K. Helmut Reich - Developing The Horizons of The Mind - Relational and Contextual Reasoning and The Resolution of Cognitive Conflict (2002, Cambridge University Press) PDF

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Developing the Horizons of the Mind
Developing the Horizons of the Mind is the first book on Relational and
Contextual Reasoning (RCR), a new theory of the human mind which
powerfully addresses key areas of human conflict such as the ideological
conflict between nations, the conflict in close relationships, and the con-
flict between science and religion. K. Helmut Reich provides a clear and
accessible introduction to the new RCR way of thinking that encour-
ages people to adopt an inclusive rather than an oppositional approach to
conflict and problem-solving. Part one outlines the key aspects of RCR
theory and supporting empirical data, and Part two offers examples
of its application in the modern world. RCR provides a stimulating and
challenging tool to several disciplines, including philosophy, psychology,
religious studies and education, and this book will be a valuable resource
for cognitive scientists, psychotherapists, theologians, educators and all
those involved in conflict resolution.
.   has had successful careers as a physicist and as a

psychologist, winning the William James Award of the APA for contri-
butions to the psychology of religion in 1997.
Developing the Horizons
of the Mind
Relational and Contextual Reasoning
and the Resolution of Cognitive Conflict
K. Helmut Reich
         
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom
  

The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK
40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA
477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia
Ruiz de Alarcón 13, 28014 Madrid, Spain
Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa
http://www.cambridge.org
© K. Helmut Reich 2004
First published in printed format 2002
ISBN 0-511-04275-2 eBook (netLibrary)

ISBN 0-521-81795-1 hardback
To my grandchildren
Michael, Nicole,
Nicolas, Natacha
May they grow up in a
society in which relationships
and contexts become more
and more recognised and valued
Contents
List of figures page x

List of tables xi
Acknowledgements xiii
Introduction 1
Part I The Theory of Relational and Contextual Reasoning

(RCR) and its Empirical Study
1. Introduction 11
Caveats 11
The nature of relational and contextual reasoning 12
Previous work on relational thinking 22
Summar y of the introduction 23
2. Development of RCR 25
Anthropology adopted 25
Theories of cognitive development 26
Cognitive development and RCR 27
Unreflected, object-reflecting, and means-reflecting thought 29
Intra-inter-trans – the ‘logic’ of RCR development 32
Input to the present study from earlier work 33
Summar y of RCR development 34
3. Metaphysical Assumptions and Theor y of RCR 35

Assumptions adopted from the philosophy of knowledge 35
Theor y of RCR 41
Summar y of the metaphysical and theoretical grounding of RCR 46
4. Empirical Studies of RCR 47

Over view 47
Methodological commonalities 49
Pilot study 1: RCR level descriptions and RCR effectiveness as pragmatic
reasoning schema 50
Pilot study 2: Additional RCR inter view problem 55
Pilot study 3: RCR and Piagetian operations 59
vii
viii Contents
Pilot study 4: RCR, Piagetian operations, cognitively complex thinking,

and evolved logics 63
Discussion of pilot studies 3 and 4 72
Summar y of empirical studies and outlook 74
5. Other Thought Forms and Matching Them to the Problem

at Hand 75
Other thought forms relevant to RCR 75
Matching the form of thought to the structure of the problem 91
Summary of other thought forms and matching them to the problem
at hand 97
Part II Applications of RCR

Over view 101
6. Methodology 103
Method for applying RCR 103
Demonstration of a par ticular search 104
7. Religion 116
Religion and the nature of human beings 116
Understanding religious doctrines 120
Co-ordination of religious and scientific world views 126
RCR and religious development 129
Conclusions 132
8. The Archaeology of RCR 133

Fathers of the Council of Chalcedon 133
Vincent van Gogh 134
William James 136
Rainer Maria Rilke 137
Rober t Musil 139
Niels Bohr 140
Conclusions 143
9. Psychology 145
Psychology as a discipline 145
The case of individual development 149
Psychophysiological phenomena 151
Which music for which purpose? 152
Conclusions 156
10. Education 157

Who controls the educational system? 157
Teaching the investiture contest 158
Stimulating RCR in the classroom 159
Concluding remarks 163
Contents ix
11. Social Issues 165

Overcoming illegal use of drugs 165
Nuclear power 174
Ways to solve old problems and create new work 181
Concluding remarks 184
12. Conclusions 185

This volume 185
Postscript 187
Appendix 1: Inter viewing techniques 191

Appendix 2: Scoring manual for RCR 194
References 199
Index 219
Figures
2.1 Evolution of cognition page 30

3.1 ‘Figure–ground’ shift of the number of cubes 44
3.2 Noncompatibility according to Bedau and Oppenheim
(reproduced by kind permission of Kluwer Academic
Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands) 45
4.1 Schematic sketch of the snail task 60
5.1 Venn diagrams of class sets 79
5.2 INCR group 83
5.3 Through becoming, being and nonbeing transform into
new being and new nonbeing 86
7.1 Changes when moving from one to two (reproduced
by kind permission of the British Journal of Religious
Education) 121
7.2 Correlation between religious judgement stages
and levels of RCR 131
x
Tables
1.1 The four structural levels of the model of thought

processes page 18
4.1 Description of RCR levels (reproduced by kind permission
of S. Karger A.G., Medical and Scientific Publishers,
Basel, Switzerland) 52
4.2 Mean scores of RCR scores of pilot study 1 (reproduced
by kind permission of S. Karger A.G., Medical and
Scientific Publishers, Basel, Switzerland) 53
4.3 Developmental logic of RCR 54
4.4 Mean scores of RCR scores of pilot studies 3 and 4 58
4.5 Mean scores of RCR scores of pilot study 3 62
4.6 Frequencies of individual scores concerning Piagetian
operations and RCR levels (reproduced by kind permission
of John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York [owner of Jossey-Bass,
Publishers, San Francisco, the original publisher];
Hogrefe, Verlag für Psychologie, Göttingen, etc.;
Ernst-Reinhardt-Verlag, Munich) 63
4.7 Frequencies of individual scores of levels of cognitively
complex thought and RCR levels 66
4.8 Frequencies of individual scores concerning levels of (meta-)
logical thinking and RCR levels 70
4.9 Minimum stages/levels of other competencies for a given
RCR level (reproduced by kind permission of
the Ernst-Reinhardt-Verlag, Munich) 72
5.1 Various operations based on formal binary logic 78
5.2 The sixteen binary operations 80
5.3 Level of cognitive complexity from an analysis of diplomatic
notes (reproduced by kind permission of Sage Publications,
Inc., Thousand Oaks, CA) 85
5.4 Main differences of various forms of thought 89
xi
xii List of tables
7.1 Frequencies of individual scores of RCR levels and

intelligibility judgement of the Chalcedonian Definition
(reproduced by kind permission of the British Journal of
Religious Education) 123
7.2 Frequencies of individual scores of RCR levels and
intelligibility judgement of the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity
(reproduced by kind permission of the British Journal of
Religious Education) 125
7.3 Frequencies of individual RCR levels and levels of
co-ordinating biblical and scientific views (reproduced by
kind permission of Pabst Scientific Publishers, Lengerich,
Germany) 127
9.1 Classification of guidelines for functional music 156
Acknowledgements
No book is complete without giving thanks to all those who contributed

in one way or another to the work described and the writing of the
book. (However, the responsibility for the actual content remains en-
tirely mine.) Thanks are particularly in order in this case, as I embarked
upon a new field of inquiry, and thus needed more help and interaction
with colleagues than usual. Fritz Oser made available the facilities of the
School of Education of Fribourg University, introduced me to actual em-
pirical work in developmental psychology, and was a helpful discussion
partner all along. Wolfgang Edelstein, Hans Fischer, August Flammer,
Dedre Gentner, Jean-Blaise Grize, Rolf Hagedorn, Siegfried Hoppe-
Graff, Karen S. Kitchener, Deirdre Kramer, Rolf Oerter, Philibert
Secretan, Thomas Bernhard Seiler, Victor F. Weisskopf, and Phillip K.
Wood were each invaluable in the early stages for critical comments
and suggestions for the next steps. Carol Rausch Albright, Henry Babel,
Michael A. Basseches, Paul-Richard Berger, Mark H. Bickhard, Ronnie
Blakeney, Thomas Bornhauser, Anton A. Bucher, Thomas J. Burke,
Michael Chandler, Philip Clayton, Veit-Jakobus Dieterich, Lutz
Eckensberger, Helmut J. Efinger, Reto Luzius Fetz, Ernst Peter Fischer,
Anne Foerst, James W. Fowler, Peter C. Hägele, Philip Hefner, Heinz S.
Herzka, Stefan Huber, John Hull, Bruce Hunsberger, Michael E. Hyland,
Christopher B. Kaiser, Gisela Labouvie-Vief, Thierry Magnin, David
Moshman, Ehrhard Mühlich, W. Jim Neidhardt, Erwin Nickel, Karl
Ernst Nipkow, Willis F. Overton, Arthur Peacocke, Martin Rothgangel,
Robert J. Russell, George Scarlett, Gerhard Schurz, Friedrich Schweitzer,
Kevin Sharpe, Jan D. Sinnott, Bernard Spilka, Maria Spychiger, Peter
Suedfeld, Kalevi Tamminen, Eberhard Todt, Peter Valentin, Hendrika
Vande Kemp, Harald Walach, Christoph Wassermann, Michael Welker,
and David M. Wulff over the years stimulated progress by way of their
remarks and suggestions. I learned much from more advanced (anony-
mous) colleagues through discussions especially after my presentations
at various conferences in Europe and North America, and I benefited
significantly from relevant Internet discussions. Whenever I quote here
xiii
xiv Acknowledgements
(a large part of ) a pertinent posting (in agreement with the author), I

indicate the author’s name. However, in some cases, I simply follow up
hints, summarise the gist of a discussion, or use some expressions with-
out individual acknowledgements. I am indebted to all participants of
those discussions, especially to Ric Barr, David R. Burwasser, Michael
Cavanaugh, Thomas L. Gilbert, Ursula Goodenough, Paul Harrison,
William Irons, Rex Kerr, Edwin C. Laurenson, Steve Petermann, and
V. V. Raman. My colleagues at the School of Education, in particular
Wolfgang Althof, Franz Baeriswyl, Traugott Elsässer, Aloys Niggli, and
Roland Reichenbach, helped in numerous ways to make me a social sci-
entist and educator. Anton Bucher (pilot study 1), Birgitta Michel (now
Mrs Thenen – pilot studies 2 and 3) interviewed grade-school children in
the local Swiss-German dialect (which I do not speak), an essential ingre-
dient of an interview bringing out the authentic views of these children;
both of them and Ornella Di Loreto (now Mrs Miller – pilot study 4)
also participated in the scoring. Philip K. Wood, Richard Klaghofer, and
Bernd Kersten in succession were instrumental for getting the statistics
done. Without Anke Schröder the classroom work would not have been
the opportunity for such a fruitful experience as it has been. And clearly,
without all those interview respondents and participating pupils as well
as students and older adults, there simply would be no book. My wife
Ursula discussed many issues with me, put up gracefully with plenty
of unavailability of her husband, and – given our differing biographies,
outlooks and temperaments – provided a good number of opportuni-
ties to apply RCR and thereby refine it. Without Emily Wilkinson it
would have been more difficult to get the book off the ground and flying.
Peter F. Bucher-Roth, Michael Cavanaugh, Kristen E. Kann, Bernd
Kersten, Hans Köppel, Ueli Simmel, Geoffrey Scobie, Bernard Spilka,
Joy Stephens and the anonymous reviewers gave valuable feedback on
earlier versions of the present text. Sarah Caro, Sophie Read and Gillian
Dadd dealt gracefully and effectively with my typescript at Cambridge
University Press. A number of figures and tables could be included due
to the kindness of the permission-granters (pp. x–xii) and the respective
authors. Finally, the Hochschulrat of the University of Fribourg provided
financial support for this research. I express my special thanks to all of
the above.
Introduction
The main purpose of this monograph is to present the findings of fifteen

years of continuous research on a particular postformal form of thought,
namely, ‘Relational and Contextual Reasoning’ (RCR). RCR is parti-
cularly helpful when one seeks to co-ordinate two or more competing
theories about the same phenomenon or issue. An example of usefully
applying RCR would be when one is debating whether to attribute an
outstanding athletic or artistic performance to native endowment or to
training. RCR will clarify the extent to which the two kinds of explanations
are needed, bring out any links between them, and elucidate the respective
explanatory potential in the context considered.
Secondary aims of the monograph are (a) to stimulate further study
of RCR, (b) to demonstrate its potential for solving particular problems
better than other forms of thought, and (c) to encourage use of RCR and
its broader application. Given these main and secondary aims, arranging
the material in a coherent manner was not obvious, apart from (c), to
which Part II is devoted. Considerations (b) were finally moved to a later
chapter (Chapter 5), to be presented after the main aim and secondary
aim (a) are met.
The research on relational and contextual reasoning to be reported was
originally triggered by the following observation. Whereas many adoles-
cents espouse either a religious or a scientific world view when trying
to understand what goes on around and inside them, some manage to
‘combine’ both views in some fashion. The question that intrigued me
was, ‘How do they do it?’ The answer I came to after looking at other pos-
sibilities was that those adolescents use relational and contextual reason-
ing, a term that I adopted after other trials for reasons to be discussed
below. Before I fully reached that insight, however, I had first to work my
way through theories of reasoning already proposed.
Until the 1970s, Piagetian formal operations were considered by many
researchers to be the high end of individual development of reasoning.
The label formal operations indicates that certain formalisms have been de-
veloped by an individual which can be used for solving a class of problems
1
2 Developing the Horizons of the Mind
irrespective of their particular content. Such operations involve a num-

ber of aspects, such as exploring possibility space, hypothetico-deductive
theory building, and checking a solution for its internal and external logi-
cal consistency. As considered here, the exclusive use of formal binary
logic constitutes the characteristic core of Piagetian formal operations
(but see Labouvie-Vief 1980). This is exemplified by the central system of
sixteen binary operations, to which I shall come back in detail in chapter 5.
In the early 1980s, a category of more highly developed thought, called
‘postformal operations’, became a topic of interest to a small group of psy-
chologists (e.g., C. N. Alexander, P. K. Arlin, Ch. Armon, P. B. Baltes,
M. A. Basseches, A. Blasi, J. M. Broughton, M. J. Chandler, M. L.
Commons, C. Gilligan, H. Koplowitz, D. Kramer, G. Labouvie-Vief,
E. J. Langer, F. A. Richards, J. D. Sinnott). A number of volumes on
that subject were published in fairly rapid succession (e.g., Commons,
Richards and Armon 1984; Commons, Sinnott, Richards and Armon
1989; Commons, Armon, Kohlberg, Richards, Grotzer and Sinnott 1990;
Alexander and Langer 1990). But those publications appear to have
dwindled to a trickle (e.g., Sinnott 1998) without having resolved the
central issue of the distinguishing characteristics of postformal operations
and their relations with Piagetian formal operations. No consensus cur-
rently exists regarding those characteristics and relations. I would argue
that insufficient attention is paid to logic in this debate. Postformal op-
erations may in principle share much with Piagetian formal operations,
with the exception of formal binary logic. In my view, postformal thinking
is based on logics different from formal binary logic. For that reason, as
will be shown, fully developed RCR, with its specific logic, is postformal.
A further characteristic of postformal thought is suggested by the es-
tablished use of the word ‘post’ (as in ex post factum) implying that fully
developed postformal thinking arises after the Piagetian formal operations
are mastered. This, however, does not exclude a development of less devel-
oped stages of various other thought forms in parallel with Piagetian stages.
I bring to this work thirty years of experience of research in physics
and engineering, together with seventeen years in social science, princi-
pally psychology. With this background, it is perhaps not surprising that
philosopher physicist Niels Bohr came to my mind when I came across the
adolescents who ‘combined’ religious and scientific world views. Among
other issues, Bohr discussed the paradox of the wave-like and particle-
like behaviour of light in terms of complementarity – that these context-
dependent behaviours do not contradict, much less exclude each other,
but instead ‘complete’ each other, and both pictures are needed for a full
explanation in non-mathematical terms. I later became aware of William
James’s account of complementary phenomena concerning (a) memory
Introduction 3
and (b) the stream of thought (Reich 1998). Along with these leads, my
own career(s) continually encouraged me to look at things from differing
points of view and then to work towards a coherent ‘story’.
Having become aware of the possible existence of relational and con-
textual reasoning, I interviewed students and some professional physicists
on issues with a ‘structure’ similar to that of religious vs. scientific world
views. For example, I asked them (1) about whether the change from
the Romanesque to the Gothic church architecture had spiritual, or eco-
nomic causes; (2) whether kidney pain is best relieved by surgery, or by
drinking a certain type of herb tea; (3) whether the reported crash of a
glider was due to naturally explainable causes, or to ‘fate’ as foretold by
the pilot’s horoscope. Along with collecting these data, I also studied var-
ious types of logic, the debates on the interpretation of quantum theory
in physics, as well as various views on the relationships between science
and religion/theology. Slowly I came to postulate hypotheses about RCR
(initially called ‘thinking in terms of complementarity’ – Oser and Reich
1987; Reich 1994b), and then worked on clarifying them through em-
pirical work and analyses of the results. After understanding RCR better,
I tried to elucidate its ‘composition’. My current view is that it shares
‘components’ with other thought forms, namely, with Piagetian opera-
tions, cognitively complex thought, and dialectical as well as analogical
thinking. Therefore, I deal here also with these thought forms after having
established the distinctness of RCR.
Let me return for a moment to the differing views of religion and
science. Is one right and the other wrong? Often both are aiming to ‘ex-
plain’ the same phenomenon, as for example in the case of the origin of the
universe. Using a Latin term, the phenomenon to be explained – here the
origin of the universe – is designated as the explanandum. Whoever works
on the explanatory task in the examples given (and in structurally similar
ones) and employs relational and contextual reasoning, should keep the
competing theories distinct. For instance, when a scientific explanation
is (still) missing, to introduce divine action as part of a ‘scientific’ expla-
nation is not appropriate. Yet, all (partial) theories should be used fully
(in their context). This may be referred to as ‘both-and’ reasoning. When
applying (partial) theories, one may find that one or the other theory has
more explanatory power under some conditions, and less under others.
In other words, one may find that context affects the explanatory efficacy
of a partial theory.
Fully developed relational and contextual reasoning will elucidate the
relations the partial theories have with the explanandum and with each
other as well as the details of the context dependence. These relationships
involve a trivalent logic: two statements about the same explanandum are
either compatible (both true concurrently), incompatible (never both true

‘simultaneously’) or noncompatible (not compatible simultaneously, but
one is ‘true’ in one context respectively at one point in time, the other in
a different context or at a different time).
I employ both the terms ‘complementary’ and ‘complementarist’ in this
monograph. The distinction between the two terms as I use them here is
as follows. Complementary merely indicates that the various parts, aspects,
activities, etc. ‘complete’ each other, yet they are inherently independent.
By contrast, complementarist refers to aspects, states, activities, events,
views, explanations, etc. which are complementary and intertwined, that
is inseparable because intrinsically linked (= entanglement as described in
quantum physics by Heisenberg’s principle of indeterminacy). Examples
of the latter would be native endowment and the efforts to produce fruits
of practising an art or skill, or the wave-like and the particle-like nature of
light. As these example and others show, as a rule the links are not of the
cause–effect type but of other types. A given link may be one of ‘kinship’,
of information transfer, of symbiosis, of mutual limitation, and so on.
The appeal of studying RCR and using it appropriately goes beyond
purely academic intellectual interest. As one looks around, examples
abound where either/or thinking (rather than both-and reasoning) has un-
desirable consequences. I would argue that rigid adherence to either/or
thinking has impeded the full realisation of the potential of psychology,
education and religion, among other fields, and has hindered better reso-
lutions of societal problems like fighting illicit use of narcotics. In these
and other comparable cases, RCR offers a method or a pathway toward
more encompassing and fruitful results. In sum, RCR is not needed for
solving crossword puzzles nor similar, conceptually simple tasks having
just one well-defined solution. Rather, it helps in dealing with highly com-
plex, often controversial problems of the kind just indicated. How does
RCR help? RCR helps one to analyse the various aspects of a problem and
their ‘internal’ relationships as well as the role of the context and thence
to bring out the respective dominant explanation. Doing so contributes
to developing the horizons of the mind. This comes about in particular
because – where applicable – the use of the ‘structural’ trivalent RCR
logic frees one from the limitations of formal binary logic. This may also
permit one to resolve cognitive dissonances or even conflicts.
Once a teacher grasps the nature of RCR and its developmental logic
he or she can stimulate RCR in the classroom step by step. In particular,
the teacher can further students’ ability to differentiate and to integrate
statements about what is or might be the case, and can help students
to become conscious of different types of logic used in establishing and
connecting statements.
Introduction 5
Urged on years ago by colleagues and one editor of a leading profes-

sional journal to publish this work as a monograph, I deferred doing so
until the conceptual basis of RCR was sufficiently clarified, the empirical
data well established, and my experience with applying RCR sufficiently
promising, particularly in a classroom setting. I am fairly confident that
those criteria have now been met. Given RCR’s potentially wide-ranging
use, I have written the present volume, in particular Part II, with an audi-
ence in mind comprising not merely experts or students of developmental
psychology, psychology of education, and cognitive science, but also of
interested persons from other fields for whom RCR might be relevant
and helpful in practice.
A brief discussion of the style of my presentation may be appropriate
at this point. Let me begin by citing two exemplars of what I aspire to do
in writing this monograph. The first is René Descartes whose ‘Discourse
on Method’ was written in a style that itself illustrated the discourse’s
content: his writing was systematic, formal, analytic. The second model
is Søren A. Kierkegaard, the Danish philosopher theologian, who docu-
mented his revolt against the formal, petrified Church of his day. His
writing on that subject is unsystematic, aphoristic, sometimes even dis-
jointed.1 In the same vein, I have attempted to write this monograph in
such a way that it expresses RCR stylistically as well as thematically. While
the thematic treatment of RCR is fairly obvious, my stylistic demonstra-
tion of RCR may require a further word of explanation.
The most significant choice a writer may face, apart from the relative
formality of his or her style, is whether to proceed deductively after hav-
ing presented the main thesis ‘up front’ (risking mental overload of the
reader), or inductively, presenting the arguments one by one and the re-
sulting thesis as conclusion (risking losing the reader on the way because
it is not clear where one is going). In this work exploring RCR, I alternate
between partial deduction and partial induction in an effort to emphasise
the both-and importance of the two methods for gaining insight. In other
words I attempt to make full use of both methods in a complementarist
1 For persons deeply knowledgeable about the Qur’an (which I am not), the style of the
holy book of Islam (in Arabic) is another example of a match between content and style:
the style is said to express both the sweetness of city dwellers’ sedentary placidity and the
forcefulness of Bedouins’ migrating roughness; the rhythm of the syllables echoes that of
both prose and poetry – the pauses, while different from those in either prose or poetry,
exhibit a harmonious and rhythmic symmetry; the words chosen are neither trivial nor
overly rare – they are the expression of an admirable nobility; the sentences are phrased
in such a way that the smallest number of words renders thoughts of extreme richness;
intellect and feelings/emotions are brought in ‘together’ in such a way that the narration,
arguments, doctrines, laws, and moral principles are both intellectually convincing and
emotionally engaging (Schimmel 1991, p. 11, quoting an Egyptian scholar; translation
from German by K.H.R. as throughout this monograph).
or linked manner, to illustrate how RCR furthers understanding through

iterated changes of the viewpoint.
Finally, a caveat: this monograph is not necessarily a fascinating read;
in fact, some readers may need extra motivation to keep reading. One of
the difficulties with RCR is its ‘invisibility’, which is comparable to that
of scaffolding: when the building or the renovation is done, almost no
trace is left of the scaffolding. Similarly, once RCR has done its work and
a solution to the given problem has been found, there is mostly no trace
left of how the solution came to be found. To use another rubric, one
may compare RCR with the number zero (without claiming for RCR the
importance of the zero). Peter Bernstein (1998, pp. 32–3) wrote:
The concept of zero was difficult to grasp for people who had used counting
only to keep track of the number of animals killed or the numbers of days passed
or the number of units travelled. Zero had nothing to do with what counting was in
that sense. As the twentieth-century English philosopher Alfred North Whitehead
put it, ‘The point about zero is that we do not need to use it in the operation of
daily life. No one goes out to buy zero fish. It is in a way the most civilised of all
the cardinals, and its use is forced on us by the needs of cultivated modes of
thought.’
Similarly, millions live their lives without having heard of relational and
contextual reasoning, and without ever using it. My claim is that, were
they to use RCR, they would better their chances for improving personal
relationships, tackling complex social problems such as getting people
to follow good health habits, and dealing more effectively with social
and political situations in strife-torn areas such as Northern Ireland, the
Balkans, the Middle East, and elsewhere.
There is another possible reason for finding this volume off-putting.
Many of us egotistically think that anything we say is both complete and
consistent (a violation of Gödel’s theorem, by the way), and therefore
incorruptible, unchangeable, and not to be questioned. And now comes
an author who potentially challenges that view. How does he have the
nerve to do that? While understanding such a reaction, I still hope that for
serious thinkers, researchers and scholars, the considerations presented
here together with the empirical data and their interpretation should open
minds to the parameters of organised thought.
Some readers may find that I argue like someone for whom everything
becomes a nail because I have a hammer in my hands: indeed, I do use
relational and contextual reasoning in many different situations, under
widely varying circumstances, and in differing modes, for instance to
obtain a result of psychological research, to formulate a hypothesis or a
desideratum, or to enable a retroduction.
Introduction 7
Although my understanding has reached a level which makes commu-

nication of the results reasonable, I do not claim that this volume consti-
tutes the final word on the issues discussed. Rather, I present something
to think about, to be explored jointly, this in the hope that others will also
contribute to the progress of RCR and its applications.
The organisation of the volume is as follows. Chapter 1 presents fully
developed RCR in a basic way so that the sequel becomes understand-
able. It includes a structural analysis of RCR in terms of elementary opera-
tions, conjunctive operations, composite operations, and complete forms
of thought. Chapter 2 discusses background knowledge needed for under-
standing the development of RCR: the general ontogenetic development
from the child’s searching to understand the world to the adolescent’s ar-
gumentative description to the mature adult’s balanced views which imply
an awareness of the power but also of the limitations of the human mind.
Piaget’s concept of intra-inter-trans, the logic of RCR development, is in-
troduced at that point. Chapter 3 deals with the philosophy of knowledge
adopted, and the theoretical underpinnings of RCR. Chapter 4 reports
the basic empirical data. Chapter 5 discusses the other thought forms
of concern (Piagetian logico-mathematical thinking, cognitively complex
thought, dialectical as well as analogical thinking), and expounds on the
need to match the type of thought that one uses in analysing and solving
a problem to the structure of the problem itself in order to obtain best
results. The reason to choose just these thought forms is twofold: on the
one hand, as already mentioned, those forms share ‘components’ with
RCR. On the other hand, due to their difference in characteristics and
‘performance’, they underline the fact that the choice of an appropriate
thought form matters. For both reasons they need to be known in their
own right, not just as contrasts to RCR.
Part II, that is Chapters 6 through 11, discusses applications of RCR.
My conclusions are presented in Chapter 12; the visions of Reginald
Victor Jones and of Daniel Goeudevert complete that last chapter. Ap-
pendix 1 and Appendix 2 deal with technicalities of RCR interviews and
their scoring, respectively. Part II can be read without first reading Part I,
but understanding Part II fully might be easier after reading Part I.
Part I
The Theory of Relational and Contextual

Reasoning (RCR) and its Empirical Study
1 Introduction
The object of this chapter is, first, to formulate a few caveats in order to
lessen the risk of misunderstandings and disappointments, then to de-
limit the domain to be discussed, and above all, to lay the groundwork
for subsequent considerations on Relational and Contextual Reasoning
(RCR). This includes the basic nature of RCR, and the meaning of rela-
tional, contextual and reasoning, RCR’s underlying logic, its components
and internal structure, and its status as postformal theory. There follows
an empirical finding as an illustration of the principles set out so far.
Finally, other forms of relational thinking and their importance for the
present study are discussed before briefly summing up the chapter.
Caveats
No overarching grand theory exists of everything concerning psycholog-
ical development of humans.1 Clearly, each of us often (a) perceives,
(b) feels, (c) reasons, (d) plans, and (e) acts in an interrelated manner,
and not only in mundane affairs of daily life. Yet, present psychological
theories mainly deal with only one of the aspects (a) to (e) (or any other,
like motivation, e.g., Reiss and Havercamp 1998); this despite their pro-
ponents’ awareness of the artificiality of such an isolating procedure. This
work is no exception in that regard.
It is neither a new nor a contested claim that thought and emotion
are ‘inseparably’ linked (e.g., Piaget 1954/1981; Bearison and Zimilis
1986; Cacioppo and Gardner 1999, pp. 194–6). Nevertheless, emotions
are very largely neglected here. Cognition (perceiving, appraising, un-
derstanding, reasoning, judging, remembering, imagining, etc.) and its
development, the general subject matter of this work, is complicated
enough. For that reason, I further restricted this work to the develop-
ment of cognitive thought processes.
1 I write this notwithstanding Wilber’s (2000) A theory of everything, which is more an eclec-
tic vision than an established theory. For the history and prospects of such a theory in phys-
ics – a culturally relative priority – see, e.g., Glashow 1980; Greene 1999; Weinberg 1992.
11
12 The Theory of Relational and Contextual Reasoning
Likewise, it seems incontrovertible that all thought processes are based

on chemico-electric processes in the brain (e.g., Baars 1997; Clark 1997;
Damasio 1994, 1999; Edelman 1992; Edelman and Tononi 2000;
Gazzaniga 1992; Ramachandran and Blakeslee 1998; Putnam 1999, es-
pecially part 2), but again, neurobiology will not be treated here. In-
terested readers might refer, e.g., to Elman, Bates, Johnson, Karmiloff-
Smith, Parisi and Plunkett (1997, pp. 2–4, 239–317, passim) and
Johnson (1998).
Nor will there be much discussion of unconscious or preconscious
processes although they play an important role in cognition (e.g., implicit
knowledge, Holyoak and Spellman 1993, pp. 278–90; the cognitive uncon-
scious, Lakoff and Johnson1999, pp. 9–15), particularly in its development.
As a rule, a person is ‘embedded’ in the current developmental stage, that
is, not fully aware of it and therefore not able to deal with it consciously:
the person is the stage. When moving to the next stage, the structure of
the previous stage becomes the content of the (structurally enlarged) new
stage: the person is presently aware of the lower stage characteristics and
therefore can have it, that is deal with it, differentiate its characteristics
(Piaget 1971, §20iv; Kegan 1982, in particular pp. 146–8).2
Also, cognitive performance and development are not independent of
the social context (e.g., Astin 1998; Monteil and Huguet 1999). While
acknowledging that fact, social context is hardly dealt with here in any
systematic fashion as far as discussing relational and contextual reasoning
proper is concerned. The aim of the work described and discussed in this
volume was to carry out enough basic research on RCR to enable its
targeted effective application, and then to concentrate on applications in
various fields; all the same, social context is included in appropriate cases.
Given these caveats, we now turn to the basic nature of RCR so as
to start with at least an elementary understanding of what will become
clearer and more detailed in subsequent sections and chapters.
The nature of relational and contextual reasoning
Basic features
Fully developed relational and contextual reasoning (RCR) is a specific
thought form which implies that two or more heterogeneous descriptions,
2 In a different rubric, Gerald Cory (2000) presents a conflict systems neurobehavioural
model of the brain: the protoreptilian brain (the evolutionarily oldest) represents the
self-preservation programming of human behaviour, the mammalian additions (the limbic
system, etc.) the affectional programming, and the (typically human) neocortex the ex-
ecutive programming of human behaviour, which notably co-ordinates the activities of
the evolutionarily earlier brain parts, especially in case of (instinctive) conflicts between
self-interest and other-interests.
Introduction 13
explanations, models, theories or interpretations of the very same entity,

phenomenon, or functionally coherent whole are both ‘logically’ possi-
ble and acceptable together under certain conditions, and can be co-
ordinated accordingly (Reich 1995a).3 Although the extent and intent of
a given description, explanation, etc. per se play a role, that is less central to
RCR than the co-ordination between competing explanations. Examples
are the explanation of human behaviour by ‘nature’ (A) and by ‘nurture’
(B), the use of the ‘wave’ (A) and the ‘particle’ (B) picture when explain-
ing light phenomena, the reference to technical malfunctioning (A) and
human failure (B) as causes of accidents, the use of scientific (A) and
religious (B) interpretations when discussing the origin and evolution of
the universe and what it contains, or the investigation of psychophysio-
logical phenomena (e.g., fright) in terms of introspection (A), outward
behaviour (B), and physiological data (pulse frequency, skin resistance,
etc. – C).
As a category, RCR can be classed alongside Piagetian logico-
mathematical thinking (Piaget 1970), dialectical thinking (Basseches
1984; Riegel 1978), analogical thinking (e.g., Gentner and Markman
1997), cognitively complex thinking (e.g., Baker-Brown, Ballard, Bluck,
de Vries, Suedfeld, and Tetlock 1992), systemic thinking (e.g., Chandler
and Boutilier 1992), and so on – although to my knowledge this is the
first book-length discussion of RCR and it is less established in academe
than those traditional forms of thought. They will be compared with and
contrasted to RCR in chapter 5.
What is the meaning of ‘relational’, ‘contextual’, and ‘reasoning’ in the
present context? Throughout this monograph, I refer to the entity, phe-
nomenon, or the functionally coherent whole to be explained as the ‘ex-
planandum’, and to the heterogeneous descriptions, explanations, mod-
els, theories or interpretations as ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ . . . In a given case, A, B,
C . . . may constitute a description, a causal attribution, a motivation for
human action, a prediction, a presentation of a process, an analysis of a
structure, an interpretation of meaning, a (partial) theory and so on; this
in many knowledge domains.
Relational concerns the relations between the explanandum and A,
B, C . . . on the one hand, and the relations between A, and B, and
C . . . themselves on the other. To anticipate: A, B, and C . . . are internally
linked (entangled as understood in quantum physics) in cases where RCR
is applicable, but mostly do not constitute a cause–effect relation in the
3 Initially, RCR was called ‘Thinking in terms of complementarity of “theories”’. The
name was changed to RCR because, on the one hand, the appropriateness of this label
was increasingly appreciated, as was, on the other hand, the ambiguity of the term ‘com-
plementarity’, used very differently in everyday life, in ‘popular’ physics, psychological
communication theory, psychotherapy, and so on (Reich in press).
classical sense. The link can consist in mutual enabling or limiting, in an

information transfer, or be of further types.
Contextual involves taking into account the circumstances, the context
of the situation. Regarding nature and nurture, context effects would show
up, for instance, when comparing and contrasting the performance at
two points in time, or, alternatively, two differing aspects of the same
activity like playing the piano (e.g., playing without faults, or playing for
the first time from the sheet music). To stay with the first example, if
the performance of an athlete in good health and unchanged food intake
varies over a matter of weeks, chances are that it has more to do with
his or her exercising than with natural endowment. With reference to
the wave picture and the particle picture of light, the one-slit (particle-
like behaviour) and the two-slit (wave-like behaviour) experiments come
to mind. As to accidents, the context may co-determine how technical
malfunctioning and human failure condition each other. In regard to
the interpretations of the origin and the evolution of the universe, the
context could be a pure question of physics (physics contributes more)
or the meaning and destiny of human life (religion has more to say). In all
pertinent cases A, B, and C . . . have to be taken into account separately
and jointly, but their explanatory potential usually varies with the context.
As to reasoning, one can differentiate between (a) inferring, (b) think-
ing, and (c) reasoning (Moshman 1998, pp. 952–3). Inferring involves the
generation of new cognitions from old, in other words to draw conclu-
sions from what was already known but had not been ‘applied’. Inferring
is often automatic and unconscious, for instance, when an infant, know-
ing that a toy can be in one of two locations, does not find it in the first
location and immediately turns to the second (e.g., Sodian and Wimmer
1987). Thinking deliberately uses the results of inferences to serve one’s
purpose, like making a decision, solving a problem, or testing a hypoth-
esis. Given the object of thinking, it is possible eventually to evaluate the
result. With experience, it may become clear which thought processes
are more successful than others. By applying the corresponding reflec-
tions to thinking, it becomes reasoning. Moshman (1998, pp. 953–60)
distinguishes different types of reasoning. RCR is a specific, and not a
general type of reasoning, applicable to phenomena or events having the
particular structure referred to above.
Altogether, RCR can be understood as a pragmatic reasoning schema
(Cheng and Holyoak 1985). Such a schema consists neither in a set of
syntactic rules (e.g., mathematical algorithms) that are independent of
the specific content to be treated, nor are they a recipe for one-off deci-
sions such as choosing a profession or a partner, but consist in applying
a set of rules for solving a particular class of problems. In the present
Introduction 15
case the issue is to ‘co-ordinate’ two or more ‘rivalling’ descriptions, ex-

planations, models, theories or interpretations (procedure in chapter 6).
This, irrespective of whether they are of the ‘nonconflicting’ type, or
‘contradicting’ each other. However, in all pertinent cases they differ cat-
egorically, are internally linked, and in a given context one has more
explicatory weight than another.
As already indicated, in the cognitive-conflict-resolving RCR world,
such rivalling descriptions, explanations, models, theories or interpreta-
tions of the selfsame entity, phenomenon or functionally coherent whole
are accepted which according to RCR logic do not exclude each other,
but neither can be derived from each other. Next, then, the question
arises, ‘What is RCR logic?’
Preliminary remarks on logic

To avoid misunderstanding, I should probably state how I use the terms
‘logic’ and ‘logical’. There are two philosophical schools concerning the
applicability of the terms logic and logical. For one school only the clas-
sical (Aristotelian) formal binary logic, including its modern symbolic
version, is deemed to be universally valid, and therefore alone deserves
the designation ‘logic’. All other rules about correct reasoning are termed
‘considerations of a philosophical or psychological nature’ (e.g., dialec-
tical ‘logic’), ‘examples of a particular logical calculus’ (e.g., quantum
‘logic’), but not ‘logic’. For the other school, there exist many varieties
of logic from deontic logic to transcendental logic.4 I take my cue from
the second school, that is, for me a variety of logics exist. With Michael
Basseches (1989, p. 171) I use ‘logic’ as ‘referring to principles and rules
governing the proper use of reasoning’. As will be developed in subse-
quent chapters, there are indeed various types of logic, and depending
on the problem under discussion, use of one type is more appropriate
than use of another. For instance, in grading a test on arithmetic, formal
binary logic is appropriate for assigning a mark (‘correct result’ or ‘wrong
result’) to each separate result, but fuzzy logic (Kosko 1994) is usually
appropriate for the resulting grading (very good, good, sufficient . . . or
equivalent grades), not binary logic.
In our Western culture, formal binary logic is held in high regard.
One of its central rules is that in case of ‘contradictory’ distinguishing
4 Thomas Balmer (1982, pp. 109–10) writes, ‘There is even no guarantee that utterly
incompatible logics may [not] exist, which, by themselves, are sound and complete. In
fact, the historical development shows the way. Quantum logic, modal logics, fuzzy logics,
context change logics (including dynamic logics), non-monotonous logics, etc. pave the
way for quite varied logical systems, which may reach the high standard of classical and
intuistic logic.’
characteristics A and B (e.g., ‘wet’ and ‘dry’), a given entity can only
have one or the other characteristic (the ‘law’ of identity), but not both.
Higher stages of reflection among other things may lead to recognising the
limits of applicability of that ‘law’ and similar ‘laws’. For example, before a
measurement, light or an electron simultaneously ‘has’ both particle-like
and wave-like characteristics (superposition of wave functions), that is, no
clear identity as just defined. Here is a sampling of views on the stringency
of the rule to avoid logical contradiction as understood by formal binary
logic (cf. Wason and Johnson-Laird 1972; Holyoak and Spellman 1993,
pp. 292–3), first in the words of two respondents interviewed in the study
of RCR: ‘It is not logical [= there is a formal contradiction],5 but it is true
[= empirically demonstrable]’, and ‘We know it for certain, but we cannot
prove it [by applying formal binary logic].’ The American philosopher
Ralph Waldo Emerson ([1841] 1903, p. 57) wrote: ‘A foolish consistency
is the hobgoblin of little minds.’ The Danish philosopher physicist Niels
Bohr (1958, p. 66) put it this way: ‘The opposite of a deep truth also
contains a deep truth.’ As already indicated in the Introduction, RCR
involves a trivalent logic; it will be discussed fully in chapter 3. The third
‘truth value’ (‘noncompatible’) refers to being ‘true’ in one context, but
not (or at least much less) in another context. Does not a potential for
resolving cognitive dissonance and conflict raise its head?
Components of RCR
RCR, while being distinct and having ‘unique’ characteristic features,
shares structural ‘components’ with other thought forms. As will be-
come clearer further on, these ‘sharing’ thought forms are (a) Piagetian
thinking, (b) cognitively complex thinking,6 (c) dialectic thinking, and
(d) thinking in analogies.
How could one tentatively envisage such a state of affairs? One way to
proceed would be to analyse in detail the structural ‘components’ of all
forms of thought concerned, and look for overlaps. However, that would
vastly exceed the scope of the present work.
Instead, I propose a hypothetical model, which is speculatively based
on some probability arguments. The model is not indispensable for the
sequel, but it constitutes a heuristic framework for future work. The ob-
jective is to go beyond the observational features (to be described in
chapter 4) and to represent the presumed underlying structure of RCR
5 As a rule, phrases in square brackets are my additions/commentaries.
6 The denotation ‘cognitively complex thinking’ emphasises that the focus is on the com-
plexity of a thought form, not primarily on the complexity of the problem structure.
Introduction 17
(and other forms of thought). The emphasis here is on structure, not on

its development (although it is true that the structure constitutes itself
and evolves from early childhood onward). According to Riegel and
Rosenwald (1975, p. xiii), ‘Structures are relational organisations [that
relate the different components to each other so that they function as
a whole].7 . . . They are the properties that remain partially stable under
transformations . . . Changes represent transformation of structures.’ To
avoid a misunderstanding: ‘structures’ or ‘forms’ are not properties of
a physical reality but the organisational configuration of mental activity
(cf. Overton 1975).8
The arguments for the model we are discussing go as follows. (1) There
are parallelisms between mental structures and brain structures (e.g.,
Baars 1997; Clark 1997; Gazzaniga 1992; Johnson 1998). (2) Given the
difficulty of disentangling ‘directly’ the complexities of the functioning
of the human brain, a more practical way is first to study and analyse
one of its ‘productions’, and then (based on the results of those studies
and analyses) assume that ‘related’ productions will have a comparable
structure. (3) Language is one of the easier-to-get-at productions of
the brain (cf. Deacon 1997). (4) Certain isomorphisms between evolv-
ing language ‘architectures’ and brain ‘architectures’ are assumed, and
similarly for the ‘architecture’ of thinking.9 (5) ‘Language and thought
7 Structures fall into two broad classes (Overton 1975): (1) elementaristic structures, based
on a view of the world as a static mechanism, understandable through analysing its parts
and decomposable (linear) interactions between them (‘classical’ computer simulation
approaches; information theory; decision theory; cybernetics); (2) holistic structures,
based on a view of the world as a complex active organism, understandable through
analysing the function of the substructures within the overall structure and the linked
(nonlinear) interaction processes (Piaget’s theory; RCR; Bertalanffy’s system theory).
Given the development of RCR through interaction with the environment, RCR may be
considered as an open system rather than a closed system.
8 According to Terrence W. Deacon (1997, cf. Cavanaugh 1999), another example of a
hypothesised structural relation between the brain and its ‘productions’ would be the triad
‘iconical’, ‘indexical’, and ‘symbolical’ representations. For instance, to signify iconically
‘stop moving’, one can depict a policeman’s outstretched hand. That sign is so close to
the actual everyday situation of a policeman’s action that the basic brain can immediately
understand and react. In contrast, to recognise the standard octagonal stop sign from
a distance as an invitation to stop there, asks more from the brain. On the basis of the
iconical representation of a policeman’s hand, it has to learn that this octagonal indexical
representation has the same meaning. Finally a symbolic representation would combine
indexical representations and thus be even more abstract, requiring an even more powerful
brain for producing and understanding it. Let us take the symbol of the raised hand when
swearing an oath: while the gesture resembles that of the policeman, the meaning is
entirely different. The person swearing the oath asks the heavenly powers for help to keep
his or her promise (Deuteronomy 32: 40).
9 What, then, is the ‘architecture’ we are looking for? In the case of language, Sidney Lamb
(1999, p. 28) considers two different, independent hierarchies of units of different sizes:
Table 1.1 The four structural levels of the model of thought processes.
Forms of thought (Piagetian thinking; dialectical thinking; RCR, etc.) are posited to be a
combination of operations from three lower structural levels.
Structural level Example
1: Elementary operations discerning a particular item or event within

a larger whole
2: Conjunctive operations recognising a relationship between two entities
3: Composite operations analysing the nature of a relationship
4: Complete thought form Piagetian operations, RCR
correlate in a most realistic manner: language and the biological “hard-

ware” (or more adequate: wetware) of our emotions, sensorimotor con-
trols, and thought are in a tight one-to-one correspondence’ (Ballmer
1982, p. 6).
The general scheme is conceived as shown in Table 1.1. At the low-
est structural level of thought processes, a large number of elementary
operations exist, such as ‘discerning a particular item or event within
a larger whole’. When two or more of these elementary operations are
combined, thought processes reach the second structural level, which
is termed conjunctive operations. An example of conjunctive operations
would be ‘recognising a relationship between two entities’. At the third
structural level of thought processes, which is termed the composite level,
a number of elementary and conjunctive operations work together, as,
for example, in analysing the nature of a particular relationship. Specific
forms of thought such as Piagetian thinking, dialectical thinking, or RCR,
the fourth structural level, are agglomerations of operations from levels
(a) phonological units (phonon [quantum of sound energy], phoneme [set of similar
speech sounds], syllable, wordP , phraseP ), and(b) grammatical units (morphemes [dis-
tinctive arrangement of phonemes that contains no meaningful smaller parts], wordG ,
phraseG , clause, sentence, discourse/text). Both sets evolve from the elementary to the
complex. Thus, if only a general model of the architecture is wanted, either can serve.
However, it would be preferable to have also an indication for a ‘reasonable’ number of
structural levels. Disregarding the phonon (so to speak a white noise of language produc-
tion), there are four levels of phonological units. In contrast, the analytical philosophers
discern six levels of grammatical units. My impression is that the phonological units, while
abstractions (excepting phonon), are closer to ‘natural’ occurrences, to the steps of chil-
dren’s learning a language (Bloom 1998), than the even more abstract grammatical units.
Also, whereas ‘clause’, ‘sentence’, and ‘discourse/text’ are of course different, perhaps
less so than the difference between wordG and phraseG . Therefore – without losing sight
entirely of the more numerous grammatical units – I posit that the architecture of thinking
can be conceived of as a structural four-level model, in analogy to the ‘architecture’ of
phonemes, syllables, wordsP , and phrasesP.
Introduction 19
1, 2, and 3.10 It is thinking and reasoning at that fourth structural level

which will actually be studied empirically (chapter 4).11
In case reality is somewhat different than hypothesised in Table 1.1,
that should not influence the conclusions of this monograph, given that
they are not built on the details of the model, such as the exact number
of levels, but above all on the ‘overlap’ of the various forms of thought,
on their sharing of ‘components’.
RCR, a postformal theory

In the early eighties, a dissatisfaction with Piaget’s theory (of the devel-
opment) of thinking grew. The formal features of Piaget’s theory (Piaget
1970) were thought to preclude appropriate reasoning about social issues,
and about psychological questions like will, imagination, and creativity.
This led to a series of alternative theories, in particular for adult develop-
ment (e.g., Commons, Richards, and Armon 1984; Commons, Sinnott,
Richards, and Armon 1989; Commons, Armon, Kohlberg, Richards,
Grotzer, and Sinnott 1990; Alexander and Langer 1990). I consider the
theory of fully developed RCR to be a postformal theory.
Although not necessarily claimed explicitly, postformal operations also
attempt to overcome the limitations of formal binary logic. John
Broughton (1984) discussed some of the numerous proposals made in
the four volumes just listed. In his view, none represents a good solution
likely to become generally accepted. The common effort of the 1980s
has not had the success hoped for. In the 1990s, publications on post-
formal reasoning are rarer – and more radical. For instance, Kincheloe
and Steinberg (1993) formulate a theory of postformal development that
10 Michael Basseches (1980 p. 408; 1984 p. 74; 1989 pp. 162–3) tentatively lists twenty-
four elements of dialectical thinking, which he terms ‘dialectical schemata’. In an ex-
ploratory exercise, I had no difficulty in classing those schemata as level 1, 2, and 3
examples, simply using the criteria of ‘elementary schemata’, ‘schemata based them-
selves on elementary schemata’, and ‘meta-level schemata’. Interestingly, Benack and
Basseches (1989, p. 97) order twenty-two of the twenty-four schemata into three devel-
opmental phases of ‘emergence’, the last two schemata appearing in the fourth, the final
phase. However, after probing empirical studies, Irwin and Sheese (1989, p. 126) con-
cluded that ‘dialectical thinking as a whole [thus posited by Basseches] does not appear
to be an empirically robust phenomenon.’ Also, while all schemata were manifest in the
study by Irwin and Sheese (1989, pp. 121–6) some of the schemata did not appear to
have a time-dependent ‘emergence’ pattern (cf. note 3, p. 56). Unfortunately, I know of
no other, more established elements of a thought form, which could be used for a more
convincing demonstration of structure levels 1 to 3 of Table 1.1.
11 The unfolding course of an individual’s cognitive development alters the contents of the
complete set of thought operations outlined in Table 1.1 in two significant ways. First,
new operations appear in the course of cognitive development (e.g., Reich, Oser and
Valentin 1994) and second, existing operations become more complex, more sophisti-
cated (Fig. 2.1, p. 30).
is informed by and extends critical, feminist, and postmodern thought.

