RUSSIA AND THE WEST: THE NEW NORMAL

INTRODUCTION. WORLD (DIS)ORDER: AN ADVANTAGE FOR RUSSIA

After the Cold War, there used to be a huge US-centered alliance. On the other hand, new
players started to emerge (China, India, Brazil and Russia), they were supporters of the
multipolar order. America’s unilateral moves evoked criticism but generally were swallowed.
Finally, the European Union, which avoided assuming an independent security role, found a
nice niche in the system as well. How long will this abnormal state of affairs last?

With the 2014 Ukraine crisis, Russia and the West are challenging the actual world (dis)order.
The crisis provoked an unbalance in European security, Russia accumulated sufficient
resources and was a strong player again, and the local antagonisms in Ukraine also increased
the tension. It seems that the conflict is the beginning of a process that shapes new reforms
and coalitions. The new players will have an important role.

-The China dilemma: It needs to choose between joining the US-centric system or
evolving its own global project. United States also needs to choose between containing
China or cooperating. If Washington and Beijing retain stable points of contact, Russia
will find itself in an extremely unfavorable situation, but if disagreements grow, China
will seek to expand and consolidate its alliances in the region. In this case, USA will
have to contain two great powers.

-The EU dilemma: NATO is unable to guarantee European security or protect Europe

from terrorism and refugees. The EU itself has no effective security tools and therefore,
it will feel a growing need for security organizations of its own (security integration).

-The Turkish dilemma: Will Turkey become part of EU integration through its NATO
role or try to become and independent regional power? Russia will have to prepare for
intense rivalry of situational agreements.

-The Indian dilemma: It all depends on India’s willingness to face China and how its
relations will proceed with the USA. For Russia, US-Indian partnership would mean the
loss of its large-scale ties with India, which today are increasingly confined to the
purchase of military equipment.

ELITES AND SOCIETY: LESSONS OF THE NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW

In the NATO summit in Warsaw, the organization underlined its position as an alliance of
democratic countries. Some NATO partners, strongly criticized the attempted military coup in
Turkey, which damaged the alliance’s reputation. However, Tukey is too important (army,
supplier of security, location) to seriously discuss kicking it out of NATO.

However, the centre of discussion was Russia. They stated that NATO’s key goal is to deter
Russia, and that there is no issue in which Moscow was viewed as a potential partner. NATO
countries did not put the same emphasis in important threats like terrorism or migration.

Warsaw summit was the stated intention to increase military spending the biggest share will
be spent to deter Russia even though the actual physical danger to people is coming from a
completely different direction. Thus, the elites and society find themselves on opposite sides.
The elites take resources from society but do not protect it consistently against urgent threats,
instead spending them to chase phantoms. Russia-NATO mutual deterrence is fraught with
escalation and conflict, which neither side needs and which will only strengthen radicals
throughout the world.

NATO will have to overhaul itself eventually. The European security system requires a flexible
institution designed to collectively counter threats of a new type. Russia should be an
inalienable part of this security system. We have to admit that Russia’s perception of threats
mirrors NATO’s.

RUSSIA AND NATO: A NEW NORMAL?

The deterioration of the relations has been abrupt. The alliance has developed a most detailed
Russia policy that comprises plans and specific measures to be taken in various situations and
Moscow’s official documents also define NATO and its possible expansion as a key challenge.
This is defined as a stably grave. This implies further aggravation and the deeper escalation of
the conflict. They seem to be reproducing Cold War logic with a lose-lose outcome.

Causes of rivalry:

Experts have stated that the main reason for rivalry has been the Ukrainian mess, but this
seems a consequence rather than the cause according to the author.

-Reason 1: Eastward expansion. The expansion is seen as a violation of the balance of forces
and a threat to Russia’s security. NATO invariably countered the charges with the right of
countries to be independent in joining alliances, but Russia became irritated when it
concerned encroaching on the post-Soviet space.

