H1. Marcos v. Manglapus 177 SCRA 668 - 178 SCRA 760

Cyril N.
Frias
Section JD 1-B
Constitutional Law 1
Soliven v. Makasiar 167 SCRA 393
FACTS:
Petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential

immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal
proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may
subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's
jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of
immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself
to possible contempt of court or perjury.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate
criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
RULING:
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is
to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that,
aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the
office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the
President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is
complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from
proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from
waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded
by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise
the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot
be assumed and imposed by any other person.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Ermita
FACTS:
On 11 and 12 June 2006, the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)
conducted the Nursing Board Examinations nationwide. In June 2006, licensure
applicants wrote the PRC to report that handwritten copies of two sets of examinations
were circulated during the examination period... among the examinees reviewing at the
R.A. Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review Center.
George Cordero, Inress Review Center's President, was then the incumbent
President of the Philippine Nurses Association. On 18 August 2006, the Court of Appeals
restrained the PRC from proceeding with the oath-taking of the successful examinees set
on 22 August 2006.
Consequently, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) replaced all
the members of the PRC's Board of Nursing. President Arroyo also ordered the
examinees to re-take the Nursing Board Examinations. On 8 September 2006, President
Arroyo issued EO 566 which authorized the CHED to supervise the establishment and
operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines.
The Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an organization of
independent review centers, asked the CHED to "amend, if not withdraw" the IRR arguing,
among other things, that giving permits to... operate a review center to Higher Education
Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will effectively
abolish independent review centers.
While it may be true that regulation of review centers is not one of the mandates
of CHED under Republic Act 7722, however, on September 8, 2006, Her Excellency,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, issued Executive Order No. 566 directing the
Commission on Higher
Education to regulate the establishment and operation of review centers and
similar entities in the entire country.
With the issuance of the aforesaid Executive Order, the CHED now is the agency
that is mandated to regulate the establishment and operation of all review centers as
provided for under Section 4 of the Executive Order which provides that "No review center
or similar... entities shall be established and/or operate review classes without the
favorable expressed indorsement of the CHED and without the issuance of the necessary
permits or authorizations to conduct review classes. x x x"
ISSUES:
Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative
power as it expands the CHED's jurisdiction; and
Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executive's rule-making power.
RULING:
Executive Order No. 566, which grants the CHED the power to regulate review
center, is unconstitutional as it expands Republic Act No. 7722,. The CHED’s coverage
under RA 7722 is limited to public and private institutions of higher education and degree-
granting programs in all public and private post-secondary educational institutions. EO
566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review centers and
similar entities. A review center is not an institution of higher learning as contemplated
by RA 7722. It does not offer a degree-granting program that would put it under the
jurisdiction of the CHED.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel, supra
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of
Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP MILF Tripoli Agreement on
Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel
Piñol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with
Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order, invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners
seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official
copies of the MAAD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOAAD and the holding of
public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOAAD be declared
unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the power to conduct Peace Negotiations.
RESOLUTION:
Yes. The authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel
groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no
such authority. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,168 in issue was the authority of the
President to declare a state of rebellion - an authority which is not expressly provided
for in the Constitution. The Court held thus: "In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus,
Justice Cortes put her thesis into jurisprudence. There, the Court, by a slim 8-7 margin,
upheld the President's power to forbid the return of her exiled predecessor. The
rationale for the majority's ruling rested on the President's unstated residual powers
which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to
comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not
limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department
and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed
intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of
the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result
was a limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to the
commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive
power.
Thus, the President's authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main
from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her
Commander-in-Chief powers.
Similarly, the President's power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly
included in her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. As Chief
Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as
Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion
and lawless violence.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
Biraogo vs.Philippine Truth Commission of 2010

G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
Facts:
The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner
Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive
Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article
VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a
public office and to appropriate funds therefor. The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman,
Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-
legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives. The genesis of the
foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when
then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and
corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people,
convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the
good senator to the presidency. To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President
Aquino found a need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption
allegedly committed during the previous administration. Thus, at the dawn of his
administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing
the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).
Issue:
WON the provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987
cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally
reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does
not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent
like the "Truth Commission."
Ruling:
Yes. The president has the authority to establish an Ad Hoc Committee. In his
memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a public
office and not merely an adjunct body of the Office of the President. Thus, in order that the
President may create a public office he must be empowered by the Constitution, a statute or
an authorization vested in him by law. According to petitioner, such power cannot be
presumed since there is no provision in the Constitution or any specific law that authorizes
the President to create a truth commission. He adds that Section 31 of the Administrative
Code of 1987, granting the President the continuing authority to reorganize his office,
cannot serve as basis for the creation of a truth commission considering the aforesaid
provision merely uses verbs such as "reorganize," "transfer," "consolidate," "merge," and
"abolish." Insofar as it vests in the President the plenary power to reorganize the Office of
the President to the extent of creating a public office, Section 31 is inconsistent with the
principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution and must be deemed
repealed upon the effectivity thereof.
Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators argue that the creation of a public office
lies within the province of Congress and not with the executive branch of government. They
maintain that the delegated authority of the President to reorganize under Section 31 of the
Revised Administrative Code: 1) does not permit the President to create a public office,
much less a truth commission; 2) is limited to the reorganization of the administrative
structure of the Office of the President; 3) is limited to the restructuring of the internal
organs of the Office of the President Proper, transfer of functions and transfer of agencies;
and 4) only to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. Such continuing authority of the
President to reorganize his office is limited, and by issuing Executive Order No. 1, the
President overstepped the limits of this delegated authority.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
Funa vs Agra, GR 191644 Feb 19 2013
FACTS:
Agra was then the Government Corporate Counsel when Pres Arroyo designated
him as the Acting Solicitor General in place of former Sol Gen Devanadera, who has been
appointed as the Secretary of Justice. Again, Agra was designated as the Acting
Secretary in place of Secretary Devanadera when the latter resigned. Agra then
relinquished his position as Corporate Counsel and continued to perform the duties of an
Acting Solicitor General.
Funa, a concerned citizen, questioned his appointment. Agra argued that his
concurrent designations were merely in a temporary capacity. Even assuming that he
was holding multiple offices at the same time, his designation as an Acting Sol Gen is
merely akin to a hold-over, so that he never received salaries and emoluments for being
the Acting Sol Gen when he was appointed as the Acting Secretary of Justice.
ISSUE:
whether or not Agra’s designation as Acting Secretary of Justice is valid and