Liu and Liu (1997) advocate adopting Confucian thinking, a philoso-
phy of integration and subjective identification, in order to overcome the
philosophy of separation and objectification (which underlies Piagetian
formal operations). Jan Sinnott (1998) researched the question of how
some adults grow wiser as they grow older. Her answer is, in a nutshell,
that they have learned how to ‘live in balance’, which is said to mean es-
pecially ‘to orchestrate the needs of mind, heart, spirit, body, and others
in their lives, despite the conflicting demands that all of us face in adult-
hood’ (ibid., p. vii). ‘Self-reference’ constitutes an essential ingredient of
postformal thought according to Sinnott (ibid., pp. 33–4). Aware that we
are all trapped in partial subjectivity, postformal thinkers are said to make
a decision about the rules of the game (nature of truth), then to act on
the basis of those rules. There are clear commonalities between Sinnott’s
objectives and those aimed at in this monograph such as tackling societal
problems more effectively, and improving education by means of more ap-
propriate thought forms (Reich, 1996a, 1997, 1999). It is undisputed that
in one’s life, situations may arise where no kind of logic is of much help,
and self-reference is unavoidable. However, the assumptions made here
about matching the thought form to the problem structure (chapter 5)
lead one to believe that such situations are the exception rather than the
rule. In the overwhelming majority of cases it should be possible to find
a form of thought (with its particular logic) that fits the structure of the
problem itself; this by means of ‘objective criteria’, as will be discussed
in chapters 3 to 5. Having come to the end of the introductory presenta-
tion of fully developed RCR, we turn to an illustration of the empirical
research.
An empirical finding and its first analysis

Having tentatively postulated RCR, I studied it empirically through analy-
sing interviewees’ responses to certain problems (chapter 4).12 To illus-
trate the principles set forth so far, let us look at an excerpt from an
interview about a Three Mile Island/Chernobyl type of accident in a nu-
clear power station (Reich 1995a, p. 2):
A TV news station reports on an accident in a nuclear power station. The main
cooling pump had stopped working, and the back-up pump did not function. The
emergency shutdown did not function either. To add to the difficulties, the oper-
ating crew became aware of the danger rather late and then underestimated it. The
12 For years, when I described my work, the reaction was, ‘Oh, you study dialectic
thinking . . . No? But what is the difference?’ To answer that question convincingly was
one of my early objectives.
Introduction 21
water temperature suddenly rose. A steam pipe cracked and leaked radioactive
steam. What or who is to blame? What should be done to avoid another such
accident in the future?
A middle-aged adult, whom we call Bertrand, exemplifies RCR:
In this accident technical and human failure are interconnected. One has to look
at the whole thing as a system, the plant and the operating crew. And one has
to study the mutual interaction, the type of effects they have on each other. One
really wants to train crew members with the help of a sophisticated simulator
so that they become aware of the many ways in which something can go wrong,
they experience their individual and collective reactions, and learn how to assess
such situations as well as how to deal with them successfully. In such simulations
the psychological stress must of course also be generated, not just the sequence
of technical events. It is precisely such a chain reaction of technical and human
malfunctioning which is so hard to foresee. By the way, I would hire only such
persons who are aware of the dangers involved and are ready to face them.
What is special about Bertrand’s response? In what ways does it exem-
plify RCR? Let us proceed sentence by sentence:
In this accident technical and human failure are interconnected. That open-
ing sentence is mental miles away from the classical ‘It was a technical
malfunctioning’, or ‘It was a human failure.’ Instead of settling for one
or the other of those usual alternatives, Bertrand, searching his enlarged
horizon, emphasises that both causes have to be taken into account. In
fact, he goes further by stating that they are not independent of each
other, but are interconnected.
One has to look at the whole thing as a system, the plant and the operating
crew. In his second sentence Bertrand reinforces the connection between
the technical and the human aspects of the accident: they together in
their ‘systemic’ structure and functions account for the event in its various
phases. If the accident is to be analysed in depth, the technical and human
occurrences have to be considered not only individually, but also together,
in their interrelationship.
And one has to study the mutual interaction, the type of effects they have
on each other. Bertrand implies that the possible effects are of several types.
In this and other interviews the following types were evoked:
(a) information from the (mis)behaviour of the power plant displayed
in the control room and the resulting (re)actions by the operating crew;
(b) controlling actions by that crew and their effect on the plant; (c) effects
of (abnormal) plant behaviour on the (unintended) emotional response
of the crew; (d) (resulting) group dynamic effects within the crew.
One really wants to train crew members with the help of a sophisticated
simulator so that they become aware of the many ways in which something can
go wrong, they experience their individual and collective reactions, and learn
how to assess such situations as well as how to deal with them successfully. This
sentence shows that Bertrand is aware of the complexity of the respective

behaviour of the plant and of the crew (individually and collectively)
as well as the connections between both behaviours and their mutual
conditioning.
In such simulations the psychological stress must of course also be generated,
not just the sequence of technical events. Here Bertrand emphasises the con-
text dependence of crew behaviour. While learning about possible tech-
nical malfunctioning in a quiet atmosphere is of value, that is not enough.
The crew needs also to be trained to stand up to the ‘heat of the battle’
and to overcome undesirable compulsions such as to panic and flee.
It is precisely such a chain reaction of technical and human malfunctioning
which is so hard to foresee. Bertrand insists once more on the undissolvable
connectedness of technical and human factors. It is by far not enough to
study and deal with them separately; a major effort needs to be made to
understand and optimise their interconnection and interaction.
By the way, I would hire only such persons who are aware of the dangers
involved and are ready to face them. As his final point, Bertrand addresses
the insight and the resulting attitude of the operators: it is not just their
technical know-how and social-cognitive competence that are needed for
a safe and efficient operation of the plant, but also an appropriate insight
and attitude.
What does this analysis already confirm about the principles of rela-
tional and contextual reasoning as set out above? (a) Bertrand relates
two distinct, categorically different causes to the accident and to each
other. (b) He brings in and explicates the context dependence of the ‘be-
haviour’: the functioning of either the plant or the crew is not the same
during normal operation and during the various phases of the accident;
nor will operators react identically in a quiet operation period or instruc-
tion session and in a dramatic accident situation. (c) He deals with the
problem at a high level of cognitively complex thinking, and brings in
considerations which go beyond the TV news.
Points (a) – relations – and (b) – context – illustrate why relational and
contextual reasoning got its designation, and point (c) characterises RCR
as reasoning aiming at knowledge leading to deeper insights. Further-
more, point (b), context dependence, points to the fact that a logic differ-
ent from formal binary logic (which is invariant with respect to time and
space) is involved. That difference of necessity will occupy us repeatedly.
Previous work on relational thinking

I am not aware that relational thinking as defined above was discussed
prior to this work. Clearly, Piagetian logico-mathematical thinking, di-
alectical thinking, analogical thinking, and cognitively complex thinking
Introduction 23
each deal with relations (see chapter 5), and systemic thinking even more
so. However, these relations exist between particular entities, not primar-
ily between an explanandum and competing heterogeneous descriptions,
explanations, models, theories, or interpretations – nor between the lat-
ter, in case they exist. Furthermore, the nature of the relations is different.
In tasks where Piagetian thinking is applicable, the entities in question
are intrinsically independent from each other, and the relations are gov-
erned by formal binary logic. Dialectical thinking deals with entities that
determine each other and are internally linked in such a manner that a
negation of a negation leads to a new situation, involving a logic differ-
ent from formal binary logic. Analogical thinking is closer to RCR in
that two heterogeneous descriptions, explanations, models, theories, or
interpretations are used to illuminate mutually two explananda. How-
ever, the relation between the two descriptions, etc., is different again,
and rather specific: they need to share a certain number of functions
(and of attributes) to make the analogy work. Problems to which cogni-
tively complex thought could usefully be applied, may have a variety of
internal structures. Systemic thinking in a narrower, more specific sense
concentrates on the relations (linear or nonlinear, circular, etc.) between
systems components and output, including multiple pathways, and feed-
back loops. Thus systemic thinking deals with complexity in both reduc-
tionistic and holistic ways (Chandler and Boutilier 1992). RCR involves
some of that (in particular in the example of the nuclear accident), but
not specifically a technical analysis of feedback loops and the like. I pre-
fer to deal with the relevant aspects under the label ‘cognitively complex
thought’, and to concentrate on the operations of differentiation and inte-
gration involved. In contrast to all of the above, RCR deals with a variety
of (mostly noncausal) relations between such A, B, C . . . that are intrin-
sically linked and where the link – as already mentioned – can consist in
mutual enabling or limiting, in an information transfer, or be of further
types.
Nevertheless, the findings concerning these other thought forms had
an impact on the present study because of their sharing of components
with RCR. Furthermore, developmental features were taken into account
when designing the empirical work (see chapter 2).
Summary of the introduction

To sum up this introduction: relational and contextual reasoning (RCR)
is a specific thought form which implies that two or more heterogeneous
descriptions, explanations, models, theories, or interpretations of the
very same entity, phenomenon, or functionally coherent whole are both
‘logically’ possible and acceptable together under certain conditions, and
can be co-ordinated accordingly. The meaning of the three terms rela-

tional, contextual, and reasoning was explained, and the type of underlying
logic was indicated as well as the mental structure of RCR. I explicated
why fully developed RCR is a postformal form of thought. These prin-
ciples thus set out were illustrated by empirical findings. Other thought
forms involving some kind of relational thinking were shown to be rather
different, yet of interest here, in particular because they share components
with RCR.
Following Gerhard Schurz (1998, pp. 10–11), in subsequent chapters
I shall explicate and discuss RCR (a) theoretically, as a scientific model
(chs. 2, 3); (b) empirically on the basis of research results (chs. 4, 7),
(c) methodologically, i.e. as a procedure, the RCR heuristic (ch. 6); and
(d) programmatically, that is, in terms of possible future applications (chs.
9–11). Also on the agenda: matching the thought form to the problem at
hand (ch. 5), and the archaeology of RCR (ch. 8).
I thereby hope to demonstrate further the value of RCR: rather than
turning every interpretative dispute into a war of attrition, it works to
hold competing accounts of certain types of issues in an embrace which
is sometimes painful to endure, but often fruitful in the end.13
13 In the case of the theory of light, there were 200 years of competition between the particle
theory and the wave theory (Baierlein 1992) before the fully satisfactory, consensually
accepted theory of quantum electrodynamics (QED) emerged (Feynman 1988). QED
not only solved the problem of explaining the behaviour of light, but contributed also
to changes in the philosophy of knowledge. ‘Thus quantum mechanics is a wonderful
example of how with the development of knowledge our idea of what counts even as a
possible knowledge claim, our idea of what counts as even a possible object, and our idea
of what counts even as a possible property are all subjects to change’ (Putnam 1999, p.
8; emphasis in original). What a development of the horizons of the mind (triggered by
researching natural phenomena)!
2 Development of RCR
To refocus on Bertrand’s response reproduced in the Introduction

(p. 21): obviously, it could not have been provided by a seven-year-old.
Such a child cannot be expected fully to understand that TV news item,
let alone respond to it in a sophisticated way. It will come as no sur-
prise that RCR develops from a rudimentary beginning to intermediate
levels before reaching the quality of Bertrand’s response. To anticipate
(chapter 4), there are five developmental levels: (i) only one description /
explanation / model / theory / interpretation can be right, the other(s)
must be wrong; (ii) maybe, there is something valid to both (all) of them;
(iii) both (all) are definitely needed to account for the phenomenon under
study; (iv) here is how they are related to each other; (v) the overarching
synopsis is as follows.
In this chapter, I first evoke the anthropology adopted, put in place the
developmental background with some general remarks on cognitive de-
velopment, explicate RCR development against that background, discuss
unreflected, object-reflecting, and means-reflecting thought as a particu-
lar, not so well-known feature putatively inherent in the development of
RCR, continue with the Piagetian concept of intra-inter-trans – the ‘logic’
of RCR development – and indicate the impact of previous developmental
work on the design of the present study before summarising.
Anthropology adopted
Put simply and ideally, the philosopher Daniel Dennett (1996, pp. 83–
101) discerns and describes the following anthropological elements:
(1) the ‘native endowment’ has evolved through the ages by way of
gene mutation and ‘field tests’; thus humans – like all other living be-
ings – are Darwinian creatures. (2) Some of the mutations led to wired-in
‘reinforcers’, mechanisms that favour actions more beneficial for the indi-
vidual or the species than the alternatives. Such individuals tried out vari-
ous kinds of behaviour and reacted to positive or negative signals from the
environment by selecting the most successful behaviour and henceforth
25
going on with it. Thus Darwinian selection was continued by operant

conditioning of Skinnerian creatures. Animals and humans learn through
associations of ‘ideas’, behaviouristic learning, and connectionism (ad-
justment of nerve cells as a result of conditioning) – ABC learning. It
links natural endowment per se and experience. (3) The next step in cog-
nitive development involved the building up of an ‘inner environment’, in
which various surrogate actions could be tried out mentally before taking
risks in the real world. Dennett writes that we are also Popperian creatures.
(4) Finally, ‘mental tools’ were developed, for instance words, numbers,
symbolic logic, and eventually virtual cyberworlds, which all extend the
power of the human mind. In honour of the British psychologist Richard
Gregory, Dennett refers to humans also as Gregorian creatures.
A conclusion is that a complete psychological investigation should in
turn look at the biological grounding, the person-centred (conscious
and unconscious) factors, and the bio-physical and socio-cultural en-
vironments involved in human development, and integrate the findings
(Overton 1998, 1999).
Theories of cognitive development

What is it to be a human thinker and knower? Which knowledge is there
‘from conception’, which is abstracted from experience? Those and re-
lated questions have been debated by philosophers for many hundred
years, and more intensely with the arrival of psychology (cf. Spelke and
Newport 1998).
Broadly speaking, psychological theories of cognitive development can
be classed under three headings: (1) endogenous theories (development
originating from within, e.g., maturation of native endowment), (2) ex-
ogenous theories (development originating from without, e.g., socialisa-
tion), and (3) interaction theories (development results from interactions
both within the organism itself and with the bio-physical, social, cultural,
and perceived spiritual environment). What is the meaning of ‘interac-
tion’? In everyday language, it will probably be conceived of as reciprocal
‘causation’. Such an interpretation would apply, for instance, to the moves
of two equally strong football teams during a game. The two teams are
independent of each other, they are ‘separable’. However, each of their
moves either is made as a reaction against an actual move by the opposite
team or is planned in view of the anticipated reaction of the adversary. In
a looser manner than that just indicated, interaction could signify interde-
pendency of determinants or conjunctive plurality of causes. An example
of a ‘loose’ interactive plural causation would be the causal net leading to
an influenza as described by psychoneuroimmunology: the type of virus
Development of RCR 27
involved and its quantity, the state of the psyche, of the nervous and of
the immune systems, all play their causal role in an interacting manner.
Anastasia’s (1958, p. 197) use of interaction is different still; for her,
‘the nature and extent of the influence of each type of factor [native en-
dowment vs. ‘independent’ acquisition] depend upon the contribution of
the other’. This means that the factors are intrinsically linked with each
other, they are ‘non-separable’. A given state of one factor unavoidably
co-determines (for the most part, limits) the effect of the other factor, yet
one cannot speak of causal interaction in the same sense used in referring
to the football game.1
Traditionally a debate took place between nativists and empiricists.
Elisabeth Spelke and Elissa Newport (1998, pp. 321–9) review the ar-
guments pro and contra nativism in the areas of action, perception, lan-
guage, and reasoning. While the respective portions of the inherent and
the acquired, the inevitable and the coincidental, the constant and the
changeable, the universal and the variable differ, all have to be taken into
account in order to understand development.
After reviewing various theories about children’s knowledge of the
mind (the theory theory, the modularity theory, the simulation theory,
and others) John Flavell (1999, p. 27) makes the judgement
that an adequate theory will finally have to include elements from each of these
perspectives . . . (a) that development in this area builds on some innate or early
people-reading capacities, (b) that we have some introspective ability that we
can and do exploit when trying to infer the mental states of other creatures . . .
(c) that much of our knowledge of the mind can be characterised as an infor-
mal theory . . . [(d) statements about certain specifics regarding theory of mind],
(e) that a variety of experiences serve to engender and change children’s concep-
tions of the mental world and explaining their own and other people’s behavior.
Although none of these considerations concerns RCR explicitly, and

research on the respective contributions of the inherent and the acquired
to the functioning and development of the mind (e.g., Perner 1996) con-
tinues vigorously (Keil 1998, p. 388), I assume that development of RCR
is based on some innate potentialities, and develops within the given con-
straints through various interactions.
Cognitive development and RCR

We now come to a sketch outline of cognitive development as it pertains
more closely to RCR, a thought form aimed at improving knowledge and
1 To anticipate, the interaction can therefore not be dealt with satisfactorily by formal
binary logic (nor analysed by certain linear methods, cf. Overton and Reese 1972).
insight through more adequate reasoning in terms of ‘theories’ about par-

ticular ‘data’, that is, evidence. If one differentiates between (a) the de-
velopment of descriptive knowledge about objects or events in our world,
and (b) attempts to explain their structures and processes/functions, then
RCR connects both. From birth we all gain descriptive and procedural
knowledge by observing and interacting (often in the sense of mutual
causality) with our bio-physical and human surroundings. And then we
want to understand and explain, at least to ourselves, what we experience;
this often in structural and/or functional terms. One result is a contin-
ual reconstruction of the knowledge base (Campbell and Bickhard 1986),
and an improvement in (logical) thinking (e.g., Reich, Oser, and Valentin
1994). While these developments are interrelated, and are in fact insep-
arable, it is useful to make the following conceptual distinctions for the
purpose of studying and discussing them.
Ontological development concerns the (perceived) existence or nonexis-
tence of various entities and their predicates, more precisely the material
categories needed to discuss those predicates. Examples include, ‘Do
fairies, quarks, or unicorns exist or not?’; ‘Is that kind person who gives
me presents really my uncle or not?’; ‘Are clouds alive or dead?’
As is well known (e.g., Keil 1998; Wellman and Gelman 1998), young
children (pre-schoolers) may take years to come fully to grips with such
issues. There are four reasons for this: (a) they are understandably in-
clined to look primarily at the exterior striking features (as distinct from
the ‘inner’ or abstract characteristics that are not infrequently used as
definition by adults, e.g., metabolism for being alive); (b) they start from
their own experiences and make analogical inferences not admitted by
adults (‘as a child, I thought that God eats or drinks because I ate
and drank’); (c) they often concentrate on just one aspect, presumably
due mostly to their limited working memory; and (d) they assume that
everybody has the same knowledge and understanding as they have, and
therefore do not feel the need to formulate and discuss their views to the
extent that older children, adolescents, and adults do (Carpendale and
Chandler 1996).
Is there evidence that ontological categories and their predicates are
not just a philosopher’s playground but have some psychological reality?
Michael Kelly and Frank Keil (1985) compared Ovid’s metamorphoses to
the fairy tales written up nearly 2,000 years later by the brothers Grimm.
They coded all transformations that occurred in terms of the ontological
categories implicated in each metamorphosis (e.g., using the Gorgon’s
[Medusa’s] head to change a throng of assailants into stone statues). The
result was that conscious beings were transformed mainly into animals
(51 per cent vs. 52 per cent), into plants (10 per cent both), non-living
entities (12 per cent vs. 11 per cent), and into liquids (5 per cent vs.
4 per cent), the first percentage number referring to Ovid, the second to
the Grimms.
A first striking feature is the near constancy of the percentages through
the centuries and across (Mediterranean and Nordic) cultures. Second,
the hypothesis, that the number of transformations will decrease as the
distance between ontological categories increases, is supported by the
analysis. Thus, there is some evidence for the existence of ontological
categories and even of a ‘family tree’ which orders their degree of close-
ness. Whereas fantasy can imagine just about any transformation, the
ontological tree constrains their number – even during the ‘willing sus-
pension of disbelief ’.
Logical arguments are used to elaborate the ontological tree. Logical
development has to do with acquiring competence in classical logical
operations where applicable (like making a valid inference, making use
of transitivity, arguing by means of a logical implication), and gaining
knowledge about logical quantifiers and their use (e.g., all, none, some;
cf. Putnam 1999, pp. 57–8). It also involves coming to grips with modality
logic (necessity, possibility, ‘all’ statements, ‘there exists’ statements –
Chinen 1984). Higher developmental stages involve (intuitive) knowledge
of other logics such as dialectical logic or RCR logic (chs. 1, 3, 4, 5).
Unreflected, object-reflecting, and

means-reflecting thought
Another perspective for looking at major milestones of cognitive devel-
opment putatively relevant for RCR consists in examining the degree to
which someone is capable of ‘turning back on one’s own thoughts’ (Fetz,
Reich, and Valentin 2001). Young children do observe, think, deduce,
conclude, and order their knowledge within particular frameworks (e.g.,
Case 1998). They can be ‘sophisticated’ explorers and experimenters –
yet their thinking is basically unreflected. They are not likely to examine
their knowledge critically, that is, to turn their thoughts back unto their
own thought (e.g., Kuhn 1999).
A tentative model of the development from unreflected thought to
(domain-dependent) reflections about ‘real’ objects and on to reflect-
ing on one’s cognitive tools is shown in Fig. 2.1. Broadly speaking,
(a) refers to the situation in early childhood, (b) to middle childhood/early
adolescence, and (c) to adolescence and young adulthood. In all cases,
the environment is perceived at knowing level 1 (Campbell and Bickhard
1986, p. 53). The higher knowing levels, to be explained shortly, arise
from lower levels via reflective abstraction (if at all – for difficult issues the
c
Reflecting about
mental tools c
b
Reflecting about Reflecting about
real objects b real objects c
a
Unreflected Unreflected Unreflected
thinking a thinking b thinking c
Level 1a Level 1b Level 1c
Environment Environment Environment
Figure 2.1 Evolution of cognition aimed at ‘seizing up’ the environ-

ment (perceived reality) in the course of age-related cognitive devel-
opment. (a) early childhood, (b) middle childhood/early adolescence
(onset of reflecting about ‘real’ objects), (c) adolescence and young
adulthood (reflecting about objects and mental tools). Explanation in
text.
age group indications are lower limits). They then interact with the lower
level(s). Thus, development does not just consist in adding levels, but
also in a transformation of existing levels (indicated in Fig. 2.1 by adding
a, b, c to the level designation).
Whereas the basic structure of Fig. 2.1 is taken from the work of
Campbell and Bickhard (1986), the content of the upper stages results
from our own work (Fetz, Reich, and Valentin 2001). That work concerns
notably the rather difficult, abstract concept of God and its development.
Figure 2.1, and in particular the age indications, therefore may not be
universally applicable. However, it is posited to apply to RCR, and noted
that RCR is of interest for gaining deeper insights into complex, contro-
versial issues.
The first milestone of turning one’s thought back on one’s own thought
is ‘object-related reflection’. Such reflections notably include discovering
contradictions in one’s world view, for instance (in the words of a bright
eleven-year-old), ‘If the world is really infinitely large, it cannot have been
made by God, because that would have taken infinite time.’ At one point
of cognitive development, fairies, Father Christmas, the Easter Bunny
etc. are recognised one by one as figures out of a child’s world, not from
the ‘real’ world of adults.
The next major milestone in the development we are discussing involves
a ‘reflection on one’s mental tools’ for arriving at particular concepts, for
instance the use of analogical reasoning for determining the attributes of
God: ‘When I was a child, I observed how masons and carpenters built
a house, and I was sure that God made the world that way: he made a
blue-print, got materials, and did the work according to the blue-print.
Now I know that such a conclusion is not warranted [= God is not as
I imagined].’ This illustrates a first stage of ‘means-related reflection’,
dealing with single concepts.
The following developmental milestone, an ‘extended mental means-
related reflection’, is reached in adulthood (and not shown explicitly in
Fig. 2.1). It concerns epistemology in its entirety such as the limitations of
our mental power: ‘A ruler can’t measure its own width. Similarly, there
are things we simply can’t know. That is why I concentrate on things we
can know.’ That empirically demonstrated level of cognitive development
(Reich, Oser and Valentin, 1994) shares features with Karen Kitchener’s
(1983, p. 225) stage of epistemic cognition, defined as ‘the process an
individual invokes to monitor the epistemic nature of problems, and the
truth value of alternative solutions. It includes a person’s knowledge about
the limits of knowing, the certainty of knowing, and the criteria for know-
ing’ (King and Kitchener 1994, p. 12; cf. Moshman 1998, pp. 964–5).
The development indicated is not about taking into account another
person’s mind and being aware that he or she (a) is making a factual
statement, (b) is joking, (c) commits an error, (d) is trying to deceive,
etc. – four-year-olds can do that. However, they nevertheless believe that
all persons having the same information will have the same views about
it. Reflection on mental tools may start when one discovers that, where
one person sees a vase, another sees two faces although each time both
persons look at the same drawing, or where one sees an old woman,
somebody else sees a young one (the well-known figure–ground shifts
occurring when looking at those particular drawings). Or, when someone
discovers that ABC evokes the alphabet for one person, and the American
Broadcasting Corporation for another, and so through to Zenith, the
highest point reached in the heavens by a heavenly body for one person,
and a brand name of home electronics for another. Arthur White gives
the following example: ‘“Density equals mass divided by volume,” a child
is told – and immediately tries to relate this to a firsthand experience

attending Sunday “mass”, turning the “volume” knob on the radio, being
called “dense” by a sibling’ (White 1999). Reflection on mental tools may
well start with questions such as ‘How come we see this differently?’,
‘How is that possible?’ Continuing from there such reflection may lead
to differentiation between unreflected perceptions and even unreflected
thoughts on the one hand, and a careful examination of the methods used
to gain a particular knowledge and to test its veridicality on the other hand.
Intra-inter-trans – the ‘logic’ of RCR development

Along with seeking the causes of events, infants and children also widen
and deepen their knowledge by (a) exploring further afield the nature of
the objects or events under study, and (b) by relating objects or events
to other objects or events in increasingly sophisticated ways (which is
also characteristic of RCR development). Jean Piaget (Piaget and Garcia
1983/1989) describes such a sequence as intra-inter-trans. Jacques
Montangero and Danielle Maurice-Naville (1994/1997, pp. 127–9) com-
ment on those terms as follows:
[We are discussing] a mechanism that leads from intra-object (object analysis)
to inter-object (analysing relations . . . ) to trans-object (the building of structures)
levels of analysis . . . ‘it is heavy and red’ is an example of intra-object relations,
‘putting an object’ into two jars simultaneously [= repeatedly one into each jar]
and understanding that this produces an equal number of objects in the two jars
exemplifies intra-operational relations. As to inter-object relations, natural embed-
dings (simple class inclusions) come to mind.
The INCR group (the 4 group) structure2 constitutes a trans-
operational relation in that two forms of partial reversibility (correla-
tion and reciprocity) are now related with full reversibility (inversion,
also called double negation) within a single structure (see below, ch. 5,
pp. 82–3).
2 The INCR group structure of transformations may be represented graphically by a square
(or a rectangle) and two diagonals (see Fig. 5.2, p. 83). Proceeding clockwise from the
upper left-hand corner, the disjunction of p and q (p v q), the disjunction of nonp and
nonq, (¬p v ¬q), the conjunction of nonp and nonq (¬p · ¬q), and the conjunction
of p and q (p · q) occupy the four corners. The diagonals represent the operation of
negation, N: it transforms p into nonp (¬p) and q into nonq (¬q) (and vice versa) and
a disjunction into a conjunction (and vice versa). The negation of a negation leads back
to the origin; the identity, I, is re-established. The vertical sides represent correlational
operations, C: disjunctions become conjunctions and vice versa. The horizontal sides
represent reciprocal operations, R: p becomes nonp, q nonq, and vice versa. Thus, C
followed by R (or R followed by C) is equivalent to N. The basic idea is that a person
mastering formal operations visualises the relationships between these transformations
without undue difficulties (more in chapter 5, pp. 80–3).
An everyday example for a development of the intra-inter-trans type

would be the evolving understanding of a savings and loan association
(Claar 1990). Asked how such an institution works, younger children
in Germany answered that ‘they keep your money safe’ (intra), older
children opined that ‘they keep some people’s money, and lend it to
others’ (inter), and adolescents explained that ‘it’s a system where you
get less interest for your deposits than you have to pay for your loans, and
that keeps it going’ (trans).
A claim about the sequential order of RCR developmental levels from
level I to level V is that they progress necessarily from unifocal ‘co-
ordination’ to bifocal (or trifocal) co-ordination, and on to ever-more
elaborated bifocal/trifocal co-ordinations, that is from intra to inter to
trans. This claim is built on two theoretical arguments: that (1) cognition
develops along with the growth and increasing complexity of the brain,3
and (2) each level is logically prior to the subsequent one. Further details
of that claim and its empirical support are presented in chapters 4 and 7.
Input to the present study from earlier work

Whereas the present study is not a direct continuation of earlier work
by others, it nevertheless benefited therefrom in various ways. As al-
ready mentioned, Piaget’s intra-inter-trans sequence (Piaget and Garcia
1983/1989) provided an overall framework for researching RCR devel-
opmental levels. The theory of Campbell and Bickhard (1986) helped
us to understand certain aspects of RCR development, such as the role
of the increasing sophistication of the nature of knowledge. Thanks to
Kitchener (1983), the importance of epistemic cognition was appreci-
ated. The stages of Piaget’s logico-mathematical developmental theory
were a continuous challenge in that they share aspects with RCR (such
as the developing competence to understand the relation between two
‘entities’), but also differ (e.g., in the underlying logic).
The initial research design (pilot study 1, ch. 4), was influenced by
several earlier findings. Nicolls (1978) studied how five- to thirteen-year-
olds explain ‘attainment’ by the logically not independent concepts of
effort and ability. For younger children effort was the prime cause, older
children used the concept of ability in addition (intermittently), and for
young adults outcomes were seen as determined jointly by effort and
3 At the microlevel the totality of cognitive development can nevertheless be conceived as a
network of multiple pathways of structural changes (cf. Table 1.1, p. 18), as distinct from
a single path from Piagetian logico-mathematical thinking to a hypothetical ‘fifth stage’
(beyond the sensorimotor, the preoperational, the concrete operational and the formal
operational stages – Piaget 1970).
ability. Mansfield and Clinchy (1985, see below, ch. 5, pp. 91–2 for de-
tails) studied children’s epistemology and observed the early growth of
multiplicity of judgements with 3- to 10-year-olds. Broadly speaking, the
development was from ‘only one position is right’ to ‘other positions are
acceptable’. Apart from a general encouragement, these studies, as well as
Piaget’s theory, advocated starting empirical work with 6-year-olds (and
to design the problems accordingly) for catching the beginnings of RCR,
to include adolescents aged 11–16 years or so (supposed to be mastering
formal operations), and to turn to mature adults for studying the higher
RCR levels.
In a wider sense, the current work benefited from the writings of
MacKay (e.g., 1974) and Pattee (e.g., 1978). Both authors argue cases
from their field of interest in which a satisfactory explanatory knowl-
edge requires the simultaneous articulation of two, formally incompatible
modes of description and they indicate some rules for doing so. While I am
more concerned with forms of thought rather than theory construction
per se, I acknowledge that they stimulated some of my own considerations,
in particular with reference to the RCR heuristics (chapter 6).
Summary of RCR development

RCR development is putatively stimulated by interactions between nature
and nurture, whether the interactions occur unconsciously, preconsciously,
or consciously. Important milestones are reaching object-reflecting, and,
even more importantly, means-reflecting thought. RCR development fol-
lows the ‘logic’ of intra-inter-trans. While not a direct continuation of
earlier work, studying RCR benefited from such work in various ways.
3 Metaphysical Assumptions
and Theory of RCR
RCR implies a certain ontology, that is, it makes assumptions about the
nature of reality. RCR also involves epistemological assumptions, those
having to do with the process of gaining knowledge in the cases con-
cerned. For these reasons, I begin with assumptions adopted here from
the philosophy of knowledge. I continue with a philosophical analysis of
RCR as thought form. Finally, there is a discussion of, and an attempt at
justifying, the underlying logic.
Assumptions adopted from the philosophy of knowledge

Why a discussion of the philosophical foundations of the work described
in this monograph? Throughout some kind of reality is assumed to exist
‘out there’. That is not undisputed, and needs clarification and justifica-
tion. In the words of Hilary Putnam (1999, p. 4): ‘And no issue polarises
the humanities – and, increasingly the arts as well – as much as realism,
described as “logocentrism” by one side and as the “defence of the idea of
objective knowledge” by the other.’ Putnam’s solution – and largely mine
– is a ‘middle way between reactionary metaphysics and irresponsible
relativism’ (ibid., p. 5).
Options
In view of the importance of the assumptive base for one’s research
(Werner [1948] 1973, 1957; Reese and Overton 1970; Overton and Reese
1972; Case 1998, pp. 747–53; Putnam 1999; Fahrenberg and Cheetham
2000), I state my position (Reich 1995c, 2000b) after reviewing some
options. Rather than recalling the history of the philosophy of knowl-
edge (e.g., Overton 1998, pp. 127–63), let me simply list some possible
assumptive bases, first concerning basic metaphysical orientations and
philosophical presuppositions.
RCR assumes that there exists a reality ‘out there’. To the question,
‘What can we know about reality, if it exists?’ one summary answer is
35
provided by radical constructivism: ‘At best we can know what reality is

not’ (Glasersfeld 1996). Another broad answer is given by the various
shades of realism (e.g., Putnam 1988). Classical realism rests on the
following three pillars:
(1) there is a reality independent of human ideas and theories; (2)
scientific theories and the theoretical entities contained in them purport
to refer to those (real) entities, processes, or structures existing inde-
pendently of the theories; (3) hence scientific theories can be judged to
be true or false in some sense larger than ‘they allow one to describe,
predict, and organise the experimental data’. Thus, the scientific theo-
ries assumed by classical realism involve ontic truth (Kitchener 1988, p.
17), not just the epistemic truth of theories ‘merely’ aimed at describing,
predicting, and organising empirical data.
‘Foundationalism’ follows from the purported ontic truth of scientific
theories. Laudan (1990, p. 134) enumerates the resulting (foundational)
epistemological programme as ‘(1) a search for incorrigible givens from
which the rest of knowledge could be derived; (2) a commitment to giving
advice about how to improve knowledge; and (3) the identification of
criteria for recognising when one had a bona fide claim.’
According to most contemporary philosophers of knowledge, foun-
dationalism can no longer be justified (e.g., Laudan 1990). Indeed, by
now it has become clear that (a) all observations are ‘theory-laden’ (in-
fluenced by pre-knowledge); (b) scientific theories are underdetermined
by facts (several theories may explain ‘equally well’ a given data set); (c)
‘verification’/‘falsification’ of a theory is more complex than thought pre-
viously (the experimentum crucis is an exceptional occurrence); and (d) the
(unwittingly chosen) underlying assumptive framework provides an in-
fluential hermeneutic context for one’s research (cf. Lakoff and Johnson
1999, pp. 74–81).
Why, then, not adopt as an assumptive base radical constructivism
sensu von Glasersfeld (a kind of instrumentalism) or even a social con-
structivism1 which holds that both science and the literary novel operate
according to the arbitrary rules of a language game (unbridled by ‘what is
out there’)? For one thing, radical constructivism, and even more social
constructivism, fail to explain the success of science and technology in
1 ‘Constructivism’ in the present context is clearly used in the sense of an epistemologi-
cal orientation, not as a developmental concept. Choosing constructivism or another
epistemological orientation (for example empiricism) still leaves one free to opt for con-
structivism as an ontogenetic developmental category (e.g., in a Piagetian sense) or not
(cf. Philips 1995). As to the particular version of social constructivism, one has again to
differentiate between the meaning in epistemology (under discussion here), in sociology
(e.g., the ‘invention’ of marriage as an institution) and in social psychology (e.g., the
co-construction of a world view by mother and child).
Metaphysical Assumptions and Theory of RCR 37
coping with, and predicting, natural phenomena. How could astronauts

have reached the moon and come back if the results of scientific research
were just as independent from any ‘objective reality’ as are certain fic-
tional novels? Why do all Indo-European languages include some say-
ing such as ‘knowing is seeing’ (= seeing something becomes eventually
knowing it) if no confirming experiences underlie this saying? Further-
more, turning from the outer world to the inner world: why should the
vocabularies of nearly all languages, even those spoken on remote islands
and in ‘inaccessible’ mountain valleys, have terms for the basic colours
(e.g., Hardin and Maffi 1997), unless those colours have the quality of
‘immanent objectivity’?
Present epistemological choice

