπαθῶς οὕτως ἐχόντων καὶ φαύλως λεγόμενα.”
The form ἐμπαθεῖς is found as referred to the Muslims in Arethas (dub.), Πρὸς
τὸν ἐν Δαμασκῷ ἀμηρᾶν, προτροπῇ Ῥωμανοῦ βασιλέως, 237,21 (nt. 13).
47
Ibid., 274,36–37: “οἱ τὸν ἡδυπαθῆ βίον ἀγαθὸν τιθέμενοι καὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον τῆς
κατ’ αὐτὸν ἀπολαύσεως μακαρίζοντες”.
48
Ibid., 275,26–27: “πεπλάνηται ἄρα ὁ λέγων τὰς ἀλόγους τελειοῦσθαι δυνάμεις ἐκ
τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ μᾶλλον αὐταῖς τὴν ἀλογίαν ἐκτείνεσθαι”.
49
Ibid., 275,27–31.
‘Topics’ and Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on this work.
Eustratios must have known these since his teacher John Italos
incorporated many fragments of Alexander’s commentary into
his own exegesis on the same work50. This demonstrates once
more that the whole text of Eustratios’ anti-Muslim digression is a
unique composition among the vast number of Byzantine works
devoted to the refutation of Islam. Even when it refers to issues
discussed by earlier scholars, Eustratios’ approach remains
autonomous and philosophically oriented, rather than dogmatic.

IV. Eustratios’ Byzantine Sources

It is clear that Eustratios regards Islam as an irrational and
sense-perception based religion. On this basis he deems
Mohamed an ‘impious law-maker’ and ‘deceitful prophet’; and,
like his predecessors, denies his prophetic and divine nature. The
argument that Islam could not be a true religion, in so far as it
does not propose an acceptable conception of ethics and moral
agency, was quite common among earlier polemicists. Yet,
Eustratios’ digression is made somewhat original by the author's
avoidance of most of the theological issues debated by earlier
apologists in favour of a standard philosophical discussion of the
role and function of the soul’s faculties. Even when Eustratios
hints at the arguments of his predecessors, his approach was
novel.
As shown above, while introducing the aporia that forms the
basis for Eustratios’ anti-Muslim digression, the author mentions
the intemperate (οἱ ἀκολασταίνοντες) as a class of people who
cannot be regarded as deserving of punishment if one assumes
that perfection can be achieved by actualizing any faculty or
power of the soul, even a lower one. Thus, ἀκολασία
50
Cf. e.g. Aristoteles, Topica, II,8, 113b15–114a6; Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In
Aristotelis topicorum libros octo commentaria, ed. M. Wallies, Alexandri
Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis topicorum libros octo commentaria (Commentaria
in Aristotelem Graeca 2.2), Berlin 1891, 193,8–195,28; Ps. Alexander
Aphrodisiensis (re vera Michael Ephesius), In Aristotelis metaphysica
commentaria, ed. M. Hayduck, Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis
metaphysica commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, 1), Berlin
1891, 218,16–17. Italos’s commentary on the ‘Topics’ is published in a modern
critical edition in S. Kotzabassi, Byzantinische Kommentatoren der
aristotelischen Topik: Johannes Italos und Leon Magentinos (Etaireia
Byzantinon Ereynon 17), Thessaloniki 1999. For Italos’ dependence upon
Alexander’s commentary on the Topics, see M. Wallies, Praefatio, in: Alexandri
Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis topicorum libros octo commentaria (Commentaria
in Aristotelem Graeca 2.2.), Berlin 1891, xlvii–l and id., Die griechischen
Ausleger der Aristotelischen Topik, Berlin 1891, 24–27.
(“intemperance” or “licentiousness”), together with θηλυμανία
(“going mad after women”) and ἡδυπάθεια (“pleasent living” or
“luxury”), form the conceptual framework of Eustratios’ depiction
of Islamic ethics. Where does Eustratios inherit this conceptual
framework from? His comments on Aristotle’s reference to
Sardanapalus, mentioned above, provide a clue. Here, Eustratios
writes that “Sardanapalus was the king of the Persians, a man
who was mad after women, intemperate and wholly licentious” 51.
Beyond this, the commentator states that “in fact, if those who
exercise authority over cities or peoples were not affected by
passions (ἐμπαθεῖς), but lived in a diligent and virtuous way, they
would never permit the more knavish of their subjects to have
access to themselves, but rather they will banish them, and
therefore not only the vice, finally set at naught, will not
increase, but it will even decrease very much or totally disappear.
But if those who exercise authority are vicious and luxurious
(ἡδυπαθεῖς) and behave like Sardanapalus, they will surround
themselves with those who resemble them and will cause the
increasing of the vice”52.
Eustratios’ comments on Sardanapalus are obviously not
original and can be traced easily to Greek historians and
lexicographers. Eustratios himself suggests this when,
concerning Sardanapalus, he writes: “the works of the ancients
are full of tales about his licentiousness”53. Unsurprisingly, when
Robert Grosseteste translates this section he introduced a
marginal note on Sardanapalus composed of excerpts from the
related entry in the ‘Suda’ lexicon, which he had partially
translated into Latin himself54. More importantly, it seems quite
clear that Eustratios deploys the same vocabulary to the
“impious law-maker” Mohamed as that used in regard to
Sardanapalus (ἡδυπαθής, ἐμπαθής etc.). Mohamed, like the king of