whether or not Agra may concurrently hold the positions by virtue of the hold-over-
principle.
RULING:
NO. The court annuls and void the designation of Hon. Alberto C. Agra as Acting
Secretary of Justice in a concurrent capacity with his position as the Acting Solicitor
General for being unconstitutional and declares that Hon. Alberto C. Agra was a De Facto
officer during his tenure as Acting Secretary Justice.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317
Facts:
Petitioners questioned the validity of Executive Order No. 284 (EO No. 284), issued by former
President Corazon Aquino which allowed members of the Cabinet, their Undersecretaries and
Assistant Secretaries to hold other government positions in addition to their primary positions.
Petitioners argued that the provisions of EO 284 were in direct contrast with Section 13, Article
VII of the Constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other
office or employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1) the Vice
President may be appointed as a Cabinet member under Section 3(2) of Article VII; 2) The
Secretary of Justice is and ex-officio of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8, Article
VIII.
Issue:
Whether or not the EO No. 284 is constitutional.
Ruling:
No, it is unconstitutional.
The Court held that the legislative intent of the Constitutional provisions is to prevent government
officials from holding multiple positions in the government for self-enrichment which is a betrayal
of public trust. According to the Court, in construing the Constitution, one should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied.
In this case, the Court ruled the EO to be unconstitutional for violating the express mandate
provided by the Constitutional provisions (Sec. 13, Art. VII and Sec. 8, Art. VIII). The Constitution,
the fundamental law of the land, shall reign supreme over any other statute. When there is conflict,
it shall be resolved in favor of the highest law of the land.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
DENNIS A. B. FUNA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA

Facts:
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista as
Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) on
October 4, 2006. Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of
the department under Special Order No. 2006-171 dated October 23, 2006. On
September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T.
Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the
Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary. On October
21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer,
filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista's
appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any
other office or employment. Petitioner argues that Bautista's concurrent positions as
DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation of Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent
with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been
appointed, violated the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices for
Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants.
Ruling:
The petition is GRANTED. The designation of respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista as
Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Administrator, Maritime Industry Authority, in a
concurrent capacity with her position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport,
is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 13, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution and therefore, NULL and VOID.
While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by
the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. Since
the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the government
during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity. On
its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be
understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of
holding multiple government offices or employment. Respondent Bautista being then
the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by the stricter prohibition
under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution. And consequently, she cannot invoke
the exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another
office is allowed by law or the primary functions of the position.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
AYTONA VS CASTILLO
Posted by kaye lee on 11:22 PM
4 SCRA 1 G.R. No. L-19313 January 19 1962 [Midnight Appointment]
FACTS:
On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner
Dominador Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the
corresponding oath. On the same day, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal
assumed office; and on the next day, he issued administrative order no. 2 recalling,
withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointments made by former President
Garcia. There were all-in all, 350 midnight or last minute appointments made by the
former President Garcia. On January 1, President Macapagal appointed Andres
Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona instituted a case (quo
warranto) against Castillo, contending that he was validly appointed, thus the
subsequent appointment to Castillo by the new President, should be considered void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 350 midnight appointments of former President Garcia were valid.
RULING:
No. After the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, previous President
Garcia administration was no more than a care-taker administration. He was duty bound
to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority the incoming President, and he should not
do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his
successor. It was not for him to use powers as incumbent President to continue the
political warfare that had ended or to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve
partisan purposes. The filling up vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced
to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for
the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But
the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and planned induction of almost all of
them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason,
be regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being
apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and
other conditions, and thereby deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make
the corresponding appointments.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
In re appointment of Hon. MA Valenzuela and Hon. Villarta as RTC Judges

298 SCRA 408, dated March 30, 1998.
Facts:
Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the
President dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as
judges of the RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively.
These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15,
Art. VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional provision prohibits the President from
making any appointments two months immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Issue:
Is the appointment void or not?
Held:
The appointment is void.
During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution “two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term” the
President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so;
and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill
vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Sec.
15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes into effect once every 6 years.
The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta is considered void and unquestionably

made during the period of the ban. They come within the operation of the prohibition
relating to appointments under Sec 15, of Art. VII. The only exception mentioned in the
preceding mentioned constitutional provision if when the President or Acting President
appoint temporarily an executive position when the vacancies therein will prejudice
service or endanger public safety. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is
undoubtedly in the public interest, this is explicitly prohibited under under Sec 15, of Art.
VII.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
Arturo de Castro v. JBC and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
FACTS
This is a consolidated case which assails the constitutionality of the action of
former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo by appointing a Chief Justice 7 days after the
Presidential election in 2010. After the compulsory retirement of former Chief Justice
Reynato Puno, the position of Chief Justice was left vacant. Section 4 (1), in relation to
Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution states that, "vacancy shall be filled within ninety
days from occurrence thereof," from a, "List of nominees prepared by the Judicial Bar
Council for every vacancy" furthermore, Section 15, Article VII was also taken into
consideration which prohibits the President or the Acting President from making
appointments within two (2) months immediately before the next Presidential elections
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The
JBC agreed that the vacant position must be filled and there were five candidates for the
position from the most senior of the Associates of the court and one of them is Associate
Justice Reynato C. Corona who was chosen by the President and was appointed for the
position of Chief Justice. Office of the Solicitor General contends that the incumbent
President may appoint the next Chief Justice since the Constitution do not apply to the
Supreme Court. If the framers of the Constitution intended the prohibition to apply in the
Supreme Court then it should have expressly stated it in the Constitution.
ISSUE
Whether or not the President can appoint the successor of the Chief Justice.
RULING
Yes, the President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice as the prohibition
under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary. Two constitutional provisions
are seemingly in conflict. The first, Section 15, Article VII and the other, Section 4 (1),
Article VIII (Judicial Department). Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court,
they could have explicitly done so. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section
4 (1), Article VIII. Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same
character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section
14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders
conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion
is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference
to the context. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15
between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of
presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the
Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar
prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
SARMIENTO VS. MISON 156 SCRA 154, 1987
FACTS:
The petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador
Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of
Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and emoluments,
on the ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is
unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of
respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.
ISSUES:
1. What are the groups of officers whom the President shall appoint?
2. Whether or not confirmation of the appointments of Commissioners of the
Bureau of Customs by the Commission on Appointments required.
RULING:
1. Under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4)
groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we
will hereafter refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law
to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest
in the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the
nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.
Those belonging to second, third and fourth groups may be appointed by the President
without such confirmation with COA.
2. NO. It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a
bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent
of the Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed
out, while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers whose
appointments need the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the 1987
Constitution, on the other hand, deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus"
from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
Bautista v. Salonga 172 SCRA 160

