the entire bequest therein.

Aznar v. Garcia
Facts Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted
Edward E. Christensen, an American citizen from California and
and filed its “Executor’s Final Account, Report of Administration
domiciled in the Philippines, left a will executed in the Philippines
in which he bequeathed Php 3,600.00 to Maria Helen Christensen and Project of Partition” where it reported, inter alia, the
("Helen") and the remainder of his estate to his daughter, Maria satisfaction of the legacy of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock
Lucy Christensen Daney. The laws of California allows the testator amounting to $240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3
to dispose of his estate in any manner he pleases. However, illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of
California law also provides that the personal property of a person P120,000. In the project partition, the executor divided the
is governed by the laws of his domicile. The executor, Adolfo C.
residuary estate into 7 equal portions
Aznar, drew a project of partition in conformity with the will.
for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children by his 1st
Helen opposed the project of partition arguing that Philippine
laws govern the distribution of the estate and manner proposed and 2nd marriages.
in the project deprived her of her legitime.
Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma
Issue Bellis filed their respective opposition to the project partition on
Whether or not the succession is governed by Philippine laws. the ground that they were deprived of their legitimates as
illegitimate children.
Held
Yes. Philippine law governs.
The lower court denied their respective motions for
Ratio reconsideration.
Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that the intrinsic validity of
testamentary dispositions are governed by the national law of the ISSUE:
decedent, in this case, California law. The provision in the laws of Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.
California giving a testator absolute freedom in disposing of his
estate is the internal law which applies only to persons domiciled
within the said estate. On the other hand, the provision in the RULING:
laws of California stating that personal property is governed by It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas
the laws of the domicile of its owner is the conflict of laws rule and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. So that even
that applies to persons not domicile in the said state. Accordingly, assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that the same
the laws of the Philippines, in which the testator is domiciled would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law,
governs the succession and the regime of legitimes must be
but would still refer to Texas Law.
respected.

Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased, PEOPLE’S BANK & (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place
TRUST COMPANY, where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the
executor, MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the
oppositors-appellants, VS. absence, however of proofs as to the conflict of law rule of Texas,
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET. AL., heir-appellees it should not be presumed different from our appellants, position
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967 is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.

FACTS:
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and
of the United States. He had 5 legitimate children with his wife,
Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children with
his 2nd wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children.
Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in
which his distributable estate should be divided in trust in the
following order and manner:
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of
the State of Texas, USA and that under the Laws of Texas, there
are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional
rights has to be determined under Texas Law, the Philippine Law
on legitimates can not be applied to the testate of Amos Bellis.
Dorotheo v. CA
GR No. 108581, December 8, 1999

a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen; FACTS:

b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and Aniceta Reyes died in 1969 without her estate being settled.
2nd wives, in equal shares. Thereafter, her husband Alejandro also died. In 1977, Lourdes
Dorotheo filed a special proceeding for the probate of Alejandro’s
Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, last will and testament. The children of spouses filed their
opposition. The RTC ruled that Lourdes being not the wife
USA. His will was admitted to probate in the Philippines. The
of Alejandro the will is intrinsically void; the oppositors are the
People’s Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the will, paid only heir entitled to the estate. Lourdes filed a Motion for
Consideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation
since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death although they
were not legally married to each other. This was denied by the
trial court. The CA dismissed her appeal for her failure to wile the
same within the extended period.
ISSUE:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared
intrinsically void in an order that has become final
and executor still be given effect?
RULING:
No. A final and executor decision or order can no longer be
disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be.
The Supreme Court ruled that the will of Alejandro was
extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof are
void. Alejandro gave all the property to the concubine. Such is
invalid because one cannot dispose what he does not own. In this
case, the whole property is the conjugal property of Alejandro and
Aniceta. Such has become final and executor. The only instance
where a party interested in probate proceeding may have a final
liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason
of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence with circumstances do
not concur herein.
Arzuela vs ca
Petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial
will of Eugenia E. Igsolo. However, this was opposed by Geralda
Castillo, who was the attorney-in-fact of “the 12 legitimate heirs”
of the decedent. According to her, the will was forged, and
imbued with several fatal defects. Particularly, the issue relevant
in this subject is that the will was not properly acknowledged. The
notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, only wrote “Nilagdaan ko at
ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod
ng Maynila.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the will is fatally defective as it was not
properly acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
the witnesses as required by Article 806 of the Civil Code.
