Paguirigan 19. Succession

CASES IN SUCCESSION
197) MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee, vs.MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO NEBREDA,
DOMINADOR NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO NEBREDA, Jr., defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-4963, January 29, 1953
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Note: This is an ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF THE OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION of five (5) parcels of land situated in
the Municipality of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four children named
Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and Faustino, surnamed Nebreda, who are all of minor age, before the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan.
FACTS:
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino
Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff-lawful wife claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in
1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and
enjoyment.
DEED OF SEPARATION: Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and her
husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in
consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to
inherit any other property that may be left by her husband upon his death. (waiver of future inheritance)
RTC: Trial court rendered decision ruling in favor of the lawful wife and ordering the defendants (common-law-wife & kids) to restore
to the plaintiff the ownership and possession of the lands in dispute.
DEFENDANTs ARGUMENT: In its appeal to the SC, defendant claimed that plaintiff has already relinquished her rights when she
expressly renounced any future property she was to inherit from her husband. It was also claimed that the provisions of the New Civil
Code, giving status and rights to natural children, should be given a retroactive effect so that the illegitimate children of Del Rosario
will be entitled to the inheritance.
ISSUE 1:
May Maria Unson validly renounce her future inheritance?
HELD 1:
NO. There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels
of lands litigated in the present case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was merely
a common-law wife of the late Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate children, her now co-defendants. It likewise
appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident
that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to
his only heir, his widow Maria Uson.
Applying Article 657 of the old Civil Code, Court ruled that the property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the
ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. The right of
ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because
of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death
(Article 657, old Civil Code).
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question because she expressly renounced to
inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into on
February 21, 1931 cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be
renounced. The decision appealed from is affirmed.
ISSUE 2:
Whether or not the illegitimate children of del Rosario are entitled to the inheritance.
HELD 2:
NO.
Defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of the late Faustino Nebreda and under
the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights, however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in June,
1950, they are given the status and rights of CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
194
natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and article 287, new Civil
Code), and because these successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect
even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code). There is
no merit in this claim
PRINCIPLE OF NON-IMPAIRMENT OF VESTED RIGHT AS AN EXCEPTION: Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed
that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have
occurred under the former legislation, BUT this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of
the same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at
once, even though the act or event which gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation,
provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin." As already stated in the early
part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her
late husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are
transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the
illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands
in dispute.
VOID DONATION: As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in state, in a gesture of pity or
compassion, agreed to assign the lands in question to the minor children for the reason that they were acquired while the deceased was
living with their mother and Maria Uson wanted to assuage somewhat the wrong she has done to them, this much can be said; apart
from the fact that this claim is disputed, we are of the opinion that said assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a DONATION OF
REAL PROPERTY, inasmuch as it involves no material consideration, and in order that it may be valid it shall be made in a public
document and must be accepted either in the same document or in a separate one (Article 633, old Civil Code). Inasmuch as this
essential formality has not been followed, it results that the alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect.
Pataueg, Nick Jr. y Alversado
Succession as a Mode of Transferring Ownership
198) ROMULO A. CORONEL, ALARICO A. CORONEL, ANNETTE A. CORONEL, ANNABELLE C. GONZALES (for
herself and on behalf of Florida C. Tupper, as attorney-in-fact), CIELITO A. CORONEL, FLORAIDA A. ALMONTE, and
CATALINA BALAIS MABANAG, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, CONCEPCION D. ALCARAZ, and
RAMONA PATRICIA ALCARAZ, assisted by GLORIA F. NOEL as attorney-in-fact, respondents.
G.R. No. 103577. October 7, 1996
MELO, J.:
Note: The petition before us has its roots in a COMPLAINT FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE to compel herein petitioners
(except the last named, Catalina Balais Mabanag) to consummate the sale of a parcel of land with its improvements located along
Roosevelt Avenue in Quezon City entered into by the parties sometime in January 1985 for the price of P1,240,000.00.
FACTS:
1st CONTRACT OF ABSOLUTE SALE: Peitioner, Romulo Coronel, et. al. being the sons and daughters of the decedent
Constancio P. Coronel (hereinafter referred to as Coronels) executed a document entitled “Receipt of Down Payment” in favor of
plaintiff Ramona Patricia Alcaraz. The document provided that for the total amount of P1,240,000.00, wherein a downpayment of
P50,000.00 was initially paid, the Coronels bind themselves to effect the transfer in their names the certificate of title of the house and
lot they inherited from their father. They also promised that upon the transfer of the TCT in their names, they will immediately execute
the deed of absolute sale of the property, and the other party Ramona will pay the balance of P1,190,000.00.
(Note: The agreement could not have been a contract to sell because the sellers herein made no express reservation of ownership or
title to the subject parcel of land. Furthermore, the circumstance which prevented the parties from entering into an absolute contract
of sale pertained to the sellers themselves (the certificate of title was CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana
Martin-Paguirigan
195
not in their names) and not the full payment of the purchase price. Under the established facts and circumstances of the case, the
Court may safely presume that, had the certificate of title been in the names of petitioners-sellers at that time, there would have been
no reason why an absolute contract of sale could not have been executed and consummated right there and then).
2nd CONTRACT OF ABSOLUTE SALE/DOUBLE SALE: The Coronels however, upon having the property registered in their
name, sold it to Catalina Mabanag for a higher price (P1,580,000.00), and cancelled and rescinded the contract with Ramona by
depositing the amount of down payment to a bank, in trust for Ramona.
THE COMPLAINT FILED: A complaint for specific performance was filed by the Concepcion’s against the Coronels.
RTC: The RTC ruled in favor of respondents Conception’s. Judgment for specific performance is hereby rendered ordering defendant-
Coronel’s to execute in favor of plaintiffs a deed of absolute sale covering that parcel of land
CA: Affirmed the same.

The petitioners claim that there could been no perfected contract on January 19, 1985 because they were then not yet the absolute
owners of the inherited property.
ISSUE 1:
Whether or not petitioners were already the owners of the inherited property when they executed the contract with respondents.
HELD 1:
Yes. Article 774 of the Civil Code defines Succession as a mode of transferring ownership as follows:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the
inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law.
Petitioners-sellers in the case at bar being the sons and daughters of the decedent Constancio P. Coronel are compulsory heirs who
were called to succession by operation of law. Thus, at the point their father drew his last breath, petitioners stepped into his shoes
insofar as the subject property is concerned, such that any rights or obligations pertaining thereto became binding and enforceable
upon them. It is expressly provided that rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
MOOTNESS OF THE ISSUE: Be it also noted that petitioners’ claim that succession may not be declared unless the creditors have
been paid is rendered moot by the fact that they were able to effect the transfer of the title to the property from the decedent’s name to
their names.
ESTOPPEL: Aside from this, petitioners are precluded from raising their supposed lack of capacity to enter into an agreement at that
time and they cannot be allowed to now take a posture contrary to that which they took when they entered into the agreement with
private respondent Ramona P. Alcaraz. The Civil Code expressly states that: Art. 1431. “Through estoppel an admission or
representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying
thereon”. Having represented themselves as the true owners of the subject property at the time of sale, petitioners CANNOT
claim now that they were not yet the absolute owners thereof at that time.
The sale of the subject parcel of land between petitioners and Ramona P. Alcaraz, is deemed perfected.
PEITIONER’s ARGUMENT: Petitioners also contend that although there was in fact a perfected contract of sale between them and
Ramona P. Alcaraz, the latter breached her reciprocal obligation when she rendered impossible the consummation thereof by going
to the United States of America, without leaving her address, telephone number, and Special Power of Attorney for which reason, so
petitioners conclude, they were correct in unilaterally rescinding the contract of sale.
ISSUE 2:
Whether or not peitioner-seller is correct in unilaterraly rescinding the contract of sale between the latter and Ramona Alcaraz, the
buyer.
HELD 2:
We do not agree with petitioners that there was a valid rescission of the contract of sale in the instant case. We note that these
supposed grounds for petitioners' rescission, are mere allegations found only in their responsive pleadings, which by express provision
of the rules, are deemed controverted even if no reply is filed by the plaintiffs (Sec. 11, Rule 6, Revised Rules of Court). The records
are absolutely bereft of any supporting evidence to CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-
Paguirigan
196
substantiate petitioners' allegations. We have stressed time and again that allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence (Ng Cho
Cio vs. Ng Diong, 110 Phil. 882 [1961]; Recaro vs. Embisan, 2 SCRA 598 [1961]. Mere allegation is not an evidence (Lagasca vs. De
Vera, 79 Phil. 376 [1947]).
Even assuming arguendo that Ramona P. Alcaraz was in the United States of America on February 6, 1985, we cannot justify
petitioner-sellers' act of unilaterally and extradicially rescinding the contract of sale, there being no express stipulation authorizing the
sellers to extarjudicially rescind the contract of sale. (cf. Dignos vs. CA, 158 SCRA 375 [1988]; Taguba vs. Vda. de Leon, 132 SCRA
722 [1984])
Moreover, petitioners are estopped from raising the alleged absence of Ramona P. Alcaraz because although the evidence on record
shows that the sale was in the name of Ramona P. Alcaraz as the buyer, the sellers had been dealing with Concepcion D. Alcaraz,
Ramona's mother, who had acted for and in behalf of her daughter, if not also in her own behalf. Indeed, the down payment was made
by Concepcion D. Alcaraz with her own personal check for and in behalf of Ramona P. Alcaraz. There is no evidence showing that
petitioners ever questioned Concepcion's authority to represent Ramona P. Alcaraz when they accepted her personal check. Neither did
they raise any objection as regards payment being effected by a third person. Accordingly, as far as petitioners are concerned, the
physical absence of Ramona P. Alcaraz is not a ground to rescind the contract of sale.
ISSUE 3:
Between the Alcaraz and Catalina Mabanag, who between them is the owner of the property subject to dispute?
HELD 3:
It belongs to Alcaraz.
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may
have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should if be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in Registry
of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the
absence thereof to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
The record of the case shows that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 25, 1985 as proof of the second contract of sale was
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City giving rise to the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of Catalina B.
Mabanag on June 5, 1985. Thus, the second paragraph of Article 1544 shall apply.
The above-cited provision on double sale presumes title or ownership to pass to the first buyer, the exceptions being: (a) when the
second buyer, in good faith, registers the sale ahead of the first buyer, and (b) should there be no inscription by either of the two
buyers, when the second buyer, in good faith, acquires possession of the property ahead of the first buyer. Unless, the second buyer
satisfies these requirements, title or ownership will not transfer to him to the prejudice of the first buyer.
In his commentaries on the Civil Code, an accepted authority on the subject, now a distinguished member of the Court, Justice Jose C.
Vitug, explains:
The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge by the first buyer of the second sale
cannot defeat the first buyer's rights except when the second buyer first registers in good faith the second sale (Olivares vs. Gonzales,
159 SCRA 33). Conversely, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register,
since knowledge taints his registration with bad faith (see also Astorga vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 58530, 26 December 1984). In
Cruz vs. Cabana (G.R. No. 56232, 22 June 1984, 129 SCRA 656), it has held that it is essential, to merit the protection of Art. 1544,
second paragraph, that the second realty buyer must act in good faith in registering his deed of sale (citing Carbonell vs. Court of
Appeals, 69 SCRA 99, Crisostomo vs. CA, G.R. No. 95843, 02 September 1992). (J. Vitug Compendium of Civil Law and
Jurisprudence, 1993 Edition, p. 604).
In a case of double sale, what finds relevance and materiality is not whether or not the second buyer was a buyer in good faith but
whether or not said second buyer registers such second sale in good faith, that is, without knowledge of any defect in the title of the
property sold.
As clearly borne out by the evidence in this CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
197
case, petitioner Mabanag could not have in good faith, registered the sale entered into on February 18, 1985 because as early as
February 22, 1985, a notice of lis pendens had been annotated on the transfer certificate of title in the names of petitioners, whereas
petitioner Mabanag registered the said sale sometime in April, 1985. At the time of registration, therefore, petitioner Mabanag knew
that the same property had already been previously sold to private respondents, or, at least, she was charged with knowledge that a
previous buyer is claiming title to the same property. Petitioner Mabanag cannot close her eyes to the defect in petitioners' title to the
property at the time of the registration of the property.
If a vendee in a double sale registers that sale after he has acquired knowledge that there was a previous sale of the same property to a
third party or that another person claims said property in a pervious sale, the registration will constitute a registration in bad faith and
will not confer upon him any right. (Salvoro vs. Tanega, 87 SCRA 349 [1978]; citing Palarca vs. Director of Land, 43 Phil. 146;
Cagaoan vs. Cagaoan, 43 Phil. 554; Fernandez vs. Mercader, 43 Phil. 581.)
Thus, the sale of the subject parcel of land between petitioners and Ramona P. Alcaraz, perfected on February 6, 1985, prior to that
between petitioners and Catalina B. Mabanag on February 18, 1985, was correctly upheld by both the courts below.
199) ISIDORO M. MERCADO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEON C. VIARDO and PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NUEVA ECIJA,
defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-14127, August 21, 1962
FACTS:
The spouses Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte were defendants in a case where a writ of execution was issued and levied upon
rights and interests the spouses have over a disputed land.
By virtue of the writ of execution as above mentioned, the sheriff sold at public acution ½ of the lots subject of controversy. This was
was bought by Leon Viardo being the highest bidder.. The spouses failed to redeem the property within the statutory period of one
year from the date of sale. A final bill of sale was issued to buyer Viardo, and a co-owner's copy of the certificate of title was likewise
issued to him.
On 28 December 1945 the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Land Registration Case acting upon a verified petition of Leon C.
Viardo, ordered the Registrar of Deeds in and for Nueva Ecija, to cancel Original Certificate of Title and to issue another in lieu
thereof in the name of and in the proportion as follows: LEONOR BELMONTE ¼ share; FELISA BELMONTE, ¼ share; PILAR
BELMONTE, ¹/8 share; LEON C. VIARDO, ¹/8 share; and INES DE GUZMAN, ¼ share
Spouses Driz and Belmonte filed an action in the CFI against the buyer-Viardo for reconveyance of the said land.
CFI (now RTC): The court dismissed, including the counterclaim of Viardo. Defendant is the legal owner of the land in question and
the right of redemption of the plaintiff of said land had already elapsed.
Not satisfied with the judgment dismissing his counter-claim, the defendant Leon C. Viardo appealed to the Court of Appeals.
CA: Pending appeal with the Court of Appeals, Bartolome Driz died. His children of age substituted him in the appeal.
The judgment of the CA, granting the prayer of Viardo, eventually became final and executory. The CFI issued a writ of execution.
Prior to the CA ruling, Belmonte sold her interest in the land to Isidoro Mercado. Mercado then filed a third-party complaint against
Belmonte. Viardo then sued Belmonte. CFI ruled that the heirs of Bartolome could not be held liable personally for judgment rendered
against them. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of Bartolome Driz can be held personally liable for the judgment rendered against their father?
HELD:
NO. The only ground of appellant for this contention is that the present owners of these lots are the children of the spouses Pilar
Belmonte and Bartolome Driz, the plaintiffs in civil case No. 161, and that, upon the death of Bartolome Driz during the pendency of
the appeal in civil case No. 161, these children were substituted as parties. This assignment of error is without merit. CIVIL LAW
REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
198
The substitution of parties was made obviously because the children of Bartolome Driz are his legal heirs and therefore could properly
represent and protect whatever interest he had in the case on appeal. But such a substitution did not and cannot have the effect of
making these substituted parties personally liable for whatever judgment might be rendered on the appeal against their deceased
father.
Article 774 of the Civil Code provides: Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to
the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by
operation of law.
Moreover, it appears from the evidence that Bartolome Driz was only a formal party to civil case No. 161, the real party in interest
being his wife Pilar Belmonte. The subject matter in litigation was Pilar Belmonte's interest in the parcel of land described in original
certificate of title No. 3484, which appears to be paraphernal property.
The trial court, therefore, correctly ruled that the remedy of Leon C. Viardo, the creditor was to proceed against the estate of
Bartolome Driz. Judgment MODIFIED.
200) Intestate of the late AGUSTIN MONTILLA, SR.; PEDRO LITONJUA, a movant-appellant, vs. AGUSTIN B.
MONTILLA, JR., administrator-appellee; CLAUDIO MONTILLA, oppositor-appellee.
G.R. No. L-4170, January 31, 1952
PARAS, C.J.:
FACTS:
In a Civil Case rendered by the CFI of Negros Occidental, Pedro L. Litonjua obtained a judgment against Claudio Montilla for the
payment of the sum of P4,000 with legal interest, plus costs amounting to P39.00 In due time, a writ of execution was issued, but no
property of Claudio Montilla was found which could be levied upon.
In order to satisfy the said judgment Pedro L. Litonjua filed in special Proceeding of the CFI of Negros Occidental, Intestate Estate of
Agustin Montilla, Sr., deceased, a motion praying that the interest, property and participation of Claudio Montilla, one of the heirs of
Agustin Montilla, Sr., in the latter's intestate estate be sold and out of the proceed the judgment debt of Claudio Montilla in favor of
Pedro L. Litonjua be paid. This motion was opposed by Claudio Montilla and by Agustin Montilla, Jr., administrator of the intestate
estate
CFI : issued an order denying the motion. Hence, this appeal to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Litonjua, as a creditor, may go after the interest of Montilla Jr. in the intestate Estate of Agustin Montilla Sr.
HELD:
NO. The creditors of the heirs of a deceased person is entitled to collect his claim out of the property which pertains by inheritance to
said heirs, ONLY AFTER all debts of the testate or intestate succession have been paid and when the net assets that are divisible
among the heirs known. The debts of the deceased must first be paid before his heirs can inherit.
A person who is not a creditor of a deceased, testate or intestate, has NO RIGHT to intervene either in the proceedings brought in
connection with the estate or in the settlement of the succession.
An execution cannot legally be levied upon the property of an intestate succession to pay the debts of the widow and heirs of the
deceased, until the credits held against the latter at the time of his death shall have been paid can the remaining property that pertains
to the said debtors heirs can be attached.
201) SOCORRO LEDESMA and ANA QUITCO LEDESMA, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. CONCHITA MCLACHLIN, ET AL.,
defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-44837, November 23, 1938
VILLA-REAL, J.:
Note: This case is an appeal taken by the defendants Conchita McLachlin, Lorenzo Quitco, Jr., Sabina Quitco, Rafael Quitco and
Marcela Quitco, from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros, making the heirs of their deceased father
solidary liable as to the CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
199
indebtedness incurred by their deceased father instituted by the plaintiff-creditor in the Intestate Estate of Eusebio, their grandfather and
not in the Intestate Estate of Quitco, their father.
FACTS:
Defendants in this case are the heirs of their deceased debtor-father Lorenzo M. Quitco.
COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP: In the year 1916, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma lived maritally with Lorenzo M. Quitco, while the
latter was still single, of which relation, lasting until the year 1921, was born a daughter who is the other plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma. In
1921, it seems hat the relation between Socorro Ledesma and Lorenzo M. Quitco came to an end.
Lorenzo M. Quitco executed a deed acknowledging the plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma as his natural daughter.
THE DEBT: On January 21, 1922, Lorenzo issued in favor of the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma a promissory note for or on behalf of his
indebtedness amounting to 2,000 w/c is to be paid on installment.
THE MARRIAGE TO ANOTHER: Subsequently, Lorenzo married Conchita McLachlin. They had four (4) children, who are the other
defendants.
DEATH: On March 9, 1930, Lorenzo M. Quitco died predeceasing his father, but, still later, that is, on December 15, 1932, his father
Eusebio Quitco also died, and as the latter left real and personal properties upon his death.
Administration proceedings of said properties were instituted in this court, the said case being known as the "Intestate of the deceased
Eusebio Quitco," civil case No. 6153 of this court.
In order to satisfy the remaining value of the PN, Socorro went after the Intestate Estate of Eusebio Quitco, to claim the indebtedness of his
debtor-deceased son Lorenzo.
ISSUE 1:
Whether or not the action for the recovery of the sum of P1,500, representing the last installment of the promisorry note has already
prescribed.
HELD 1:
YES. According to the promissory note executed by the deceased Lorenzo M. Quitco, on January 21, 1922, the last installment of P1,500
should be paid two years from the date of the execution of said promissory note, that is, on January 21, 1924. The complaint in the present
case was filed on June 26, 1934, that is, more than ten years after the expiration of the said period. The fact that the plaintiff Socorro
Ledesma filed her claim, on August 26, 1933, with the committee on claims and appraisal appointed in the intestate of Eusebio Quitco,
does not suspend the running of the prescriptive period of the judicial action for the recovery of said debt, because the claim for the unpaid
balance of the amount of the promissory note should not have been presented in the intestate of Eusebio Quitco, the said deceased not
being the one who executed the same, but in the intestate of Lorenzo M. Quitco, which should have been instituted by the said Socorro
Ledesma as provided in section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure, authorizing a creditor to institute said case through the appointment of
an administrator for the purpose of collecting his credit. More than ten years having thus elapsed from the expiration of the period for the
payment of said debt of P1,500, the action for its recovery has prescribed under section 43, No. 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure.
ISSUE 2:
Whether or not the properties inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by representation are subject to the payment of
debts and obligations of their deceased father, who died without leaving any property
HELD 2:
NO. The claim for the unpaid balance of the amount of the PN should have been presented in the intestate of Lorenzo and not in the
intestate of Eusebio, the former’s father.
RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION: While it is true that under the provisions of articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a children presents
his father or mother who died before him in the properties of his grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation does not make
the said child answerable for the obligations contracted by his deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen from the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is received with the benefit of inventory, that
is to say, the heirs only answer with the properties received from their predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
200
representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their said father from whom they did NOT
inherit anything.
The appealed judgment is reversed, and the DEFENDANTS ARE ABSOLVED from the complaint, with the costs to the appellees
202) DKC HOLDINGS CORPORATION,petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VICTOR U. BARTOLOME and REGISTER OF
DEEDS FOR METRO MANILA, DISTRICT III, respondents.
G.R. No. 118248, April 5, 2000
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Note: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal Decision of the CA entitled "DKC Holdings Corporation vs. Victor U.
Bartolome, et al.", affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC of Valenzuela, which dismissed Civil Case No. 3337-V-90 and ordered
petitioner to pay P30,000.00 as attorney's fees.
FACTS:
THE LOT IN DISPUTE: The subject of the controversy is a 14,021 square meter parcel of land located in Malinta, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila which was originally owned by private respondent Victor U. Bartolome's deceased mother, Encarnacion Bartolome, under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. B-37615 of the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District III. This lot was in front of one of the textile plants of
petitioner and, as such, was seen by the latter as a potential warehouse site.
THE CONTRACT: DKC entered into a CONTRACT OF LEASE W/ OPTION TO BUY with Encarnacion Bartolome (plaintiff
deceased mother). DKC was given the option to a.) lease or b.) lease with purchase the subject land w/c must be exercised within a period
of two (2) years counted from the signing of the contract.
1st REFUSAL TO ACCEPT PAYMENT: DKC regularly paid its dues to Encarnacion until her death. DKC coursed its payment to Victor
Bartolome, the sole heir of Encarnacion. Victor refused to accept these payments.
THE TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP OVER THE LOT: Meanwhile, Victor executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication over all the
properties of Encarnacion, including the subject lot. Accordingly, respondent Register of Deeds cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title No.
B-37615 and issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-14249 in the name of Victor Bartolome.
2nd REFUSAL TO ACCEPT PAYMENT: On March 14, 1990, petitioner served upon Victor, via registered mail, notice that it was
exercising its option to lease the property, tendering the amount of P15,000.00 as rent for the month of March. Again, Victor refused to
accept the tendered rental fee and to surrender possession of the property to petitioner.
DKC deposited its payments at China Bank. DKC filed a COMPLAINT FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND DAMAGES against
Victor, praying among others the surrender and delivery of possession of the subject land in accordance with the Contract terms.
RTC: dismissed the complaint filed by DKC, thus ruling in favor of Victor Bartolome.
CA: affirmed in toto.
BASIS OF RTC & CA: Victor is not a party thereto to the contract entered into between his deceased mother and plaintiff.
ISSUE 1:
Whether or not the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy entered into by the late Encarnacion Bartolome with petitioner was terminated
upon her death or whether it binds her sole heir, Victor, even after her demise. Stated differently, whether or not Contract of Lease with
Option to Buy entered into by the late Encarnacion Bartolome with petitioner is transmissible to his sole heir.
HELD 1:
YES. General Rule: Heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations
arising therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of law. (Art 1311 CC)
In the present case, there is neither contractual stipulation nor legal provision making the rights and obligations under the Contract
intransmissible. More importantly, the nature of the rights and obligations therein are, by their nature, transmissible. CIVIL LAW
201
The nature of intransmissible rights as explained by Arturo Tolentino, an eminent civilist, is as follows:
Among contracts which are intransmissible are those which are purely personal, either by provision of law, such as in cases of
partnerships and agency, or by the very nature of the obligations arising therefrom, such as those requiring special personal
qualifications of the obligor. It may also be stated that contracts for the payment of money debts are not transmitted to the heirs of a
party, but constitute a charge against his estate. Thus, where the client in a contract for professional services of a lawyer died, leaving
minor heirs, and the lawyer, instead of presenting his claim for professional services under the contract to the probate court,
substituted the minors as parties for his client, it was held that the contract could not be enforced against the minors; the lawyer was
limited to a recovery on the basis of quantum meruit.
In American jurisprudence, "(W)here acts stipulated in a contract require the exercise of special knowledge, genius, skill, taste, ability,
experience, judgment, discretion, integrity, or other personal qualification of one or both parties, the agreement is of a personal nature,
and terminates on the death of the party who is required to render such service."
TEST:It has also been held that a good measure for determining whether a contract terminates upon the death of one of the parties is
whether it is of such a character that it may be performed by the promissor's personal representative. Contracts to perform personal
acts which cannot be as well performed by others are discharged by the death of the promissor. Conversely, where the service or act is
of such a character that it may as well be performed by another, or where the contract, by its terms, shows that performance by others
was contemplated, death does not terminate the contract or excuse nonperformance.
NO PERSONAL ACT: In the case at bar, there is no personal act required from the late Encarnacion Bartolome. Rather, the obligation
of Encarnacion in the contract to deliver possession of the subject property to petitioner upon the exercise by the latter of its option to
lease the same may very well be performed by her heir Victor.
ISSUE 2:
Whether or not Victor Bartolome as sole heir is not a party to the contract executed by his deceased mother. The property subject of
the contract was inherited by Victor.
HELD 2:
Victor cannot insist that he is not a party to the Contract because of the clear provision of Art 1311. Being an heir of Encarnacion,
there is PRIVITY OF INTEREST between him and his deceases mother. He only succeeds to what rights his mother had and what is
valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as against him.
The subject matter of the Contract is lease, which is a property right. Hence, the death of a party DOES NOT excuse non-
performance of a contract which involves a property right, and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the personal
representatives of the deceased. Non-performance is NOT excused by the death of the party when the other party has a property
interest in the subject matter of the contract.
203) ARUEGO VS CA
254 SCRA 711
FACTS:
Jose Aruego Sr. had an amorous relationship with Luz Fabian, out of which was born Antonia and Evelyn Aruego.
A Complaint for Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of Successional Rights was filed by the two children, represented by their
mother, Fabian. Said complaint prayed for the following:
a. That Antonia and Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children of the deceased Jose;
b. That petitioners be compelled to recognize and acknowledge them as the compulsory heirs of the deceased Jose;
c. That their share and participation in the estate of Jose be determined and ordered delivered to them.
The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged “open and continuous possession of the status of illegitimate
children.”
RTC declared Antonia as illegitimate daughter of Jose but not as to Evelyn. It ordered petitioners to recognize Antonia and to deliver
to the latter her share in the estate of Jose.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration alleging loss of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court by virtue of the advent
of the Family Code. Said motion was denied. CA affirmed. CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-
Paguirigan
202
ISSUE:
WON the application of the Family Code will prejudice or impair any vested right of Antonia such that it should not be given
retroactive effect.
HELD:
YES. The action brought by Antonia for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was filed before the
advent of the Family Code must be governed by Art 285 of the Civil Code and NOT by Art 175, par.2 of the Family Code.
The Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect as its application will prejudice the vested right of Antonia. The right was vested
to her by the fact that she filed her action under the Civil Code.
The action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative father was already deceased, since
Antonia was then still a minor when it was filed – an exception to the general rule under Art 285 of the Civil Code.
204) LORENZO VS POSADAS
64 PHIL 353
Doctrine:
A transmission by inheritance is taxable at the time of the predecessor's death, notwithstanding the postponement of the actual
possession or enjoyment of the estate by the beneficiary, and the tax measured by the value of the property transmitted at that time
regardless of its appreciation or depreciation.
Facts:
It appears that on May 27, 1922, one Thomas Hanley died in Zamboanga, Zamboanga, leaving a will and considerable amount of real
and personal properties. On june 14, 1922, proceedings for the probate of his will and the settlement and distribution of his estate were
begun in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. The will was admitted to probate.
The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga considered it proper for the best interests of the estate to appoint a trustee to administer the
real properties which, under the will, were to pass to Matthew Hanley ten years after the two executors named in the will, was, on
March 8, 1924, appointed trustee. Moore took his oath of office and gave bond on March 10, 1924. He acted as trustee until February
29, 1932, when he resigned and the plaintiff herein was appointed in his stead. During the incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee,
Defendant Collector of Internal Revenue assessed against the estate of Hanley an inheritance tax together with the penalties for
delinquency in payment. Lorenzo paid the amount under protest. CIR overruled the said protest and refused to refund the same.
CFI held that the real property of Thomas Hanley, passed to his instituted heir, Matthew Hanley, from the moment of death of the
former, and that from that time, the latter became the owner thereof.
Issue:
Whether an heir succeeds immediately to all of the property of his or her deceased ancestor?
Held:
It is well-settled that inheritance taxation is governed by the statute in force at the time of the death of the decedent. The taxpayer can
not foresee and ought not to be required to guess the outcome of pending measures. The SC hold that a transmission by inheritance is
taxable at the time of the predecessor's death, notwithstanding the postponement of the actual possession or enjoyment of the estate by
the beneficiary, and the tax measured by the value of the property transmitted at that time regardless of its appreciation or
depreciation. The mere fact that the estate of the deceased was placed in trust did not remove it from the operation of our inheritance
tax laws or exempt it from the payment of the inheritance tax. The corresponding inheritance tax should have been paid to escape the
penalties of the laws. This is so for the reason already stated that the delivery of the estate to the trustee was in esse delivery of the
same estate to the cestui que trust, the beneficiary in this case. A trustee is but an instrument or agent for the cestui que trust. When
Moore accepted the trust and took possesson of the trust estate he thereby admitted that the estate belonged not to him but to his cestui
que trust.
205) CASTAÑEDA vs. ALEMANY
3 PHIL 426
Issue:
Whether or not the will of Doña Juana Moreno was duly signed by herself in the presence of three witnesses, who signed it as
witnesses in the presence of the testratrix and of each other. It was therefore executed in conformity with law.
Held:
There is nothing in the language of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure which supports the claim of the appellants that the will
must be written by the testator himself or by someone else in his presence and under his express direction. That CIVIL LAW
203
section requires (1) that the will be in writing and (2) either that the testator sign it himself or, if he does sign it, that it be signed by
some one in his presence and by his express direction. Who does the mechanical work of writing the will is a matter of indifference.
The fact, therefore, that in this case the will was typewritten in the office of the lawyer for the testratrix is of no consequence. The
English text of section 618 is very plain. The mistakes in translation found in the first Spanish edition of the code have been corrected
in the second.
(2) To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the formalities required by
law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate
of a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power
to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another
one valid. It could not in this case make any decision upon the question whether the testratrix had the power to appoint by will a
guardian for the property of her children by her first husband, or whether the person so appointed was or was not a suitable person to
discharge such trust.
All such questions must be decided in some other proceeding. The grounds on which a will may be disallowed are stated the section
634. Unless one of those grounds appears the will must be allowed. They all have to do with the personal condition of the testator at
the time of its execution and the formalities connected therewith. It follows that neither this court nor the court below has any
jurisdiction in his proceedings to pass upon the questions raised by the appellants by the assignment of error relating to the
appointment of a guardian for the children of the deceased.
It is claimed by the appellants that there was no testimony in the court below to show that the will executed by the deceased was the
same will presented to the court and concerning which this hearing was had. It is true that the evidence does not show that the
document in court was presented to the witnesses and identified by them, as should have been done. But we think that we are justified
in saying that it was assumed by all the parties during the trial in the court below that the will about which the witnesses were
testifying was the document then in court. No suggestion of any kind was then made by the counsel for the appellants that it was not
the same instrument. In the last question put to the witness Gonzales the phrase "this will" is used by the counsel for the appellants. In
their argument in that court, found on page 15 of the record, they treat the testimony of the witnesses as referring to the will probate
they were then opposing.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, eliminating therefrom, however, the clause "el cual debera ejecutarse fiel y exactamente
en todas sus partes." The costs of this instance will be charged against the appellants.
206) IN RE WILL OF RIOSA
39 PHIL 23
FACTS:
Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917. He left a will made in the month of January, 1908, in which he disposed of an estate valued at more
than P35,000. The will was duly executed in accordance with the law then in force, namely, section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The will was not executed in accordance with Act No. 2645, amendatory of said section 618, prescribing certain additional
formalities for the signing and attestation of wills, in force on and after July 1, 1916. In other words, the will was in writing, signed by
the testator, and attested and subscribed by three credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other; but was not
signed by the testator and the witnesses on the left margin of each and every page, nor did the attestation state these facts. The new
law, therefore, went into effect after the making of the will and before the death of the testator, without the testator having left a will
that conforms to the new requirements.
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:
No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same,
unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The
attestation shall state the fact that the testator signed the will, or caused it to be signed by some other person, at his express direction,
in the presence of three witnesses, and that they attested and subscribed it in his presence and in the presence of each other. But the
absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this
section provided. CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
204
Act No. 2645 has amended section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to make said section read as follows:
SEC. 618. Requisites of will. — No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or
personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect known by the testator and signed by him, or by
the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The testator or the person requested by him to write his name
and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each, and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages
shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet. The attestation shall state the number of sheets or
pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other
person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will
and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.
The Court of First Instance for the province of Albay rendered its decision on December 29, 1917 disallowing the will of Jose Riosa.
ISSUE:
The issue which this appeal presents is whether in the Philippine Islands the law existing on the date of the execution of a will, or the
law existing at the death of the testator, controls.
RULING:
The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that the validity of the execution of a will must be tested by the statutes in force at
the time of its execution and that statutes subsequently enacted have no retrospective effect. This doctrine is believed to be supported
by the weight of authority. It was the old English view; in Downs (or Downing) vs. Townsend (Ambler, 280), Lord Hardwicke is
reported to have said that "the general rule as to testaments is, that the time of the testament, and not the testator's death, is regarded."
It is also the modern view, including among other decisions one of the Supreme Court of Vermont from which State many of the
sections of the Code if Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands relating to wills are taken. (Giddings vs. Turgeon [1886], 58 Vt., 103.)
Of the numerous decisions of divergent tendencies, the opinion by the learned Justice Sharswood (Taylor vs. Mitchell [1868], 57 Pa.
St., 209) is regarded to be the best considered. In this opinion is found the following:
Retrospective laws generally if not universally work injustice, and ought to be so construed only when the mandate of the legislature
is imperative. When a testator makes a will, formally executed according to the requirements of the law existing at the time of its
execution, it would unjustly disappoint his lawful right of disposition to apply to it a rule subsequently enacted, though before his
death.
It is, of course, a general rule of statutory construction, as this court has said, that "all statutes are to be construed as having only a
prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is
necessarily implied from the language used. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the restrospective effect."
(Montilla vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos [1913], 24 Phil., 220. See also Chew Heong vs. U.S. [1884], 112 U.S., 536; U.S. vs
American Sugar Ref. Co. [1906], 202 U.S., 563.) Statute law, as found in the Civil Code, is corroborative; article 3 thereof provides
that "laws shall not have a retroactive effect, unless therein otherwise prescribed." The language of Act No. 2645 gives no indication
of retrospective effect. Such, likewise, has been the uniform tendency of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands on cases having
special application to testamentary succession. (Abello vs. Kock de Monaterio [1904], 3 Phil., 558; Timbol vs. Manalo [1906], 6 Phil.,
254; Bona vs. Briones, supra; In the Matter of the Probation of the Will of Bibiana Diquiña [1918], R. G. No. 13176, 1 concerning the
language of the Will. See also section 617, Code of Civil Procedure.)
The strongest argument against our accepting the first two rules comes out of section 634 of the Code of Civil Procedure which, in
negative terms, provides that a will shall be disallowed in either of five cases, the first being "if not executed and attested as in this Act
provided." Act No. 2645 has, of course, become part and parcel of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will in question is admittedly not
executed and attested as provided by the Code of Civil Procedure as amended. Nevertheless, it is proper to observe that the general
principle in the law of wills inserts itself even within the provisions of said section 634. Our statute announces a positive rule for the
transference of property which must be complied with as completed act at the time of the execution, so far as the act of the testator is
205
concerned, as to all testaments made subsequent to the enactment of Act No. 2645, but is not effective as to testaments made
antecedent to that date.
To answer the question with which we began this decision, we adopt as our own the second rule, particularly as established by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The will of Jose Riosa is valid.
The order of the Court of First Instance for the Province of Albay of December 29, 1917, disallowing the will of Jose Riosa, is
reversed, and the record shall be returned to the lower court with direction to admit the said will to probate, without special findings as
to costs. So ordered.
207) ENRIQUEZ VS ABADIA
95 SCRA 627
FACTS:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a document purporting to be his Last Will and
Testament. He died on January 14, 1943 and left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez,
one of the legatees, filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews, who would
inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without contradiction that in his presence and in
the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out in longhand the subject document in Spanish which the testator spoke and
understood; that he (testator) signed on the left hand margin of the front page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the
document is composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his writing at the last
page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his last will and that the said three witnesses
signed their names on the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The oppositors did not
submit any evidence.
The learned trial court found and declared the subject document to be a holographic will; that it was in the handwriting of the testator
and that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law still,
because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code
permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to the
trial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect in form, said trial court admitted to probate the subject document, as
the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the Civil Code allowing holographic wills should be applied.
HELD:
No. The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides that a person may execute a holographic will
which must be entirely written, dated and signed by the testator himself and need not be witnessed. It is a fact, however, that at the
time the subject document was executed in 1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not
permitted, and the law at the time imposed certain requirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each page
(not folio or sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses, requirements
which were not complied with in the subject document because the back pages of the first two folios of the will were not signed by
any one, not even by the testator and were not numbered, and as to the three front pages, they were signed only by the testator.
But Article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of
the law in force at the time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or statement of the weight of authority to the affect
that the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is
presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the instrument was executed. One reason in
support of the rule is that although the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the
disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in
reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act.
From the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees CIVIL LAW REVIEW I -
LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
206
under it becomes a vested right, protected under the due process clause of the constitution against a subsequent change in the statute
adding new legal requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning, when one executes a
will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he should
be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with
more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate a defective will
and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is that the Legislature cannot
validate void wills.
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and the subject document is denied probate.
208) Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator vs. ANDRE BRIMO
50 PHIL 867
FACTS:
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The
court, however, approved it.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will
which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10
of the Civil Code.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws,
inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such
laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.
There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary
dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed. lawphil.net
As to the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be
taken into consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which says:” that although by
law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and,
on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the
property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be
made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish,
otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply
with this request.”
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to
distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the condition imposed by the decedent in his will is void being contrary to law.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the Civil Code provides that
“Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or
legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide”.
Moreover, the said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to article 10 of
the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
Therefore, the condition, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said
will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.
The second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void,
being contrary to law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to
include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees. CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana
Martin-Paguirigan
207
209) BELLIS vs BELLIS
20 SCRA 358
FACTS: Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E.
Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward, George, (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry, Alexander
and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin, Walter and
Dorothy and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration
are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife,
Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or
P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by
his first and second wives in equal shares. 1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in
the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis, and pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary estate into
seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they
were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
The lower court, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and administration and
project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law,
which did not provide for legitimes.
Issue: WON the national law of Amos Bellis should apply in the said partition.
Held: YES.
In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. So
that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the
same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Rather, they argue that their
case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary
successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of
the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —Prohibitive laws concerning persons,
their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. It is evident that whatever public policy
or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law.
Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there
are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional
rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto.
210) Bugnao v. Ubag