51
Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 35,19–20: “βασιλεὺς δὲ
Περσῶν ὁ Σαρδανάπαλος, ἀνὴρ θηλυμανὴς καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἀσελγέστατος”.
52
Ibid., 35,12–19.
53
Ibid., 35,20–21 (cf. nt. 21).
54
Eustratius, Enarratio in primum Aristotelis moralium ad Nicomachum, ed.
H.P.F. Mercken, The Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics of
Aristotle in the Latin Translation of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln
(†1253), vol. 1: Eustratius on Book I and the Anonymous Scholia on Books II,
III, and IV (Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum VI,1),
Leiden 1973, 59,41–61,63. On Grosseteste’s translation of the Lexicon Suidae,
see A.C. Dionisotti, Robert Grosseteste and the Greek Encyclopedia, in: J.
Hamesse/M. Fattori (eds.), Rencontres de cultures dans la philosophie
médiévale. Traductions et traducteurs de l’antiquité tardive au XIVe siècle,
Actes du Colloque international de Cassino 15–17 juin 1989 organisé par la
Société Internationale pour l’ Étude de la philosophie médiévale et l’Università
degli Studi di Cassino, Louvain–La-Neuve/Cassino 1990, 337–353.
the Persians, was someone who lived a sinful and licentious life,
an intemperant womanizer affected by passion and luxuries, unfit
to be a model of virtuous law-maker.
Eustratios, however, combines the antique lexicographical
tradition on Sardanapalus with an argument found in the work of
an earlier Byzantine polemicist. In fact, Eustratios’ emphasis on
the passions’ usurpation of the rational part of the human soul as
the peculiar trait of Islam, refers to passages of Niketas of
Byzantium’s Answer to the ‘Second Letter of the Agaren’ (9th
century). That Eustratios draws upon this composition is
surprising, as it is less well circulated than Niketas’ other anti-
Muslim work the ‘Refutatio Mohamedis’, which was popularised
through the paraphrase of the work produced by the monk
Euodios55. Yet, an argument contained in the Niketas’ ‘Second
Letter’ has close parallels with Eustratios’ allegations against
Islam, and it is possible to cautiously suggest that parts of the
digression are dependent upon Niketas’ contribution56.
In his Answer, Niketas elaborates on the Greek Patristic view of
man as participating in both the angelic or intellectual nature and
the irrational and sensitive one, respectively through the
λογιστικόν and the διακριτικόν, on the one hand, and the θυμικόν
and ἐπιθυμητικόν, on the other57. Human beings keep their natural
condition when the rational part of the soul, the λογιστικόν,
dominates over the θυμικόν and ἐπιθυμητικόν. Thus, writes
Niketas,

“when the condition contrary [to man’s rationality]

becomes evident in him, then, on the one hand, the
passions prevail over reason, on the other, the latter
becomes a servant (doubtless this is what happens to the
intemperate and murderous people). Then it is clear: when

On this see Rigo, Niceta Byzantios (nt. 3), 163–182.

55

The text of Niketas’ Answer to the Second Letter of the Agaren is edited in A.
56

Mai, Nova Patrum Bibliotheca, IV, Romae Typ. S. Cons. prop. Christi nomini,
1847, 418–431; Patrologia Graeca, CV, 821–841; Niketas Byzantios, Ἀντίρρησις
καὶ ἀνατροπὴ τῆς δευτέρας ἐπιστολῆς τῆς σταλείσης παρὰ τῶν ἀγαρηνῶν πρὸς
μιχαὴλ βασιλέα υἱὸν θεοφίλου, ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῆς τῶν χριστιανικῶν πίστεως , ed.
Förstel, Niketas von Byzanz (nt. 4), 176–198 (= Ἀντίρρησις καὶ ἀνατροπὴ τῆς
δευτέρας ἐπιστολῆς). In the present paper I will refer to the Förstel edition. For a
full bibliography of Niketas, see Rigo, Niceta Byzantios (nt. 3), 148, n. 1.
57
See e.g. Joannes Damascenos, Expositio Fidei, ed. P.B. Kotter, Die Schriften
des Johannes von Damaskos, vol. 2, Berlin 1973 (Patristische Texte und
Studien, 12), 25,42–43. Eustratios himself refers to this widespread view in his
theological writings, like in Eustratios, Διάλογος ἐκτεθεὶς ὅτε ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις περὶ
τῶν ἁγίων εἰκόνων ἐγένετο, ed. A. Demetrakopoulos, Ἐκκλησιαστικὴ Βιβλιοθήκη,
vol. 1. Leipzig 1866, 138,16–24.
 man performs the worse actions he descends from the
realm of the natural and supernatural things to that of
things against nature. Whence, so much the irascible and
appetitive faculties are left out of control, so also the
passions frisk; so much they frisk, so they also grow; so
much they grow, so man becomes similar to the irrational
animals.”58

Everything here foreshadows Eustratios’ argument and

vocabulary. Niketas’ reference to the intemperate is also found in
the incipit of Eustratius’ digression, where he questions the basis
of punishing the intemperate. Furthermore, both authors
emphasise that when reason is dominated by the passions and
the irrational faculties, human beings, who are rational by nature,
become similar to, if not worse than, the irrational animals.
In another passage Niketas writes,