On account of such arguments, instead of adopting a radical, let alone a
social constructivism, I opt for a conjectural/hypothetical, sceptical and
qualified, critical realism (cf. Putnam 1999, especially part 1).2 Accord-
ing to this view, we are engaging with realities that may be referred to
and pointed at, but which are beyond the range of any completely literal
description; these realities include thoughts, virtual quantum ‘particles’,
and so on. To refer to them, we most appropriately employ metaphorical
language3 and describe a given reality in terms of models, which models
may eventually be combined into theories.
To give an example of metaphorical language: the German poet
Eduard Mörike characterises spring as ‘flying its blue ribbon in the air
while sweet familiar scents roam about full of foreboding . . . ’, and for
the poet Rainer Maria Rilke, in autumn ‘the leaves tumble downward as
if coming from far away, as if distant gardens in the skies were wither-
ing – they fall with a negating gesture . . . ’ (both my inadequate transla-
tion from German4 ). Clearly, no mature adult would expect to find blue
ribbons on the streets or in the fields in spring, or to hear about gar-
dens in the sky from astronauts travelling in autumn, yet both poets help
2 I have justified my choice more at length elsewhere (Reich 1995c; 2000b). In essence, I
there present the options in a more fundamental way.
3 Metaphors mainly work by making use of shared attributes of the base concept and the
entity or event towards which it ‘points’, the target concept. Examples are, ‘he is a fox’
or ‘she is a whirlwind’ (cf. Goodenough 2000). A number of biblical parables (e.g., ‘The
kingdom of heaven is like a mustard seed’, Matthew 13: 31–2; Mark 4: 30–2; Luke 13:
18–19) can be viewed as extended metaphors. By contrast, reasoning by analogy mainly
maps functions, that is relational predicates, such as ‘The stem of a flower is like a straw
for sucking up a liquid’ – cf. Gentner and Markman (1997).
4 ‘Frühling läßt sein blaues Band wieder flattern durch die Lüfte, süße wohlbekannte Düfte
streifen ahnungsvoll durchs Land . . . ’, respectively ‘Die Blätter fallen, fallen wie von weit
weg, als welkten in den Himmeln ferne Gärten; sie fallen mit verneinender Gebärde . . . ’
their readers to get a sense of what spring and autumn feel like in our
latitudes.
And here is an example of metaphorical language in physics taken from
a news brief of Scientific American on the 1999 Nobel prizes:
The humming, beeping, well-lit modern world could not have been built without
the knowledge that electric current is a parade of electrons and that those particles
are not ricocheting billiard balls but fuzzy clouds of probability that obey odd rules
of etiquette as they manoeuvre in a dance of mutual repulsion. (Nobel Prizes
1999, p. 16)
In this passage the terms ‘parade’, ‘ricocheting billiard balls’, ‘fuzzy
clouds’, ‘rules of etiquette’, and ‘dance of mutual repulsion’ are all used
not literally but metaphorically. Because electrons cannot be appre-
hended directly by the five senses, metaphors based on actual sensual
experiences are used to convey a sense of what electrons are like to those
for whom the equations of quantum electrodynamics (Feynman 1988)
are not sufficiently telling. Using metaphorical language in effect extends
knowledge from known (personal) experience (billiard balls, dance, etc.)
to a lesser known case that is often not directly accessible to the senses
(behaviour of electrons) – cf. Goodenough (2000).
Franz Brentano and his successors broke with the idea of ‘uncertainty’
about coming to grips with the outside world. They posited instead that all
contents of mental acts are to be taken as immanently objective, whether or
not they have an external referent (cf. Baron-Cohen 1995; Vande Kemp
1996, pp. 166–7; Yates 1985).5 In other words, for the very large majority
of persons, his or her ideas and representations usually spring from a
sense of utter reality, regardless of what exists externally – theirs is a first-
person ontology.6 Thus, as mentioned above, no person will doubt that
5 I am aware that the ‘reality’ of the contents of mental acts, in particular of certain ‘sense
data’ (qualia), is debatable (e.g., Putnam 1999, especially lectures 2 and 3, and the second
afterword). However, the assumptions stated above seem adequate for present purposes.
6 This, then, raises the question, ‘Whose truth?’ Here are some answers (drawn partly
from an Internet discussion): (a) For the individual, observation by a single person (him-
self/herself) would be sufficient for regarding something as true. (b) For a community
which shares a belief system, statements about unusual experiences, interpretations of
texts, etc. from one or more trusted persons are enough to be accepted as true. (c) For
the justice system, a proposition or fact is more believable if it is supported by several
kinds of evidence or several unrelated instances of the same kind of evidence. ‘Opinions’
from single persons are admitted provided that person (i) is an expert, (ii) attempts to
provide evidence on the state of mind of the defendant, or (iii) is dying (and therefore
likely to speak the truth). (d) For the scientific community, it is in principle not the belief
of persons, their mental/emotional state or their number, but the methodology by which
the phenomenon is observed, recorded, reproduced, etc. which determines acceptance
as ‘true’.
What about getting to universal truths accepted by all, given such a state of affairs?
In case of a brute fact such as ‘all humans are mortal’, no particular difficulty should
colours are attributes of the external world unless he or she has learned
certain scientific facts about our visual apparatus (cf. Ramachandran and
Blakeslee 1998, pp. 72–80, passim).
Faced with the loss of foundationalism and the resulting weakening of
the correspondence theory of truth,7 what can one say about the truthful-
ness of a given scientific theory? The answer is ‘little’. But from Laudan’s
(1990, pp. 19, 59, 85, 103) discussion one gathers that under the assump-
tions adopted here (all observations are ‘theory-laden’; scientific theories
are underdetermined by facts; ‘verification’/‘falsification’ of a theory is
more complex than thought previously), it remains possible to compare
rival approaches.
The approach, model, or theory considered more effective would –
each time compared to its rival – (a) explain broader ranges of different
kinds of phenomena, (b) have been tested in more areas, (c) already have
led to more unexpected discoveries or applications, (d) yield more precise
results, (e) be more dependable, (f) possibly be the only candidate which
offers a satisfactory explanation for certain phenomena. When making the
comparison between the rivals, it is understood that no criterion (a) to
(f) is individually sufficient for a ranking but that all criteria count jointly
for a (defeasible) preference. In other words, the ‘victorious’ approach,
model, or theory wins a relative victory, not an absolute one, and, in
case the comparison is repeated after further work on a non-victorious
competitor, it may well win. The basis and results of such comparisons
can be agreed inter-individually, and thereby gain scientific credence.8
From the perspective of the critical realist approach we are discussing,
the task of science is to come to some (tentative) conclusions concerning
arise. But that is no longer so when the issue becomes ‘communication with deceased
persons’, ‘resurrection’, ‘reincarnation’, etc. In such cases the ‘insider’ and the ‘outsider’
interpretations may well stand as antitheses to each other. Then a major principle (in-
corporated into RCR) should be to respect that the criteria implied in (a) to (d) above
cannot – and should not – be forced on the other parties to the discussion (cf. chapter 6,
notes 2, p. 106; 5, p. 107; 6, p. 108; and 7, p. 108). If a helpful, progressive dialogue is
to take place, criteria for a comparison of conflicting views and their inter-individually
acceptable assessment have to be evolved before entering into the search for consensually
acceptable ‘truths’.
In this context one should also be aware of the following: a social life built exclusively
on consensually accepted truths is hardly envisageable. There is always the question of
how to deal with the unknown, even the unknowable. And that is where trust, treaties
and conventions (e.g., the Mayflower Compact) and the like come in.
7 The correspondence theory of truth is based on a one-to-one relationship between ‘what
is really out there’ and statements referring thereto. For instance, ‘This is a woman’ is true
if, and only if, what is being referred to is a woman (which can be proven incontrovertibly).
8 Gerhard Schurz (1998) argues contra Thomas S. Kuhn – rightly in my view – that even
in ‘non-revolutionary’ times of doing science not just one single paradigm monopolises
research activities. Rather, also at that time competing theories exist – not only during
scientific revolutions – and moreover are desirable for advancing scientific progress.
‘order’ or ‘patterns’ with respect to the object of study, to explain them

by elucidating the variables involved and demonstrating relationships be-
tween them, and finally to understand the underlying mechanisms in
depth, whenever possible in terms of a coherent theory. Any such or-
der or pattern and its understanding is neither simply discovered as ob-
jectively given, nor constructed purely socially, without any ‘objective’
constraints. Not infrequently, theories evolve by iterative bootstrapping
analyses of ever more appropriate data gathered in the light of ever bet-
ter hypotheses, possibly aided in this by improved reasoning using more
appropriate tools of thought, and better empirical methods.
Assumptive framework and methodology adopted

My assumptive framework is close to that described by Overton (1998),
that is to say an inclusive relational frame. In this recent handbook arti-
cle, Overton (ibid., pp. 111–14) distinguishes between (a) ‘transforma-
tional change’ (change in form, pattern, or organisation, e.g., embryolog-
ical changes, or the successive transformations from action to symbolic
thought as a way of gaining insight) and (b) ‘variational change’ (degree or
extent that a change varies from an assumed standard such as thinking,
e.g., analytic thinking styles and synthetic styles). In a split-based ap-
proach, the analytic difference between transformational and variational
changes are transformed into ‘true cuts of nature’ (ibid., p. 112) and
either transformational or variational change are claimed to be real. In
Overton’s relational, both-and approach, transformation and variation
represent differing perspectives on the same object of inquiry – devel-
opmental change within a framework of inclusiveness. The existence of
one type of change is not incompatible with the other type of change,
even in the same person. The movement from babbling to language may
be profitably understood as sequential and directional and, hence, irre-
versible (transformational change); however, when the infant has become
a student, raising of the grade point average can be reversed some time
later (variable change) – there is no contradiction (ibid., pp. 113–14).
The point is that ‘casting our fundamental understanding of develop-
ment into an inclusive relational frame has profound implications for
the concepts and theories, as well as the methodology and methods, of
developmental inquiry’ (ibid., p. 114). There will be ample opportu-
nity later on to fill that statement with concrete examples beyond the
nativism–empiricism debate already briefly referred to. An inclusive re-
lational framework is not the only conceivable framework but one that is
consonant with RCR.
Summing up, I espouse a critical realist ontology and a nonfounda-
tional epistemology involving a ‘transverse rationality’. The latter permits
one to build bridges also between disciplines considered incompatible, in-

commensurable, and the like by some protagonists (see chapters 6 to 11).
As I also report on empirical work, here is a word on methodology
to close this section. I accept the following methodological stipulations:
first, convergence of evidence from as many sources as possible is to be
striven for; second, an adequate theory must provide empirical generali-
sations over the widest possible range of phenomena (Lakoff and Johnson
1999, pp. 79–80). I also subscribe to the triadic network of justification:
(1) research aims and theories should normally harmonise, (2) theories
justify methods and are in turn justified by them, (3) methods exhibit the
realisability of the research and are justified by the aims (Laudan 1984,
pp. 62–6).
Theory of RCR
Philosophical analysis
Following the philosopher Philibert Secretan (1987), an analysis of vari-
ous thought forms leads one to the conclusion that RCR is ‘situated’, if
one may say so, between dialectical and analogical thinking and shares
some features with each. All three differ from the classical analytical
(Piagetian) thinking, and therefore the relationships between those four
types of thought need to be clarified. In doing so I draw on Secretan’s
argumentation.
Given RCR’s acceptance that two or more heterogeneous descriptions,
explanations, models, theories, or interpretations of the very same func-
tionally coherent entity or phenomenon are ‘logically’ possible and ac-
ceptable under certain conditions, that raises the tricky issue of the ex-
cluded middle (chapter 5). The question is whether the maxim of the
excluded middle (A must be either A+ or A−, it cannot be anything else)
is really universally valid, or whether it is an analytical interpretation of
a principle, which may admit of differing interpretations. Affirming the
exclusion of the middle is based on a mutual exclusion of being and non-
being, which implies a classical logical negation (chapter 5). Is that really
the only legitimate interpretation? Or is it merely a simplification? The
world viewed from the standpoint of the excluded middle is a world of
a formal static ontology ruled by an analysing, dissecting logic, thereby
creating an impression of order, clarity, and operability.
The world viewed by RCR is not the world of the excluded middle.
It is incompatible with a strictly analytical view based on that maxim.
Given that the analytical view has a long tradition and is well established,
where can one look for help to justify and legitimise the RCR view? Can
dialectical thinking be of assistance?
Dialectical thought acknowledges and deals with ‘contradictory’ ele-

ments within and between the states of affairs it tackles. It aims – particu-
larly in Hegel’s approach – to overcome any ‘contradictions’ (understood
in a more general sense than in formal binary logic) through a process
of becoming. It is important to understand the meaning of ‘negation’ in
dialectic thought. It is not identical with the meaning of that term in for-
mal binary logic, where a negation of a negation refers to the operation of
returning exactly to the initial situation/conditions. In dialectical thought
the negation of a negation implies arriving at a new state. That new state
may still involve an internal ‘contradiction’, which is not objectionable
in itself – but, importantly, is not the case in the RCR world. Thus the
detour via dialectical thought has been helpful in that it demonstrates
the nonuniversality of classical analytical thinking, but it has not resolved
the question of how to justify and legitimise RCR vis-à-vis the maxim
of the excluded middle.
To that effect we need to introduce analogical thinking (chapter 5),
which accords a central value to analogies. Looking back at its long his-
tory, one may say that analogical thinking consists in making a com-
parison that connects nonequal entities in such a way that either (a) a
particular numerical ratio or a common function pertaining to both en-
tities constitute the analogy, or (b) a discrepancy within the common
feature(s) of both entities is at the core of the analogy. An example for the
latter would be the analogia entis (analogy of being) of the Middle Ages:
God’s being is quite different from the being of nature and of humans in
particular, yet God’s being shares features with the latter’s being (Fourth
Lateran Council, 1215).
As these and other examples (chapter 5) show, analogical thought is
based on equivocality over against the univocality of analytical thought.
Analogical thought de-emphasises full comparisons per se (and a fortiori
refuses an elimination of the ‘loser’) while maintaining a beneficial tension
between commonalities embedded in differences. In other words, analog-
ical thought is primarily concerned with striking commonalities despite
differences between the two entities considered (but not particularly with
their ontological status). Thus, analogical thinking is RCR’s ally against
analyticity’s univocality (itself a consequence of the excluded middle).
How closely are analogical thought and RCR related? To answer that
question by way of an example, let us discuss the experience of ‘light’
(cf. Fagg 1999). Using analogical thinking, the experience of physical
light (the sun) can be connected with gaining an insight (ex oriente lux – the
illuminating message came from the east), with experiencing a divine
presence in the soul (the ‘inner light’), with describing the aura and agency
of a prominent person (one of the ‘leading lights’). These analogies can be
studied, for instance, by physicists, phenomenologists, and psychologists.

Could RCR justifiably be applied to their findings, the explanandum
being light ?
RCR is not merely concerned with the rivalling descriptions, explana-
tions, models, theories, points of view, etc., but also with the status of the
explanandum itself. In fact, RCR keeps an ‘existential’ distance from the
explanandum (and thus shares a feature with analytical thought in regard
to the explanandum). In the present case, applying RCR would lead one
to the conclusion that the explanandum of interest is not light, but hu-
man experiencing. RCR recognises that human beings (a) experience the
world around them and inside them, (b) constitute singular individuals
living their particular lives in interaction with their bio-physical, social,
cultural, and perceived spiritual surroundings, to which life they endeav-
our to give a meaning, and (c) are objects of scientific research. For RCR,
the simultaneous validity of (a), (b), and (c) is not just an expression of
synchronicity, but an expression of the wholeness of the human person.
Inside this whole, elements of analogical thinking have their place, but to
seize up the overarching unity, RCR is called for, not analogical thought
per se. Thus, while sharing some features, analogical thought and RCR
are different.
To sum up what has been said so far: RCR shares certain features
with (a) Piagetian thinking (analyticity), (b) dialectical thought (refusing
a unique, separable status quo that is constant in time, and claiming
the existence of a ‘link’ between ‘rivalling’ entities), and (c) analogical
thinking (commonalities imbedded in differences can be held in a fruitful
tension, they are somehow ‘linked’). As a result of these shared features,
RCR is cognitively complex. Furthermore, it involves a logic of its own.
Ontology, epistemology and methodology of RCR

Applying RCR in justifiable cases is based on a certain ontology, epis-
temology, logic, and methodology (Reich 1994b; cf. Fahrenberg 1992;
Fahrenberg and Cheetham 2000). Let us again denote by A one de-
scription, explanation, model, theory, or interpretation in regard to the
explanandum, and by B another, categorically different description, ex-
planation, model, theory, or interpretation concerning the same expla-
nandum.
Ontologically, a ‘meta-relation’ is posited between the class of inten-
sions (= contents, meanings) pertaining to A and the class of intensions
pertaining to B. An illustration would be ‘ultra posse nemo tenetur’ (no-
body should be held morally responsible for failing to perform an act
which is beyond his or her capability). That ‘norm’ connects the moral
Figure 3.1 ‘Figure–ground’ shift of the number of cubes (after rotation

of the figure by 180◦ ) as an illustration for noncompatibility.
demands pertaining to a certain act (the ought) with the capability of the
actor to meet those aims (the is). Given the hypothetical, critical realism
adopted, and previous research on the issue, RCR recognises that both
moral norms and human capabilities have a certain existence of their own,
but are not independent of each other. The link is considered ‘objectively
true’, independent of our individual degree of relevant knowledge.
The epistemology calls for ascertaining that the intensions of A and B
are co-extensional, that is, they refer to the same explanandum. This,
then, is a partial procedure for exploring the explanandum’s ontologi-
cal status in a new case. There are cases when probing the veridicality
of that contention is far from easy. An illustration would be the analysis
of psychophysiological phenomena (Fahrenberg 1992; Fahrenberg and
Cheetham 2000), for instance of the results of (a) a person’s introspec-
tion of his or her fright, (b) the observation of that person’s synchronic
behaviour, and (c) the simultaneous measurement of his or her physiolog-
ical indicators (pulse rate, skin resistance, etc.). A related questions is: do
(a) to (c) really refer to exactly the identical phenomenon/explanandum,
are their extensions equivalent? If the answer is yes, then the research
hypothesis is that (a), (b), (c) are intrinsically linked (entangled). A sec-
ond epistemological RCR requirement is satisfied in the present case: the
three intensions (a) to (c) belong to different categories. That latter con-
dition is also met in the cases nature versus nurture, or moral norm versus
individual capability, but is not in the case of the cubes of Fig. 3.1.
The underlying logic will be dealt with more extensively in the next
subsection. As already indicated, it is neither a formal binary nor a clas-
sical dialectic logic.
[
(x) (∃C') (∃C'') (t) ¬(C' = C'') . {(x ε nc) ⊃ [{Obs (x, C', t)
⊃[F'(x, t) . ¬F''(x, t)]}
. {Obs (x, C'', t) ⊃ [F''(x, t) . ¬F'(x, t)]}]}]

a
Figure 3.2 Noncompatibility according to Bedau and Oppenheim

(1961, pp. 213–14). The statement in front of a bracket always refers
to the entire content between those particular brackets. Explanation of
symbols: x = explanandum, which has the noncompatible features F
and F ; ∃ = there exists; C , C = context-related conditions; t = time
of observation; ¬ = not; · = and (conjunction); ε nc = belongs to the
validity domain of noncompatibility; ⊃ = implies; Obs (x, C , t) = ob-
servation of x under the condition C at time t, bringing out F ; F =
result of observation under condition C .
The methodology has to meet the categorical specifics of A, B, (C . . . ).

For instance, when explaining observations on fright belonging in cate-
gory (a) above (introspection), one cannot suddenly argue in terms of (b)
(behaviour) or (c) (physiology). First, coherent explanations within (a),
(b), and (c) have to be found, and only then should possible links to the
other categories be looked into systematically.
These issues of ontology, epistemology, and methodology are less con-
cerned with the basic characteristics of RCR itself, and more with the
RCR heuristics, the potential application of RCR to research issues. That
issue is dealt with in chapter 6 and it is hoped that any related question
lingering on should be answered there at the latest.
The logic imbedded in RCR

I posit that the logic imbedded in RCR is basically that analysed by
Paul Bedau and Hugo Oppenheim (1961) regarding quantum mechani-
cal phenomena and their study. The characteristic quantum mechanical
features are (a) dependence of the experimental results on the details
of the experimental set-up (the context), and (b) the nonseparability of
certain variables. Bedau and Oppenheim base their analysis largely on
the ‘truth value’ ‘noncompatible’ already indicated in chapter 1: two
or more statements about the same explanandum are noncompatible,
if they do not (fully) apply concurrently but are fully valid in different
situations/contexts.
The meaning of noncompatible is illustrated in Fig. 3.1. The number of

‘complete’ cubes is different depending on whether one looks at the figure
upright as it appears here in the text or upside-down. (Most persons see
six and seven cubes respectively.) To re-emphasise: this figure–ground
shift is used to illustrate the meaning of noncompatible, not to claim that
the content of Fig. 3.1 is an ideal study object for RCR. (It is not because
only one category – the number of cubes – is under discussion.)9
Applying formal binary logic to Fig. 3.1 would lead to the stipulation
that either 6 or 7 is the true value, the other must be wrong. However, from
the perspective of noncompatibilty, either answer is correct in its context.
The latter view, resulting from applying RCR logic, may be expressed by
a predicate logical statement (Fig. 3.2): in one context one observational
result obtains but not the other, and vice versa in a different context.
To illustrate the working of the logical relationships shown in Fig. 3.2:
taking the case of Fig. 3.1, C would be ‘upright’, C ‘upside down’, F
would then be ‘six’, and F would be ‘seven’.
Summary of the metaphysical and theoretical grounding

of RCR
A critical/hypothetical realist stance is adopted, and an inclusive relational
framework. By way of analysing dialectical and analogical thinking, it is
shown that the univocality of analyticity (e.g., Piagetian logico-mathe-
matical thinking) is not the only way to deal with the excluded middle
(through exclusion of one of the competing propositions). That has con-
sequences for the ontology, epistemology, and methodology of RCR.
Where RCR is applicable, a more inclusive approach is adopted than
with Piagetian thinking. It is based on a trivalent logic which takes into
account differing contexts.
9 A genuine study object for RCR would be the one-slit and the two-slit experiments with
light ‘rays’, demonstrating particle-like and wave-like behaviour of light, respectively.
However, that example is too far removed from cognitive development per se to be imme-
diately helpful.
4 Empirical Studies of RCR
Overview
The empirical research proceeded as follows: first pilot study in 1985
(basic nature of RCR and RCR developmental levels), second pilot study
in 1988 (new standard interview problem), third pilot study in 1988/1989
(RCR and Piagetian concrete and formal operations), fourth pilot study
in 1992/1993 (RCR, Piagetian formal operations, cognitively complex
thought, and use/understanding of more than one logic).1 Respondents
changed from study to study.
All studies are methodologically flawed in several ways, but they do
point to the value of considering RCR as a distinct form of reasoning,
and demonstrate its developmental levels.
A first flaw is that almost all respondents were non-representative. The
children and adolescents were all pupils from ‘higher-level’ primary and
secondary schools (that is not from ‘lower-level’ schools, let alone school
drop-outs), and the adults mostly had university degrees. The adults had
been ‘hand-picked’ throughout. Criteria were a ‘scientific’ thinking style
as opposed to a dogmatic or an ad hoc style, and the capacity to express
one’s thought clearly and fairly rapidly.
The reason for wishing to work with specifically chosen (unrepresen-
tative) respondents is as follows. It was suspected that RCR would evolve
with cognitive development. In any such development, the tricky, and
particularly interesting developmental levels/stages are the higher ones,
because the lower ones ‘aim’ at a developmental ‘end point’, which ap-
pears the more clearly, the higher the level/stage. Unfortunately, and un-
derstandably, the higher the level, the smaller the number of persons
found at that level. Hence, it would take quite high numbers of respon-
dents in a representative sample if one were to obtain the same number
of high level/stage answers as obtained in the research discussed in this
monograph, in particular any relation of RCR with specific age groups.
1 The application studies (e.g., intervention in secondary school classes – not reported here
in detail) took place 1994–8.
47
Whereas selecting ‘high-level’ participants has the practical advan-

tage of reducing the workload, the disadvantage is obviously that no
meaningful statement can be made about a ‘typical’ age distribution
of levels/stages, nor about any dependence on education, economic sta-
tus, and the like. Therefore, such issues – while obviously interesting in
themselves – are not discussed in this monograph, in particular not any
correlations of RCR levels with specific age groups.
A second flaw concerns the number of participants, which in some
cases was only about thirty. That still allows one to do some statistics,
but is at the lower limit of the desirable.
The third flaw has to do with dialectical and analogical thought. Al-
though referred to in the theoretical analysis as being somehow ‘close’
to RCR and sharing components with RCR, these thought forms were
not included in any empirical study. The reasons were that (a) their re-
lation to RCR seemed fairly clear from theory, (b) there was no doubt
that they represent a form of thinking different from RCR, and (c) the
studies actually made were judged to have a higher claim to the limited
resources.
As a fourth flaw, no systematic longitudinal study was carried out;
only a few respondents were followed up. In those cases RCR developed
indeed, but these results are too anecdotal to be reported here.
An ideal design would aim at a detailed comparison of all the elemen-
tary, conjunctive, and composite operations of all the thought forms in-
volved. However, that would be a Herculean task. Only Basseches (1980,
1984, 1989) has tentatively proposed such a breakdown (for dialectical
thinking). A comparable amount of work would first be required for the
other thought forms. For that reason a study of the situation at level 4
of Table 1.1 (p. 18), the ‘overlap’ of the thought forms themselves was
adopted as basic design throughout – not a study of the various opera-
tions of levels 1–3 of Table 1.1. If it turns out (as it will) that mastering
a particular other form of thought is a necessary condition for mastering
RCR, then certain elementary, conjunctive, and/or composite operations
are necessarily shared between these thought forms.
All results referred to here have been ‘published’ in one way or another
(as internal institute reports, in scientific journals, as a book chapter). The
choice then is (a) to assume that the reader of the present monograph
is knowledgeable about all these publications or at least ready to consult
them, or (b) that such is not the case, given the difficulty of access to
some of them (and maybe a problem of language exists). I opted for (b),
and hence will present all results, basically in an archival type publication
approach, at least as far the data proper are concerned. However, whereas
all data are presented unchanged, their discussion is occasionally updated
when helpful for getting into view what may not have been so obvious, or
Empirical Studies of RCR 49
simply unavailable at the time. Such updating will be indicated. Occasion-

ally, the reader is referred to the original publication for further details.
Methodological commonalities
The basic methodology was to infer the characteristics of RCR (and of the
other thought forms studied) as well as the developmental level from the
observed use in the interviewee’s dealing with a particular kind of prob-
lem. The emphasis is on use, not primarily on the resulting product. To
be clear, the RCR interviews do not consist in merely recording answers
to a set of preformulated questions, nor to respond to self-selected items
from such a set (which responses could then be treated with standard
statistical methods), but to deal reflexively with a story. Hence, the scor-
ing in essence is not based on quantifiable behaviour, nor on right or
wrong answers, but on an ensemble of statements by the interviewee;
it is a hermeneutic enterprise. The detailed procedure of the individual
interviews is described in Appendix 1 (pp. 191–3), and the scoring pro-
cedure for RCR in Appendix 2 (pp. 194–8). Throughout all studies,
scoring was based on actual, demonstrated competence, not on (meta-)
statements about that competence (we know and can do more than we
can say/explain). Thus, where applicable, tacit rather than explicitly jus-
tified thinking was rated.
All problems used in the various interviews were formulated ad hoc,
except the Piagetian tasks. The main criterion was to conceive and present
a given problem in such a way that only one thought form would provide
the best solution (cf. ch. 5). As will be understandable from the foregoing
considerations, problems to do with nature–nurture, mind–body, and the
like were good candidates for elucidating the level of interviewees’ RCR
argumentation.
The continuity of the four pilot studies was notably ensured by using
throughout two identical RCR problems termed pianist (nature–nurture)
and model of humans (mind–body). These problems were administered
from age six years onward. For children up to ten years or so – but not for
older interviewees in studies 2, 3, 4 – the rivalling explanations/‘theories’,
were spelt out orally, and briefly summarised in large letters on a half a
page, displayed in front of the respondent. The scoring procedure as
such was independent of the age of the interviewee. All interviews were
audiotaped and transcribed.
In pilot studies 2, 3, and 4 the problem Accident in a nuclear power
plant (already presented in chapter 1, pp. 20–2) was used in addition.
It was introduced because that issue was less ‘part of the culture’ than
either the pianist or the mind–body problem. The hope therefore was that
it would bring out RCR even more convincingly. To avoid repetition later
on, these three standard problems are now reproduced (in the version for
adolescents and adults):
Pianist (nature–nurture). The young pianist is fully immersed in her playing: her
fingers speak to the chords via the keys, the movement of her body follows the
music’s rhythm, and her mimic gestures express her intense inner participation.
After she has played the last note, the audience applauds enthusiastically. The
pianist is satisfied with her performance, but wonders whether it is more due to
her practising or to her natural endowment. What is your view?
Model of humans (mind–body problem). Since Antiquity it is recognised that hu-
man beings have a body, a mind, and a soul/a spirit. What is at issue in philosophy,
and lately also in various sciences, is the nature of the relationship between the
body and the other parts. How do you see that?
Accident in a nuclear power plant. A TV news station reports on an accident in
a nuclear power station. The main cooling pump had stopped working, and
the back-up pump did not function. The emergency shutdown did not function
either. To add to the difficulties, the operating crew became aware of the danger
rather late and then underestimated it. The water temperature suddenly rose. A
steam pipe cracked and leaked radioactive steam. What or who is to blame? What
should be done to avoid another such accident in the future?
The task of the interviewer was first to present the problem at hand
(orally to younger children, in written form to older participants) and
then to find out about the interviewee’s capacity to ‘co-ordinate’ the two
explanations/‘theories’ (cf. Appendix 1, pp. 191–3). This was done using
questions such as ‘Who is right (the protagonist of “theory” A or that of
“theory” B)?’; ‘Why?’; ‘What is the relationship between A and B?’; ‘How
do you know?’; ‘How sure are you?’ These questions (and further requests
for clarification) aimed at unearthing the structure of the respondent’s
thinking, the co-ordinating and argumentative processes, over against his
or her sheer knowledge about the particular issue, let alone his or her
linguistic competence.
Pilot study 1: RCR level descriptions and RCR

effectiveness as pragmatic reasoning schema
Based on the principles and considerations presented in chapters 1 to 3,
this study aimed at testing the hypothesised basic features of RCR, the
posited development, and the scope of RCR applicability.
Method
In this first pilot study (Oser and Reich 1987), we presented nine prob-
lems, with two explanations each, individually to twenty-four nonrepre-
sentative respondents aged 6–25 years (12 m., 12 f.) and to four senior
physicists (mean age 54 years), and interviewed them about their solution
of these problems in the way already explained. The interview lasted
about three-quarters of an hour (age 6–25) or longer (physicists).
The interview problems of this pilot study came in three groups:
I. Social science, architecture, and physics: (1) Performance of a con-
cert pianist, A: practising explains it all, B: native endowment determines
everything; (2) Evolution from Romanesque to Gothic church architec-
ture, A: economic reasons were decisive (less building material), B: a
change of religious feeling provided the motivation (pictures of the in-
terior of a Romanesque and a Gothic church were shown); (3) Weather
forecast, A: it is sufficiently well computable to justify making extra pro-
visions for snow-clearing ahead of time, B: it is subject to chance and
does not provide a basis for (costly) arrangements.
II. Matter vs. human spirit (mind, soul). (4) Obesity of a student, A:
physiological cause, B: psychological reasons; (5) Healing kidney pain,
A: a surgeon carries out surgery, B: a healer prescribes a herb tea; (6)
Model of humans, A: humans are cell agglomerations, comparable to a
clockwork, B: the mind/soul is in command (free will).
III. Matter vs. ultimate being. (7) Crash of a glider, A: natural causes,
(B) fate (horoscope); (8) Miraculous braking of a car on ice, A: chance, B:
God’s hand; (9) Origin of the universe, A: Big Bang, B: God’s creation.
Two of the events were actual contemporary local occurrences (snow
clearing, crash of a glider).
Results
All in all 216 statements plus 36 from the physicists were obtained. These
statements were used to establish two results: (a) a description of RCR
levels (see discussion section below for the choice of ‘level’), and (b) RCR
scores for each problem (individually, and by age group – neither pre-
sented here – and averaged across all ages); this by means of a provisional
scoring manual based on (a).
The descriptions of RCR levels resulting from the theory-guided con-
tent analysis of the 216 + 36 transcribed interview responses are shown
in Table 4.1. The formulation is the latest, taking into account the insight
gained since 1987. However, the description in Oser and Reich (1987,
p. 182) is already quite close to that of Table 4.2. Also shown are the intra-
inter-trans levels according to Piaget and Garcia (1983/1989), introduced
in chapter 2 (pp. 32–3).
As to the rating of individuals’ answers according to a provisional ver-
sion of the scoring manual of Appendix 2, sublevels were used for greater
precision. Whenever the development had gone beyond a given level, the
Table 4.1 Description of RCR levels.

The characterisation of the developmental logic in terms of intra-inter-trans is taken from
Piaget and Garcia (1983/1989). (Early level descriptions in Oser and Reich 1987,
p. 182 – see note 3, p. 13 for change of name to RCR.)
Level Description
I A and B (and C . . . ) are considered separately; only one of them is

intra declared correct. The (implicitly) reigning concept is that A and
B (and C . . . ) are alternatives, not complementarist aspects.
Usually single-track choice of A or B, (or C . . . ), occasionally
tentatively both (without offering a detailed justification),
depending on chance knowledge or socialisation.
II The possibility that A and B (and C . . . ) might both (all) be right is
inter considered. A may be right, B may be right, (C . . . may be right),
both (all) may be right, possibly with rather different weighting
factors.
III The necessity of explaining the given phenomenon with the help of
trans-intra A as well as by means of B (and C . . . ) is affirmed globally. After
examination, neither A nor B (nor C) is considered quite correct
as individual explanations, both (all) are needed for a full
explanation. The limits of formal binary logic begin to be
overstepped (intuitively).
IV Conscious connecting of A and B (and C . . . ), explicit evocation of
trans-inter their relationship. Affirmation that neither A alone explains the
explanandum of itself nor B alone (nor C . . . alone). The
relationship between A and B is analysed (e.g., ‘B permits
making use of A’, ‘B cannot exist without A’, etc.). Any context
dependency of the explanatory weight of A, B, (C . . . ) is (dimly)
perceived. The use of RCR logic is more frequent. Although the
argumentation may have some arguments in common with those
of level II and/or III, it is markedly more complex.
V Encompassing ‘theory’, or at least synopsis, featuring
trans-trans (reconstructed) parts of A, B, (C . . . ) possibly supplemented by
D, . . . , the various relations and context dependencies being fully
understood from a multi-perspective viewpoint. Use of RCR
logic has become a routine.
next higher level was added in parenthesis, e.g., II (III). Approaching,

but not yet quite reaching the next level is indicated similarly, e.g. III
(II). Thus there are ten levels and sublevels from level I to level IV, in-
cluding both these full levels. The statistics shown in Table 4.2 were done
using the (sub-)levels, in particular for computing the mean scores for all
participants regarding a given problem. For instance, a mean score of 6
indicates that the average RCR developmental level of the participants
concerned is III (II).
Table 4.2 Mean scores of RCR (sub-)level, variance, and

correlations between problem scores and total scores for the
9 problems and the 24 respondents aged 6–25 years.2
(1 = level I, 10 = level IV, see text – source: Oser and Reich 1987, p. 184.)
Mean Corrected
Problem scores Variance correlations
1 Pianist 5.83 14.67 .95

2 Architect 5.71 8.47 .81
3 Weather 6.13 10.63 .92
4 Obesity 5.96 12.74 .89
5 Healing 6.38 8.41 .87
6 Humans 5.96 11.49 .93
7 Plane crash 4.83 10.67 .83
8 Braking 4.67 9.10 .82
9 Origin 4.58 10.95 .88
Internal consistency alpha (Cronbach) = .97
The interrater agreement was 77 per cent, if a difference of one-third

of a level between their scoring results was ignored. Such a difference is
considered an acceptable error limit of scoring single responses. Mean
values plus some others are reproduced in Table 4.2.
As regards the statistics of the (acceptable) internal within-subject con-
sistency across the various problems, and the within-problem variation
of the scores across each age group, the reader is referred to the origi-
nal publication (Oser and Reich 1987, pp. 183–4). Consistency is also
indicated by the value of Cronbach’s α (.97).
No gender effects were observed. Therefore, in the subsequent studies,
a gender imbalance was accepted.
Discussion
To emphasise the ‘developmental logic’ of RCR, the core differences of
the level descriptions of Table 4.1 are abstracted in Table 4.3, with the
intra-inter-trans ‘development logic’ added again.
Thus, the expectations from the foregoing theoretical considerations
were met, namely that (a) RCR development proceeds in an orderly, sys-
tematic fashion; (b) consistent with other cognitive developments, RCR
becomes ever more differentiated and integrated; and (c) RCR appears
2 Given the ordinal scales, the results of the statistical treatment are used only for compar-
ison purposes, not as absolute values.
Table 4.3 Developmental logic of relational and contextual

reasoning.
(Cf. Table 4.1, p. 52, for level descriptions.)
Core characteristic Stage according to

Level of RCR of level Piaget & Garcia (1983/89)
I A or B (or C) intra
II A, but also B (C) inter
III A and B (and C) trans-intra
IV Logic of and (context) trans-inter
V Synopsis/theory trans-trans
in particular to be consonant with the intra-inter-trans sequence of Piaget

and Garcia (1983/1989).
From the state of affairs presented in Table 4.1 (p. 52), the question
arose whether to designate the differences in RCR development as ‘levels’
or as ‘stages’. Stages in a narrow sense (hard stages), as defined by Piaget,
Kohlberg, and others, refer to organised systems of action (e.g., logico-
mathematical operations), are qualitatively different from each other, and
follow each other in an unchanging order with a clear developmental
logic. If that were the only criterion, the differences in RCR development
could arguably be declared stages. However, the term (hard) stages also
implies the existence of a structured whole, a monolithic view of specific
cognitive processes. In view of that particular (controversial) point, and
the as yet unclear inner structure of RCR, the designation ‘level’ was
retained for the five ‘milestones’ in RCR development. Now that the
internal composite nature of RCR has become clearer, that choice is
reaffirmed.
On examining Table 4.2 (p. 53), one is immediately struck by the
relative uniformity of the mean scores as well as the high values of the
correlations between the problem scores and the total scores, not forget-
ting the high value of coefficient alpha. This was hoped for, yet the high
numerical values were somewhat unexpected, given the vast differences
between the nine problems, concerning in particular (a) the knowledge
domain, and (b) the kind of explanation/‘theory’ involved (causal attribu-
tion, motivation for human action, prediction, presentation of a process,
analysis of a structure, interpretation of meaning).
The conclusions drawn first tentatively and then more and more con-
firmed in the course of the studies 2, 3, and 4 include the following: (1)
to assess a person’s RCR level, presenting, say, three problems is enough.
Problems 1 (pianist) and 6 (humans) of Table 4.2 seem particularly suited

(good mean scores and highest correlation values; they can be adminis-
tered in slightly simplified form to grade-schoolchildren). (2) The mean
scores and correlations of problems 7–9 are markedly lower. As studied
in more detail later (chapter 7), one reason is a competence-performance
discrepancy: for a variety of reasons the respondents do not produce their
best.
Nevertheless, based on the data of Table 4.2 (p. 53), RCR can be
considered as a pragmatic reasoning schema (Cheng and Holyoak, 1985);
this was hypothesised in chapter 1 (p. 14).
Summing up the results of pilot study 1, it can be said that they support
the basic features of RCR as explicated in chapters 1, 2, and 3, and clarify
the number of developmental levels consistent with Piaget’s intra-inter-
trans sequence. A main open question remained: what is the relationship
between RCR and Piagetian logico-mathematical thought?
Pilot study 2: additional RCR interview problem

For the subsequent studies, it seemed desirable to construct a supple-
mentary RCR problem, preferably one that was not as ‘solved’ by the
current culture as the problems pianist and humans. Therefore I chose a
more controversial subject, an accident in a nuclear power plant, already
presented in chapter 1 (pp. 20–2), being a scaled-down version of the
Three Mile Island or the Chernobyl type accident.
An additional aim was to look for such elements in the answers as
would point to other thought forms.
Administration
The suitability of this problem was explored in a small test run. Not unex-
pectedly, the youngest age of respondents able to come up with scorable
answers was not six years as for the other two standard RCR problems
( pianist and humans), but usually a little older, namely about nine years.
Apart from that difference, as a rule the interviewing proceeded as in the
first pilot study.
The results of using the new problem in pilot studies 3 and 4 are
presented below.
Typical results and analysis

This section is devoted to the traces of other forms of thought found in
the responses to the nuclear accident problem. Technical malfunctioning
is labelled A, human failure B. Five excerpts, chosen among other com-

parable ones, are ordered according to the developmental level of the res-
pondents (I to V). Applying all that was said earlier, each excerpt will be
analysed in turn. Here are prototypical answers I–V and their discussion
(Reich 1995a, reproduced in parts with the kind permission of the Insti-
tute for the Advancement of the Philosophy of Children, Montclair State
University):
I. That technology was not reliable [A]. The operating crew is not to blame [not
B] – they have done their duty, day in, day out (respondent aged 11 years).
The author of this first quotation (RCR level I) argues clearly at the
Piagetian intra level. There is no indication of Piagetian concrete, let alone
formal operations, nor of cognitively complex thought (level 1 – see p. 84
for levels 1–7), or real comparisons (no dialectical or analogical thinking),
just the exclusion of B using an idiosyncratic argument. All this indicates,
by the way, that the respondent performs somewhat below the average
of his/her age level. Granting the benefit of doubt, one may discern a
beginning of Basseches’s (1980, p. 408; 1984, p. 74; 1989, pp. 162–3)
schema no. 9 (‘locating decisive elements within a whole’).3
II. It is true that a technical breakdown has occurred for starters [A]. But it
appears that the operating crew has not been up to it either. That made it much
worse [probably also B] (bright 8-year-old).
In this excerpt, we witness an enlargement of the observational horizon

(RCR level II): in addition to the technical failure (A), the possibility
of a mismanagement of the accident situation comes into view (B); the
Piagetian inter level raises its head. There are indications of Piagetian
concrete operations (working with two variables) and of differentiation
(level 2 of cognitively complex thought). In a way, analogical thinking
comes into the picture in that the common feature of (A) and (B) is
identified as ‘involved in the accident/damage to the plant’ but then the
difference is also recognised. In fact, there is an onset of a comparison of
the respective weights in the damage assessment. Dialectical schema no. 9
is better developed, and schema no. 10 begins to appear (‘description of
a whole in functional terms’).
III. In the beginning a malfunctioning occurred. But then, such systems can’t
work without human control. The operating crew has simply not noticed that the
3 Of the seven schemata to be referred to in the present analysis, Irwin and Sheese (1989,
pp. 122–4) class nos. 10, 11, and 24 as used increasingly with better education/age, nos. 9,
12, and 14 as having a questionable pattern of emergence, and no. 15 as not appearing to have
a developmental pattern. (However, their interview results indicate that dialectical thinking
changed – became more powerful – across their educational/age groups; ibid., p. 119.)
instruments indicated a problem. Or perhaps they have seen it but not taken the
right countermeasures. The people were excited. The accident involves both a
technical and a human deficiency [A and B] (14-year-old).
The third quotation is from a person who is clearly at a more advanced

development stage (RCR level III). The argumentation is at the trans-
intra level, the variables are dealt with at a confirmed level of concrete
operations with an indication of the formulation of a tentative hypothesis
(‘perhaps . . . ’). An element of integration (level 4 of cognitively complex
thought) appears, ‘The people were excited [on account of the accident]’.
Likewise, Basseches’s module no. 12 (‘assertion of relations’) comes into
view. This indicates the transition toward Piagetian formal operations
(dealing with the functioning of systems). One also may note that a logic
different from that of formal binary logic is used: the events in the power
station and the psychological state of the crew are not separable, and the
latter is not reversible, at least not instantaneously.
IV. Such accidents are very rare. So one can understand that it may have taken
time before the crew realised that something was amiss. But then they may well
have done the wrong thing. And the situation got worse. Maybe they quarrelled
about the right action to take. Maybe they even panicked when the steam came
out. And they never called in a specialist who might have been able to get the
situation under control. Such crews need training with a simulator under as
realistic conditions as possible [relations between A and B, context dependency]
(25-year-old).
The author of the fourth quotation has progressed to the trans-inter

level (RCR level IV). One is immediately struck by the use of elements
of Piagetian formal operations: hypotheses are formed and argued about
in an abstract way. The integration is stronger (level 5–6 of cognitively
complex thought). There appear three new schemas, nos. 14 (‘two-way
reciprocal relationship’), 15 (‘assertion of internal relations’), and in a
rudimentary way no. 11 (‘assumption of contextual relativism’). The lat-
ter finds its expression in the statement ‘Such accidents are very rare. So
one can understand that it may have taken some time before the crew
realised that something was amiss.’
V. In this accident technical and human failure are interconnected. One has to
look at the whole thing as a system, the plant and the operating crew. And one
has to study the mutual interaction, the type of effects they have on each other.
One really wants to train crew members with the help of a sophisticated simulator
so that they become aware of the many ways in which something can go wrong,
they experience their individual and collective reactions, and learn how to assess
such situations as well as how to deal with them successfully. In such simulations
the psychological stress must of course also be generated, not just the sequence
of technical events. It is precisely such a chain reaction of technical and human

correlations between problem scores and total scores for 3 problems
and 63 respondents aged 9–68 years (1 = level I, 13 = level V).
Mean Corrected
1 Pianist 9.11 5.23 .90

2 Accident 8.46 5.96 .77
3 Humans 9.14 4.46 .89
malfunctioning which is so hard to foresee. By the way, I would hire only such
persons who are aware of the dangers involved and are ready to face them [all
RCR characteristics] (middle-aged adult).
As to answer V (already analysed in chapter 1, pp. 21–2 in a preliminary

way), finally everything falls in place. The respondent argues at a trans-
trans level (RCR level V ). What are commonalities and differences with
respect to Piagetian operations? As regards commonalities, one observes
the systematic approach, the formulation of hypotheses, the search for
effective ‘variables’, and the tendency to generalise. With respect to dif-
ferences, the underlying logic is not the formal binary logic: one notes that
for the respondent the sequence of events is not reversible, the different
interventions of the crew and the respective state of the power plant do
not commute (that is their sequential order makes a difference), and the
psychological state of the crew members is considered not to be separable
from the way the accident situation evolves. Obviously, there is plenty of
differentiation and integration (level 7 of cognitively complex thought).
Furthermore, relevant aspects are mentioned which were not indicated in
the problem description as presented. This is consonant with Basseches’s
schema no. 24 (‘multiplication of perspectives to get as inclusive a view
as possible’).
After inspecting next what became of the new problem, we turn to the
study of the relation between RCR and Piagetian operations, and then to
the inclusion of cognitively complex thought, and ‘logics’.
Subsequent performance of the new problem

This problem was used in pilot studies 3 and 4. The combined results are
shown Table 4.4, using the format of Table 4.2 (p. 53) for comparison
purposes.
The mean values are higher (and the variance smaller) on account of the
different sampling of participants. A mean score of 9 corresponds to RCR
level IV (III). As before, the mean scores and correlations for problems 1
and 3 are remarkably close; the values for the more unfamiliar problem
no. 2 stay fully acceptable.
Pilot study 3: RCR and Piagetian operations
Method
Participants were thirty-eight nonrepresentative children, adolescents,
and young adults (10 m. and 28 f.) from the local area, aged 7–22 years.
The procedure for ascertaining the RCR levels was essentially the same
as before, that for the Piagetian task as stated in the literature. The total
interview lasted about one hour.4
RCR problems: the problem presented first was always that of the pianist
because even grade schoolers were somehow ‘familiar’ with playing an
instrument, so that it made for a good start in the otherwise unfamiliar
situation of the interview. The second problem was that of the power plant
accident (administered to respondents from 9 years onwards), and the
third the humans one. They were administered in between Piagetian tasks.
For participants younger than 9 years the RCR level was determined
using the results from the interview about the pianist and the humans
problems.
Piagetian tasks: these tasks were taken from the literature, but (slightly)
modified for increasing the difficulty and thereby providing a better
(sub)stage discrimination. Also, for convenience, the numbering of the
stages was made uniform and changed compared to Piaget’s number-
ing, namely IIa, b for preoperational substages, IIIa, b for substages
of concrete operations, and IVa, b for substages of formal operations,
a indicating an initial, and b a confirmed substage.
Snail task (Piaget et al. [1946] 1972, pp. 95–109 for principle; details were modi-
fied as described below), see Fig. 4.4. The four subtasks consist in adding (or
subtracting) displacement distances, respectively displacement speeds, either by
actually carrying out the displacements or effecting them purely mentally. A snail
(symbolised by a snail house) moves on a board, on which seven ‘milestones’,
each time separated by one unit, are recognisable. (The extreme milestones on
either side coincide with the edges of the board.) The board rests on a table,
and is displaced itself. Both movements are either parallel or antiparallel. A scale
extending from 3 units left to 3 units right is fixed on the table in such a manner
that the board displacement can be read off. The units on the board (milestone
separations) and on the scale are of the same size. The snail always starts from the
central milestone (central position) and moves up to three milestones either to
4 Additionally, problem 9 of pilot study 1 (see ch. 7, p. 126) was proposed on a voluntary
basis to the participants of pilot study 3.
Snail Milestones Board
Scale
3L 2L 1L 0 1R 2R 3R
Table
Figure 4.1 Schematic sketch of the snail task. L = left; R = right.