14 PHIL 163
FACTS:
The last will and testament of Domingo Ubag was admitted for probate. It was signed by him in the presence of three subscribing and
attesting witnesses and appears upon its face to have been CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-
Paguirigan
208
duly executed in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on the making of wills. The instrument was
propounded by his widow Catalina Bugnao who is the sole beneficiary.
The order admitting the will was appealed by the appellants who are brothers and sisters of the deceased and would be entitled to
share in the distribution of his estate, if probate were denied, as it appears that the deceased left no heirs in the direct ascending or
descending line. They contend that Ubag was not of sound mind and memory, and was physically and mentally incapable of making a
will.
The appellants pointed out that one of the attesting witnesses stated that the decease sat up in bed and signed his name to the will, and
that after its execution food was given him by his wife; while the other testified that he was assisted into a sitting position, and was
given something to eat before he signed his name.
Appellants also contended that the decedent was physically incapacitated to make the will because he was then suffering from an
advanced stage of tuberculosis, such that he was too weak to stand or even sit up unaided, and that he could not speak when he had
asthma attacks.
Of the four witnesses appellant presented who tried to prove that the attesting witnesses were not present during the signing of the will
by the decedent, two of the witnesses stand to inherit from the decedent if the will were denied probate. These two witnesses, on direct
cross-examination, later admitted that they were not even in the house of the decedent at the time of the execution of the will. The
attesting witnesses, on the other hand, testified on the due execution and testamentary capacity of the decedent.
Appellants, who are siblings of the decedent, also claimed that the will was obtained by fraud considering that they were excluded
therefrom.
ISSUE:
Whether the evidence of the appellants is sufficient to prove that the testator lacked testamentary capacity at the time of the execution
of the will or that he was induced by fraud in making the same
HELD:
That the testator was mentally capable of making the will is in our opinion fully established by the testimony of the subscribing
witnesses who swore positively that, at the time of its execution, he was of sound mind and memory. It is true that their testimony
discloses the fact that he was at that time extremely ill, in an advanced stage of tuberculosis complicated with severe intermittent
attacks of asthma; that he was too sick to rise unaided from his bed; that he needed assistance even to rise himself to a sitting position;
and that during the paroxysms of asthma to which he was subject he could not speak; but all this evidence of physical weakness in no
wise establishes his mental incapacity or a lack of testamentary capacity, and indeed the evidence of the subscribing witnesses as to
the aid furnished them by the testator in preparing the will, and his clear recollection of the boundaries and physical description of the
various parcels of land set out therein, taken together with the fact that he was able to give to the person who wrote the will clear and
explicit instructions as to his desires touching the disposition of his property, is strong evidence of his testamentary capacity.
Counsel for appellant suggests that the fact that the alleged will leaves all the property of the testator to his widow, and wholly fails to
make any provision for his brothers or sisters, indicates a lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence; and because of the
inherent improbability that a man would make so unnatural and unreasonable a will, they contend that this fact indirectly corroborates
their contention that the deceased never did in fact execute the will. But when it is considered that the deceased at the time of his death
had no heirs in the ascending or descending line; that a bitter family quarrel had long separated him from his brothers and sisters, who
declined to have any relations with the testator because he and his wife were adherents of the Aglipayano Church; and that this quarrel
was so bitter that none of his brothers or sisters, although some of them lived in the vicinity, were present at the time of his death or
attended his funeral; we think the fact that the deceased desired to leave and did leave all of his property to his widow and made no
provision for his brothers and sisters, who themselves were grown men and women, by no means tends to disclose either an unsound
mind or the presence of undue influence on the part of his wife, or in any wise corroborates contestants' allegation that the will never
was executed.
For the purposes of this decision it is not necessary for us to attempt to lay down a definition of testamentary capacity which will
cover all possible cases which may present themselves, because, as will be seen from what has already been said, the testator was, at
the time of making the instrument under consideration, endowed with all the elements of mental capacity set out in the following
definition of testamentary capacity which has been frequently announced in courts of last resort in England and the United States; and
while is some cases testamentary capacity has been held to exist in the absence of CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)
Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
209
proof of some of these elements, there can be no question that, in the absence of proof of very exceptional circumstances, proof of the
existence of all these elements in sufficient to establish the existence of testamentary capacity.
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect
the property to be disposed of and the person who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend
the manner in which the instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty.
The order probating the will affirmed.
211) JULIANA BAGTAS, plaintiffs-appellee, vs. ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
22 PHIL 227
FACTS:
The testator,Pioquinto Paguio, for some 14 or 15 years prior to the time of his death suffered from a paralysis of the left side of his
body; that a few years prior to his death his hearing became impaired and that he lost the power of speech. Owing to the paralysis of
certain muscles his head fell to one side, and saliva ran from his mouth. He retained the use of his right hand, however, and was able
to write fairly well. Through the medium of signs he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to other members of his family. At
the time of the execution of his will, four testamentary witnesses were present: Agustin Paguio, Anacleto Paguio, and Pedro Paguio,
and attorney, Señor Marco, and one Florentino Ramos.The testator, wrote out on pieces of paper notes and items relating to the
disposition of his property, and these notes were in turn delivered to Señor Marco, who transcribed them and put them in form. The
witnesses testify that the pieces of paper upon which the notes were written are delivered to attorney by the testator; that the attorney
read them to the testator asking if they were his testamentary dispositions; that the testator assented each time with an affirmative
movement of his head; that after the will as a whole had been thus written by the attorney, it was read in a loud voice in the presence
of the testator and the witnesses; that Señor Marco gave the document to the testator; that the latter, after looking over it, signed it in
the presence of the four subscribing witnesses; and that they in turn signed it in the presence of the testator and each other.
The executrix and widow of the decedent, Juliana Bagtas, filed a petition to probate the will of Paguio.It was opposed by Isidro
Paguio, son of the deceased and several grandchildren by a former marriage, the latter being the children of a deceased daughter. Their
opposition is based on the ground that the will was not executed according to the formalities and requirements of the law, and further
that the testator was not in the full of enjoyment and use of his mental faculties to execute a valid will. CFI Bulacan admits the will to
probate. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: DID THE TESTATOR POSSESS THE REQUIRED MENTAL SOUNDNESS TO VALIDLY EXECUTE A WILL?
HELD: CFI AFFIRMED
Upon this point considerable evidence was adduced at the trial. One of the attesting witnesses testified that at the time of the execution
of the will the testator was in his right mind, and that although he was seriously ill, he indicated by movements of his head what his
wishes were. Another of the attesting witnesses stated that he was not able to say whether decedent had the full use of his mental
faculties or not, because he had been ill for some years, and that he (the witnesses) was not a physician. The other subscribing witness,
Pedro Paguio, testified in the lower court as a witness for the opponents. He was unable to state whether or not the will was the wish
of the testator. The only reasons he gave for his statement were the infirmity and advanced age of the testator and the fact that he was
unable to speak. The witness stated that the testator signed the will, and he verified his own signature as a subscribing witness.
Florentino Ramos, although not an attesting witness, stated that he was present when the will was executed and his testimony was
cumulative in corroboration of the manner in which the will was executed and as to the fact that the testator signed the will. This
witness also stated that he had frequently transacted matters of business for the decedent and had written letters and made inventories
of his property at his request, and that immediately before and after the execution of the will he had performed offices of his character.
He stated that the decedent was able to communicate his thoughts by writing. The testimony of this witness clearly indicates the
presence of mental capacity on the part of the testator. Among other witnesses for the opponents were two physician, Doctor Basa and
Doctor Viado. Doctor Basa testified that he had attended the testator some four or five years prior to CIVIL LAW REVIEW I -
210
his death and that the latter had suffered from a cerebral congestion from which the paralysis resulted. The following question was
propounded to Doctor Basa: Q. Referring to mental condition in which you found him the last time you attended him, do you think he
was in his right mind? A. I can not say exactly whether he was in his right mind, but I noted some mental disorder, because when I
spoke to him he did not answer me. Doctor Basa testified at more length, but the substance of his testimony is that the testator had
suffered a paralysis and that he had noticed some mental disorder. He does not say that the testator was not in his right mind at the
time of the execution of the will, nor does he give it at his opinion that he was without the necessary mental capacity to make a valid
will. He did not state in what way this mental disorder had manifested itself other than that he had noticed that the testator did not
reply to him on one occasion when he visited him. Doctor Viado, the other physician, have never seen the testator, but his answer was
in reply to a hypothetical question as to what be the mental condition of a person who was 79 years old and who had suffered from a
malady such as the testator was supposed to have had according to the testimony of Doctor Basa, whose testimony Doctor Viado had
heard. He replied and discussed at some length the symptoms and consequences of the decease from which the testator had suffered;
he read in support of his statements from a work by a German Physician, Dr. Herman Eichost. In answer, however, to a direct
question, he stated that he would be unable to certify to the mental condition of a person who was suffering from such a disease. We
do not think that the testimony of these two physicians in any way strengthens the contention of the appellants. Their testimony only
confirms the fact that the testator had been for a number of years prior to his death afflicted with paralysis, in consequence of which
his physician and mental strength was greatly impaired. Neither of them attempted to state what was the mental condition of the
testator at the time he executed the will in question. There can be no doubt that the testator's infirmities were of a very serious
character, and it is quite evident that his mind was not as active as it had been in the earlier years of his life. However, we cannot
include from this that he wanting in the necessary mental capacity to dispose of his property by will. The courts have been called upon
frequently to nullify wills executed under such circumstances, but the weight of the authority is in support if the principle that it is
only when those seeking to overthrow the will have clearly established the charge of mental incapacity that the courts will intervene to
set aside a testamentary document of this character.In this jurisdiction the presumption of law is in favor of the mental capacity of the
testator and the burden is upon the contestants of the will to prove the lack of testamentary capacity. The rule of law relating to the
presumption of mental soundness is well established, and the testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged insane by a court
of competent jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent upon the opponents to overcome this legal
presumption by proper evidence. This we think they have failed to do. There are many cases and authorities which we might cite to
show that the courts have repeatedly held that mere weakness of mind and body, induced by age and disease do not render a person
incapable of making a will. The law does not require that a person shall continue in the full enjoyment and use of his pristine physical
and mental powers in order to execute a valid will
In the above case the will was sustained. In the case at bar we might draw the same contrast as was pictured by the court in the case
just quoted. The striking change in the physical and mental vigor of the testator during the last years of his life may have led some of
those who knew him in his earlier days to entertain doubts as to his mental capacity to make a will, yet we think that the statements of
the witnesses to the execution of the will and statements of the conduct of the testator at that time all indicate that he unquestionably
had mental capacity and that he exercised it on this occasion. At the time of the execution of the will it does not appear that his
conduct was irrational in any particular. He seems to have comprehended clearly what the nature of the business was in which he was
engaged. The evidence show that the writing and execution of the will occupied a period several hours and that the testator was
present during all this time, taking an active part in all the proceedings. Again, the will in the case at bar is perfectly reasonable and its
dispositions are those of a rational person. CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
211
212) TRINIDAD NEYRA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ENCARNACION NEYRA, defendant-appellee
76 PHIL 333
FACTS:
Severo Nayra died leaving certain properties and two children, by his first marriage, named Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra,
and other children by his second marriage; That after the death of Severo Neyra, the two sisters, Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad
Neyra, had serious misunderstandings, in connection with the properties left by their deceased father.Trinidad Neyra filed a complaint
against her sister, Encarnacion Neyra, in CFI Manila, for the recovery of ½ of a property left by their deceased father, and demanding
at the same time ½ of the rents collected on the said property by the defendant Encarnacion Neyra. CFI decided in favour of Trinidad
but at the same time ordered her to pay Encarnacion the sum of P727.77, plus interests, by virtue of said counterclaims.Trinidad Neyra
appealed from the said decision, to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, dismissed the appeal on a decision dated November 10, 1942, by virtue of said agreement or compromise, Atty.
Lucio Javillonar, claiming to represent Encarnacion Neyra, who had died since November 4, 1942, and other relatives of hers, The
heirs of the deceased filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that the alleged compromise or agreement, dated November 3, 1942,
could not have been understood by Encarnacion Neyra, as she was already then at the threshold of death, and that as a matter of fact
she died the following day; and that if it had been signed at all by said Encarnacion Neyra, her thumbmark appearing on said
document must have been affixed thereto by Trinidad Neyra's attorney, against Encarnacion's will.
Pending the appeal before CA, Encarnacion became seriously ill and was advised by her religious adviser, Fr. Garcia to reconcile with
her sister. Trinidad was invited to her sister’s home and they reconciled while Encarnacion was lying in bed. In the course of their
conversation which they also talked about the properties left by their father and their litigations which had reached the Court of
Appeals, and they agreed to have the latter dismissed, on the condition that the property involved therein should be given exclusively
to Trinidad Neyra, that the latter should waive her share in the rents of said property collected by Encarnacion, and the Trinidad had
no more indebtedness to Encarnacion. Attorney Panis prepared said document of compromise as well as the new will and testament,
naming Trinidad Neyra and Eustaquio Mendoza beneficiaries therein, pursuant to Encarnacion's express instructions, and the two
documents were prepared, in duplicate, and were ready for signature, since the morning of November 3, 1942; that in the afternoon of
that day, of compromise and last will and testament to Encarnacion Neyra, slowly and in a loud voice, in the presence of Father
Teodoro Garcia, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio Aldecoa, Trinidad Neyra, and others, after which he asked her if their terms were in
accordance with her wishes, or if she wanted any change made in said documents; that Encarnacion Neyra did not suggest any change,
and asked for the pad and the two documents, and, with the help of a son of Trinidad, placed her thumbmark at the foot of each one of
the two documents, in duplicate, on her bed in the sala, in the presence of attesting witnesses, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio R.
Aldecoa and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, after which said witnesses signed at the foot of the will, in the presence of Encarnacion Neyra,
and of each other. The agreement was also signed by Trinidad Neyra, as party, and by Dr. M. B. Abad and Eustaquio Mendoza, a
protege, as witnesses.
Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz argue, that when the thumbmark of Encarnacion Neyra was affixed to
the agreement in question, dated November 3, 1942, she was sleeping on her bed in the sala; and that the attesting witnesses were not
present, as they were in the caida.
ISSUES:
1. WHETHER ENCARNACION WAS OF SOUND MIND WHEN SHE SIGNED HER WILL AND THE COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT
2. WHETHER THE WITNESSES WERE PRESENT IN THE SIGNING OF THE WILL
HELD: PETITION DENIED, CA AFFIRMED
1.It has been conclusively shown that Encarnacion Neyra died on November 4, 1942, due to a heart attack, at the age of 48, after an
illness of about two (2) years. Presentacion Blanco, in the course of her cross-examination, frankly admitted that, in the morning and
also at about 6 o'clock in he afternoon of November 3, 1942, Encarnacion Neyra talked to her that they understood each other clearly,
thus showing that the testatrix was really of sound mind, at the time of signing and execution of the agreement and will in question.
It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the mental faculties of persons suffering from Addison's disease, like the testatrix in
this case, remain CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
212
unimpaired, partly due to the fact that, on account of the sleep they enjoy, they necessarily receive the benefit of physical and mental
rest. And that like patients suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia or diabetes, they preserve their mental faculties until the moments of
their death.
Judging by the authorities above cited, the logical conclusion is that Encarnacion Neyra was of sound mind and possessed the
necessary testamentary and mental capacity, at the time of the execution of the agreement and will, dated November 3, 1942.
2.The contention that the attesting witnesses were not present, at the time Encarnacion Neyra thumbmarked the agreement and will in
question, on her bed, in the sala of the house, as they were allegedly in the caida, is untenable. It has been fully shown that said
witnesses were present, at the time of the signing and execution of the agreement and will in question, in the sala, where the testatrix
was lying on her bed. The true test is not whether they actually saw each other at the time of the signing of the documents, but whether
they might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so; and the attesting witnesses actually saw it all in this case. And the
thumbmark placed by the testatrix on the agreement and will in question is equivalent to her signature.
213) In re estate of Piraso, deceased. SIXTO ACOP, petitioner-appellant, vs. SALMING PIRASO, ET AL., opponents-
appellees.
52 PHIL 660
FACTS:
The proponent Acop appeals the judgment of the CFI Benguet, denying the probate of last will and testament of the deceased Piraso.
The will was written in English; that Piraso knew how to speak the Ilocano dialect, although imperfectly, and could make himself
understood in that dialect, and the court is of the opinion that his will should have been written in that dialect.
ISSUE: WAS THE WILL VALIDLY EXECUTED?
HELD: CFI AFFIRMED
Section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure, strictly provides that:
"No will, except as provides in the preceding section" (as to wills executed by a Spaniard or a resident of the Philippine Islands, before
the present Code of Civil Procedure went into effect), "shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same,
unless it be written in the language or dialect known by the testator,"
Nor can the presumption in favor of the will established by this court in Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476), to the effect that the
testator is presumed to know the dialect of the locality where he resides, unless there is proof to the contrary, even he invoked in
support of the probate of said document as a will, because, in the instant case, not only is it not proven that English is the language of
the City of Baguio where the deceased Piraso lived and where the will was drawn, but that the record contains positive proof that said
Piraso knew no other language than the Igorrote dialect, with a smattering of Ilocano; that is, he did not know the English language in
which then will is written. So that even if such a presumption could have been raised in this case it would have been wholly
contradicted and destroyed.
Such a result based upon solidly established facts would be the same whether or not it be technically held that said will, in order to be
valid, must be written in the Ilocano dialect; whether or not the Igorrote or Inibaloi dialect is a cultivated language and used as a
means of communication in writing, and whether or not the testator Piraso knew the Ilocano dialect well enough to understand a will
written in said dialect. The fact is, we repeat, that it is quite certain that the instrument Exhibit A was written in English which the
supposed testator Piraso did not know, and this is sufficient to invalidate said will according to the clear and positive provisions of the
law, and inevitably prevents its probate.
214) GERMAN JABONETA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. RICARDO GUSTILO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
5 PHIL 541
FACTS:
Macario Jaboneta executed under the following circumstances the document in question, which has been presented for probate as his
will:
Being in the house of Arcadio Jarandilla, in Jaro, in this province, he ordered that the document in question be written, and calling
Julio Javellana, Aniceto Jalbuena, and Isabelo Jena as witnesses, executed the said document as his will. They were all together, and
were in the room where Jaboneta was, and were present when he signed the document, Isabelo Jena signing afterwards as a witness, at
his request, and in his presence and in the presence of the other two witnesses. Aniceto Jalbuena then signed as a witness in the
presence of the testator, and in the presence of the other two CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-
Paguirigan
213
persons who signed as witnesses. At that moment Isabelo Jena, being in a hurry to leave, took his hat and left the room. As he was
leaving the house Julio Javellana took the pen in his hand and put himself in position to sign the will as a witness, but did not sign in
the presence of Isabelo Jena; but nevertheless, after Jena had left the room the said Julio Javellana signed as a witness in the presence
of the testator and of the witness Aniceto Jalbuena.
The last will and testament of Macario Jaboneta, deceased, was denied probate because the lower court was of the opinion from the
evidence adduced at the hearing that Julio Javellana, one of the witnesses, did not attach his signature thereto in the presence of
Isabelo Jena, another of the witnesses, as required by the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure..
ISSUE: EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL WITH RESPECT TO THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF WITNESSES
SIGNING THE WILL IN THE PRESENCE OF EACH OTHER
HELD: TRIAL COURT REVERSED
We can not agree with so much of the above finding of facts as holds that the signature of Javellana was not signed in the presence of
Jena, in compliance with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The fact that Jena was still in the room when he
saw Javellana moving his hand and pen in the act of affixing his signature to the will, taken together with the testimony of the
remaining witnesses which shows that Javellana did in fact there and then sign his name to the will, convinces us that the signature
was affixed in the presence of Jena. The fact that he was in the act of leaving, and that his back was turned while a portion of the name
of the witness was being written, is of no importance. He, with the other witnesses and the testator, had assembled for the purpose of
executing the testament, and were together in the same room for that purpose, and at the moment when the witness Javellana signed
the document he was actually and physically present and in such position with relation to Javellana that he could see everything which
took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction, and without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so, therefore
we are of opinion that the document was in fact signed before he finally left the room.
The purpose of a statutory requirement that the witness sign in the presence of the testator is said to be that the testator may have
ocular evidence of the identity of the instrument subscribed by the witness and himself, and the generally accepted tests of presence
are vision and mental apprehension. (See Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, vol. 30, p. 599, and cases there cited.)
In the matter of Bedell (2 Connoly (N.Y.), 328) it was held that it is sufficient if the witnesses are together for the purpose of
witnessing the execution of the will, and in a position to actually see the testator write, if they choose to do so; and there are many
cases which lay down the rule that the true test of vision is not whether the testator actually saw the witness sign, but whether he might
have seen him sign, considering his mental and physical condition and position at the time of the subscription. (Spoonemore vs.
Cables, 66 Mo., 579.)
215) EUTIQUIA AVERA, petitioner-appellee, vs. MARINO GARCIA, and JUAN RODRIGUEZ, as guardian of the minors
Cesar Garcia and Jose Garcia,objectors-appellants
42 PHIL 45
FACTS:
Eutiquia Avera instituted the probate of the will of one Esteban Garcia; contest was made by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, the
latter in the capacity of guardian for the minors Jose Garcia and Cesar Garcia. The proponent of the will introduced one of the three
attesting witnesses who testified that the will was executed with all necessary external formalities, and that the testator was at the time
in full possession of disposing faculties. Upon the latter point the witness was corroborated by the person who wrote the will at the
request of the testator. Two of the attesting witnesses were not introduced, nor was their absence accounted for by the proponent of the
will. The attorney for the opposition introduced a single witness whose testimony tended to show in a vague and indecisive manner
that at the time the will was made the testator was so debilitated as to be unable to comprehend what he was about.
The trial judge found that the testator at the time of the making of the will was of sound mind and disposing memory and that the will
had been properly executed. He accordingly admitted the will to probate.Hence this appeal
ISSUES:
1. whether a will can be admitted to probate, where opposition is made, upon the proof of a single attesting witness, without producing
or accounting for the absence of the other two;
2. whether the will in question is rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the signature of the testator and of the three attesting
witnesses are
214
written on the right margin of each page of the will instead of the left margin.
HELD: lower court affirmed
1. While it is undoubtedly true that an uncontested will bay be proved by the testimony of only one of the three attesting witnesses,
nevertheless in Cabang vs. Delfinado (34 Phil., 291), this court declared after an elaborate examination of the American and English
authorities that when a contest is instituted, all of the attesting witnesses must be examined, if alive and within reach of the process of
the court.
In the present case no explanation was made at the trial as to why all three of the attesting witnesses were not produced, but the
probable reason is found in the fact that, although the petition for the probate of this will had been pending from December 21, 1917,
until the date set for the hearing, which was April 5, 1919, no formal contest was entered until the very day set for the hearing; and it
is probable that the attorney for the proponent, believing in good faith the probate would not be contested, repaired to the court with
only one of the three attesting witnesses at hand, and upon finding that the will was contested, incautiously permitted the case to go to
proof without asking for a postponement of the trial in order that he might produce all the attesting witnesses.Although this
circumstance may explain why the three witnesses were not produced, it does not in itself supply any basis for changing the rule
expounded in the case above referred to; and were it not for a fact now to be mentioned, this court would probably be compelled to
reverse this case on the ground that the execution of the will had not been proved by a sufficient number of attesting witnesses.
2. We are of the opinion that the will in question is valid. It is true that the statute says that the testator and the instrumental witnesses
shall sign their names on the left margin of each and every page; and it is undeniable that the general doctrine is to the effect that all
statutory requirements as to the execution of wills must be fully complied with. So far as concerns the authentication of the will, and
of every part thereof, it can make no possible difference whether the names appear on the left or no the right margin, provided they are
on one or the other.
The controlling considerations on the point now before us were well stated In Re will of Abangan (40 Phil., 476, 479), where the
court, speaking through Mr. Justice Avanceña, in a case where the signatures were placed at the bottom of the page and not in the
margin, said:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution o
will and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a
way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the
law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any
other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the
testator's last will, must be disregarded.
In the case before us, where ingenuity could not suggest any possible prejudice to any person, as attendant upon the actual deviation
from the letter of the law, such deviation must be considered too trivial to invalidate the instrument.
216) IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA VILLACORTE. CELSO ICASIANO,
petitioner-appellee, vs. NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositors-appellants.
11 SCRA 423
FACTS:
A special proceeding was commenced on October 2, 1958 for the allowance and admission to probate of the original will of Josefa
Villacorte, deceased, and for the appointment of petitioner Celso Icasiano as executor thereof. Natividad Icasiano, a daughter of the
testatrix, filed her opposition. Enrique Icasiano, a son of the testatrix, also filed a manifestation adopting as his own Natividad's
opposition to the probate of the alleged will. Proponent subsequently filed a motion for the admission of an amended and
supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent left a will executed in duplicate with all the legal requirements, and that he was, on
that date, submitting the signed duplicate , which he allegedly found only on or about May 26, 1959. oppositors Natividad Icasiano de
Gomez and Enrique Icasiano filed their joint opposition to the admission of the amended and supplemental petition, but by order, the
court admitted said petition.
The evidence presented for the petitioner is to the effect that Josefa Villacorte died in the City of Manila on September 12, 1958; that
on June 2, 1956, the late Josefa Villacorte executed a last will and testament in duplicate at the house of her daughter Mrs. Felisa
Icasiano at Pedro Guevara Street, CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
215
Manila, published before and attested by three instrumental witnesses, namely: attorneys Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Jose V. Natividad, and
Mr. Vinicio B. Diy; that the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and by the said three instrumental witnesses on the same date
before attorney Jose Oyengco Ong, Notary Public in and for the City of Manila; and that the will was actually prepared by attorney
Fermin Samson, who was also present during the execution and signing of the decedent's last will and testament, together with former
Governor Emilio Rustia of Bulacan, Judge Ramon Icasiano and a little girl. Of the said three instrumental witnesses to the execution
of the decedent's last will and testament, attorneys Torres and Natividad were in the Philippines at the time of the hearing, and both
testified as to the due execution and authenticity of the said will. So did the Notary Public before whom the will was acknowledged by
the testatrix and attesting witnesses, and also attorneys Fermin Samson, who actually prepared the document. The latter also testified
upon cross examination that he prepared one original and two copies of Josefa Villacorte last will and testament at his house in
Baliuag, Bulacan, but he brought only one original and one signed copy to Manila, retaining one unsigned copy in Bulacan.
Witness Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page three (3) of the original, admits that he may have lifted two pages instead
of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page three (3) was signed in his presence.
The court issued the order admitting the will and its duplicate to probate. From this order, the oppositors appealed directly to this
Court
ISSUE: WHETHER THE WILL IS VALID IN THE ABSENCE OF A WITNESS’ SIGNATURE IN ONE PAGE
HELD: CFI AFFIRMED
On the question of law, we hold that the inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, due to the
simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate. Impossibility of
substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by
its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three
witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a
single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its
component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full
observance of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de Gil. vs. Murciano, 49 Off. Gaz. 1459, at 1479 (decision on
reconsideration) "witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it or the attestation clause".
That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is shown by his own testimony as well
as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of signatures in every page. The text of the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise evidence that no one was aware of the defect at the time.
This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory requirements, where the
purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal tenor of the law, this Court has held that a testament, with the only
page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses, but not in the left margin, could nevertheless be probated (Abangan vs. Abangan, 41
Phil. 476); and that despite the requirement for the correlative lettering of the pages of a will, the failure to make the first page either
by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429). These precedents exemplify the Court's policy to require
satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud and bid faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of the
testamentary privilege.
217) Testate estate of the late VICENTE CAGRO. JESUSA CAGRO, petitioner-appellee, vs. PELAGIO CAGRO, ET AL.,
oppositors-appellants.
92 PHIL 1033
FACTS:
This is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Samar, admitting to probate the will
allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro who died in Laoangan, Pambujan, Samar, on February 14, 1949.
The main objection insisted upon by the appellant in that the will is fatally defective, because its attestation clause is not signed by the
attesting witnesses. The signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the
page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin. CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty.
Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
216
The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin conform substantially to the law
and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause.
ISSUE: WHETHER THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WHEN THE WITNESSES’ SIGNATURES APPEAR ON THE
LEFT MARGINS BUT NOT IN THE ATTESTATION CLAUSE
HELD: CFI REVERSED
We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is correct. The attestation clause is 'a memorandum of the facts attending
the execution of the will' required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An
unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof
negatives their participation.
The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin conform substantially to the law
and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause. This is untenable, because said signatures are in compliance with the
legal mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses
at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the
absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses
218) BEATRIZ NERA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. NARCISA RIMANDO, defendant-appellant..
18 PHIL 450
FACTS:
The lower court admitted the instrument propounded therein as the last will and testament of the deceased, Pedro Rimando.The
defendant appeals the decision, contending that it one of the witnesses was not present during the signing of the will by the testator
and of the other subscribing witnesses. one of the witnesses was the outside some 8 or 10 feet away, in a small room connected by a
doorway from where the will was signed ,across which was hung a curtain which made it impossible for one in the outside room to
see the testator and the other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their signatures to the instrument.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE WILL WAS VALIDLY EXECUTED EVEN IF ONE OF THE WITNESSES WAS IN ANOTHER ROOM
DURING THE SIGNING OF THE WILL
HELD: LOWER COURT AFFIRMED
In the case just cited, on which the trial court relied, we held that:
The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they actually saw each other sign,
but whether they might have been seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical condition and
position with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each signature.
But it is especially to be noted that the position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment of the subscription of each
signature, must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so. This, of course, does not mean that the testator and
the subscribing witnesses may be held to have executed the instrument in the presence of each other if it appears that they would not
have been able to see each other sign at that moment, without changing their relative positions or existing conditions. The trial court’s
decision merely laid down the doctrine that the question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the
instrument in the presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon the paper at the
moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment existing conditions and their position with relation to each other
were such that by merely casting the eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign. To extend the doctrine further
would open the door to the possibility of all manner of fraud, substitution, and the like, and would defeat the purpose for which this
particular condition is prescribed in the code as one of the requisites in the execution of a will.
219) CANEDA VS CA
222 SCRA 781
FACTS: Testator Mateo Caballero is a widower without any children. He executed a will in the presence of three witnesses. He was
assisted by his lawyer and a notary public in the preparation of his will. Under the said will, the testator disposed of his properties to
persons without blood relation to the testator. The testator himself submitted the will to the probate court but the testator passed away
even before his petition could be heard. CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
217
The petitioners, who claimed to be the nephews and nieces of the testator, filed for the settlement of the intestate estate of Mateo. The
probate proceedings and special proceedings filed were consolidated.
Petitioners opposed the allowance of the will of Mateo on the ground that on the date stated in the will, the testator was already of
poor health and could not have executed the will. They likewise questioned the genuineness of the signature of the testator in the said
will.
The probate court allowed the will. On appeal, the petitioners contended that the Attestation Clause was fatally defective for failing to
state that the testator signed in the presence of the witnesses and the witnesses signed in the presence of the testator and of one
another.
Court of Appeals, nevertheless affirmed the probate court’s decision and held that there was substantial compliance with Art. 805.
ISSUE: Whether or not the attestation clause contained in the last will complies with the requirements of Art. 805 and 809?
HELD: In the case of ordinary or notarial wills, the attestation clause need not be written in a language or dialect known to the testator
since it does not form part of the disposition. The language used in the attestation clause likewise need not even be known to the
attesting witnesses. The last paragraph of Art. 805 merely requires that, in such a case, the Attestation Clause shall be interpreted to
said witnesses.
An Attestation Clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses certify that the instrument has been
executed before them and to the manner of the execution of the same. It is a separate memorandum of the facts surrounding the
conduct of execution of the same.
Paragraph 3 of Art. 805 requires three things to be stated in the Attestation Clause, the lack of which would result in the invalidity of
the will:
a) The number of pages
b) That the testator signed or expressly caused another to sign, the will and every page thereof in the presence of the attesting
witnesses and
c) That the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all of its pages, and that said witnesses also signed
the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The purpose of the law is to safeguard against any interpolation or omission of some of its pages, whereas the subscription of the
signatures of the testator and the attesting witnesses is made for the purpose of authentication and identification, and thus indicates
that the will is the very instrument executed by the testator and attested to by the witnesses. By attesting and subscribing to the will.
The witnesses thereby declare that due execution of the will as embodied in the Attestation Clause. The Attestation Clause provides
strong legal guaranties for the due execution of a will and to ensure the authenticity thereof. It needs to be signed only by the
witnesses and not the testator, absence of the signature of the former invalidates the will.
In the case at bar, the will was comprised of three pages, all numbered correlatively, with the left margin of each page bearing the
respective signatures of the testator and the three attesting witnesses. The testamentary dispositions were expresses in Cebuano-
Visayan dialect and were signed at the foot by the testator. The Attestation Clause was recite in English and is likewise signed at the
end of three attesting witnesses.
What is fairly apparent upon a careful reading of the Attestation Clause herein is the fact that while it recites that the testator indeed
signed the will and all its pages in the presence of three attesting witnesses and stated as well the number of pages that were used, the
same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other. What is clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. The absence of that statement is a fatal defect which must necessarily result
in the disallowance of the will.
As to the substantial compliance rule under Art. 809, while it may be true that the Attestation Clause is indeed subscribed at the end
thereof and at the left margin of each page by the three attesting witnesses, it certainly cannot be conclusively inferred therefrom that
the said witnesses affixed their respective signatures in the presence of the testator and of each other, since the presence of such
signatures only establishes the fact that it was indeed signed, but it does not prove that the attesting witnesses did subscribe to the will
in the presence of the testator and of one another. CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-
Paguirigan
218
The execution of a will is supposed to be one act so that where the testator and the witnesses sign on various days or occasions and in
various combinations, the will cannot be stamped with the imprimatur of effectivity. In a situation like in the case at bar, the defects is
not only in the form or language of the Attestation Clause but the total absence of a specific element requires by Art. 805.
In order that Art. 809 can apply, the defects must be remedied by intrinsic evidenced supplied by the will itself. In the case at bar,
proof of the acts requires to have been performed by the attesting witnesses san be supplied only by extrinsic evidence thereof.
Reversal of the judgment rendered by the CA.
220) AZNAR VS GARCIA
7 SCRA95
FACTS: Aznar (executor) filed a petition to probate the will of the deceased Edward Christensen giving to Helen Christensen 3, 600
pesos while Lucy all the remainder of his property which was opposed by Helen because it deprives her legitime as an acknowledged
natural children hence she is entitled to ½ of the estate but CFI opposes the final accounting of the executor.
ISSUE:WON Helen is entitled to ½ share of the estate?
HELD: Remand the case to Philippine court for partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides. The citizenship of the
deceases was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, hence the meaning of national law in Art 16 is the conflict of law rules in
California. However, ART 946 of California Civil Code authorizes the return of the question to the law of the testator’s domicile, The
Philippines. Therefore, the Philippine court should not refer back it to California.
Court of domicile is bound to apply its own law as directed in conflict of law rule of decedent state.
221) CRUZ VS VILLASOR
54 SCRA 31
FACTS: Respondent Manuel Lugay filed a petition for probate of the will of Valente Cruz with the CFI which was opposed by the
petitioner, Agapita Cruz on the ground that the one of the three witnesses is at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will
was supposed to have been acknowledged.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will was executed in accordance with Art. 805 and 806?
HELD:The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he
cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge before means to avow or to own as genuine, to assent
and “before” means in front or preceding in space or ahead of. Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself, he
would have to avow assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of himself.
The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements. That function would be
defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. For them he would be interested in sustaining the
validity of the will as it directly involves himself and the validity of his own act. It would place him in an inconsistent position and the
very purpose of the acknowledgement, which is to minimize fraud would be thwarted.
To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one of the attesting and acknowledging witnesses, would have the effect of
having only two attesting witnesses to the will which would be in contravention of the provisions of Art. 805 requiring at least three
credible witnesses to act as such and of Art 806 which requires that the testator and the required number of witnesses must appear
before the notary public to acknowledge the will. The result woukd be, as has been said, that only 2 witnesses appeared before the
notary public for that purpose.
222) KALAW VS RELOVA
132 SCRA 237
FACTS: The private respondent, who claims to be the sole heir of his sister who is Natividad Kalaw, filed for a petition to admit to
probate the holographic will of his sister. In such will, private respondent Gregorio was named as the sole heir of all the properties left
behind by the testatrix and was also named as the executor of the will.
The petition was opposed by Rosa, the sister of the testatrix, who claims to have been originally instituted as the sole heir. She alleged
that the CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
219
holographic will contained alterations, corrections and insertions without the proper authentication by the full signature of the testatrix
as requires by Art 814 of the Civil Code.
The court denied the petition. Rosa filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: whether or not the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions were voided by the Trial Court for lack of
authentication by the full signature of the testatrix, should be probated or not, with her as sole heir.
Held: No. ordinarily, when a number of erasures, correction made by the testator on a holographic will not be noted under his
signature, hence the will is not invalidated as a whole but as most only as respects the particular words erased or corrected.
However in this case, the holographic will in dispute had only one substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the original
heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect
must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain
valid. To state that the will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that
change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full
signature- the intention of the testator could not be ascertained. However, there is clear showing of the testator’s intention to revoke the
institution of Rosa as her sole heir.
Thus, the petition is hereby dismissed and the decision of the respondent judge is affirmed.
223) AJERO VS CA
236 SCRA 488
FACTS: Late Anne Sand left a will and named as devisees the petitioner, Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente
Sand, Meriam Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand. Fe Sand, Lisa Sand and Dr. Jose Ajero Sr and their children. Petitioner filed
for the allowance of decedent holographic will contending that the latter was of sound mind and not acting under duress. Private
Respondent opposed it that the testament body and signature was not decedents handwriting and such properties, the decedent is not
the sole owner. RTC admitted the will while CA reversed it that the will fails to meet the requirements for its validity under Art 813
and 814 because the dispositions were either unsigned and undated or signed but not dated and erasure had not been authenticated by
decedent.
ISSUE: WON the will is valid?
HELD: Yes. Art 839, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are:
(1) whether the instrument submitted is the decedent’s will
(2) whether said will was executed in accordance with formalities prescribed by law
(3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed and
(4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were voluntary acts of the decedent
Art. 813 of the new Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but
not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated.
Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.
In the case at bar, unless, the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or
on testator’s signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of
such changes.
In addition to, courts in probate are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will. However, exception, Courts are not
powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will that Cabadbaran property is in the
name of her late father John Sand which Dr Ajero question her conveyance.
224) LABRADOR VS CA
184 SCRA 170
FACTS: Testator Melencio died and left a parcel of land and his children as heirs. He allegedly executed a holographic will. The
holographic will was CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
220
submitted for probate by petitioner Sagrado, the devisee of the parcel of the land.
Jesus and Gaudencio opposed the probate of the will on the ground that the will has been extinguished or revoked by implications of
law, when the testator, before his death, sold the parcel of land to the oppositors. The said transaction was evidenced by the new TCT
issued in the name of the oppositors and the Deed of Sale executed by the testator. Meanwhile, Jesus sold the parcel of land to a 3rd
person, Sagrado sought to have the Deed of Sale annulled on the ground that it was fictitious.
LC allowed the probate of the will and declared null and void the Deed of Sale. CA reversed the judgment and disallowed the probate
of the will on the ground that it was undated.
ISSUE: WON the alleged holographic will is dated?
HELD: The Holographic is dated. It appears that the date when the testator made the will was stated in the body of the complaint, on
the 2nd page of the will
“and this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning the respective assignment of the said fish
pond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year 1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be
followed, and the one who made this writing is no other that MELECIO LABRADOR, their father.”
The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only requirements are that the date be
in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These requirements are present in the subject will.
225) PEREZ VS TOLETE
232 SCRA 722
FACTS: Dr. Jose Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan are husband and wife, who became American citizens and residents of New
York, U.S.A, with their children, Jocelynm18; Jacqueline,16; and Josephine,14.
Each executed a will also in New York, containing provisions on presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known which
one of the spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his wife).
To wit: “If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to
determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that I predeceased her, and my estate shall be administered and
distributed, in all respects, in accordance with such presumption.”
Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will and testament containing the same provisions as that
of the will of her husband.
To wit: “If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to
determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that he predeceased me, and my estate shall be administered and
distributed in all respects, in accordance with such presumption.”
Later, the entire family perished in a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in Jose’s will, filed for separate
probate proceedings of the wills. Later, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael opposed,
arguing that Salud was not an heir according to New York law. He contended that since the wills were executed in New York, New
York law should govern. He further argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers and sisters were Jose’s heirs and as such
entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to give. For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her
daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were in accordance with New York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the
law of New York, the reprobate court already issued an order, disallowing the wills. ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobate of the wills
should be allowed HELD: The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this
country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines: Art. 816. The will of an alien who is
abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes. Thus, proof that both
wills conform with the CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
221
formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative. The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance
of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the
foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to
probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and
allowance of wills. Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence. The necessity of
presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts
cannot take judicial notice of them. This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact - petitioner
has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose
F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only
impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party.
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original
will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad
should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with
Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of
the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required. The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose
F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule
76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be
addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . " WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is
SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of
the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all
pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.
226) TESTATE ESTATE OF BOHANAN
106 PHIL. 997