“therefore, since your faith promises and foretells the

intemperate life (τὸν ἀκόλαστον βίον) and the increasing
and domination of the passions (τῶν παθῶν τὴν αὔξησιν και
ἐπικράτειαν) more than that of reason […] we profess that a
religion that ordains similar commandments is harmful and
inconvenient […]. That is why our faith promises the
opposite of yours: the latter promises intemperance, the
first temperance; yours promises gluttony, ours self-control;
yours promises concupiscence, ours liberality; it is evident
that your religion is harmful and not appropriate to God, for
it renders its followers more similar to the irrational
animals.”59

While remarking that a true religion must be founded on

rationality, Niketas refers to the the faith of the ‘Saracens’ as
prescribing the increase, αὔξησις, of the passions. This
corresponds to Eustratius’ reference to his opponent’s view that
perfection consists in “unfolding or increasing [ ἐκτείνεσθαι] more
and more man’s irrational nature”, and to the aforementioned
description of Sardanapalus as an example of a ruler whose
habits cause the increase of vice and licentiousness among his
subjects.
The very style of Eustratios anti-Muslim digression often
reflects the earlier polemicists’ works. For example, large
58
Niketas Byzantios, Ἀντίρρησις καὶ ἀνατροπὴ τῆς δευτέρας ἐπιστολῆς (nt. 56),
186,207–214.
59
Ibid., 186,228–232.
sections of the text are full of rhetorical questions introduced by
πῶς, which is a strategy also used in the ‘Letter to the Emir of
Damascus’ attributed to Arethas. Yet, despite all the similarities
with the traditional arguments developed by Eustratios’
predecessors, his solution to the aporia and conclusion of the
digression cannot be said to derive from the earlier Byzantine
scholars who engaged with Islam.

