MH370 Search DOC 2 - Investigation

Report – FLAPERON found on Reunion

Island - QUESTIONS RAISED – 1. A Left
wing Flaperon panel part has been
identified on the found Right wing
Flaperon - (Preliminary Expert advices
indicate that these panels or parts are not
interchangeable) 2. Temporary repairs on
the located Flaperon were not recorded by
Malaysian Airlines - and the official
Engineer’s Report requiring Modifications
and or repairs before 28 Jan 2014 to the
Right wing Flaperon were not done.
Dated: December 10 2019

MH370 Flaperon
brief Extracts info
and photographs
from the Official
Investigation
Report:

justicecare
 RESTRICTED

Summary :

Following the discovery on 29/07/2015 on a beach on the island of la Réunion of a part from
the flight controls (a flaperon), the Tribunal of Grande Instance of Paris (TGI Paris)
requested assistance from the DGA techniques aéronautiques (DGA TA) in order to perform
examinations on this part.
The part arrived on site on 01/08/2015 and was placed in the Hall 42, which was secure. The
seals were broken on 05/08/2015 in the presence of members of the judicial investigation and
of the technical investigation.
In the light of the parts available, all of the examinations that could be undertaken on that
day were performed. This report is thus intended to present the results from them.

(Source: Appendix-1.12A-2Item1Flaperon(Main).pdf – (Page 4 of 97 pdf.))

SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT RESTRICTED APPENDIX 1.12A-2 – DEBRIS EXAMINATION
MH370 (9M-MRO) ITEM 1 - FLAPERON
CIRCULATION RAPPORT
DGA Techniques aéronautiques N° 16-DGATA-MTI-P1501516001002-DGA
DR-F-Â

(EXTRACTS:)

- SUMMARY (continued) -
2. HISTORY OF DOCUMENT

Version Date Type

A 26/07/2016 Initial Document

3. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

1. Ordinance of expert commission (appendix 1),

2. Oath taken by expert not registered on a list of experts (appendix 2),
3. Technical proposal n°15-DGATA-MTI-P1501516001-A,
4. MMM 57-63-05 : COMPONENT MAINTENANCE MANUAL WITH ILLUSTRATED PARTS
LIST - WING TRAILING EDGE FLAPERON ASSEMBLY,
5. Repairs to the flaperon seal retainers (joint mouldings), Malaysia Airliness Engineering note n° 77
IN- 57 - 20215 issue A (appendix 3).
6. Boeing responses (mail, word and powerpoint documents in appendix 13),

(Source: Appendix-1.12A-2Item1Flaperon(Main).pdf – (Page 10 of 97 pdf.))

5. PROGRESS OF THE EXAMINATION

- From 14 to 18 December 2015, meeting in Malaysia in the context of the request for international
criminal assistance, presentation of the results to the Malaysian safety investigation and to the judicial
investigation and to the judicial investigation drawing attention to the absence data from Boeing,

(Source: Appendix-1.12A-2Item1Flaperon(Main).pdf – (Page 11 of 97 pdf.))

6. SECTION 1: IDENTIFICATION OF THE PART
The objective of section 1 was to get information that made it possible to identify the part
and to check that it did in fact belong to aircraft 9M-MRO that undertook flight MH370 on 8
March 2014.

When the crate was opened, it was noted that the identification plate was missing (see plate
n°1). It was then decided to :
- sample a piece of the paint that seemed to be a touch-up for analysis (see plate 2),
- check the presence of a temporary repair which had not been replaced,
according to Malaysia Airlines (see plate n°3 and appendix 3 for the plan),
((See Photos - Page 11 of 20.pdf herein))
- undertake an boroscope search for the numbers identifying the various parts that
make up the flaperon.

The boroscope inspection initially made it possible to find numbers on the

panels in the area of the leading edge:

- 557 CB, (* left wing

- 657 BB, right wing
- 657 AT, right wing
- 657 DB, right wing
- 657 CT. right wing – See Photos & diagrams as following)

These numbers, photos of which are shown in plate n°4, ……

(Source: Appendix-1.12A-2Item1Flaperon(Main).pdf – (Page 12 of 97 pdf.))