Facts:
On December 17, 1988, Pres. Aquino appointed Bautista as Chairman of the
Commission of Human Rights (CHR) to which she later qualified. On Jan. 10, 1989, she (with
the other appointed members of the CHR) was requested by Commission on Appointments
(CA) to appear before it for deliberation on their appointments. She refused to submit averring
their appointments were not subject for CA’s review. On Jan 14, 1989, the President apparently
submitted an ad interim appointment of Bautista, which CA disapproved in view of her refusal to
submit to its jurisdiction. Pending resolution, the President designated an Acting Chairman in
lieu of her. Meanwhile, Bautista filed this present petition to declare unconstitutional the actions
of, among others, the CA.
Issue:
Does CA have the authority to review the appointments made by the
President to the CHR?
Held:
No. Since the position of Chairman of the CHR is not among the positions mentioned in
the first sentence of Sec 16, Art VII, it follows that such appointment is to be made without the
review or participation of the CA. The President appoints the Chairman and its members of the
CHR pursuant to the second sentence of said Sec for she is authorized to do so by law (EO
163). Regarding the President’s submission of an “ad interim appointment” to CA on Jan 14, it
was ruled that neither the Executive nor the Legislature can create power where the
Constitution confers none. The exercise of political options that finds no support in the
Constitution cannot be sustained. Thus, when the appointment is one that the Constitution
mandates is for the President to make without the participation of the CA, the executive’s
voluntary act of submitting such appointment to the CA and the latter’s act of confirming or
rejecting the same are done without or in excess of jurisdiction. Moreover, it cannot be
impressed that the new or re-appointment of Bautista was an ad interim appointment, because
ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for the President to make. Petition
granted. Bautista is declared to be, as she is, the duly appointed Chairman.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
QUINTOS-DELES V. COA
177 SCRA 259
FACTS:
On April 6, 1988, petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by
the President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7
of the Constitution. In the May 12, 1988 meeting of the Committee on Appointments ruled
against the position of petitioner Deles. Petitioner Teresita Quintos-Deles contends that
her appointment as Sectoral Representative for Women by the President does not require
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments to qualify her to take her seat in the
House of Representatives.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to

the House of Representatives to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
HELD:
The first group of people that may be appointed by the president, as previously stated in
the Sarmiento v. Mison case, are “the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution.” Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2,
Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of
Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is indubitable that sectoral representatives to
the House of Representatives are among the “other officers whose appointments are
vested in the President in this Constitution,” referred to in the first sentence of Section 16,
Article VII (or the first group of people who may be appointed) whose appointments are
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
Calderon., Petitioner Vs. Carale, et.al., Respondents 208 scra 254

Facts: This case is a Petition for Prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the
appointments made by President Cory Aquino appointing Carale as the Chairman and
other Commissioners of National Labor Relations Commissions, without the confirmation
of the Commission on Appointments pursuant to section 13 of RA 6715. Republic Act
6715 passed in 1989 amended the Labor code of the Philippines, under section 13 of RA
6715 it allowed the President to appoint The Chairman, The Division Presiding
Commissioners and other Commissioners, subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Calderon questioned the appointment of Carale, and other appointees of
the President for violating RA 6715. Calderon also asserted that RA 6715 is not an
“encroachment“ or intrusion of the appointing power of the Executive branch Contained
in Section 16 article VII of the Constitution. On the other hand the Solicitor General and
Carale contends that RA 6715 “transgresses” the appointing power of the President and
expanding the power of Commission on Appointments without constitutional basis citing
the case of Mison and Bautista herein the President by Law may be authorized to appoint
without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Issue: Is the Congress by law requires confirmation of Commission on Appointments on
the appointing of Government officers by the President as expressly mentioned in the first
sentence of Article VII, section 16 of the Constitution?
Ruling: Supreme Court ruled in favor of respondents and declared the amendment of
article 215 of the Labor code by section 13 of RA 6715 unconstitutional. Going back to
the case of Mison as mentioned by the Sol Gen, there are four(4) groups that the
president shall appoint. 1) Heads of executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls officers of the armed forces from colonel or naval captain and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in the constitution. 2) all other government
officials whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. 3) people whom the
president may be authorized to appoint, 4) officers in lower rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone. Without a doubt the NLRC chairman
and the other Commissioners are under the third group as stated in the case of Mison,
the people whom the President may be authorized to appoint. Confirmation of CA is
required only for those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, article VII
of the Constitution.
Supreme Court declared RA 6715 unconstitutional on two grounds. 1) It amends by
legislation in the first sentence of section 16 Article VII of the Constitution by adding
appointments requiring confirmation by CA and 2) it amends by legislation the second
sentence of section 16 article VII of the Constitution by imposing confirmation of CA to
the appointments entrusted only with the President. The petition was dismissed
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
Tarrosa vs Singson
Facts:
Gabriel C. Singson was appointed Governor of the Bangko Sentral by President Fidel V.
Ramos in 1993. Jesus Armando Tarrosa, as a "taxpayer", filed a petition for prohibition
questioning the appointment of Singson for not having been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments as required by the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No.
7653, which established the Bangko Sentral as the Central Monetary Authority of the
Philippines. The Secretary of Budget and Management was impleaded for disbursing
public funds in payment of the salaries and emoluments of respondent Singson. In their
comment, respondents claim that Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring
the confirmation by the CA of the appointment of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral.
They contend that an appointment to the said position is not among the appointments
which have to be confirmed by the CA, citing Section 16 of Article VI of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the Governor of the BSP is subject to COA’s confirmation.
Held:
No. Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the COA
of the appointment of the Governor of the BSP. An appointment to the said position is
not among the appointments which have to be confirmed by the COA under Section 16
of Article 7 of the Constitution. Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers
of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointment of other
government officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of
Article 7 of the Constitution.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
Flores v. Drilon 223 SCRA 568
Facts:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the
"Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor
Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged with prayer for
prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Said provision
provides the President the power to appoint an administrator of the SBMA provided that
in the first year of its operation, the Olongapo mayor shall be appointed as chairman
and chief of executive of the Subic Authority. Petitioners maintain that such infringes to
the constitutional provision of Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which
states that "no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any
capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure," The petitioners also contend
that Congress encroaches upon the discretionary power of the President to appoint.
Issue:
Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates the constitutional prescription
against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.
Ruling:
The court held the Constitution seeks to prevent a public officer to hold multiple
functions since they are accorded with a public office that is a full time job to let them
function without the distraction of other governmental duties.
The Congress gives the President the appointing authority which it cannot limit
by providing the condition that in the first year of the operation the Mayor of Olongapo
City shall assume the Chairmanship. The court points out that the appointing authority
the congress gives to the President is no power at all as it curtails the right of the
President to exercise discretion of whom to appoint by limiting his choice.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
Luego v Civil Service Commission 143 SCRA 327
Facts:
Petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu
City, by Mayor Florentino Solon on 18 February 1983. The appointment was described
as “permanent” but the Civil Service Commission approved it as “temporary.” On 22
March 1984, the Civil Service Commission found the private respondent better qualified
than the petitioner for the contested position and accordingly directed herein private
respondent in place of petitioner’s position. The private respondent was so appointed on
28 June 1984, by the new mayor; Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner is now invoking
his earlier permanent appointment as well as to question the Civil Service Commission’s
order and the private respondent’s title.
Issue:
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a

permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the
appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?
Ruling:
No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was
therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was
permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse
him and call it temporary.
Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall
have inter alia the power to “…approve all appointments, whether original or promotional,
to positions in the civil service… ….and disapprove those where the appointees do not
possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.”
The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature
of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to
approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service
Law. When the appointee is qualified and the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil
Service Laws. Hence, the Civil Service Commission’s resolution is set aside.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
Philippine Ports Authority v Hon. Rafael Mendoza 138 SCRA 632
FACTS: This controversy began when the term of office of Honorable Francia as PRC
Commissioner/Chairman expired. At that time, Mendieta was the senior associate
Commissioner and Pobre was the second associate Commissioner of the PRC. Then
the executive secretary sought the opinion of acting secretary of justice on
whether the President may appoint as Commissioner/Chairman of the PRC any
person other than the Senior Associate Commissioner. Acting secretary of justice
answered that Sec. 2 of PD 223 does not limit or restrict the appointing power of the
President. President Aquino then appointed the petitioner, then an Associate
Commissioner, as the PRC Commissioner/Chairman. Mendieta filed a petition for
declaratory relief contesting Pobre’s appointment as Chairman of the PRC because he
allegedly succeeded Francia as PRC Chairman by operation of law. The trial court ruled
in favor of Mendieta. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WoN the vacancy in the commission shall be filled by “succession” or “operation
of law”
Held: NO. The Court finds unacceptable the view that every vacancy in the
Commission (except the position of "junior" Associate Commissioner) shall be filled
by "succession" or by "operation of law" for that would deprive the President of his
power to appoint a new PRC Commissioner and Associate Commissioners -- "all to be
appointed by the President" under P.D. No. 223. The absurd result would be that the
only occasion for the President to exercise his appointing power would be when the
position of junior (or second) Associate Commissioner becomes vacant. We may not
presume that when the President issued P.D. No. 223, he deliberately clipped
his prerogative to choose and appoint the head of the PRC and limited himself to the
selection and appointment of only the associate commissioner occupying the lowest rung
of the ladder in that agency. Since such an absurdity may not be presumed, the Court
should so construe the law as to avoid it.
Since the appointment of the petitioner as PRC Chairman/Commissioner to succeed Julio

B. Francia, Jr. at the expiration of his term did not violate any provision of P.D. No. 223
and in fact conforms with the Chief Executive's interpretation and implementation of the
law, the legality of said appointment should be upheld.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The questioned decision dated
August 5, 1992 and the writ of prohibitory injunction dated August 19, 1992 issued by
respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 92-60272 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The appointment of petitioner Hermogenes P. Pobre as Commissioner/Chairman of the
Professional Regulation Commission is declared lawful and in order. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
Arturo de Castro v. JBC and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
FACTS
This is a consolidated case which assails the constitutionality of the action of
former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo by appointing a Chief Justice 7 days after the
Presidential election in 2010. After the compulsory retirement of former Chief Justice
Reynato Puno, the position of Chief Justice was left vacant. Section 4 (1), in relation to
Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution states that, "vacancy shall be filled within ninety
days from occurrence thereof," from a, "List of nominees prepared by the Judicial Bar
Council for every vacancy" furthermore, Section 15, Article VII was also taken into
consideration which prohibits the President or the Acting President from making
appointments within two (2) months immediately before the next Presidential elections
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The
JBC agreed that the vacant position must be filled and there were five candidates for the
position from the most senior of the Associates of the court and one of them is Associate
Justice Reynato C. Corona who was chosen by the President and was appointed for the
position of Chief Justice. Office of the Solicitor General contends that the incumbent
President may appoint the next Chief Justice since the Constitution do not apply to the
Supreme Court. If the framers of the Constitution intended the prohibition to apply in the
Supreme Court then it should have expressly stated it in the Constitution.
ISSUE
Whether or not the President can appoint the successor of the Chief Justice.
RULING
Yes, the President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice as the prohibition
under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary. Two constitutional provisions
are seemingly in conflict. The first, Section 15, Article VII and the other, Section 4 (1),
Article VIII (Judicial Department). Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court,
they could have explicitly done so. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section
4 (1), Article VIII. Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same
character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section
14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders
conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion
is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference
to the context. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15
between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of
presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the
Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar
prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
Drilon vs. Lim 235 SCRA 135
Facts:
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local
Government Code. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and
a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-
compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing
certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.
The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance. It
declared Sec. 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests in the Secretary the
power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the
Constitution. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and
that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the
Local Government Code had indeed not been observed.
Issue:
Whether or not 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or
both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is
not also permitted to substitute his own judgement for the judgement of the local
government that enacted the measure. Sec. Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue
Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. What
he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was
determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that
is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant
powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that
was an act not of control but of mere supervision.
Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act.
The Section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax
ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or
confiscatory.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
VIILLENA VS. SECRETARY OF INTERIOR 67 PHIL 451

FACTS:
This is an original action of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the
Secretary of the Interior to restrain him and his agents from proceeding with the investigation
of the herein petitioner, Jose D. Villena, mayor of Makati, Rizal, which was scheduled to take
place on March 28, 1939, until this case is finally determined by this court. It appears that the
Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice, upon the request of the Secretary of
the Interior, conducted an inquiry into the conduct of the petitioner, as a result of which the
latter was found to have committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority and
unauthorized practice of the law profession. The respondent, therefore, on February 8, 1939,
recommended to the President of the Philippines the suspension of the petitioner to prevent
possible coercion of witnesses, which recommendation was granted, according to the answer
of the Solicitor-General of March 20, 1939, verbally by the President on the same day. The
Secretary of the Interior suspended the petitioner from office on February 9, 1939, and then
and thereafter wired the Provincial Governor of Rizal with instruction that the petitioner be
advised accordingly. On February 13, 1939, the respondent wrote the petitioner a letter,
specifying the many charges against him and notifying him of the designation of Emiliano
Anonas as special investigator to investigate the charges. The special investigator forthwith
notified the petitioner that the formal investigation would be commenced on February 17,
1939, at 9 a. m., but due to several incidents and postponements, the same had to be set
definitely for March 28, 1939.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Secretary of Interior has the power to order an investigation.
2. Whether or not the Secretary of Interior has the power to suspend.
RULING:
Yes. It is true, of direct control, direction, and supervision over bureaus and offices under the
jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior, but this section should be interpreted in relation to
section 86 of the same Code which grants to the Department of the Interior "executive
supervision over the administration of provinces, municipalities, chartered cities and other
local political subdivisions." In the case of Planas vs. Gil (37 Off. Gaz., 1228), we observed
that "Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not without
limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render
the power real and effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not
automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon a knowledge of actual facts and conditions
disclosed after careful study and investigation." The principle there enunciated is applicable
with equal force to the present case.We hold, therefore, that the Secretary of the Interior is
invested with authority to order the investigation of the charges against the petitioner and to
appoint a special investigator for that purpose.
Yes. There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a
municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears lodged in the
provincial governor by section 2188 of the Administrative Code which provides that "The
provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints made under oath against
municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of
maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral
turpitude. For minor delinquency he may reprimand the offender; and if a more severe
punishment seems to be desirable he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the
provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by
registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal
treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official
integrity of the officer in question.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v. Pano