V. The Solution to the Aporia

As has been established, Eustratios utilised Niketas’ emphasis
on the ‘irrationality’ of the Muslim faith as a model for his
digression, rather than a source to be directly quoted. Yet,
Eustratios’s work is also marked out by an autonomous approach
which is particularly evident in what I have defined as the
‘solution’ of the aporia, which can be divided into two parts. In
the first one, Eustratios investigates the reason God provided
human beings with irrational faculties in terms of ‘aim’ ( τίνος
ἕνεκεν)60. In the second one, the commentator delves more
deeply into this topic by delineating the scope of the union
between rational and irrational faculties in human beings, and,
finally, provides the reader with the definitive answer 61.
Interestingly, the anti-Muslim undertones of the discussion
become of secondary importance as the traces of a
contemporary debate on the soul attract Eustratios’ attention.
In the first part of the solution, Eustratios simply states that, by
nature, the irrational faculties are supposed to be dominated by
the reason, allowing them to become rational through
“participation” (μετεχόντως). He frames this statement within a
Neoplatonic metaphysical scheme, and, accordingly 62, something
acquires perfection only when it reverts to the superior principle.
Yet, Eustratios shapes his Neoplatonism with expressions taken
from the Greek Fathers. For example, the commentator states
that, when out of control, the irrational faculties are “thrown
down into an abyss of perdition and they dispose of it (scil. the
reason) as servant of evil thoughts” ( εἰς βυθὸν ἀπωλείας
κατακρημνίζουσαι καὶ ὑπουργὸν αὐτὸ ἔχουσαι πρὸς ἐπινοίας κακῶν)63.
This is constructed by joining together two expressions, “εἰς
βυθὸν ἀπωλείας and πρὸς ἐπινοίας κακῶν“ found in a similar context
in the Church Fathers64. Nonetheless, the whole argument
remains Neoplatonic. The very formula “yet, each thing which
60
Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 275,1–276,12.
61
Ibid., 276,12–38.
62
Ibid., 275,12–20.
63
Ibid., 275,11–12.
acquires its perfection is perfected by something superior to it,
and refers to it” (ἔτι ἕκαστον τῶν τελειουμένων ἐκ τοῦ κρείττονος
αὐτοῦ τελειοῦται, ἀναφερόμενον πρὸς αὐτό)65 is a re-elaboration of
at least three propositions of Proclus’ ‘Elements of Theology’66.
Besides, Eustratios’ claim that “the rational soul won’t acquire its
perfection without referring to the Intelligence and, through the
Intelligence, to God, so that it is illuminated by them, insofar as
they are superior principles, and receive its perfection” ( ἡ λογικὴ
ψυχὴ οὐκ ἂν τὸ τέλειον ἕξει ποτὲ μὴ πρὸς νοῦν ἀναφερομένη καὶ διὰ
νοῦ πρὸς θεὸν καὶ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ὡς κρειττόνων ἐλλαμπομένη καὶ
δεχομένη τὴν τελειότητα)67 closely resembles Proclus’ notes on
proposition 193 of the aforementioned ‘Elements of Theology’.
Here Proclus writes that “if the proximate source of the soul’s
perfection is the Intelligence, then it reverts to an Intelligence”
(εἰ δὲ προσεχῶς ὑπὸ νοῦ τελειοῦται, καὶ ἐπιστρέφεται πρὸς νοῦν)68.
Thus, according to Eustratios, the irrational faculties attain
perfection by obeying the principle that is prior and superior to
them, i.e., reason, in the same way as reason and the rational
soul acquire their perfection by reverting to the principles
superior to them, i.e. the Intelligence and God. Eustratios,
however, regards this explanation as insufficient, adding: “Let us
inquire which is the very scope (τίς δὲ καὶ ὁ σκοπὸς) of the
creation in attaching the irrational and vegetative lives to the
rational soul”69. This more detailed investigation occupies the
second part of Eustratios’ solution, and discusses the providential
plan concerning the link between the rational and irrational
faculties: whether this link exists “in order that the rational
beings live irrationally, submitting their reason to the passions, or
because of the soul’s bond (διὰ τὸν σύνδεσμον τῶν ψυχῶν) with the
64
For the expression εἰς βυθὸν ἀπωλείας see Eusebius Caesariensis, Historia
Ecclesiastica, IV,vii,2, ed. G. Bardy, Eusèbe de Césarée. Histoire
ecclésiastique, Livres I–IV, t. 1, Paris 2001 (Sources chrétiennes 31), 167;
Gregorius Nazianzenus, De vita sua, ed. C. Jungck, Gregor von Nazianz. De
vita sua, Heidelberg 1974, 110, 1148. For the expression πρὸς ἐπινοίας κακῶν
see Gregorius Nazianzenus, ep. 206, ed. P. Gallay, Saint Grégoire de Nazianze.
Lettres, vol. 2, 98,7.
65
Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 275,12–13
66
Proclus, Elementatio Theologica, prop. 24, ed. E.R. Dodds, Oxford 21963,
29,8–9; prop. 31, 34,28–29; prop. 35, 38,9–10.
67
Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 275,16–18
68
Proclus, Elementatio Theologica (nt. 66), prop. 193, 168,24–25. The English
translation of this passage is that of Dodds, slightly modified. Eustratios’
sentence “ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ὡς κρειττόνων ἐλλαμπομένη καὶ δεχομένη τὴν τελειότητα ”
shows remarkable similarities with Simplicius, Commentarius in Epicteti
enchiridion, ch. 37, ed. I. Hadot, Leiden – New York – Köln 1996, p. 354,229–
230: καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν κρειττόνων ἐλλαμπομένη διὰ τὴν τελειότητα . That which is
illuminated is in this case the virtue.
69
Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 276,12–14
carnal, mortal and earthly flesh (πρὸς τὴν παχυτέραν ταύτην σάρκα
καὶ θνητὴν καὶ ἀντίτυπον)”70. The latter view is endorsed by
Eustratios, who regards the first as absurd, insofar as it would be
absurd for God to place the superior realities under the command
of the inferior ones. More importantly, Eustratios’ preferred view
is borrowed word by word from Gregory the Theologian’s ‘In
Sanctum Pascha’. Here, Gregory explains that, since man was
banished from the tree of life, paradise and God, he “was clothed
in skin, that is to say the carnal, mortal and earthly flesh ( καὶ
τοὺς δερματίνους ἀμφιέννυται χιτῶνας, ἴσως τὴν παχυτέραν σάρκα,
καὶ θνητὴν, καὶ ἀντίτυπον)”71.
The loss of the Adamic condition seems to be the background
of the whole discussion.72 Eustratios’ choice of focus, however,
lies on explaining the soul’s composition as a compound of
rational and irrational faculties and God’s providential plan
behind them, above the moral and eschatological consequences
of humankind’s present state. “It is therefore necessary”,
continues the commentator, “to scrutinize the cause of the bond
in one and the same thing between contrary elements” 73. At this
point every word must be examined carefully.
At first, Eustratios’ argument is a general one: “in fact”, he
writes, “as well as creating these things, that is to say the mortal,
material and perishable things, God, the creator of the universe,
did not deny that even those realities could participate in one
and the same goodness, disposition and order” 74. What is
relevant here is not just that the argument is reminiscent of John
of Damascus’ ‘Expositio Fidei’, where one can find the sentence
“ὁ ἀγαθὸς καὶ πανάγαθος καὶ ὑπεράγαθος θεός, ὅλος ὢν ἀγαθότης,
διὰ τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα πλοῦτον τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀγαθότητος οὐκ ἠνέσχετο
μόνον εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἤτοι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν ὑπὸ μηδενὸς
μετεχόμενον”75, but also that the lower potencies of the soul fall
within the class of lower realities. That is to say, despite their
inferior rank, they participate, to a certain extent, in the divine
goodness. “That is why”, explains Eustratios,

“he [scil. God] created the rational souls as capable of

entering in contact with the bodies, which are made out of
contrary elements, and, concerning the conjunction, he
70
Ibid., 276,14–16.
71
Gregorius Nazianzenus, In Sanctum Pascha, Patrologia Graeca, 36, 633A.
72
On Eustratios’ view on this issues, see Trizio, Neoplatonic (nt. 35), 100–101.
73
Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 276,20–21.
74
Ibid., 276,22–25: “ὁ γὰρ πάντα παραγαγὼν θεὸς διὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ ἀγαθότητα, ἐπειδὴ
καὶ τὰ θνητὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἔνυλα καὶ πεφυκότα ταῖς οὐσίαις κακύνεσθαι παρῆξεν, οὐκ
ἠνέσχετο μὴ καὶ ταῦτα μετέχειν ἀγαθότητος ὁμοῦ καὶ λόγου καὶ τάξεως”.
75
Joannes Damascenus, Expositio Fidei (nt. 57), 86.
 wanted it as capable of taking place directly, although the
bodies can neither be rendered good (ἀγαθύνεσθαι) by the
rational soul, nor receive its illumination without any
intermediary.”76