Planche 4 : Boroscope inspection – leading edge (Above PHOTOS – as following:)

SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT RESTRICTED APPENDIX 1.12A-2 - DEBRIS EXAMINATION
MH370 (9M-MRO) CIRCULATION ITEM 1 - FLAPERON
RAPPORT
N° 16-DGATA-MTI-P1501516001002- DGA Techniques aéronautiques
DR-F-Â

(Source: Appendix-1.12A-2Item1Flaperon(Main).pdf –(Page 39 of 97 pdf.))

(Source: ATSB/JACC Communications–MH370 Search DOC 1-Investigation Report-Flaperon.pdf-21-2-2018)

http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-
dXqk2CXubuY/Vboa5NUekWI/AAAAAAAABs8/NPchlwy0HqU/s1600/Capture%2Bd%25E2%2580
%2599e%25CC%2581cran%2B2015-07-30%2Ba%25CC%2580%2B14.31.55.png

(Source: ATSB/JACC Communications-MH370 Search DOC 1-Investigation Report-Flaperon.pdf-21-2-2018)

(Source: ATSB/JACC Communications-MH370 Search DOC 1-Investigation Report-Flaperon.pdf-21-2-2018)
(Source: ATSB/JACC Communications-MH370 Search DOC 1-Investigation Report-Flaperon.pdf-21-2-2018)

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10.1.2. INBOARD HINGE FITTING AND NEARBY ELEMENTS

Plate n°31 showed the inboard hinge fitting after removal of the leading edge panel, and
shows, after disassembly of the seal retainer, that a repair had been made. This repair could not
be identified. A priori it was not in the in the Malysia Airlines aeroplane log as it was not
mentioned as a means of identifying the part and Boeing did not indicate that the flaperon had
any variance (see appendix 10). It thus seems possible that this repair, which can be considered
as minor, was not recorded.

(Source: Appendix-1.12A-2Item1Flaperon(Main).pdf) –(Page 21 of 97 pdf.))

12. CONCLUSIONS
The significant damage was appraised for the purpose of determining a scenario for
separation of the part from the aeroplane. In the absence of data from Boeing, and despite the
deterioration of some fracture surfaces, a hypothesis was nevertheless formulated: taking into
account the results of the examinations, it appears that the flaperon impacted the water while still
attached to the aeroplane and that at the time of the impact it was deflected. A fall simulation for
the flaperon with an initial speed corresponding to that of an aeroplane in flight could definitively
exclude the loss of the latter in flight.

The little data supplied by Boeing did not enable the examination to be progressed by
making calculations that would have made it possible to confirm or reject the proposed
hypothesis.

(Source: Appendix-1.12A-2Item1Flaperon(Main).pdf –( Page32 of 97 pdf.))

Planche 3 : Check on the presumed repair made by Malaysia Airlines - (PHOTO 3 – as

follows:)
SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT RESTRICTED APPENDIX 1.12A-2 - DEBRIS EXAMINATION
MH370 (9M-MRO) CIRCULATION ITEM 1 - FLAPERON RAPPORT
N° 16-DGATA-MTI-P1501516001002-
DGA Techniques aéronautiques DR-F-Â

Planche 3 : Check on the presumed repair made by Malaysia Airlines

This repair is a minor and temporary repair and that should be replaced by a modification (according to ref. 6 in
appendix 11). It thus seems probable that application of the modification was not recorded.
(Source: Appendix-1.12A-2Item1Flaperon(Main).pdf – (Page 38 of 97 pdf.))
 - APPENDICES - ---------------------------

SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT DIFFUSION RESTREINTE APPENDIX 1.12A-2 - DEBRIS EXAMINATION

MH370 (9M-MRO) ITEM 1 - FLAPERON
RAPPORT
DGA Techniques aéronautiques N° 16-DGATA-MTI-P1501516001002-
DR-F-A

Annexe 3 : Repair temporaire appliquée au Flaperon – (ENGINEERING Notes – (3 pages) as

follows:)

(See also above: Malaysia Airlines – Technical Services – ENGINEERING NOTE 26

SEPT 2013 – (above Page 2 of 3 (item 6.)) – “Replace the affected seal retainers (etc)……
before 28 JAN 2014”.) (Page 9 of 143 pdf.)

