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Int. J. Psycho-Anal. (1990) 71, 241

THE ORIGINS OF FREUD'S CONCEPT OF OBJECT

REPRESENTATION ('OBJEKTVORSTELLUNG') IN HIS
MONOGRAPH 'ON APHASIA': ITS THEORETICAL AND
TECHNICAL IMPORTANCE

ANA-MARIA RIZZUTO, BROOKLINE, MASS.

Aile Anregungen zum spontanen Spreche aus dem Gebiet der Objectassociationen stammen.

Allstimulations to speakspontaneously comefrom the region of the objectassociations. (Freud, 'On aphasia',
1891, G. p. 81, E. p. 78)1

The neurologists of the end of the nineteenth
century were deeply committed to the under-
standing of what was commonly called the
'speech apparatus' of human beings. The top
researchers of the period had provided their own
theoretical speech apparatuses as models to
guide their understanding of the pathology of
speech. When Freud undertook the task of
creating a new model of the speech apparatus he
was intent on providing one capable of explain-
ing more than anatomical disturbances of
speech. He wanted to use the same model to
explain normal spontaneous speech and func-
tional reversible disturbances. I have shown
elsewhere (Rizzuto, 1989) that his motive for
undertaking such an enterprise might have been
the need to make sense of the remarkable speech
phenomena presented by his women patients,
Emmy von N and Frau Cacilie, and Breuer's
earlier patient Anna 0.
The problem Freud saw in the speech
apparatuses of his prominent colleagues,
Lichtheim, Grashey, Wernicke, Meynert and
others, was that they could not account for
spontaneous speech. Their models were good
enough for the repetition of language spoken by
others, but did not include any clear explanation
of what prompts people to speak of their own
volition. Freud needed to solve this difficulty
and to find an apparatus capable of accounting
for spontaneous speech because Frau Emmy
von N, his patient at the time, insisted on saying
what she had to say. Freud had also learned
from Breuer that Anna O's hysterical symptoms
had improved when she was able to talk willingly
about the episode that had originated them.
Freud needed a model of a speech apparatus
that could explain both phenomena, the need to
speak spontaneously and the curative power of
such speech.
Freud observes (1891) that Wernicke's model
of a speech apparatus has no relation to cortical
activity and is applicable only to the activity of
repeating words heard. Speech is therefore 'a
cerebral reflex' (E.: 2; G.: 3), not a voluntary
spontaneous act.
Lichtheim's speech apparatus did include 'nu-
merous parts of the cortex from which the speech
apparatus can be stimulated into action' (E.: 6;
G.: 6). Freud questioned the validity of the
improved model because Lichtheim had not
produced any neurological evidence to support

Presented at the 36th International Psychoanalytical Congress, August 1989, Rome.

1 G. indicates the page in the German translation. E. indicates the page in the English translation of 1953 by Stengel, but

Freud's words have been re-translated by the author.

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242 ANA-MARIA RIZZUTO
his ideas. He had proceeded 'deductively',
postulating neural tracts whose anatomical
existence had not been proved. Besides, the
schema could not explain the speech disorders
observed in clinical practice, in spite of
Lichtheim's claim of having 'corroborated all
forms of dissociation of speech function arising
from his schema' (E.: 8; G.: 8).
Freud insisted on this point because he wanted
to show that the empirical model he had created
could explain it all: normal spontaneous speech,
anatomical and functional disturbances and
everyday dysfunctions like those caused by
fatigue or divided attention. The next step Freud
had to take was to demonstrate that the ap-
paratus of speech is located exclusively in the
cerebral cortex and that subcortical organs and
functions are not involved in the speech function.
The so-called cortical speech centres are, in
Freud's view, artefacts of pathological post
mortem examinations. Broca's centre relates only
to the muscles for the articulation of speech;
Wernicke's centre to the 'understanding' of
sounds. Wernicke believed that word sounds
were contained in the centre. Freud insists that
nothing is contained in them; that they only
appear to be centres of speech. Freud demon-
strates with implacable logic that the notion of
speech centres as localization offunctions cannot
be maintained. After the demolition of his
colleagues' models, Freud is left with a cortical
apparatus of speech that is constituted by two
components: representations of objects (Objekt-
vorstellungen) that incite the apparatus to speak
and word representations (Wortvorstellungen)
capable of inciting the motoric muscles of speech
into the act of speech. Together they form a
symbol, a full word of sound and representations
capable of carrying meaning (E.: 77; G.: 79).