This passage is a difficult one77. However, the author clearly

suggests that the bodies receive and participate in the divine
goodness through their bond with the rational souls. Despite the
aforementioned quote from John of Damascus’ ‘Expositio Fidei’,
the whole argument hints at a Neoplatonic model of providence.
In fact, the commentator’s vocabulary can be traced back to
Proclus’ ‘Tria Opuscula’ on evil and providence which is currently
only available in the Latin translation by William of Moerbeke and
in its re-elaboration by Isaac Comnenos the Sebastocrator, who
was probably the brother of the emperor Alexius I 78. Eustratios
knew the work of Isaac. For example, the word ἀγαθύνεσθαι used
by Eustratios to describe the benefits for bodies that derive from
the link with the soul is the same one used by Proclus to remark
that divine providence makes everything better, “not only the
eternal realities, but also each of the perishable ones”79.
More importantly, Eustratios’ wording “τὰς ἐλλάμψεις αὐτῆς
[scil. the soul]” that explains the effect of the soul on the body in
terms of illumination is probably taken from another passage of
Proclus’ ‘Tria Opuscula’, not extant in Sebastocrator’s Greek
version. In fact, Moerbeke’s translation reports a passage that
concerns the different kinds of soul, stating that there are two
main types: “On the one hand, those which are substance and
are separable from the bodies; on the other, those which exist as
illumination in the bodies coming from the substantial souls”
(hee quidem substantiales et separabiles a corporibus, hee

76
Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 276,25–29: “διὰ τοῦτο
ψυχὰς λογικὰς παράγει δυναμένας συμπλέκεσθαι σώμασιν, ἃ ἐξ ἐναντίων
συντέθεινται, τὸ δὲ τῆς συμπλοκῆς δυνατὸν ἀμέσως γίνεσθαι, μὴ δυναμένων τῶν
σωμάτων ἄνευ μέσου τινὸς ἐκ τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς ἀγαθύνεσθαι καὶ τὰς ἐλλάμψεις
αὐτῆς παραδέχεσθαι”.
77
It might be that the text is corrupted. The sentence τὸ δὲ τῆς συμπλοκῆς
δυνατὸν ἀμέσως γίνεσθαι seems part of a μὲν/δὲ period which is missing in the
Heylbut text. Thus, there is an apparent contradiction between τὸ δὲ τῆς
συμπλοκῆς δυνατὸν ἀμέσως γίνεσθαι and what follows afterwards concerning the
fact that the conjunction cannot occur without any medium. Unfortunately,
neither Grosseteste’s Latin translation nor a new collation of the manuscript
used by Heylbut (Paris, Bibl. Nat., Coisl. 161) were helpful for improving the
text.
78
Cf. Proclus, Tria Opuscula (de providentia, libertate, malo), latine Guilelmo de
Moerbeka vertente et graece ex Isaaci Sebastocratoris aliorumque scriptis
collecta, ed. H Boese, Berlin 1960.
79
Proclus, De decem dubitationes circa providentiam, q.3, 17, 31,6–9 (nt. 78).
autem in corporibus illustrationes ab hiis que secundum
substantiam animabus)80. Proclus’ “in corporibus illustrationes”
refers to the embodied soul as the principle that organizes the
vital functions of the body. This matches perfectly with
Eustratios’ usage of the word ἐλλάμψεις regarding benefits
granted to the bodies by the bond with the rational souls. As a
matter of fact, in Proclus, these illustrations ( ἐλλάμψεις) are said
to come from the soul which are such “by essence” or
“substantially” (secundum substantiam).
Accordingly, then, after mentioning the ἐλλάμψεις of the
rational soul in the bodies, Eustratios makes it clear that “in fact,
the rational soul is by nature separated from the body both in its
substance and operation” (ἡ μὲν γὰρ λογικὴ ψυχὴ καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ
τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τοῦ σώματος χωρίζεσθαι πέφυκεν )81. The commentator
disagrees with Aristotle, and argues that the soul is not just the
entelechy of the body.82 On the contrary, it keeps it substantial
and operative independence from the body, and is only indirectly
responsible for vital bodily functions of the body, through certain
roots it has in the body itself. In fact, according to Eustratios the
bond between the soul and the body cannot take place without
an intermediary. In arguing this, Eustratios agrees with the
Neoplatonists in admitting that, while remaining unaffected in its
substance, the soul organizes the vital functions of the body
through certain roots or lives 83. “That is why”, continues
Eustratios, “God yoked the soul with the vegetative and sensitive
lives, so that, due to their affinity with the rational soul and the
body, they could act as mediator, for by nature they are akin to
both of them” (διὰ τοῦτο φυτικὴ ζωὴ καὶ αἰσθητικὴ συνέζευκται
ταύτῃ, μεσιτεύουσαι τῇ τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίᾳ
πρὸς ἄλληλα διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἄμφω συγγένειαν )84. The source is, in this
case, Philoponos’ polemical statement that “we admit that nature
and the irrational potencies, that are generated and, as such,
perishable, mediate between the rational soul and the body”
(μεσιτεύειν γὰρ τῇ λογικῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τῷ σώματι τήν τε φύσιν καὶ τὰς
ἀλόγους δυνάμεις γενητὰς οὔσας καὶ αὐτὰς καὶ φθαρτὰς καὶ ἡμεῖς
συγχωροῦμεν). Evidently, Eustratios expounds the general
Neoplatonic view that the lower potencies of the soul, the