(Shown as viewed by the participant; the table is larger than the frame
of Fig. 4.4; explanation in text.)
the right or to the left. Initially, the board is located with the snail at position zero
of the scale. The task is to indicate where the snail finds itself at the end of the
displacements with reference to the scale on the table. The participant is free to
move both the snail and the board, but a higher score (IV) is obtained for doing
it all in the head. (All this and the given subtask is explained to the participant.)
The four subtasks are:
(a) Snail one unit to the right Board two units to the right
(b) Snail two units to the left Board one unit to the right
(c) Snail three units to the right Board to the left with a third of the
snail’s velocity (both starting together)
(d) Snail continuously to the left Board to the right with half the snail’s
until it leaves the board velocity (both starting together).
(last milestone)
The solutions are (a): 3R; (b): 1L; (c): 2R; (d): 1 12 L. And the scores:
IIa:
Irrelevant, confused answers, possibly description of snail motion
IIb:Description of one displacement or the other, but no combination
IIIa:Dimly aware of principle; perhaps one of (a)–(d) solved correctly
IIIb:More competent; two or more of (a)–(d) solved ‘manually’
IVa:Principle understood; three or more subtasks solved, mostly in the
head
IVb: All subtasks (a)–(d) rapidly solved in the head without mistakes
‘Principle understood’ means that the participant argues in terms of
adding/subtracting directly the displacements in question (subtasks a
and b) or transforms first the velocity differences into displacement dif-
ferences (subtasks c and d) and then proceeds as before.
Plant task. This task tests the capacity to separate the variables and to determine
the ‘operative’ ones. The original task (Kuhn and Brannock 1977) comprised
four pictures, two of healthy plants (one with a full glass of water and white plant
food; one with half a glass of water, white plant food, and leaf lotion), and two of
unhealthy plants (one with a full glass of water, black plant food, and leaf lotion;
one with half a glass of water and black plant food). The interviewer explains to
the respondent that the water, plant food, and leaf lotion (if so depicted) are given
each week to the plant in the quantities pictured. The task is to find out what it
takes to grow healthy plants.
This version is easy to solve in that only the white plant food is effectively oper-
ative. Deirdre Kramer (private communication) therefore extended the problem
by making also the leaf lotion operative, and provided a total of eight correspond-
ing pictures. I extended the plant task further by adding two pictures of unhealthy
plants (with leaf lotion, either a full glass or half a glass of water, and no plant
food) to Kramer’s eight. These two pictures were not displayed, but delivered on
the request, ‘I do not know whether the white food is good for the plant, or the
black food is bad; I need to see what happens without plant food.’
The correctness of the solution ‘white plant food and lotion’ as well as
‘between one half and one glass of water’ can be proven convincingly with
the ten pictures; in particular the hypothetical possibility that the white
plant food is ineffective and the black food a poison can demonstrably be
excluded. The scoring was as follows (on account of the more difficult
task, involving more criteria, stages III and IV were subdivided into three
substages, a, b, c):
IIa:
Irrelevant, confused answers
IIb:Separation of variables unknown (idiosyncratic explanations)
IIIa:Beginning of separation of variables, but no correct solution
IIIb:Water level excluded as operative, but no correct solution
IIIc:As IIIb, but in addition correct operative variables found
IVa:As IIIc plus explicit demonstration of plant’s tolerance for water
level
IVb: As IVa, but more spontaneous search for finding and justifying nec-
essary conditions (leaf lotion, plant food)
IVc: As IVb plus request for information on state of plant without food.
Pendulum task (Inhelder and Piaget [1955] 1958, pp. 67–79). The task is to find
the operative variable determining the pendulum’s oscillation frequency. The
participants were individually given four pendulums (two long and two short ones,
each time with a light and a heavy weight), and a stopwatch. What determined
the pendulum’s oscillation frequency, the length of the suspension, the weight, or
the impetus of setting it in motion? Experimenting was supplemented by asking
questions provided by Küchemann (1977, 1979), which assess the capacity to
test relevant hypotheses ‘in one’s head’, i.e. without actually experimenting with
real pendulums.

correlations between problem scores and total scores for 3 problems
and 30 respondents5 aged 9–22 years (1 = level I, 10 = level IV).
(Source: Reich and Oser 1990, p. 53)
Mean Corrected
1 Pianist 7.37 2.79 .85

2 Accident 6.90 3.68 .70
3 Humans 7.63 1.90 .79
The solution is, ‘only the length of the suspension determines the fre-
quency. The longer the suspension, the lower the frequency (inversely
proportional to the square root of the length).’ In this task the scoring
was:
IIa: Irrelevant, confused answers
IIb: Separation of variables unknown (idiosyncratic explanations)
IIIa: Beginning of separation of variables, but principle not grasped
IIIb: On the way to understanding the principle, partial separation
IVa: Separation of variables found eventually but not spontaneously
IVb: Separation of variables and exclusion of inoperant variables
Results and discussion

RCR problems. For comparability, the mean scores for the participants
9 years old or older are presented in Table 4.5, using the format of
Table 4.2 (p. 53). The values for the nuclear plant accident are less good
than those for pianist and humans, but still acceptable. As a comparison
with the relevant values of Table 4.2 shows, the mean values of Table 4.5
are higher (and variances smaller) on account of the higher starting age
for the nuclear accident problem. A mean value of 7 corresponds to RCR
level III.
Piagetian tasks. The values of Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients
of the various scores were: snail–plant: .77; snail–pendulum: .73; plant–
pendulum: .68 (p = .01 or smaller in all cases). In case of discrepancies
between the three individual scores, the highest score was used subse-
quently, as competence, not performance, was the issue.
5 As a rule, the nuclear accident problem was administered to participants 9 years old or
older – here to thirty-one persons, but only thirty records were fully usable.
Table 4.6 Frequencies of individual scores concerning Piagetian operations

and RCR levels.
Level I (II) is somewhat above level I, level II (I) somewhat below level II, etc. N = 38,
age 7–22 years. (Source: Reich and Oser 1990, p. 54; reproduced in Reich 1991, p. 85,
and in Oser and Reich 1992, p. 90).
RCR level
Piagetian
operations I I (II) II (I) II II (III) III (II) III III (IV) IV (III) IV IV (V)
Early concrete 2
Confirmed
concrete 2 1 1 2 1
Transition 1 2
Early formal 8 6 2
Confirmed
formal 3 3 3
(Transition?) 1?
Piagetian operations and RCR. The frequencies of interest are shown in

Table 4.6. No scores are found in the upper right-hand corner. Thus no
interview participant argued at a low (sub-)stage of Piagetian operations
and at a high RCR level. In contrast, a high (sub-)stage of Piagetian
operations did not ensure an equally high RCR level. This state of affairs
can be interpreted as follows: Reaching a given (sub-)stage of Piagetian
operations is necessary but insufficient for reaching a given RCR level.
(The insufficiency indicates a lack of performance in one or more of the
other components involved in RCR.)
The conclusion is that Piagetian concrete and formal operations and
RCR are really distinct, yet structurally interconnected. In particular,
the Piagetian stage actually reached limits the attainable RCR level, at
least up to the confirmed formal stage. From there onwards, RCR seems
to free itself from the ‘Piagetian’ embrace. This supports the foregoing
considerations, especially those about Fig. 2.1 (p. 30), and about a dif-
fering RCR logic.
Pilot study 4: RCR, Piagetian operations, cognitively

complex thinking, and evolved logics
Pilot study 4 was an extension of study 3 to include cognitively complex
problems, and evolved logics. The procedure was essentially that of pi-
lot study 3. As the participants were different, the Piagetian tasks were
included again; however, the lengthy pendulum task was replaced by the
balance scale task.
Hypotheses
Pilot studies 3 and 4 jointly tested the following four hypotheses:
H. 1: RCR shares elementary/conjunctive/composite operations with
Piagetian operations and with cognitively complex thinking.
H. 2: The chain of RCR levels I–V and the sequence of levels 1–7 of cog-
nitively complex thinking (p. 84) share commonalities regarding
the respective measures of differentiation and integration.
H. 3: The development of RCR involves transcending the limits set by
formal binary logic, and hence by certain partial Piagetian opera-
tions (cf. Table 5.4, right-hand column – p. 89).
H. 4: Higher levels of RCR involve a logic other than formal binary logic.
These hypotheses can be tested as follows. If the interviews of a statis-
tically significant number of participants demonstrated competence with
RCR, but neither with Piagetian operations nor with cognitively complex
thinking, then H. 1 would be falsified. If all RCR problems were treated
at low RCR levels (II or III), but the problems assessing cognitively com-
plex thinking at high levels (6 or 7 of that thinking), or vice versa, then
H. 2 would be falsified. If the RCR problems were dealt with at lower
levels (II or III) without using formal binary logic, then H. 3 would be
falsified. If no other logic than formal binary logic showed up in re-
spondents’ RCR argumentation at levels III and up, then H. 4 would be
falsified.
Method
The sample consisted of thirty-two nonrepresentative participants from
the local region (17 m., 15 f.), aged 13–68 years. The interview (about
the nine [unique solution] tasks / [ill-defined] problems) lasted about one
hour.
As far as the pilot study 4 per se is concerned,6 the nine tasks/problems
were: the standard set of three RCR problems, a set of three Piagetian
tasks, a set of two problems for assessing cognitively complex thinking,
and one problem for assessing competence with logics. The problems
were administered in one or the other of a mixed, partly counterbalanced
order.
Piagetian task. In addition to the snail task and the plant task, the fol-
lowing task was used:
6 Additionally, two religious doctrines and problem 9 of pilot study 1 (see chapter 7) were
proposed to participants of pilot study 4.
Balance scale task (Inhelder and Piaget [1955] 1958, pp. 164–81). The interviewee
was presented with a picture of a balance scale and the invitation to describe how
the equilibrium condition can be worked out.
As RCR and Piagetian operations had been the object of pilot study
3 and those results (Table 4.6, p. 63) were to be analysed jointly with
the results of study 4, it was only necessary to ascertain whether the
present participants mastered Piagetian formal operations, and thence
the indicated use of the balance scale task, its scoring being an additional
check on the results of the two other Piagetian tasks used in study 4.
Problems for assessing cognitively complex thinking. Despite a literature
search, no suitable problems were found. In constructing two problems,
a supplementary condition was that they could also serve in the task of
assessing logical competence. Here are the two problems:
Filling a post. Mr Boschung [all names are typical local names for added real-
life feeling] heads a laboratory in a successful technical firm. He has just been
given a new post, and wants to fill it rapidly despite a shortage in the labour
market. He offers the post to Franz Riedo, a competent young collaborator of his
colleague Zosso who heads another laboratory in the same company. Boschung
has not informed Zosso about his offer. When Zosso learns about it, he asks their
common boss, Mr Götschmann to prevent Boschung from hiring Riedo.
Interviewing. When interviewing a person, on the one hand one wants him or her to
be as spontaneous and self-organising as possible in order to learn authentically
a maximum about that person. On the other hand, the interview does serve a
specific purpose, which requires a certain degree of directivity. What problems
result from that situation in your view?
Clearly, the logical structure of these problems is quite different com-

pared to that of the Piagetian tasks: no single correct answer exists; at
best probabilistic scenarios can be depicted. The reason for such a state
of affairs does not reside primarily in a lack of information (the respon-
dent could and sometimes did ask for more), but in the intrinsic un-
certainties involved. Regarding the filling of the post, the attitudes and
opinions of the protagonists are not necessarily fixed once and for all, in
particular not that of Franz Riedo. In respect to interviewing, the con-
trasting, even contradictory objectives can only lead to a more or less
successful compromise. Also, the context conditions (possibly unfamil-
iar surroundings, noise, presence of third persons, nervousness of the
interviewee on account of unfamiliarity with the interview theme or the
particular interview method, etc.) usually have a marked influence on
the result.
For these two problems the scoring followed the manual of Baker-
Brown et al. (1992), with level 1 corresponding to no differentiation and
Table 4.7 Frequencies of individual scores of levels of cognitively

complex thought and RCR levels.
Fractional levels/levels as before. N = 32. (Source: Reich 1995d, p. 12.)
Level of cognitive RCR level

complexity
(Baker-Brown) III III (IV) IV (III) IV IV (V) V (IV)
3(4) 1
4(3)
4 1
4(5) 1
5(4) 2
5 1
5(6) 2 3
6(5) 3
6 1 3 1 1
6(7) 1 2 2
7(6) 2 2
7 1 2
no integration and level 7 to full differentiation and integration (see chap-

ter 5 for details, p. 84).
Problem for assessing the (meta-)logical competence. Empirically, levels of
(meta-)logical competence were assessed as follows. The respondents
were asked to analyse and to class the eight tasks/problems administered
up to that point (three RCR problems, three Piagetian tasks, two prob-
lems for assessing cognitively complex thinking) according to the logic
involved. Five developmental levels were defined as follows:
(1) No coherent, pertinent answer
(2) Only one logic class identified (here that of the Piagetian tasks)
(3) At least one further class (dimly) identified, first class identified more
accurately
(4) First class fully identified, other classes more fully characterised
(5) All three classes clearly distinguished and fully characterised
Results
The results were as follows.
Levels of cognitively complex thought and RCR. The frequencies of indi-
vidually assessed levels of cognitively complex thinking and RCR levels
are shown in Table 4.7. The same general appearance is observed as was
discussed for Table 4.6 (p. 63). Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient
has the value rs = .68, p < .01.7
The aggregated answers (N = 32) to the problem Filling a post were as
follows, ordered according to four self-revealed categories (a)–(d):
(a) Expression of a personal viewpoint of the respondent: To ‘steal’ an employee from
a colleague is simply not right. That cannot be a normal procedure for filling a
post. The way hiring is done should be fully transparent and above board. All the
people immediately concerned have misbehaved. If Mr Götschmann had really
known his collaborators, and knew what was going on in his department, he
would have given clear instructions as to the procedure for filling the new post;
that would have avoided the present mess. But simply to undo the hiring will not
work either. Having had such an experience of promotion changes a man, he is
no longer the same as before. One can understand that Mr Zosso complains. But
the conflict cannot simply be solved by invoking certain principles. In particular,
Mr Götschmann should not simply impose a solution thought out by him in his
lonely corner. A reflection is needed in order to do justice both to the persons
involved and to the interests of the company.
(b) Immediate considerations of Mr Götschmann (before acting): Franz Riedo will
not be much more productive in Boschung’s laboratory than in Zosso’s labora-
tory. However, if he changes laboratories, then Zosso is short of a collaborator.
So, that change is not really in the interest of the company. Furthermore, such
‘hijacking’ should not be encouraged because it leads to an undesirable overbid-
ding between our laboratories. Nevertheless, Mr Boschung should not lose face.
It remains true that the post has been offered to Franz Riedo. He now knows that
he is deemed capable to tackle more demanding jobs. Having seen that possibility
in front of him, he will not want to stay in his former less promising post. He has
also become aware that right now professionals like himself are in short supply.
Probably he already has told others about his promotion, and has made plans
based thereupon. At least, that is how it goes in general. If I just stop him from
taking on the new post without offering an equally attractive alternative, then
he is probably mad, feels pushed around, blames Zosso for the step back, works
less well than before the offer, and possibly even joins one of our competitors.
Perhaps the first thing to do is to talk to Riedo to find out what attracts him
to the new post, whether the work itself, the salary, the promotion prospect, or
what else. I also want to know why he has not talked to Zosso before accept-
ing Boschung’s offer. Maybe he needs to be encouraged to look at the dealings
also from the company’s perspective. Furthermore, I have to be sure about his
competencies, and as to whether there will not soon develop a possibility for
promotion either in Zosso’s laboratory or in my third laboratory. I will do that
7 A post hoc Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance (H test) for levels 4 to 7 further sup-
ported the findings of the correlation computation: the mean ranks of levels of cognitive
complexity ‘connected’ to the various RCR level scores differed (chi2 = 11.9, df = 3,
p < .01). The corresponding U-Test (Mann-Whitney) showed that the significant dif-
ferences were between levels 4 and 7 (U = 0, p = .05), and levels 5 and 7 (U = 4.5,
p < .01).
immediately. Apart from that, I sit on the fence for the time being, and sug-
gest to Messrs Boschung and Zosso to find a solution that is acceptable to all
concerned.
(c) Subsequent steps: In the unlikely case that such a solution comes about,
Mr Götschmann invites Boschung, Riedo, and Zosso to a meeting. He makes
sure that all involved have understood what is being proposed, and are in full
agreement; he then communicates the result to all ‘his’ employees, if only to stop
rumours. In case no solution comes forth, he looks for one together with the
two laboratory heads, Boschung and Zosso; this with the guiding criteria of (i)
serving the company’s interests, (ii) strengthening or least maintaining the pre-
vious good ‘climate’ in his department, (iii) sustaining the positive motivation
of all collaborators, and (iv) furthering Franz Riedo’s career prospects. In case
no agreement comes forth, Götschmann single-handedly takes a decision and
proceeds as described for the solution by Boschung and Zosso.
(d) Administrative improvements: In the future, a job description will be produced
for all open posts, specifying in particular if candidates from the department
or from the company may apply, or only outside candidates. Furthermore, the
personnel administration makes known afresh the rules for filling a post (which
expressly exclude internal ‘hijacking’) and ensures their strict application.
The aggregated answers (N = 32) to the problem Interview were as

follows, again ordered according to four self-revealed categories:
(a) Description of the problem: This is a problem of communication and coordi-

nation. The actual interview ‘frame’ must have the right size: small enough to
keep the interview on track, but not so small that it hampers spontaneity. Basi-
cally, interviewing presents an insoluble dilemma: hold the reins loosely, yet steer
the horse to where you want to go. The two desiderata are almost incompatible.
It only works with luck. Somehow, the interviewer is walking on a tightrope. In
case the interviewee says something of importance to him or her, but which does
not stay within the research frame, that person needs to be nudged gently back
into that frame. Most interviewees will answer straightforwardly the question
as to when they last ate in an Italian restaurant. But if the interviewer wants to
know, for instance, the degree of patriotism of the interviewee, the answer may be
more guarded. No matter how much the interviewers are burning to advance the
research at hand, for ethical reasons they have to respect an interviewee’s unwill-
ingness to communicate what they consider as private, even intimate information.
Contrary to the balance scale experiment, where one can immediately observe
what happens, in the case of an interview one mostly can only progress by way of
inferring, namely from the kind of answer given to the views or the personality of
the interviewee. The interpretation of the data is difficult in any case. The balance
scale reacts only to the weights and their distribution. The interviewees respond
not only to the questions, but also to the way the interviewer puts them, to his
or her attitude, body language, and so on; this possibly in a rather idiosyncratic
manner. In fact, different interviewers may well obtain differing answers from the
same person about the same issue.
(b) Specific difficulties: The interviewers experience certain mental associations,

and the interviewees possibly different ones. For instance, in the case of the
plant task, the interviewers base themselves strictly on the pictures presented,
while the interviewees may remember their garden, and their own experience
with the effects of water, earth, fertiliser, and so on, and start from there. The
interviewers have perhaps a research frame before their mind, and only want
answers which fit inside. It may be that in fact they pay no attention to what
falls outside that frame. The interviewees are likely to notice such an attitude
and change their answering strategy accordingly, thereby falsifying the interview.
Sometimes, journalists almost manipulate the person(s) they interview. If one
knows that it is an interview for a particular purpose, spontaneity may suffer.
One may feel that certain answers are expected, and that they should be ‘correct’.
Strange surroundings and the presence of other persons also might falsify the
result. One gives one’s best only when interviewed for a first time. When the
interview is repeated, boredom may result, and rather than repeating the same
answers, one just says what comes to mind and is more amusing.
(c) Differences between the persons interviewed: Some interviewees like perhaps to
help the interviewer and say what they feel the interviewer wants to hear, or what
is ‘correct’, that is, socially desirable. Others would like to get the interview over
with and say the first thing that comes to mind. Some persons are more given to
moods (and that might make for differing views on the same event) than others.
Again, different persons may require differing ‘treatments’ to give their best. An
introverted person needs encouragement and stimulation, a extrovert possibly a
little calming down (and an encouragement to think more deeply). Some talk
immediately, simply just as it comes to them; others first think very hard before
speaking, perhaps too hard. Some uncover themselves, others are more secretive.
The interviewers need to diagnose whom they have in front of them and act
accordingly.
(d) How to conduct interviews: As much as possible interviewing volunteers (who
are motivated). The atmosphere should be open and confidence-inspiring, the
environment familiar and friendly, speaking in a dialect admitted, data protection
assured, and the allocated time fully sufficient. In case the interviewee looks
nervous or timid, one should begin by relaxing/warming him or her up, and only
then begin with the interview proper. As a general rule, the interviewer should
not put questions answerable simple by ‘yes’ or ‘no’, not use multiple choice
questions, and avoid suggestive questions. By going once more over some of
the ground already covered, the interviewer should make sure that the answers
were genuine and complete. Maybe the interviewer should see the interviewee
again a few days later in order to find out whether new answers did occur to
the interviewee, or corrections came to mind. Possibly the interviewer can invite
the interviewee to read the transcript of the interview and to comment on it. In
case one wants to compare the answers from several persons, then the interview
must be more structured, that is, be more like an oral questionnaire. In contrast,
to learn the most about an individual, the interview should not be structured; it
is ideally of the narrative variety. In case a person having little experience is to
be interviewed publicly, it seems fair to indicate ahead of time the theme of the
interview so that he or she can make preparations.
Table 4.8 Frequencies of individual scores concerning levels of

(meta-)logical thinking and RCR levels. N = 31.
(Source: Reich 1995d, p. 13.)
RCR level
Levels of (meta-)
logical thinking III III (IV) IV (III) IV IV (V) V (IV)
3(2) 1
3 1 1 3 1
3(4) 3 2
4(3) 1 3 2
4 1 3 2
4(5) 1 2 2
5(4) 1
5 1
Clearly, a person coming anywhere near these integrated answers was

answering at level 7.
(Meta-)logical competence and RCR levels. These results are collected in
Table 4.8. Once more, no values are found in the right-hand upper corner.
Again, for a given level of (meta-)logical competence, e.g. 4(3), various
RCR levels pertain, namely IV(III), IV(V), V(IV). Thus, the competence
under discussion can also be regarded as a necessary yet insufficient con-
dition for RCR. Kendall’s rank correlation coefficient had the value .52,
p < .01.8
The thirty-one scorable participants (one audiotape was partly faulty)
distinguished three logical cases: (1) tasks, whose solution is simply cor-
rect or wrong (snail, plant, balance scale); (2) problems, where various
aspects might be considered contradictory, other aspects seemingly as
completing each other, and all aspects are needed for an explanation
(pianist, nuclear accident, model for humans); and (3) problems, where
the individual attitude and likely action of the protagonists are the most
important considerations for finding a solution (filling a post, interview).
The aggregated answers (N = 31) to the problem logical classes were as
follows, ordered according to the three classes indicated:
8 A post hoc Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance (H test) further supported the findings of
the correlation computation: the mean levels of (meta-) logical thinking related to the
various RCR level scores differed (chi2 = 11.7, df = 2, p < .01). The corresponding
U-Test (Mann-Whitney) showed that the significant differences were between levels 3
and 4 (U = 33, p < .01), and to a lesser degree between levels 3 and 5 (U = 1.5,
p < .05).
Class 1: Here we are dealing with natural laws in the domain of physics and biology,
which are unchangeable and reproducible. The physical systems are not capable
of learning; they do not develop. All these tasks primarily have nothing to do with
me. One can focus one’s imagination and reflections onto concrete entities. We are
dealing with clear initial conditions and well-defined objectives. Using the right
method leads to a single correct solution. The task is to establish mathematical
relations between the variables. Thus the competence for scientific work is tested.
The solution can be justified by logical arguments. Once a mathematical solution
is found, predictions can be made. Therefore, the answers of various persons are
surely similar, if not identical. And in the cases of the snail and the balance scale,
the solution does not depend on the environment. In all cases, one can repeat a
trial or experiment without intrinsic limitations.
Class 2: The task is to harmonise two statements, to create a link, to put them
under one umbrella, to find out whether they support each other or not. Both
aspects often ‘collaborate’. Even if some statement is not ‘logical’, it may be true.
Native endowment and the effects of exercising cannot be separated, nor mind
and body; they are intrinsically linked. Probably, such states of affairs can be
researched further, because certain regularities obtain despite the complexities
involved. The environment may play a certain role in these problems. For in-
stance, the pianist may be influenced by the audience, the operating crew may
panic when the reactor explodes, and a person’s mind and body are influenced,
for instance, by the weather.
Class 3: Humans can act according to the most diverse criteria ranging from
the cold logic of focusing on gaining an advantage to the warm logic of decent
behaviour. But humans also react. Contrary to the experiments with the balance
scale, one can’t do experiments with humans as one fancies. When humans are
concerned, a different scale of values applies. When the psyche is involved, the
situation often becomes irreversible. There are no solutions which are a priori
correct or wrong, because the idiosyncratic reaction of each individual counts.
People do not all react in the same way. It may be helpful to reflect how one would
react oneself. Such a reflection may further progress with understanding. Deci-
sions have to worked out by way of dialogue. In such discussions the aims and
wishes of all persons involved should be put on the table, including emotions that
play a role. Persons react differently, because they are aware that their experi-
ence of life differs from that of others. Sometimes differing moral values play a
role. And the actors may change on account of how events unfold. One knows
a lot about single factors, but not how they relate to each other: usually many
solutions can be envisaged in principle, but none predicted with a high proba-
bility. At best one can make statements beginning with ‘probably’ or ‘possibly’,
which indicate a tendency. At issue are not logical necessities, but reaching an
optimised solution for the future. That requires the capacity to sort out the es-
sentials and calls for social sensitivity and creativity. Not infrequently, the core
issue resides in conflicting interests, in the difficulties having to do with living to-
gether. There exists no universally agreed sure method for arriving at a solution
satisfactory to all persons involved. Moreover, the objective is not always clear,
progress towards it not easily measurable. It may be that both maintaining the
status quo and making changes in all likelihood will lead to future problems.
Table 4.9 Minimum stages/levels of other competencies for a

given RCR level.
Appropriate partial levels of dialectical and analogical thinking are also
required. (Source: Reich, 1999, p. 145)
(Meta-)logical
RCR Piagetian operations Complex thinking competence
II concrete operations level 2 level 1

III transition to formal op. level 3 level 2+
IV established formal op. level 5− level 3
V level 7 level 5
But once a decision has been taken, it cannot be fully reversed, one cannot start
afresh from scratch. As a rule, the solution depends on many things, all the
more if many persons are involved, and is likely to be tailor-made. Therefore,
different persons will propose different solutions. At issue is the black box indi-
vidual, whose behaviour often is not reproducible, and who is given to emotional
whims.
lf a third of the difference between levels is ignored, the inter-rater

agreements were 97 per cent (RCR), 81.8 per cent (complex thought)
and 81.8 per cent ([meta-]logical thought).
Discussion of pilot studies 3 and 4

By retroduction RCR was demonstrated to involve (1) elementary, con-
junctive, and/or composite operations singly or plurally shared with
Piagetian operations and cognitively complex thinking, as well as (2) a
logic different from formal binary logic. The respective minimum levels
are listed in Table 4.9.
These results support H. 1: there are (developmental) commonalities
between the thought forms/competencies under discussion. However,
RCR is not reducible to any one of the others.
How about H. 2, the development of RCR and of cognitively complex
thought? Given the quite significant value of the correlation coefficient
(rs = .68, p < .01) and the high chi2 values of the Kruskal-Wallis test, H. 2
is supported by the empirical results: the levels of cognitively complex
thought may also be interpreted as a developmental sequence. This is
in agreement with the notion that during the life course reasoning be-
comes more and more general, abstract, differentiated, integrated, and
structured (Seiler 1994, p. 79; cf. Werner [1948] 1973, 1957).
To reach RCR level III, the lowest ‘real’ RCR level, ‘almost’ formal
operations and (meta-)logical competence at level 2+ are required. These
findings support H. 3 and H. 4, in that below RCR level III formal binary
logic is used, and at that level it is transgressed, at least in a rudimentary
way. From the manner the ‘logic’ of the RCR problems was described
by the participants, it is also clear that at least some of them understand
(more or less well) the notion of noncompatibility, even if they do not
know that term.
The results shown in Tables 4.6 (p. 63), 4.7 (p. 66), and 4.8 (p. 70)
furthermore shed light on another issue debated currently. As discussed
by Bjorklund (1999, p. 34), in middle childhood psychometric IQ and
results of Piagetian reasoning tests correlate at the .4 level. If both tests
measure some generalised intelligence, and given that the IQ increases
continuously – that is not stepwise – Bjorklund doubts the correctness of
Piagetian stage theory. From the present data it appears that stages or
levels are indeed just milestones within an ongoing development. The very
notion underlying the present level notation, namely level I (II), etc.
indicates a more or less continuous change (as does Piaget’s notion of
substages). However, at a level/stage milestone, the sum of earlier small
developmental steps has led to a noticeable qualitative change, a marked
transformation of the mental structure.
How does RCR actually develop? A robust answer remains to be re-
searched. The impressions gained from the present study are twofold: on
the one hand an increase of factual knowledge may well be one of the
causes. That would be consistent with other studies showing the impor-
tance for development of prior knowledge as distinct from a higher IQ
(Weinert, Bullock, and Schneider 1999, pp. 334–5). On the other hand
increased epistemic cognition seems required, in particular reflection on
the means of thinking and reflecting (cf. ch. 2, pp. 29–32), including
the nature and use of various logics. At least as a temporary strategy,
at the current degree of understanding, it may be advisable to study in
more depth the underlying complex processes (Reich, Oser, and Valentin
1994) as against searching for nomothetic relations.
In his considerations on spiritual intelligence, Robert Emmons (2000,
p. 49) evokes four empirical criteria for determining whether a particular
candidate for a different type of (multiple) intelligence makes the grade.
It seems to me that, mutatis mutandis, these criteria are also applicable
to thought forms, and I do so for RCR: (1) The thought form should
be translatable into performance, that is, a person possessing it should
be able to solve specifiable problems that someone without it cannot.
The data presented here, in particular those on the understanding of re-
ligious doctrines (chapter 7), clearly show that this criterion is met by
RCR. (2) The thought form must be applicable to a diversity of con-

tent domains, not just one (narrow) domain. Pilot study 1 (Oser and
Reich, 1987) – demonstrating that RCR can be considered as a prag-
matic reasoning schema – the archaeology of RCR (chapter 8), as well
as the applications in this monograph demonstrate that criterion no. 2 is
met by RCR. (3) The thought form under discussion should be similar
enough to other thought forms to be recognisable as such, but differ-
ent enough to be worth studying. The considerations (chapter 5) and
the data presented here document that this criterion too is met by RCR.
(4) The thought form must develop from infancy to adulthood. Again,
the data of chapters 4 and 7 are evidence that RCR also meets this last
criterion.
Summary of empirical studies and outlook

The existence of the postformal thought form RCR and its developmen-
tal levels, having been explained theoretically in previous chapters, were
demonstrated empirically. Furthermore, there is empirical evidence that
RCR shares ‘components’ with other thought forms, but not their logic,
and that (ideally) it can develop from rudimentary stages in childhood to
a fully developed stage in adulthood. Development of RCR implies cor-
responding levels of Piagetian thinking, cognitive complex thought, and
putatively of dialectical and analogical thought as well as at least a ‘feel’
for, and minimal use of different types of logic. Additional studies would
usefully focus on competence with RCR as a function of age, education,
socio-economic status, etc., and on longitudinal studies to ascertain the
present level descriptions and the sequencing of the levels. Exploring fur-
ther the relation of RCR with dialectical and analogical thought would
also be desirable.
5 Other Thought Forms and Matching
Them to the Problem at Hand
In chapter 1 (pp. 16–19) RCR was hypothesised to share elementary,

conjunctive, or even composite operations with other forms of thought.
In chapter 3 (pp. 41–3) arguments were provided that Piagetian opera-
tions, dialectical thinking, analogical thinking, and cognitively complex
thought were relevant other thought forms. This was broadly supported
empirically (chapter 4). It is therefore justified to compare and contrast
them with RCR and with each other. A second reason is that they are
sufficiently different from each other and RCR to serve for a demonstra-
tion of the thesis that for best results the thought form employed must
be matched to the problem structure. That will constitute the second
section of this chapter.
Other thought forms relevant to RCR
Piagetian logico-mathematical thinking

Rather than covering Piagetian logico-mathematical thinking1 in its en-
tirety (cf. Fondation Archives Jean Piaget 1989), after a short recap I
concentrate on its critical aspect in regard to RCR: the logic involved.
Some core characteristics of thinking according to Piaget (1970) were
already indicated in previous chapters. At the formal operational stage,
the overall challenge of Piagetian tasks consists in formulating hypotheses,
testing them, and coming to a conclusion. Specific objectives are (a) to
find out which are the ‘true’ (active) variables (e.g., task ‘combination of
coloured and colourless chemical bodies’); (b) to combine variables (e.g.
the ‘snail’ task – see Fig. 4.1, p. 60), or (c) to elucidate natural laws (e.g.,
tasks ‘floating bodies’, ‘balance scale’).
1 I do not enter into the debate on the validity of some of Piaget’s findings and interpre-
tations as well as their amelioration (e.g., Barrouillet and Poirier 1997; Bickhard 1997;
Goswami 1998, ch. 8). The portions of Piaget’s work I make use of seem undisputed
(cf. Bond 1995).
75
Task
Here I focus on the balance scale task (Inhelder and Piaget [1955] 1958,
pp. 164–81) with a view to bringing out the structure of a Piagetian task,
which among other things ‘justifies’ the application of the logic involved in
logico-mathematical thinking. The balance scale task consists in finding
out how to balance the scale by adjusting the various weights and their
distance from the fulcrum on either side of the beam.2 Two essential,
‘obvious’, yet crucial points are (1) the ‘truth value’ of the variables is
time-independent (a weight or a fixed distance over time stay the same
weight and the same fixed distance) and (2) the variables are intrinsically
independent from each other (a given weight is unchanged at whatever
distance it is put, and a given distance stays exactly the same whatever
weight is put there). From (1) and (2) and the definition of a balance
scale it follows that (3) the situation is strictly reversible (by reversing any
change made, the former situation is re-established exactly).
Underlying logic
Those three conditions (well-defined, time-constant entities; separability
of variables; reversibility) are precisely among those which authorise the
use of formal binary logic in reasoning about the tasks under discussion.
To clarify the foundations of that logic (Kainz 1988, pp. 14–21), a small
excursion is necessary. The three pillars holding up formal binary logic
are: (1) the maxim of identity: everything is identical with itself, A = A; A
cannot at the same time be A and nonA; (2) the law of non-contradiction: a
notion cannot possess neither nor both of two relevant mutually exclusive
predicates; (3) the maxim of the excluded middle: A must be either A+ or
A−, it cannot be anything else. It may be helpful to go a little further into
those maxims/laws.
Whereas philosophers like Hegel, Wittgenstein, and Kainz find faults
with the identity maxim (Kainz 1988, pp. 9–10),3 it is accepted as such
in everyday life. In practice, there may be problems of the exact determi-
nation of the limits of the categories concerned (such as ‘when does the
night end and the day start?’), but it is clear that the day is not the night
and the night is not the day.
Readers interested in a philosophical discussion of the law of non-
contradiction are referred to the considerations of Eric Toms (1962) –
summarised by Kainz (1988, p. 18). At a practical level, there are clearly
2 The solution is that for equilibrium the sum of the torques [torque = weight × distance
from the fulcrum] on the one side has to equal that on the other side.
3 One argument is that one cannot fully know a given entity unless one knows its limits,
i.e., what is ‘outside’ of it. Therefore, so goes the argument, that ‘other’ is also part
of it.
Other Thought Forms 77
difficulties: is a hermaphrodite not both male and non-male, an ambivert

not both extrovert and non-extrovert, and does light not behave in wave-
like and non-wave-like ways?
As regards the excluded middle, Toms (1962) again discusses the philo-
sophical point of view (Kainz 1988, pp. 18–19). At a practical level, ac-
cording to the maxim under discussion: ‘Either this is a butterfly or this
is not a butterfly.’ What about the egg, the chrysalis? Again, ‘legally’,
‘Either a cow is holy or it is not holy.’ What about the views of Hindus
(for whom a cow is holy) and of non-Hindus; is one view to be accepted
and the other rejected? ‘Either this neutron is about to disintegrate or it
is not about to disintegrate.’ (We only know the answer once the neutron
has disintegrated; before that disintegration the state is indeterminate.)
Once more, formal binary logic does not fit the logical structure of these
and of other cases arising in real life.
Applications of formal binary logic

If the problem structure is such that formal binary logic is applicable (e.g.
Newtonian physics problems, that is Piagetian tasks) then the following
operations are valid: use of transitivity, association, commutation, distri-
bution, use of reversibility, solving of syllogisms, working with condition-
als, manipulating sets of data (Table 5.1). In other cases (e.g., problems
in quantum physics, biology, psychology, sociology, dialectical problems,
RCR problems, etc.), the applicability of Table 5.1 cannot be assumed.
In many such cases most of those operations will lead to wrong results;
the detailed applicability must first be tested.
To illustrate the importance of the separability (locality) of the (iden-
tical, unchanging) elements to which formal binary operations are appli-
cable, Errol Harris (1987, pp. 34–7) discusses a material implication, a
conditional (penultimate example of Table 5.1): ‘If p (the antecedent),
then q (the consequent)’ which is understood as a separation of relations.
No essential connection is required (and in fact admitted) between the
truth or falsity of the two propositions concerned. The implication is
true whenever both propositions are true, or both are false, or p is false
and q is true: (a)If it rains, the street is wet; (b)if it does not rain, the street is
not wet; (c)it does not rain, yet the street is wet are all logically acceptable.
The only unacceptable case would be: (d) it rains, yet the street is not wet.
That would be a genuine logical contradiction, provided the truth of an
implication is accepted as a principle.
Harris’s (1987, pp. 36–7) counter-example is the following: If Newton’s
mother is a woman, then Newton is a man. Whereas cases (a) (Newton’s
mother is a woman, and Newton is a man), and (b) (Newton’s ‘mother’
is not a woman, and Newton is not a man) above work out all right, case
Table 5.1 Various operations based on formal binary logic.
Operation Description/Characteristics Example
Use of transitivity Use of logic to avoid a further a > b; b > c → a > c

comparison measurement
Association The result is independent (x + y) + z = x + (y + z)
from the grouping (x · y) · z = x · (y · z)
Commutation The result is independent x+y=y+x
from the order of the elements x·y = y·x
Distribution The result is independent from x · (y + z) = x · y + x · z
the order of the operations
Use of Reversing an operation will x+y−y=x
reversibility re-establish the initial situation x·y : y = x
Solving Drawing conclusions from All men are mortal; Socrates
syllogisms the premises is a man; Socrates is mortal
Working with Drawing conclusions for If p, then q . p, but not q:
conditionals different situations logically not possible
Manipulating Sets are dealt with as wholes Set B is a subset of set A;
sets of data set A and set B overlap
(c) now presents a problem: If Newton’s mother is not a woman, then Newton
is a man. The problem arises, because mother and son are not logically
independent, they are not separable. Another way to look at this is to
appreciate that a conditional of this type states a sufficient condition, not
a necessary one.
Before concluding this section on logic, a brief discussion of class sets
will prove useful later (chapter 6). The possible relationships of class sets
according to formal binary logic are shown in Fig. 5.1.
According to Venn ([1881] 1971, p. 7), the four basic possibilities can
be described as follows: in case 1 both classes are logically identical, they
overlap completely. Their extensions are identical, but not their inten-
sions. An example would be the class of equilateral triangles (A), and
the class of equiangular triangles (B). In case 2 one class is a subset of
the other class. For instance, if A is the class of religious norms, and B the
class of moral norms, then 2a would mean that moral norms are a subset
of religious norms (theological view), and 2b that religious norms are a
subset of moral norms (view of humanistic philosophy). In case 3 the two
classes overlap. An example would be the class of automobiles (A) and
the class of vans (B) A car-a[nd]-van transports persons and therefore
belongs to class A, but it also transports goods and hence also belongs to
class B. Case 4 depicts the situation where independent classes are totally
separated, no interaction is assumed. An example would be a scientific
world view determined by a ‘rational’ investigation of nature (A), and a
1 2a 2b
A B A B A B
3 4
A B A B
Figure 5.1 Venn diagrams of class sets.
religious world view determined by religious feelings and mystical expe-

riences (B).
A helpful point – but also a limitation – of Fig. 5.1 is that (within
formal binary logic) no other relations exist. Dialectical and RCR-type
‘relations’ are excluded on principle, because they do not meet the above
conditions underlying the use of set theory (well-defined, time-constant
entities; separability of variables; reversibility).
The diagrams of Fig. 5.1 help to clarify class relations and are therefore
often more useful in (controversial) discussions than mere words (Reich
1996c). However, one has to be aware that they depict essentially class
extensions (and intensions by implication, at least in case 1), but not
the nature of any interaction. If that also needs depicting, a second set of
diagrams may be used to depict the relationship, for instance the nature of
any hierarchy in case 2, the kind of interaction in a common ‘area’ in case
3, etc. The exact nature of the interaction might still not be depictable
though: is it causal, one of information transfer, dialectical, appropriate
for applying RCR?
Summing up this subsection in the words of John Macnamara (1994,
p. 150):
classical logic is ill equipped to handle logic of ordinary discourse precisely be-
cause classical logic derives mainly from an analysis of arithmetical sentences.
Arithmetic is an unusual domain of discourse because (a) the objects in the
domain are eternal and unchanging. All properties are necessary ones. And
(b) only a single basic count noun is required in arithmetical sentences: num-
ber or set depending on the level of one’s work. Any other count noun can be
Table 5.2 The sixteen binary operations. p, ¬p, q, ¬q = independent

variables; x = dependent variable. T = true; F = false. (Explanation in
text.)
x if 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
p&q T T T T F T T F T F T F F F F F
¬p & q T T T F F T F T F T F T F T F F
p & ¬q T T F F F F T T T T F F T F T F
¬p & ¬q T F F F F T T T F F T T T F F T
defined as a subset of numbers or sets – for example prime number, finite set.
(emphasis in original)
Examples of formal binary logical operations