RULING: Yes, the will is fatally defective. By no manner of
contemplation can those words be construed as an
acknowledgment.
An acknowledgement is the act of one who has executed a deed
in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it
to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken
whereby the signore actually declares to the notary that the
executor of a document has attested to the notary that the same
is his/her own free act and deed.
It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even
though it does not hew to the usual language thereof. A jurat is
that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before
him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn to by the
executor.
Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a
jurat, the will would nonetheless remain invalid, as the express
requirement of Article 806 is that the will be “acknowledged,” and
not merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does not present
any textual proof, much less one under oath, that the decedent
and the instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as
their own free act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a will
provides for another all-important legal safeguard against
spurious wills or those made beyond the free consent of the
testator.
Alvarado v. Gaviola
On 5 November 1977, 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a
notarial will entitled “Huling Habilin” wherein he disinherited an
illegitimate son, petitioner Cesar Alvarado, and expressly revoked
a previously executed holographic will at the time awaiting
probate before the RTC of Laguna.
According to Bayani Ma. Rino, private respondent, he was present
when the said notarial will was executed, together with three
instrumental witnesses and the notary public, where the testator
did not read the will himself, suffering as he did from glaucoma.
Rino, a lawyer, drafted the eight-page document and read the
same aloud before the testator, the three instrumental witnesses
and the notary public, the latter four following the reading with
their own respective copies previously furnished them.
Thereafter, a codicil entitled “Kasulatan ng Pagbabago ng Ilang
Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na May Petsa
Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado” was executed changing
some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for the
testator’s eye operation.
Said codicil was likewise not read by Brigido Alvarado and was
read in the same manner as with the previously executed will.
When the notarial will was submitted to the court for probate,
Cesar Alvarado filed his opposition as he said that the will was not
executed and attested as required by law; that the testator was
insane or mentally incapacitated due to senility and old age; that
the will was executed under duress, or influence of fear or
threats; that it was procured by undue pressure and influence on
the part of the beneficiary; and that the signature of the testator
was procured by fraud or trick.
ISSUE:
W/N notarial will of Brigido Alvarado should be admitted to
probate despite allegations of defects in the execution and
attestation thereof as testator was allegedly blind at the time of
execution and the double-reading requirement under Art. 808 of
the NCC was not complied with.
HELD:
YES. The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was
not. Although there should be strict compliance with the
substantial requirements of law in order to insure the authenticity
of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside
when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into
account, may only defeat the testator’s will.
Cesar Alvardo was correct in asserting that his father was not
totally blind (of counting fingers at 3 feet) when the will and
codicil were executed, but he can be so considered for purposes
of Art. 808.
That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil.
However, in the case at bar, there was substantial compliance
where the purpose of the law has been satisfied: that of making
the provisions known to the testator who is blind or incapable of
reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate) and enabling him
to object if they do not accord with his wishes.
Rino read the testator’s will and codicil aloud in the presence of
the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary
public.
Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being
asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions.
Only then did the signing and acknowledgment take place.
There is no evidence that the contents of the will and the codicil
were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the
testator.
With four persons, mostly known to the testator, following the
reading word for word with their own copies, it can be safely
concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that what
was read to him were the terms actually appearing on the
typewritten documents.
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the
testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will to himself (as
when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to
him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance
with his wishes.
Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial
requirements of law in order to insure the authenticity of the will,
the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do
not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may
only defeat the testator’s will.
Vda de perez vs Tolete
FACTS:
Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who
became American citizens and residents of New York, each
executed a will also in New York, containing provisions on
presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known
which one of the spouses died first, the husband shall be
presumed to have predeceased his wife). Later, the entire family
perished in a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was
named trustee in Jose’s will, filed for separate probate
proceedings of the wills.
Later, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate
in Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir
according to New York law. He contended that since the wills
were executed in New York, New York law should govern. He
further argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers and
sisters were Jose’s heirs and as such entitled to notice of the
reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to give.