80
Ibid., q. 9 et 10, 63, 102,31–33. As a matter of fact, through all his
translation of the ‘Tria Opuscula’ ‘illustratio’ is the term used by Moerbeke to
translate the Greek ‘ἔλλαμψις’.
81
Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 276,33–35.
82
Cf. Aristoteles, De anima, II,1,412b5–6.
83
On this topic see C. Steel, The Changing Self. A Study on the Soul in Later
Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus, Brussels 1978.
84
Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 276,29–31.
irrational lives, are roots that the soul itself puts forth to bond
with the body85.
The Christian undertones present in the text do not affect this
conclusion, as is clear from Eustratios’ subsequent claim that
these lives can be conceived as separate from the bodies only by
thought and “because of this those who investigated these
matters called them ‘inseparable acts’” (διὸ καὶ ἀχωρίστους
ἐντελεχείας ταύτας εἰρήκασιν οἱ περὶ ταῦτα σπουδάζοντες )86. Who
are “those who investigated these matters”? All the evidence
suggests that no Christian author is meant here. To answer the
question one might fruitfully look at what Eustratios writes
elsewhere in his commentary on book VI of the ‘Nicomachean
Ethics’, where he states: “for what comes after the rational soul
is neither immediately nature, nor the bodies, but some other
lives, which they call ‘acts’ and are inseparable from the bodies”
(ὡς καὶ μετὰ τὴν λογικὴν ψυχὴν οὐχ ἡ φύσις εὐθὺς καὶ τὰ σώματα
ἀλλὰ ζωαί τινες ἕτεραι, ἃς ἐντελεχείας φασὶν εἶναι, ἀχωρίστους οὔσας
σωμάτων)87. This passage derives from Proclus’ refutation of the
view that the soul is an act or a series of acts of the body found
in his commentary on Plato’s ‘Timaeus’. When speaking about
the link between the soul and the body, Proclus observes: “Are
we going to speak of such an intermixture, as some say, as if the
soul is present in the body through partible powers, acts and
inseparable lives? No way” (ἔτι τὴν διαπλοκὴν τοιαύτην ἀνεξόμεθα
λέγειν, οἵαν τινὲς λέγουσιν, ὡς μερισταῖς δυνάμεσι καὶ ἐντελεχείαις
καὶ ζωαῖς ἀχωρίστοις τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ σώματι παρούσης; μηδαμῶς )88.
Obviously, as known to Proclus' specialists, Proclus himself
admits the existence of such lives, but denies that the soul is
made up of just these acts89. What counts here is that Eustratios
simply takes Proclus’ “τινὲς λέγουσιν” and the related doxography
and incorporates it in his commentary, as is evidenced by the
form “φασίν” that Eustratios introduces in the reference to the
notion of inseparable lives.
85
This view can be found for example in Iamblichus, “ ἐπιστολὴ πρὸς Μακεδόνιον
περὶ εἱμαρμένης”, apud Stobaeum, Anthologium, 2,8,45, ed. O. Hense/C.
Wachsmuth, Ioannis Stobaei anthologium, vol. 2, Berlin 1884, p. 174,25–31;
Simplicius (re vera Priscianus Lydus), In libros Aristotelis De anima
commentaria, edidit M. Hayduck (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 9),
Berlin 1882, 242,4–6. Cf. Steel, The Changing (nt. 83), 52–68.
86
Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 276,37–38.
87
Ibid., 317,32–34.
88
Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, ed. E. Diehl, vol. 2, Leipzig 1904,
2,285,23–26. On this passage as a source for Eustratios see Trizio, Neoplatonic
(nt. 35), 92–93.
89
Cf. Proclus, In Platonis Parmenidem, ed. C. Steel, Procli in Platonis
Parmenidem commentaria, vol. 1, Oxford 2007 (Oxford Classical Texts),
819,24–25.
 Seemingly, the previously mentioned passage from Proclus’
‘Tria Opuscula’, which appeared to be the source of Eustratios’
reference to the ‘ἐλλάμψεις’ that the bodies receive from the
souls, states that “animatum secundum participationem
animatum quadam anima in ipso facta, quam vocet quis
entelecheiam, cui amicum sic vocare animata vincula”. Here
“entelecheiam” refers to the Aristotelian definition of the soul
and “animata vincula” to a rather Platonic view 90. Furthermore, it
is worth mentioning that in his theological writings Eustratios
refers to the Plotinian view that the soul does not join the body
directly, but only through an illumination, a mere “image” or
“reflection” (ἴνδαλμα) of the soul91. Indeed, Plotinus’ view is not
the same as Proclus’92. In general, there were different
Neoplatonic views on the bond between the soul and the body,
but Eustratios seems more interested in the common trait
between the different Neoplatonic solutions to the problem at
stake; the idea that the soul cannot bind with the body directly.
That is why, according to Eustratios, the Creator posited lower
and irrational lives that could mediate between them.
Yet, once again, Eustratios’ strategy might seem bizarre: what
does this Neoplatonic account for the link between soul and body
have to do with Islam and the debate among Byzantine and
Muslim polemicists? Indeed, Eustratios’ point, which he shares
with Niketas of Byzantium, concerns the irrational faculties of the
soul and the traditional idea that living according to the irrational
faculties renders men worse than the beasts. The evidence here,
however, suggests that this text has much more to do with the
intellectual trends of Byzantium in the 11 th and 12th century, such
as the Neoplatonic tendencies apparent in many authors of the
time, than the traditional Byzantine-Muslim theological debate93.
But there is something more. Eustratios’ way of discussing the
soul’s faculties and the reason why rational and irrational
potencies co-exist at the same time in terms of scope or aim is
similar to another text written around the time of John Italos’
90
Cf. Plato, Timaeus, 38e5.
91
Cf. Eustratios, Τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγος δεύτερος περὶ τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος , ed.
Demetrakopoulos, Ἐκκλησιαστικὴ (nt. 57), 80,23–26. The notion of ἴνδαλμα as
referred to Plotinus’ view is found in Proclus’ account of it found in his lost
commentaries on Plotinus’ Enneads and reported by Michael Psellus. Cf. L.G.
Westerink, Exzerpte aus Proklos’ Enneaden-Kommentar bei Psellos, in:
Byzantinische Zeitschrift 52 (1959), 1–10, 7.
92
Cf. Steel, The Changing (nt. 83), 69–75
93
On the 11th–12th-century readers of Proclus and the other Neoplatonists, see
G. Podskalsky, Nikolaos von Methone und die Proklosrenaissance in Byzanz, in:
Orientalia Christiana Periodica 42 (1976), 509–523; L. Benakis, Neues zur
Proklos-Tradition in: G. Boss/G. Seel (eds.), in Proclus et son influence, Zürich
1987, 247–259.
condemnation of 1082 when Eustratios, who was Italos’ former
pupil, was still a young scholar; Niketas Stethatos’ ‘Treatise on
the Soul’94.
A comparison between Stethatos’ Λόγος περὶ ψυχῆς and
Eustratios’ anti-Muslim digression demonstrates that Eustratios’
digression against Islam reproduces, in miniature, the structure
of Stethatos’ long ‘Treatise on the soul’, which heavily relies on
John of Damascus’ ‘De Fide Orthodoxa’. Like Eustratios, Stethatos
discusses the soul’s faculties and their function 95 and mentions
the four cardinal virtues96 and the effect of θυμός and ἐπιθυμία on
the rational part of the soul97. More importantly, from the very
beginning of the text, Stethatos intends to investigate “which is
the divine plan (τίς τε ὁ θεῖος σκοπός) according to which man’s
creation took place after the creation of beings from non-being”.
Like Eustratios, he mentions the fact that human being
participates in both the rational and irrational nature “through
the combination and conjunction in him of contrary elements”98.
The point here is not the originality of Stethatos’ arguments,
but his insistence on the notion of σκοπός. In fact, he discusses
the providential plan concerning the soul’s faculties in terms of
οἰκονομία and σκοπός. Interestingly, while discussing the reason
why man was also created with irrational faculties which
characterize his present state, he answers “to the end that man
suffers, and in so doing he remembers the glory and freedom
from which he fell and what sort of slavery he received instead of
this freedom”99. This is what Stethatos calls “the providential plan
concerning the soul’s faculty”100. As we have seen, Eustratios
investigates the same issue as he wonders about the providential
plan for the bond between the soul and the body. But the
solutions given by these authors to the same problem could not
have been more different. Eustratios, on the one hand, is merely
concerned about the philosophical explanation of the lower lives
of the soul as the mediators between soul and body. Stethatos,
on the other hand, openly conceives this problem within a
broader and purely eschatological perspective concerning man’s
salvation.