G.R. No. L-27811 November 17, 1967
Sanchez, J.
Facts:
Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao.
The said land was a forest zone which was later declared as an agricultural zone.
Magallanes then ceded his rights to LMC of which he is a co-owner. Paňo was a farmer
who asserted his claim over the same piece of land. The Director of Lands denied Paňo’s
request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his petition hence it was elevated
to the Office of the President. Exec Sec Pajo ruled in favor of Paňo. LMC averred that the
earlier decision of the Secretary is already conclusive hence beyond appeal. He also
averred that the decision of the Executive Secretary is an undue delegation of power. The
Constitution, LMC asserts, does not contain any provision whereby the presidential power
of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the
constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter.
Issue:
Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Executive
Secretary and whether it can be further delegated by the Executive Secretary.
Held:
The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his
control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his
confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at
pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go
over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this
context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision
of a department secretary. Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the
President reposes upon the President's power of control over the executive departments.
And control simply means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter."
It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the President must
exercise in person. Not as correct, however, is it to say that the Chief Executive may not
delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not command that
he perform in person. Reason is not wanting for this view. The President is not expected
to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The office
of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which
has thus gained recognition is that "under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary
who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction
to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order" that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
City of Iligan vs. Director of Lands

Facts: On August 9, 1952 the President of the Philippines issued Proclamation No. 335 whereby
pursuant to the provision of Section 88 of the Commonwealth Act (CA) 141 as amended, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of agriculture and Natural Resources, he withdrew from sale or
settlement and reserved for the use of the National Power Corporation (NPC) certain parcels of
the public domain situated at Iligan City and more particularly described in the Bureau of Lands
Plan No. IR-1 028. These parcels of land comprise the Camp Overton Military Reservation which
was turned over to the Republic of the Philippines in 1949.In the meanwhile, the NPC, a public
corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 120, as
amended, and Executive Order No. 399 the latter known as the "Uniform Charter for Government
Corporations," constructed a fertilizer plant known as Maria Cristina Fertilizer Plant within the
reservation covered by Proclamation 335, series of 1952.On September 15,1960, under a "Deed
of Sale with First Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage" the NPC sold, ceded, transferred and
conveyed to Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation the Maria Cristina Fertilizer Plant with all
appurtenant machineries, equipment, buildings, quarters, structures, etc.,"including the right of
occupancy and use of the land" described in Proclamation 335, Series of 1952; and further
covenanted to "collaborate with the On December 28,1965, a preliminary injunction was issued
by the court as prayed for in the complaint.On August 25,1966, President Ferdinand Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 94 "excluding from the operation of Proclamation No. 469 dated October
4,1965 certain portions of the land embraced therein, situated in Iligan City and declaring the
same open to disposition under the provisions of public Land Act." Said portions of land, as
described therein are Lots 1-a, 2-a and 3 of the parcels of land in question. On April 13, 1967,
after the trial on the merits, the court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint and dissolving
the writ of preliminary injunction of December 28, 1965 with costs against the plaintiff Iligan City.
Issue: Whether or not the President has the power to grant a portion of public Domain to any
government entity like the city of Iligan.
Ruling plaintiff assails the ruling of the court a quo that "Proc. No. 469 did not confer a title to the
City of Iligan because the donation made by the President is not at all sanctioned by the Public
Land Act. The plaintiff should have applied for it under any of the ways provided by said
law. Section 60 of C.A. No. 141 provides as follows: Sec. 60. Any tract of land comprised under
this title may be leased or sold, as the case may be, to any person, corporation, or association
authorized to purchase or lease public lands for agricultural purposes. The area of the land so
leased or sold shall be such as shall, in the judgment of the Secretary of agriculture and Natural
Resources, be reasonably necessary for the purposes for which such sale or lease is requested,
and shall in no case exceed one hundred forty-four hectares; Provided, however, That this
limitation shall not apply to grants, donations, or transfers made to a province, municipality, or
branch or subdivision of the Government for the purposes deemed by said entities conducive to
the public interest; but the land so granted, donated, or transferred to a province, municipality, or
branch or subdivision of the Government shall not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise
disposed of in a manner effecting its title, except when authorized by Congress; Provided, further,
That any person, corporation, association, or partnership disqualified from purchasing public land
for agricultural purposes under the provisions of this Act, may lease land included under this title
suitable for industrial or residential purposes referred to The question that arises is who has the
authority to donate the said public land to such a province, municipality, branch or subdivision of
the government?
Under Section 60 aforecited, the lease or sale of any tract of land comprised under the said title
may be leased or sold by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources thru the Director of
Lands who acts under bis immediate control. The limitation is that the area to be sold or leased
shall not exceed 144 hectares.However, it is also provided therein that the limitation shall not
apply to grants, donations or transfers made to a province, municipality or branch or subdivision
of the government for The purposes deemed by said entities conducive to the public interest It
logically follows therefore that when it is a grant, donation or transfer made to a province,
municipality or branch or subdivision, as aforesaid the same may also be made by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources thru the Director of Lands.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
Gascon v. Arroyo
G.R. No. 78389 October 16, 1989
Facts:
Petitioners seek to annul and set aside the “Agreement to Arbitrate” entered into by and
between the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Executive Secretary Joker T.
Arroyo, and ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, represented by its President, Eugenio
Lopez, Jr., dated 6 January 1987, to settle the claims of ABS-CBN for the return of radio
and television stations (TV Station Channel 4), and to enjoin the Arbitration Committee
created under the aforesaid agreement from adjudicating the claims of ABS-CBN.
Issue:
Whether the Executive Secretary had the power and authority to enter into the
“Agreement to Arbitrate” with the ABS- CBN Broadcasting Corporation.
Ruling:
Yes. Under the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines also known as
the Freedom Constitution), which was in force and effect when the “Agreement to
Arbitrate” was signed by the parties thereto on 6 January 1987, the President exercised
both the legislative and executive powers of the Government. As Chief Executive, the
President was (and even now) “assisted by a Cabinet” composed of Ministers (now
Secretaries), who were appointed by and accountable to the President. In other words,
the Members of the cabinet, as heads of the various departments, are the assistants
and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or the law to act in person, or where the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the heads of such departments performed in the regular
course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Respondent Executive Secretary had, therefore, the power and authority to enter into
the “Agreement to Arbitrate” with the ABS- CBN Broadcasting Corporation, as he acted
for and in behalf of the President when he signed it; hence, the aforesaid agreement is
valid and binding upon the Republic of the Philippines, as a party thereto.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
Kilusang Bayan vs. Dominguez