Freud concludes, after irrefutable analysis of
the data, that' the pathway by which we speak is
identical to that, by which we repeat (die Bahn,
auf der gesprochen wird, identisch ist mit der,
auf welcher nachgesprochen wird)' (E.: 12; G.:
12). Freud placed the conclusion in italics. The
conclusion solves the central problem inherent
in Lichtheim's and Wernicke's apparatuses.
For Freud the spoken word is the final result
of a very complex process. Its meaning does not
come from the sound made and heard, but from
the internal connexion of such sound to the
object representations. It is then, and only then,
that words are the true speech of the individual
pronouncing them.
In this paper I explore Freud's manner of
conceiving of the object representations, and the
great significance it has for his entire theory and
technique.
Philosophically, Freud adheres to the teach-
ings of John Stuart Mill 'that the object rep-
resentation does not contain anything else be-
sides the appearance of a "thing" (Wir
entnehmen der Philosophie, dass die Objekt-
vorstellung ausserdem nichts anderes enhalt,
dass der Anschein eines "Dinges" (E.: 78; G.:
80).
By talking about the appearance of a 'thing',
Freud and Mill make a clear distinction between
a' thing' (Ding), a material object, existing in the
real world, and its representation, the' appear-
ance' of an object in the mind. This
Objektvorstellung is constructed in the process of
perceiving and belongs entirely to the psychic
realm. A 'thing' can be there, in front of the
viewer as a Gegenstand (literal meaning: that
that stands in front of the viewer). Another way
of saying the same in German is Objekt (from
Latin: objectus, a casting before). For Kant an
Objekt is a human construction made out of
sensations originating in and referred to an
existing thing in factual reality. An object rep-
resentation is therefore a psychic representation
that resembles a 'thing' that is there in the world.
The representation of the external object is
formed in the psychic realm in the following
manner: to the' properties' of the 'thing' revealed
by the sensorial impressions, and to the enu-
meration of the impressions obtained from an
external object (Gegenstand), we add the possi-
bility of a large series of new impressions in the
same associative chain (Associationskette) (E.:
78; G.: 80).The object representation enriched by
a multiplicity of associated sensorial impressions
must, of necessity, have a complexity of potential
details far beyond the material 'thing'
(Gegenstand) that provided the occasion for its
coming into being.
The word Vorstellung requires clarification.
Freud selects it to denote the formation in the
mind of a representation of an external object.
The word, as a philosophical term, had a long
tradition when Freud decided to use it, along
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FREUD'S CONCEPT OF OBJECT REPRESENTATION 243

with many neurologists of the day. Leibniz by point but in a less detailed manner and
(1646-1 716) and Kant ( 1724-1804) used the term through selected fibres' (E.: 51; G.: 52).
in their philosophical efforts to understand the Meynert believed that the white fibre coming
mind's capacity to utilize sensory data in order from the spinal cord passed through the grey
to represent reality. Ricoeur (1982) points out nuclei keeping its identity and therefore arrived
that for Hegel (1770-1831) Vorstellung makes at the cortex unchanged, carrying its' projection'
sense as the opposite of BegrijJ (concept). It of the periphery of the body. Freud disagreed.
should not be translated as 'idea' but as For him the grey nuclei and substance are the
'figurative thinking'. These clarifications are true organs of the brain. Freud calls attention to
indispensable because Stengel's translation of several facts: (1) The fibres from the spinal cord
'On aphasia' renders Vorstellung as idea, con- interrupt their itinerary in grey nuclei; (2) the
cept or association. Such interpretations of the grey nuclei receive input from other areas of the
term make it impossible to understand the full brain; (3) from each entering fibre, several
meaning of Freud's text. emerge as the result of interconnexions within
For Kant, Vorstellung opposes' the thing in the nucleus; (4) the emerging fibre is different
itself (Ding an Sich)'. Freud seems to follow from the arriving fibre, because it carries the
Kant and Mill by locating Vorstellung in the input of other areas of the brain.
mental realm and Ding (thing) and Gegenstand What happens to the information about the
(object) in reality. He seems to follow Hegel and body periphery carried by the sensory tract when
Kant in giving Vorstellung sensorial qualities. 'we regard its frequent interruptions in grey
For Freud a 'Vorstellung' is always a subjective nuclei and its arborization through them'? Freud
event prompted initially by the sensorial per- answers with words related to language: 'We
ception of a thing. The best translation for the must then accept the thought that a fibre on its
term is representation (A.E., 1978; Ricoeur, way to the cerebral cortex altered its functional
1982). Freud's later theorizing in the monograph meaning (Bedeutung) after each emergence from
supplies full confirmation for this point. a grey substance' (E.: 52; G.: 54).