94
Niketas Stethatos, Λόγος περὶ ψυχῆς, ed. J. Darrouzès, Nicétas Stéthatos,
Opuscules et Lettres (Sources chrétiennes 81), Paris 1961, 64–153.
95
Ibid., 31, 96,1–16; 37, 100,1–12.
96
Ibid., 26, 86,1–88,12.
97
Ibid., 57, 118,1–12.
98
Ibid., 1, 64,11–17.
99
Ibid., 46, 110,11–12: “ἵνα πάσχῃ καὶ πάσχων ὑπομιμνῄσκηται ἧς ἐξέπεσε δόξης καὶ
ἐλευθερίας καὶ οἵαν ἀνθ’ οἵας δουλείαν ἠλλάξατο”.
100
Ibid., 47, 110,1–2.
 VI. Conclusions
Concerning Eustratius’ career as a theologian, we know that he
was involved in discussions with the Latins and the Armenians,
and he also wrote against Leo of Chalcedonia on icons 101. When
referring to the Muslim ‘heretics’ in this digression, he writes
“ὁποίοις ἔγωγε διαφόροις ὡμίλησα”102, suggesting the author’s
direct acquaintance with his opponents. Are we looking at an
unknown chapter of Eustratios’ career and, more generally, of
Byzantine-Muslim theological relations? Is Eustratios’ opponent
fictitious or does he correspond with a real defendant in a
theological debate? It is, of course, difficult to answer these
queries without producing conjectures that are difficult, if not
impossible, to prove.
Eustratios’ anti-Muslim digression takes on the appearance of
a series of Chinese boxes in which several different textual levels
fit into one another. The reader is faced with a refutation of Islam
conveying both Niketas of Byzantium’s emphasis on the
irrationality of the Muslim faith and the Neoplatonic view on the
soul’s lower lives or potencies, which, in turn, he shapes with
some Christian elements. At the same time, the text reflects a
contemporary debate on the soul, and, in general, is
representative of the inner tensions within the Byzantine
intellectual scenery concerning the value and use of pagan
philosophical source-material. It is obviously difficult to
demonstrate that Eustratios’ treatment of the soul-body problem
is directly addressed against Niketas Stethatos. Yet, the
difference between these two authors in discussing the same
issue cannot be regarded as accidental.
Thus, I believe that the question concerning Eustratius’ direct
or indirect acquaintance with Islamic theology and the Qur’an
becomes less relevant as his text seems to be entirely the
product of the Byzantine scholarship of Eustratios’ time. His
attitude seems to be ‘philosophical’ in avoiding any involvement
with theological issues as much as possible. He introduces his
digression by wondering “on what basis the intemperate, those
who do wrong, the cheater and those who perform other things
of this kind are to be judged worthy of punishment” 103.
Apparently, the argument concerns Aristotelian moral agency