The concept formal operations refers to operations that abstract from the
substantive content of knowledge. If they are governed by binary logic,
one lives in a dichotomous world of yes or no, true or false. One guide
in that world is the set of sixteen operations, presented in Table 5.2. To
understand the nature of Piagetian formal operations further, and to con-
trast them with RCR, we shall discuss Table 5.2 in some detail. Before
that let me emphasise, however, that I am not entering into the debate as
to whether Piaget had an adequate grasp of logic, or whether the sixteen
operations are a correct model of his understanding of formal operations
(e.g., Smith 1987). Above all, the point is to compare and to contrast
formal binary operations with dialectical, analogical, cognitively com-
plex thinking, and RCR ‘operations’ after going through the examples
of the next several pages. Readers who want to relax for a moment can
go right on to the amusing story on page 83 (‘A Piagetian task from the
Internet’).
Table 5.2 shows the sixteen different possibilities of how one of the
two dichotomous values (x, ¬x) of the dependent variable x might be a
function of the dichotomised independent variables p and q (p, ¬p; q,
¬q, where ¬ means not). The table was created by starting (column 1, on
the left) purely formally with four times T (= ‘true’, i.e., probability 1),
then in the columns 2 to 5 each time replacing one T by an F (= ‘false’,
i.e., probability 0), next varying the position first of one F, then of two
Fs, and finally of three Fs.4
4 In the literature, the content of Table 5.2 is often organised differently, for instance, with
rows 2 and 3 inverted, or with a different order of the columns. However, that does not
change the truth functions of a given column, which is the core content of Table 5.2.
Column 1 represents the case of ‘complete affirmation’ (four times

true): whatever the combination of p, ¬p and q, ¬q values, x has the
same (dichotomous) value (not a very likely situation in the real world –
the conclusion might be that the ‘wrong’ variables were studied). Ac-
cording to column 2,5 x keeps the value of column 1, except for the
combination ¬p, ¬q (‘disjunction’ of p and q; ‘inclusive or’). Column 3
indicates a combination where only q determines x (‘affirmation of q’),
column 4 that where the combination (conjunction) of p and q6 is deci-
sive. Column 5 is the inverse of column 1 (all truth values are inverted),
its logical complement (‘complete negation’). As to the truth values of
column 6, only the combination p, ¬q does not lead to x (‘implication’);
in the case of column 7 the combination ¬p, q (‘converse implication’)
has the same effect. Column 8 (‘incompatibility’; ‘alternative or’) repre-
sents the logical complement of column 4.7 In column 9, p determines
x, irrespective of q (‘affirmation of p’), in column 10 either p alone, or q
alone takes that role (‘reciprocal exclusion’; ‘exclusive or’). Column 11
indicates the reign of either p and q or neither of them as determinants
of x (‘equivalence’ of p and q), in column 12 it is q alone or neither p nor
q (‘negation of p’), in column 13 either p or neither p nor q (‘negation
of q’) determines the overall truth value. Columns 14–16 refer to the
reigns of only q (‘converse nonimplication’), only p (‘nonimplication’),
and neither of them (‘conjoint negation’).8
As already indicated and a closer inspection shows in detail, certain
relationships obtain between the columns, that is between the truth func-
tions represented in the various columns of Table 5.2. Thus, an inversion,
5 Column 2 represents the truth function termed ‘disjunction’, a function often written
as (p v q). In that expression v stands for vel, the Latin term for or. As is apparent from
column 2, a disjunction has the truth value 1 (= true) if either p is true, or q, or both
(inclusive or). An everyday example for such a state of affairs would be, ‘automobiles
have either hub brakes (p) or disk brakes (q), or hub brakes on one pair of wheels and
disk brakes on the other’. In electronic circuitry, the corresponding Boolean function is
termed ‘OR’.
6 This truth function is called ‘conjunction’, and may be written p · q. An everyday example
would be, ‘Getting a driver’s license requires us both to have the required age, and to have
passed the tests.’ In electronic circuitry, the corresponding Boolean function is termed
‘AND’.
7 This truth function is called ‘incompatibility’, and may be written as ¬p v¬q. It is true,
if either p, or q, or neither p nor q obtains (alternative or). An example would be, ‘The
car under that tarpaulin is either a Chevy, or a Ford, or something else.’ In electronic
circuitry, the corresponding Boolean function is termed ‘NAND’, the logical complement
of AND (column 4).
8 This truth function may be called ‘conjoined negation’, and be written as ¬p · ¬q. An
example would be, ‘This pendulum (dichotic weight ¬p, and dichotic length of suspension
¬q) has neither the weight p nor the length of suspension q.’ In electronic circuitry,
the corresponding Boolean function is termed ‘NOR’, the logical complement of OR
(column 2).
transforming all Ts into Fs, and all Fs into Ts, that is into their logical
complements, represents a ‘negation’, N. Examples are the transforma-
tions 1 → 5; 2 → 16; 3 → 13; 4 → 8 and vice versa. A correlative transfor-
mation, C, is concerned with functions having the same truth values in
the first and the last rows of Table 5.2. That transformation changes the
T and F values of the middle rows into F and T values, respectively. For
example, a conjunction (column 4) is the resulting ‘converse’ of a dis-
junction (column 2), and vice versa. A reciprocal transformation, R, relates
a proposition to its ‘obverse’. This concerns functions which share the
truth values of the middle rows of Table 5.2; in the first and last rows that
transformation entails a change of T into F, and vice versa. An example
is the transformation of a disjunction of p and q (column 2) into an in-
compatibility (disjunction of ¬p and ¬q – column 8), and vice versa. An
affirmation of p, q is transformed into a negation of p, q, and vice versa.
To see the formalism of Table 5.2 at work, we use it to assist with solving
a simplified, dichotomised pendulum task (cf. ch. 4, p. 61). Two pendu-
lums have a heavy weight (p), and two a light weight (¬p). In each weight
category, one pendulum has a long suspension (q), the other a short sus-
pension (¬q). The question is, ‘What are the conditions for obtaining
a high oscillation frequency of the pendulum (x)?’ Experimenting with
the four pendulums yields the empirical answer: ‘The pendulums with
the short suspension (¬q) exhibit the high frequency.’ A look at Table 5.2
shows that the result is represented by column 13. Having understood the
formalism of the sixteen operations, one can surmise that the condition
for ¬x, the low frequency, is represented by the logical complement of
column 13, that is by column 3. An experimental check will rapidly con-
firm that conclusion. A conscientious researcher would now look at the
other fourteen truth operations and check whether he or she has tested
them empirically, or whether they can be considered irrelevant for the
present case (e.g., nos. 1 and 5). If both issues are settled, the researcher
can be certain that he or she has obtained the correct result.
The INCR group

We have just seen that through a correlative transformation (C) disjunc-
tions can transform into conjunctions, and vice versa. Affirmation and
negation of p or q can be transformed into each other through a recip-
rocal transformation (R). A negation (N) leads simultaneously to both
transformations. The three types of transformations constitute the INCR
group depicted in Fig. 5.2. There are three ways to get from p v q to
¬p · ¬q: via (1) a negation, (2) a correlative transformation followed by
a reciprocal transformation of the result, or (3) by a reciprocal transfor-
mation followed by a correlative transformation.
p v q p v q
C N C
p q p q
Figure 5.2 INCR group. I stands for identity transformation (resulting,

e.g., from a double negation), N for negation, C for correlative transfor-
mation, and R for reciprocal transformation (explanation of transfor-
mations in text).
As an example, generalising the relations depicted in Fig. 5.2 can be

used for assisting in a modified version of the snail task (Piaget [1946]
1972, pp. 59–109). A snail moves on a board, which is displaced on a
table (cf. Fig. 4.1, p. 60). These double movements go on for some time.
The task is to find a way for reconstituting exactly the situation reign-
ing at the start. Obviously, one way is simultaneously to reverse exactly
all the movements made, to operate a negation. However, according to
Fig. 5.2, and if the movement of the snail is represented by C and that
of the board by R, then one can immediately discuss two more possibili-
ties, namely, to correct separately the movements of the snail and of the
board, this in either order. Many similar examples can be found from bal-
ancing a scale to making up a seating order for a dinner party using two
criteria.
A Piagetian task from the Internet

The following story from the Internet provides, I hope, an enjoyable
example of Piagetian formal operations at work, that is applying the for-
malism just reviewed to a hypothetical case:
‘Is Hell exothermic (releases heat) or endothermic (absorbs heat)? Support your
answer with proof.’ Most of the students wrote proofs of their beliefs using Boyle’s
Law (gas cools off when it expands and heats up when it is compressed) or some
variant. One student, however, wrote the following:
First, we need to know how the mass of Hell is changing in time. So, we need
to know the rate that souls are moving into Hell and the rate they are leaving. I
think that we can safely assume that once a soul gets to Hell, it will not leave.
Therefore, no souls are leaving. As for how many souls are entering Hell, let’s
look at the different religions that exist in the world today. Some of these religions
state that if you are not a member of their religion, you will go to Hell. Since there
are more than one of these religions and since people do not belong to more than
one religion, we can project that all people and all souls go to Hell. With birth
and death rates as they are, we can expect the number of souls in Hell to increase
exponentially. Now, we look at the rate of change of the volume in Hell because
Boyle’s Law states that in order for temperature and the pressure in Hell to stay
the same, the volume of Hell has to expand as souls are added. This gives two
possibilities: (1) If Hell is expanding at a slower rate than the rate at which souls
enter Hell, then the temperature and pressure in Hell will increase until All Hell
breaks loose. (2) Of course, if Hell is expanding at a rate faster than the increase
of souls in Hell, then the temperature and pressure will drop until Hell freezes
over. So which is it? If we accept the postulate given to me by Ms Therese Banyan
during my Freshman year, ‘That it will be a cold night in Hell before I sleep with
you’, and take into account the fact that I still have not succeeded in that area,
then (2) cannot be true, and so Hell is exothermic.
This student got the only A.
Having discussed the nature, the potential as well as the limitation
of Piagetian operations to cases where formal binary logic applies (as
allegedly in the Hell task), we come to cognitively complex thinking,
another major ingredient of RCR.
Cognitively complex thinking

Cognitively complex thinking originally was dealt with as an instance of
information processing (Schroder, Driver, and Streufert 1967). This type
of thinking involves differentiation (bringing out differences of fact, of
possible interpretations, and valuing) and integration (attempts at link-
ing various elements in order to arrive at an overall assessment). The
seven-level scale for assessing degrees of cognitively complex thinking
(Baker-Brown, Ballard, Bluck, Vries, Suedfeld, and Tetlock 1992) is re-
flected in the five levels of RCR (Table 4.7, p. 66). The seven-level scale
can be described briefly as follows: level 1, no differentiation or integra-
tion (only one point of view, no other comes into the field of vision);
level 2, beginning of differentiation; level 3, clear differentiation (at least
two approaches to dealing with the information received; ‘either/or’ is
in view); level 4, beginning of integration (both-and becomes a [weak]
possibility); level 5, explicit integration; level 6, systematic approach in-
cluding an evaluation of the different possibilities and a comparison of
their likelihood to be most promising; (7) elaboration of a framework that
can ‘house’ the various considerations of the lower levels.
One can appreciate the importance of the cognitive complexity of
reasoning (and thence of RCR) from a study by Peter Suedfeld and
Philip Tetlock (1977). They graded sets of diplomatic communications
Table 5.3 Level of cognitive complexity

resulting from an analysis of diplomatic notes
exchanged during five international crises.
Mean level of
Crisis Result complexity
1911 peace 4.64

1914 war 1.95
1948 peace 2.75
1950 war 1.71
1962 peace 4.71
Source: Suedfeld and Tetlock (1977, p. 182).
in particular during the following five crises: (1) Agadir (1 July–4 Nov.
1911), (2) outbreak of First World War (26 June–4 August 1914), (3)
Berlin Blockade (22 June–18 Sept. 1948), (4) outbreak of Korean War
(25 June–4 July 1950), and (5) the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Results
are presented in Table 5.3.
In view of the striking differences, an argument can be made that cog-
nitively complex thinking should be encouraged (and thence RCR) if
one wants a more peaceful world. The counter-argument one sometimes
hears (but about which I have reservations) is that in times of adversity
persons thinking in an undifferentiated way are better fighters – maybe
that the resoluteness of the ‘kamikaze fighters’ in war or warlike action
explains how one can get to such a view.
Dialectical thinking
Dialectical thinking has a long history; it was notably practised by Greek
philosophers. In the course of the centuries, it took on many shades of
meanings, and different schools define and practise it differently (e.g.,
Harris 1987; Kainz 1988; Reese 1982). When Basseches (1984, p. 20)
started his work, he looked among others at the writings of Hegel, Marx,
Darwin, von Bertalanffy, and at Piaget’s theory of adaptation through
assimilation and accommodation.9 His general description of dialectical
thinking ‘in the broadest sense’ is said to be applicable to the published
works of the authors named and to ‘the way in which ordinary adults
confront common problems of living’.
9 The paradoxical situation is that Piaget could not have worked out fully his ‘complete’
theory of cognitive development by using exclusively formal binary operations (which are
at the pinnacle of cognitive development according to that theory). Dialectical thought is
involved in the description of the development itself as distinct from the description of a
given stage and the logico-mathematical thinking at that stage.
Figure 5.3 Through becoming, being and nonbeing transform into

new being and new nonbeing.
Dialectical thinking is related to ‘here-and-now’ thinking in the same

way that a motion picture is related to a still photograph. The motion
picture does not ‘contradict’ the still photograph but combines a series of
them according to the laws of motion. Dialectical thought acknowledges
that a change of quantity may become a change of quality. The dialectical
‘conflict’ of content and structure eventually leads to a restructuring.
Thus, dialectical thinking also deals with the interruption of continuity.
With Basseches (1984, pp. 21–30), dialectical thinking, as understood
here, is based on an ontology of wholeness and of change, in which old
structures (systems) give way to new structures (systems). Wholeness
means that first, entities are emphasised over against monadic, indepen-
dent elements, and second, the entities themselves are de-emphasised
relative to the process of existence as a whole. Dialectical change is de-
picted in Fig. 5.3.
As will be apparent from Fig. 5.3, the dialectic outlook emphasises
intrinsic internal relations.
The relations among parts within a whole make the parts what they are, and thus
the relations are ‘internal’ to the nature of the parts. At the same time, the relations
form the internal structure of the whole . . . as these relations change, fundamental
change in what exists occurs . . . Thus the emphasis on change, wholeness, and
internal relations are interconnected in dialectical ontologies. (ibid., p. 22)
Examples of corresponding dialectical analyses may be found, for in-
stance, in the works of Karl Marx and of Thomas S. Kuhn.
Basseches (ibid., p. 29) points out that dialectical analyses are not with-
out costs. The ‘willingness to question the permanence and intransigence
of the boundary conditions of a problem, and to ask about situations
which lie beyond those boundaries’ might endanger intellectual security.
It will depend on each individual, whether trading off such a security
for freedom from intellectually imposing limitations on oneself and other
people is considered worthwhile or not.
I do not want to close this subsection without referring to Klaus Riegel,
who revitalised the study of dialectical thinking (e.g., Riegel 1978), but
unfortunately left us much too young. Jack Meacham (1999) sees the cur-
rent importance of dialectical theory in its facilitating the understanding
of issues in multiculturalism. From that perspective he reviews Riegel’s
work and in particular its commonalities with the work of the Russian
psychologist Rubinstejn. Riegel’s dialectical psychology was motivated in
particular by the observation that ‘traditional psychology retains a strong
commitment to the belief that traits and abilities remain stable, and to the
concepts of balance and equilibrium’ (Meacham 1999, p. 135). Actually,
imbalances, disequilibria, questions, doubts, and challenges may pro-
voke developmental changes and therefore need study. A major point is
to consider changes not just within a given domain, but to pay attention
‘to transactions occurring among major developmental progressions –
biological, psychological, and culture-historical’ (ibid., p. 138). A view
inspired by Fig. 5.3 is probably better able than other approaches to un-
derstand racial strife and to devise medium-term and long-term remedial
measures with a view to achieving a viable multiculturalism. The lesson is
clear: a complex understanding of relationships and their evolving nature
is a core issue. Dialectical thought is geared to tackle it, and therefore
needs to be supported. Notice too that this is already an example of
matching the thought form to the problem structure.
Analogical thinking
Not only for children do analogical arguments play key roles for finding
a mental way when facing a new problem (cf. Gentner, Brem, Ferguson,
Markman, Levidow, Wolff and Forbus 1997; Moshman 1998, pp. 954–
5). That remains true even for scientists (Oppenheimer 1956). In the
laboratory, four-year-olds can complete analogies such as ‘bird is to nest
as dog is to?’ (bird:nest::dog ? – Goswami 1998, p. 223). To come to
the solution, children must map the relation lives in that links bird to
nest to the item dog in order to find kennel.10 With development, more
10 Goswami (1998, pp. 223–4) had presented the task to 4-year-old Lucas as a picture of
a bird and that of a nest with three eggs in it, and told a story around those pictures,
complex relational mappings can be carried out. Goswami’s (ibid., p. 253)

example is to use an analogy from the mental representation of familiar
height relations such as Daddy > Mummy > Baby as a basis for mapping
to a transitive inference problem such as ‘Tom is happier than Bill, Bill is
happier than Mike, who is happiest?’ The solution involves mapping Tom
to Dad, Bill to Mummy, and Mike to Baby. As Daddy is the tallest, Tom
is the happiest. Whereas in the first example (bird:nest::dog?) the mapping
referred to a single relation, now the mappings refer to an ordered pair
of relations.
For RCR, only some of the operations composing analogical think-
ing are required, namely searching for commonalities and differences
(cf. Medin, Goldstone, and Gentner 1990).
Concluding remarks
The characteristics, and main differences of the four thought forms, and
RCR, can be summarised as shown in Table 5.4.
Having discussed the characteristics of the four thought forms under
discussion, and earlier those of RCR I finish this section by applying all
five in turn to a micro-analysis of an impending partnership break-up (cf.
Basseches 1984, pp. 26–7). In real life hardly anybody will argue in that
way (and certainly not for so brief a time), people being more pragmatic,
but to use pure forms of thought in this illustration might help to get a
better sense of what each brings out.
John and Barbara are Piagetians. ‘It’s all your fault, Barbara, you never
understood me.’ ‘And you John, what did you really do to make me
happy? I am deeply disappointed.’ ‘Well, maybe we were never meant
for each other!’ For John and Barbara only black and white exist in their
dichotomous world, only fully right or fully wrong, in short the break-up
is to be analysed in terms of the sixteen binary operations of Table 5.2.
The result is likely to lead singly or in combination to (a) a lowered self-
esteem, (b) anger at the partner, (c) devaluing the relationship as long as
it lasted, and (d) a hesitancy to make future commitments.
Dick and Joan are cognitive complex thinkers: ‘You know, Dick, I shall
miss sailing with you, we were really a good team.’ ‘Yes, and we always
knew where we wanted to go. But then, you were too easy with spending
money, and that put a strain on our relationship.’ ‘Well, I thought that
with all the raises you told me about we could afford it.’ ‘Now Joan, there
is a lot I could say to that and to other things. Nevertheless, I keep some
including a dog. Lucas argued that birds lay eggs and dogs ‘lay’ puppies, so he insisted
that the missing analogue was puppy! In any event the answer shows analogical thinking
exploring far afield and coming up with a solution.
Table 5.4 Main differences of (1) Piagetian operations, (2) cognitively

complex thinking, (3) dialectical thinking, (4) analogical thinking, and
(5) RCR. A, B, C, D are the ‘variables’, ‘dimensions’ or characteristic
‘aspects’ concerned.
No. Nature of aspects A, B, (C, D) Relationships between A, B, (C, D)
1 A, B, (C . . . ) are part of the same In agreement with (time-independent)

conceptual system; are intrinsically formal binary logic (tertium non
independent from each other; they datur) transitivity, associativity,
can variously be ‘linked externally’ distributivity, commutativity,
with each other. Piagetian tasks reversibility (the negation of a
often involve the elucidation of such negation leads exactly back to
relationships within a given closed the origin) pertain. Logical
system, for instance in the case of contradiction is not to be tolerated;
the pendulum task or the balance the overall system is of a static and
scale task. synchronous nature.
2 Not defined; a large variety pertains as Experience of human life, recognition
in the case of human relationships. of protagonists’ motivations, of their
That large variety invites wide- objectives, of personality variables,
ranging exploration (differentiation etc. are more helpful for insights
and integration). than ‘logics’.
3 Within an open system, A and B Relationships are dynamic and have to
belong to different subsystems; they do with change and development.
determine each other as do ‘being’ The negation of a negation leads to
and ‘nonbeing’, ‘as such’ and ‘for something new: through becoming,
us’, ‘assimilation’ and nonbeing turns into new being and
‘accommodation’. being into nonbeing.
4 A, B are part of one reference system, In order for the analogy to work
C, D of another system. Properties/ (enlarged search space, better
functions of A and B correspond to understanding), the similarities of
analogous properties/functions of C, the properties/functions need to be
D: in the case of linked traffic lights, sufficiently strong and evident.
a car driver ‘surfs’ along like a surfer Nevertheless, almost by definition
on the ocean waves. there will always also be marked
differences.
5 A, B, (C . . . ) belong to different Negations mean an iterative refocusing
categories within the frame of a from A onto B and so on, with
given explanandum; they are ideally each time a gain in
‘permanently’ linked intrinsically; understanding of their relationship –
‘completely understandable’ in their based on a logic of
own context; all needed for a non-compatibility (which is not
genuine insight. incompatibility).
(Source: Reich 1999, p. 139)

good memories, and anyway, next time, I shall know better.’ Dick and
Joan clearly differentiate and integrate their experience considerably more
than our Piagetians. The break-up is less traumatic for them than for John
and Barbara, and possibly Dick and Joan will still meet occasionally to
speak about their respective new partnerships.
Ron and Liz are dialecticians. ‘Now Ron, who would have thought
when we first met that it would end with us this way? Do you remember
how happy we were, the things we did together?’ ‘Of course I do, Liz, and I
shall go on valuing those times. But then, we have changed since. You have
started your new career.’ ‘And you have developed new interests I simply
cannot share.’ ‘Well, maybe, Liz, one day we will move closer together
again, but for the moment a separation seems the most reasonable thing
to do, don’t you agree?’ Looking thus for changes in either partner within
and outside the relationship embeds the break-up into the flow of life. It
could even appear as a gate towards further development, and would
leave positive remembrances intact.
Walt and Anne often use analogies to explain things. ‘You know, Walt,
this is just like what happened with your brother Ted. One day he had
enough and just broke up with his partner, I never understood why.’
‘No Anne, that is the wrong comparison. Rather take Frank and Nancy.
They were together for quite a while until it became clear to them that
their partnership was nor really fulfilling. So they parted ways in mutual
agreement.’ The good aspect of this discussion is that both partners try to
understand what happened (and they do it without directly attacking each
other). However, as no two cases of human relationships are identical,
there are limitations to this approach. Walt and Anne may never get to
the bottom of their impending break-up unless they really focus on their
personal case.
Bob and Betty favour RCR. ‘Bob, it seems to me as if lately we have a
problem with our relationship.’ ‘Oh, why do you say that? We still like to
travel together to interesting places and we have a good time sharing our
impressions, don’t we?’ ‘Yes indeed, but for one thing, I enjoy less and less
jogging or skiing with you, you are just too strong for me.’ ‘Well, should
I admit that your love of going to concerts and expecting me to come
along each time is getting a bit much for me? I am not against concerts,
but there has to be a measure to everything.’ ‘I am glad you are so frank
about it, Bob. Maybe we should do more things we like to do together,
and learn how not to get on each other’s nerves by either reducing or
transforming those less pleasant occasions.’ ‘That may not be easy, Betty,
but let’s try!’ By way of bringing in the context and differentiating their
respective experiences, Bob and Betty give their partnership a second
chance.
If any conclusions can be drawn from these imagined, much too rudi-
mentary ‘vignettes’, it is clearly that Piagetian operations are of limited
helpfulness in this context. The other thought forms have more to offer,
each in its own way. After this interlude we are ready to see all five forms
fully at work, each where it can serve most.
Matching the form of thought to the structure

of the problem
Development of children’s natural epistemology

When one reads about the various stages of development of epistemic
competence (e.g., King and Kitchener 1994; Kohlberg’s 1984, pp. 432–
6 summary of Perry’s work), one might get the (mistaken) impression
that at a given stage, the mental tools, the epistemic approach character-
istic of that stage is applied globally, no matter what the logical structure
of the problem may be. This monograph contends, rather, that for op-
timal results, the particular thought form (with its inbuilt logic) used to
reason about a given problem should match that problem’s structure (cf.
Wood 1983). This matching may succeed more or less well, depending
on the person’s developmental stage, but that variation in itself is not an
argument against the principle of matching the ‘right’ thought form to
the structure of the problem about which one is thinking. In other words,
irrespective of the approach used most often at a given age/developmental
level, several approaches should be available, and the most appropriate
used in a given case. Thus, the thrust of this section is to argue for a
person’s development and targeted use of a variety of thought forms over
against cultivating one or perhaps two, and ‘adapting’ them pragmatically
if forced by ‘reality’.
Are there any empirical grounds for the possibility of implementing
such a stipulation? Annick Mansfield and Blythe Clinchy (e.g., 1985)
reported several studies on the development of children’s natural episte-
mology. The tasks assigned to children in these studies were to decide (1)
whether a particular item floats or sinks (verifiable fact), (2) whether a
dog can understand human language or not (debatable fact), (3) whether
a new boy is ‘yucky’ or nice (interpretation), (4) whether a new food tastes
good or not (personal taste). These researchers found that (a) young chil-
dren (age 3 to 4 years) exhibited an absolutist epistemology (one with no
concept of subjectivity), (b) children aged 7–10 years displayed a dichoto-
mous epistemology (one able to differentiate between objective fact and
subjective opinion), (c) adolescents and young adults evidenced an inte-
grated epistemology (one in which subjectivity plays a role even in matters
of ‘fact’, and in which inferential knowledge and expertise can be brought

to bear even on matters of taste) – note the implicit development of RCR
when going from (a) to (b) to (c). The young children relied mostly on
their own experience or on ‘reason’ (= trial) to justify their judgement.
In middle childhood, children still relied prominently upon personal ex-
perience, but they offered subjective justifications for their judgements
regarding issues 3 and 4 (interpretation and personal taste) and appealed to
outside authority to judge the correct answer to issue 2 (debatable fact).
College students invoked personal experience and subjectivity in much
the same way as the 10-year-olds did. Unlike the children, however, they
referred more often to outside authority regarding both verifiable and
debatable facts, as well as matters of taste.
Thus, at least one series of studies demonstrate that children aged 7
and up discriminate between different issues/problems as regards (a) the
possibility of a consensual ‘true’ statement vs. a personal opinion, and
(b) the optimal way to reach such a consensual statement. To cite an
example from an RCR interview with a 9-year-old girl (‘On the wall before
us we see two paintings. Can we argue which is more beautiful?’): ‘Not
really, that is a matter of personal taste. But we can argue as to whether
either picture is damaged or not.’ As this example also demonstrates,
children already have a sense at that age for matching their approach to
‘reasoning’ about a problem to the problem structure, at least in certain
cases.
Five examples of matching the thought form to the problem

The problems
To exemplify and concretise the issue of this section – matching the
thought form to the structure(s) of the problem at hand – we will analyse
five problems, which look more or less alike, but whose solutions involve
different logics (= principles or rules governing the proper use of rea-
soning, cf. ch. 1, pp. 15–16). These logics are embedded in five thought
forms, the fifth being RCR.
The first problem poses the question, what determines the frequency
of a pendulum’s oscillations: (a) the weight of the pendulum, (b) the
amplitude (range) of the oscillation (whether originating from releasing
the displaced pendulum from varying heights or giving it a more or less
strong push from the resting position), (c) the length of the suspension,
or (d) something else?
The second problem involves a scenario: a woman’s husband is an
alcoholic. He has recently returned home from a clinic after a second
attempt at curing his alcoholism. His wife tells him, ‘The first treatment
had no effect. If you come home drunk one more time, I’m going to leave
you!’ He then comes home drunk. What will the wife do?
In the third problem’s scenario, a trade union demands a 6 per cent
wage increase, arguing that higher wages will spur greater consumption,
thereby creating new jobs and driving down unemployment. The employ-
ers respond by offering the union a wage increase of 2 per cent. The em-
ployers argue that increased consumption will only lead to higher levels of
imports, while higher wages will make exports less competitive, so that as
an overall effect no net decrease in unemployment will be achieved. They
claim that only by producing marketable, competitively priced products
and services will they be able to hire additional workers. Does this mean
a stalemate? Or is there a way to negotiate between these two positions?
The fourth problem involves a teacher who wants to assist students
with learning about the functions of flower stems. With that aim in mind,
she invites the students to compare the flower stem to a drinking straw.
The question is, why could that be helpful to the students?
In the fifth problem’s scenario (already introduced in chapter 1), a
TV news station reports on an accident in a nuclear power station. The
main cooling pump had stopped working, and the back-up pump did
not function. The emergency shutdown did not function either. To add
to the difficulties, the operating crew became aware of the danger rather
late and then underestimated it. The water temperature suddenly rose.
A steam pipe cracked and leaked radioactive steam. What or who is to
blame? What should be done to avoid another such accident in the future?
In each case, one is being asked to find a solution to the problem
presented, a process that involves analysing, possibly experimenting, rea-
soning, judging, and drawing conclusions. But there are important differ-
ences between the structures of the five problems, and therefore different
thought forms have to be applied for best results.
The Piagetian task

The first task is of a physico-mathematical nature. One expects a single,
clear-cut solution, which can be expressed in the form of an equation for
the frequency of the pendulum. One might find this equation inductively
by a method based upon experimentation, making many precision mea-
surements of pendulum oscillation frequencies under widely differing,
strictly controlled conditions which are varied singly, each in turn. One
would then infer from the experimental data the answer to the problem,
that is to say, the best possible relation between the independent vari-
able(s) and the frequency of the pendulum’s oscillation. Formal binary
logic is helpful, even indispensable (Inhelder and Piaget [1955], 1958,
pp. 67–79), in reaching this solution (cf. ch. 4, p. 61; ch. 5, p. 82).
The cognitively complex problem

If one attempted to apply the same kind of logic to the second problem,
i.e., to infer from the ‘data’ – here the wife’s statement – what is the
most likely conclusion, the answer clearly would be, ‘The wife will leave
her husband.’ After all, she has told him that if he came home drunk
one more time, she would leave him; he has done so and thus, she must
leave, at least according to the classical logic of conditionals. But when we
presented this problem to participants in our interviews, only a 9-year-old
boy gave that categorical a response. By contrast, an 11-year-old girl said,
‘Maybe she was just menacing.’ And we might predict that an experienced
social worker would want to know much more before hazarding a guess
about the wife’s behaviour, if he or she were willing to guess at all. The
social worker might ask such questions as, ‘Was this the first time she had
threatened to leave?’; ‘Did she really mean it or was this a self-protective
move that would allow her to say to herself, “I tried. I did the best that I
could”?’; ‘What is her relationship with her husband really like?’; ‘Was her
father perhaps an alcoholic?’; ‘Do she and her husband have children?’; ‘If
so, how does the father treat them when he is drunk?’; ‘What alternatives
to living with her husband are actually viable for her?’; ‘Could she earn a
living?’; ‘Does she have friends and relatives who support her?’
Clearly, one could posit at best a probable outcome given an intimate
knowledge of the family concerned and a rich personal experience of
human life. Piagetian formal operations would hardly help one to solve
this problem, because the wife’s attitude does not appear unambiguous;
that is, it does not appear to carry a time-independent ‘truth’ value. Nor
is the wife’s attitude, presumably, fully reversible. Therefore no simple,
straightforward cause–effect relationship exists comparable to what ob-
tains in the pendulum case. The social worker’s questions differentiate
between several possible causes and motives, weighing the ‘data’ from a
number of perspectives. In short, solving problem no. 2 requires one to
differentiate between various aspects of the problem and to integrate the
partial results. Cognitively complex thinking (and experience of human
life) is called for, not applying formal binary logic.
The dialectical problem

As regards problem no. 3, the negotiation between a trade union and the
employer(s), everyday ‘real world’ experience teaches one that in the end,
unions and employers usually achieve some sort of resolution, stalemates
between the two sides do not extend ad infinitum. The resolution is often
unpredictable, however. At least, one cannot predict it with precision.
One reason for this lies in the multitude of variables and the diversity of
influences that co-determine any outcome. Another reason lies in the fact
that intermediate steps in the process of negotiation are often irreversible

steps that change the ‘givens’ or ‘data’. Indeed, the eventual solution may
well emerge out of a series of provisional iterations, possibly influenced by
strike action, pressure of public opinion, government intervention, etc. In
order to ‘solve’ this problem, both negotiating parties must understand
the dynamics of the process, its dialectics. And one salient feature that
distinguishes dialectical logic from formal binary logic is that ‘a negation
of a negation does not lead back to the original position/situation (as in
the case of formal binary logic), but to something new’.
The analogical problem

What kind of logic is involved in problem no. 4, learning about the flower
stem? Evidently, the teacher wants to ground the children’s thinking ini-
tially in something that they know from their daily life, a drinking straw.
When students begin to compare the shapes of the stem and the straw,
they will presumably notice the straightness of both and perhaps also the
fact that both are hollow. Noting these shared traits might lead them to
recognise that both serve to transport a liquid. Pushing the comparison
further, the students might even venture to surmise that the stem serves
to convey nourishment to the flower, as a straw conveys nourishment to
a human being.
Seeking out differences, the students might note the difference in ma-
terial, in the stem’s status as (no longer) alive vs. the (synthetic) straw’s
status as never alive, and in the stem’s quality of being an integral part
of a plant vs. the straw being an independent artefact being used as an
implement, or again in the stem holding itself up vs. the straw being held
by a person. Thus far, this type of reasoning has shown little use of formal
binary logic. Such a logic may nevertheless come into play when students
undertake an independent study of the stem either to confirm or reject
the clues gleaned from analogical thinking. However, the reflective ana-
logical thinking proper relies upon its own form of logic, which involves
looking for potential analogues and then judging whether clear, strong
and plentiful functional commonalities exist that make a given analogue
useful and persuasive.
The RCR problem

Finally, we come to problem no. 5, the accident at the nuclear power plant.
A ‘solution’ was already presented in chapter 1. So let us see whether an-
other form of thought could have done better than RCR. This problem
resembles the pendulum task in terms of considering the relative im-
portance of three variables: what are the contributions of (a) the plant
behaviour, (b) the actions of the operators, and (c) the operators’ group
dynamics to the final outcome? Indeed, in principle one can formulate hy-
potheses regarding both problems no. 1 and no. 5 and can then test them
until one arrives at a satisfactory answer. But the differences between the
two problems immediately surface: (i) the study of the pendulum can be
repeated ad infinitum using the same pendulum, which is not true in the
case of the power plant; (ii) the pendulum variables can be varied one by
one at will, whereas a simulation of the power plant accident can hardly
be expected to reproduce the original event, let alone to permit variation
of the variables step by step; (iii) physics alone is involved in the pen-
dulum task, while the power plant task also involves human behaviour;
(iv) in the pendulum task the three potential variables are separable, inde-
pendent of each other, whereas in the plant accident at least some of the
variables are inseparable. Thus, while some components of Piagetian op-
erations clearly apply to problem no. 5 (such as constructing a hypothesis
in possibility space), once again formal binary logic does not.
Might one take a cue from problem no. 2, the story of the alcoholic
and his wife? Both problems no. 2 and no. 5 involve human beings. The
differences are that (a) problem 5’s outcome is already known, while
one must speculate about the wife’s decision in problem 2; (b) the hu-
man beings working at the power plant are trained professionals doing
their job, not a wife involved in a personal relationship with its problems;
(c) problem 5’s outcome is co-determined by the plant’s behaviour, while
problem 2 involves only human behaviour. Nevertheless, one might rea-
sonably expect some components of cognitively complex thinking to play
a role in the solution of problem no. 5.
Might one consider the problem-solving process of no. 3, the wage
negotiation, as being of any help? Both problems 3 and 5 have in common
that (a) the situation at the end is different from the situation at the
beginning; and (b) the ‘actors’ involved are somehow linked together;
they react to what is happening before their eyes – and which may well not
be anticipated. As to differences, (i) the power plant has less ‘freedom of
manoeuvre’ than do problem 3’s negotiating parties, and (ii) the outcome
of problem 5 is possibly even further from anyone’s expectations than is
the outcome of problem 3’s negotiation. Nevertheless, one might expect
to find some elements of dialectical thinking involved in finding a solution
to problem 5.
What might problem 4’s analogical thinking contribute to answering
problem no. 5? Both problem 4’s plant and problem 5’s operating crew
age and eventually ‘die’. Both need ‘nourishment’ and ‘maintenance
care’. There are clear differences, however, including (a) non-living vs.
living entities; (b) ‘behaviour’ that is narrowly bound by natural laws
vs. behaviour that allows for some free choice; (c) non-emotional (plant)
‘behaviour’ vs. potentially emotional (human) behaviour, and (d) morally

neutral (plant) ‘behaviour’ vs. legally and morally responsible (human)
behaviour, to name a few. Analogical considerations (‘what are common-
alities and differences?’) are helpful when battling to answer the ques-
tions posed by problem no. 5, but of themselves will not fully answer the
questions. Nevertheless, elements of analogical thinking might help one
methodically when seeking answers to the questions raised by problem
no. 5.
Concluding remarks
Closing this section, I hope to have demonstrated that a single thought
form cannot solve optimally problems that have such different structures
as nos. 1–5. Rather, problem 1 was best solved by Piagetian logico-
mathematical thinking, problem 2 by cognitively complex thought, prob-
lem 3 required dialectical thinking, problem 4 needed analogical thinking,
and problem 5 was optimally solved by RCR. On the assumption that
these results can be generalised, the application of RCR, the RCR heuris-
tic is presented and multiply illustrated in Part II of this monograph.
Summary of other thought forms and matching them

to the problem at hand
This chapter consists of two distinct, yet related main sections. Both have
to do with Piagetian thinking, cognitively complex thinking, dialectical
thinking, analogical thinking, and, in a different way, with RCR. In the
first section, the characteristics of the first four forms of thought were
compared to and contrasted with RCR. The main difference was found
to be at the level of logic. In the second section five differing (unique-
solution) tasks/(ill-defined) problems were used to demonstrate matching
the thought form to the problem structure.
Part II
Applications of RCR
101
Overview
The natu re of the variou s chapters of Part II is diverse. Chapter 6 il-
lu strates the application of RCR, first pu rely formally, and then tow ays
of relating science and religion/theology, thereby highlighting, among other
things, the symbolic meaning of the cover pictu re. Chapter 7 reports
mainly empirical stu dies in the area of religion/theology. Chapter 8 en-
deavou rs to u nearth u se of RCR at earlier times invariou s su bject do-
mains (Christian doctrine, painting, psychology, poetry, literatu re,
physics). From chapter 9 onward, considerations become yet more spec-
u lative. Each time, I attempt to apply RCR to a given issu e (in psycho-
logy, edu cation, nu clear energy, illegal u se of narcotics, rehabilitation of
depressed areas), and then I discu ss the cu rrent state of the (pu blic) dis-
cu ssion of that issu e against the backgrou nd of RCR desiderata, and draw
some conclu sions. Readers who are mainly after robu st evidence for RCR
will have seen what I have to offer by the end of chapter 7; they may want
to go from chapter 8 or even from chapter 7 immediately to chapter 12,
the conclu sions. Nevertheless, I hope to have provided su fficient circu m-
stantial evidence and argu mentative plau sibility in chapters 8 to 11 to
make their reading worthwhile.
6 Methodology
Method for applying RCR

This chapter aims to demonstrate how RCR can be used to gain a deeper
understanding of a (controversial) complex issue, the ‘explanandum’
which is subject to rivalling descriptions, explanations, models, theories,
and/or interpretations.
At first blush, applying RCR, the RCR search heuristic, may be some-
what hard to understand. I first present it formally, as a series of eight
abstract steps. Readers who prefer to see immediately each step applied
to a concrete case may want to turn to page 104 after reading the next
paragraph.
Before going into the actual procedure, a word needs to be said about
the explanandum. Basically, there are two cases: (i) it is a given (e.g., the
nature of light, taking remedial action after a nuclear accident) or (ii) it
needs to be determined (e.g., when entering a ‘new’ field such as science
and religion/theology – to be dealt with momentarily). In the latter case,
the explanandum has to be ‘cut out’ such that it contains the ‘control
centre(s)’ (Reich 1995b). For instance, if one wants to improve the un-
derstanding of blood circulation in vertebrae, it is not sufficient to con-
sider the heart and the vascular system; one needs to include equally
the relevant parts of the nervous system. Delimiting a coherent functional
whole as explanandum implies that one can envisage with some confi-
dence developing its overarching theory in the (distant) future, even if it
is (by far) not clear at present what it will look like (e.g., mind and brain).
Going through the sequence of the first seven steps represents what I
call the RCR heuristic. Whereas applying RCR ‘tacitly’ may already be
quite helpful, its full potential becomes fruitful when the RCR heuristic
is applied systematically.
Here are the complete eight steps (Reich 1990b, 1990d):
(1) clarifying and defining, at least tentatively, the entity, the phe-
nomenon, the event, the functionally coherent whole which constitutes
the explanandum;
103
104 Applications of RCR
(2) listing all descriptions/explanations/models/theories/interpretations

A, B, C . . . of the explanandum, even if they are considered incompatible
or incommensurable by the ambient culture, possibly adding new ones,
and dealing with any conflicts and contradictions arising (which may
mean throwing out either A or B or C – it is possibly not a case for
RCR) (mastering different logics and means-reflecting thought, cf. ch. 2,
pp. 29–32, is particularly important for dealing with this step);
(3) ascertaining that A, B, C . . . are genuinely coextensive, that they
refer to the identical explanandum;
(4) establishing the circumstances, the context, under which A, B,
C . . . describe or explain particular aspects of the explanandum, and, if
a genuine understanding does not come forth, reconsidering A (B, C . . . )
as approximation only;
(5) discovering and describing any (including unexpected) links be-
tween the respective attributes/features of A, B, C . . . , as well as any
coinherences (mutual pointers);
(6) exploring the extent to which the (relative) explanatory power of A
(B, C . . . ) depends on the current strength of B (A, C . . . ), etc.;
(7) developing a complete synopsis or theory that explains all features
of the explanandum under differing contextual conditions;
(8) explaining any shifts in the meaning of the concepts needed to
explain the explanandum, A, B, C . . . , and the new synopsis or theory.
Demonstration of a particular search

To clarify the heuristic indicated, the example chosen is ‘ways of relating
science (A) and religion/theology (B)’. Before doing this step by step, pro-
ceeding from (1) to (8) above, some background knowledge is required.
Background knowledge about science and religion/theology