(Source: Appendix1.12A-2-Item1Flaperon-2-Appendices.pdf – (Pages 8 to 10 of 143 pdf.))

(Source: Appendix1.12A-2-Item1Flaperon-2-Appendices.pdf – (Page 8 of 143 pdf.))
(Source: Appendix1.12A-2-Item1Flaperon-2-Appendices.pdf – (Page 9 of 143 pdf.))
(Source: Appendix1.12A-2-Item1Flaperon-2-Appendices.pdf – (Page 10 of 143 pdf.))
SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT DIFFUSION RESTREINTE APPENDIX 1.12A-2 - DEBRIS EXAMINATION
MH370 (9M-MRO) ITEM 1 – FLAPERON
RAPPORT
DGA Techniques aéronautiques N° 16-DGATA-MTI-P1501516001002-
DR-F-A -
Annexe 13 : Réponses of Boeing
Réponse of the cabinet d’avocat by mail with two parts jointes -
SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT DIFFUSION RESTREINTE APPENDIX 1.12A-2 - DEBRIS EXAMINATION
MH370 (9M-MRO) ITEM 1 - FLAPERON
RAPPORT
N° 16-DGATA-MTI-P1501516001002- DGA Techniques aéronautiques
DR-F-A
-Eléments of réponse in the première part joint

ABOVE PARA 3 – “Finally,

Boeing is unaware of any repairs that may have been made by
Malaysian Airlines during its operation of the aircraft.”
(Source: Appendix1.12A-2-Item1Flaperon-2-Appendices.pdf – (Pages 138 & 139 of 143 pdf.))
(Source:)

SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT

Malaysia Airlines Boeing B777-200ER (9M-MRO)
08 March 2014
By
The Malaysian ICAO Annex 13 Safety
Investigation Team for MH370
The Malaysian ICAO Annex 13
Issued on 02 July 2018 Safety Investigation Team for MH370
MH370/01/2018 Email: MH370SafetyInvestigation@mot.gov.my

1.6.4 Airworthiness and Maintenance

The aircraft, Serial Number 28420, was issued with a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Export
Certificate of Airworthiness No: E370249 on 29 May 2002 and placed on the Malaysian aircraft register as
9M-MRO on 03 June 2002. Ownership of the aircraft, as stated on the Certification of Registration (C of R),
was Malaysian Airline System Berhad. The ownership was subsequently changed to Aircraft Business
Malaysia Sdn. Bhd., as the lessor, and leased and operated by MAS. A new C of R to reflect the new owner
was issued on 17 June 2002.

A Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A) in the ‘PRIVATE’ category was initially issued on 03 June 2002. The
aircraft was then flown to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia where a C of A (Certificate of Airworthiness) in
‘TRANSPORT PASSENGER’ category was issued by the DCA Malaysia on 12 June 2002 after the pre-
service modifications were accomplished.

The C of A (Certificate of Airworthiness) was subjected to annual renewal by DCA Malaysia and its renewal
was subjected to compliance to the DCA Malaysia Airworthiness Notice No. 2 - Certificate of Airworthiness
Renewal Procedure. The operator was required to declare the aircraft, engine, APU and equipment
maintenance status as per the approved Maintenance Schedule, and that they complied with all the
mandatory inspections and modifications originating from the State of Manufacture and State of Registry.
The Quality Assurance Department of MAS was required to submit an ‘Aircraft Physical Inspection for the
Purpose of C of A (Certificate of Airworthiness) Issue/Renewal’ prior to the expiry of the C of A (Certificate
of Airworthiness). An ‘Aircraft Survey Report for Certificate of Airworthiness’ will be issued by the DCA
Inspector after a satisfactory physical inspection on the aircraft has been carried out. At times, the physical
aircraft inspection has to coincide with the aircraft scheduled check at base or line maintenance.

The last C of A (Certificate of Airworthiness) document review by DCA Inspector was carried out on 15 May
2013 for the C of A (Certificate of Airworthiness) renewal and the aircraft physical inspection was carried
out by MAS Quality Assurance Engineer (QAE) on 12 April 2013. The only inspection defect noted was a
torn left hand flaperon inboard seal which was subsequently replaced. The aircraft C of A was renewed
with no airworthiness issues identified.