For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter,
Evelyn, and that the two wills were in accordance with New York
law. But before she could present evidence to prove the law of
New York, the reprobate court already issued an order,
disallowing the wills.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be
allowed
HELD:
Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American
citizens, will only be effective in this country upon compliance
with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of
the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this
Code prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities
prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.
Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the Philippines
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills
which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as
follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the
foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign
country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted
to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is
a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on
procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the
Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil.
500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the
first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the
needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon
which the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by
the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them.
On Lack of Notice to Jose’s Heirs
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a
very glaring fact - petitioner has always considered herself the
sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not
consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably
failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus,
even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent
Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is
merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General,
215 SCRA 876 [1992]).
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a
will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original
will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27,
Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated
abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will
that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly,
compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require
publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines"
and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to
petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of the time and place for
proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules
of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the
time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator, . . . "
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent
Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable time within which to
submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the
Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr.
Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings
pertinent to the probate proceedings.
Garcia v. Lacuesta
90 P 489
FACTS:
This case involves the will of Antero Mercado, which among other
defects was signed by the testator through a cross mark (an “X”).
The will was signed by Atty. Javier who wrote the name of
Mercado as testator and the latter allegedly wrote a cross mark
after his name. The CFI allowed the will but the CA disallowed it
because its attestation clause was defective for failing to certify 1)
that the will was signed by Atty. Javier at the express direction of
the testator, 2) that the testator wrote a cross at the end of his
name after Atty. Javier signed for him, and 3) that the 3 witnesses
signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
ISSUE:
Whether the will should be allowed despite the defect of the
attestation clause since the testator had placed a cross mark
himself as his signature.
HELD:
The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that
Mercado directed Javier to write the testator’s name under his
express direction. Petitioner’s argument that such recital is
unnecessary because the testator signed the will himself using a
cross mark which should be considered the same as a thumb-
mark (which has been held sufficient in past cases) is not
acceptable. A cross mark is not the same as a thumb mark,
because the cross mark does not have the same trustworthiness
of a thumb mark.
Yap Tua vs Kuan
Abangan v. Abangan
Facts:
1. On September 1917, the CFI of Cebu admitted to probate Ana
Abangan's will executed on July 1916. It is from this decision
which the opponent appealed. It is alleged that the records do not
show the testatrix knew the dialect in which the will was written.
Issue: Whether or not the will was validly probated
YES. The circumstance appearing on the will itself, that it was
executed in Cebu City and in the dialect of the place where the
testarix is a resident is enough to presume that she knew this
dialect in the absence of any proof to the contrary. On the
authority of this case and that of Gonzales v Laurel, it seems that
for the presumption to apply, the following must appear: 1) that
the will must be in a language or dialect generally spoken in the
place of execution, and, 2) that the testator must be a native or
resident of the said locality
TESTACY OF SIXTO LOPEZ, JOSE LOPEZ VS. LIBORO(GR No. L-1787;
Aug. 27, 1978)
FACTS: The will subject of the controversy is the last will and
testament of Don Sixto Lopez who died at the age of 83 in
Balayan, Batangas on March 3, 1947. Only one of the objections
raised in the lower court was raised on appeal: that the said will
(Exhibit A) was not executedin accordance with requirements
under the law. The fatal defect pertained to by theoppositor is the
absence of a page in the first sheet, either in letters or in Arabic
numerals. In the case of Abangan, the purpose of the law in
prescribing the paging of wills is to guard against fraud, and to
afford means of preventing the substitution or of detecting the
loss of any of its pages. Another, the Supreme Court dwelled on
the issue also of putting his thumb mark by the testator instead of
a signature. Lastly, Supreme Court raised that appellant impugns
the will because of its silence on the testator’s understanding of
the language used in the testament which is Spanish.
Issues: (1) WON the will was validly executed despite the absence
of a page number.(2) WON the thumbmark used by the testator is
sufficient in lieu of his signature.(3) WON the testator’s
knowledge of the Spanish language used in the will is material
.Held: (1) Yes. The will is still valid despite the absence of a page
number on the first sheet.The omission to put a page number on
the first sheet, if that be necessary, is supplied by other forms of
identification more trustworthy than the conventional numeral
words or characters. The Supreme Court determined the first
sheet as the first page by virtue of the document’s (will) contents
for which the said sheet was logically and coherently a precedent
of the second one and the two cannot be interchanged since
there were only two sheets.