In the Middle Ages science and religion/theology were in consonance,
for instance in the writings of Thomas Aquinas. Along with the growing
success of inductive science (e.g., Galileo’s works), that consonance grad-
ually weakened from the Renaissance onward, the split between science
and theology widened in the eighteenth century with the advent of the
philosophy of the Enlightenment (e.g., Voltaire’s writings), and became
even more marked with the ascent of (first Comtean and then Logical)
Positivism (e.g., Haeckel’s materialistic monism). Given the recently
changed philosophy of knowledge discussed in chapter 3 (pp. 35–7),
and the partial dissatisfaction with science and technology on account
Methodology 105
of its danger for the environment and potentially for human health, the
intellectual climate concerned has somewhat ‘warmed up’ during the
latter part of the twentieth century: here and there a dialogue between
science and religion/theology has been rekindled (e.g., Byers 2000; Grenz
2000; John Templeton Foundation 1996; Numrich and Numrich 2000;
Polkinghorne 1996; Richardson and Wildman 1996; Southgate, Deane-
Drummond, and Murray 1999). Nevertheless, the clash between
creation/intelligent design scientists on the one hand, and evolutionists
(Darwinians) on the other, persists.1 Also to be noted: besides Christian-
ity, other religions join the discussion (Stannard 2000), for instance Islam
(e.g., Golshani 2001) and Buddhism (e.g., Ricard and Thuan 2000). The
topic under discussion therefore remains of actual interest.
Ian Barbour (1990, p. 3), professor of science, technology and society,
in his Gifford lecture at Aberdeen in 1989, stated the following:
1 The following Internet news brief of Saturday, 13 May 2000 (copyright Chicago Sun-
Times Inc.), titled ‘Intelligent Design meets Congressional Designers’ (courtesy of Davis
Wald at Caltech) illustrates the latter statement:
On May 10th, a House Judiciary Committee hearing room was the site of a three-hour
briefing on palaeontology, biology, and cosmology. Although presentations were at times
quite technical, the speakers were not there to discuss the latest research in these fields.
They were on Capitol Hill to promote intelligent design (ID) theory, to debunk Darwinian
evolutionary theory, and to expose the negative social impact of Darwinism.
Entitled ‘Scientific Evidence of Intelligent Design and its Implications for Public Policy
and Education’, the briefing was sponsored by the Discovery Institute, a Seattle-based
think tank (http://www.discovery.org), and its Center for the Renewal of Science and
Culture. The afternoon briefing was preceded by a private luncheon in the US Capitol
for Members of Congress and was followed by an evening reception. . . . Main speakers
were biology professor Michael Behe, philosophy professor Stephen Meyer, Discovery
Institute Fellow Nancy Pearcey, and law professor Philipp Johnson.
Until now, the creation–evolution debate has primarily been active at the state and local
level, but this event may represent the start of a new effort to involve Congress in efforts to
oppose the teaching of evolution. Whether by chance or by design, the briefing took place
as the Senate entered its second week of debate on overhauling federal K-12 education
programs. Both houses are expected to work throughout the summer on reauthorization
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act.
N.B. (K. H. R.): The Kansas Board of Education members explicitly cited Behe’s book
on Intelligent Design as influencing their decision of August 1999 no longer to require
examinations about Darwinian evolution. (A newly elected Board revised that decision in
February 2001.) Intelligent design has been critiqued by the numerous authors presented
on the (continuously updated) website http://www.world-of-dawkins.com/box/behe.htm.
Competition and debates are good for science, and in the long run ‘nature’ will show
who ‘is right’. My objection to ID ‘theory’ is not primarily to this conceptualisation per se,
but to its misuse (although not necessarily by the authors) as an argument for preventing
students forming their own judgement about the evolution of human beings and related
issues (cf. Working Group on Teaching Evolution, [US] National Academy of Sciences
1998). And then there is a possible effect on the public school system if parents disagree
to the point of turning to private schools or to home schooling.
The first major challenge to religion in an age of science is the success of the
method of science. Science seems to provide the only reliable path to knowledge.
Many people view science as objective, universal, rational, and based on solid
observational evidence.2 Religion, by contrast, seems to be subjective, parochial,
emotional, and based on traditions and authorities that disagree with each other.
Barbour groups the current options for viewing the relation between
the two fields as (a) conflict, (b) independence, (c) dialogue, and
(d) integration. I shall use these categories as a standard3 for a com-
parison with the result of applying RCR to the issue at hand.
Irreconcilable conflict arises from the side of science through the claim
that the ‘scientific method’ is the only reliable path to genuine knowledge
(e.g., Jacques Monod, Carl Sagan),4 religion being declared as poetry or
something similar, and from the side of religion especially by biblical lit-
eralists who hold that the overriding statements from scripture about the
natural world (in particular its creation) are incompatible with the claims
of modern science, notably those of evolutionists. In the Scopes trial in
2 However, as V. V. Raman remarked in an Internet discussion: in cosmogonic/cosmological
matters, science uses some non-observables that cannot be related to observables in a well-
defined way. ‘Worm-holes’, Hawking’s imaginary time, certain constructs in string and
superstring theories, belong to this category. They have interest and relevance largely in
their mathematical consistency, and relate only in very round-about and indirect ways to
observable features of the world.
3 While other classifications exist (Reich 1996c), Barbour’s is quoted and used widely.
4 Persons holding such a view not infrequently also refuse to consider the possibility that
there might be something to parapsychology, or that another logic than formal binary
logic might be admissible (e.g., Breuer and Springer 2000 – see note 2 p. 117), let alone
preferable in a particular case. There are indeed various ways to respond to ‘anomalous
data’ (Chinn and Brewer 1992), some more fruitful than others.
In the interest of authenticity, let me quote Paul Harrison, a religious naturalist
(http://members.aol.com/Heraklit1/index.htm) from a recent Internet exchange: ‘In
short, there is no limit to the religious assertions, however wild, that cannot be dis-
proved. In fact it is much harder to think of ones that can be disproved. In view of this it
seems preferable to adopt a “no benefit of the doubt” principle. If someone asserts that
something exists or has happened, or is happening, or will happen, which is outside of all
common or thoroughly documented human experience and of science, and which neither
I nor anyone else on earth has any possible means of disproving, then it is reasonable to
place the entire onus on those who make these assertions to prove them with the rigorous
evidence that the religious naturalist (as well as atheists and humanists and other scep-
tically minded folk) will demand. Until they do so it is reasonable to assume that these
assertions are false until proved correct.’ My question was, ‘Why should the other side
accept those standards of “rigorous evidence”?’ Harrison answered, ‘The standards are
those that the naturalist applies to her/his own reasoning before she/he will believe some-
thing that is prima facie incredible. We know that faith-based believers do not and mostly
will not adopt these standards, but we would hope they would accept our right to apply
them in deciding on our own beliefs. Of course, we might (and often do) believe the world
might be a better place if everyone applied more rigorous standards of evidence before
believing things, and we would argue this point in public, just as faith-based believers
argue for faith.’ (Cf. note 6, p. 38; and note 6, p. 108 for a contrasting view.)
Methodology 107
1925 at Dayton, Tennessee (e.g., Larson 1997), the view of biblical literal-
ists (written into a Tennessee law) was upheld (and John T. Scopes, a high
school teacher, found guilty for not having observed that law by teaching
the theory of evolution, was fined a sum of $100, and subsequently had
to leave his teaching post), but the Tennessee law was disregarded after
1968 when the US Federal Supreme Court ruled that a similar Arkansas
law was unconstitutional because contrary to the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the US Constitution. All the same, the battle for parallel
teaching of both ‘scientific creationism’ and ‘(neo-)Darwinian evolution’
continued until the Supreme Court ruled again in 1987 that creationism
is a religious idea that cannot be mandated in public education (but see
note 1, p. 105). Barbour (1990, pp. 4–10) presents in extenso the argu-
ments of both scientific materialism and biblical literalism. His conclusion
is – and I fully agree – that each oversteps the proper boundaries of their
discipline: science in the direction of natural philosophy and metaphysics,
biblical literalism by making undue scientific claims (ibid., p. 3). Basically,
conflict may mean that only A or only B is recognised as being true.
Independence implies that science and religion/theology concern differ-
ent domains (explaining objective, public, repeatable data vs. experiences
of inner life such as guilt and forgiveness, meaninglessness and whole-
ness) and have different languages (scientific language used for prediction
and control vs. religious language used for recommending a way of life,
eliciting a set of attitudes – ibid., pp. 10–16). Taking an independence po-
sition avoids conflict, but (a potentially fruitful) dialogue is also ruled
out. The other position is acknowledged (perhaps only grudgingly) as
existing, but there is no real desire to know more about it.
Dialogue implies that the methods in science and religion/theology have
something in common (e.g., interpretation of the ‘data’5 and commitment
5 The methods used for collecting ‘data’ differ though (Reich 1995c, pp. 394–5). Scientific
standards require (a) the complete and precise indication of the conditions under which
an experiment/experience occurred, (b) willed repeatability, (c) testability by any (com-
petent) third person, (d) generalisable significance. Theologians, apart from pointing out
that such standards are inapplicable to contemplative, aesthetic, and similar experiences,
explain that (a) to (d) are inappropriately maximised requirements as far as religious ex-
periences are concerned (cf. Watts and Williams 1988, especially ch. 9). However, weaker
forms are maintained. In particular, appropriate testimony of witnesses from both ear-
lier and present times is considered epistemologically adequate as justification for the
veridicality of ‘data’, even if not everybody has had or will in all likelihood ever have
the witnesses’ experiences. Religious learning from experience is based less on the ro-
bustness of single facts and more on an ensemble of experiences, accumulated across
situations and events with time. This poses the question of an ‘absolute’ third-person
versus a ‘restricted’ third-person ontology on the one hand, and a third-person ontology
vs. a first-person ontology on the other. How many witnesses and with which character-
istics are needed to turn their witnessing into credible evidence? Among other things, the
of the practitioner), and there are some overlapping claims about reality
(e.g., about the world’s origin) (ibid., pp. 16–23).6 Many of the more
recent contacts between the protagonists of the two fields involved a dia-
logue position with the hope of benefiting theology, but also science.7
answer probably also depends on the knowledge domain under discussion (cf. note 6,
p. 38).
6 Argyris, Putnam, and McLain-Smith (1985, p. 238) indicate the following conditions for
a fruitful dialogue (especially between participants tending to be defensive): ‘Participants
must be able to retrieve largely tacit inferential processes; they must be able to deal openly
with challenges and conflicting views; they must reveal information that might expose their
own and others’ vulnerabilities; they must be able to recognise and acknowledge when
they are wrong; and they must feel free to choose among competing views.’ To which I
would only add at the end, ‘where appropriate’ (cf. notes 13, p. 24, and 16, p. 113), and
also that participants should strive to understand why the other persons hold the views
they hold, why they consider them justified. The debate reported by Breuer and Springer
(2000) shows that non-observance of these conditions nevertheless can bring out the
characteristics of the respective positions (and their weak points), but the example due to
Paloutzian (2000) of (multiple) dialogues in which they are observed shows in addition
how fruitful such dialogues can be.
7 To quote Ric Barr, an Internet discussion partner who expressed rather well my own
view: ‘Philosophically, one can see and be convinced of the reality of a broad, universal
purpose which gives meaning and direction to life and maintain that this meaning will
not and cannot be found within the limited constraints of knowing characterised by the
scientific method. Personally, I use the image of a supernatural God (as a being who
can hear, feel, respond) as an imaginative construct to provide a working model for
my spirituality, knowing full well that my image of a “supernatural God” does not do
justice to what I perceive intuitively as the profound ground of the universe, which I call
God. This image/idea enables me to pray, to give praise and thanks, to affirm value and
to understand suffering in a way not possible (at least for me) through an impersonal
view of the universe. This view is compatible with science but certainly not provable
by it. I do not like the term “supernatural” much because it implies a certain amount
of arbitrariness in the way “God acts” . . . God is the same God everywhere or he/she
is not God. I therefore like terms like Tillich’s “Being itself” or Weiman’s “Source of
Human Good” [or Brahman for Hindus]. My image of God is grounded and immanent
with the natural world, though not fully contained by it (I am not a pantheist). I am
not a creationist though I do believe that the universe is best explained by a mind-like
intelligence from which all the possibilities which we see derive. I am not a deist because
I believe that this source is still present, actively sustaining the universe in being. It is
this reality which (most?) practising Christians, Muslims, Jews, Hinduists [and others]
worship and in which we have our trust. I part company with many of my fellow Christians
in that I have no issue what-so-ever with evolution, the big bang, and the full reliance of
the human self on its physical/chemical/biological substrate.’
And I can also share V. V. Raman’s (forthcoming) Internet response: ‘When I see a
fragrant flower and admire its beauty, when I pick up a shell from the sea shore and
marvel at its pleasing symmetry, or when I read about the tardy tortoises on Galapagos,
and am intrigued about how all these came to be, I tell my biologist friend about my
wonderment, and she explains to me in fascinating detail how we can make sense out
of the apparent biodiversity that is splashed all over the planet. When I see the diamond
sparkle and the multicoloured rainbow arch the sky, when I see the silent stars up on high
and observe dry sheets of plastic stick to my clothes, I recall the patterns and principles
of physics from which emerge all the magnificence in the range and variety of perceived
reality. I am grateful to science for these insights and enlightenment. But in all of this I
also experience a mystery that is beyond my intellectual grasp. It is like the pleasures of
poetry, the joy of music, and the ecstasy of meditative merger with the world at large.’
Methodology 109
There is now a wish to learn more about the ‘other side’, and perhaps
also to contribute to its progress.
Barbour’s integration comes in three versions. (i) In natural theology8 it
is claimed that the existence of God can be inferred from the evidences
of design in nature.9 (ii) A theology of nature draws on sources outside
the sciences, but takes scientific findings into account. (iii) In a system-
atic synthesis (e.g., the process theology of Birch and Cobb), both science
and religion/theology contribute to the development of an inclusive meta-
physics (ibid., pp. 23–30). The danger with integration is that either scien-
tific or religious ideas are distorted to fit a preconceived schema claimed
to encompass all of reality.
What can one say about Barbour’s classification (apart from admiring
its impressive scope) when looking at it from a RCR perspective? First,
the question arises as to the explanandum. If it is taken as knowledge and
insights by humans situated in the bio-physical world and being part of
human society with its history, social relations, and culture, a first ob-
servation is the ‘static’, time-invariant nature of almost all of Barbour’s
categories and sub-categories (cf. Reich 1996c). (The explicit exception is
process theology in the category integration.) Set-theoretical considerations
of categories are therefore applicable. Referring to Fig. 5.1 (p. 79), one
sees that conflict is represented by diagram no. 2 (where B may become
8 V. V. Raman provides a sense of natural theology in an Internet posting ‘When there is
a sudden spewing of matter or passion, of disease or destruction, there is an eruption.
Volcanoes erupt, as do anger and fury and an epidemic of plague. When something
appears, and retains its entity in form and substance, there is emergence. A flower emerges
and so does a sonnet or a work of art. But when what emerges is governed by law and
principle, and it evolves too, we have creation: the launching of something that never
existed before and that does not remain the same. From this perspective, and in this
terminology, the big bang was not a mere eruption, nor the universe a mere emergence:
the cosmos was created. What is created has an existence of its own. More importantly,
others things appear from it: it too creates. The theologian Phil Hefner (1993) speaks of
human beings as co-creators, for we create: ideas and things, values and works of art, and
much more.
‘I would like to extend this insight: We may look upon ourselves as conscious co-creators.
For it would seem that there are unconscious and semiconscious co-creators too. The
matter and energy that were created from the big bang were unconscious co-creators,
for they led to atoms and molecules, to elements and compounds, to planets and stars:
each a created entity in its own right. And when the self-replicating macro-molecules of
life arose, another level of co-creation arose: for evolution is a creative process too. This
biological evolution is different from the unconscious formation of atoms and stars, and
it may be described as semiconscious co-creation, for there is a fine difference between
crystal growth and cell-division. Finally, with the onset of mind, creation leaps, as it were,
to a higher level: the level of self-awareness. The creation from now on is conscious, and
what is created is not just machines and bridges, but ideas and ideals, values and morals.
This constitutes what may well be called conscious co-creation. Such a perspective can
be part of natural theology.’
9 It is not quite clear why natural theology thus defined is classed as integration, given that
only one source is indicated.
unimportant, even vanishing in the eyes of A and vice versa), independence

by no. 4, dialogue by no. 3, and integration by no. 1. This being all the log-
ical possibilities according to formal binary logic, Barbour’s classification
is exhaustive within that framework.
A second (arguable) observation is that at first blush conflict could be
interpreted as an expression of (the descriptive, not normative) RCR level
I, independence as that of level II, dialogue as implying RCR levels III or IV,
and integration as an expression of level V. On second thoughts, the step
from level II to level III is not just developmental; it may well require a
(conscious) decision and commitment. It is difficult in today’s world to
ignore totally either science or religion and their workings, and therefore
one can understand the reason for making the mental step from conflict to
independence. However, even somebody capable of arguing intellectually
at level V of RCR may still prefer to stay with independence for his or her
own good reasons.10 Further observations will emerge when applying
RCR to science and religion/theology.
10 In case a reader finds this second observation absurd, consider Kohlberg’s (1984) stages
of moral cognition. There figures not simply one single argumentation, justification and
motivation with respect to acting morally but a variety, depending especially on the levels
of ‘ego-centredness’ of social cognition: a person at stage 1 of moral judgement is egoisti-
cally motivated, which involves arguments of external rewards and punishments. Stage 2
implies an enlightened egoism. Stage 3 is based on being accepted by one’s immediate
social circle as moral reason and motivational factor. Stage 4 enlarges that circle to one’s
own society. Stage 5 is characterised by a philosophy favouring the greatest good for the
greatest number (social contract). Now, I am aware that moral cognition is not the same
as assessing the relation of science and religion/theology. No society can survive without
some moral rules – they are a necessity. In contrast, assessing the relation of science and
religion/theology in a way is a luxury indulged in by a small number of enthusiasts (but
potentially a useful one, given the large numbers of religious believers the world over,
and the partly unhappy history of the relation of science and religion/theology). Also, I
do not ignore the criticism levelled against Kohlberg’s stages (mostly not really pertinent
here). However, moral judgement and assessing science-and-religion/theology both in-
volve cognition, and both deal with the relation between two entities (the individual and
society in the case of morality). As I attempt to show throughout this monograph, our
judgements and insights are not produced automatically from sense data and other in-
put, but (partly) (re)constructed according to our level of cognitive development (which
continues in adulthood). The parallelism between ‘science-and-religion/theology’ and
‘moral judgement’ goes even further. Just as persons refuse to proceed from indepen-
dence to dialogue for their own reasons, not all are willing to make the step from moral
stage 2 (an egoistic position) to stage 3 (acknowledging a person’s social embedded-
ness and hence justified arguments for a certain amount of ‘solidarity’), in particular
not Ayn Rand (1964) in her Virtue of selfishness. Kohlberg (1984, pp. 429–31) encoun-
tered a number of students who, at a particular point in their life, rejected the demands
of society and valued their unbridled self-fulfilment and self-development higher. One
college sophomore said, ‘[In high school] I was trying to please the norms of society,
and in essence, conforming to the prevailing thought about moral right. I was con-
cerned about other people and society in general when I was younger. Now I think more
of a moral responsibility to oneself. Self-concern takes precedence over morals’ (ibid.,
p. 444). A well-developed moral cognition was not in doubt, these students having argued
Methodology 111
Applying RCR to science and religion/theology

As it will turn out, this is not an ideal case for demonstrating RCR at
work per se. For one, it is too vast a case to be dealt with in any depth in
the present context. However, the overriding advantage is that Barbour’s
‘standard’ exists to which the result of applying RCR can be compared.
Also, the result can be checked against the results of the corresponding
empirical study presented in chapter 7. We proceed according to the eight
formal steps delineated above:
(1) (clarifying and defining, at least tentatively, the entity, the phe-
nomenon, the event, the functionally coherent whole which constitutes
the explanandum). The general procedure is to assume that the explanan-
dum is suitable for study by RCR, and then to find out whether that is
so by going through the next six steps. To begin with, ways of relating
science and religion/theology does not appear to be a proper explanandum,
because it is not a functionally coherent whole (Reich 1995b). There are
quite a few areas where science is of little or no concern to theology (e.g.,
inorganic chemistry) and vice versa; in other issues science supports re-
ligion/theology (e.g., by demonstrating the beneficial effects of religious
life11 – Gorsuch 1995); in yet others it weakens it (e.g., heliocentrism
versus medieval Christian teaching). Also, historically, the relation has
changed and still changes, as indicated earlier. Furthermore, there is not
just one theology, but a diversity, even in Christianity (Fulljames and
Stolberg 2000). As a consequence, the explanandum has to be more re-
stricted, better focused. The proposal is to concentrate on ‘Understand-
ing the origin of the universe, its changes until today, and the resulting
lessons for leading a human life’ (which is still simplifying considerably
the actual state of affairs, e.g., Reich 1995c).
previously at stage 4, but a corresponding commitment was lacking. In other words, cog-
nitive competence explains much, but not all. As further evidence for such a view, notice
the results of the relevant empirical study on science-and-religion/theology reported
in chapter 7 (pp. 126–9). From the present perspective, one explanation could be that
(some of ) the persons under discussion have reached the stage of reflecting about men-
tal tools (discussed in chapter 1, pp. 29–32), and from there question the validity of
(meta)ethical principles. Just to keep the record complete: later in life those former
‘self-concerned’ students returned to a stage 4 or even a stage 5 argumentation (ibid.,
pp. 430, 445).
11 To be fair, cases of unhealthy religions/sects need to be recognised too, e.g., collective
suicides/murders of persons belonging to new religious movements such as suffered
by the 909 members of the People’s Temple led by the Reverend Jim Jones (Guyana,
November 1978), by the several dozens of the members of the Order of the Solar Temple
led by Joseph Di Mambro and Luc Jouret (Canada, France, Switzerland, 1994/1995),
by the 39 members of the Heaven’s Gate led by Marshall Applewhite (California,
March 1997), and finally by hundreds of persons adhering to the Movement for the
Restoration of the Ten Commandments of God (the Doomsday sect – Uganda, March/
April 2000).
(2) (listing all descriptions/explanations/models/theories/interpreta-

tions A, B, C . . . of the explanandum). The following convention will be
used throughout this section (cf. Barbour 1990, p. 3): A = science (em-
pirical study of the order and patterns of nature); B = theology12 (crit-
ical reflection on the life and beliefs of the religious community); C =
philosophy (analysis of the characteristics of inquiry and knowledge as
well as analysis of the most general characteristics of reality). Regarding
the explanandum under discussion, A involves cosmogony and cosmo-
logy, neo-Darwinian evolution, and biological/sociological anthropology;
B refers to the theology of creation (in Christian terms, or to the equiv-
alent in other religions), to that of divine providence, and to theological
anthropology; C involves an analysis of methods admitted in A and B for
gathering, analysing, and interpreting evidence, a procedure for dealing
with (perceived) transcendent reality (e.g., Reich 2000b), and philosoph-
ical anthropology.
(3) (ascertaining that A, B, C . . . are genuinely coextensive, that they
refer to the identical explanandum). This is a much larger task than can be
tackled here. At first glance one might say that individually A, B, C will
not have something to say to each and every aspect of the explanandum.
That explanandum is clearly a weaker functional whole than, for instance,
a single human being. However, that is probably not strong enough a
reason to stop the application of RCR at this point.
(4) (establishing the circumstances, the context, under which A, B,
C . . . describe or explain particular aspects of the explanandum). Again,
this is a lengthy study in itself. The suspicion is that A will provide the
most relevant explanation of the actual changes of the universe and what
it contains from the big bang until today,13 B on the lessons to be drawn,
12 In which cases is it more appropriate to discuss science and religion, and in which
science and theology? There is no single, consensual answer. If religion is judged to be
motivational, experiential, and prescriptive, then (scientific) anthropology, psychology
and sociology are ‘immediate’ discussion partners. If theology is taken as descriptive, ex-
planatory, interpretative, then it is a more appropriate discussion partner for cosmology,
biology, and medicine than religion. However, it is also true that for science it is easier
to get a clear idea of the origin and the functioning of religion (authority, ritual, specu-
lation, tradition, God’s sovereignty and grace, mystery – Smith 1965, pp. 101–4) than
of theology. And, theology is not recognised by all religions as even existing. In any case,
the ‘best’ of religion/theology should be introduced into the science-religion/theology
debate, not some caricature (as unfortunately still happens).
13 David R. Burwasser wrote in an Internet discussion (cf. Reich 2000b): ‘Almost by defi-
nition, science should not be interested in anything more than its methodology and the
consistency of its results [cf. note 6, p. 38]. It ceases to be science if it becomes captive
to any social agenda, even a democratic or spiritual agenda. However, scientists need to
be concerned for human impact, but as the human beings under the lab coats. The two
must be kept separate just to preserve the integrity of both.’
Methodology 113
in particular regarding the inner life of humans14 (but will possibly also
contribute to the presuppositions of A and C), and C on the validity of the
‘truth’ claims of A and B, on the limits of their ‘legitimacy’, and possibly
on anthropology.
(5) (discovering and describing any (including unexpected) links be-
tween the respective attributes/features of A, B, C . . . , as well as any
coinherences). A furnishes B with detailed knowledge about the wonders
of the universe and all it contains so that B can go on from there. Histor-
ically, B has supplied A with a world view which made research possible
and attractive; if needed, B reminds A of its responsibility for the envi-
ronment and human welfare. C furnishes to A and B a base for a rational
discourse using consensual categories and procedures.
(6) (assessing the extent to which the (relative) explanatory power of
A (B, C . . . ) depends on the current strength of B (A, C . . . ), etc.). In
the present case, the clearest case is probably the dependence of C, but
also of B, on A (e.g., brain research). If B weakens, the lessons drawn by
A (and perhaps by C) may be too one-sided.15 If C were to drop out, the
quality of the dialogue might suffer.
(7) (developing a complete synopsis or theory that explains all features
of the explanandum under differing contextual conditions). Given the
difficulties evoked all along in this section, that task will take time.16
RCR proceeds by keeping A, B, C distinct, and iterating the sequel from
(1) to (7), feeding in each time any new insight gained.
(8) (explaining any shifts in the meaning of the concepts needed to
explain the reference, A, B, C . . . , and the new synopsis or theory). In
the present case there is no obvious candidate for meeting point (8). One
14 Religions/theologies may be classed as collectively evolved encyclopaedias of human
characteristics, actions, and events. Believers turn to the accumulated wisdom of a re-
ligious symbol system when they feel the need to get in touch with their deepest self
(cf. Hefner 1996). As Carol Albright has observed, ‘choices persons make about the
answers to “unprovable” questions may depend more than one would like to admit on
unconscious inclinations. The need to be independent or dependent, related or detached,
hopeful or resigned, affect (lay) theology. Nevertheless, cognitive checks and balances
are needed too, or at least by some persons’ (from an Internet posting).
15 Like other human enterprises, science has a tendency to establish, and even increase its
influence and power, sometimes in not very ethical ways (e.g., Toulouse 1998). While
others may and do oppose that tendency, religious believers/theologians carry their op-
positional share, in particular when it comes to protecting the environment, biodiversity,
and so on.
16 The 200-year struggle to get to a satisfactory theory of light, incorporating both the
light-as-corpuscle model and the light-as-wave model, was already evoked in note 13
(p. 24). Or take Darwin’s ‘theory’ of evolution. At the time neither Mendel’s laws nor
the role of DNA was known, let alone the detailed working of mutations. Hence, a really
informed debate about the respective roles of chance and necessity in evolution had to
wait for another century.
could possibly argue for writing science-and-theology(-and-philosophy)

in order to emphasise the links found.
To sum up the result: Science-and-theology(-and-philosophy) ‘jointly’
contribute to Understanding the origin of the universe, its changes until to-
day, and the resulting lessons for leading a human life. While each discipline
contributes something to most issues, science provides the most relevant
explanation of the actual changes of the universe and what it contains
from the big bang until today, theology (potentially) contributes most
to the lessons to be drawn, in particular regarding the inner life of hu-
mans (but possibly contributes also to the presuppositions of science and
philosophy), and philosophy is most knowledgeable about the validity of
the ‘truth’ claims of science and philosophy, on the limits of their ‘legiti-
macy’, and possibly on anthropology. While clearly distinct, on account
of certain links each discipline can benefit from the others for flourishing
optimally.
Actually, the foregoing result is more of a programme for further work
than a complete achievement. However, it is sufficiently different from
the above ‘standard’ due to Barbour (1990) to warrant a discussion. What
are the differences?
(a) The focus is narrowed. As already indicated, in an RCR approach,
the entire field is carved up into appropriate domains, and the exercise
repeated until the entire field is covered. It is not clear whether an overall
summary could then be made in the present case, but if so, it would be
more differentiated than the ‘standard’ classifications.
(b) Applying RCR results in a single (idealised) category, not four.
From a developmental point of view, it is assumed to be a description of
a stage which is likely to be reached more widely in the future, given the ex-
istence of exemplars (e.g., John Templeton Foundation 1996; Richardson
and Wildman 1996; Southgate, Deane-Drummond, and Murray 1999) –
but see the caveat of the second part of note 4, p. 106.
(c) The context dependence of the explanatory power of science, the-
ology, and philosophy is emphasised over against a universal context-
independent evaluation of their respective contributions/explanatory
power.
(d) The links between science, theology and philosophy are made
explicit.
(e) Overall, an attitude of mutual collaboration is fostered, given that
neither side can prove the other side ‘wrong’ as far as discipline-specific,
(peer-reviewed) established findings are concerned.
If examples of the latter are wanted, I would name biologist Kenneth
F. Miller’s (1999) book, Finding Darwin’s God, and theologian John F.
Haught’s (1999) book, God after Darwin (without necessarily endorsing
Methodology 115
all views expressed by these authors). While belonging to different disci-

plines, both authors come to similar conclusions: (neo-)Darwinian evo-
lution does not exclude religious beliefs; on the contrary, both views can
enrich each other (cf. Ruse 2000).
In case this exercise has been too difficult to follow or is not convincing,
more (partial) exercises applying RCR are coming up in chapters 7, 9,
10, and 11.
7 Religion
The four issues of this chapter are: (1) religion and the nature of human
beings, (2) understanding Christian doctrines, (3) the co-ordination of
religious and scientific world views, and (4) religious development; this
each time from an RCR perspective. The first section applies RCR afresh
to a particular domain of the science–religion debate. It is therefore com-
parable to the exercise in chapter 6, but focused yet more narrowly.
Religion and the nature of human beings
Religion and its truth claims

Across the ages there have been human groups on our planet without
agriculture, without the wheel, without writing, without formal laws, but
‘neither history nor anthropology knows of societies from which religion
has been totally absent’ (Rappaport quoted by Burkert 1996/1998, p. 1).1
Palaeolithic sacrificial rituals existed more than 20,000 years ago (ibid.,
p. 39) and traces of ritual burials are even older.
This is not the place to discuss the origins of religion (e.g., Burkert
1996/1998), nor its diversity within and across various cultures (e.g.,
Wulff 1997), its psychological multidimensionality (e.g., Hood, Spilka,
Hunsberger, and Gorsuch 1996, pp. 8–12), or its possible role for human
development (e.g., Peck 1997, especially pp. 241–306).
The assessment of a transcendent religious ‘reality’ is a great cogni-
tive challenge (in particular when only formal binary logic is admitted
1 In a seven-page summary, Derek Stanesby (2000) reviews and comments/critiques the
meaning of the term ‘God’ and the various arguments for God’s existence (the ontologi-
cal and the cosmological arguments, those from design and from experience – cf. Vardy
1990). Neither the existence of God nor God’s non-existence can be proven irrefutably.
However, ‘the human need to search for some meaning and purpose in life is unquench-
able, and to the extent that we are rational creatures, then we will endeavour to support
our beliefs with good reason’ (Stanesby 2000, p. 7). It is also noted that in the Western
word about half of the people believe in the existence of a ‘higher being’, and a higher
percentage in developing countries (e.g., Argyle 2000, chapters 14, 15).
116
Religion 117
for a reality check2 ) – cf. Vardy 1990/1997.3 Among others, two au-
thors of encompassing works have set themselves that task: the Christian
theologian Hans Küng ([1978], 1994) with his Does God exist? and the
self-declared atheist Michael Shermer (1999) with his How we believe.
The scholarship of both authors is impressive, their enterprises illustrate
the vastness of the field, and the difficulty of coming to convincing con-
clusions (cf. Reich 2000b). On the last page Küng concludes his crit-
ical evaluation of the works of Descartes, Pascal, and Hegel as well as
those of Feuerbach, Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche; this after further con-
siderations in the fields of theology and religious studies. Küng states
that the evidence allows one on rational grounds to answer the ques-
tion ‘Does God exist?’ in the affirmative. And according to Küng, that
constitutes a solid foundation of an enriching religious life. In contrast,
Shermer (1999, p. 236) relates that for him, ‘The conjunction of los-
ing my religion, finding science, and discovering glorious contingency
was remarkably empowering and liberating. It gave me a sense of joy
and freedom . . . I was free to live my life to the fullest.’ Can RCR help
to clarify the dissonance between the views expressed by Küng and by
Shermer?
2 In a debate in Germany (Breuer and Springer 2000) between the self-declared atheistic
philosopher of science Bernulf Kanitscheider and the theistic philosopher of religion
Ulrich Lüke, Kanitscheider challenged the latter as follows (ibid., p. 85): ‘Would you agree
that binary Aristotelian logic is applicable to basic theological statements and Christian
doctrines?’ Lüke answered (and I agree), ‘The reach of our [Aristotelian] logic, which
is always finite and mediated by language, is insufficient to capture a comprehensive
knowledge about God. Using such an approach, one can perhaps become an atheist
[gottlos werden], but not get rid of the question of God [Gott los werden].’ Kanitscheider’s
answer, ‘Escape into mystery does not solve the problems of logic.’ To which I would
respond with, ‘But why should there be only a single logic applicable everywhere and all
the time?’
3 This state of affairs constitutes a particular difficulty for the psychology of religion, which
may lead one to work in mixed teams of theists and atheists (Reich 2000b – see Breuer and
Springer 2000, for a possible, though not optimal result). Michael Argyle (2000, pp. 239–
40), after working for more than forty years in the field, sees it as follows: ‘The traditional
solution to the science vs. religion problem was to say that science deals with the material
world and religion with the subjective world; but psychology claims to deal with the inner
world too . . . What seems to be wrong . . . is a failure to take seriously the experience of
those concerned, to recognize the power of metaphors and symbolic behaviour, which are
felt to express some kind of truth . . . In contrast, psychologists have not tried to “explain”
mathematics, which is recognized as having an independent existence . . . Worship and
sacrifices are pervasive aspects of religious behaviour throughout the ages . . . ; psychology
has had no success in explaining them . . . beliefs about religion are unlike beliefs about
the physical world: they are not verifiable in the same way, they are couched in symbols
and myths, they represent commitment and relationship, and they need to be measured
and studied in a different way from other kinds of belief.’ Hartmut Beile (1999, p. 115),
a believing Christian, reported that his thesis work on religious emotions benefited from
the fact that the supervisor was a self-professed atheist.
Applying RCR
RCR was already applied to a co-ordination of science and religion/
theology (ch. 6, pp. 111–14), and that co-ordination will be taken up
again in the third section below. In this section, the central issue is a par-
ticular aspect of anthropology as viewed by (Christian) religious beliefs
and by neurobiology (e.g., Shermer 1999, pp. 65–9).
Warren Brown and Malcolm Jeeves (1999, p. 139) put that issue as
follows:
Proposition 1: Humans are physical beings who also have non-material souls. It
is through our souls that we experience and relate to God.
Proposition 2: Humans are neurobiological beings whose mind (also soul, reli-
gious experience, etc.) can, in theory, be exhaustively explained by neurochem-
istry, and ultimately by physics.
Clearly, these propositions, representing traditional Christian theology
(proposition 1) and (reductive) scientific physicalism (proposition 2) are
dissonant. In particular, (1) intimates free will, and the possibility of
eternal life, (2) holds that behaviour is determined (exclusively) by the
laws of biology, chemistry, and physics.
Applying the RCR heuristic of chapter 6 (pp. 103–4) to that dissonance,
the first task is to determine the explanandum. It shall be: The nature of
human beings and their capacity to relate to a perceived transcendent (God for
the adherents to a monotheistic religion).
As to step two (listing all descriptions, explanations etc.), we already
have proposition 1 above (= A) and proposition 2 (= B). I add a third
(= C):
Humans are naked animals who share capacities with other animals, in particular
with their nearest primate relatives. However, in humans some of these capaci-
ties are more enhanced, for instance ‘language’, a ‘theory of mind’ (hypothesis-
ing what is going on in another person’s mind), ‘episodic memory’, ‘conscious
top-down agency’ (conscious mental control of behaviour), ‘future orientation’
(mental scenarios of future implications of behaviour and events), and ‘emotional
regulation’ (cf. Brown and Jeeves 1999, pp. 144–5). The enhanced capacities
have enabled human culture to evolve; it co-determines human behaviour – as
does the proximate human group.
Simplifying, A emphasises the spiritual aspect of human beings4 , B

their biological aspect, and C the social aspects.
4 Close to the time of her death, adolescent Anne Frank wrote to herself: ‘I have found that
there is always some beauty in life – in nature, sunshine, freedom, in yourself; these can
all help you. Look at these things, then you find yourself again, and God, and then you
regain your balance’ (Frank 1993, p. 14). Marsha Sinnetar (2000) quotes this and many
other testimonials of spirituality and spiritual intelligence (cf. Paloutzian 2000).
Religion 119
As the next step, (3), the question has to be answered whether A, B, C

are coextensive. If the extension is given by C, then the coextensionality
of A and B with C seems debatable. C considers four explanatory levels:
(i) the biological level, (ii) the individual psychological level, (iii) the
social (group) level, (iv) the cultural (societal) level. A deals primarily
with level (ii). It does not explicitly rule out the other levels (except
the biological for the soul), but they remain hazy at best. B deals ex-
clusively with the biological level; the other levels are declared epiphe-
nomena (by implication). From this short comparison, a few questions
arise, which would be put to the protagonists: to A, How does the soul
communicate with the memory – and with the body? To B, How do
social and cultural influences, and in particular those which go against
the biological grain (e.g., devotion to visions, ideals) get into that neuro-
chemical system? To C, Exactly at which level(s) are religion and reli-
gious experience located, and in particular the perceived transcendence?
To do things properly, these questions should be answered before pro-
ceeding further. That cannot be done here, but we shall nevertheless
continue.
As step 4, we look for circumstances, the context, under which A, B, C
explain best particular aspects of the explanandum. A opens the door to
a spiritual life, possibly lasting beyond the death of the body. B makes a
rudimentary ‘religion’ of animals understandable such as the ‘religious’
devotion of dogs to their masters, the sun ‘worship’ of baboons, the ‘ritual
dances’ of anthropoids, and further animal ritualised behaviour (Wulff
1997, pp. 146–55). C lets one get a sense of the multivariate nature of
religion and religious experience.
Next (step 5), we look for links between respective attributes/features
of A, B, and C. Even if A and B seem to be incomplete according to the
foregoing considerations, there should nevertheless be links between one
or more of their attributes/features and C, for instance concerning the
psychosomatic nature of human beings.
Step 6 concerns the relative explanatory power of A as a function of
(B) and vice versa, and so on. At this stage of the debate with the protag-
onists of (A) and (B), that question cannot be answered satisfactorily be-
cause (A) and (B) practically exclude each other as to explanatory claims.
(C) could benefit from (B) regarding any biological roots of perceived
transcendence.
Next, the penultimate step 7 involves a synopsis. To my mind that
critical summing up has to be based on (C). The most difficult part is
presumably to explain the relations/connections between the (neuro-)
biological level and the individual psychological level, in particular as far
as perceived transcendence is concerned (e.g., Zygon 1999). One would
have to go into the ergotropic and the trophotropic forms of arousal

(Wulff 1997, pp. 109–19), and into the latest results of brain research
(e.g., Ashbrook and Albright 1997; d’Aquili and Newberg 1998, 1999;
Persinger 1993; Ramachandran and Blakeslee 1998; Saver and Rabin
1997), being aware though of the speculative nature of some of this writ-
ing. Presumably, part of the arguments will centre on the issue as to
whether a first-person ontology of the mental is acceptable, or whether
only a third-person ontology makes the grade (chapter 3, note 6, p. 38).
As regards the important relations/connections between the individual
psychological level, the social level, and the cultural level, much material
exists, given the longer history of the corresponding research. Thus at
least a descriptive synopsis should be possible.
Finally, (8), any shift in meaning of the terms used should be explained.
That concerns primarily the soul. Brown and Jeeves (1999, p. 145) find
it attractive to view it as emerging from the experience of personal relat-
edness. I would say ‘relatedness to other people, to nature, and to what
is transcendent as perceived by the person concerned’. Such relatedness
can be considered a core characteristics of spirituality (Reich, Oser, and
Scarlett 1999).
Once more, RCR’s contribution was to determine the explanandum
in terms of a functionally coherent whole, to add a further description/
explanation, to uncover missing information, to discover links between
A, B, C, and to thematise the context dependence of the respective ex-
planatory power (cf. Sharpe 2000, for an example of seeing the RCR
heuristic (tacitly) at work). Of course, the real work remains to be done
by the experts in the various disciplines.
Understanding religious doctrines

Religious doctrines are not infrequently held to be irrational, to be under-
standable only to believers, if at all. Examples would be (a) the human
and divine nature of Jesus Christ, (b) the three personae of the single
Trinitarian God, (c) God’s interaction with a world governed by natural
laws, etc. Theoretical and empirical research has shown that RCR can
contribute to overcoming some of these cognitive hurdles (Reich 1989,
1990b, 1991, 1994a, 1996b), in particular because it is not tied down to
the limitations of formal binary logic (cf. Kaiser 1996). Hence, it seems
worthwhile, on the one hand, to stimulate such thinking, in particular
in the context of religious education (Reich 1996a – cf. ch. 10, p. 162
below) and, on the other hand, to review here briefly the work on (a) and
(b) above.
Religion 121
A A B (a) Two or one?
A B (b) A, B seen
as parts
(c) Focus on
A B relationship
between parts
(d) Plus relationship

A B between each part
and the whole
Figure 7.1 Complexification and conceptual changes when moving

from one to two. (Source: Reich 1994a, p. 116)
The two natures of Jesus Christ

The historical part, the proceedings at the Council of Chalcedon (451
AD), are dealt with in the next chapter. As a result of those proceedings,
the assembled Fathers declared that
our Lord Jesus Christ is . . . truly God and truly man . . . made known in two na-
tures [which exist] without confusion, without change, without division, without
separation.
On account of the exemplary value of the issue of the two natures, some
background knowledge will be provided first. One essential basic diffi-
culty concerns the move from one to two. That move does not represent
a linear addition of more of the same, but means a profound complexifi-
cation and conceptual change, and correspondingly requires a different
logic and epistemological approach. To understand what is involved in go-
ing from one to two, we take the cue from John Puddefoot (1992). The one
is assumed to be primitive, indivisible, and complete in itself. Something
new occurs as we move to two, a plurality of scales: Are we now dealing
with a doublet of ones or with a unity, ‘the unity of two’? Which one is it to
be? The answer to this ‘simple’ question (and where ‘one’ should not be
identified with plain concrete things) depends on one’s stage of complex
reasoning. An unsophisticated reasoning will presumably settle for one
of these alternatives, often without deeper reflection. A more complex
reasoning will view the situation as schematically depicted in Fig. 7.1.
Going from one to two thus introduces a plurality of languages, and

possibly a scheme of ‘levels’ of reality:
The movement from one to two is no mere aggregation, as if complexity were
only the sum of simples; it is a movement from indivisibility to divisibility and
structure: the movement from one to two alters the one, for now the one is not
only related to itself, in itself, and even for itself; it is also to, in, and for the
other: The other in the sense of the other part, and the other in the sense of the
whole of which the one is itself part. In moving from one to two the being of one
is no longer complete in itself; its totality involves the other. (Puddefoot 1992,
p. 16)
The empirical study

In the laboratory study (Reich 1994a), twenty-eight volunteers (from the
sample of thirty-two respondents of the pilot study 4), aged 13 to 68 years,
both religious believers and nonbelievers, about half male and half female,
were interviewed individually. These participants were not representa-
tive, as explained in chapter 4 (pp. 47–8). The shortened Chalcedonian
Definition was presented in written form, reading (in translation):
The Fathers who met in 451 at the Council of Chalcedon declared notably that
‘Our Lord Jesus Christ is truly God and truly man . . . made known in two na-
tures [which exist] without confusion, without change, without division, without
separation.’ What do you think about this Chalcedonian Definition?
To assess their level of RCR, all respondents furthermore were inter-

viewed about the three standard themes ( pianist, accident in a nuclear power
station, and humans, the mind–body problem), presented and discussed
in chapter 4.
The results were as follows. About a third of the respondents (group
1) could not make sense of the doctrine. About another third (group 2)
said that on first thoughts it all looked confusing, but on second thought
it made some sense, and they explained how. The remaining respondents
(group 3) explained why that particular wording of the doctrine was the
most appropriate if not the only possible way to explain the state of affairs
concerned. The inter-rater concordance concerning group assessment
was 90 per cent. The individual scores of RCR and understandability of
the doctrine are shown in Table 7.1.
All participants who responded below level IV of RCR belong to group
1. (This statement is not reversible though; in that group were also re-
spondents who were capable of higher level reasoning, yet they lacked
religious knowledge or had reserves about the two natures.) Respondents
in group 2 reasoned at least at level IV, those of group 3 at least at level
Religion 123
Table 7.1 Frequencies of individual scores of RCR levels and intelligibility

judgement of the Chalcedonian Definition.
Level III(IV) is somewhat above level III; IV(III) is somewhat below IV, etc. Ntot = 28;
age 13–68 years; mean 33 years, 8.4 months; SD 15 years, 2.3 months. Source: Reich
1994a, p. 121.
Is the Chalcedonian Definition rationally understandable?
Level of Group 1 Group 2 Group 3