FACTS: C.O. Bohanan was born in Nebraska and therefore a citizen of that state. Notwithstanding his long residence in the
Philippines, he continued and remained to be a citizen of the United States and of the state of his pertinent residence to spend the rest
of his days in that state. His permanent residence or domicile in the United States depended upon his personal intent or desire, and he
selected Nevada as his homicide and therefore at the time of his death, he was a citizen of that state.
The oppositors, Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children, question the validity of the executor/testator C.O. Bohanan’s last will
and testament, claiming that they have been deprived of the legitimate that the laws of the form concede to them.
Another, is the claim of the testator's children, Edward and Mary Lydia Bohanan, who had received legacies in the amount of PHP 6,
000 each only, and, therefore, have not been given their shares in the estate which, in accordance with the laws, should be two- thirds
of the estate left by the testator.
ISSUE: WON the testamentary dispositions of the testator is valid: as to Magdalena Bohanan and second to his children?
HELD: The first issue refers to the share that the wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, should be entitled to receive. The will
has not given her any share in the estate left by the testator. It is argued that it was error for the trial court to have recognized the Reno
divorce secured by the testator from his Filipino wife Magdalena C. Bohanan, and that said divorce should be declared a nullity in this
jurisdiction. The court refused to recognize the claim of the widow on the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was
a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his former (or
divorced) wife. No right to share in the inheritance in CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-
Paguirigan
222
favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada, thus the oppositor can no longer claim portion of the estate left by the testator.
With regards the second issue, the old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944, expressly
provides that successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law of the person whose succession is in
question, thus the two-third rule is not enforceable.
Wherefore, the court finds that the testator, C.O Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen of the United States and declares that
his will and testament is fully in accordance with the laws of the State of Nevada and admits the same to probate.
The validity of Testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the testator and as it has been decided and it is not
disputed that the national law of the testator is that State of Nevada, which allows the testator to dipose his properties according to his
will, like in the case at bar.
Thus the order of the court approving the project partition made in accordance to testamentary provisions must be affirmed.
227) Testate Estate of Maloto
158 SCRA 451
FACTS:
Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the petitioners believing that no last wiil and testament was left they
iniateda an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunt's estate. While the case was still in progress, the parties executed an
agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adriana's estate. The agreement provided for the division of the estate into four equal parts
among the parties. They then presented the extrajudicial settlement agreement to the trial court for approval.
Three years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma discovered a document entitled "KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento),"
dated January 3,1940, and purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana. It
Significantly, the appellate court while finding as inconclusive the matter on whether or not the document or papers allegedly burned
by the househelp of Adriana, Guadalupe Maloto Vda. de Coral, upon instructions of the testatrix, was indeed the will, contradicted
itself and found that the will had been revoked. The respondent court stated that the presence of animus revocandi in the destruction of
the will had, nevertheless, been sufficiently proven. The appellate court based its finding on the facts that the document was not in the
two safes in Adriana's residence, by the testatrix going to the residence of Atty. Hervas to retrieve a copy of the will left in the latter's
possession, and, her seeking the services of Atty. Palma in order to have a new will drawn up.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will was revoked by Adriana.
HELD:
It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an effective revocation,
unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be
done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person but under the express direction and in the presence of the testator.
Of course, it goes without saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself.
In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone
would not suffice. "Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will and testament.
The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried
out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction. There is paucity of evidence to show
compliance with these requirements. For one, the document or papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily
established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under
the express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in
stating that they were the only ones present at the place where the stove (presumably in the kitchen) was located in which the papers
proffered as a will were burned. Nowhere in the records before us does it appear that the two witnesses, Guadalupe Vda. de Corral and
Eladio Itchon, both illiterates, were unequivocably positive that the document burned was indeed Adriana's will. Guadalupe, we think,
believed that the papers she destroyed was the will only because, according to her, Adriana told her so. Eladio, on the other hand,
obtained his information that the burned document was the will because Guadalupe told him so, thus, his testimony on this point is
double hearsay. CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
223
228) Molo vs. Molo
90 PHIL 37
FACTS:
The deceased died leaving no forced heir in the descending or ascending line, however he was survived by his weife and and his
nieces and nephews who were the legitimate children of his deceased brother, during his lifetime he executed two wills, one executed
at 1918 and the subsequent one in 1939. The latter will contains a clause which revokes the will in 1918. The said will containing the
clause revoking the previous will, however, was disallowed.
ISSUE:
Whether the previous will was annulled even if the subsequent will, with revoking clause, was disallowed.
HELD:
A subsequent will containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was not executed in
conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to making of wills, cannot produce the effect of
annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void
Execution of Wills
229) Tolentino v Francisco
57 PHIL 749
FACTS:
Gregorio Tolentino had been married to Benita Francisco, but she predeceased him years ago. The pair had no children with a number
of his wife’s kin as survivors. However, strained relations, resulting from grave disagreements, developed between Tolentino and the
Francisco relations and he determined to make a new will in which, apart from certain legacies in favor of a few individuals, the bulk
of his estate, worth probably about P150,000, should be given to Adelaida Tolentino de Concepcion, as his universal heir.
To this end, Tolentino went to the office of Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, an attorney and informed him that he wanted to make a new
will and desired Repide to draft it for him. After the necessary preliminary inquiries had been made, the attorney suggested to him to
bring a copy of the will previously made which was reduced to itsproper form. As the instrument was taking shape Tolentino stated
that he wanted the will to be signed in Repide's office, with the latter as one of the attesting witnesses. For the other two witnesses
Tolentino requested that two attorneys attached to the office, namely, Leoncio B. Monzon and Ramon L. Sunico, should serve.
When the instrument had been reduced to proper form, changes were made by Tolentino with regards to the attesting witnesses.
Pursuant to these instructions Repide made the desired changes in the will and just before twelve o'clock noon of the next day
Tolentino returned to Repide's office and received from him the criminal document with a carbon copy thereof. Repide advised the
testator that the copy should be executed with the same formality as the original in order that the intention of the testator should not be
frustrated by the possible loss or destruction of the original.lawphil.netIt is a custom in the office of Repide not to number the
consecutive pages of a will, on the typewriting machine, the duty of numbering the pages being left to the testator himself.
Tolentino thereupon drew two documents from his pocket saving that it was his last will and testament, done in duplicate, and he
proceeded to read the original to the witnesses. After this had been completed, Legarda himself took the will in hand and read it
himself. He then returned it to Tolentino, who thereupon proceeded, with pen and ink, to number the pages of the will thus, "Pagina
Primera", "Pagina Segunda", etc. He then paged the duplicate copy of the will in the same way. He next proceeded to sign the original
will and each of its pages by writing his name "G. Tolentino" in the proper places. Following this, each of the three witnesses signed
their own respective names at the end of the will, at the end of the attesting clause, and in the left margin of each page of the
instrument. During this ceremony all of the persons concerned in the act of attestation were present together, and all fully advertent to
the solemnity that engaged their attention.
After preliminary explanations had been made, Tolentino requested Repide to keep the will overnight in his safe, In this connection
the testator stated that he did not wish to take the will to his home, as he knew that his relatives were watching him and would take
advantage of any carelessness on his part to pry into his papers.
On the morning of November 9, 1930, Gregorio Tolentino was found dead in his bed, having perished by the hands of an assassin.
ISSUE:
Whether the will was executed and attested in the manner required by law CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty.
224
HELD:
The peculiarity of this case is that, upon the trial of this proceeding for the probate of the will of the decedent, two of the attesting
witnesses, Jose Syyap and Vergel de Dios, repudiated their participation in the execution of the will at the time and place stated; and
while admitting the genuineness of their signatures to the will, pretended that they had severally signed the instrument, at the request
of the testator, at different places. Thus Syyap, testifying as a witness, claimed that the testator brought the will to Syyap's house on
the afternoon of October 21 a time, be it remembered, when the will had not yet left the hands of the draftsman and upon learning that
Syyap could not be present at the time and place then being arranged for the execution of the will, he requested Syyap, as a mere
matter of complaisance, to sign the will then, which Syyap did. Vergel de Dios has another story to tell of isolated action, claiming that
he signed the will in the evening of October 22 at the Hospital of San Juan de Dios in Intramuros.
We are unable to give any credence to the testimony of these two witnesses on this point, the same being an evident fabrication
designed for the purpose of defeating the will. In the first place, the affirmative proof showing that the will was properly executed is
adequate, consistent, and convincing, consisting of the testimony of the third attesting witness, Vicente Legarda, corroborated by
Miguel Legarda and Urbana Rivera, two disinterested individuals, employees of La Previsora Filipina, who were present in Legarda's
office when the will was executed and who lent a discerning attention to what was being done. In the second place, each of the seven
signatures affixed to his will by Syyap appear to the natural eye to have been made by using the same pen and ink that was used by
Legarda in signing the will. The same is also probably true of the seven signatures made by Vergel de Dios. This could hardly have
happened if the signatures of Syyap and Vergel de Dios had been affixed, as they now pretend, at different times and places. In the
third place, Both Syyap and Vergel de Dios are impeached by proof of contradictory statements made by them on different occasions
prior to their appearance as witnesses in this case. In this connection we note that, after the murder of Gregorio Tolentino, and while
the police authorities were investigating his death, Nemesio Alferez, a detective, sent for Syyap and questioned him concerning his
relations with the deceased. Upon this occasion Syyap stated that Gregorio Tolentino had lately made a will, that it had been executed
at the office of La Previsora Filipina under the circumstances already stated, and that he himself had served as one of the attesting
witnesses.
These circumstances and other incidents revealed in the proof leave no room for doubt in our mind that Syyap and Vergel de Dios
have entered into a conspiracy between themselves, and in concert with the opponents, to defeat the will of Gregorio Tolentino
although they are well aware that said will was in all respects properly executed; and the trial court, in our opinion, committed no
error in admitting the will to probate.
When a will is contested it is the duty of the proponent to call all of the attesting witnesses, if available but the validity of the will in
no wise depends upon the united support of the will by all of those witnesses. A will may be admitted to probate notwithstanding the
fact that one or more of the subscribing witnesses do not unite with the other, or others, in proving all the facts upon which the validity
of the will rests. (Fernandez vs. Tantoco, 49 Phil., 380.) It is sufficient if the court is satisfied from all the proof that the will was
executed and attested in the manner required by law. In this case we feel well assured that the contested will was properly executed
and the order admitting to it probate was entirely proper.
SUCCESSION – Probate of Wills
230) Mercado vs. Santos
57 Phil. 749
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercado applied for the probate of the will of his deceased wife. There was no opposition to it. The court then admitted the
will to probate. After more than a year, the relatives of his wife filed a complaint against Mercado on the ground of falsifaction or
forgery of the will probated. A motion to quash was filed by Mercado stating that the will has already been admitted to probate. It is
therefore conclusively presumed to be genuine.
RTC: For respondent. Motion denied.
CA: Affirms RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the will is can be presumed to be genuine?
HELD: Yes, it is.
A criminal action for falsification of will, will not lie after its admission to probate. This is the effect of the probate of a will. CIVIL
LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
225
The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem. The provision of notice by publication as a prerequisite to the
allowance of a will is constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon
everybody, even against the State.
The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction thereof is considered as conclusive as to its due execution and validity,
and is also conclusive that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he executed the will, and was not acting
under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, and that the will is genuine and not a forgery.
The will in question having been probated by a competent court, the law will not admit any proof to overthrow the legal presumption
that it is not a forgery.
A criminal action will not lie against a forger of a will which had been duly admitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction in
view of the provisions of sections 306, 333, and 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
231) Testate Estate of Biascan vs. Biascan
347 SCRA 621
FACTS:
In 1975, respondent Rosalina Biascon filed a petition for her appointment as the administratrix of the intestate estate of Florencio
Biascan and Timotea Zulueta. The court issued an order appointing her as the regular administrator. Maria Biascon was the legal wife
of Florencio and filed an opposition to the appointment. On April 2, 1981, the court issued an order resolving that Maria as legal wife,
and Rosalina and her brother as the natural children of Florencio, are the legal heirs of the deceased and upheld the appointment of
Rosalina as the administratrix. On June 6, 1981 or 58 days after the receipt of the Order, Maria filed her MFR. On November 15,
1981, the fourth floor of the City Hall of Manila was completely gutted by fire. The records of the settlement proceedings were among
those lost in the fire. Thus, on January 2, 1985, private respondent filed a Petition for Reconstitution of the said records. Due to the
delay caused by the fire and the reconstitution of the records, it was only on April 30, 1985 that the RTC issued an Order denying
Maria’s June 6, 1981 MFR. Sometime thereafter, Maria died and her lawyer Atty. Lopez was appointed as interim special
administrator. Notice of this April 30, 1985 Order allegedly came to the attention of Maria’s lawyer only on August 21, 1996. Her
lawyers thereafter filed a Notice of Appeal and Record of Appeal on September 20, 1996. The TC issued an order denying the appeal
on the ground that it was filed out of time. A petition for certiorari was filed with the CA which was likewise denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the appeal was filed on time?
HELD:
No, it was not.
Section 1. Rule 109 of the RROC enumerates the orders and judgments in special proceedings which may be the subject of an appeal.
An appeal is allowed in these cases as these orders, decrees or judgments issued by a court in a special proceeding constitute a final
determination of the rights of the parties so appealing. The ruling of the TC that Maria, Rosalina and her brother were entitled to
participate in the settlement proceedings falls squarely under paragraph b of section 1, Rule 109 as the proper subject of appeal. By so
ruling, the TC has effectively determined that the three persons are the lawful heirs of the deceased. As such, the same may be the
proper subject of an appeal.
Similarly, the ruling of the TC denying Maria’s motion to set aside the order appointing Rosalina as the regular administratrix of the
estate of Florencio Biascan is likewise a proper subject of appeal. The order of the TC appointing a regular administrator of a deceased
person’s estate is a final determination of the rights of the parties thereunder and is thus appealable. This is in contrast with an order
appointing a special administrator which is appointed only for a limited time and for a specific purpose. Because of the temporary
character and special character of this appointment, the Rules deem it not advisable for any party to appeal from said temporary
appointment.
It is thus clear that the Order dated April 2, 1981 may be the proper subject of an appeal in a special proceeding. In special
proceedings, the period of appeal from any decision or final order rendered therein is thirty days. The appeal period may only be
interrupted by the filing of a motion for a new trial or reconsideration. Once the appeal period expires without an appeal or a MFR or
new trial being perfected, the decision or order becomes final. Considering that this was only on June 6, 1981 or a full 58 days after
the receipt of the order that the MFR was filed, it is clear that the same was filed out of time. There was no more appeal period to
interrupt as the Order had already become final.
It is well settled that judgments or orders become final and executory by operation of law and not by CIVIL LAW REVIEW I -
226
judicial declaration. Thus, finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is
perfected or MFR or new trial is filed. The TC need not even pronounce the finality of the order as the same becomes final by
operation of law. Being final and executory, the TC can no longer alter, modify or reverse the questioned order. The subsequent filing
of the MFR cannot disturb the finality of the judgment order.
The Order of the trial court denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the April 2, 1981 Order was issued on April 30, 1985.
Allegedly, petitioner was only made aware of this April 30, 1985 Order on August 21, 1996 when it inquired from the trial court about
the status of the case. Giving petitioner the benefit of the doubt that it had indeed received notice of the order denying its motion for
reconsideration on August 21, 1996, it follows that petitioner only had until the following day or on August 22, 1996 within which to
perfect the appeal.
At this point, we note with disapproval petitioner’s attempt to pass off its Notice of Appeal as having been filed on August 22, 1996.
In all its pleadings before this Court and the Court of Appeals, petitioner insists that its Notice of Appeal was filed the day after it
secured the August 21, 1996 Certification from the trial court. While the Notice of Appeal was ostensibly dated August 22, 1996, it is
clear from the stamp of the trial court that the same was received only on September 20, 1996. Moreover, in the Order dated October
22, 1996 of the trial court denying petitioner’s appeal, the court clearly stated that the Notice of Appeal with accompanying Record on
Appeal was filed on September 20, 1996.
Considering that it is clear from the records that petitioner’s notice of appeal was filed on September 20, 1996, the same was clearly
filed out of time as it only had until August 22, 1996 within which to file the said pleading.
232) Nuguid vs. Nuguid,
17 SCRA 449
FACTS:
Rosario Nuguid died and was survived by her parents, brothers and sisters. Petitioner Remedios, her sister, filed for the probate of her
holographic will a year after her death. Remedios was instituted as the universal heir in the said will. The parents opposed this,
claiming that they were preterited by the institution of Remedios as the sole heir thereby invalidating the will. The trial court declared
the will to be a complete nullity and therefore creating an intestacy of the estate of Rosario.
ISSUE:
Whether the parents were preterited creating intestacy of Rosario’s estate?
HELD:
Yes, they were.
In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic
validity of the will; the due execution thereof; the testatrix’s testamentary capacity; and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law. In the case at bar however, a peculiar situation exists. The parties shunned aside the question of whether
or not the will should be allowed probate. They questioned the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the court
has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. But if the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be
gained. In the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, the probability exists that the case will come up once again before the
court on the same issue of the instrinsic validity of or nullity of the will. The result would be a waste of time, effort, expense, plus
added anxiety. These practical considerations induce the SC to meet head-on the issue of the nullity of the provisions of the will in
question, there being a justiciable controversy.
The deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line, her parents. Her will
does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance
is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition. There is no other provision in the will except the institution of
Remedios as the universal heir. Such institution by itself is null and void and, intestate succession ensues. The disputed order declares
the will in question ‘a complete nullity’. Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies ‘the institution of the heir’. The will
however, provides for the institution of the petitioner as the universal heir and nothing more. The result is the same. The entire will is
null.
Preterition ‘consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned
therein or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.’ Disinheritance in turn ‘is a
testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.’ The effects flowing
from CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
227
preterition are totally different form those of disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 ‘shall annul the institution of an heir. This
annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective
disinheritance under Article 918, such disinheritance shall also annul the institution of the heirs but only insofar as it may prejudice the
person disinherited, which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. In disinheritance, the nullity is limited to that portion of
the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.
233) Caniza vs. CA
268 SCRA 641
FACTS:
Caniza was 94 years old and was declared incompetent because of her advanced years. She was represented in this case by
Evangelista, her guardian. Caniza previously allowed the spouses and their relatives to occupy the house without paying any rent out
of the goodness of her heart. However, she needed money for her support, maintenance and medical treatment. A demand by
Evangelista was made on the Estrada’s to vacate the house but refused contending that they would inherit the house as stated in
Caniza’s holographic will. Evangelista then moved to eject the spouses from the premises. The MetTC ruled in favor of Caniza which
was reversed by the RTC on the ground that the "action by which the issue of defendants' possession should be resolved is accion
publiciana, the obtaining factual and legal situation ** demanding adjudication by such plenary action for recovery of possession
cognizable in the first instance by the Regional Trial Court." This was affirmed by the CA. Caniza died during the pendency of the
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the Estrada’s may rightfully claim the property through the holographic will?
HELD:
No, they cannot.
It is settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, it suffices to allege that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from
the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, and a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or
the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. The only issue that could legitimately be
raised under the circumstances was that involving the Estrada’s possession by tolerance, i.e., possession de facto, not de jure. It is
therefore incorrect to postulate that the proper remedy for Cañiza is not ejectment but accion publiciana, a plenary action in the RTC
or an action that is one for recovery of the right to possession de jure.
The Estrada’s possession of the house stemmed from the owner’s express permission. That permission was subsequently withdrawn
by the owner, as was her right; and it is immaterial that the withdrawal was made through her judicial guardian, the latter being
indisputably clothed with authority to do so. Nor is it of any consequence that Caniza executed a will bequeathing the disputed
property to the Estradas, that circumstance did not give them the right to stay on the premises after demand to vacate on the theory
that they might in the future become owners thereof. The Estrada’s right of ownership being at best inchoate, no transfer of ownership
being possible unless and until the will is duly probated. Prior to the probate of the will, any assertion of possession by them would be
premature and inefficacious.
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate,
it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court." An owner's intention to confer title in the
future to persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the meantime for
any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case there was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is apparent: she
needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the
guardian or the ward, the rule affords no advantage to the Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as niece of Carmen Cañiza, is one of the
latter's only two (2) surviving heirs, the other being Cañiza's nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion and by Resolution of this
Court of June 20, 1994, they were in fact substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased, in accordance with Section
17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-
Paguirigan
228
the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Cañiza's
demise did not extinguish the desahucio suit instituted by her through her guardian. That action, not being a purely personal one,
survived her death; her heirs have taken her place and now represent her interests in the appeal at bar.
234) PECSON VS. AGUSTIN CORONEL
G.R. No. L-20374, 11 October 1923
FACTS:
Decedent Dolores Coronel died testate and without issue. She appointed as sole heir her nephew, Lorenzo Pecson, wife of her niece
Angela Coronel, for the services he rendered for the decedent. He was also appointed as executor thereof, and in his absence,
decedent’s grandson Vincent Pecson. As she cannot read and write, he asked Vicente Francisco to write the will and sign it in her
behalf. In the attestation clause, it stated that the will was signed by “each of (them) us signed these presents in the presence of others
and of the testatrix...”
Decedent’s relatives opposed the probate of the will, contending that the will could not be valid because first, it is not natural in our
culture to exclude a person’s blood relatives from her vast estate and hence at most, the decedent merely intended to appoint Lorenzo
as executor; and second, that the attestation clause failed to comply with the provisions of Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
as amended by Act No. 2645.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the relatives’ exclusion in the will amounts to preterition?
2. Whether or not the defect in the attestation clause invalidates the will?
RULINGS:
First issue: Relatives’ Exclusion from the Will
Their exclusion in the will does not amount to preterition. The liberty to dispose of one’s estate by will when there are no forced heirs
is rendered sacred by the Civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1889 which provides: Any person who has no forced heirs may
dispose by will all of his property or any part of it in favour of any person qualified to acquire it. The preference given to Lorenzo is
not purely arbitrary, nor a caprice or whim of the moment as there was sufficient proof that Lorenzo indeed rendered services for the
decedent even prior to 1914, and was the decedent’s administrator and manager of her affairs in the last years of her life.
Second issue: Defect in the Attestation Clause
Section 618 of the Civil Code of Procedure provides that: The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, uponwhich
the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will in each and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write
his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages
thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.” However, the attestation clause of the decedent’s will stated that it was
signed in the “presence of others.” In resolving the same, the Court relied on in its decision in In Re Will of Abangan whereby it ruled
that the object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution
of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. Hence, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a
way as to attain these primordial ends. However, one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and
curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation
whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisite entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator’s will, must be
disregarded. The phrase is then construed to mean as “of the other” and is a mere grammatical error. Grammatical or clerical errors are
not usually considered of vital importance when the intention is manifest in the will.
235) ACAIN VS. IAC
G.R. No. 72706, 27 October 1987
FACTS:
Nemesio Acain died testate, leaving the following as heirs: his wife Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain, his legally adopted daughter
Virginia Fernandez, and his nephews and nieces from his brother Segundo Acain. In his will, he bequeathed all of his property to
Segundo, and in case the latter predecease him, all his property will pass on to Segundo’s children. As Segundo predeceased Nemesio,
the former’s children moved for the probate of the will. Nemesio’s widow and daughter filed a motion to dismiss, contending that they
were preterited. The trial court denied their motion. On appeal, the IAC reversed and ordered the trial court to dismiss the probate of
the will. CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
229
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rosa and Virginia had been preterited?
RULING:
Yes. Article 854 of the Civil Code provides that: The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of the heir; but
the devisese and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. If the omitted compulsory heir should die before the
testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned
therein , or even though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Preterition annuls the institution
of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance, except those legacies and devices, unless it impairs
the legitime of the heirs.
In the case of Rosa, preterition shall not apply as she does not ascend nor descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir.
There is no preterition because she is not in the direct line. However, in the case of Virginia, preterition applies because as a legal
adoptee, she is vested with the same rights and duties as that of a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adoptee the legal heir
of the adopter.
The universal institution of the petitioner and his siblings to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will
because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs-without any other testamentary disposition in the will-amounts to a
declaration that nothing at all was written.
236) NERI VS. AKUTIN
G.R. No. L-47799, 13 June 1941
FACTS:
Agripino Neri died on 12 December 1931 leaving 6 children from his first wife, and 5 children from his second wife Ignacia Akutin.
In his will, he stated that his children by the first marriage shall have no longer any participation in his estate as they had already
received their corresponding shares during his lifetime. However, during the hearing for declaration of heirs, the court found that
contrary to what Agripino declared in his will, that all his children by the first and second marriages are intestate heirs of the deceased
without prejudice to one-half of the improvements introduced in the properties during the existence of the last conjugal partnership
which should belong to Ignacia Akutin. The Court of Appeals modified the decision and ruled that the will was valid with respect to
the two-thirds part which the testator can freely dispose of.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the omission of the children by the first wife annuls the institution of the children by the second wife as sole heirs of
the testator?
RULING:
Yes. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. In this case, while the
children of the first marriage were mentioned in the will, they were not accorded any share in the hereditary property, without
expressly being disinherited. The omission of a forced heir or anyone of them, whether voluntary or involuntary, is a preterition if the
purpose to disinherit is not expressly made or is not at least manifest. Except as to “legacies and devises” which shall remain valid
insofar as they are not officious, preterition avoids the institution of heirs and gives rise to intestate succession. The will in this case,
there being no legacies or devises, is void.
237) VIADO NON VS. CA
G.R. No. 137287, 15 February 2000
FACTS:
Spouses Julian and Virginia Viado owned, among others, a house and lot pertained to as the Isarog property. Virginia died on 20
October 1982, followed by Julian 3 years later. Left as heirs were their children namely: Rebecca Viado Non, Delia Viado, Nilo Viado,
and Leah Viado Jacobs. Both Nilo and Leah died on 22 April 1987. Nilo left as heirs his wife Alicia and their 2 children.
The children of spouses Viado lived in the Isarog property together with Nilo’s widow and children. However, a dispute arose when
Rebecca Viado Non asked that the property be divided equally between the 2 families to make room for their growing children. Nilo’s
wife and children claimed absolute ownership over the property evidence by a deed of donation executed by Julian in favour of Nilo,
covering his ½ conjugal share, and CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
230
a deed of extrajudicial partition settlement in which Julian, Leah, and Rebecca waived in favour of Nilo all their interests and rights
over their share of the property inherited from Virginia. Both documents were registered 5 years after its execution, and a new TCT is
issued by the Register of Deeds in Nilo’s favor.
Petitioner Rebecca contends that Delia Viado, their retardate sister, was not part of the extrajudicial settlement, and hence amounts to
preterition which should invalidate the settlement. Both the trial court and CA ruled in favor of Nilo’s wife and children. Hence this
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Delia’s exclusion from the extrajudicial settlement amounts to preterition?
RULING:
Yes. However, in the absence of bad faith and fraud, Article 1104 of the Civil Code must apply which, in essence, provides that where
the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value
of the share pertaining to her.
238) PEREZ VS. GARCHITORENA
G.R. No. L-31703, 13 February 1930
FACTS:
Ana Maria Alcantara died testate. The pertinent provisions of her will are as follows:
NINTH. Being single and without forced heir, to show my gratitude to my niece-in-law, Carmen Garchitorena, of age, married to my
nephew, Joaquin Perez Alcantara xxx as my sole and universal heiress to the remainder of my estate xxx
TENTH. Should my heiress Carmen Garchitorena dies, I order that my whole estate shall passu unimpaired to her surviving children;
and should any of these die, his share shall serve to increase the portions of his surviving brothers (and sisters) by accretion, xxx the
estate shall never pass out of the hands of my heiress or her children insofar as it is legally permissible.
Among Ana Maria’s properties is a deposit amounting to Php 21,428.23 with La Urbana. Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for
Php 7, 872.23 against Joaquin, Carmen’s husband. He attached the La Urbana deposit to satisfy his claims. Carmen secured an
injunction restraining the execution.
Garchitorena contends that the same can be levied because Carmen is a universal heiress. Carmen contends that the deposit belongs to
Carmen’s children as fideicommissary heirs of Ana Maria.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the instant case is a fideicommissary substitution?
RULING: Yes. Manresa provides 3 requisites for fideicommissary:
1. First heir called primarily to the enjoyment of the estate;
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve and transmit to a 3rd person the whole or a part of the estate;
3. Second heir.
Applying the foregoing to the case, Carmen was called to the enjoyment of the estate according to the 9th clause of the will. Clause
10th which provides that the “whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her (Carmen’s) surviving children,” thus, instead of leaving
Carmen at liberty to dispose of the estate by will, or by living the law to take its course in case she dies intestate, the said clause not
only disposes of the estate in favour of the disposition thereof in case she should die after the testatrix. The children of Carmen are
referred to as second heirs. Hence, the deposit does not belong to Carmen as her absolute property, but also to her children, from the
moment of death of Ana Maria. It cannot be attached by Mariano.
239) RABADILLA VS. CA
G.R. No. 113725, 29 June 2000
FACTS:
Alejandra Belleza executed a Codicil making Jorge Rabadilla as her heir. The Codicil provides that she is bequeathing No. 1392 of the
Bacolod Cadastre and that should Dr. Rabadilla predecease her, the lot will go to his wife and children. She also stated that it shall be
Dr. Rabadilla’s obligation to deliver in favour of Marlina Coscolluela 75 piculs of Export sugar and 35 piculs of domestic sugar, until
Marlina’s death. In case of Dr. Rabadilla’s death, his heir shall fulfil such obligation. In the event that Dr. Rabadilla or his heirs shall
later sell, lease, mortgage the Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall also have the obligation to respect and deliver to Marlina yearly
100 piculs of sugar ever December.
Dr. Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife and children. His son Johnny is herein petitioner. Marlina then filed a
complaint against the heirs of Dr. Rabadilla for the enforcement of the CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty.
231
Codicil. The parties came up with a Memorandum of Agreement whch was, however, not complied with by the heirs. The RTC
dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whehter or not Dr. Rabadilla’s institution in the Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution?
RULING:
Yes. Article 882 of the New Civil Code provides that the statement of the object of the institution or the application of the property left
by the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be considered as a condition unless it appears that such was his intention. That
which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the instituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance
with the wishes of the testator and for the return of anything he or they may receive, together with its fruits and interests, if he or they
should disregard this obligation. Article 883 provides that when without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the preceding
article cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it shall be complied with in a manner most analogous to and in
conformity with his wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in article 882 is known as an institucion sub modo or modal substitution. In a modal
substitution, the testator states:
1. The object of the institution;
2. Purpose or application o the property left by the testator;
3. Charge imposed by the testator upon the heir.
A ‘mode’ imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficscy of his rights to the succession. In a
conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the
testator. The condition suspends but not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend.
In this case, Alejandra intended Dr. Rabadilla to inherit the property. She likewise imposed an obligation on him and to his heirs to
deliver 100 piculs of sugar to Marlina. However, Alejandra did not make Dr. Rabadilla’s inheritance and effectivity of his institution as
a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. Should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be
turned over to Alejandra’s near descendants. The institution of Dr. Rabadilla is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge
upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution. Since testamentary dispositions are generally acts
of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heirs should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself
that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal institution.
240) MORENTE VS. DE LA SANTA
G.R. No. L-3891, 19 December 1907
FACTS:
Consuelo Morente died testate. In her will, her husbnd Gumersindo de la Santa was made sole heir, subject to the condition that he
shall not remarry, remain to live with her brothers, and that should he have children with anyone, the 2/3 of the estate shall remain for
her brother Vicente, or the latter’s children, and the remaining 1/3 is subject to Gumersindo’s disposal.
Gumersindo married again 4 months after his wife’s death. Consuelo’s sister asked for the annulment of the legacy in the will on the
ground of remarriage. She contends that the mere act off remarriage of Gumersindo strips him off of his rights acquired from the will.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Consulelo’s intention that Gumersindo’s remarriage would forfeit the legacy?
RULING:
No. Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions may be made confidential and Article 798 provides that a
prohibition against another marriage may in certain cases be validly imposed upon the widow or widower.
In this case, there was nothing in the will which would mean that it was Consuelo’s intention that Gumersindo’s remarriage would
strip him of his rights from the legacy. There is no express condition attached to that legacy in references to the 2nd marriage, as the
will simply said he will not marry again. No condition was attached in case of non-compliance.
241) ROSALES VS. ROSALES
No L-40789, 27 February 1987
FACTS:
Petra Rosales died intestate, leaving as heirs her husband Fortunato and their 2 children. Carterio Rosales, also a child of Spouses
Rosales, CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
232
predeceased her, and left as heirs his son Macikequerox and widow Irenea. The estimated gross value of Petra’s estate was about Php
30, 000.00.
Magna Rosales Acebes, her daughter, filed for intestate proceedings and was later on appointed as administratrix. The court then
declared the following as Petra’s legal heirs, and their respective shares:
1. Fortunato Rosales (husband) ¼;
2. Magna Rosales Acebes (daughter) ¼;
3. Macikequerox Rosales (grandson) ¼;
4. Antonio Rosales (son) ¼.
Irena appealed, contending that as the surviving spouse of Carterio, she is compulsory heir of Petra together with her son. The court
denied her plea. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law?
RULING:
No. Intestate heirs/ legal heirs are divided into two: those who inherit in their own right (as in the order of intestate succession
provided for in the Civil Code), and those who inherit by right of representation as provided in Article 981 of the Civil Code.
There is nothing in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The
provisions of the Code which relates to intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate
heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir.
Article 887, from which Irenea bases her claim refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of the parent-in-law. The surviving spouse is considered as a 3rd person as regards the
estate of the parent-in-law.
The estate in this case is that of Petra Rosales, the mother-in-law of Irenea. It is from Petra’s estate that Macikequerox draws a share
of the inheritance by right of representation as provided in Article 981. Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox is called to
succession by law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father Carterio who predeceased his grandmother, Petra
Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have succeeded. Irenea cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no
filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
242) FRANCISCO vs. FRANCISCO-ALFONSO
G.R. No. 138774. March 8, 2001
FACTS:
Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso (hereafter Aida) is the only daughter of spouses Gregorio Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, who
are now both deceased. Petitioners, on the other hand, are daughters of the late Gregorio Francisco with his common law wife Julia
Mendoza, with whom he begot seven (7) children. Gregorio Francisco (hereafter Gregorio) owned two parcels of residential land,
situated in Barangay Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan, covered by TCT Nos. T-32740 and T-117160. When Gregorio was confined in a
hospital in 1990, he confided to his daughter Aida that the certificates of title of his property were in the possession of Regina
Francisco and Zenaida Pascual.
After Gregorio died on July 20, 1990, Aida inquired about the certificates of title from her half sisters. They informed her that
Gregorio had sold the land to them on August 15, 1983. After verification, Aida learned that there was indeed a deed of absolute sale
in favor of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. Thus, on August 15, 1983, Gregorio executed a “Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan,
whereby for P25,000.00, he sold the two parcels of land to Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. By virtue of the sale, the Register
of Deeds of Bulacan issued TCT No. T-59.585 to Regina Francisco and TCT T-59.586 to Zenaida Pascual.
On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan a complaint against petitioners for annulment of sale with
damages. She alleged that the signature of her late father, Gregorio Francisco, on the Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15,
1983, was a forgery.
In their joint answer to the complaint, petitioners denied the alleged forgery or simulation of the deed of sale. After due proceedings,
on July 21, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. The Court of Appeals Reversed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
May a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her deceased father by a simulated contract transferring the
property of her father to his illegitimate children?
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the kasulatan was simulated. There was no consideration for the CIVIL LAW REVIEW I -
233
contract of sale. Felicitas de la Cruz, a family friend of the Franciscos, testified that Zenaida Pascual and Regina Francisco did not
have any source of income in 1983, when they bought the property, until the time when Felicitas testified in 1991.
As proof of income, however, Zenaida Pascual testified that she was engaged in operating a canteen, working as cashier in Mayon
Night Club as well as buying and selling RTW (Ready to Wear) items in August of 1983 and prior thereto. Zenaida alleged that she
paid her father the amount of P10,000.00. She did not withdraw money from her bank account at the Rural Bank of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, to pay for the property. She had personal savings other than those deposited in the bank. Her gross earnings from the RTW
for three years was P9,000.00, and she earned P50.00 a night at the club.
Regina Francisco, on the other hand, was a market vendor, selling nilugaw, earning a net income of P300.00 a day in 1983. She
bought the property from the deceased for P15,000.00. She had no other source of income.The testimonies of petitioners were
incredible considering their inconsistent statements as to whether there was consideration for the sale and also as to whether the
property was bought below or above its supposed market value. They could not even present a single witness to the kasulatan that
would prove receipt of the purchase price. Since there was no cause or consideration for the sale, the same was a simulation and
hence, null and void.
Even if the kasulatan was not simulated, it still violated the Civil Code provisions insofar as the transaction affected respondent’s
legitime. The sale was executed in 1983, when the applicable law was the Civil Code, not the Family Code. Obviously, the sale was
Gregorio’s way to transfer the property to his illegitimate daughters at the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was executed to
prevent respondent Alfonso from claiming her legitime and rightful share in said property. Before his death, Gregorio had a change of
heart and informed his daughter about the titles to the property.
According to Article 888, Civil Code:
“The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.
“The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as
hereinafter provided.”
Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of land involved were the only property left by their father,
the sale in fact would deprive respondent of her share in her father’s estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of her father as
his only legitimate child. The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco must be determined in proper testate or intestate proceedings
for settlement of the estate. His compulsory heir can not be deprived of her share in the estate save by disinheritance as prescribed by
law.
243) NIEVA vs. ALCALA
G.R. No. L-13386 October 27, 1920
FACTS:
Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva, married Francisco Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo
Deocampo was born. Juliana Nieva died intestate on April 19, 1889, and her said son, Alfeo Deocampo, inherited from her, ab
intestate, the parcels of land described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint.
Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and without issue on July 7, 1890. Thereupon the two parcels of land above-mentioned passed to his
father, Francisco Deocampo, by intestate succession. Thereafter Francisco Deocampo married the herein defendant Manuela Alcala, of
which marriage was born Jose Deocampo, the other defendant herein.
Francisco Deocampo died on August 15, 1914, whereupon his widow and son, the defendants herein, took possession of the parcels of
land in question, under the claim that the said son, the defendant Jose Deocampo (a minor) had inherited the same, ab intestate, from
his deceased father.
On September 30, 1915, the plaintiff herein, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of the said Juliana Nieva, instituted the
present action for purposes of recovering from the defendants the parcels of land in question, particularly described in Paragraphs V
and X of the complaint, invoking the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff is an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased Juliana Nieva and if an illegitimate relative within
the third degree is entitled to the reserva troncal provided for by article 811 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the plaintiff was an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva,
she was not entitled to the property here in question because, in CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana
Martin-Paguirigan
234
its opinion, an illegitimate relative has no right to the reserva troncal under the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code and which
reads as follows:
“ Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from
a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came.”
SC held that the object is to protect the patrimony of the legitimate family, following the precedents of the foral law. And it could not
be otherwise. Article 943 denies to legitimate parents the right to succeed the natural child and viceversa, from which it must be
deduced that natural parents neither have the right to inhering from legitimate ones; the law in the article cited established a barrier
between the two families; properties of the legitimate family shall never pass by operation of law to the natural family. (Ibid. pp. 251-
252.)
Article 943, above referred to provides as follows:
A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother who has
acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child.
To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural brother, Alfeo Deocampo, by operation of law, would be a
fragrant violate of the express provision of the foregoing article (943).
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, without any finding as to costs. So ordered.
244) SOLIVIO vs. CA
G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990
FACTS:
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the
Dawn," who died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are:
(1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private
respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr. He was a posthumous child. His
father died barely ten (10) months after his marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban, Jr. was
born.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which she had
inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife (p. 325, Record), but no conjugal property was acquired during
her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo
City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his
estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of
a heart attack on February 26,1977 without having set up the foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia
about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from whom his properties came, for the purpose
of helping indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased.
Celedonia was appointed as the administratix of the estate and later on the court adjudicated her as the sole heir of the estate of
Esteban Javallana Jr. and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION"
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order
declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. On September 3, 1984, the said trial
court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 13207, in favor of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property of the deceased was subject to reserve troncal.
HELD:
The Court finds no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased was subject to reserva troncal and that it pertains
to her as his only relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal provision of the Civil Code is found in
Article 891 which reads as follows:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have CIVIL LAW REVIEW I -
235
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired
by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property
came.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)—the ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from his
descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees (reservatarios)—relatives within the third degree counted from the
descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which the property came.
3. The propositus—the descendant who received by gratuitous title and died without issue, making his other ascendant inherit by
operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the
descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his
inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his mother's
side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or
9 brother or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by
Article 891. Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving spouse,
brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code
which provide:
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed
to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood.
However, It is true that by the agreement, she did not waive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of
Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation, and therefore, Concordia is obligated to honor her commitment
as Celedonia has honored hers.
The petition for review was granted. The decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals were SET ASIDE. Concordia J.
Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his estate. However, comformably with the
agreement between her and her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of the deceased should be conveyed to the "Salustia
Solivio Vda. de Javallana Foundation," of which both the petitioner and the private respondent shall be trustees, and each shall be
entitled to nominate an equal number of trustees to constitute the Board of Trustees of the Foundation which shall administer the same
for the purposes set forth in its charter.
245) SUMAYA vs. IAC