G.R No. 85439
Facts:
Petitioners questioned the validity of the order of the Secretary of Agriculture Hon.
Carlos G. Dominguez which ordered: (1) the take-over by the Department of Agriculture
of the management of the petitioner Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod Ng Mga Magtitinda
ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntilupa, Inc. (KBMBPM) pursuant to the
Department's regulatory and supervisory powers under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175, as
amended, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 13, (2) the creation of a Management
Committee which shall assume the management of KBMBPM upon receipt of the order,
(3) the disbandment of the Board of Directors, and (4) the turnover of all assets,
properties and records of the KBMBPM the Management Committee.
The exordium of said Order unerringly indicates that its basis is the alleged petition of
the general membership of the KBMBPM requesting the Department for assistance "in
the removal of the members of the Board of Directors who were not elected by the
general membership" of the cooperative and that the "ongoing financial and
management audit of the Department of Agriculture auditors show (sic) that the
management of the KBMBPM is not operating that cooperative in accordance with P.D.
175, LOI 23, the Circulars issued by DA/BACOD and the provisions and by-laws of
KBMBPM." It is also professed therein that the Order was issued by the Department "in
the exercise of its regulatory and supervisory powers under Section 8 of P.D. 175, as
amended, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 113."
Issue:
Whether or not the order issued by the respondent Secretary of Agriculture is illegal.
Ruling:
Yes. Regulation 34 of Letter of Implementation No. 23 (implementing P.D. No. 175) provides
the procedure for the removal of directors or officers of cooperatives, thus: “An elected officer,
director or committee member may be removed by a vote of majority of the members
entitled to vote at an annual or special general assembly. The person involved shall
have an opportunity to be heard.” A substantially identical provision, found in Section
17, Article III of the KBMBPM's by-laws. Under the same article are found the
requirements for the holding of both the annual general assembly and a special general
assembly. There is an established procedure for the removal of directors and officers of
cooperatives. It is likewise manifest that the right to due process is respected by the express
provision on the opportunity to be heard.
The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent Secretary of Agriculture
arrogated unto himself the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized
to vote to remove the petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under
Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 which grants him authority to supervise and regulate all
cooperatives. This section does not give him that right. An administrative officer has
only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the
exercise thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what
may to necessary for their just and reasonable execution.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
Olaguer v. Military Commission No.34 150 SCRA 144
Facts:
On 24 December 1979, herein Petitioners – all, of which, are civilians – were arrested by the
military and were subsequently detained at Camp Crame and were then transferred to Camp
Bagong Diwa. Sometime in 1980, the then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces created the
Respondent Military Commission No. 34 for the purposes of trying the said Petitioners of their
alleged crimes. Hastily, the said Respondent Commission sentenced the Petitioners to death.
Petitioners now come to the Supreme Court to challenge the said Military Commission.
Issue:
Whether or not the actions of the military are Constitutional.
Ruling:
It must be noted that in 1981, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2045, thereby officially
lifting Martial Law. Furthermore, between 1981 and 1986, the Petitioners were given provisional
liberty thereby rendering their Petitions for Habeas Corpus moot and academic.
It has been held in a long line of cases that Military Commissions/Tribunals have no jurisdiction
to try civilians for alleged offenses when Civil Courts are open and functioning. Such being the
case here, the respondent Military Commission’s actions of trying the Petitioners and rendering
sentence is null and void.
And assuming that the same does have jurisdiction, the fact that the trial(s) were conducted hastily
– i.e., the Petitioners were never actually given a chance to defend themselves or even present
their own evidences – due process was actually denied to the Petitioners; hence, their sentence
should be treated as unconstitutional.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
SANLAKAS vs. Executive Secretary
Facts:
In the wee hours of 27 July 203 some 300 junior officers and enlisted men of AFP,
heavily armed stormed the Oakwood Premiere in Makati demanding for the resignation
of the President, Secretary of Defence and Chief of the PNP. By virtue of Proclamation
427 dated 27 July 2003, state of rebellion was declared and General Order No 4 of the
same date, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police were
directed to suppress and quell the rebellion pursuant to Section 18 Article VII of the
Constitution. The soldiers returned to barracks on the same night and the declaration of
state of rebellion was lifted on 1 August 2003 by virtue of Proclamation No 435. In the
interim, several petitions were filed before the Court challenging the validity of
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4. Sanlakas contend that Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call
out the armed forces. Because of the cessation of the Oakwood occupation, there exists
no sufficient factual basis for the proclamation by the President of a state of rebellion for
an indefinite period. Solicitor General argues that the petitions have been rendered moot
by the lifting of the declaration.
Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?
Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?
Ruling:
The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No.
4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or
rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the
Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary
power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such
power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within
constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the
petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted
without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there
was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military
authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the
legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a
state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of
her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive
powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the
delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on
warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there
is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as
long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is
whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the
foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal
standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of
Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of Congress
are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
David et al. vs Macapagal-Arroyo