To provide the speech apparatus with a source In conclusion, the fibres arriving at the cortex
of spontaneous speech Freud had to create a from different nuclei suggest that the body
model that located the stimuli in the cortex. The periphery may be represented in the cortex in
essential question was: 'in what manner is the manifold ways, and each individual part may be
body reproduced (abgebildet) in the cerebral represented more than once or not at all. The
cortex' (E.: 50; G.: 50). The answer to the fibres have undergone transformational pro-
question is a challenge to some theories of cesses, at the service of representing the body
Meynert's and of his followers who had postu- 'not topographically but only in a manner suited
lated 'a complete and topographically exact to the function [of language]' (E.: 53; G.: 55).
representation of the body in the cortex' (E. : 48 ; To illustrate the change in meaning, Freud
G: 49). That meant that the whole body was selects the impressions carried by the optic nerve
'projected' on to the cortex' point by point' like to the quadrigeminal body. The retinal impres-
the visual representation in the retina (E.: 47; sions establish a link (Verbindung) with the
G.: 49). sensations of movement of the ocular muscles.
Freud uses empirical evidence to challenge the Freud concludes: 'It is extremely likely that the
great master Meynert. In answering his question new fibre between the quadrigeminal body and
he covers systematically every aspect of the the occipital cortex conducts (fortleitet) no longer
process offormation of an object representation, a retinal impression but the connection
its characteristics and its functions. (Verknupfung-word related to making a knot)
Freud discriminates between two types of of one or more such impressions with sensations
reproduction: projection and representation. of movement. These changes in meaning
Projection, a copy, point by point, occurs only (Bedeutungsanderung) must still be more com-
in the spinal cord. In the cortex, there is 'repre- plicated for the conduction fibres of the sen-
sentation (Reprasentation), i.e. the periphery sibility of the skin and muscles' (E.: 52-3; G.:
of the body is not represented (vertreten) point 54). Freud's selection of the word' Verknupfung '
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244 ANA-MARIA RIZZUTO
reinforces the notion of the type of trans-
formational processes he envisioned were taking
place in a connexion. (Farrell says in The Dic-
tionary of German Synonyms that 'Verknupfung
indicates a closer connection than Verbinden.
When applied to a thought, it therefore denotes
a logical connection, not a casual association'
(p. 168).)
To further illuminate the fibres' transforma-
tion of their conducted impressions Freud
makes a striking comparison: 'They contain the
periphery of the body as-to borrow an example
from the subject with which we are concerned
here-a poem contains the alphabet, i.e. in a re-
ordering (Umordung) of the individual topo-
graphic elements, in manifold connections
(Verknupfung) serving other purposes, whereby
several [topographic elements] are represented
(vertreten) several times, others not at all' (E.:
53; G.: 55).
This remarkable comparison reveals how con-
vinced Freud was that the mechanical function
of the alphabet-like fibres was at the service of
transforming body letters into rich poetic repre-
sentational meanings. One may ask-it is not
self-evident-how does a poem contain the al-
phabet? Besides the three factors mentioned by
Freud, re-ordering, manifold connexions and
serving other purposes, a poem utilizes the
alphabet for rhyme, metrics, musicality and,
more than anything else, for transformation of
meaning through imagery and sound and their
multiple echoes. Freud's metaphor brings to the
fore the richness of transformational meanings
he envisions in the fibres' function: to organize
representations which then will be suitable for
the cortical function of human speech. The
metaphor hints indirectly at the presence of an
affective component.
Freud's vocabulary demands further atten-
tion. To convey the manner in which the rep-
resentation of the surface of the body occurs in
the cortex he resorts to political terminology, the
noun' Reprasentation ' (representation) and the
verb 'vertreten' (replace or represent in par-
liament). They suggest that in the spinal cord the
manner of representation is one to one, some-
thing direct as a reproduction of a sector of the
body. In the cortex, the manner of reproduction
follows the political laws of parliamentary rep-
resentation, in which a delegate represents many
different people with diversified inputs in their
need to be represented. The representation is
indirect.
Freud's next question is where the repre-
sentations localize themselves in the cortex.