G.R. No. 68843-44 September 2, 1991
FACTS:
Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different ascendants the two (2) sets of properties subject of this case: 1) A one-third (1/3)
interest, pro-indiviso in a parcel of land situated in Dita, Lilio (Liliw) Laguna from his father Jose, Sr., who died on January 28, 1945;
and 2) A one-seventh (1/7) interest pro-indiviso in ten (10) parcels of registered lands from his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista,
who died on November 3, 1950.
On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and leaving only his mother, Consuelo Joaquin Vda. de Balantakbo,
as his sole surviving heir to the real properties above-mentioned. On November 3, 1952, Consuelo adjudicated unto herself the above
described properties in an Affidavit entitled "Caudal Herederario del finado Raul Balantakbo."
Consuelo then sold some properties to Mariquita H. Sumaya and Villa Honorio Development Corporation which the latter in turn
transferred and assigned all its rights to the properties in favor of Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative.
On June 3, 1968, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo died. On March 4, 1970, Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, and Erasto, all
surnamed Balantakbo, brothers in full blood of Raul Balantakbo and Luisa, Jose and Dolores, also all surnamed Balantakbo, surviving
children of deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr., another brother of the first named Balantakbos, filed the above mentioned civil cases to
recover the properties described in the respective complaints which they claimed were subject to a reserva troncal in their favor.
236
ISSUE:
Whether or not the properties sold were subject to a reserva troncal and if it is necessary to reserve and annotate the same.
HELD:
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the Balantakbos and the Coust of Appeals affirmed said decision.
The SC Held that consistent with the rule in reserva viudal where the person obliged to reserve (the widowed spouse) had the
obligation to annotate in the Registry of Property the reservable character of the property, in reserva troncal, the reservor (the
ascendant who inherited from a descendant property which the latter inherited from another descendant) has the duty to reserve and
therefore, the duty to annotate also.
The jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Registry of Property of the right reserved in real property subject of reserva viudal
insofar as it is applied to reserva troncal stays despite the abolition of reserva viudal in the New Civil Code. This rule is consistent
with the rule provided in the second paragraph of Section 51 of P.D. 1529, which provides that: "The act of registration shall be the
operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned . . ." (emphasis supplied)
The properties involved in this case are already covered by a Torrens title and unless the registration of the limitation is effected
(either actual or constructive), no third persons shall be prejudiced thereby.
The respondent appellate court did not err in finding that the cause of action of the private respondents did not prescribe yet. The
cause of action of the reservees did not commence upon the death of the propositus Raul Balantakbo on June 13, 1952 but upon the
death of the reservor Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo on June 3, 1968. Relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right (or
property) is reserved have no title of ownership or of fee simple over the reserved property during the lifetime of the reservor. Only
when the reservor should die before the reservees will the latter acquire the reserved property, thus creating a fee simple, and only then
will they take their place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives within the third degree (See Velayo Bernardo
v. Siojo, G.R. No. 36078, March 11, 1933, 58 Phil. 89). The reserva is extinguished upon the death of the reservor, as it then becomes
a right of full ownership on the part of the reservatarios, who can bring a reivindicatory suit therefor. Nonetheless, this right if not
exercised within the time for recovery may prescribe in ten (10) years under the old Code of Civil Procedure (see Carillo v. De Paz,
G.R. No. L-22601, October 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 467, 473) or in thirty years under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code. The actions for
recovery of the reserved property was brought by herein private respondents on March 4, 1970 or less than two (2) years from the
death of the reservor. Therefore, private respondents' cause of action has not prescribed yet.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is AFFIRMED, except for the
modification on the necessity to annotate the reversable character of a property subject of reserva troncal.
246) RIOSA vs. ROCHA
G.R. No. L-23770, February 18, 1926
FACTS:
Maria Corral was united in marriage with the deceased Mariano Riosa, it being her first and only marriage and during which time she
bore him three children named Santiago, Jose and Severina. The latter died during infancy and the other two survived their father,
Mariano Riosa. Santiago Riosa, now deceased, married Francisca Villanueva, who bore him two children named Magin and
Consolacion Riosa. Jose Riosa, also deceased, married Marcelina Casas and they had one child who died before the father, the latter
therefore leaving no issue. Mariano Riosa left a will dividing his property between his two children, Santiago and Jose Riosa, giving
the latter the eleven parcels of land described in the complaint. Upon the death of Jose Riosa he left a will in which he named his wife,
Marcelina Casas, as his only heir.
On May 16, 1917, the will of Jose Riosa was filed for probate. Notwithstanding the fact that Marcelina Casas was the only heir named
in the will, on account of the preterition of Maria Corral who, being the mother of Jose Riosa, was his legitimate heir, I Marcelina
Casas and Maria Corral, on the same date of the filing of the will for probate, entered into a contract by which they divided between
themselves the property left by Jose Riosa, the eleven parcels of land described in the complaint being assigned to Maria Corral.
Maria Coral then sold some parcels of land to Marcelina Casas and the latter to Pablo Rocha. However some of the parcels of land
were returned by Pablo to Marcelina alleging that the said parcels of land were erroneously transferred by Maria to Marcelina. CIVIL
LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
237
An action was brought by Magin Riosa, for whom the property should have been reserved, against Maria Corral, whose duty it was to
reserve it, and against Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha as purchasers of parcels 10 and 11. The complaint prays that the property
therein described be declared reservable property and that the plaintiffs Jose and Consolacion Riosa be declared reservees; that this
reservation be noted in the registry of deeds; that the sale of parcels 10 and 11 to Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha be declared valid
only in so far as it saves the right of reservation in favor of the plaintiff Magin Riosa and of the defendant Consolacion Riosa, and that
this right of reservation be also noted on the deeds of sale executed in favor of Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha;
ISSUE:
Whether or not the parcels of land subject to reserva troncal necessitates the recording of which in the registry of deeds.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that Marcelina Casas, as well as Pablo Rocha, Knew of the reservable character of the property when they
bought it. They had knowledge of the provisions of the last will and testament of Mariano Riosa by virtue of which these parcels were
transferred to Jose Riosa. Pablo Rocha was one of the legatees in the will. Marcelina Casas was the one who entered into the contract
of partition with Maria Corral, whereby these parcels were adjudicated to the latter, as a legitimate heir of Jose Riosa. Pablo Rocha
was the very person who drafted the contracts of sale of these parcels of land by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas and by the latter to
himself. These facts, together with the relationship existing between Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha, the former a
daughter-in-law and the latter a nephew of Maria Corral, amply support the conclusion that both of them knew that these parcels of
land had been inherited by Maria Corral, as her legitime from her son Jose Riosa who had inherited them, by will, from his father
Mariano Riosa, and were reservable property. Wherefore, the duty of Maria Corral of recording the reservable character of lots 10 and
11 has been transferred to Pablo Rocha and the reservees have an action against him to compel him to comply with this obligation.
The judgment appealed from is modified and Pablo Rocha is ordered to record in the registry of deeds the reservable character of
parcels 10 11, the subject of this complaint.
247) DE PAPA vs. CAMACHO
G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986
FACTS:
Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate
relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt and granduncles and having a common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had
a sister by the name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of defendant.
Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and
Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her
said two children in equal pro-indiviso shares.
Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and legitimate
grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of land now covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 16545 and 16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, were adjudicated as the inheritance of the late Toribia
Tioco, but as she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the said three (3) parcels of land devolved upon her two legitimate
children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in equal
Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land
above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received the said property subject to a reserva troncal
which was subsequently annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title.
Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights and interests in the parcels of land abovementioned were inherited by her only
legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject to the usufructuary right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo
Tongko.
Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived his only legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.
Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned as her
inheritance from her mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.
Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the other half of the said seven (7) parcels of land
abovementioned by virtue of the reserva troncal imposed thereon upon the death of CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)
238
Faustino Dizon and under the laws on intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal advice, oppose her said claim because
they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which interest was inherited by Eustacio
Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their being also third degree relatives of
Faustino Dizon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not all relatives of the praepositus within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed without distinction to the
reservable property upon the death of the reservista, or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of said relatives are subject
to, and should be determined by, the rules on intestate succession.
HELD:
The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Padura vs. Baldovino,, declared the principles of intestacy to be
controlling,
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without
any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the praepositus), they are excluded from the succession
by his niece, the defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the same degree as the latter. The court, therefore, held,
and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and
nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.
Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is no doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees would have been
excluded by the defendant-appellant under the rules of intestate succession. There is no reason why a different result should obtain
simply because "the transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva;" 6 i.e., the property took a "detour"
through an ascendant-thereby giving rise to the reservation before its transmission to the reservatario.
Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defendant-appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to
the entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and set aside and the complaint is dismissed.
248) LLorente vs. Rodriguez, et. Al.
G.R. NO. L-3339, MARCH 26, 1908
FACTS:
Martina Avalle, widow of Llorente, had during her marriage four legitimate children named Jacinta, Julio, Martin, and Francisco, all
with the surname of Llorente y Avalle. In the will executed by her on the 31st of December, 1900, she instituted as her sole and
general heirs her three first-named children, Jacinta, Julio, and Martin, and the children of the late Francisco, named Soledad and
Adela Llorente.
Jacinta died prior to the testatrix, on the 11th of August, 1901, leaving several legitimate children with the surname of Rodriguez y
Llorente, and besides them, a natural daughter named Rosa Llorente.
The said Rosa Llorente, the natural daughter of Jacinta Llorente, wanted to become a party in the proceedings for the probate of the
will of Martina Avalle, but the legitimate children of the said Jacinta Llorente objected thereto on the ground that they were the sole
and exclusive heirs of their mother, the late Jacinta Llorente, and that the plaintiff, Rosa Llorente, absolutely cannot be a party thereto.
The Court of First Instance of Cebu, where the will was admitted for probate, held that Rosa Llorente had no right whatever to the
inheritance of the late Martina Avalle, and denied her all right to intervene in the proceedings regarding the estate of the said deceased.
ISSUE: Whether or not the hereditary portion which Martina Avalle left in her will to her legitimate daughter Jacinta Llorente, and
which the latter had not been able to possess because of her death before that of the testatrix, should also pass to her natural daughter,
Rosa Llorente, the same as to her legitimate children.
HELD: No. From the fact that a natural son has the right to inherit from the father or mother who acknowledged him, conjointly with
the other legitimate children of either of them, it does not follow that he has the right to represent either of them in the succession to
their legitimate ascendants; his right is direct and immediate in CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana
Martin-Paguirigan
239
relation to the father or mother who acknowledged him, but it cannot be indirect by representing them in the succession to their
ascendants to whom he is not related in any manner, because he does not appear among the legitimate family of which said ascendants
are the head.
If Jacinta Llorente had survived her mother, Martina Avalle, she would have inherited from her, and in what she inherited from her
mother, her natural daughter, Rosa Llorente would have participated, in conjunction with her legitimate children, from the day in
which the succession became operative, because she would then appear by virtue of her own right to inherit from her mother the legal
quota that pertained to her; but, not because she has said right, would she also be entitled to that of representation, inasmuch as there is
no legal provision establishing such a doctrine; that Rosa Llorente might and should inherit from her natural mother is one thing, and
that she should have the right to inherit from her who would be called her natural grandmother, representing her natural mother, is
quite another thing. The latter right is not recognized by the law in force.
Therefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed.
249) FILOMENA PECSON, as administratix of the last will and testament of Florencio Pecson, et al. vs. ROSARIO
MEDIAVILLO
28 PHIL. 81
FACTS:
Some time prior to the 17th day of September, 1910, the last will and testament of Florencio Pecson was presented to the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Albay for probate.
Mr. Tomas Lorayes, an attorney at law, opposed the legislation of the will on the ground that it had not been authorized nor signed by
the deceased. However, after hearing the respective parties, the court found that the will had been signed and executed in accordance
with the provisions of law.
On the 18th day of September, 1910, the said Tomas Lorayes, representing Basiliso Mediavillo and Rosario Mediavillo, presented a
motion alleging that Rosario Mediavillo is and Joaquin Mediavillo was a legitimate child of the deceased Teresa Pecson. Teresa was a
daughter of the testator; that the said granddaughter, Rosario Mediavillo y Pecson, was disinherited by her grandfather, the testator
Florencio Pecson, according to clause 3 of the will, because she failed to show him due respect and on a certain occasion raised her
hand against him.
On his will, Florencio Pecson state that he disinherited Rosario Mediavillo "because she was grossly disrespectful to me and because
on one occasion, when it was I do not remember, she raised her hand against me. Therefore it is my will that she, the said Rosario
Mediavillo, shall have no share in my property."
ISSUES: Whether or not the court may inquire into the cause of the disinheritance and decide whether there is a ground for such
disinheritance.
Whether or not Basiliso Mediavillo, the father of Joaquin Mediavillo, is the latters’ heir by representation.
HELD: Yes, the Civil Code (art. 848) provides that disinheritance shall only take place for one of the causes expressly fixed by law. In
accordance with the provisions of that article (848) we find that articles 756 and 853 provide the cases or causes for disinheritance; or,
in other words, the cases or causes in which the ancestors may by will disinherit their heirs.
Article 849 of the Civil Code provides that the disinheritance can only be effected by the testament, in which shall be mentioned the
legal grounds or causes for such disinheritance. If it is true that heirs can be disinherited only by will, and for causes mentioned in the
Civil Code, it would seen to follow that the courts might properly inquire whether the disinheritance has been made properly and for
the causes provided for by law.
The right of the courts to inquire into the causes and whether there was sufficient cause for the disinheritance or not, seems to be
supported by express provisions of the Civil Code. Article 850 provides that "the proof of the truthfulness of the reason for
disinheritance shall be established by the heirs of the testator, should the disinherited person deny it." It would appear then that if the
person disinherited should deny the truthfulness of the cause of disinheritance, he might be permitted to CIVIL LAW REVIEW I -
240
support his allegation by proof. The right of the court to inquire whether or not the disinheritance was made for just cause is also
sustained by the provisions of article 851, which in part provides that:Disinheritance made without statement of the reason, or for a
cause the truth of which, if contradicted, should not be proven . . . shall annul the designation of heirship, in so far as it prejudices the
person disinherited.
With reference to the second assignment of error, The Supreme Court held that the right of representation shall always take place in
the direct descending line, but never in the ascending. In collateral lines, it shall take place only in favor of the children of brothers or
sisters, whether they be of the whole or half blood.
It will be remembered that the whole argument of the appellants with reference to the first assignment of error was that Rosario
Mediavillo had been disinherited and the court evidently believed that there were no "legitimate children, descendants of the deceased,
surviving," and that therefore the father or mother of said legitimate children would inherit as ascendants. Inasmuch, however, as there
was a descendant in the direct line, surviving, the inheritance could not ascend, and for the reason the lower court committed an error
in declaring that Basiliso Mediavillo was entitled to inherit that share of the estate that would have belonged to Joaquin Mediavillo,
had he been living.
Therefore, and for all the foregoing, that part of the judgment of the lower court nullifying and setting aside paragraph 3 of the will is
hereby affirmed, and that art of said judgment which decrees to Basiliso Mediavillo one-half of the estate of Florencio Pecson,
belonging to Teresa Pecson and which would have been given to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been surviving, is hereby revoked.
And without any findings as to costs, it is hereby ordered that the cause be remanded to the lower court.
250) DOROTHEO vs CA
320 SCRA 12
FACTS:
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate
being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after Alejandro’s death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of
Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latter’s last will and testament. In 1981, the court issued an
order admitting Alejandro’s will to probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a “Motion To
Declare The Will Intrinsically Void.” The trial court granted the motion and issued an order, declaring Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of
the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and declaring the
oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda Dorotheo Quintana as the only heirs of the late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo
and Aniceta Reyes, whose respective estates shall be liquidated and distributed according to the laws on intestacy upon payment of
estate and other taxes due to the government.”
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since she took care of Alejandro prior to his
death although she admitted that they were not married to each other. Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed for failure to file appellant’s brief within the extended period granted.
This dismissal became final and executory on February 3, 1989 and a corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith issued by the
Court of Appeals on May 16, 1989.
Petitioner assails the Order of the Court of Appeals upholding the validity of the January 30, 1986 Order which declared the intrinsic
invalidity of Alejandro’s will that was earlier admitted to probate.
Issue: May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that has become final and executory
still be given effect?
Held: The petition is without merit.
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated, particularly on
three aspects:
ð whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedent’s last will and testament;
ð compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
ð the testamentary capacity of the testator; CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
241
ð and the due execution of the last will and testament.
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of
its execution, that he had freely executed the will and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will
is genuine and not a forgery, that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a person not expressly prohibited by law from
making a will.
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has been authenticated.
Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was
validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful
inheritance according to the laws on succession,i[13] the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is
specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and executory decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such
determination having attained that character of finality is binding on this Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court
finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory decision of which the party had the opportunity to challenge
before the higher tribunals must stand and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided by law
constitutes waiver. And if the party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was aggrieved by a decision or court
action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is satisfied with the decision or order
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the will, as she precisely appealed from an
unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and executory Order of January 30, 1986 wherein private respondents were declared
as the only heirs do not bind those who are not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son of the testator, the same constitutes
res judicata with respect to those who were parties to the probate proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise those matters anew for
relitigation otherwise that would amount to forum-shopping. It is clear from the executory order that the estates of Alejandro and his
spouse should be distributed according to the laws of intestate succession.
No intestate distribution of the estate can be done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If
the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the next
test is to determine its intrinsic validity – that is whether the provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of succession. In this
case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules
of intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
251) URIARTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BENEDICTO ESTRADA
284 SCRA 511
FACTS:
Agatonica Arreza is the offspring of Pedro Arreza and Ursula Tubil. The Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is the son of Agatonica.
Upon the death of Pedro Arreza, Ursula married Juan Arnaldo by whom she had another daughter, the decedent Justa. Private
respondent Benedicto Estrada is thus the nephew of Justa by her half sister Agatonica.
Domingo Arnaldo is the brother of Juan Arnaldo. Domingo and his wife Catalina Azarcon had a daughter, Primitiva Arnaldo.
Primitiva then married Conrado Uriarte who had children, one of whom was Pascasio Uriarte. The widow and daughters of Pascasio
are the petitioners in his case. Petitioners are thus grandchildren, the relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity, of Justa by her
cousin Primitiva Arnaldo Uriarte.
The other petitioners are the children of Primitiva and those of her brother Gregorio. The children of Primitiva by Conrado Uriarte,
aside from Pascasio, are Josefina, Gaudencio, Simplicio, Domingo and Virgilio, all surnamed Uriarte. The children of Gregorio
Arnaldo, Primitiva's brother, by Julieta Ilogon, are Jorencio, Enecia, Nicolas, Lupecino and Felisa. These other petitioners are thus
grandchildren and relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity of Justa by her cousins Gregorio Arnaldo and Primitiva Arnaldo.
Private respondent Benedicto Estrada brought this case in the Regional Trial Court for the partition of the land left by Justa Arnaldo-
Sering. The land, consisting of 2.7 hectares, had been acquired by Justa as follows: 0.5 hectare by inheritance from her parents Juan
Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, and 2.2 hectares by purchase. Private respondent claimed CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-
2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
242
to be the sole surviving heir of Justa, on the ground that the latter died without issue. He complained that Pascasio Uriarte who, he
claimed, worked the land as Justa's tenant, refused to give him (private respondent) his share of the harvest. He contended that
Pascasio had no right to the entire land of Justa but could claim only one-half of the 0.5 hectare land which Justa had inherited from
her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil.
Pascasio died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by his heirs. In their answer, the heirs denied they were mere tenants
of Justa but the latter's heirs entitled to her entire land.
They claimed that the entire land, subject of the case, was originally owned by Ambrocio Arnaldo, their great granduncle. It was
allegedly bequeathed to Domingo and Juan Arnaldo, Ambrocio's nephews, in a holographic will executed by Ambrocio in 1908.
Domingo was to receive two-thirds of the land and Juan, one-third. The heirs claimed that the land had always been in their possession
and that in her lifetime Justa never asserted exclusive right over the property but only received her share of the harvest from it. They
alleged that private respondent did not have any right to the property because he was not an heir of Ambrocio Arnaldo, the original
owner of the property.
ISSUE: Whether a nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant or spouse survive the
decedent
HELD: YES. Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and private respondent. As already stated, private respondent is
the son of Justa's half-sister Agatonica. He is therefore Justa's nephew. A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if
no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the decedent. That private respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This
alone does not disqualify him from being his aunt's heir. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, "The determination of whether
the relationship is of the full or half blood is important only to determine the extent of the share of the survivors.
252) SAYSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
205 SCRA 321
FACTS:
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on 1952, and
Rafaela on 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on 1972. His wife died nine years later, on, 1981. Their properties
were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for
partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel
Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedent's lawful descendants.
Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and
Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children. The complainants asserted the defense, that Delia and Edmundo were the
adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share
in his parents' estate by right of representation.
ISSUE: Whether the adopted children of Teodoro (Delia and Edmundo) are entitled to inherit Teodoro’s share by right of
representation?
HELD:NO! There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel
has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted
above, she is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her
grandparents' other children.
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it
is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include
the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and
does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.
253) Bagunu vs. Piedad
G.R. No. L-66574 June 17, 1987