Facts: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the
Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in
the country. The Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and
activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and
revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments and dispersal
of the rallyists along EDSA. The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S.
David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also
arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.In the early
morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily
Tribune offices in Manila and attempt to arrest was made against representatives of
ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom suspected of inciting to sedition
and rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the
state of national emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari
with the Supreme Court and three (3) of those petitions impleaded President Arroyo as
respondent questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that it encroaches the
emergency powers of Congress and it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom
of the press, of speech and assembly.
Issues: 1.) Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?
2.) Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming
powers incident to Martial Law are used?
Ruling:
1.) The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a
call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever
becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
However, there were extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied
powerTo direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to
lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President[The absence of a law
defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police
or military]; and
2.) Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, in times of national
emergency, when the public interest so requires, the President may temporarily take
over a privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest only if there
is congressional authority or approval. There must enactment of appropriate legislation
prescribing the terms and conditions under which the President may exercise the
powers that will serves as the best assurance that due process of law would be
observed.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
Salviar M. Kulay an et. al. vs Gov. Abdusakur M. tan et. al.
FACTS:
On 15 January 2009, three members from the International Committee of the
Red Cross were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. They
were purportedly inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail
when inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they
were seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be members of the Abu
Sayyaf Group. On 21 January 2009, a task force was created by the ICRC and the
PNP, which then organized a parallel local group known as the Local Crisis Committee.
The local group, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee. Governor Tan
organized the Civilian Emergency Force, a group of armed male civilians coming from
different municipalities, who were redeployed to surrounding areas of Patikul.
On 31 March 2009, Governor Tan issued Proclamation 1-09, declaring a state of
emergency in the province of Sulu. It cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the
said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act. It
also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which bestows on the
Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and
natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law
enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence.In the same
Proclamation, respondent Tan called upon the PNP and the CEF to set up checkpoints
and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other
actions necessary to ensure public safety.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 465, in relation to Section 16, of the Local Government
Code authorizes the respondent governor to declare a state of emergency, and exercise
the powers enumerated under Proclamation 1-09.
RULING:
Given the foregoing, respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the
power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed
proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of
emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian
Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is
exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief
executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the
Local Government Code, as will be discussed subsequently.
Government Code cannot be invoked to justify the powers enumerated under
Proclamation 1-09. Respondent governor characterized the kidnapping of the three
ICRC workers as a terroristic act, and used this incident to justify the exercise of the
powers enumerated under Proclamation 1-09. He invokes Section 465, in relation to
Section 16, of the Local Government Code, which purportedly allows the governor to
carry out emergency measures and call upon the appropriate national law enforcement
agencies for assistance. But a closer look at the said proclamation shows that there is
no provision in the Local Government Code nor in any law on which the broad and
unwarranted powers granted to the Governor may be based.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
Torres v. Gonzales
FACTS
Convict Torres was granted a conditional pardon. The condition was that he would “not
again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines.” About 7 years thereafter, his pardon
was cancelled upon recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole which had
records showing he was charged of a wide assortment of crimes; however, he has not
been convicted by final judgment of any. He was accordingly arrested and recommitted.
He now claims he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted
by final judgment and so he also avers he has been deprived of due process of law. Sec
64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC) provides: “[The President has power] xxx
to authorize the arrest and recommitment of any such person who, in his judgment, shall
fail to comply with the condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole or suspension of
sentence.” Art 159 of the RPC imposes the penalty of prision correccional upon a convict
who “having been granted conditional pardon by the [President], shall violate any of the
conditions of such pardon”
ISSUE
In recommitting a conditional pardonee without having been convicted by final judgment,

is the due process clause violated?
RULING
No. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional
pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. In proceeding
against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have
breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Dept has two options: proceed
against him under sec 64(i) RAC which determination is purely an executive act, not
subject to judicial scrutiny; or to proceed under Art 159 of the RPC which determination
is a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon.
Where the President opts to proceed under Sec 64(i) of the RAC, as in the case at bar,
no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less
conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommitted
for the violation of his conditional pardon. Because a conditionally pardoned convict had
already been accorded his day in court in his trial and conviction for the offense for which
he was conditionally pardoned, sec 64(i) of the RAC is not violative of the due process
clause.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
Monsanto vs. Factoran 170 SCRA 190
Facts:
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer

of Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. She
was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50. The SC
affirmed the decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion
was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she
accepted (at that time, the rule was that clemency could be given even before conviction).
By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that
she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still
vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of Finance who ruled that she may be
reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the
date she was extended the absolute pardon. Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that
the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in
the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement
should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to
backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to
pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50. The Ministry referred the issue
to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran denied Monsanto’s
request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not
reinstate her former position.
Issues:
1. Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive,
entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment?
2. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by
the sentence?
Held:
1. No. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from
holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as
assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for
a new appointment.
2. No. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists
notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by
pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be
extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of
the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor,
compensation and novation. (Monsanto vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989)
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
People v. Salle Jr., 250 SCRA 581

Facts
On November 1991, Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were convicted of the
compound crime of murder and destructive arson before the RTC of Quezon City. Salle
and Mengote filed their Notice of Appeal which was accepted by the Supreme Court on
March 24, 1993.
In 1994, Salle filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal but was found that the
motion was signed without the assistance of counsel because he thought that it was
necessary for his early release following the grant of a conditional pardon by the President
on December 9, 1993. La’o also stated that Mengote was also granted conditional pardon
and that he immediately left for his province without consulting her. She prayed that the
Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal.
On March 23, 1994, the Court granted Salle's motion. After taking into
consideration Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which provides that the President
may, except in cases of impeachment or as otherwise provided in the Constitution, grant
pardon after conviction by final judgment, the Court required (1) the Solicitor General and
the counsel for accused appellants to submit their memoranda on the issue of the
enforceability of the conditional pardon and (2) the Presidential Committee for the Grant
of Bail, Release or Pardon to inform the Court why it recommended to the President the
grant of the conditional pardon despite the pendency of the appeal.
In its Memorandum, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that the
conditional pardon granted to appellant Mengote is unenforceable because the judgment
of conviction is not yet final in view of the pendency in this Court of his appeal.
On the other hand, through Atty. La'o, submitted that the conditional pardon
extended to Mengote is valid and enforceable by reason, because although Mengote did
not file a motion to withdraw the appeal, he was deemed to have abandoned the appeal
by his acceptance of the conditional pardon which resulted in the finality of his conviction.
Issue
Whether or not a pardon granted to an accused during the pendency of his appeal
from a judgment of conviction by the trial court is enforceable.
Ruling
No. The Supreme Court declared that the “conviction by final judgment” limitation
under Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon,
whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from his
conviction by the trial court.
Before an appellant may be validly granted pardon, he must first ask for the
withdrawal of his appeal, i.e., the appealed conviction must first be brought to finality.
Where the pardoning power is subject to the limitation of conviction, it may be
exercised at any time after conviction even if the judgment is on appeal. It is, of course,
entirely different where the requirement is “final conviction,” as was mandated in the
original provision of Section 14, Article IX of the 1973 Constitution, or “conviction by final
judgment,” as presently prescribed in Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. In
such a case, no pardon may be extended before a judgment of conviction becomes final.
A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is seasonably
perfected, (b) when the accused commences to serve the sentence, (c) when the right to
appeal is expressly waived in writing, except where the death penalty was imposed by
the trial court, and (d) when the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his right
to appeal. Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not yet
therefore attained finality, as in the instant case, executive clemency may not yet be
granted to the appellant.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
GARCIA VS. COA 226 SCRA 356