Freud challenges those who believe that 'a
representation is localized in the nerve cell'.
Instead he declares-following Hughlings
Jackson-that the chain of physiological events in
the nervous system is not in a causal relation
with psychic processes. The relation is one of' a
dependent concomitant', i.e. a parallel process.
The representation is a psychic phenomenon,
not a physiological one. 'Such "transference"
(Ubertragung) from a physiological to a
psychological process is totally unjustifiable '.
Neither the psychological representation nor its
physiological correlate can be localized (E.: 55;
G.: 57).
At this point Freud asks a critical question:
'What is then the physiological correlate of a
simple representation, or of [a representation]
that recurs by itself (fur sie wiederkehrenden
Vorstellung)?' (my italics). Freud does not
specify what he means by 'recurs by itself'. The
context suggests that he is referring to the
subjective awareness of a representation that
does not depend on will. Obviously, Freud has
spontaneous speech and the troubling un-
verbalized representations of his patients in
mind. The answer is that the physiological
correlate is not something that remains at rest
(nicht Ruhendes) but' something in the nature
of a process. This process admits broad localiza-
tion. It starts from a particular point in the
cortex and spreads out from there over the
whole cortex or along a particular path. When
this process has taken its course, it leaves behind,
in the affected cortex, a modification, the possi-
bility of memory (Erinnerung). It is very doubt-
ful whether something psychic corresponds
to this modification. Our consciousness
(Bewusstsein) contains nothing similar, that
would, from the psychological point of view,
justify the name" latent memory images (latentes
Erinnerungsbild ". Yet, whenever the same state
of the cortex is stimulated (angeregt) the psy-
chical (das Psychische) emerges anew as re-
membered image (Erinnerungsbild)' (E.: 55-6;
G.: 57-8).
Freud has presented a general description of
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FREUD'S CONCEPT OF OBJECT REPRESENTATION
the process of forming a representation. He
proceeds to describe the formation of an object
representation (Objectvorstellung). The object
representations use for their formation the cor-
tical physiological correlates of the sensory
nerves. Freud provides a definition: 'The object
representation ... is ... an association complex
[made up] of the most heterogeneous
(verschiedenartigsten) visual, acoustic, tactile,
kinaesthetic and other representations' (E.:
77-8; G.: 79).
An object representation is therefore a com-
posite representation, formed by associations of
other representations into a single complex pro-
cess. The adjective' komplex' in German refers
to something many-sided and intricate. The
word association has for Freud the ordinary
neural connotations and the added meaning of
the particular way in which associations work in
the formation of representations.
Freud asked the question: 'is it possible to
differentiate, in the physiological correlate, the
part of the" sensation" (Empfindung) from that
of the association (Association)?' The answer is
no. Sensation and association are just two
names, two concepts for the same 'integrated
and indivisible process'. 'We cannot have a
sensation without immediately associating it.'
'The localization of the physiological correlate
is for the representation and (my italics) its
association. ' 'We must refuse to move (verlegen)
the representation to one point of the cortex,
and the association to another.' They are
processes: 'Both depart from one point [of the
cortex] and are not found at rest (ruhend) at any
point'. Sensations or representations, contrary to
Meynert's opinion, do not occupy any nerve cell.
White fibres are not needed to associate anything.
The associative process is intrinsic to the rep-
resentation itself (E.: 57; G.: 58-9).
The formation of an object representation as
a composite of many representations (Associa-
tion der Vorstellungen) does require intra-
cortical connecting pathways (E.: 57; G.: 59).
Freud does not theorize about the need for a
synthetic process to bring about a represen-
tation. Earlier, however, in discussing the
aphasia of Grashey's patient, Freud concluded
that he 'was unable to synthesize (zusam-
menfassen), to perceive as a whole object images,
sound images, impressions of touch, and
245
symbols [of the external object] ... ' (E.: 36; G.:
37). The patient could attend to only one aspect
of the object at a time.
Finally, Freud attends to the vicissitudes of
representations in the life course of the individual
and most specifically during development.
Meynert had made it an issue of progressive
occupation (Occupation) of neighbouring cells in
the so-called centres. He had connected the later
development of the child's overall views to the
increment of memory images (Gedachtniss-
bildern) in the available cells. It was a matter
of extension in the cortical representational
field. Intellectual achievement and memory
are limited by the number of cells still un-
occupied.