Doctrine: The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant
ones except when and to the extent that the right of CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-
Paguirigan
243
representation can apply. By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by operation of law, "raised to the
same place and degree" of relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the same decedent. In the direct line, right of representation
is proper only in the descending, never in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in
favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts.
The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and
respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the
legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the
brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, fourth decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of
the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an
absolute rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives
direction.
Facts:
On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in Special Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the
matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad," pending before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 117,
of Pasay City. Asserting entitlement to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad, petitioner assailed the finality of the order of
the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad contending that the proceedings were tainted with procedural
infirmities, including an incomplete publications of the notice of hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and
irregularity in the disbursements of allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the estate.
Issue: WON petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, can inherit alongside respondent, a collateral relative of the third
civil degree? Elsewise stated does the rule of proximity in intestate succession find application among collateral relatives?
Held:No. Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or ascendants. Respondent is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a
third-degree relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or a fifth-degree relative of the
decedent. The right of representation does not apply to "others collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both
petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants,
secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and
fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, fourth decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews
and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of the
Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil
Code gives direction. Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes
petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding an intestato to the estate of the decedent.
254) DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, petitioners, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA guardian of FEDERICO
SANTERO, et al., vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, respondents
182 SCRA 427
FACTS: ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, FACTS: Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976
with the CFI of Cavite in a special proceeding "In The Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero,"
praying among other things, that the corresponding letters of Administration be issued in her favor and that she be appointed as special
Administratrix of the properties of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate
children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion. Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa
Pamuti and another child who died during infancy. Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of
244
Pablo Santero. Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Pascual Santero died in 1970, while Pablo Santero died in 1973 and Simona Santero died in 1976. Pablo Santero, at the time of his
death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma
Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.
In 1976, the court declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit: Petition for the Letters of Administration of the intestate Estate of
Pablo Santero; Petition for the Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of Pascual Santero; Petition for Guardianship over
the properties of an incompetent Person, Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; and Petition for Settlement of the Intestate Estate of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene was allowed to intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and Pascual Santero
by Order of the Court in 1977. Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, filed her "Opposition and Motion to
Exclude Felisa Pamuti from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero, as well as in the intestate estate of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero. Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children.
In 1980, the court issued an order excluding Felisa Jardin "from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate
estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and declared her
to be, not an heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero."
Felisa Jardin filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and it was denied by the trial court. On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court
reversed the decision of the trial court and declaring the Felisa Jardin as the sole heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and
ordering oppositors-appellees not to interfere in the proceeding for the declaration of heirship in the estate of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right
of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda, de Santero.
HELD: NO. Since the hereditary conflict refers solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the
legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which reads as follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (943a)
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the oppositors (petitioners herein) are the
illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato
between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may
have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992, Between the legitimate family and the
illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully
looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged
condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing
but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding
further grounds of resentment. Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of the letter to
the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier provided for under Art. 992 of
the New Civil Code.
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. The
record shows that from the commencement of CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-
Paguirigan
245
this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin
and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992,
the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to
the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
255) WENCESLA CACHO, petitioner-appellee, vs. JOHN G. UDAN, and RUSTICO G. UDAN, oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-19996 April 30, 1965
REYES, J.B.L., J.
FACTS:
John, Rustico and Silvina are siblings. Silvina G. Udan died leaving a purported will naming her illegitimate son, Francisco G. Udan,
and one Wencesla Cacho, as her sole heirs, share and share alike. During the probate of the will, opposition was made by her two
brothers on the ground that the will was not attested and executed as required by law, that the testatrix was incapacitated to execute it;
and that it was procured by fraud or undue influence. Francisco died pending the probate. The RTC denied the oppositions filed by the
two brothers. Hence, this appeal
ISSUE:
WON oppositor brothers, John and Rustico Udan, may claim to be heirs intestate of their legitimate sister, the late Silvina Udan.
HELD:
The Court ruled that the court below correctly held that they were not, for at the time of her death Silvina's illegitimate son, Francisco
Udan, was her heir intestate, to the exclusion of her brothers under Articles 988 and 1003 of the governing Civil Code of the
Philippines in force at the time of the death of the testatrix
It decreed that collateral relatives of one who died intestate inherit only in the absence of descendants, ascendants, and illegitimate
children. Albeit the brothers and sisters can concur with the widow or widower under Article 1101, they do, not concur, but are
excluded by the surviving children, legitimate or illegitimate (Art. 1003). The trial court committed no error in holding that John and
Rustico Udan had no standing to oppose the probate of the will. For if the will is ultimately probated John and Rustico are excluded
by its terms from participation in the estate; and if probate be denied, both oppositors-appellants will be excluded by the illegitimate
son, Francisco Udan, as sole intestate heir, by operation of law.
The death of Francisco two years after his mother's demise does not improve the situation of appellants. The rights acquired by the
former are only transmitted by his death to his own heirs at law not to the appellants, who are legitimate brothers of his mother, for the
reason that, as correctly decided by the court below, the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child. This is
clear from Article 992 of the Civil Code.
The legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child. This is clear from Article 992 of the Civil Code.
David T. Tolentino
256) ISABEL DE LA PUERTA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CARMELITA DE LA
PUERTA, respondents.
G.R. No. 77867 February 6, 1990
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
The testator, Dominga Revuelta died on July 3, 1966, at the age of 92, leaving her properties to her three surviving children, Alfredo,
Vicente and Isabel. Isabel was given the free portion in addition to her legitime and was appointed executrix of the will.
Vicente and Alfredo opposed the petition for the probate of the will filed by Isabel. The two claimed that their mother was already
senile at the time of the execution of the will and did not fully comprehend its meaning, that the properties listed in the inventory of
her estate belonged to them exclusively.
Alfredo subsequently died, leaving Vicente the lone oppositor. Vicente de la Puerta filed with the CFI of Quezon, a petition to adopt
Carmelita de la Puerta, which was thereafter granted. Isabel appealed the said decision to the CA. Vicente died during the pendency of
the appeal, prompting her to move for the dismissal of the case. Carmelita filed a motion for the payment to her of a monthly
allowance as the acknowledged natural child of Vicente de la Puerta. The said motion was granted by the probate court granted the
motion, declaring that Carmelita was a natural child of Vicente de la Puerta and was entitled to the amounts claimed for her support.
CA affirmed this order of the lower court. Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner's main argument is that CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
- LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
246
Carmelita was not the natural child of Vicente de la Puerta, who was married to Genoveva de la Puerta in 1938 and remained his
wife until his death in 1978. Carmelita's real parents are Juanito Austrial and Gloria Jordan.
ISSUE:
WON respondent Carmelita de la Puerta, can claim successional rights to the estate of her alleged grandmother.
HELD:
The Court held that Vicente de la Puerta did not predecease his mother and Carmelita is a spurious child. It is settled that in
testamentary succession, the right of representation can take place only in the following cases: first, when the person represented
dies before the testator; second, when the person represented is incapable of succeeding the testator; and third, when the person
represented is disinherited by the testator. In all of these cases, since there is a vacancy in the inheritance, the law calls the children
or descendants of thefiliation of private respondent Carmelita de la Puerta, who claims successional rights to the estate of her
alleged grandmother. person represented to succeed by right of representation.
The law is clear that there is representation only when relatives of a deceased person try to succeed him in his rights which he
would have had if still living.
Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta, her son Vicente had the right to inherit from her directly or in his own right. No right
of representation was involved, nor could it be invoked by Carmelita upon her father's death, which came after his own mother's
death. It would have been different if Vicente was already dead when Dominga Revuelta died. Carmelita could then have inherited
from her in representation of her father Vicente, assuming the private respondent was a lawful heir. As a spurious child of Vicente,
Carmelita is barred from inheriting from Dominga because of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which lays down the barrier between
the legitimate and illegitimate families. This article provides quite clearly:
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother;
nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
Even as an adopted child, Carmelita would still be barred from inheriting from Dominga Revuelta for there would be no natural
kindred ties between them and consequently, no legal ties to bind them either.
Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of Vicente de la Puerta, has successional rights to the intestate estate of her father but not to the
estate of Dominga Revuelta. Her claims for support and inheritance should therefore be filed in the proceedings for the settlement
of her own father's estate and cannot be considered in the probate of Dominga Revuelta's will.
David T. Tolentino
257) BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA MANUEL, MADRONA
MANUEL, ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL, BASILISA MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and NUMERIANA
MANUEL, petitioners, vs. HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Lingayen,
Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL, respondents.
G.R. No. 117246 August 21, 1995
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is the inheritance left by an illegitimate child who died intestate
without any surviving descendant or ascendant.
Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling, filed this suit. During his marriage with
Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with Ursula Bautista. From this relationship, a child named Juan Manuel was born.
Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, a donation propter
nuptias over a parcel of land, with an area of 2,700 sqm was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel. Two other
parcels of land, were later bought by Juan and registered in his name. The couple were not blessed with a child that is why they
took private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own "daughter." On June 3, 1980, Juan
Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land. Juan
Manuel died intestate on February 21, 1990. Two years later, Esperanza Gamba also passed away. A month after the death of
Esperanza, Modesta executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land.
Following the registration of the document of adjudication with the Office of the Register of Deeds, the three titles in the name of
Juan Manuel were CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
247
canceled and new titles, were issued in the name of Modesta Manuel-Baltazar. Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent
Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land that was sold to the
latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. The petitioners filed a complaint filed before the RTC
Lingayen, Pangasinan, seeking the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments. The trial court dismissed the complaint holding
that petitioners, not being heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate brother Juan Manuel, were not the real parties-in-interest to institute
the suit. The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the trial court. Hence, this Petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioners are entitled to inherit in the intestate estate of their illegitimate brother, Juan Manuel.
RULING:
The Court ruled that the petitioners are not entitled to inherit from the intestate estate of their illegitimate brother, Juan Manuel under
ARTICLE 992, an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; nor shall such children or relative inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
The principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family wherein such doctrine rejects succession
ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it
does not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no
application, however, on testamentary dispositions.
A barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family from members of the legitimate family wherein the legitimate brothers and
sisters as well as the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the illegitimate child.
Admittedly in her answer, Modesta is not an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. A ward, without the benefit of formal/judicial adoption, is
neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. Nevertheless, the complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity of the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three TCT's issued to her favor, as well as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of
Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly dismissed by the trial court.
David T. Tolentino
258) OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners, vs. ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL
C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C.
PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL,
LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL,
GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC,
Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents.
G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992
PARAS, J.:
Facts:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being
the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual.
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious
children.
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a Special
Proceeding for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband. On October 16, 1985, all the heirs entered into a
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual
The Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes
Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their uncle. On September 30, 1987,
petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights.
Both the RTC and CA dismissed the submitted Motions as well as Motions for reconsideration reiterating the hereditary rights of
Olivia and Hermes Pascual.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
WON Article 992 excludes recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased. CIVIL LAW REVIEW I -
248
Ruling:
The Court dismissed the instant petition for lack of merit and affirmed the assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals. It
cited the previous decided case of Diaz v. IAC, where such Court ruled that Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron
curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives
of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes
of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the
former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does
no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
Applying the doctrine, respondent IAC did not err in holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the
succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.
David T. Tolentino
259) MANUEL SARITA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ANDRES CANDIA, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-7768 November 14, 1912
ARELLANO, C.J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Apolinario Cedenio and Roberta Montesa are allegedly the owners of a parcel of land apparently of an area of 2 cavanes of
corn upon which they had planted fruit trees. Respondent Candia claims ownership over the land having purchased the same from
Villarosa, the vendee of Apolinario. Petitioners claim on the other hand, that as nieces and nephews,they are the collateral heirs of
Apolinario, through the latter’s brothers and sisters. Sarita, however, is the grandnephew of Apolinario.
The RTC absolved the defendant from the complainant, on the grounds that, with regard to the animals and real property sued for,
there was no proof whatever that they were in possession of the spouses at the time of their death, and, with respect to the land: (1)
That the defendant was the possessor in good faith continuously and was presumed to hold under just title so long as the contrary
should not be proved; and (2) that neither the plaintiffs nor their alleged predecessors in interest made demand for it during the period
of twenty-six years, since the ownership thereof was conveyed by Isidario or Apolinario Cedeño to Juan Basa Villarosa, on the 24th of
June, 1881, it being that during this very long period of time they did not obtain possession of the property.
Hence, the judgment having been appealed through a bill exceptions.
ISSUE:
WON grandnephews have a right of representation over the estate of the deceased.
HELD:
The Court ruled that the right of representation is limited to nephews and nieces who are children of brothers and sisters of decedent.
The plaintiff Sarita who joins as the representative of his grandfather in a complaint with others, who are brothers and nephews of the
predecessor in interest, lacks such right of representation, for it belongs in the collateral line only to the nephews and not to the
grandnephews. Hence, sister and nephews of the deceased having appeared to claim the inheritance, they, as the nearest of kin,
exclude a remote relative like a grandnephew.
David T. Tolentino
260) CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA
DOMINGO, respondents.
G.R. No. 121027 July 31, 1997
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
This case involves an action for reconveyance filed by herein petitioners against herein private respondent before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as the aforesaid Civil Case No. Q-88-1054, over a parcel of land with a house and
apartment thereon located at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and which was originally owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero
and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
249
Petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and nephew, respectively, of the deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero who
is the sister of petitioner's father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or
descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on
October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.
Records revealed that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse, Martin, executed an Affidavit of
Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute which is covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 66886, as a consequence of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 358074 was issued in the name of Martin Guerrero.
Martin Guerrero then sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
374012 was issued in the latter's name.
After Martin Guerrero’s death, Petitioners filed an action for reconveyance claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the
property in question by right of representation.
Both the RTC and CA granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the complaint for reconveyance and declared that the
documentary evidence presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all
inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners failed to meet the quantum of proof required by Article 172 of the Family Code to establish legitimacy and filiation
HELD:
The Court ruled for the petitioners and reversed and set aside the questioned judgment of respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioners and
Private Respondent were declared co-owners of the subject property with an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share
therein, respectively.
The Court considered two points:
First is the issue on petitioner's legitimacy.
The documentary evidence adduced by petitioners, taken separately and independently of each other, are not per se sufficient proof of
legitimacy nor even of pedigree. It seems that the lower courts have regrettably overlooked the universally recognized presumption on
legitimacy. There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason
than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be
attacked collaterally.
The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate children of Hermogenes Dezoller cannot be properly controverted in
the present action for reconveyance. This is aside, of course, from the further consideration that private respondent is not the proper
party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. The presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of petitioners unless
and until it is rebutted.
Indubitably, when private respondent opted not to present countervailing evidence to overcome the presumption, by merely filing a
demurrer to evidence instead, she in effect impliedly admitted the truth of such fact. Indeed, she overlooked or disregarded the
evidential rule that presumptions like judicial notice and admissions, relieve the proponent from presenting evidence on the facts he
alleged and such facts are thereby considered as duly proved.
Second is the question regarding their filiation with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
The Court is sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance where the general requirement on evidence
aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of the declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration
made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such
relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being such declaration is
rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. More importantly, there is in the
present case an absolute failure by all and sundry to refute that declaration made by the decedent.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the sole basis of the decedent's declaration and without need for
further proof thereof, that petitioners are the niece and nephew of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
Applying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless produce the same result. For while the documentary evidence
submitted by petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on their admissibility, we are however of the considered opinion that the
same may be admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being
offered in evidence. David T. Tolentino CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
250
261) ZOSIMA VERDAD vs. CA
G.R. No. 109972 April 29, 1996
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Zosima Verdad is the purchaser of a 248-square meter residential lot at Magallanes Street, now Marcos M. Calo St., Butuan
City. Private respondent Socorro Cordero Vda. de Rosales, seeks to exercise a right of legal redemption over the subject property and
traces her title to the late Macaria Atega, her mother-in-law, who died intestate on 08 March 1956.
During her lifetime, Macaria contracted two marriages: the first with Angel Burdeos and the second, following the latter's death, with
Canuto Rosales. At the time of her own death, Macaria was survived by her son Ramon A. Burdeos and her grandchild (by her
daughter Felicidad A. Burdeos) Estela Lozada of the first marriage and her children of the second marriage, namely, David Rosales,
Justo Rosales, Romulo Rosales, and Aurora Rosales (notice that other respondents in this case are the children from the 2nd marriage).
Socorro is the wife of David Rosales who sometime after the death of Macaria, died intestate without issue.
It was discovered that the heirs of Ramon Buderos sold the lot in question to petitioner in an instrument dated 14, June 1982 (for
P55,460) and another instrument on 14 Nov 1982 (this time a duly notarized deed of sale for P23,000), which sale was later
discovered by respondent Socorro on 30 Mar 1987. Settlement was attempted at the Failure of settlement at the Lupong
Tagapamayapa prompted the Respondent to initiated a case for the "Legal Redemption with Preliminary Injunction" before the
Regional Trial Court of Butuan City.
RTC decided that the private respondents' right to redeem the property had already lapsed. On appeal by respondents, Court of
Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision declaring plaintiff-appellant, Socorro C. Rosales, entitled to redeem the inheritance rights
(Art. 1088, NCC) or pro indiviso share (Art. 1620, NCC) of the Heirs of Ramon Burdeos, Sr. in Lot 529, Ts-65 of the Butuan
Cadastre, within the remaining ELEVEN (11) DAYS from finality hereon, unless written notice of the sale and its terms are received
in the interim, under the same terms and conditions appearing under Exhibit "J" and after returning the purchase price of P23,000.00
within the foregoing period.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON respondents may initiate redemption proceedings over the lot, her not being a legal co-heir, as well as the timeliness of that the
said case was instituted.
HELD:
The Court denied the petition. On the contention of petitioner as to the capacity of Socorro to initiate the redemption proceedings, the
Court ruled that Respondent possess the capacity to ask for a redemption. It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law (or, for that matter,
a mere relative by affinity), is not an intestate heir of her parents-in-law; however, Socorro's right to the property is not because she
rightfully can claim heirship in Macaria's estate but that she is a legal heir of her husband, David Rosales, part of whose estate is a
share in his mother's inheritance.
David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his mother's death. When Macaria died on 08 March 1956 her estate passed on to her
surviving children, among them David Rosales, who thereupon became co-owners of the property. When David Rosales himself later
died, his own estate, which included his undivided interest over the property inherited from Macaria, passed on to his widow Socorro
and her co-heirs pursuant to the law on succession(Art 995 and 1001). Socorro and herein private respondents, along with the co-heirs
of David Rosales, thereupon became co-owners of the property that originally descended from Macaria.
As to the timeliness of the filing of the petition, the Court ruled that such was exercised on time. Concededly, no written notice of the
sale was given by the Burdeos heirs (vendors) to the co-owners required under Article 1623 of the Civil Code. Hence, the thirty-day
period of redemption had yet to commence when private respondent Rosales sought to exercise the right of redemption on 31 March
1987, a day after she discovered the sale from the Office of the City Treasurer of Butuan City, or when the case was initiated, on 16
October 1987, before the trial court. The written notice of sale is mandatory. This Court has long established the rule that
notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner in order to
remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and status.
David T. Tolentino CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
251
262) FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant, vs.GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO,