1) Aircraft Maintenance Schedule

Brief description of the sections follows: ……

(Source: Safety Investigation Report-Issued 2 July 2018.pdf - (Page 86 of 495 pdf.))

SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT MH370 (9M-MRO)

No. Type of Date of Airframe Landing

Aircraft aircraft Hours Cycles
Checks Checks
1. A1 23 February 53,301:17 7,494
2014
2. A4 14 - 16 January 52,785:37 7,422
2014
3. A3 13 December 52,323:00 7,359
2013
4. A2 04 November 51,766:29 7,282
2013
5. C1 and A1 29 August-26 51,270:15 7,208
September
2013
6. A4 24 - 25 July 50,810:19 7,132
2013
7. A3 19 June 2013 50,372:07 7,069
8. A2 14 May 2013 49,840:28 6,994
9. A1 04 April 2013 49,331:52 6,910
10. A4 19 - 20 48,836:23 6,840
February 2013
11. A3 10 January 48,291:37 6,766
2013
12. A2 03 December 47,749:39 6,693
2012
13. A1 25 October 47,214:27 6,617
2012
14. A1, A4 and C2 06 - 22 July 46,727:16 6,552
2012
15. A4, C2, CX and 25 May - 26 37,014:15 5,304
D June 2010
Table 1.6B - Recent Aircraft Checks

(Source: Safety Investigation Report-Issued 2 July 2018.pdf – ( Page 88 of 495 pdf.))

A review of the maintenance records for 9M-MRO revealed the following sequence of recent checks (Table
1.6B [above]) carried out by MAS prior to the disappearance of the aircraft on the 08 March 2014. No
significant defects were noted during the checks including the turn-around transit checks.

The Maintenance Schedule incorporated the Structural Inspection Programme based on the B777
Maintenance Review Board Report and B777 Maintenance Planning Document, which are categorised as
Structural Inspection Items, Corrosion Prevention and Control Items and Fatigue Related Inspection Items.
Inspection findings would be evaluated by the MAS Reliability Section of the Technical Services Department
and the department would recommend any follow-up actions as necessary and report to Boeing Company
of all significant structural discrepancies.
The Maintenance Schedule also included compliance procedures for Airworthiness Directives 5,
Airworthiness Limitations (AWL) 6 and Structural Inspections with Provisions for Damage Tolerance Rating.
It also included Certification Maintenance Requirement Compliance to the Extended Twin Engine
Operations (ETOPS) 7 operational approval, which was obtained from DCA Malaysia. The MAS B777
ETOPS Maintenance Manual specified the maintenance policies, procedures and requirements for ETOPS
operations. A policy to prevent the same personnel to perform or certify certain tasks on multiple similar
systems at the same downtime is stipulated. ETOPS task intervals cannot be exceeded. If a concession is
given for a check that contains ETOPS task or for individual ETOPS task, the aircraft must be downgraded
to non-ETOPS status. 9M-MRO was approved and had no limitations for ETOPS operations at the time of
departure from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing. It was not on an ETOPS flight plan. MAS and its fleet of B777 were
approved for Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM) operation.
5 An AD is a notification to owners and operators of certified aircraft that a known safety deficiency with a particular model of aircraft,
engine, avionics or other system exists and must be corrected. It is mandatory in nature.
6 AWLs are items that the Certificate process has defined as critical from a fatigue or damage tolerance assessment.
7 ETOPS is an aviation rule that allows twin-engine airliners to fly long distance routes that were previously off -limits to twin-engine
aircraft.
(Source: Safety Investigation Report-Issued 2 July 2018.pdf – (Page 89 of 495 pdf.))

2) Major Repair
There was an entry in the Aircraft Log Book on 09 August 2012 that the aircraft right wing tip was damaged
during taxiing at Pudong, Shanghai Airport. The aircraft collided with a China Eastern Airlines A340-600,
registered B-6050. The right wing tip of 9M-MRO ran into the left horizontal stabilizer of B-6050. Part of the
aircraft wing tip was ruptured and stuck at the left elevator of the B-6050.

(Source: Safety Investigation Report-Issued 2 July 2018.pdf – (Page 90 of 495 pdf.))

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