Freud cannot accept Meynert's theories even
when he finds the observations about the signifi-
cance of early memories correct. Freud theorizes
about the significance of that which 'has been
primarily associated (das primar Associierte)'
(E.: 61; G.: 62) in the area of language which
includes word and object associations. The
process-Freud says-is not one of anatomical
occupation (besetzen) but of later associations
linking up with earlier (primar) associations. He
calls this process super-association and its result
the super-associated (Superassocierte). The un-
ceasing process of adding super-associations to
the primary representation makes an object
representation an open process, hardly closable.
It is easy to see how, for Freud, to stop super-
associating would have meant to stop sensing
and perceiving. I conclude that for Freud, as
long as we remain capable of perceiving, we
continue to add associations to the represen-
tation.
Freud finds evidence of the process of super-
association in the fact that when a polyglot
experiences speech difficulties the languages are
lost in the reverse order from that in which they
were acquired. The mother tongue is always the
last to be lost. Freud concludes, talking about
language pathology: 'Wherever a lesion might
be located, that which has been super-associated,
would be impaired earlier than what has been
primarily associated' (E.: 60-1; G.: 62). The
earliest impressions prevail.
Object representations are one of the indis-
pensable components of the spoken word.
Freud points out that 'A word acquires its
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246 ANA-MARIA RIZZUTO
meaning (Bedeutung) through the connection
(Verkniipfung) with the object representation, at
least if we restrict our considerations to sub-
stantives' (E.: 77; G.: 79). The question is: in
what manner do word and object representation
connect with each other? Freud uses the same
verb, 'vertreten', that he had used to describe
the way the body is represented in the cortex:
'The word representation is not linked
(verkniipft) to the object representation by all its
components but only by its sound image. Among
the object associations the visual are those that
represent (vertreten) the object in the same
manner as the sound image represents (vertritt)
the word' (E. 77; G.: 79).
The visual side of the object representation is
the customary and prevalent link to the word,
but not the exclusive one. Under certain specific
circumstances, the object representation may
'represent' itself to connect with the sound image
of the word by tactile or other impressions. In
either case Freud draws his final conclusion and
states it emphatically: 'all stimulations
(Anregungen) to speak spontaneously come
from the region (Gebiet) of object associations'
(E.: 78; G.: 81). A new conclusion can be drawn
from Freud's emphasis: what speaks is not the
speech apparatus. The apparatus is only a tool.
What speaks is a sentient human being who
represents, remembers and feels the impulse to
talk spontaneously. To speak, then, is to
symbolize in words the representations of a bodily
mind.
The process goes on in the following manner:
the senses project sensations to the spinal cord;
the spinal cord impulses are indirectly repre-
sented in the cortex after manifold trans-
formations of meaning. There, endless processes
of super-association enrich the physiological
correlate of a potential representation. Under
some particular stimulation a process is started
in some area of the cortex and, following pre-
existing paths, brings forth a psychic represen-
tation. Then the process comes to an end, and
that particular representation is gone. A rep-
resentation henceforth is a virtual, potential
psychic process, resulting from a series of trans-
formational connexions, which remains open
for further super-associations. A representation
is never a 'thing' in the mind.
REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Freud early in his career called 'On aphasia'
a 'really good thing' (21 May 1894, Masson,
1985).However, he left it behind and later called
it a neurological book. In spite of Freud's
disclaimer, many authors (Bernfeld, 1944; Jones,
1912; Kris, 1977; Otto, 1966; Stengel, 1954;
Strachey (in translating' The unconscious ') and,
more recently, Forrester, 1980) have concluded
that it is Freud's first psychoanalytic book. They
notice that the core terminology of psycho-
analysis appears for the first time in the mono-
graph.
In my conclusions, I attend only to the conse-
quences of Freud's understanding of how object
representations come into existence. His con-
ception bears relation to his later theories and in
particular his technique.
The most critical theoretical point is that all
object representations, however removed from
real objects they might be, are related to bodily
representations. The mind is the body in rep-
resentation and its later elaborations. This is,
obviously, the first precursor of the body ego
that was to appear thirty-two years later.
This manner of understanding representations
makes it easier to comprehend Freud's theory of
sexuality as colouring the entirety of psychic life,
deeply connecting mentation with bodily sensa-
tions and experiences.
Psychic determinism is already present because
the mind cannot invent its representational path-
ways. It can only use them. However, because
there are so many super-associations, it is clear
that freedom to reshape representations and the
later concept of overdetermination are simul-
taneously present in the earlier concept (see note
3, Freud, A.E., 14, 209).