CATALINA FERARIS DE VILLEGAS, JUANITO FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS, oppositors-appellees.
G.R. No. L-19382 August 31, 1965
FACTS:
Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided
in Manilacontinuously until 1944. More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was
declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and distributing her estate among her heirs.
Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City. The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse,
but was survived only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedent's father,
Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the
children of Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent).
The trial court ruled that the appellees, as children of the only predeceased brother of the decedent, are nearer in degree than the
appellant since nieces and nephews succeed by right of representation.
ISSUE:
Who amongst the claimants are entitled to the inheritance?
HELD:
We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in
the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and then
descending to the heir. Appellant is likewise right in her contention that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of
representation (i.e., per stripes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased.
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other
collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. Under Article 1009, the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and
nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession.
Brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other collaterals succeeded
only after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and
nieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the latter vis-a-vis the other collaterals.
Therefore, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are
willing and qualified to succeed.
263) BICOMONG vs. ALMANZA
G.R. No. L-37365 Nov. 29, 1977
Facts:
Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas having three children: Perpetua, Igmedia and Ignacio. When Sisenda died, Simeon
married Silvestra producing two children: Felipa and Maura.
The subject matter of the complaint concerns the one-half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the 5 parcels of land which she
inherited from her deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso.
Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint, namely: (a) the Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos, children of
Igmedia Bagsic; and (c) Francisco Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City against the
defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio Menese for the recovery of their lawful shares in the properties left by Maura Bagsic.
After the death of Maura Bagsic, properties passed on to Cristela Almanza who took charge of the administration of the same.
Thereupon, the plaintiffs approached her and requested for the partition of their aunt's properties. However, they were prevailed upon
by Cristeta Almanza not to divide the properties yet as the expenses for the last illness and burial of Maura Bagsic had not yet been
paid. Having agreed to defer the partition of the same, the plaintiffs brought out the subject again sometime in 1959 only. This time
Cristeta Almanza acceded to the request as the debts, accordingly, had already been paid. Unfortunately, she died without the division
of the properties having been effected, thereby leaving the possession and administration of the same to the defendants.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. The respondents have the right to inherit from Maura by right of
representation. CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
252
The appellate court certified the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the nephews and nieces from the brothers and sisters whether full or half blood has the right to inherit
Held:
Yes. The nephews and nieces from the brothers and sisters whether full or half blood has the right to inherit.
In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, Art. 1003 of the NCC provides that collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. It appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her
husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her
sister of full blood and the ten (10) children of her brother and two (2) sisters of half blood in accordance with the provision of Art.
975 of the NCC.
Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to whether the nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal
line and without preference as to whether their relationship to the deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole niece of whole blood of
the deceased does not exclude the ten nephews and n of half blood. The only difference in their right of succession is provided in Art.
1008, NCC in relation to Art. 1006 of the NCC, which provisions, in effect, entitle the sole niece of full blood to a share double that of
the nephews and nieces of half blood.
264) CITY OF MANILA VS. ARCHBISHOP
G.R. No. L-10033 / August 30, 1917
FACTS: In 1668, Ana Sarmiento resided with her husband in the City of Manila. She owned properties consisted of five parcels of
land in Malate and Paco. She made a will and later on added a codicil to said will. The will contained provisions for the establishment
of a "Capellania de Misas"; that the first chaplain of said capellania should be her nephew Pedro del Castillo; that said will contained a
provision for the administration of said property in relation with the said "Capellania de Misas" succeeding administration should
continue perpetually. In 1672, Ana Sarmiento died. For more than two hundred years, respondent Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila, through his various agencies, has administered said property.
Petitioner city of Manila filed an action before the CFI to have declared escheated to the city of Manila the mentioned property. The
theory of the petitioner is that one Ana Sarmiento was the owner of said property and died in the year 1668 without leaving "her or
person entitled to the same." However, the respondent opposed alleging that it has rightfully and legally succeeded to the possession
and administration of the property in accordance with the terms and provisions of the will of Ana Sarmiento.
The trial court denied the petition.
ISSUE: Whether the property can be escheated in favor of City of Manila.
HELD: No
Section 750 of Act No. 190 provides when property may be declared escheated. It provides, "when a person dies intestate, seized of
real or personal property . . . leaving no heir or person by law entitled to the same," that then and in that case such property under the
procedure provided for by sections 751 and 752, may de declared escheated.
The proof shows that Ana Sarmiento did not die intestate. She left a will. The will provides for the administration of said property by
her nephew as well as for the subsequent administration of the same. She did not die without an heir nor without persons entitled to
administer her estate. It further shows that she did not die without leaving a person by law entitled to inherit her property. Therefore,
the property in question cannot be declared escheated.
The will clearly, definitely and unequivocally defines and designates what disposition shall be made of the property in question. The
heir mentioned in said will evidently accepted its terms and permitted the property to be administered in accordance therewith. And,
so far as the record shows, it is still being administered in accordance with the terms of said will for the benefit of the real beneficiary
as was intended by the original owner.
265) TORRES vs. LOPEZ
G.R. No. L-25966 November 1, 1926
FACTS:
Tomas Rodriguez, had been judicially declared incapable of taking care of himself and had been placed under the care of his cousin
Vicente F. Lopez, as guardian. The will instituted as universal heirs of all his property his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno and cousin
Lopez. Lopez died 4 days from the time the will was made and the testator died CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)
253
about a month thereafter. The time the will was made Lopez had not presented his final accounts as guardian, and no such accounts
had been presented by him at the time of his death.
Margarita Lopez was a cousin and nearest relative of the decedent, filed a case claiming half of the estate of Tomas by intestate
succession as next of kin and nearest heir. Luz, on the other hand, claims the same by accretion and in the character of universal heir
under the will of Tomas. Appellant contends that there has supervened a partial intestacy with respect to the half of the estate which
was intended for Vicente F. Lopez and that this half has descended to the appellant.
The trial court ruled in favor of Luz.
ISSUE:
Whether or not one-half of the estate of Tomas Rodriquez should go to Margarita Lopez being the next of kin and nearest heir of
Vicente Lopez or to his daughter by accretion?
HELD:
Article 753 of the Civil Code which in effect declares that, with certain exceptions in favor of near relatives, no testamentary provision
shall be valid when made by a ward in favor of his guardian before the final accounts of the latter have been approved. This provision
is of undoubted application to the situation before the court and the provision made in the will of Tomas Rodriguez in favor of Vicente
F. Lopez was not any general incapacity on his part, but a special incapacity due to the accidental relation of guardian and ward
existing between the parties.
Accretion takes place in a testamentary success when two or more persons are called to the same inheritance or the same portion
thereof without special designation of shares and secondly, when one of the persons so called dies before the testator or renounces the
inheritance or is disqualified to receive it. In the case before us we have a will calling Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter, Luz Lopez de
Bueno, to the same inheritance without special designation of shares. In addition to this, one of the persons named as heir has
predeceased the testator, this person being also disqualified to receive the estate even if he had been alive at the time of the testator's
death by reason of his being then the legal guardian of the testator with accounts unsettled, does not make a case for intestate
succession as to his part of the estate. This article (982) is the exact application to the case and its effect is to give to the survivor, Luz
Lopez de Bueno, not only the undivided half which she would have received in conjunction with her father if he had been alive and
qualified to take, but also the half which pertained to him. There was no error whatever, therefore in the order of the trial court
declaring Luz Lopez de Bueno entitled to the whole estate.
266) NEPOMUCENO vs. IAC

