G.R. No.
153031 December 14, 2006 that the twin requirements of notice and hearing applies
PCL SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC. and U-MING
MARINE TRANSPORT CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
STEVE RUSEL, respondents.
Facts:
In April 1996, Rusel was employed as GP/AB seaman
by manning agency, PCL Shipping Philippines, Inc. (PCL
Shipping) for and in behalf of its foreign principal, U-Ming
Marine Transport Corporation (U-Ming Marine). Rusel
thereby joined the vessel MV Cemtex General (MV
Cemtex) for the contract period of twelve (12) months
with a basic monthly salary of US$400.00, living
allowance of US$140.00, fixed overtime rate of
US$120.00 per month, vacation leave with pay of
US$40.00 per month and special allowance of
US$175.00.
While Rusel was cleaning the vessel's kitchen, he
slipped, and as a consequence thereof, he suffered a
broken and/or sprained ankle on his left foot. A request
for medical examination was flatly denied by the captain
of the vessel. Feeling an unbearable pain in his ankle,
Rusel jumped off the vessel using a life jacket and swam
to shore. He was brought to a hospital where he was
confined for eight (8) days.
Rusel filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment
of wages, overtime pay, claim for medical benefits, sick
leave pay and damages against PCL Shipping and U-
Ming Marine before the NLRC. In their answer, the latter
alleged that Rusel deserted his employment by jumping
off the vessel.
Petitioners argued that: the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that private respondent was illegally dismissed
from employment and in not upholding petitioners' right
to pre-terminate private respondent's employment.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner PCL Shipping has the
right to pre-terminate respondent Rusel’s employment
contract
Ruling: No.
The Court finds nothing in the records to show that
petitioners complied with the other conditions
enumerated for termination, such as the payment of all
of private respondent's earned wages together with his
leave pay for the entire contract period as well as
termination pay equivalent to his one month salary.
Petitioners admit that they did not inform private
respondent in writing of the charges against him and that
they failed to conduct a formal investigation to give him
opportunity to air his side. However, petitioners contend
strictly only when the employment is within the
Philippines and that these need not be strictly observed
in cases of international maritime or overseas
employment.
The Court does not agree. The provisions of the
Constitution as well as the Labor Code which afford
protection to labor apply to Filipino employees whether
working within the Philippines or abroad. Moreover, the
principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place
where the contract is made) governs in this
jurisdiction. In the present case, it is not disputed that the
Contract of Employment entered into by and between
petitioners and private respondent was executed here in
the Philippines with the approval of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Hence,
the Labor Code together with its implementing rules and
regulations and other laws affecting labor apply in this
case. Accordingly, as to the requirement of notice and
hearing in the case of a seafarer, the Court has already
ruled in a number of cases that before a seaman can be
dismissed and discharged from the vessel, it is required
that he be given a written notice regarding the charges
against him and that he be afforded a formal
investigation where he could defend himself personally
or through a representative. Hence, the employer should
strictly comply with the twin requirements of notice and
hearing without regard to the nature and situs of
employment or the nationality of the employer.
Petitioners failed to comply with these twin requirements.
G.R. No. 170139 August 5, 2014
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY,
INC., Petitioner,
vs.
JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.
Facts: Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency,
Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency. Joy was
later asked to sign a oneyear employment contract for a
monthly salary of NT$15,360.00.8 She alleged that
Sameer Overseas Agency required her to pay a
placement fee of ₱70,000.00 when she signed the
employment contract.
Joy was deployed to work for TaiwanWacoal, Co. Ltd.
(Wacoal) on June 26, 1997.10 She alleged that in her
employment contract, she agreed to work as quality
control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to work
as a cutter.
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims that a
certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without
prior notice, that she was terminated. She was asked to
"prepare for immediate repatriation."
Joy filed a complaint7 with the National Labor Relations
Commission against petitioner and Wacoal. She claimed
that she was illegally dismissed.
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency alleged that
respondent's termination was due to her inefficiency,
negligence in her duties, and her "failure to comply with
the work requirements [of] her foreign [employer]."
The National Labor Relations Commission declared that
Joy was illegally dismissed. According to the court, there
was no just cause for the termination and that the
procedural due process was not observed in terminating
respondent.
Issue: Whether or not there was illegal dismissal
Ruing: Yes.
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that
there was just cause for causing Joy’s dismissal. The
employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due process
of law.
Workers are entitled to substantive and procedural due
process before termination. They may not be removed
from employment without a valid or just cause as
determined by law and without going through the proper
procedure.
Security of tenure for labor is guaranteed by our
Constitution.64
Employees are not stripped of their security of tenure
when they move to work in a different jurisdiction. With
respect to the rights of overseas Filipino workers, we
follow the principle of lex loci contractus.Thus, in Triple
Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. NLRC,65 this court
noted:
Petitioner likewise attempts to sidestep the
medical certificate requirement by contending
that since Osdana was working in Saudi Arabia,
her employment was subject to the laws of the
host country. Apparently, petitioner hopes
tomake it appear that the labor laws of Saudi
Arabia do not require any certification by a
competent public health authority in the
dismissal of employees due to illness.
Petitioner’s argument is without merit.