The importance of primary impressions, and
their significance as the foundation for later
impressions, provides the earliest antecedents of
the developmental point of view and the re-
gression to earlier stages in moments of func-
tional or organic disturbance.
The notion of a representation that' recurs by
itself' provides the earliest reference to both the
normal and the pathological power of un-
expressed, i.e. unverbalized, representations to
bring about pathological formations and dreams.
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FREUD'S CONCEPT OF OBJECT REPRESENT A nON
The conception of the object representation as
a combinative process facilitates the understand-
ing of the remarkable freedom of dreams and
fantasies in reshaping every imaginable reality,
without driving us mad. It also removes psychic
reality (a later concept) from reification, and
provides the best available concept for a dynamic
concept of mind.
Freud's notion of object representation also
provides many important elements for analytic
technique. The idea that fatigue or divided
attention may prompt a regressive return to
earlier words or representations is the absolute
foundation of the theory oi free association. In a
broad sense it can be said that the analyst's aim
is to help the patient to verbalize some relatively
early representations, perceptions, beliefs, buried
in the present under compromise formations (a
later concept), that can well be called, at this
stage of Freud's theorizing, super-associations.
Analysts know that the direct or indirect return
of certain early representational conceptions is
the only means of changing them and their
pathological consequences.
Finally, to speak in the analytic setting, with
divided attention, by trying to attend to nothing
in particular, brings about the optimal con-
ditions for letting the representations bring forth
many early connexions to the body. To be
analysed is to rediscover one's body and its
subjective and interpersonal meaning in the early
(primar) representations of childhood ex-
periences. In the last resort, all personal words
stem from our body.
SUMMARY
In 'On aphasia' Freud finds it necessary to
ask a question: 'In what manner is the body
reproduced in the cerebral cortex?' His answer
to this question would provide the foundation
for the essential concepts of psychoanalytic
theory and technique.
In this paper I present in detail Freud's
conception of the process of representing the
body in the cortex. I also attend to the vo-
cabulary he selected to present his ideas. Finally,
I describe the consequences of both for his later
theorizing.
Freud was the first to oppose Meynert's notion
247
that' a representation is localized in the nerve
cell'. Freud suggests that representations are
processes without any localization. The process,
once formed, has the potential to reappear under
proper stimulation, to bring forth, as mnemic
images, something psychical (das Psychische).
These psychical representations are the sole
possessors of the proper stimuli that motivate
human beings to talk spontaneously and vol-
untarily.
I am grateful to Drs Sanford Gifford and Axel Hoffer
for their careful reading of an earlier version of this
paper and for their most helpful suggestions.
TRANSLATIONS OF SUMMARY
Dans 'Contribution a la conception des aphasies'. Freud
juge necessaire de poser une question: 'De quelle maniere Ie
corps est-il reproduit dans Ie cortex cerebral?' Sa reponse a
cette question constituerait Ie fondement des concepts essen-
tiels de la theorie et de la technique psychanalytique.
Dans cet article, je presente en details la conception
freudienne du processus de representation du corps dans Ie
cortex, tout en pretant attention au vocabulaire que Freud a
choisi pour presenter ses idees. Enfin, fen decris les con-
sequences pour sa theorisation a venir.
Freud a ete Ie premier a s'opposer a l'idee de Meynert
selon laquelle 'Ies representations sont localisees dans les
cellules nerveuses'. Freud suggere que les representations
sont des processus sans aucune localisation. Le processus,
une fois forme, a la possibilite de reapparaitre grace a une
stimulation appropriee, de faire advenir sous formes d'images
mnesiques, quelque chose de psychique (das Psychische).
Ces representations psychiques sont les seules a detenir les
stimuli appropries pour motiver les etres humains a parler
spontanement et volontairement.
In seiner Arbeit 'Uber Aphasie' halt es Freud fur
notwendig die folgende Frage zu stellen: 'In welcher Art und
Weise wird der Kerper in der zerebralen Himrinde re-
produziert?' Seine Antwort auf diese Frage sollte dann die
Grundlage fur die wichtigsten Begriffe der psycho-
analytischen Theorie und Technik schaffen.