139 SCRA 206
FACTS:
On July 16, 1974, Martin Jugo died and left a will. In the said will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J.
Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain
Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully
wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. The estate was devised to his legal heirs, except the free portion
which was devised to petitioner. Petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the will but was denied by the court on the opposition of
the legal heirs on the ground that petitioner admitted her living in concubinage with the testator, thus, she is wanting in integrity and
letters testamentary should not be issued to her.
The Court of Appeals declared the will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void, Petitioner contends
that the lower court has no jurisdiction in passing upon the question of the intrinsic validity of the will.
ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court may pass upon the provisions of the will.
HELD: NO.
The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the
intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic
validity of the will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will. The fact that the probate court
declared a devise made in a will null and void will be sustained where no useful CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)
254
purpose will be served by requiring the filing of a separate civil action and restricting the court only to the issue of extrinsic validity of
the will. There is no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified provision to the proper court in a separate action
for that purpose simply because, in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
The prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between persons who are living in adultery or
concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very
wordings of the will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had
been living in concubinage.
267) PASTOR vs. CA
122 SCRA 885
FACTS:
Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.), a Spanish subject, died in Cebu City on June 5, 1966, survived by his Spanish wife Sofia Bossio
(who also died), their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (PASTOR, JR.) and Sofia Pastor de Midgely (SOFIA), and an
illegitimate child, not natural, by the name of Lewellyn Barlito Quemada (QUEMADA).
QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of PASTOR, SR., which contained a legacy
in favor of Quenada consisting of 30% of Pastor Sr.’s 42% share in the operation of Atlas Mining.
PASTOR, JR. and his wife claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights, and not by inheritance Thus, Quemada appointed as
special administrator filed for reconveyance of said claims of alleged properties including the subject of legacy.
ISSUE:
Whether the probate order resolved with finality the questions of ownership.
Whether the probate ordere resolved the intrinsic validity of the will.
HELD:
In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will, As a rule, the
question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may
pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action
to resolve title.
Probate court erred in assuming in its implementing order that the probate order adjudged the issues of ownership. In case of death of
one of the spouses, their respective rights must be liquidated and the debts paid in the succession proceedings for the deceased spouse.
Certiorari is proper where probate court issued erroneous implementing orders of its probate order. Legacy made in a will cannot be
distributed without a prior liquidation of the decedent’s estate and payment of debts and taxes. A legacy is not a debt of the estate for
which a writ of execution may issue. An order of execution that varies the terms of a final order can be questioned in a certiorari
proceeding.
268) SANCHEZ vs. CA
G.R. No. 108947 September 29, 1997
FACTS:
Private respondent Rosalia S. Lugod is the only child of spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca while Arturo S. Lugod,
Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto S. Lugod are the legitimate children of Rosalia. Petitioners Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and
Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez, are the illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez. Rosalia filed a petition for letters of administration
over the estate of her mother following her death and the estate of her father, Juan, who was at the time in a state of senility. But
before the administration proceedings could formally be terminated and closed, Juan died. Such that petitioners as heirs of Juan, filed
a petition for letters of administration over the intestate estate of Juan, which petition was opposed by Rosalia. Thereafter, Rosalia and
petitioners executed a Compromise Agreement wherein they agreed to divide the properties enumerated therein of the late Juan
Sanchez. Petitioners filed a Motion to require administratrix, Rosalia, to deliver deficiency of 24 hectares and/or to set aside
compromise agreement. Private respondent Rosalia and petitioners entered into and executed a memorandum of agreement which
modified the compromise agreement. Nine years later, petitioners filed a motion to require Rosalia to CIVIL LAW REVIEW I -
255
submit a new inventory and to render an accounting over properties not included in the compromise agreement. They likewise filed a
motion to defer the approval of the compromise agreement, in which they prayed for the annulment of the compromise agreement on
the ground of fraud.
The trial court declared the compromise agreement void and unenforceable, the same not having been approved by the intestate court
and that the same having been seasonably repudiated by petitioners on the ground of fraud. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court and declared the modified compromise agreement valid and binding. Petitioners contend that, because the compromise
agreement was executed during the pendency of the probate proceedings, judicial approval is necessary to shroud it with validity.
Issue: Whether or not the compromise agreement entered by the parties during the pendency of probate proceedings is valid and
binding.
Held: Yes. Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise agreement as "a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced." Being a consensual contract, it is perfected upon the meeting
of the minds of the parties. Judicial approval is not required for its perfection. Petitioners' argument that the compromise was not valid
for lack of judicial approval is not novel; the same was raised in Mayuga vs. Court of Appeals, where the Court ruled: “It is alleged
that the lack of judicial approval is fatal to the compromise. A compromise is a consensual contract. As such, it is perfected upon the
meeting of the minds of the parties to the contract. And from that moment not only does it become binding upon the parties, it also has
upon them the effect and authority of res judicata (Civil Code, Art. 2037), even if not judicially approved .” In the case before us, it is
ineludible that the parties knowingly and freely entered into a valid compromise agreement. Adequately assisted by their respective
counsels, they each negotiated its terms and provisions for four months; in fact, said agreement was executed only after the fourth
draft. As noted by the trial court itself, the first and second drafts were prepared successively in July, 1969; the third draft on
September 25, 1969; and the fourth draft, which was finally signed by the parties on October 30, 1969, followed. Since this
compromise agreement was the result of a long drawn out process, with all the parties ably striving to protect their respective interests
and to come out with the best they could, there can be no doubt that the parties entered into it freely and voluntarily. Accordingly, they
should be bound thereby. To be valid, it is merely required under the law to be based on real claims and actually agreed upon in good
faith by the parties thereto. Indeed, compromise is a form of amicable settlement that is not only allowed but also encouraged in civil
cases. Article 2029 of the Civil Code mandates that a "court shall endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree upon some
fair compromise."In opposing the validity and enforcement of the compromise agreement, petitioners harp on the minority of Florida
Mierly, Alfredo and Myna. Citing Article 2032 of the Civil Code, they contend that the court's approval is necessary in compromises
entered into by guardians and parents in behalf of their wards or children. However, we observe that although denominated a
compromise agreement, the document in this case is essentially a deed of partition, pursuant to Article 1082 of the Civil Code which
provides that "[e]very act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a
partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction."For a partition to be valid,
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, requires the concurrence of the following conditions: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the
decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3) the heirs and liquidators are all of age, or if they are minors,
the latter are represented by their judicial guardian or legal representatives; and (4) the partition was made by means of a public
instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds. We find that all the foregoing requisites are present in this case. We
therefore affirm the validity of the parties' compromise agreement/partition in this case.
269) NAZARENO VS. CA
343 SCRA 637
FACTS
Maximinoo Nazareno Sr. and Aurea Poblete were husband and wife. Aurea died on April 15, 1970 , while Maximo Sr. died on
December 18, 1980 . They were survived by their children, Natividad, Romeo, Jose, Pacifico and Maximinoo Jr. Maximinoo Jr. and
Natividad are petitioners in this case, while Romeo and his wife are respondents.
Deceased spouses Nazareno acquired properties in Quezon City and in Cavite . It is the ownership of CIVIL LAW REVIEW I -
256
some of these properties that is in question in this case.
It appears that after the death of Maximino Sr. Romeo filed an intestate case in the CFI of Cavite. Romeo was appointed administrator
of his father’s estate. In the course of the proceedings, Romeo discovered that his parents executed several deeds of sale conveying a
number of real properties in favor of his sister, Natividad. This involved 6 lots in QC one of which is a lot occupied by Romeo and his
wife. This lot was later sold by Natividad to Maximino Jr.
Romeo filed on behalf of the estate of Maximino Sr., a case for annulment of sale with damages against Natividad and Maximino Jr.
on the ground that both sales were void for lack of consideration. Trial Court rendered judgement declaring the nullity of the deed of
sale. CA modified RTC, ordered lots cancelled and restored to the estate of Maximino Sr.
ISSUE: Whether upon death of the deceased spouses their estate alone can seek the annulment of said sale? Whether the sale is valid?
HELD
The petition is without merit.
The fact that other properties had allegedly been sold by the spouses Maximino Sr. and Aurea does not necessarily show that the deed
of sale made in favor of Natividad is valid.
The trial court and CA found that the Nazareno spouses transferred their properties to their children by fictitious sales in order to avoid
payment of inheritance taxes. It was also found out that Natividad had no means to pay for the six lots subject of the deed of sale.
The estate of Maximino alone cannot contest the validity of the deed of sale because the estate of Aurea has not been settled. CA
decision affirmed.
270) ZARAGOZA VS. CA
341 SCRA 309
FACTS
Flavio Zaragoza Cano was a registered owner of certain parcels of land situated at the municipalities of Cabatuan, New Lucena and
Sta. Barbara, Iloilo . He had four children, Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentina and Alberta . On Decemeber 1964 he died without a will.
Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan filed a complaint against Florentino for delivery of her inheritance share, consisting of lots 943 and 871 and
for payment of damages. She claims that, his father in his lifetime partitioned the said properties among his children. The shares of her
brothers and sisters were given to them in advance by way of deed of sale, but without valid consideration. Her share, lots 943 and
871 were not conveyed then. She averred that because of her marriage, she became an American citizen and was prohibited to acquire
lands in the Philippines except by hereditary succession.
Petitioners denied that there was partition of the estate of their father during his lifetime. The trial court ruled and ordered adjudication
lot 871 to the plaintiff Alberta , the claim for lot 943 is dismissed. Ca reversed RTC in so far as lot 943 is concerned, ordered Alberta
as owner of lot 943.
ISSUE: 1. Whether the partition inter vivos by Flavio Zaragoza of his properties which includes lot 871 and 943 valid?
2. Whether the validity of the sale and consequently, the TCT over lot 943 registered in the name of Petitioners Florentina be a valid
subject matter of the entire proceeding for the delivery of the inheritance share.
HELD
This court affirms the decision of CA, lots 871 and 943 were inheritance shares of respondent, based on documentary evidence and
testimonial evidence. Partition during the lifetime of Flavio zaragoza is valid. It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter
vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Article 1080 of the Civil Code is clear, the petition, must be dismissed
without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding were all the indispensable parties are present for the rightful determination of
their respective legitime.
Second Issue. Petition is a collateral attack. It is not allowed by Sec 48 of PD 1529. The certificate, in absence of fraud, is eveidence
of title and shows exactly the real interest of the owner. The title once registered. Should not be thereafter impugned, altered or
changed except in direct proceeding permitted by law. CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-
Paguirigan
257
271) MENDOZA VS CA
199 SCRA 778
FACTS
Petitioner Mendoza I et al instituted before CFI of Bulacan an action for reconveyance of real property against private respondents
spouses Samonte. Petitioners are legitimate children of deceased Mendoza , Trinidad , their mother sold a parcel of land to
respondents spouses Samonte. Petitioners aver that they are entitled to legal redemption.
According to the plaintiff, the sale of the disputed property in favor of the defendants was null and void on the ground that, as a mere
co-owner of an undivided estate, Trinidad Mendoza had no right to divide the estate into parts and then convey a part thereof by metes
and bounds to a third person, since there had never been any partition, judicial or extra judicial, of the estate among the heirs of their
late father, Arcadio.
The trial court dismissed the the petitioner’s complaint. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether the deed of sale is void? Whether petitioners can still exercise the right of legal redemption?
HELD:
Petitioner Trinidad is not entitled to one-half (1/2) of said lot but only to the share of one legitimate child or 1 and 1/3 rights and
interest, citing article 996 of the Civil Code.
The deed of sale is void insofar as it affects the rights and interests of other petitioners because petitioner Trinidad can only sell her 1
1/3 rights and interest over the said lot and no more than that. Corollary, the remaining petitioners can still exercise the right of legal
redemption, conformably with Article 1620 of the civil code.
272) AZNAR BROTHERS REALT CO. VS CA
327 SCRA 359
FACTS
Lot no. 4399 containing an area of 34,325 square meters located at Brgy. Mactan, Lapu Lapu City was acquired By Aznar from the
heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on by virtue of an extrajudicial Partition of real estate with deed of absolute sale.
Private respondents were allegedly allowed to occupy portions of lot 4399 provided that they leave the land in the event that the
company would use the property for its purpose. Later, Aznar entered into a joint venture with Sta. Lucia Realty for development of
the subject lot into a multi-million peso housing subdivision and beach resort.
When demands to vacate failed, Aznar filed with MTCC a case for unlawful detainer and damages. Private Respondents alleged that
they are the successors and descendants of the eight children of the late Crisanta and that they had been residing in the concept of
owner since the time of their parents and grandparents. They claim that the deed of absolute sale was simulated and fraudulent. Thus
files with RTC a complaint seeking to declare the subject document null and void.
MTCC favored Aznar. RTC ordered demolition. CA reversed and set aside RTC and declared Private Respondents as the rightful
possessors.
ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale is valid.
HELD:
Private respondents claim that not all the known heirs participated in the extrajudicial partition, and that two persons who participated
and were made parties thereto were not the heirs of Crisanta.
This claim even if true would not warrant rescission of the deed. Article 1104 of the Civil Code as to parties who were allegedly not
heirs, article 1105 is in point.
Extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale is a notarized document. As such, it has in its favor the presumption of regularity and
it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. It is admissible in evidence without further proof
of authenticity. Decision of RTC reinstated.
273) RALLA VS. UNTALAN
L-63253-54 APRIL 27 1989
FACTS
Rosendo Ralla, a widower, filed a petition for the probate of his will in the RTC of Albay. In his will he left his entire estate to his son,
Pablo (herein petitioner substituted by heirs), leaving nothing to his other son, Pedro. CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-
2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
258
At the same time, Pedro filed an action for the partition of the estate of their mother, Paz. With this case, the brothers agreed to
amicably compromise via project partition, whereby sixty-three parcels of land, apparently forming the estate of their deceased mother
was divided between them.
In the course of the proceeding for the probate of Rosendo, Pablo filed a motion to dismiss the petition for probate on the ground that
he was no longer interested in the allowance of the will of his late father for its probate would no longer be beneficial to him. This
motion was denied, it was also denied at the CA. In its decision the CA said, indeed the petitioner stood to gain if the testate
proceedings were to be dismissed because then he would not be compelled to submit for inclusion in the inventory of the estate of
Rosendo comprising 149 parcels of land from which he alone had been collecting rentals and receiving income, to the exclusion and
prejudiced of hi s brother who was being deprived of his successional rights. Consequently, the court declared Pedro and Pablo the
only heirs of Rosendo who should share equally upon the division of the latter’s estate and thereupon converted the testate
proceedings into one of intestacy.
After eleven years, one Joaquin Chancoco brother in law of Pablo filed a petition for the probate of the same will of Rosendo on the
ground that the decedent owed him P5000. The petition for probate was granted. Teodorico Almine, son-in-law of Pablo was
appointed special administrator, over and above the objections of the heirs of Pedro. In taking possession, Teoderico also took
possession of the 63 parcels of land subject of the partition earlier.
Judge Untalan orderd that the 63 parcels of land should be included in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Rosendo and
thereafter proceed as probate proceedings. After 2 years, Judge Untalan reconsidered his order and held that the project partition is
respected and upheld.
Petitioners filed an MR but was denied hence the instant case.
ISSUE: Whether the partition should be regarded or respected in view with the probate proccedings of the estate of Rosendo
HELD:
Verily, the rule that there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the will has been probated. This, of course, presupposes
that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced in the will. Thus this rule invoked, is inapplicable in the instant
case where there are two separate cases each involving the estate of two different person comprising dissimilar properties.
The project partition is valid and binding upon the brothers as well as upon their heirs especially as this was accompanied by delivery
of possession to them of their respective shares. They are duty bound to respect the division agreed upon by them and embodied in the
document of partition.
Thus the petitioner could no longer question the exclusion of the lands subject of the partition from the proceedings for the settlement
of the estate of Rosendo. Petition dismissed.
274) FELIX BALANAY, Jr. vs. Martinez
L-39247 June 27, 1975
FACTS
Leodegaria Julian died in Davao City , she was survived by her husband Felix Balanay Sr. and by their 6 children, Felix Jr., Avelina,
Beatriz, Carolina Delia and Emilia.
Felix Jr. filed in the lower court a petition for the probate of his mother’s notarial will. In the said will, it was declared that, 1.) She
was the owner of the southern half of the nine conjugal lots, 2.) That it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among
her heirs during her husband’s lifetime. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed
of in the will her husband’s one half share of the conjugal assets.
Feliz Sr. and Avelina opposed the probate on the ground of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence preterition of the husband
and alleged improper partitioned of the conjugal estate. They claim that Felix Jr. should collate certain properties which he had
received from the testatrix. Felix Jr. in his reply attatched an affidavit signed by Feliz Sr waiving and renouncing hereditary rigts in the
estate of his wife in favor of their children. Avelina contended that the affidavit was void. Lower court denied and gave effect to the
affidavit and conformity of Felix Sr.
In the meantime, A lawyer Montana appeared claiming to be a lawyer of Felix Jr, he filed a motion CIVIL LAW REVIEW I -
259
to withdraw the probate and to proceed by intestae estae proceeding. The lower court adopted the view of Atty , Montana that the will
was void. So, it dismissed the petition for probate and converted the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding.
ISSUE: Whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal
validity, and declaring it void.
HELD
We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to
withdraw the petition for probate. The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will’s intrinsic validity even before its formal
validity had been established. But the probate court erred in declaring the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into
an intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that in its order it gave effect to the surviving husband’s conformity to the will and to
his renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably included in one-half share of the conjugal estate.
The rule is that “the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other
dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition
had not been made.” (Art.792 CC) “Where some valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without defeating
the intention of the testator or interfering with the general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries.”
The provision of the will of the testatrix should not be divided among her heirs during her husband’s lifetime but should be kept intact
and that the legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code.
Felix Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of the conjugal partnership (Art. 179 and Art 1041 CC) but
insofar as said renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal estate (1061 CC) it
should be subject to the limitations prescribed in Articles 750 and 752 of the CC. A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the
widower for his support and maintenance or at least his legitime should be respected.
In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to partition the conjugal estate in the manner set forth
in paragraph V of her will. It is true that she could dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal estate but since the husband, after
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to her testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such partition has become
valid assuming that the will may be probated.
In the instant case, the preterited heir was the husband, the surviving spouse. His preteritiion did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he
signified his conformity to his wife’s will and renounced his hereditary rights.
Hearing for the petition for probate affirmed.
275) Amorante Plan vs. IAC
L-65656 February 28,1985
FACTS
In the intestate proceeding for the settlement of Regino Bautista’s estate, his widow filed a motion dated December 9, 1964 for
authority to sell to Plan the two lots and theater for not less than P140,000. The purpose was to pay the debts amounting to P117,220.
The motion was set for hearing. It was indicated that the children were notified through one child Milagros Bautista.
Judge Jimenez of the probate court granted the authority to sell to Plan the entire estate of the deceased for not less than P140,000 so
as to pay the obligations of the estate, appearing that all heirs have conformed thereto.
On that day, Florencia and Plan executed a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage obligations for the two lots. A motion to approve
the sale was filed. Judge signed the original deed of sale under the word approved to indicate that the sale was okayed by probate
court.
Sixteen days after the sale an opposition to the agreement of absolute sale was filed by Federico Bautista child of the deceased.
Federico’s counsel did not file any objection to the project of partition as per order by the Judge. The reason is not hard to surmise.
The estate sought to be partitioned had already been sold to Plan. CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana
Martin-Paguirigan
260
Federico contended that because there was no compliance with Section 7 Rule 89 of the Rules of Court the sale was void. Instead of
asking the court to act on his petition for relief from the orders authorizing and approving the sale, Federico filed a separate action
against Plan to nullify the sale. Judge dismissed the action. He ruled that the nullity of the sael as to Federico’s 1/16 share should be
resolved in the intestae proceeding. He filed three times same action, all have been dismissed.
Ca ruled in favor of Federico, it declared void the agreement to sell based on article 1088 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether Federico could nullify in a separate action, instead of an intestate proceeding his father’s estate, the sale of two
conjugal lots made by his mother, with authorization and approval of the probate court.
HELD
We hold that the appellate court erred in ordering Plan to reconvey the disputed property to Federico. Said judgment is bereft of
factual and legal basis. Federico did not pray for reconveyance he prayed for receivership for nullification of the agreement to sell and
the sale itself. Article 1088 of the Civil Code does not justify legal redemption in this case because it refers to the sale of hereditary
rights, and not to specific properties, for the payment of the debts of the decedent’s estate as to which there is no legal redemption.
In the instant case we agree with the decision of the Judges that Federico’s remedy is in the intestate proceeding where his petition for
relief has been pending for nearly twenty years.
276) Maria Bicarme vs. CA and Cristina Bicarme
L-51914 June 6, 1990
FACTS
Maria Bicarme and Cristina Bicarme are the only surviving co-heirs and co-owners and entitled in equal shares over the parcel of
lands (cornland and Riceland) in litigation. Spouses Bicarme died intestate and were survived by children, Maria and Victoria (mother
of Cristina). Cristina instituted this action for partition, because her aunt, Maria refused to share with her the yearly fruits of the
disputed parcels of lan. Maria howeve, maintains that “she acquired these two parcels of land from deceased spouses Bidaya and since
then until the present, had been in open, public, peaceful and contionous, adverse possession and enjoyment in the concept of absolute
owner. Maria further claims that Cristina never shared or contributed to the payment of taxes of said two parcels of land.
The trial court stated that the provision in the deed of sale (Maria subscribed that the property is inherited from her father) was in the
nature of trust provision in favor of Cristina as co-owner and co-heir.
ISSUE:
Who has ownership rights over the litigated parcels of land
HELD: We agree with the trial court. By admitting that the cornland is inherited property, Maria in effect recognized Critina’s rights
thereto as a co-owner co-heir.
Having established that Critina’s co-ownership rights, maria nonetheless insists that Cristina’s rights are barred by prescription under
secs 40 and 42 of act 190 / art 1116 of the Civil Code where the longest period of both acquisitive and extinctive prescription is ten
years. In the present case, Cristina, it is alleged, asserted her claims 34 yers after her right of action accrued. On Maria’s claims of
acquisitive prescription, the trial court held that Maria was a trustee with respect to Cristina’s share. As such, prescription, as a mode
of acquiring title, could not apply.
An action for partition implies that the thing is still owned in common. If a co-owner holds the property in exclusive adverse
possession as owner, asserting the property in exclusive dominion for a required period, he can acquire sole title to it as against co-
heirs or co-owners. The imprescriptibly of an action for partition cannot thus be invoked when one of the co-owners has possessed the
property as exclusive owner, and for a period sufficient to acquire it by prescription. From the moment one of the co0owners claims
that he is absolute owner and denies other any question involve is no longer of partition but of ownership.
Acquisitive prescription cannot apply in this case.

A mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents fruits or profit from the property cannot serve as proof of exclusive
ownership, it is not borne out of clear and complete evidence that he exercise acts of possession which unequivocally constitute an
ouster of the other co-owners. Cristina’s rights to partition will therefore prosper

Paguirigan 19. Succession

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Descrizione originale:

Titolo originale

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Paguirigan 19. Succession

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

CASES IN SUCCESSION

G.R. No. L-4963, January 29, 1953

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

May Maria Unson validly renounce her future inheritance?

Pataueg, Nick Jr. y Alversado

Succession as a Mode of Transferring Ownership

G.R. No. 103577. October 7, 1996

CA: Affirmed the same.

Pataueg, Nick Jr. y Alversado

G.R. No. L-14127, August 21, 1962

Pataueg, Nick Jr. y Alversado

G.R. No. L-4170, January 31, 1952

Pataueg, Nick Jr. y Alversado

G.R. No. L-44837, November 23, 1938

Pataueg, Nick Jr. y Alversado

G.R. No. 118248, April 5, 2000

CA: affirmed in toto.

Pataueg, Nick Jr. y Alversado

254 SCRA 711

204) LORENZO VS POSADAS

205) CASTAÑEDA vs. ALEMANY

206) IN RE WILL OF RIOSA

Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:

207) ENRIQUEZ VS ABADIA

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto.

210) Bugnao v. Ubag

The order probating the will affirmed.

211) JULIANA BAGTAS, plaintiffs-appellee, vs. ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

HELD: CFI AFFIRMED

212) TRINIDAD NEYRA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ENCARNACION NEYRA, defendant-appellee

2. WHETHER THE WITNESSES WERE PRESENT IN THE SIGNING OF THE WILL

HELD: PETITION DENIED, CA AFFIRMED

ISSUE: WAS THE WILL VALIDLY EXECUTED?

HELD: CFI AFFIRMED

Section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure, strictly provides that:

214) GERMAN JABONETA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. RICARDO GUSTILO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

HELD: TRIAL COURT REVERSED

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan

HELD: lower court affirmed

HELD: CFI AFFIRMED

HELD: CFI REVERSED

218) BEATRIZ NERA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. NARCISA RIMANDO, defendant-appellant..

HELD: LOWER COURT AFFIRMED

222 SCRA 781

a) The number of pages

220) AZNAR VS GARCIA

ISSUE:WON Helen is entitled to ½ share of the estate?

221) CRUZ VS VILLASOR

222) KALAW VS RELOVA

132 SCRA 237

236 SCRA 488

ISSUE: WON the will is valid?

(1) whether the instrument submitted is the decedent’s will

184 SCRA 170

ISSUE: WON the alleged holographic will is dated?

225) PEREZ VS TOLETE

232 SCRA 722

226) TESTATE ESTATE OF BOHANAN

106 PHIL. 997

227) Testate Estate of Maloto

158 SCRA 451

Whether or not the will was revoked by Adriana.