FACTS:
Petitioner was a Supervising Lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Lucena City. On 1 April 1975, petitioner was summarily dismissed
from the service on the ground of dishonesty in accordance with the decision of the then
Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications in Adm. Case No. 975 for
the loss of several telegraph poles which were located at the Sariaya-Lucena City and
Mauban-Sampaloc, Quezon, telecom lines. Petitioner did not appeal from the decision.
Based on the same facts obtaining in the administrative action, a criminal case for
qualified theft was filed against petitioner. On 23 January 1980, the trial court rendered
its decision acquitting petitioner of the offense charged.Consequently, petitioner sought
reinstatement to his former position
in view of his acquittal in the criminal case. In an indorsement dated 7 April 1980,
petitioner's request to be reinstated was denied by the Bureau of Telecommunications.
Hence, petitioner pleaded to the President of the Philippines for executive clemency
which was granted.
Petitioner thereafter filed with respondent COA a claim for payment of back
salaries effective 1 April 1975, the date of his dismissal from the service. This was denied
by the COA in its 5th Indorsement dated 12 October 1982 on the ground that the executive
clemency granted to him did not provide for the payment of back salaries and that he has
not been reinstated in the service.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to payment of back wages after having been
reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioner's automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to

back wages. This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start and
to make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the
service. To rule otherwise would defeat the very intention of the executive clemency, i.e.,
to give justice to petitioner. Moreover, the right to back wages is afforded to those with
have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise
acquitted of the charges against them. There is no doubt that petitioner's case falls within
the situations aforementioned to entitle him to back wages.
After having been declared innocent of the crime of qualified theft, which also
served as basis for the administrative charge, petitioner should not be considered to have
left his office for all legal purposes, so that he is entitled to all the rights and privileges
that accrued to him by virtue of the office held, including back wages.
The bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely obliterated

the adverse effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty
and ordered his separation from the service. This can be inferred from the executive
clemency itself exculpating petitioner from the administrative charge and thereby directing
his reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon. This signifies
that petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment; he is
restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
LLAMAS v. EXEC. SEC. ORBOS, OCAMPO III

October 15, 1991 (G.R. No. 99031)
FACTS:
Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other
complainants filed an administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting
graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found guilty. He was suspended for office for 90
days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30 days however,
Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence he can resume
office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him.
The petitioner argues that President may grant executive clemency only in criminal
cases. They say that the qualifying phrase “after conviction by final judgment” applies
solely to criminal cases, and no other law allows the grant of executive clemency or
pardon to anyone who has been “convicted in an administrative case, allegedly because
the word “conviction” refers only to criminal cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President of the Philippines has the power to grant executive
clemency in administrative cases.
HELD:
Yes. It is not specified in the constitution whether it may be considered under
criminal or administrative cases. , if the law does not distinguish, so we must not
distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive
clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment
cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases,
it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from
the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Cases of impeachment are
automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal
offenses.
The do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot
grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is the court’s considered view that if
the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency
in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant executive
clemency in administrative cases, we refer only to all administrative cases in the
Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government.
In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof
beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of
evidence required is mere substantial evidence to support a decision.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading 3 SCRA 351

Facts:
Respondent Eastern Sea Trading was the consignee of several shipments of onion
and garlic and some shipments came from Japan and others from Hong Kong. In as much
as none of the shipments had the certificate required by Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44
and 45 for the release thereof, the goods thus imported were seized and subjected to
forfeiture proceedings for alleged violations of section 1363(f) of the Revised
Administrative Code, in relation to the aforementioned circulars of the Central Bank. The
said circulars were pursuant to EO 328, which was the implementing law of the Trades
and Financial Agreement, an executive agreement entered into between Philippines and
Japan. EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the said EO was never
concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and
the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.
In due course, the Collector of Customs of Manila rendered a decision on

September 4, 1956, declaring said goods forfeited to the Government and — the goods
having been, in the meantime, released to the consignees on surety bonds, filed by the
same, as principal, and the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., as surety, in compliance
with orders of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in Civil Cases Nos. 23942 and 23852
thereof — directing that the amounts of said bonds be paid, by said principal and surety,
jointly and severally, to the Bureau of Customs, within thirty (30) days from notice.
Issue:
Whether or not the executive agreement sought to be implemented by Executive

Order No. 328 is legal owing to the fact that our Senate had not concurred in the making
of said executive agreement.
Ruling:
No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the
concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the
President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements
and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal
instruments — treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of
notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or
‘protocols’. The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other
governments ends and agreements — whether denominated executive agreements or
exchanges of notes or otherwise — begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready
ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of
executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive
agreements, other than those entered into under the trade- agreements act, have been
negotiated with foreign governments. It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that
the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are
not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain
classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of
the Senate. They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues,
income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and
commercial relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of
trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific
congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress
with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly
those with respect to the settlement of claims against foreign governments, were
concluded independently of any legislation.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
G.R. NO. 183871

Rubrico vs. Arroyo February 18, 2010
FACTS:
Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men belonging
to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine Air Force
Field Station at Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas. During her detention, the
petitioner added, her daughters Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel and Jean Rubrico Apruebo
were harassed by Senior Insp. Arsenio Gomez and that there were also armed men
following them. The petitioners prayed that a writ of amparo be issued, ordering the
individual respondents to desist from performing any threatening act against the security
of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an
information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the
offended party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents
submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material
inculpatory averments against them. Respondents interposed the defense that the
President may not be sued during her incumbency.
Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the
President, et al.
By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case .
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and
dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.
HELD:
The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government,
albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-
members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision
on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in
jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure.
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency,
may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head
of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the amparo case against other respondents for
failure of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for
the enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed.
Cyril N. Frias
Section JD 1-B
Marcos v. Manglapus 177 SCRA 668_ 178 SCRA 760

Facts
September 28, 1989, former President Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii. In a

statement, President Aquino said declared that the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will
not be allowed to be brought to our country until such time as the government, until her
administration or the succeeding administration decides so, for reason of the interest of
the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely and passionately
conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order of society.
On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners, raising

the following major arguments:
1. to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines is
to deny them not only the inherent right of citizens to return to their country of birth
but also the protection of the Constitution and all of the rights guaranteed to
Filipinos under the Constitution;
2. the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she
had exercised it arbitrarily; and
3. there is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos.
Thus, petitioners prayed that the Court reconsider its decision, order respondents to
issue the necessary travel documents to enable Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R.
Marcos, Jr., Irene M. Araneta, Imee M. Manotoc, Tommy Manotoc and Gregorio Araneta
to return to the Philippines, and enjoin respondents from implementing President Aquino’s
decision to bar the return of the remains of Mr. Marcos, and the other petitioners, to the
Philippines.
Issue
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Ruling
Yes. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with
his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people.
Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and, subsequently, the remains of Mr.
Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with this
bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or
with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the
implementation of this decision.
The death of Mr. Marcos has not changed the factual scenario under which the
Court’s decision was rendered. The threats to the government, to which the return of the
Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have
ceased. On the contrary, instead of erasing fears as to the destabilization that will be
caused by the return of the Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos reinforced the bases for the decision
to bar their return when she called President Aquino “illegal,” claiming that it is Mr. Marcos,
not Mrs. Aquino, who is the “legal” President of the Philippines, and declared that the
matter “should be brought to all the courts of the world.”
Further, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is
vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power
and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The
powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on
the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution.

H1. Marcos v. Manglapus 177 SCRA 668 - 178 SCRA 760

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H1. Marcos v. Manglapus 177 SCRA 668 - 178 SCRA 760

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Cyril N.

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