Np RCR (‘no’) (‘partly’) (‘yes’)
1 III(IV) 1
1 IV(III) 1
8 IV 2 6
12 IV(V) 4 4 4
6 V(IV) 1 1 4
28 9 11 8
IV (V), which is somewhat above level IV. Kendall’s rank correlation co-
efficient has the moderate but significant value rK = .40, p < .02.5
To get a sense of what respondents in group 3 said, here are two excerpts
(Reich 1994a, p. 121). Ariane (23 years, 11 months; henceforth 23; 11)
explained:
You can’t judge this by the usual rationality nor by arguing from personal ex-
perience. Jesus has to be human, otherwise he could not suffer [and wouldn’t
be close to us]. And he has got to be God, otherwise atonement wouldn’t work.
And because both [natures] have to come together in a single person, you get this
helplessness with the usual notions. . . . [The difficulties] stem from the habit of
imagining things on a scientific or human base.
Rainer (28; 9) said:
Without separation – that makes sense if one can say that it belongs together
naturally, it is not thinkable that the one exists without the other. But now, without
confusion – that is again what is without separation – that means the two natures
can all the same be analysed separately . . . Now it makes sense to me, without
confusion, without separation.
The three personae and the single Trinitarian God

The Trinitarian Godhead, the Holy Trinity (three personae yet one God)
involves a further complexification (Reich, 1994a): As there are now three
5 A post hoc Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance (H test) further supported the findings of the
correlation computation: the mean RCR ranks of the members of groups 1 to 3 differed
(chi2 = 7.87, df = 2, p = .02). The corresponding U-Test (Mann-Whitney) showed that
the significant differences were between group 1 and group 3 (U = 14, p = .02), and
between group 2 and group 3 (U = 14, p < .01).
‘entities’, different groupings of the type ‘two versus one’ can be imag-
ined. In fact, for more than a thousand years the Roman Catholic Church
and the Eastern Orthodox Churches cannot agree on the procession of
the Holy Spirit. For Catholics (and Anglicans as well as many Protes-
tants) the so-called Nicene Creed (adopted by the Ecumenical Council of
Constantinople, AD 381) reads in part, ‘The Holy spirit . . . who pro-
ceedeth from the Father and from the Son ( filioque) . . . ’ In contrast, the
Orthodox Church did not accept the addition of filioque to the original
creed. As a result, for the Catholics, in a way the Son is ‘closer’ to the
Father than the Spirit, and for the Orthodox, the Son is ‘closer’ to the
Spirit than the Father.
However, these theological disputes were not the object of an empirical
study. Rather, the aim was similar to that concerning the Chalcedonian
Definition, namely, to find out whether respondents arguing at a higher
RCR level about the three standard nonreligious problems would under-
stand the doctrine of the Trinity better than respondents who argued at
a lower RCR level. The procedure was the same as in the case of the
Chalcedonian Definition (except that two respondents of that study did
not participate and two new ones joined). The interview text submitted
to the respondents reads:
Christian theology teaches the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity: the Father, the Son,
the Holy Spirit. What is your opinion about this doctrine?
The result of this study was similar to that of Table 7.1 in that again
three groups emerged, and the understanding of the doctrine correlated
with RCR (sub-)levels (Table 7.2). Kendall’s rank correlation coefficient
has the moderately high value rK = .56, p = .001.6
Here again are some interview excerpts, first of a group 2 respondent
(Reich 1994a, p. 123). Peter (17; 0) said:
Well, that is another problem you can’t really grasp nor picture. But it shows
our relationships: God the Father, the creator – you imagine what you feel for
your own father but projected onto God. Then the Son, he is the mediator, he is
much closer. He has reconciled us with the Father. And then the Holy Ghost, the
wisdom, the love, [is] really humanity’s ideal. It is almost as if God has personally
cut this up for us . . . Depending on the problem, we address ourselves each time
to another ‘person’ in quotes [sic]. That simply is a help for us.
The scoring was group 2, because Peter had not yet fully grasped the
intrinsic relationship between the three personae (the perichoresis): his
6 A post hoc Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance (H test) further supported the findings of the
correlation computation: the mean RCR ranks of the members of groups 1 to 3 differed
(chi2 = 10.17, df = 2, p = .006). The corresponding U-Test (Mann-Whitney) showed
that the significant differences were between group 1 and group 3 (U = 9, p < .01), and
between group 2 and group 3 (U = 19, p = .02).
Religion 125
Table 7.2 Frequencies of individual scores of RCR levels and intelligibility

judgement of the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity.
Ntot = 28; age 13–68 years; mean 32 years, 0.3 months; SD 15 years, 4.9 months.
(Source: Reich 1994a, p. 122)
Is the Doctrine of the Trinity rationally understandable?
Level of Group 1 Group 2 Group 3

Np RCR (‘no’) (‘partly’) (‘yes’)
1 III 1
2 III(IV) 2
1 IV(III) 1
8 IV 3 5
12 IV(V) 1 6 5
4 V(IV) 1 3
28 9 11 8
Trinity evokes more tritheism than monotheism. Here are three answers
from group 3 respondents:
Jean-Luc (46; 7) emphasised: ‘Our mind can’t seize up God as creator in his
entire dimension. But our mind grasps certain aspects. God, the wholly other,
if he wants to reveal himself to us, then he must do it in a manner that we can
understand. Moreover, the formulation [of the doctrine] matches our mental
reception capacity.’
Oskar (53; 8) opined: ‘The Trinity somehow combines the human longing for
community with the longing for individuality.’
Richard (64; 8) added: ‘It does not bother me that in different situations there
are different aspects which you can’t really combine. I always remember that light
has to be pictured as wave-like and as corpuscle-like.’
Conclusions
The main finding of both studies on the intelligibility of Christian doc-
trines is that RCR appears to be a necessary but insufficient condition
for an intellectually acceptable understanding of the doctrines studied.
Specific knowledge and interest (motivation) are needed in addition if
the potential competence is to show up in the actual performance (Reich
1994a, p. 124).
In a wider context, and taking up an issue discussed earlier, these results
indicate that an understanding of Christian doctrines requires one to
transgress the limits of formal binary logic (as already known to Thomas
Aquinas). Richard expresses this by evoking a parallelism between the
‘logic’ of the relationship between the three personae and the logic of
quantum mechanics.
Furthermore, these studies bring out particularly well the means-reflec-
ting thinking (chapter 2, pp. 29–32) at high RCR levels. For instance,
Jean-Luc not only evokes the limitations of the human mind (Our mind
can’t seize up God as creator in his entire dimension), but also points out that
God took them into account (God . . . if he wants to reveal himself to us, then
he must do it in a manner that we can understand ).
Co-ordination of religious and scientific world views

This section is based on a summary of my related research (Reich 1998).
The change of people’s world views as they grow up is a particularly
informative developmental instance. Here world view means the way a
person pictures the origin of the universe, the way it evolved until the
present time, the origin of life, the place of human beings in the universe,
etc. There exist purely religious, purely nonreligious, and mixed world
views (Fetz, Reich, and Valentin 1989; 2001; Reich 1989, 1990a, 1996b).
In a constructivist conception of cognitive development an individual as
a rational agent constructs new and/or more dependable views on the
basis of his or her own observations and reasoning (e.g., Reich, Oser,
and Valentin 1994). In fact, studying the world views of children and
adolescents led to my involvement with RCR.
I interviewed children, adolescents, and adults aged 7–68 years about
statements from a scientist and from a church minister about their re-
spective world views (Reich 1989, 1990a, 1996b). For the scientist the
theories of the big bang and of evolution explain all that one would like to
know. The minister recognises these contributions to our world view, but
adds that for him God is still the ultimate explanation as to why there is
a universe altogether. Also, he senses God in nature and in other human
beings, and experiences God’s assistance when he has to make morally
difficult decisions. The participants were invited to judge who was right,
the scientist or the minister. From the answers, five developmental levels
could be extracted:
Level 1. Only one world view comes into the field of vision: ‘I believe that the
minister is right’, or ‘The scientist is right, he can prove it.’
Level 2. Both views are tentatively put side by side: ‘I believe that animals and
humans would not have come into existence without God.’ [‘Does that mean
science is wrong?’] ‘I would say, maybe there really was a big bang. So the minister
is right, and maybe the scientist a little too.’
Level 3. Both world views are considered necessary for a full explanation: ‘Well, to
my mind, both are right. The scientist must have developed his views according
Religion 127
Table 7.3 Frequencies of individual RCR levels and levels of co-ordinating

biblical and scientific views on the world’s origin.
1(2) means a level somewhat above level 1, 2(1) a level somewhat below 2, etc. N = 67,
age 7–68 years. (Source: Reich 1996b, p. 132)
Level of co-ordination of the two world views

Levels
of RCR 1 1(2) 2(1) 2 2(3) 3(2) 3 3(4) 4(3) 4 4(5) 5(4)
I 2 2
I(II) 1
II(I)
II
II(III) 2 1 1
III(II) 1
III 2 4 3 2
III(IV) 2 2 1 4 2
IV(III) 1 1 3
IV 1 1 1 2 4 3
IV(V) 1 4 3 4
V(IV) 2 1 3
to the results of scientific research. And the minister is right in that there would
be no world if it were not for God. I do not see any contradiction.’
Level 4. The relation between both world views is thematised: ‘The two statements
do not exclude each other. The minister speaks about his conscience, his feelings
when looking at nature, about human encounters and the like. The scientist ex-
plains how the stars came about, and so on. If God had created the preconditions
for those processes to occur, then the two views would supplement each other.
The world came into being rather suddenly, perhaps somehow through an energy
created by God, which enabled matter to come into existence. I am unsure how
to understand symbolically Genesis in the Bible. Anyway, nobody can visualise
the time scales involved.’
Level 5. A synopsis is endeavoured: ‘If I were the third person in that discussion
between the minister and the scientist, I might say the following: Maybe things
occurred as stated by the scientist. He has presented a model that explains plaus-
ibly how things evolved from the big bang until today. But of course, we cannot
be absolutely sure about it. But I also have to side with the minister, and even to
support him: Maybe in the future even more convincing models will come about.
Anyway, they will not explain why there is a world altogether, and why our life
proceeds as it does, and not differently. I too believe that one can sense God in
nature, in human encounters, and in one’s conscience.’
At first blush, that sequence from level 1 to level 5 resembles that
of RCR levels I to V. RCR levels were assessed employing the standard
procedure (also used, e.g., in the preceding studies on the grasp of the two
Christian doctrines; see Table 4.4, p. 58 for all of the results underlying
Table 7.3).
However, the two types of levels were not ‘the same’ throughout when
the ‘nonreligious’ RCR scores were compared individually to the world
view scores (Table 7.3). For instance, some interviewees who argued
about the nonreligious issues at RCR level III, ‘co-ordinated’ the world
views at level 1, and so did even a respondent at RCR level IV. Hence, the
intra-individual variance was larger when religious issues were included.
Indeed, for eighteen out the sixty-seven participants (27 per cent) the
difference between their RCR level score and the co-ordination score
was at least one full level.
Is the difference due to the characteristics of the religious domain?
One explanation would indeed be ‘segmentation’ (Piaget’s ‘décalage’),
that is the developmental time delay between reaching a given level in one
domain, and later reaching the same level in a different domain, the size of
the delay depending on the particular issue or domain. Alternatively, lack
of pertinent knowledge or perhaps insufficient motivation for applying the
existing competence could be a reason (Reich 1996b). Notice, however,
that nobody argued the case of co-ordinating different world views at
a higher level than the nonreligious RCR issues. It therefore appears
that basically the same form of reasoning is at work. (Spearman’s rank
correlation coefficient has the high value rs = .84, p < .001 – and rs =
.94, p < .001, if the eighteen ‘deviant’ cases are discounted).
In chapter 6 (pp. 109–10), I commented on Barbour’s four categories
characterising the relation between science and religion/theology to the
effect that they could be considered as RCR developmental levels. I also
contended that eventually the solution resulting from applying RCR pre-
sented there would be accepted more generally (p. 114). The present
empirical study supports this contention in that the answers at level 5
(having come about by reasoning at RCR level V) are ‘isomorphic’ with
the result of the exercise of chapter 6: throughout, (a) A, B, (C) are con-
sidered necessary for elucidating the explanandum; (b) the links between
A, B, (C) and (c) the context-dependence of their explanatory power are
explicitly thematised.
The present study (Table 7.3) has been ‘replicated’ several times
(Reich 1996b, p. 128). As to the actual results of questioning various spe-
cific samples of adolescents and young adults, mostly about science and
religion (apprentices, high school students, university level students), the
proportion of respondents arguing at least at coordination level 3 ranged
from a few per cent ( Jablonski and Gryzmala-Moszczynka 1995, p. 53;
Nipkow and Schweitzer 1991, pp. 96–7) to about 40 per cent (Tamminen
1991, p. 128). In the studies of William Kay and Leslie Francis (1996,
p. 100), 33 per cent of the 11- to 14-year-olds functioned at level 2 and
an equal proportion at level 3. (Eighty per cent of the 21- to 25-year-olds
were found at level 4. Peter Fulljames and his colleagues made comparable
Religion 129
studies and also interpreted certain results in terms of RCR – Fulljames

1996, p. 259.) How can one understand such divergencies? I have no
robust explanation, but note that (a) none of these studies used exactly
the interview method described here, (b) in case questionnaires were
used, the items were phrased differently, and (c) in one case (Nipkow
and Schweitzer 1991) the data resulted from a secondary analysis of an-
swers to questionnaires designed for a different purpose. While all these
studies can be interpreted as a (weak) support of the thesis argued here,
they illustrate the need to ‘harmonise’ the methodology if results are to
be compared in a convincing way.
Finally, the present study also confirms the earlier statement that cogni-
tive development is not necessarily synonymous with railroading a person
to ‘more developed’ views. To espouse a particular developed view, a cor-
responding level of cognitive development is necessary, but insufficient.
In cases where one’s established positions come into play, a decision may
well be needed to apply one’s competence for furthering development,
and then to keep on applying it.
RCR and religious development

What is the essence of ‘religious development’? Already Paul of Tarsus
was aware of it: ‘When I was a child, I spoke like a child, I thought like
a child, I reasoned like a child. When I became an adult, I put an end
to childish ways’ (First Letter to the Corinthians 13: 11, NRSV), and he
drew the conclusion: ‘We must no longer be children, tossed to and fro
and blown about by every wind of doctrine, by people’s trickery, by their
craftiness in deceitful scheming’ (Letter to the Ephesians 34: 14, NRSV).
Thomas Aquinus (1225–74) wrote in his Summa theologica (1273, part I,
question 75, article 5, second of his arguments concerning objection 4):
‘Omne quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo per modum recipientes’
(‘Whatever is received into something is received according to the condi-
tion of the recipient’). In other words, it depends on the (developmental)
state of the receiver’s (epistemic) cognition how the sense perceptions are
analysed and interpreted.
At present, notably James W. Fowler’s theory of ‘faith development’
and Fritz K. Oser’s theory of ‘religious judgement’ describe religious
development. Both are stage theories, and RCR plays a role in both.
Fowler’s stages of faith

Fowler’s (1981, 1987, 1996, 2001) seven stages of faith (and selfhood) are
labelled (1) primal faith, (2) intuitive-projective faith, (3) mythic-literal
faith, (4) synthetic-conventional faith, (5) individuative-reflective faith,
(6) conjunctive faith, and (7) universalising faith. The seven dimensions
of faith are taken to be (a) form of logic, (b) perspective taking, (c) form of
moral judgement, (d) bounds of social awareness, (e) locus of authority,
(f) form of worlds coherence, and (g) symbolic function (Fowler 1981,
pp. 243–57). RCR has mainly to do with (a), the form of logic, specifically
with that of stage 6 (and stage 7):
In the transition to Conjunctive faith one begins to make peace with the tension
arising from the fact that truth must be approached from a number of different
directions and angles of vision. As part of honoring truth, faith must maintain the
tensions between these multiple perspectives and refuse to collapse them into one
direction or another. In this respect, faith begins to come to terms with dialectical
dimensions of experience and with apparent paradoxes: God is both immanent
and transcendent; God is both an omnipotent and a self-limiting God; God is
sovereign of history while being the incarnate and crucified One. In physics, in
order to account for the behavior of light, two incompatible and unintegrable
models must be employed – one based on the analogy with packets of energy,
and the other upon the analogy with wavelike motions somewhat as in sound.
Similarly, many truthful theological insights and models involve holding together
in dialectical tension the ‘coincidence of opposites’. (Fowler 1987, p. 72)
Does that not read like a description of RCR at work, more specifically
RCR levels III and IV? (Even if Fowler originally labelled the underlying
form of thought as dialectical thinking, he now agrees that my analysis of
‘the relations between Fowler stage six and Oser/Gmünder stage five is
on target’.) As to his stage 7, Fowler (1987, p. 75) writes: ‘In this stage
we see persons moving beyond the paradoxical awareness and the em-
brace of polar tensions of the Conjunctive stage.’ As there are very few
persons at stage 7, it is hard to know eactly what that means. Fowler
postulates synthetic/unitive thinking at this stage. That is not in contra-
diction with RCR level V (assuming an everyday awake state of con-
sciousness and not an enlarged, altered state of consciousness – Reich,
2001a).
Oser/Gmünder’s stages of religious judgement

‘Religious Judgement’ (RJ) involves the interpretation of a given expe-
rience from the perspective of the personal relationship to an Ultimate
Reality, God for religious believers. The five experimentally observed
stages are labelled (1) Deus ex machina, (2) Do ut des (give so that you may
receive), (3) Deism, (4) Divine plan, and (5) Universal solidarity (Oser
and Gmünder 1991; Oser and Reich 1996). The dimensions of the reli-
gious judgement are so-called polar pairs, for instance the ‘immanent’ and
the ‘transcendent’. Religious development translates as, and stipulates, a
Religion 131
5.0
RCR
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
RJ
Figure 7.2 Correlation between religious judgement stages (RJ) and

levels of relational and contextual reasoning (RCR). Kendall’s tau =
0.70; p < .01. N = 30.
changing equilibrium between these poles: ‘Psychologically, this means

that persons produce stage-specific equilibria between the immanent and
the transcendent . . . ’ (Oser and Gmünder 1991, p. 27). At RJ stage 1, the
immanent and the transcendent are seen as totally separate. At the high-
est stage, ‘the transcendent becomes evident in the immanence of human
communication, and vice versa’ (ibid.). To take another pair, ‘freedom’
and ‘dependency’: at RJ stage 1, these concepts mutually exclude each
other – freedom is conceived as freedom from dependency. At the higher
stages, freedom is conceived progressively as freedom for something and
interrelated more and more with dependency. Finally, freedom is recog-
nised as being grounded in dependency on God (ibid., pp. 27–8). For
these and further reasons (Oser and Reich 1996), a case can be made
that RCR development is important for religious development.
To test this hypothesis empirically, I interviewed, in a pilot study carried
out in Germany and Switzerland, thirty adolescents and adults, aged
from 13–79 years (Schenker and Reich, forthcoming). Their religious
judgement was assessed using the modern Job dilemma about the church
minister who becomes blind (cf. Oser and Gmünder 1991, p. 173), and
RCR using the standard problem of the power plant accident (pp. 20
and 55).
The results are shown in Figure 7.2. The correlation between RJ and
RCR is high and significant, Kendall’s tau = 0.70; p <.01. The most
outstanding result is that reaching RJ stage 4 requires at least RCR level
IV. The reverse is once more not true. For instance, a respondent argu-
ing at RCR level IV(III) – somewhat below level IV – only scored at RJ
stage 3(2) – somewhat below 3, another respondent argued at RCR level
IV(V), but only at RJ level 3. This is a well-known phenomenon (Reich
1989, 1991, 1996b): to raise the RCR performance to the competence
level, motivation to apply one’s competence and a basic knowledge about
religious issues are also required (cf. Table 7.3, p. 127). (An alternative
explanation would be to assume segmentation, Piaget’s décalage hori-
zontale.) Given that this was an exploratory pilot study, a full study with
more respondents and more dilemmata would be warranted.
Conclusions
Religion is a domain where use of formal binary logic is not infrequently
inappropriate, and use of RCR logic helpful for gaining understanding.
(The same remark applies to art.) Especially, this state of affairs was
shown to be the case for the Christian doctrines of the two natures of
Christ, and of the Trinitarian Godhead as well as for the relation of science
and religion.
Therefore, various discussions of RCR have found their entrance into a
number of religion-related works other than my own (cf. Oser and Reich
1996). For instance, they figure in the considerations of the well-known
German theologian Karl Ernst Nipkow (1998a, p. 218; 1998b, pp. 270–7,
passim) on moral and religious education, in Martin Rothgangel’s (1999)
Habilitationsschrift (advanced thesis, a condition for obtaining a profes-
sorship) on ‘Natural science and theology’, and in Thomas Bornhauser’s
(2000, ch. 3, passim) doctoral thesis on ‘God for adults’.
8 The Archaeology of RCR
In chapters 4 and 7, empirical evidence for the use of RCR was pre-
sented. Given that evidence, the question arises whether traces can be
found at earlier times. Obviously, this is a somewhat speculative endeav-
our as I could not interview any of the persons to be discussed, and
hence have not assessed their level of RCR via the standard interview
procedure.
Candidates for earlier use of RCR are (i) Fathers of the Council of
Chalcedon of 451, (ii) Vincent van Gogh (1853–90), (iii) William James
(1842–1910), (iv) Rainer Maria Rilke (1875–1926), (v) Robert (Edler
von) Musil (1880–1942), and (vi) Niels Bohr (1885–1962).
Fathers of the Council of Chalcedon

In 451 at the Fourth Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon, the assembled
Fathers unanimously adopted the Chalcedonian Definition declaring not-
ably that
our Lord Jesus Christ is the one and the same Son . . . truly God and truly man . . .
made known in two natures [which exist] without confusion, without change,
without division, without separation; the difference in nature having been in no
way taken away by way of reason of the union, but rather the properties of each
being preserved, and (both) concurring into one person (prôsopon) and one
hypostasis. (Sellers 1953, pp. 210–11)
I hypothesise that this was an early application of RCR. The arguments

(Reich 1990b) are mainly that (1) the above wording was formulated by
a few ‘expert’ bishops within a few days, the centrepiece being the ‘para-
doxical’ expressions without confusion, without change, without division,
without separation. The emphasis is first put on the distinctness, the sep-
arateness of the two natures (‘without confusion, without change’), and
then on the concurrence in the person of Jesus Christ (‘without division,
without separation’) – this in consonance with the RCR heuristic. (2) The
wording of the four adverbial expressions avoids carefully both a fusion
133
of the two natures and neglecting one or the other (which were all current
in the fifth century but are proscribed by RCR). (3) In Jesus’ life, the di-
vine and human natures became ‘visible’ in different contexts (e.g., John
8: 58 (‘before Abraham was, I was’, NRSV) vs. Matthew 27: 50 (‘Then
Jesus cried again with a loud voice and breathed his last’, NRSV). Cor-
responding considerations fit the predicate logical statement (Fig. 3.3)
on pages 122–3, which epitomises the trivalent logic of RCR. (4) The
laboratory studies (Reich 1994a) reported in chapter 7 (pp. 000–000)
demonstrate that persons arguing at high RCR levels did not find the
Chalcedonian Definition ‘paradoxical’, but quite understandable, and in
fact appropriate. For a more detailed argumentation the reader is referred
to the original publication (Reich 1990b).
Vincent van Gogh

The contention is that Vincent van Gogh applied RCR, not that he was fully
aware of it as a form of thought and used it consciously and systematically,
for instance as discussed in chapter 6. What is the evidence for such a
thesis?
First, on 28 June 1890 – a few weeks before his death – van Gogh
wrote a letter to his brother Théo about his painting of Mademoiselle
Gachet (Fischer 1992, pp. 8–9).1 That painting is named Marguerite
Gachet at the piano2 (Basel, Switzerland, Öffentliche Kunstsammlung,
Kunstmuseum). Vincent’s considerations are not just concerned with
this painting, but also with a possible companion piece. The painting of
Mlle Gachet is of a high format (vertical dimension larger than horizon-
tal). According to the letter, the features of interest to van Gogh are the
following:
Yesterday and the day before I painted Mlle Gachet’s portrait, which I hope you
will see soon; the dress is red, the wall in the background green with orange
spots, the carpet red with green spots, the piano dark violet; it is 40 inches high
by 20 inches wide. It is a figure that I enjoyed painting – but it is difficult. I have
noticed that this canvas goes very well with another horizontal one of wheat, as
one canvas is vertical and in pink tones, the other pale green and greenish yellow,
the complementary of pink. (Vincent [1890]1999)
1 Van Gogh (1988, pp. 647–9). Unfortunately, this particular letter is not included in
the currently available English-language edition (Roskill 1997). Nevertheless, the latter
edition provides a vivid picture of van Gogh and also of Dr Gachet, his country doctor at
Auvers-sur-Oise (pp. 12, 81, 82–5, 336), this both via the memoir of van Gogh’s sister-
in-law, J. van Gogh-Bonger, and his own letters. However, the letter we are discussing is
reproduced on the Internet (Vincent [1890], 2001).
2 See Internet display http://www.vangoghgallery.com/painting/p 0772.htm Marguerite
Gachet at the Piano, oil on canvas, 102.6 × 50.0 cm, Auvers-sur-Oise, June 1890;
F 772, JH 2048.
The Archaeology of RCR 135
He sees the ‘fitting’ companion painting as of a ‘horizontal’ format

(horizontal dimension larger than vertical), and featuring fields of wheat
in pale green and greenish yellow. Possible candidates are: (1) Wheat Field
at Auvers with White House (Washington D.C., The Phillips Collection),
(2) Wheat Fields near Auvers-sur-Oise (Vienna, Austria, Österreichische
Galerie in der Stallburg), both painted in the same month of June 1890
the letter was written, or (3) Wheat Fields at Auvers under Clouded Sky
(Pittsburgh, PA, Carnegie Museum of Art),3 finished in July 1890. Note,
however, that the reference to ‘fields of wheat in pale green and greenish
yellow’ fits (1) and (3) but not so well (2). Conversely, (2) matches best
the 2:1 ratio of the dimensions of the painting of Mlle Gachet. It could
be, of course, that van Gogh was referring to an earlier painting, wheat
fields being a recurrent theme, or even just to his imagination.
On the surface, one could think that van Gogh argued at level III of
RCR, that he had in view the full range of possibilities for ‘constructing’
a painting, and simply put them into differing, complementary mental
boxes, namely the two usual formats (vertical or horizontal – there are
few square paintings), portrait or landscape, dark or light colours, red or
green, blue or yellow. However, if one reads on, it becomes clear that he
argues at least at level IV, a genuinely complementarist level:
but we are still far from the time when people will understand the curious relation
between one fragment of nature and another, which all the same explain each
other and enhance each other. But some certainly feel it, and that’s something.
(Vincent [1890] 1999)
The significant words here are those about the relation between one
fragment of nature and another which all the same explain each other and
enhance each other. Explain each other could refer to analogical thinking,
and enhance each other to dialectical thinking. But it could also mean the
iterative refocusing from A on to B and so on, with ideally each time a
gain in understanding of their relation, which is characteristic of RCR.
Second, there is van Gogh’s masterpiece, the Starry Night (New York
City, Museum of Modern Art, painted at Saint-Rémy, June 1889; oil on
canvas, 73 × 92 cm; F 612, JH 1731).4 That painting has some of the
3 See Internet display http://vangoghgallery.com/painting/p 0804.htm for (1), oil on can-
vas, 48.6 × 83.2 cm, F 804, JH 2018. For (2) idem, 50.0 × 101.0 cm, F 775, JH
2038, see http://vangoghgallery.com/painting/p 0775.htm, and for (3) also oil on can-
vas, 73.0 × 92.0 cm, F 781, JH 2102, July 1890, see http://www.vangoghgallery.com/
painting/p 0781.htm.
4 Roskill (1997, plate XII) shows a drawing much like the Starry Night but which is
referred to as Cypresses and Stars (until its loss: Bremen, Germany, Kunsthalle; the
drawing is said to have been lost during the war). Van Gogh has repeatedly painted
cypresses, also together with a sky, but Starry Night is the acclaimed masterpiece, see
http://vangoghgallery.com/index.html.
complementary features just referred to such as a dark landscape with

(vertical) dominating high cypresses and a church featuring a pointed
spire on the one hand and a limitless (horizontal) sky illuminated by un-
told galaxies and the moon. But, then, there is more. The Starry Sky
was painted at a time (1889) when there was great interest in the rota-
tional movement of the (spiral) galaxies. To express his complementarist
aesthetic and scientific views, van Gogh put those movements into the
picture in an artistic manner. As a whole, then, the painting stimulates
impressions and reflections about heaven and earth, about religion and
science, and about the relations between them. (For those reasons it fig-
ures partly on the cover of Fischer, Herzka and Reich 1992.)
William James
As a first intimation of William James’s implied use of RCR, I quote from
the published version of the Hibbert Lecture ( James, 1909):
rationality has at least four dimensions, intellectual, aesthetical, moral, and prac-
tical; and to find a world rational to the maximal degree in all these respects
simultaneously is no easy matter. (ibid., p. 175)
Is this not consonant with RCR’s considerations on constituting an ex-
planandum?
For the next indications I draw on my previous writing (Reich, 1998).
In chapter VIII of his first volume on The principles of psychology, William
James (1890, pp. 202–5) analysed the ‘split’ consciousness of certain
hysterics: the partial consciousnesses coexisted, but ignored each other.
For instance, if one whispered a question behind the back of such a
hysterical person while he or she was in conversation with another, and
the hysteric had a pencil to hand, then he or she wrote down the answer
without the ‘upper’ consciousness which was involved in the conversation
being aware of that writing. An awareness would only arise if the pencil
came into the field of vision, which implies the context-dependence of the
phenomenon. From such findings James drew the following conclusions:
It must be admitted, therefore, that in certain persons, at least, the total possible
consciousness may be split into parts which coexist but mutually ignore each other, and
share the objects of knowledge between them. More remarkable still, they are
complementary. Give an object to one of the consciousnesses, and by that fact
you remove it from the others. Barring a certain common fund of information,
like the command of language, etc., what the upper self knows the under self is
ignorant of, and vice versa. (ibid., p. 206; italics in the original)
What James seems to have had in mind is a kind of class logic: barring
the common fund, the total is split up in such a way that there is no
duplication; a particular item belongs in one ‘bin’, and not in the other,
and vice versa. However, for a total understanding, the contents of all
‘bins’ must be taken into account. This would be consonant with RCR
level III.
In the next chapter of the same volume, ‘The stream of thought’, James
refers to the breaks in the stream of thought that are produced by sudden
contrasts in the quality of successive segments. James likens them to an
alternation of a bird’s perchings and flights. He calls the resting place, the
perching, the ‘substantive’ segment, and the flight the ‘transitive’ segment
of the stream of thought. In a presumed contrast to what happens in a
bird’s case, according to James a person cannot become aware by intro-
spection of the content of the transitive segment. Trying to do that would
be like ‘trying to turn up the gas [light] quickly enough to see how the
darkness looks’ (ibid., pp. 243–4). A certain mutual exclusiveness reigns.
However, both segments of the stream are needed for full comprehension
of the phenomenon. Again, that is consonant with RCR level III in that A
and B are considered separately, but both taken into account. As will be
recalled shortly, Niels Bohr emphasised the same point, possibly inspired
by James.
Rainer Maria Rilke

So far we have not yet applied RCR to gender issues. What should the
relationship between a man and a woman be like in the progressive twenty-
first century? What can it be between two autonomous individuals who
each want both independence and community? In his letters to the young
poet Franz Xavier Kappus, Rilke writes that the nature of love (all texts
taken from Fülleborn 1992; translations by K. H. R.)
which we prepare with effort as wrestlers . . . consists in that two solitudes protect,
limit, and greet one another.5
In what ways are those two lines an expression of RCR? Let us first
look at the relationship between men and women in traditional terms.
Even if only fully apparent in ‘patriarchal’ societies, was the underlying
social, and even legal structure not for a long time (and in some societal
settings still is) one where a man ‘owned’ his wife? One may even quote
from the Bible, ‘You shall not covet your neighbour’s house; you shall not
covet your neighbour’s wife, or male and female slave, or ox, or donkey,
or anything that belongs to your neighbour’ (Exodus 20: 17, NRSV).
Over against such a state of affairs Rilke affirms the autonomy, the basic
5 ‘die wir ringend und mühsam vorbereiten . . . darin besteht, daß zwei Einsamkeiten einan-
der schützen, grenzen und grüßen’.
equality of men and women as human beings, yet who protect, limit
and greet each other, that is, care about a mutual relationship. The other
conceptualisation against which Rilke demarks himself is that of romantic
love, which leads a man and a woman to fuse into becoming One. Here
Rilke (as an expression of RCR) insists on the distinctness of men and
women and the need to preserve that distinction if a durable, developing
relationship is to be possible.
I do not discuss the practicality of Rilke’s view. His own attempt at
marriage did not last long, and many present-day marriages (which are
more or less conceived in accordance with Rilke’s model) end up on
the rocks. So, maybe RCR should be applied further to find out what is
missing in order to fit the needs and possibilities of the average person
(cf. the RCR analysis of an impending partnership break-up on pp. 89–
91 above). But that subtracts nothing from the fact that Rilke pioneered
an RCR view of a gender issue.
Looked at differently, Rilke’s readiness to explore new territory may
also have been motivated by a desire to leave Descartes’s strict subject-
object relations behind. Instead, Rilke tends towards a generalised com-
plex relationship. The last lines of ‘Sonette an Orpheus’ express that view:
And if all that is earthly passes you over,
say to the quiet earth: I flow gently.
To the water flowing swiftly say: I am.6
Rilke has explained that these lines are primarily addressed to him-
self. The first line reflects his experience of having been excluded from
normal life to the point of almost ceasing to exist (starting with his suffer-
ing at and the forced exit from a military preparatory school as a young
adolescent). His message is to react, to remind one’s entire surround-
ings that one is part and parcel of it, that one belongs to it. However, if
so, one does not hide that one is different. Vis-à-vis the static earth the
poet emphasises his (gentle) dynamism. To the water flowing swiftly, he
explains his simply being there (without moving). For Rilke, all that is
earthly includes both earth and water, lasting and passing away. Once
more, RCR becomes ‘visible’ especially clearly in the opposition of ‘I
flow gently’ (ich rinne) and ‘I am’ (ich bin). That is the RCR feature of
‘keeping A, B, . . . distinct’. Where is the bridge-building part, the search
for links between A, B, . . . ? According to Rilke it comes in through the
alternation of both phases in time. When one is in one phase, the other is
absent, but to be fully oneself, one has to experience both in succession.
In that way one avoids both being petrified because one is too static, and
6 ‘Und wenn dich das Irdische vergaß/zu der stillen Erde sag: Ich rinne./Zu dem raschen
Wasser sprich: Ich bin.’
losing a sense of direction and purpose because one is all the time in a
(partly uncontrolled) movement. In other words, Rilke approaches the
issue under discussion not metaphysically but existentially. And despite
all its difficulties and suffering (such as the shock of the First World War
even if only experienced as an observer) life is affirmed as worthy to be
lived.
Fülleborn provides further examples from Rilke’s poetic writings, but
let us concentrate on how he views Rilke’s approach:
In the vast majority of cases Rilke does not make statements about an anthropolog-
ical or ontological state of affairs but first of all he gives witness to contradictions
experienced existentially. That all contradictions nevertheless constitute a whole
in a complementarist manner seems to be a desideratum arising from necessity
or desirability. (Fülleborn 1992, p. 152)
Robert Musil
In his novel Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften (A man without qualities), Musil
writes about the incestuous relationship of the siblings Agathe and Ulrich
who live in a world full of possibilities, which is all along contrasted with
the lives of persons living in a world of the more usual realities. Another
relevant feature of the novel is the use of two types of language to refer to
the same explanandum: (a) a precise, down-to-earth technical language,
and (b) the evocative language of a writer. The opening sentence of the
novel provides an illustration:
The low pressure over the Atlantic moved eastward toward the high pressure over
Russia; nothing as yet announced its tendency to circumvent the high pressure
on its northern edge. The isotherms and isothers did their duty . . . To use a word
which describes well the reality referred to, although that word is somewhat old-
fashioned, it was a beautiful August day in the year 1913.7
That passage illustrates one of Musil’s major themes: precision and soul,
facts and emotions. The event which occurred on that August day in 1913
provides a second example of facts and emotions: a car accident. A woman
standing by is emotionally seized by the accident and sympathises with
the victims. She regains her composure when a man next to her explains
(a) the significance of the lengths of the traces on road resulting from
an attempt to brake the car in the last minute, and (b) statistics about
car accidents in the USA, and when furthermore the ambulance arrives
7 ‘Über dem Atlantik befand sich ein barometrisches Minimum; es wanderte ostwärts,
einem über Rußland liegenden Maximum zu, und verriet noch nicht die Neigung, diesem
nördlich auszuweichen. Die Isothermen und Isotheren taten ihre Schuldigkeit. . . . Mit
einem Wort, das das Tatsächliche recht gut bezeichnet, wenn es auch etwas altmodisch
ist: Es war ein schöner Augusttag des Jahres 1913.’
and deals with the wounded in a matter-of-fact routine way. Finally the
woman loses the feeling of having witnessed something unusual which
merits reflection, and that is wrong in Musil’s eyes. Musil’s solution: the
scientist has to become something of a poet, and the poet something of
a scientist. Of course Musil himself was such a person, as were and are
others including to some extent Thomas Mann (who studied scientifically
the themes of his novels). Their task is to create a language which is
both precise and supportive of a moral and emotional life (cf. note 1,
p. 5).
The objective of writing was to gain insights into various contemporary
human interrelationships in order to assess what they might be like in
the future. Thus Musil produced several utopias around his hero Ulrich
and examined them. One of these utopias was the incestuous attempt
of Ulrich and Agathe to break all social taboos. One of the (foreseeable)
difficulties they encountered was that they could either move ahead and
experience the unknown, or reflect upon and speak about it, but not both
simultaneously. When they speak, Ulrich uses more a scientific language
and Agathe one of emotions and feelings. Their difficulties in speaking to
each other can be understood as symbolising the ‘two cultures’ situation
(C. P. Snow) of twentieth-century society. Scientific language needs to
open itself up to emotions, and the language of emotions has to become
more precise. That will not lead to a single mixed language, nor will it
get all difficulties out of the way. It is simply the best that can be done.
Summing up, both Rilke and Musil sent a message for a new rela-
tionship, a getting away from one-sided approaches, from unbalanced
dominance by one side and towards an encompassing wholeness which
takes into account various perspectives and a beneficial, fruitful relation
between them. Has the message been received? Yes, to some extent, I
would say. But as discussed in previous chapters, there are still many for
whom it is too new, perhaps too demanding, too much ‘against nature’
to be acceptable.
Niels Bohr
In the public mind, the Danish physicist Niels Bohr is often associated
with the complementarity of the particle-like and the wave-like behaviour
when explaining the nature of light (‘seemingly irreconcilable points of
view need not be contradictory’).8 Actually, he introduced the idea of
8 As a matter of record (e.g., Beller 1992, p. 154), to ‘visualise’ the nature of light, Bohr
favoured neither the picture of a single continuous wave nor that of a localised point-like
particle, but one of a wave-packet, a superposition of waves trains of different vibrational
frequencies.
complementarity – in my view an expression of RCR – quite differently.