-Reason 2: Strengthening of the OSCE would take the issue of self-determination of countries
toward alliances off the table. With an effective arms control system and overall security
organization at hand, Russia would not have worried about NATO. However, NATO countries
did not ratify the renovated CFE Treaty and OSCE is not strong. Specially threatening were the
Baltic states, because they created a grey zone along Russian borders.

-Reason 3: US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and the subsequent discussion of the BMD
system in Europe. Prior to the Ukraine crisis the West insisted that the BMD was not directed
against Russia, during the Ukraine events, more voices emerged in favour of using the BMD for
containing Russia.

-Reason 4: Anti-Russian sentiments in the Baltic states and the interpretation of the
communist past-

-Reason 5: Public discussions and mass media exaggerating the situation in both sides.

-Reason 6: Russia perceived Colour revolutions and the subsequent anti-Russian policies in
Georgia and Ukraine as anti-Russian ploys of the West. The Maidan was associated directly as
a Western maneuver.
Drivers of Russia-Nato relations:

Containment is the key element of Russia-NATO relations of today. (Containment is the New
Normal). But things can go much worse it another crisis arises.

Strategic factors:

1) Instability in the Middle East affects regions and have long-term effects both on Russia
and NATO countries including the USA. Particularly vulnerable is the Mediterranean
region and the destabilization in the Caucasus. If Russia and the USA engage in building
a new Middle Eastern security system, the Russia-NATO milieu may improve.
2) NATO’s inability to overcome challenges as refugees, Islamist terrorism and
disintegration in states. The future of NATO hinges on its ability to transform into a
more flexible alliance adjusted to counter emerging threats, and therefore EU seeks to
have a more independent security despite NATO remaining a key partner. The
successful construction of EU security will affect NATO.
3) Moscow faces numerous unsolved problems pertaining to economic modernization.
This affects the Russian political clout.

Tactical factors:

1) Peace process in Donbas, and the stability of the Ukrainian state and the entire post-
Soviet space. The Ukraine situation remains wobbly. The collapse of the Minsk process,
resumption of fighting in Donbas and expansion of instability beyond its borders would
inevitably worsen the Russia-NATO relationship. The alliance would hardly interfere
militarily but any aggravation of the crisis would badly affect European security.
2) Incidents at sea and in airspace, especially in the Baltic and Black Sea regions.
Dangerous maneuvering of Russian and NATO ships and aircraft is fraught with the risk
of accidental collisions that might cause an unwelcome escalation and a local conflict.
3) Black swans in Europe’s periphery, such as the bombings of the UN convoy in Syria or
the Syrian government contingents by the US-led coalition that almost torpedoed
Russia-US agreements.

What to do?

1) Preservation and advancement of the Russia-NATO Council

2) Resumption of talks on conventional forces in Europe
3) Preservation of the treaty on intermediate and shorter-range missiles as a foundation
for nuclear missile security.
4) A pause in NATO expansion, which implies not only Ukraine and Georgia, but also
neutral Sweden and Finland. In its turn, Moscow should lift the concerns of these
countries about marine and airspace incidents in the Baltic.
5) Mutual restraint in building up military contingents in the areas of Russia-NATO
geographic contacts
6) Resume cooperation in Afghanistan
7) Implementation of the Minsk accords
All these measures should be eclipsed by the long-term vision of the European security,
the emerging challenges will have to be overcome through the strengthening of OSCE ad
the institution for pan-European security.

RUSSIA AND NATO IN THE BALTIC

Poland’s intention to deploy elements of the American BMD system; the Polish, Estonian
and Lithuanian boycott of the adopted CFE Treaty; their interpretation of the Soviet past
aggravated the relations between the Baltics and Russia. At the same time, all these issues
had never caused any sort of a serious crisis in Russia-NATO relations and had no systemic
impact that would make matters worse. After Ukraine crisis, however, the Baltic appears
to be a real threat or a suitable area for decreasing risks and gradual normalization of the
sides.