First, established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the
law of the place where the contract is made) governs in
this jurisdiction. There is no question that the contract of
employment in this case was perfected here in the
Philippines. Therefore, the Labor Code, its implementing
rules and regulations, and other laws affecting labor
apply in this case. Furthermore, settled is the rule that
the courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim
obnoxious to the forum’s public policy.
Even with respect to fundamental procedural rights, this
court emphasized in PCL Shipping Philippines, Inc. v.
NLRC,67 to wit:
Petitioners admit that they did notinform private
respondent in writing of the charges against him
and that they failed to conduct a formal
investigation to give him opportunity to air his
side. However, petitioners contend that the twin
requirements ofnotice and hearing applies
strictly only when the employment is within the
Philippines and that these need not be strictly
observed in cases of international maritime or
overseas employment.
The Court does not agree. The provisions of the
Constitution as well as the Labor Code which afford
protection to labor apply to Filipino employees whether
working within the Philippines or abroad. Moreover, the
principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place
where the contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction.
In the present case, it is not disputed that the Contract of
Employment entered into by and between petitioners
and private respondent was executed here in the
Philippines with the approval of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA). Hence, the Labor
Code together with its implementing rules and
regulations and other laws affecting labor apply in this
case.68 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
By our laws, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) may only
be terminated for a just or authorized cause and after
compliance with procedural due process requirements.
G.R. No. 122191 October 8, 1998
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA and
HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 89, Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, respondents.
Facts:
In 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight
Attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
In 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia,
plaintiff went to a disco dance with fellow crew members
Thamer Al-Gazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi
nationals. They agreed to have breakfast together at the
room of Thamer. Thamer attempted to rape plaintiff.
Fortunately, a roomboy and several security personnel
heard her cries for help and rescued her. Later, the
Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and Allah
Al-Gazzawi.
When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later,
several SAUDIA officials interrogated her about the
Jakarta incident. They then requested her to go back to
Jakarta to help arrange the release of Thamer and Allah,
however, she refused to cooperate because she did not
understand the local dialect.
In 1992, plaintiff’s superiors requested her to see Mr. Ali
Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to the
police station where the police took her passport and
questioned her about the Jakarta incident. She was
pressured to drop the case against Thamer and Allah.
Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her
passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out
of Jeddah.
In 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few minutes before
the departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff was not
allowed to board the plane and instead ordered to take a
later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal
Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the
SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi court where she
was asked to sign a document written in Arabic. They
told her that this was necessary to close the case
against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff
signed a notice to her to appear before the court on June
27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
Defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to
Jeddah once again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993
for further investigation.
The judge rendered a decision sentencing her to five
months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did
she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together
with Thamer and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta.
The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to
a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of
Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in
contravention of Islamic tradition.
SAUDIA denied her the assistance she requested, but
because she was wrongfully convicted, Prince of
Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her
to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to
Manila, she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA,
without her being informed of the cause.
On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint for
damages against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi (“Al-
Balawi”), its country manager.
Saudia asserts that Philippine courts and/or tribunals are
not in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the
law and the facts. This is because respondents' Cabin
Attendant contracts require the application of the laws of
Saudi Arabia, rather than those of the Philippines. It
claims that the difficulty of ascertaining foreign law calls
into operation the principle of forum non conveniens,
thereby rendering improper the exercise of jurisdiction by
Philippine tribunals.
Issue: Whether or not the Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to try the case?
Ruling: Yes
Philippine law is definite as to what governs the formal or
extrinsic validity of contracts. The first paragraph of
Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he forms and
solemnities of contracts . . . shall be governed by the
laws of the country in which they are
executed"55 (i.e., lex loci celebrationis).
In contrast, there is no statutorily established mode of
settling conflict of laws situations on matters pertaining
to substantive content of contracts. It has been noted
that three (3) modes have emerged: (1) lex loci
contractus or the law of the place of the making; (2) lex
loci solutionis or the law of the place of performance;
and (3) lex loci intentionis or the law intended by the
parties.
Given Saudia's assertions, of particular relevance to
resolving the present dispute is lex loci intentionis.
An author observed that Spanish jurists and
commentators "favor lex loci intentionis."57 These jurists
and commentators proceed from the Civil Code of Spain,
which, like our Civil Code, is silent on what governs the
intrinsic validity of contracts, and the same civil law
traditions from which we draw ours.
In this jurisdiction, this court, in Philippine Export and
Foreign Loan Guarantee v. V.P. Eusebio Construction,
Inc.,58 manifested preference for allowing the parties to
select the law applicable to their contract":
No conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts
is expressly provided for in our laws. The rule
followed by most legal systems, however, is that
the intrinsic validity of a contract must be
governed by the lex contractus or "proper law of
the contract." This is the law voluntarily agreed
upon by the parties (the lex loci voluntatis) or the
law intended by them either expressly or
implicitly (the lex loci intentionis). The law
selected may be implied from such factors as
substantial connection with the transaction, or
the nationality or domicile of the parties.
Philippine courts would do well to adopt the first
and most basic rule in most legal systems,
namely, to allow the parties to select the law
applicable to their contract, subject to the
limitation that it is not against the law, morals, or
public policy of the forum and that the chosen
law must bear a substantive relationship to the
transaction.59 (Emphasis in the original)