(2) Yes. The thumb mark was sufficient in lieu of his signature. The
Court took noticeof the fact that the testator was suffering from
partial paralysis. The Court added that it was a matter of taste or
preference. A statute requiring a will to be "signed" issatisfied if
the signature is made by the testator's mark. (De Gala vs.
Gonzales andOna, 53 Phil., 108)
(3) No. The knowledge of Spanish language of the testator is
immaterial according to the Supreme Court. There is no
statutory requirement that such knowledge be expressly stated in
the will itself. Citing Gonzales vs. Laurel (46 Phil 781), there is a
presumption that the testator knew the language
Toboada vs Rosal
FACTS
In the petition for probate filed with the respondent court, the
petitioner attached the alleged last will and testament of the late
Dorotea Perez. Written in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect, the will
consists of two pages. The first page contains the entire
testamentary dispositions and is signed at the end or bottom of
the page by the testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by the
three (3) instrumental witnesses. The second page which contains
the attestation clause and the acknowledgment is signed at the
end of the attestation clause by the three (3) attesting witnesses
and at the left hand margin by the testatrix.
ISSUE
Whether or not the will is void for failure to state the number of
pages used in writing the will.
RULING
NO. This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact
that, in this case, it is discernible from the entire will that it is
really and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the
testatrix and her instrumental witnesses. [T]he first page which
contains the entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed by
the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental
witnesses signed at the left margin. The other page which is
marked as “Pagina dos” comprises the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself states that “This
Last Will and Testament consists of two pages including this
page”.
Nera v. Rimando
G.R. L-5971 February 27, 1911
Ponente: Carson, J.:
'Test of Presence'
Facts:
1. At the time the will was executed, in a large room connecting
with a smaller room by a doorway where a curtain hangs across,
one of the witnesses was in the outside room when the other
witnesses were attaching their signatures to the instrument.
2. The trial court did not consider the determination of the issue
as to the position of the witness as of vital importance in
determining the case. It agreed with the ruling in the case of
Jaboneta v. Gustillo that the alleged fact being that one of the
subscribing witnesses was in the outer room while the signing
occurred in the inner room, would not be sufficient to invalidate
the execution of the will.
3. The CA deemed the will valid.
Issue: Whether or not the subscribing witness was able to see the
testator and other witnesses in the act of affixing their signatures.
HELD: YES
The Court is unanimous in its opinion that had the witnesses been
proven to be in the outer room when the testator and other
witnesses signed the will in the inner room, it would have
invalidated the will since the attaching of the signatures under the
circumstances was not done 'in the presence' of the witnesses in
the outer room. The line of vision of the witness to the testator
and other witnesses was blocked by the curtain separating the
rooms.
The position of the parties must be such that with relation to each
other at the moment of the attaching the signatures, they may
see each other sign if they chose to.
In the Jaboneta case, the true test of presence is not whether or
not they actualy saw each other sign but whether they might have
seen each other sign if they chose to doso considering their
physical, mental condition and position in relation to each other
at the moment of the inscription of the signature.
LORENZO LLORENTE, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
respondent
G.R. NO. 124371. November 23, 2000
FACTS:
Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as
“Paula”) were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic
Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur. Before the outbreak of the
Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula
stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines
Sur.[5]
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States
citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was
issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern
District of New York. Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the
Office of the Registrar of Nabua as “Crisologo Llorente,” with
the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the
line for the father’s name was left blank.
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951
filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California
in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by
counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings.
On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of
California, for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations
to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce.[11]
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. On December
4, 1952, the divorce decree became final. In the meantime,
Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. Lorenzo married Alicia F.
Llorente in Manila.[13] Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the
first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who
did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.
Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was
notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by
Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco
Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his
property to Alicia and their three children.
Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a
petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and
testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed
Special Administratrix of his estate.
Paula filed with the same court a petition*22+ for letters of
administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor.