101
On Eustratios’ career as theologian, see Cacouros, Eustrate de Nicée (nt. 1),
380–382.
102
Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 272,14.
103
Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 272,5–6 “διὰ τί
κολάσεως ἄξιοι κρίνονται οἱ ἀκολασταίνοντες ἢ ἀδικοῦντες ἢ ἀπατῶντες καὶ ἄλλο τι
τοιοῦτον κατεργαζόμενοι”.
since the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ discusses ‘punishment’ (κόλασις)
and ‘reward’ as the prerogative of the legislator, and in this same
work the philosopher states that the ‘bad-tempered’ ( χαλεποί)
cannot be reconciled “without vengeance or punishment” ( ἄνευ
τιμωρίας ἢ κολάσεως)104. Yet, Eustratios’ sentence hints at man’s
punishment and reward in a theological sense as well, probably
related to the final judgement,105 although this theological
allusion is left unaddressed. By the same token, Eustratios’
discussion about the soul deliberately avoids the most crucial
theological problems of the time, such as the denial of the pre-
existence of the soul and the soul’s post-mortem destiny106.
So who were the readers of this anti-Muslim digression? It
seems likely that they were the erudite ‘philologoi’, a circle of
erudite and highly ranked readers around some important
member of the imperial court107. This group was probably
composed of those who Eustratios rhetorically refers to as his
ἑταῖροι, ‘fellows’, elsewhere in his work and they might have
included the princess praised by Eustratius at the beginning of
his commentary to book VI of the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’108.
Beyond this circle, the text could have hardly been presented as
a piece of ‘official’ apologetics. Perhaps it is better seen as a
theological treatise written for courtiers, which, as a result, did
not need to strictly follow the standard path of the official
theological works. But this was also Eustratius’ final attempt at
theology. In the beginning of his commentary on book VI of the
‘Nicomachean Ethics’ he describes himself as old and affected by
all sort of diseases. Having, in all likelihood, already been
condemned for his theological writings (1117), the digression
104
Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea, IV, 6, 1126a26–28.
105
As a matter of fact the very expression “κολάσεως ἄξιοι” used by Eustratios
is found in several Patristic works as referred to a divine punishment. Cf e.g.
Maximus Confessor, Capita de caritate, I,56, ed. A. Ceresa-Gastaldo, Massimo
Confessore. Capitoli sulla carità, Roma 1963, 70.
106
This theological concern is found for example in Niketas Stethatos,
Epistulae, 4, ed. J. Darrouzès, Nicétas Stéthatos, 244,1–9; Λόγος περὶ ψυχῆς, 26,
88,11–12 (nt. 94). Obviously Stethatos’ reference to the simultaneous creation
of the soul and the body is reminiscent of the Patristic refutation of Origen’s
doctrine and the Manichean heresy.
107
Eustratios, In Aristotelis analyticorum posteriorum librum secundum
commentarium, ed. M. Hayduck, Eustratii in analyticorum posteriorum librum
secundum commentarium (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 21.1), Berlin
1907, 123,27–29. The reference to a request by fellows as the cause for the
composition of a work is rhetorical insofar as it is an antique ‘topos’, found for
instance in Galenus, De compositione medicamentorum per genera libri vii,
C.G. Kühn, Claudii Galeni opera omnia, vol. 13., Leipzig 1827, 887,17–19.
Obviously, despite being rhetorical, Eustratios’ reference to his fellows can
hardly be regarded as fictitious.
108
Eustratius, Ethica Nicomachea commentaria (nt. 1), 256,3–22
could also have been an attempt to regain a reputation for being
a reliable theologian109. Yet, as I demonstrated in the present
paper, until the very end of his career he did not give up referring
to his beloved Neoplatonists, like Proclus, even when he turned
to theological matters.

109
On Eustratios’ condemnation see P. Joannou, Eustrate de Nicée: Trois pièces
inédites de son procès (1117), in: Revue des Études Byzantines 10 (1952), 24–
34; Id., Der Nominalismus und die Menschliche Psychologie Christi: Das
Semeioma gegen Eustratios von Nikaia (1117), in: Byzantinische Zeitschrift,
47 (1954), 369–378; Le sort des évêques hérétiques réconciliés: Un discours
inédit de Nicétas de Serres contre Eustrate de Nicée, in: Byzantion 28 (1958),
1–30; J. Darrouzès, Documents inédits d’ecclésiologie byzantine, Paris 1966,
57–60; 306–309; J. Gouillard, Le Synodikon de l’Orthodoxie. Édition et
commentaire, in: Travaux et mémoires 2 (1967), 56–61; 207–210.