Im vorliegenden Aufsatz stelle ich im Detail Freuds
Vorstellung des Prozesses der Darstellung des Korpers in der
Hirnrinde dar. Ebenso beriicksichtige ich das Vokabular,
das er auswahlte, urn seine Gedanken darzulegen. SchlieBlich
beschreibe ich die Konsequenzen, die beide Faktoren auf
seine spatere Theoriebildung hatten.
Freud war der Erste, der sich der Theorie Meynerts
entgegenstellte, die besagte, daf 'eine psychische
Reprasentanz in der Nervenzelle lokalisiert ist'. Freud
hingegen schlagt vor, daf Reprasentanzen Prozesse ohne
jede Lokalisierung sind. Einmal geformt, hat der Prozess das
Potential durch geeignete Stimulierung wiederzuerscheinen,
und das Psychische, in der Form mnemischer Bilder,
vorzubringen. Diese psychischen Reprasentanzen sind allein
im Besitz der geeigneten Stimuli, die den Menschen
motivieren, spontan und aus freiem Willen zu sprechen.
En' Sobre la afasia ' a Freud Ieparece necesario preguntar:
'En que manera esta el cuerpo representado en la corteza
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248 ANA-MARIA RIZZUTO
cerebral?' Su respuesta a esa pregunta habia de proporcionar
la base de los conceptos esenciales en teoria y tecnica
psicoanaliticas.
En este articulo presento con detal1e el concepto de Freud
del proceso de representacion del cuerpo en la corteza
cerebral. Presto tam bien atencion al vocabulario que
selecciono para presentar sus ideas. Finalmente describo las
consecuencias de ambas cosas en sus posteriores teorias.
Freud fue el primero en oponerse a la nocion de Meynert
REFERENCES
A.E. (1978). Sigmund Freud, Obras Completas: Sobre
la version castellana. Buenos Aires: Amorrortu
editores.
BERNFELD, S. (1944). Freud's earliest theories and the
school of Helmholtz. Psychoanal. Q., 13: 341-362.
FARRELL, R. B. (1977). Dictionary of German
Synonyms. London: Cambridge Univ. Press.
FORRESTER, J. (1980). Language and the Origins of
Psychoanalysis. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
FREUD, S. (1887-1902). The Origins ofPsychoanalysis.
New York: Basic Books, 1977.
a
~- (1891) Contribution la Conception de la Aphasie.
Paris: Presses Univ. de France, 1983.
~- (1891). On Aphasia. A Critical Study. New York:
Int. Univ. Press, 1953.
~- (1891). Zur Auffassung der Aphasien. Leipzig &
Wien: Franz Deuticke.
~- (1893-1895). Studies on hysteria. S.E. 2.
~- (1915). The unconscious. S.E. 14.
JONES, E. (1912). Preface to Papers on Psychoanalysis.
London: Bailliere, Tindall & Cox.
Ana-Maria Rizzuto
75 Gardner Road
Brookline
MA 02146
(MS. received March 1989)
de que 'las representaciones se localizan en las celulas
nerviosas'. Freud sugiere que las representaciones son
procesos sin localizacion, Una vez formado, el proceso tiene
la capacidad de reaparecer bajo el estimulo apropiado para
producir, en forma de imagenes mentales, algo que es
psiquico (das Psychische). Estas representaciones psiquicas
son las iinicas que poseen los estimulos apropiados que
motivan a los humanos a hablar espontanea y
voluntariamente.
KRIS, E. (1977). Introduction. In Freud, S.
(1887-1902). The Origins of Psychoanalysis. New
York: Basic Books.
MASSON, J. (ED.) (1985). The Complete Letters of
Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 1887-1904.
Cambridge, Mass. & London: Harvard Univ. Press.
OTTO, M. M. (1966). Aphasia studies and language
theory in the 19th century. Bull. Hist. Med., 40:
328-349.
~- (1967). Freud and aphasia: an historical analysis.
Amer. J. Psychiat., 124: 815-825.
RICOEUR, P. (1982). The status of Vorstellung in
Hegel's philosophy of religion. In Meaning, Truth,
and God, ed. L. S. Rouner. Notre Dame & London:
Univ. of Notre Dame Press.
RIZZUTO, A.-M. (1989). A hypothesis about Freud's
motive for writing the monograph 'On aphasia'.
Int. Rev. Psychoanal., 16: 111-118.
STENGEL, E. (1954). A re-evaluation of Freud's book
'On aphasia': its significance for psychoanalysis.
Int. J. Psychoanal., 35: 85-89.
Copyright © Institute of Psycho-Analysis, London, 1990
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