Russia-NATO: the Security Dilemma in the Relationship system

The security dilemma suggests a high degree of uncertainty, including the goals, the
potentials and determination of the parties to use available assets. NATO’s perception
appears more accentuated, to a large extent because of the suddenness of Ukraine
developments. Other surprises for NATO include the Syria operation, the swift collapse
and even swifter restoration of the Russia-Turkey relations, as well as a series of smaller
episodes and incidents. Escalation of the arms race and the potential for containment are
the security dilemma basic components. Both Russia and NATO proceed from the notion
that they are building up their defensive rather than offensive potential and both see each
other as a priority threat. The spiral of fear, is also affecting the dilemma, where media is
to be blamed, as it exaggerates every event and shows phantom threat.

The security dilemma in the Baltic

Western capitals are serious about scenarios of hybrid and open military actions against
Baltic states. They fear another historic justice action of capturing Narva (the Baltic
Crimea). This comes from thinking that Russia is intentionally anti-Western. The NATO
multinational battalions, the Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad area and the Russian military
aircraft flying over NATO ships or airliners are examples of the security dilemma. Sweden
and Finland could promote stabilization of the region, but in practice they are closer to
NATO. Factors out of the Baltics like Syrian conflict, Ukraine… also solidify the tensions in
the area.

The Baltic scenarios:

Scenario 1. Sustained containment, with the security dilemma preserved. The sides rely on
mutual containment and minimal dialogue. The negative backdrop in Russia-NATO
relations holds, due to the lack of progress over Donbas. Finland and Sweden drift toward
NATO but stay out.

Scenario 2. Inconsisten containment. The security dilemma intensifies. The Minsk process
id deadlocked and militaty action in Donbas resumes. Antagonism in Syria. Drastic
weapons buildup. The region becomes an arena for local political crisis, although
communication channels remain.

Scenario 3. Regional conflict. One of the sides ups the ante. The relations rise to a new
level of hostility, with the dialogue discontinued. The situation balances on the verge of a
massive Russia-NATO conflict. Finland and Sweden join the alliance and offer
unconditional military support.

Scenario 4. The security dilemma shrinks. Mutual containment is hurtful for both sides and
they switch to confidence building measures. The Donbas conflict remains but acquires a
positive dynamic. USA and Russia cooperate in the Middle East. Mistrust still exist.

Scenario 5. An overhaul of relations is initiated by a side to improve the situation. There is

revision of Russia’s relations with NATO and the EU, as well as a compromise on the
Donbas settlement. Both sides work to strengthen the OSCE as the Europe-wide security
institution, and discuss conventional armaments control. NATO is reformatted to counter
new challenges.

THE NEW NORMAL IN EU GLOBAL STRATEGY

The most important element in the EU Global Strategy is reinforcing the EU’s independent
security role and making the EU a major regional and global political player, while
remaining close to NATO. Independence will be achieved first, developing Europe’s own
industrial infrastructure to provide military equipment and second, evolving common
security institution. Regarding relations with Russia, Russia is portrayed as a source of
numerous security threats to the EU. Besides the conflict in Ukraine, there is a threat of
hybrid warfare. In energy, Russia is also perceived as a threat. Therefore, cooperation will
be limited and containment will be the principal strategy. This makes it more difficult for
Russia to implement the Eurasia project. Much depends on how EU itself succeeds in
achieving its plans

EU- RUSSIA: SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT AND STRATEGIC DIALOGUE

Neither Brussels nor Moscow seem to have a clear understanding of what issues need to
be included into the list of partnership destinations. For Russia majority of challenges
defined in the Global Strategy of the EU, are as important as for the European Union:
radical Islamists, digital environment, migrants… Therefore, there is an interest in
maintaining lines of partnerships. It is necessary to avoid the selective engagement to
purely secondary issue. The overall objective is to turn the selective engagement into a
greater engagement, where the cooperation on a narrow list of issues will become a self-
sustaining system. Questions to discuss: Helsinki principles, OSCE reform, conventional
arms control…