RTC: considering that this court has so found that the divorce
decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and
inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he
contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is
likewise void. CA Affirmed
ISSUE:
Who are entitled to inherit?
RULING:
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.”
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of
the Court of Appeals must be reversed.[43] We hold that the
divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula
was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate
of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the
trial court. “Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills,
and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the
country in which they are executed. Will is valid. SC reversed the
decision.
Cayetano v. Leonidas, G.R. No. L-54919, May 30, 1984.
The testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and
was a permanent resident of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the
testatrix died in Manila while temporarily residing with her sister;
that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and
testament according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that after
the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented,
probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wills at the
County of Philadelphia, U.S.A. An opposition to the reprobate of
the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging among other things
that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void. The
petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the
reprobate of Adoracion’s will, Hermogenes C. Campos was
divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.
ISSUES
[1]Whether or not the Philippine law will apply to determine the
intrinsic validity of a will executed by an undisputed foreigner.
[2] Whether or not Philippine law will apply to determine the
capacity to succeed of Adoracion’s heirs.
RULING
[1] NO. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of
the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and
1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must
apply. This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20
SCRA 358).“It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or
good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession
of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter
alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent’s national
law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.”
[2] NO. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation
of the decedent. (Article 1039, Civil Code) The law which governs
Adoracion Campo’s will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is
the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that
the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all
the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete
stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply
because it would be contrary to the sound and established public
policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of
Philippine Law.
Alsua-Betts, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.
L-46430-31, July 30, 1979
FACTS: After executing a holographic will which was later
probated during his lifetime, the deceased executed an-other will,
but this second will he did not submit to the court for probate
while still alive. Can the second will be probated after his death?
HELD: Yes, for the fact of non-submission to probate during his
lifetime of the second will does not indicate any defect in the
requisite testamentary capacity. Besides, a will is revocable at any
time by the testator while still alive
Gonzales v. CA
90 SCRA 183
FACTS:
Isabel Gabriel died on June 7, 1961 without issue. Lutgarda
Santiago (respondent), niece of Isabel, filed a petition for probate
of Isabel’s will designating her as the principal beneficiary and
executrix. The will was typewritten in Tagalog and was executed 2
months prior to death of Isabel.
The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gonzales (petitioner), also a
niece of Isabel, on the following grounds: 1. the will is not
genuine, 2. will was not executed and attested as required by law,
3. the decedent at the time of the making of the will did not have
testamentary capacity due to her age and sickness, and 4. the will
was procured through undue influence.
The trial court disallowed the probate of the will but the Court
of Appeals Reversed the said decision of the trial court. The
petitioner filed a petition for review with SC claiming that the CA
erred in holding that the will of the decedent was executed and
attested as required by law when there was absolutely no proof
that the 3 instrumental witnesses are credible.
ISSUE:
1. 1. Can a witness be considered competent under Art 820-821
and still not be considered credible as required by Art. 805?
2. Is it required that there must be evidence on record that the
witness to a will has good standing in his/her community or that
he/she is honest or upright?
HELD:
1.Yes. The petitioner submits that the term credible in Article 805
requires something more than just being competent and,
therefore, a witness in addition to being competent under Articles
820-821 must also be credible under Art. 805. The competency of
a person to be an instrumental witness to a will is determined by
the statute (Art. 820 and 821), whereas his credibility depends on
the appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and
conclusion of the Court that said witness is telling the truth. In the
case of Vda. de Aroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de
Molo, No. L-22005, May 3, 1968, the Supreme Court held and
ruled that: “Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is
another to be a credible witness, so credible that the Court
must accept what he says. Trial courts may allow a person to
testify as a witness upon a given matter because he is competent,
but may thereafter decide whether to believe or not to believe his
testimony.”
2.No. There is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify
initially or at any time during the trial as to his good standing in
the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and for being
reliable, his honesty and uprightness (such attributesare
presumed of the witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise
by the opposing party) in order that his testimony may
be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the
qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are
complied with, such that the soundness of his mind can be shown
by or deduced from his answers to the questions propounded to
him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from
his appearance, testimony , or competently proved otherwise, as
well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is
able to read and write to the satisfaction of the Court, and that he
has none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil
Code.