The objective was not to ‘combine’ what had been considered as mutually
exclusive, but to keep distinct what had been ‘confounded’.
At the congress of physics held in September 1927 in Como, Italy, Bohr
for the first time introduced in a public lecture his formulation of comple-
mentarity. To understand that introduction, some background knowledge
is needed. In 1913 Bohr had presented his heuristic ‘planetary’ model
of atoms: the electrons were supposed to circulate on stationary orbits
around the atomic nucleus without emitting (or absorbing) energy/light.
This was coupled with the quantum postulate: when absorbing or emit-
ting light, the electrons ‘jumped’ from one well-defined discrete orbit to
another well-defined discrete orbit.9 The ‘stationary’ orbits had an angu-
lar momentum which was an integral multiple of the value h/(2π ), where
h = Planck’s constant. The difference between the energy of orbit n, En ,
and that of orbit n + x, En + x , corresponded to the vibrational frequency ν
of the light waves absorbed or emitted by the ‘jumping’ electron7: En+x −
En = ν h. In absolute terms, the energy of the ground state (smallest
radius), En0 , is the smallest. Absorption of energy translates as ‘jumping’
to a larger radius and ‘jumping’ from an orbit with a larger radius to one
with a smaller to emission of radiation. Thus, the space–time description
(the orbits) was confounded with the energy balance.10
Bohr’s model was incomprehensible in terms of classical physics (cf.
Beller 1992, p. 155), but produced the correct numbers of the spec-
tral frequencies of atomic hydrogen. After quantum mechanics had been
developed, the model faced opposition from two camps (Beller 1992,
pp. 152–63). On the one hand, Schrödinger insinuated that his own (con-
tinuous) wave mechanics explained light emission and absorption without
recourse to stationary states (fixed orbits) and quantum jumps (cf. Bohr
1985, p. 47). On the other hand, Heisenberg wanted to do away with
a space–time description altogether, claiming that his matrix mechanics
and his particulate-kinematical interpretation of atomic systems did not
need it (Beller 1992, p. 156).
Bohr’s solution at Como was as follows (Bohr 1985, p. 115 [= p. 567
of Atti, 1928, the Italian conference proceedings]):
The very nature of the quantum theory thus forces us to regard the space–time
co-ordination and the claim of causality, the union of which characterises the
9 See http://www.colorado.edu/physics/2000/quantumzone/bohr.html for a model and
http://dbhs.wvusd.k12.ca.us/Chem-History/Bohr/Bohr-1913a.html for Bohr’s original
publication.
10 A causal space–time co-ordination is natural (and appropriate) for billiards players: they
interpret a successful strike which propels the ball to where it is wanted as having been
hit with just the right energy (and direction).
classical theories, as complementary but exclusive features of the description,

symbolising the idealisation of observation and definition respectively.
Hence Bohr insisted that a simultaneous consideration of the space–

time vector and the energy–momentum vector was prescribed. In other
words, he gave up the possibility of observing and describing the space–
time behaviour of the electrons inside the atom, thereby avoiding any
disturbance of their energy and therefore removing a major objection to
a stable electron energy. Bohr thus saved a basic feature of his model
of stationary states and quantum jumps, although not in the original
form of the ‘planetary’ model. On the debit side, without a space–time
description, the ‘jump’, the mechanism of the transition from one energy
state to the next could not be elucidated, in particular not the exact time
of its likely occurrence. Summing up his Como lecture, Bohr said (Bohr
1985, p. 135 [Atti 1928, p. 587]):
the concepts of stationary states and individual transition processes within their
proper field of application possess just as much or as little ‘reality’ as the very
idea of individual particles. In both cases we are concerned with the demand of
causality complementary to the space–time description, the adequate application
of which is limited only by the restricted possibilities of definition and observation.
I close with three remarks. (1) This not being a physics text, I have
simplified the presentation considerably, as a perusal of Bohr (1985)
and Beller (1992) will easily show. (2) The RCR features standing out
are Bohr’s insistence (a) on keeping distinct appropriate (idealised) as-
pects11 and (b) on their context dependence. (3) Bohr’s interest clearly
11 Robert Russell (1989) applied Bohr’s insight to the problem of understanding God’s
providence (cf. Reich 1991, pp. 80–1). Russell suggests that any causal explanation
involving God should be kept separate from a personal or historical space–time descrip-
tion of what happened: God’s action cannot be merged point-by-point with a diachronic
event description into a unified picture. However, a sequence of events can be explained
ex post facto as when Joseph tells his brothers (Genesis 50: 20 NRSV): ‘Even though you
intended to do harm to me, God intended it for good, in order to preserve a numerous
people, as he is doing today.’ In other words, Joseph concentrates on the causality of the
outcome, and does not question (as is often done in everyday life) why God let it happen
that he was sold as a slave to the Egyptians, that Potiphar’s wife tried to seduce him, that
he had to go to prison although innocent, and so on.
Markus Mühling-Schlapkohl (2000) takes up that issue from the perspective of individ-
uation (= identity of an entity) and identification of that individuation. Until recently,
spatio-temporal location was a condition sine qua non identification was not possible.
Furthermore, identification implied individuation, and therefore spatio-temporal loca-
tion of individuation (a sufficient condition, not a necessary condition). As we have seen
from Bohr’s considerations, electrons inside an atom cannot be located spatio-temporally
with precision, and therefore their individuation is limited (if possible at all). Another
example given by Mühling-Schlapkohl concerns the very first moments after the big
bang: as long as the universe was smaller than the Planck length of 1.616 10−35 m,
was physics, not thought forms. However, one may well ask why his col-
leagues, who struggled with the same issues (see letters in Bohr 1985)
were not driven to Bohr’s insights by the empirical findings. Did Bohr
perhaps use a more appropriate thought form in his analysis?
Conclusions
What can be learned from the foregoing case studies? Each time, the
descriptions, explanations, models, theories, or interpretations A and B
were kept distinct, yet somehow linked. That is true too for Piagetian
operations, and dialectical as well as analogical thought. However, those
three thought forms deal with the ‘simultaneous’ presence of A and B, be
it in the same time frame or the same space frame. Not so RCR: the con-
tributions of A and B to the elucidation of the explanandum are context
sensitive. In one context (time frame, space location, situational circum-
stance), A is more ‘real’, respectively ‘visible’, explains more, in another
B. The second difference concerns the nature of the link between A and
B. In cases where Piagetian operations apply, A and B are intrinsically
independent yet imbedded in an unchanging mathematical or logical re-
lation involving the explanandum. In dialectical thinking, A and B are
‘opposites’ that ‘condition’ each other and evolve dialectically. In ana-
logical thinking, A and B share commonalities and exhibit differences;
they stay the same. RCR does not exclude A and B evolving, but usually
focuses on one or a few more points in time, space locations, or situ-
ational circumstances. The expectation is that (statistically) the ‘truth’
value stays the same for the same ‘context’ (time, space, situation). The
link between A, B, C . . . requires a few extra words.
In cases where RCR is applicable, the nature of the link (the entangle-
ment in quantum physics) is diverse. Let us look at the five case stud-
ies. For the Fathers of the Council of Chalcedon of 451, the link be-
tween the divine and the human nature of Jesus Christ doubtless existed
(‘without division, without separation’), yet was mystical (‘without con-
fusion, without change’). Van Gogh described the link between A and B
as between ‘one fragment of nature and another, which all the same ex-
plain each other and enhance each other’. For James, A and B both limit
and complement each other. Rilke took a similar view in regard to men
and within the Planck time of 5.391 10−44 sec, it does not make sense to speak about
space–time, and therefore not about identification/individuation if they depend on spatio-
temporal location. Given that it makes sense in quantum mechanics to speak about an
individuation which cannot be located in space–time, why not grant the same to God?
Theologically speaking, that is indeed unavoidable if God is to be the creator of space
and time.
and women. Musil dealt with the mutual limiting and enhancing of the
emotional and the cognitive domains. Finally, for Bohr the link between
the space–time vector and the energy–momentum vector is constituted
by Heisenberg’s indeterminacy principle. All these findings support the
claim explained previously (pp. 14, 55, 74) that RCR is a pragmatic rea-
soning schema (Cheng and Holyoak 1985) which allows for case-to-case
differences within a ‘loosely’ yet clearly determined framework of cogni-
tive activity.
9 Psychology
Chapters 9–11 have the following format. First, I apply ‘tacitly’ RCR
according to the eight steps of chapter 6 (pp. 103–4), and summarise the
results here as desiderata. Then I compare the actual (or sometimes the
past) state of affairs with those desiderata, and draw some conclusions,
mainly as to the degree of overlap of the two.
In this chapter four issues are considered: (a) the discipline as a whole,
(b) human development, (c) psychophysiological processes, and (d) func-
tional music. That list could be lengthened without difficulty. The aim
is not to cover psychology in its entirety, but to illustrate the potential of
RCR by means of a few (otherwise arbitrary) examples.
Psychology as a discipline
Desiderata resulting from applying RCR

To begin with a statement from chapter 2 (p. 26): ‘a complete psycho-
logical investigation should in turn look at the biological grounding, the
person-centred (conscious and unconscious) factors, and the bio-physical
and socio-cultural environments involved in human development, and
integrate the findings’ (Overton 1998, 1999). Applying RCR to that
statement, (1) a more narrow, ‘internal’ desideratum, and (2) a wider,
‘external’ desideratum result. The idea is that the effects would be
markedly positive if psychological research were inspired by these two
desiderata. Here they are:
(1) Given the unavoidable specialisation of present-day research and
the (narrowly) targeted application of its results, a concerted effort is
required (a) to create and maintain active contacts between the practition-
ers of the various schools of psychology, (b) to study the commonalities
and differences of their knowledge and insights, (c) to search for intrinsic
links between the findings of those schools, (d) to elucidate possibili-
ties for mutual fertilisation, (e) to establish the explanatory/beneficiary
145
potential in function of various contexts, and (f ) to strive toward an over-

arching synopsis/theory.
(2) Biology (including neurobiology and the evolution of life) may
be considered the (lower) antidiscipline to psychology,1 and the various
subdisciplines of psychology (social psychology, educational psychology,
political psychology, clinical psychology, psychology of religion, cultural
psychology) seen as the antidiscipline to sociology, education, political
science, medicine, religion/theology, culture theory, respectively. A con-
certed effort is required (i) to create and maintain active contacts between
the practitioners of biology, those of a given branch of psychology, and
the practitioners of the related discipline to which that branch of psycho-
logy is the antidiscipline, (ii) to study the commonalities and differences
of the respective knowledge and insights, (iii) to search for intrinsic links
between the findings of those disciplines, (iv) to elucidate possibilities for
mutual fertilisation, (v) to establish the explanatory/beneficiary potential
in function of various contexts, and (vi) to strive towards an overarching
synopsis/theory.
Meeting the desiderata

Collecting the empirical evidence for RCR presented in chapters 4 and 7
was a decade-long uphill struggle. To cover the much larger field of psy-
chology as a discipline in any comparable manner would vastly exceed
the scope of this chapter. In fact, my treatment here (and in the next
section) will be impressionistic – and sketchy. No doubt other workers in
the field will have different impressions or views. Under these conditions,
is it worthwhile to go on? My answer is ‘yes’, if the attention of some sea-
soned psychologist could be caught and at least a few younger colleagues
were encouraged to get into RCR.
Beginning with the ‘internal’ desideratum (1), and taking a ‘bird’s-eye
view’ over the history of psychology, one notes that in the last hundred
years a number of psychological schools have succeeded and in some cases
dominated each other rather than growing up together.2 That is also true
for other disciplines (e.g., the school in physics that explained the nature
1 The notion of ‘antidicipline’ implies a hierarchy of knowledge levels, broadly speaking
from physics, chemistry and biology to psychology, sociology and other social and human
sciences to philosophy. Hierarchy merely indicates the order of the levels; it corresponds
largely to the chronology of the evolution of the universe (and of human culture). The
‘lower antidiscipline’ figures just one rank below the given discipline under discussion,
for instance physics in relation to chemistry.
2 Clifford Geertz (1997, p. 22 – as quoted by Putnam 1999, p. 129) writes: ‘The wide
swings between behaviourist, psychometric, cognitivist, depth psychological, topological,
developmentalist, neurological, evolutionist and culturist conceptions of the subject, have
made being a psychologist an unsettled occupation, subject not only to fashion, as are
Psychology 147
of light in terms of tiny corpuscles, and the school of physics that explained
the nature of light in terms of waves), although the time frames may
be different (cf., note 13, p. 24). However, Liu and Liu (1997, p. 159,
passim) argue that in psychology revolutions have not been of a scientific
but of a social kind. According to these authors, the result has been and
is a non-cumulative discipline.3 A few of their examples may illustrate
that claim. In the late nineteenth century both Freud and Wundt set
much store by the detailed analysis of an individual’s reports of mental
events: free association, dream analysis, and in-depth interviews being
preferred by Freud (for studying the negotiation between the conscious
and the unconscious), experimental methods of introspection by Wundt
(for studying perception, sensations and feelings). Despite such a basic
methodological commonality, there was next to no discussion between
the Freud and Wundt schools, no interchange and mutual fructification
between the two endeavours, no common striving for developing a broad-
based understanding of the possibilities and limitations of introspection.
(That does not mean, of course, that other persons did not appreciate
the value of both Freud’s and Wundt’s work.)
When behaviourism took over after the First World War, introspection
was declared as not part of a scientific methodology. In fact, behaviourists
did not form a unified school, but believed different things. Nevertheless,
they were united by the belief that overt behaviour can be observed and
measured, but intuition, introspection, etc. often cannot. The opportu-
nity was missed to explore any potentially fruitful commonalities or links
between introspection and behaviourism, even at the level of method-
ology. Nevertheless, behaviourism changed from the Stimulus-Response
(SR) theory to the Stimulus-Organism-Response (SOR) theory.
Some decades later, behaviourism was largely replaced, mainly by so-
cial and cognitive theory. Basically, the cognitive revolution was an uprising
against behaviourists’ belief that animal learning could be translated di-
rectly into human behaviour. In this case of change-over there was more
all the human sciences, but also to sudden and frequent reversals of course. Paradigms,
wholly new ways of going about things, come along not by the century, but by the decade;
sometimes, it almost seems, by the month.’ While this is obviously a somewhat polemical
statement, the ‘conceptions’ listed overlap, and refer to different aspects of psychology,
there is a certain amount of overlap between Geertz’s ‘enthusiastic’ views and those of
Liu and Liu (1997).
3 That phenomenon exists also in other disciplines. Hillary Putnam (1999, p. 3) opens his
considerations on philosophy as follows: ‘The besetting sin of philosophers seems to be
throwing out the baby with the bath water. From the beginning, each “new wave” [marks
in original] of philosophers has simply ignored insights of the previous wave in the course
of advancing its own. Today we stand near the end of a century in which there have been
many new insights in philosophy; but at the same time there has been an unprecedented
forgetting of the insights of previous centuries and millennia.’
‘continuity’ in that the Organism (O) also plays a role in social and in
cognitive psychological theory, and in the understanding of individual
differences. However, little attempt was made to build an encompassing
accumulation of insights, or to explore links and possible mutual ferti-
lisation between behaviourism, social psychology and cognitive psycho-
logy – this with the possible exception of learning theory. All the same:
who would deny that the policy of the carrot and the stick (explainable by
behaviourism) has a long history, surely not because of its total inefficacy?
In sum, much of the past history can be characterised as having taken
place at level I or level II of RCR, if that is an admissible way of putting it,
and little mutual exploration, let alone in-depth stimulation took place.
All is not bleak, of course. Some bridge-building has been tried by
individuals. An example would be Hans G. Furth’s (1987) essay on
Freud and Piaget, aimed at allowing their theories to illuminate each
other, and similarly Seymour Epstein’s (1994) work. Cichetti and Cohen
(1995) bridge developmental and clinical psychology, Noam and Röper
(1999) bring developmental aspects to bear on psychotherapy. An even
more recent, ‘collective’ example (Paloutzian, 2000) is the fruitful dis-
cussion of ‘spiritual intelligence’ by Emmons (personality psychology,
especially ultimate concerns), Gardner (cognitive and educational psy-
chology), Kwilecki (empirical religious studies) and Mayor (personality
psychology, especially emotions).
Summing up, the record seems to show that initially desideratum
(1) was hardly met in psychology as a discipline, but with time the subdis-
ciplines interacted more (partly guided more by pragmatism than princi-
ple). Meeting desideratum (1) was more frequent at the level of individual
researchers and in applied psychology such as psychotherapy (e.g., Grawe
1998), all with good results.
As regards desideratum (2), many positive examples spring to mind.
The entire nature–nurture debate centres on both biology and psycho-
logy. In the beginning, there was much rivalry between the proponents of
each view.4 It was felt that only one of the explanations could be signifi-
cant, not both. Yet neither side could triumph definitely over the other.
Finally that debate led to questions such as, ‘How do the two factors
operate?’ (Anastasia 1958), ‘Are their effects additive or interactive?’
(Overton 1973), ‘How does that affect mental development?’ (McCall
1981). As evidence accumulated, for example when training top athletes
(Andersen, Schjerling and Saltin 2000; Niemitz 1987), the common view
changed: ‘either nature or nurture’ gave way to ‘both nature and nurture’.
4 A militant rivalry still seems to exist between biological and cultural anthropologists
(Stanford 2000, p. 39).
Psychology 149
More specifically, Piaget (1971) always linked cognitive development in

a general way to its biological base. Today, desideratum (b) is largely met
(e.g., Kirsch and Hyland 1987; Elman et al. 1997, p. 23; de Waal 1999,
and, above all, evolutionary psychologists such as Buss 1999), and the
actual knowledge and research benefit correspondingly.
In time, it also became clear that one of the causes for the difficulty of
collaboration between the various protagonists was divergent philosoph-
ical groundings. ‘Such presuppositions ultimately determine the types of
questions that will and will not be asked, and the types of methodologies
that will and will not be employed’ (Overton 1973, p. 78). In particular,
the additive camp (nature and nurture show up in separable components,
with can be added together) had adopted a mechanical world view, and
the interactionist camp (nature and nurture are non-separable, and inter-
act strongly) an organismic world view (ibid., p. 79).5
Preserving/regaining health is another area of evidence for the positive
effects of a situation referred to by desideratum (b), this time involving
psychology and medicine (e.g., Robins and Rutter 1990; Del Volgo, Gori
and Poinso 1994).
Psychology and physics also have their area of mutual fruitfulness (e.g.,
Baird 1997). Baird starts off explicitly with a discussion of complemen-
tarity, and treats issues like the sensory aggregate model, and the psy-
chophysics of memory.
In brief, to judge tentatively from this anecdotal evidence, a case could
be made that meeting the desiderata resulting from applying RCR is
beneficial to psychology as a field.
The case of individual development

In this case, A stands for a development of the individual based on group
characteristics, and B for a development drawing on his or her inner abilities
and own dynamic. The desideratum from applying RCR is the standard
one, namely to consider A and B ‘together’ while keeping them distinct,
elucidate any links between them as well a context-sensitivity of their ex-
planatory power, and after all other steps have been achieved successfully,
to construct an overarching synopsis or theory.
5 This is by no means an exceptional instance. The foreground/surface dispute is not infre-

quently about one thing, while the real issue is about another: the underlying philosophy
of knowledge. A classic case of this is the decades-long, sometimes acrimonious debates
on the epistemological status of quantum theory (e.g., Heisenberg 1958, pp. 128–46),
in particular the exchanges between Bohr and Einstein (Bohr 1958, pp. 32–66). The
suspicion is that (perhaps unwittingly) Bohr defended a phenomenological world view,
and Einstein the pantheistic philosophy of Spinoza (deus sive natura).
Hamilton Cravens (1987, p. 327) makes the following observation:

‘developmental science appears inherently more controversial than many
other sciences’. Cravens ascribes this to the tension between the develop-
ment of the individual and that of the group to which ‘science’ or ‘society’
assigns the individual. Has an individual only those characteristics or pat-
terns of behaviour, A, that were generic to the group to which he or she
had been assigned (within individual differences as found in that group)?
Or, B, could an individual develop outside that range according to his or
her own dynamic of inner abilities and outer stimuli? One issue in that
context is the (tacitly) assumed taxonomy of natural and social reality
which exerts its effects at a deep structural level of the scientific commu-
nity. In contrast, the events, which people see and in which they partic-
ipate, exist at a ‘surface’ level. According to Cravens, from 1870 to 1920
the question of an outstanding individual in practice was not in the fore-
ground because a much more mosaic view of development reigned, with
many detailed preoccupations such as the importance of the body, nutri-
tion, etc. Mental testing presupposed that also intelligence was inborn,
biological (B dominated). From 1920 onwards a significant change took
place in that a more holistic view took over, the whole was now thought to
be greater than the parts. During that period it was no longer biology but
the group which gave the individual his or her lifetime identity (A dom-
inated). Contrary to the prior period, the deep-lying taxonomy now put
the social reality above the natural reality. Any contrary findings there-
fore provoked much controversy. However, with time, the idea of a whole
greater than the parts weakened. Each part now has to be understood
on its own terms. From such a perspective, a child developing outside
the range of his or her group becomes more acceptable. Once more, we
witness a development which parallels the sequence of RCR levels, and
brings the situation closer to the desideratum.
What does all this tell us? That fashions are at work in psychology as
distinct from paradigm changes forced on the discipline by the exhaus-
tion of the contemporary paradigm, by clear evidence that it is no longer
fruitful? Maybe, but I would rather attribute such a state of affairs to a
lack of a deep-seated conviction that any scientific endeavour gains from
a (fair-minded and competent) competition and interaction between dif-
fering approaches, models or even theories. Perhaps it is unavoidable
that a group of researchers carrying out a difficult lengthy investigation
also engage themselves emotionally in that enterprise with the effect that
incorporating other points of view into the programme becomes diffi-
cult. However, an undue singular focus may not be in the best interest
of the research in question. A more pragmatic view of what happens
Psychology 151
actually in the field would be that – contrary to abstract subdisciplines

per se – individual researchers are basically ready to improve their ap-
proach wherever the ideas come from. Maybe the reality of ‘isolation’
vs. ‘collaboration’ is co-determined by the local culture, personal dis-
positions and attitudes – and possibly age. There are no doubt hurdles
on the way to adopting an RCR heuristic (see pp. 159–60), but that
does not make it less attractive from the perspective of potential positive
results.
Psychophysiological phenomena
Here is another field of investigation where meeting desideratum (b)
above looks fruitful (Jackson [1884] 1958; Edelheit 1976; Fahrenberg
1992). A central research question is how best to study and understand
phenomena like pain, fright, and the like. Generally speaking, these phe-
nomena are perceptible at three levels: (i) introspection by the persons
concerned; (ii) observation of their behaviour; and (iii) measurement of
physiological changes, for instance brain activity, heart beat frequency,
and/or skin resistance.
Problems arise because (i), (ii), and (iii) traditionally use differing
methods, and are based on different theories. Briefly: (i) values fairly open
interviews and their interpretation using hermeneutics, (ii) specifies data-
taking, for instance with video cameras, and their ‘objective’ quantitative
analysis, and (iii) involves appropriate medical tests and measurements
as well as their comparison with the base line values concerned.
How does RCR desideratum (2) – p. 146 – come in here? In two ways:
first, through insisting that (i), (ii), and (iii) should be kept distinct, as far
as both data-taking and initial explanations are concerned. Often, that is
indeed already the case in practice, although occasionally explanations are
immediately taken from another level, which is not admissible. Second,
after going through the first six steps of chapter 6 (pp. 103–4), an over-
arching theory might suggest itself in outline.
Equipping respondents with recording equipment and with measuring
devices and then taking data both from introspection and from those de-
vices during normal working activities is a practical step in the indicated
direction, even if the results are not error-free.
A successful extension consists in considering psychotherapy as a field
viewed from the perspectives of, first, fundamental psychological knowl-
edge and, second, research into the efficacy of the various psychothera-
peutic methods, and then to propose the most suitable method(s) for a
given diagnostic (Grawe 1998).
Which music for which purpose?

You are sitting in a dentist’s waiting room. You are somewhat apprehen-
sive: ‘how painful will the treatment be?’ But then a relaxing music takes
over; soon after, your apprehension is practically gone.
There is no known society which does not have some type of music. The
general issue of this section is to determine which type of music best suits
a given function. In other words, how is one to classify functional music,
music that enhances a person’s mood, and possibly fosters action? In some
cases the answer is obvious because the music has evolved or has been
composed for a particular purpose such as a lullaby, a dance music, or a
military music. The overall answer – if it exists – cannot be just formal –
in each case it also depends on the particular culture, the context, the
personality and motivations of listeners and other intervening variables.
Elsewhere (Reich 1990c), I have analysed the Live Aid rock marathon of
19856 from the perspective of the diversity (a) of listeners’ motivations
to participate, and (b) of the effects of the concert on the listeners. I
do not claim expertise in this area, but simply want to show that RCR
can nevertheless offer insights, in particular if one enters the field as a
newcomer. In contrast to previous examples of applying RCR, the task
now is to understand the reasons for a solution already provided, not to
find a solution. The claim is that the RCR heuristic is helpful for reaching
this objective fairly rapidly, mainly thanks to determining appropriately
the partial reasons A, B, C for the extant ‘guidelines’ about providing
functional music, and working from there.
The explanandum is, Why are the guidelines (see p. 155 below) for pro-
viding functional background music in shopping malls, waiting areas, work
places and similar locations as ‘flat’, as ‘inexact’ as they are?
Tentatively, the competing reasons are conceived as follows: A, the
physiological response of humans to various sounds, B, the emotional
response to various types of music, and C, musical preferences in various
contexts. The task is to understand the explanandum by considering A,
B, and C ‘together’ (yet keeping them distinct), elucidating any links be-
tween them as well as any context-sensitivity involved, and so on (steps 2–
7 of chapter 6). What is this all about?
It is well known that the use of functional music has a long history,
starting with ‘ritual’ music, which dates back thousands of years. What-
ever its cultural setting, ritual music is said to be powerful, meaning-
ful, mediatorial, and transformative, and to be ‘a path for human and
6 This rock concert collected some £50 million for needy children in Africa; a number
of the biggest names in rock music participated and donated their earnings to the good
cause.
Psychology 153
divine meeting’ (Collins 1989, p. 3). Also, ‘music is a way of inhabiting

the body and of situating a self or a people in time and space’ (Power 1989,
p. 149). However, this does not mean that all problems have been solved
by choosing the ‘right’ ritual music. Not only do cultures change, but also
ideas about rituals, and reactions to a given piece of music. And there is
‘technological’ development: from the Gregorian chant to the electronic
organ and the synthesiser. One particular issue is whether in ritual, words
come first and the music should suit them or whether it is the other way
around. Also, where deep cultural differences exist, the suitability of a par-
ticular music for a given purpose will be questioned (cf. Power, Collins
and Burnim 1989). For instance, some traditional Christian churches re-
strict music appropriate for church services to spiritual music. In contrast,
for some tribal religions use of sensual music is equally appropriate.
Another long-standing use of music is ‘music while you work’. In this
case a differentiation imposes itself between (a) spontaneous singing and
the like for accompanying and enjoying the work, and (b) externally tar-
geted music for raising workers’ output. Here we are concerned with (b).
Europeans used music as early as the fifteenth century to activate work-
ers, and Jesuit missionaries in Latin America used it to induce natives to
do manual labour (Rosenstiel 1997, p. 159). In the last decades detailed
studies were made which elucidate the effect of music on the quantity
(more effective during night shifts) and quality (less clear) of work. Re-
sults indicate the best effect, that is higher productivity, was obtained
when music was played for 10 per cent of the time during the day, and
50 per cent during evening and night shifts (ibid., pp. 161–2).
As far as the ‘listener’ is concerned, there are at least seven ways to listen
to music7 : (a) ‘motor’ (music resonates with the desire to move contin-
ually), (b) compensatory (music makes one feel less lonely), (c) vegeta-
tive (music gets under the skin), (d) diffuse (listening to music with one
ear only), (e) emotional/sentimental (bathing in the music, dreaming),
(f ) associative (linking music with visual representations) (g) distanced
(trying to understand the structure of that particular piece of music)
7 According to David Hargreaves (1986, pp. 105–42), listeners’ responses depend in par-
ticular on the state of three psychic levels. (a) The most stable level, that of taste response,
reflects long-term predilections honed by activities like concert-going and record-buying.
This response is under a high degree of conscious control. (b) Preference response re-
sides at a medium level between instant reaction to music and long-term commitment.
(c) Mood/emotional responses are of a short-term nature; they are least internalised in the
sense that listeners exert little control over them (ibid., p. 108). That construct shares
features with Simon Epstein’s (1990, 1994) ‘cognitive-experiential self-theory’ (CEST).
Epstein posits that personality emerges as the product of (i) the Freudian and Jungian
unconsciousness (c above), (ii) conscious processing of information in a rational manner
(b), and (iii) an experiential system operating preconsciously that interprets reality and
directs behaviour in everyday life yet does not exclude control (a).
(Rösing 1997, p. 116). For instance, the composers of film music base
their work on (f ), associative listening. Their music ‘explains’ the emo-
tions of the actors like love or hate, awe and joy, that is it helps the
spectators to understand the feelings of the protagonists. Alternatively,
the music prepares the spectators for what is coming: an eerie music pre-
cedes an encounter of the third kind, a horribly frightening music leads
up to a murder, and so on.
From the side of the music producer and that of the music seller, effec-
tive functional background music should (i) create an ‘atmosphere’ (acous-
tical ornamentation); (ii) ‘cover’ disturbing noise produced by work in
progress (absorption of unwanted din); (iii) activate the tired and calm
the nervous (conditioning and influencing subjective psychic states); (iv)
stop reflection by way of spreading well-being through a familiar music
(mental stabilisation through emotional synchronisation) (ibid., p. 122).
Obviously, much more could be said (the handbook of the psychology
of music I am using has about 700 pages), but let us see whether we can
summarise something as to specifics of A, B, and C above in order to ad-
vance with applying RCR to the explanandum. Since A, the physiological
response of humans to various sounds, has not yet been considered, the
pertinent information is provided directly. Relevant studies show in par-
ticular that the left ear is better at recognising bits of music played on the
piano, the violin, and the organ, and the right ear better at recognising
rhythms (Fassbender 1997, p. 624). There exists also much knowledge
as to how sounds ‘penetrate’ the limbic system and the cerebral cortex,
and influence the vegetative neural system.
How about B, the emotional response to various types of music? From
the foregoing it seems likely that no single answer can be given. Even
without the extra complication of different types of music (including that
of high culture, folk culture, and mass culture), and listeners’ personality
and socialisation as well as their developmental stage (Hargreaves 1986),
not forgetting their attitude towards and their experience with music, the
several ways to listen to music (a) to (f ) (p. 153 above) bring in extra
diversity.
C, musical preferences for various contexts, presents a similar problem.
Again, no unique answer seems possible beyond some general consider-
ations. The volume of sound needs to be appropriate for each occasion:
softer in waiting rooms, cafés, etc., many decibels at rock concerts. Nei-
ther a totally unknown piece of music nor a piece which is currently
popular is likely to be pleasant for very many persons.8 By the way, that
8 How does the pleasantness of a piece of music develop with time? That relation takes the
form of an inverted U shape: something entirely new and unfamiliar is rarely experienced
as pleasant, and a music heard ‘too often’ is not very pleasant anymore; the optimum
lies between the two. The happy-medium situation for experiencing pleasantness seems
Psychology 155
immediately creates a problem. If a shopping centre wants to attract cus-

tomers for extended Christmas shopping, familiar Christmas music is the
order of the day. But what about the sales staff? How long can they stand
the continuous repetition of a limited series of tunes?
Where does that lead us with regard to understanding the explanandum
(Why are the guidelines for providing functional background music in shopping
malls, waiting areas, workplaces and similar locations as ‘flat’, as ‘inexact’ as
they are?)?
These guidelines are as follows: (a) the basic recipe is to use well-known
pieces of music in a new arrangement; (b) to use a very simple structure
(short motifs, their multiple repetition, simple harmonies); (c) the basic
‘frequency’ is 70 beats per second (the average human heart beat), any
variation being slow and gradual; (d) solo singers are disfavoured on the
grounds of being possibly too involving; (e) the volume is more or less
invariant throughout a musical programme – in shopping centres and
restaurants it is three dB above the general noise level, in working areas
seven dB; (f ) unusual sound combinations are avoided, a ‘blended’ type of
music produced by synthesiser is preferred. Furthermore, when actually
playing the music, the following is considered ideal: (i) the sources are
distributed so that their location can hardly be recognised; (ii) the audio
frequencies are limited to about 80 to 4000 Hz (neither very low nor
very high notes); (iii) the music is not necessarily played continuously –
interruptions create an impression of no beginning and no end; (iv) single
pieces of music are assembled into programmes providing some variation
in the musical sound characteristics (harmony, melody, timbre), and the
rhythm (Rösing 1997, pp. 119–20).
How do these guidelines (a)–(f ) and (i–iv) connect with the reasons
A (physiological response), B (emotional response), and C (preferences)
(Table 9.1)? We begin with the clear cases:
Under A come (c – 70 beats/sec), and likely also (b – simple struc-
ture), (e – invariant volume), and (f – blended music) as well as (i –
distributed sources) and (ii – limited frequency range). The frequency of
70 beats/sec, (c), positively reinforces bodily the stability of (involuntary)
music consumers. We class such a guideline as justified by a ‘positive’ rea-
son. The other guidelines (b, e, f, i, ii) are designed to minimise unbalance
and instability (‘negative’ reason).
To B (emotional reactions) pertain guidelines (d – no solo singers),
(i – distributed sources), (iii – no beginning, no end), and (iv – pro-
grammes with variety). Rule (iv) is a positive compromise to meet the
multivariate diversity of B for which no single ‘right’ answer is possible.
to be a familiar piece of music of medium complexity, as subjectively perceived, listened
to from time to time. However, experts will analyse the issues involved in a much more
finely grained way (e.g., Hargreaves 1986, pp. 110–22).
Table 9.1 Classification of the guidelines (a) to (iv) for functional

background music according to the reasons A (physiological response to
music), B (emotional response to music), and C (musical preferences).
Positive guidelines are designed to reinforce desirable behaviour, negative guidelines to
minimise undesirable behaviour. Further explanations in text.
Reason A B C
Positive guideline c iv a, iv
Negative guideline b, e, f, i, ii d, i, iii (a) d (e, f )
Guidelines (d), (i), and (iii) are ‘negative’ compromise solutions to min-
imise unwanted behavioural effects.
For C (preferences) a similar state of affairs is true; consequences
are guidelines (a – known pieces in a new arrangement) and (iv – pro-
grammes with variety) as positive compromises, and (d – no solo singer)
as prevention.
But then, apart from (d), (i), and (iv), there are further overlaps: (a –
known pieces in a new arrangement) could also be justified by B (neg-
atively), and (e – invariant volume) as well as (f – blended music) by C
(negatively).
One result of this exercise is to have become aware in more detail that
the explanandum is not a well-defined ‘functional whole’. Nevertheless,
the exercise has been worth the effort, at least for me, in that a sense of the
multivariate nature of the guidelines and of their interconnections has
been gained. Once more, that is partly due to determining the explanan-
dum appropriately (Reich 1995b) as well as A, B, C . . . , and looking for
relations between A, B, C and the explanandum as well as between A, B,
C themselves.
Conclusions
If any conclusion can be drawn from such impressionistic and sketchy
evidence, it would be as follows. Several examples were used to demon-
strate the usefulness of RCR in various areas of psychology, be it for
starting research, determining an appropriate methodology, or interpret-
ing results.
Not unexpectedly, the field as a whole started at low RCR levels, with
a correspondingly low effectiveness as a consequence. By now, higher
RCR levels have been reached, and that proves mutually beneficial for
the subdisciplines concerned. Where not yet done, it is to be hoped that
RCR will be applied more and more in appropriate cases.
10 Education
Once more, many examples could be dealt with under this heading. Three
were chosen, partly for their diversity: (a) who controls the educational
system?; (b) teaching the investiture contest; (c) stimulating RCR in the
classroom.
Who controls the educational system?

Since the dawn of humanity, the question of who is in control, that is,
who is the more powerful, has, as a rule, been decided by an open or
a covert fight, from which a victor emerges. Not infrequently, that also
goes for the educational system. Dictatorships use it to produce obedient
followers. But even in democracies ideological fights about the access
conditions and the curriculum are not uncommon (e.g., note 1, p. 105).
What should be done according to the RCR heuristic? Inspired by the
issue of the investiture contest (see below), the desideratum would be to
give roughly ‘equal’ power and responsibilities to the state authorities, the
school itself (including some sharing with the students), and the parents.
What is the actual situation?
In most countries monolithic solutions are more visible as regards the
control of the educational system(s) than stipulated by the desideratum.
In other words, either the state, often a ministry of education or an-
other administration such as a municipality, controls everything (finance,
staffing, curriculum, entrance test and examination procedures, etc.) or
the control is largely in the hands of a school or university itself, par-
ticularly if it is private. In the first case the system may well suffer from
sclerosis; in the second case a lack of common standards, and even of
effectiveness, may hamper education, in particular in the case of chil-
dren who need to change schools repeatedly because of their parents’
mobility.
A system meeting the above desideratum is the Dutch educational
system (Liket 1993). In the Netherlands practically three out of every
four schools are ‘private’. Public and private schools have equal rights
157
before the law. The consequence is that the founding and the orientation
of a given school (or university) is largely unrestricted, yet it is publicly
financed. Nevertheless, all institutions of learning are subject to three
restrictions: (1) they must conform to the rather general state laws on
education; (2) all schools and other institutions of learning have to accept
inspection by national inspectors; (3) all students must take a national
examination at the end of the obligatory school attendance, the result of
which counts for 50 per cent of their total grades. ‘Institutions of learning’
in this context include universities; their external inspection has existed
for more than ten years.
What are the advantages of this system? (a) On account of the greater
responsibility given to individual schools/institutions – which includes
general educational policy, curriculum, hiring of staff, and budget
administration – they are motivated to develop an identity, to innovate,
and attract students. This has led them to propose detailed educational
programmes to prospective attendees, in order to facilitate their choice.
Also, the schools/institutions recognise their duty to account for their use
of taxpayers’ money. (b) Nevertheless, the state retains the power of a
selective control (e.g., of the educational programme) as opposed to either
full control or total deregulation, and in particular the power to sanction
abuse. The outcome is a broad curricular spectrum, yet standards are
preserved and moving from one institution to another does not present
major difficulties.
Teaching the investiture contest

The reason for including the following example is that RCR can bring
out the full meaning of the conflict and its solution – and thereby improve
its teaching – and this conflict was an important one; it had widespread
consequences. The example concerns the investiture contest, which took
place in Europe from 1075 to 1122 (e.g., Roberts 1985, pp. 470–2;
Kinder and Hilgemann 1984, p. 148). It was solved in 1122 by taking
into account the complementarity of the different powers involved. Otto
I (912–73), Holy Roman Emperor (936–73), had granted worldly power
to the bishops, thereby making them his vassals. Along that line he also
took a hand in investing clerics with a bishopric. This went on until Pope
Gregory VII (1073–85) in 1075 claimed the sole right to appoint to a
vacant bishopric, that is, to implement the investiture, and contested the
right of kings or even emperors to do it. The pope’s decision led to extreme
consequences, including deposition of the pope by a German synod,
excommunication of King Henry IV (1056–1106) and his humiliation at
Canossa, nomination of the rival Pope Clement III, conquest of Rome,
Education 159
the crowning of Henry IV as emperor by Clement III (while Gregory

VII maintained himself solitarily in his Roman fortress), more strife and
wars. Finally, in 1122, the Concordat of Worms was concluded, which
put an end to the investiture contest.
How was the solution brought about? First, a third party was intro-
duced into the procedure, the chapter of canons of the cathedral pertain-
ing to the vacant bishopric (= A). It was up to that chapter to propose
a candidate. The chosen candidate was then invested with his temporal
(worldly) power by the king/emperor or his representative (= B), sym-
bolised by the handing over of the sceptre, and finally with his spiritual
(ecclesiastical) power by the pope or his representative (= C), symbol-
ised by the handing over of the staff and the ring. Thus, each of the three
parties co-acted in the investiture.
To come to a full understanding of what is involved, outsiders (but also
insiders) have to consider that investiture procedure from the standpoint
of each party A, B, C and its context, and they need to consider the subtle
links between the outlook and interests of A, B, C. Also to be noticed
are the additional possibilities which were opened up through adopting
such an approach. The chapter had basically three choices: a ‘neutral’
candidate, one who was more inclined towards the king/emperor, or one
who was more inclined toward the pope. Depending on the situation, the
chapter could elect one or the other, and try to get some ‘compensation’
from the advantaged party. The king/emperor would insist that the bishop
engaged himself fully in his worldly affairs, and he could hope that the
bishop would also bring his spiritual experience and ecclesiastical powers
to that task. The pope from his side insisted on the priority of the spiritual
and ecclesiastical tasks and hoped that they would be facilitated through
the bishop’s worldly power. In any event it is clear that this solution in the
RCR spirit was less socially disruptive than the foregoing state of affairs.
Playing the roles A, B, C in the classroom can help students to appreciate
the full significance of the Concordat of Worms, and pari passu to get into
the RCR spirit.
Stimulating RCR in the classroom
Hurdles on the way to RCR

Before describing the explicit stimulation of RCR in the classroom, it is
useful to have likely obstacles in mind (Reich 1990b, pp. 154–5; 1991,
p. 87; 1996a, pp. 135–6). These are discussed by going from the more
general to the more specific. They apply less, the further a person has
advanced in mastering RCR.
Either/or orientation: (a) For more than 90 per cent of their existence
as a species, humans were hunters (and gatherers). ‘To fight or to flee’
was and is a question when facing a sudden danger whose answer may
decide survival. (b) Such an either/or action pattern may (unwittingly)
be transferred into a thought pattern. In present everyday life, the alter-
natives are usually less dramatic, but still of the alternative variety: yes
or no, right or wrong, good or bad? (c) Such either/or thinking, which
has of course its proper place, in our culture is encouraged to overstep
the boundaries of its legitimate application by a deep-seated bias towards
formal binary (Aristotelian) logic. ‘Paradox’, a ‘non-excluded third’ and
the like are intellectually suspicious, are assumed to indicate a lack of a
deeper analysis which would eliminate them (or even indicate a person
with a weak character who is afraid of taking decisions!). (d) From a dif-
ferent perspective, either/or choices help to buttress one’s identity in an
ambiguous or even hostile environment, to put solid foundations under
one’s ideology, and so on. Particularly in the latter cases, such an either/or
position may even be unconscious.
Lack of motivation: Apart from a general resistance to newness and
change, there are specific explanations for a lack of motivation to become
familiar with RCR and to develop it. Point (d) just made indicates one rea-
son for a lack of interest in entering into a dialogue about alternatives. Why
waste time, when one has made up one’s mind about who one is, and what
one believes and wants to achieve in life? A different reason is a marked un-
familiarity with the topic under discussion to which RCR is to be applied.
One simply does not know where to start and how to proceed. So one sim-
ply drops out. Yet another reason could be that a sufficient level of cogni-
tive development has not yet been reached, leading to a similar (re)action.
Specific shortcomings: Table 4.9 (p. 72) lists some requirements for
reaching a particular RCR level. Before reaching that level, one or more of
those requirements were not met. Likely candidates (i) are insufficiently
competent to differentiate, (ii) lack competence to integrate, (iii) are at
too low a Piagetian (sub)stage, (iv) fixate on formal binary logic.
General approach in the classroom

Stimulating RCR in the classroom seems most appropriate for grades 5–
12. Starting with indirect methods in grade 5 (like letting students draw
pictures on an ‘RCR theme’ and comparing them), the stimulation can
become more explicit with increasing age. Nevertheless, for effectiveness,
it should be based on a particular subject.
In physics, one could start, for instance, with the so-called one-slit and
two-slit experiments, which demonstrate that light has a particle-like or a
Education 161
wave-like behaviour, respectively. The discussion of these empirical facts

could then follow roughly the steps (1)–(7) of chapter 6 (pp. 103–4).
In history, one might begin with the struggle between King Henry IV
and Pope Gregory VII (the investiture contest, discussed above). Again,
steps (1)–(7) could be used more or less to ascertain to what extent the
students could find a solution which would be similar to that of the Con-
cordat of Worms. Hurdles on the way would be systematically discussed
and dealt with.
In religious studies, a creation myth versus the big bang and Darwinian
evolution would be a good starting point (Reich 1996a). Once more, after
establishing the issues, the procedure would be as in the two foregoing
examples.
These introductory approaches are designed not only to find out what
the actual knowledge of the class is, but above all what the actual diffi-
culties with RCR are in terms of the three major hurdles listed above
(either/or orientation, lack of motivation, specific shortcomings). The
next steps, then, are based on targeted remedial actions to be based on
the actual findings during the initial exploration just referred to. I indicate
three steps in particular (Reich 1996a).
Specific stimulating actions

Differentiating: a simple example, usable from 8 or 9 years of age onward,
is provided by the figure–ground shift of the well-known instances ‘two
human faces – a vase’; ‘young woman – old woman’; ‘rabbit – duck’.
Thus the idea is introduced that two people can see something different
although starting from the same picture.
Another simple example would be to have students study and describe
different types of cross (Archiepiscopal cross, Calvary cross, Celtic cross,
Chi-rho cross, Greek cross, Jerusalem cross, Latin cross, Maltese cross,
Patriarchal cross, swastika, and Tau cross). Again, different persons will
visualise something different when the word ‘cross’ comes up.
A somewhat more demanding task is to compare Salvador Dali’s
‘melting’/‘dripping’ clock to a regular classroom clock (from grade 5
onwards). Without much help students usually find out that the artist
wanted to visualise human time, life time (which may be quite nonlinear,
and is reversible in thought), whereas the regular clock indicates mechani-
cal, linear time (Reich 1996a, p. 138). The context dependence of the
meaning of time would be a further step which offers itself as a sequel.
Integrating: a simple example would follow from the above discussion
about time. When do we use the one or the other time concept? What do
the two have in common? What happens if we confuse them?
A more controversial example would be to examine the arguments

for and against abortion from the perspective of the child, the mother,
and society. The fighting of illegal drugs, another possible theme, will be
discussed shortly (chapter 11).
Sometimes, unexpected results provide an immediate opportunity for a
little exercise in integration. In a religious education class, the opportunity
arose from the narrative of the prodigal son (Luke 15: 11–31).1 When
asked to find a title, the pupils (aged 16) split spontaneously into two
groups: ‘The tale of a large-hearted father’ versus ‘The tale of the son
believed to be lost’ (Reich 1996a, p. 139). There was a competition as
to which title was the most fitting with arguments going to and fro but
no single attempt at integration. After some prodding came a first answer
indicating integration: ‘The tale of the son believed to be lost and his
return to his large-hearted father’. As it turned out, this was just a peace-
making move without a real conviction behind it. The discussion therefore
continued as to the meaning of the ‘and’. The students finally understood
that the ‘and’ was not just a grammatical conjunction but involved an
intrinsic link: the son had returned not just because he had fared ill but
because he knew his father was large-hearted.
Different logics: this is probably the most difficult issue of the three.
To begin with, the adolescents may take ‘logic’ to mean ‘as commonly
understood’, ‘as empirically tested’, ‘in accordance with common sense’
or the like over against ‘referring to principles and rules governing the
proper use of reasoning’. If no agreement can be obtained to use logic in
the latter sense, it may be useful to use a term such as ‘philosophical logic’
in order to distinguish the meaning we are discussing from the meaning
the pupils imply spontaneously.
The next difficulty may well be their narrow but strong either/or
orientation. Then, a dispassionate discussion aiming at demonstrating
the validity limits of formal binary logic probably will not lead far. A sur-
prise of some kind is required to ‘unbalance’ a deep-rooted orientation or
rather conviction. In one case, involving the adolescents in a discussion
about who was at fault when a boy and a girl their age (who went with
each other) quarrelled seriously, did the trick. After a heated discussion
about who was to blame, the pupils concluded that the future of the rela-
tionship was not foreseeable by logical argument but its future was open
1 Similar narratives (learning from leaving home, experiencing various occurrences, and
finally returning home) exist worldwide, not last in Zen Buddhism. To remember,
Gautama Siddartha of the Sakyas (who became the Buddha), according to legend was
transformed from an heir to a king’s throne into a spiritual leader after encountering the
Four Passing Sights, (i) a decrepit, broken-toothed, grey-haired trembling old man, (ii) a
body racked with disease lying by the road, (iii) a corpse, and (iv) a monk with shaven
head, ochre robe, and a bowl (Smith 1965, p. 92).
Education 163
because ‘the confidence had been shaken’ and it was not possible to know
ahead of time how the relationship would evolve after that event (Reich
1996a, p. 140).
It may also be helpful to look at the difference between ‘where is smoke,
there is smoke’ and ‘where is smoke, there is fire.’ The first statement, an
identity, is valid at all times and in all conceivable universes. However,
not much can be learned from it. The second statement is probabilistic;
underlying it is a ‘weaker’ logic. That statement is not true all the time
but when it is true it is helpful.
Once an opening has been achieved, the usual classroom approaches
should lead towards an understanding of different logics as discussed in
chapters 3 and 5. However, such an understanding is unlikely to arise by
a sudden ‘conversion’. Rather, it will need time and ever-renewed efforts
using differing cases for a deeper understanding to arrive and become
ingrained.
Does all this sound like a detour? Yes, it is a detour. But according to
my (limited) classroom experience (in Germany) it may save time in the
end because some of the above hurdles have been overcome.
Concluding remarks
So far I have written about (1) the organisation of teaching and learning
in terms of sharing the responsibility between the public and the pri-
vate sector, (2) teaching a subject where RCR makes a difference, and
(3) stimulating and supporting RCR itself.
I could have gone into more issues in order to illustrate the role and
the breadth of applicability of RCR in education. For instance, what is
the relation between teaching methods, classroom climate, and pupils’
progress? Or, how are ‘method and manner’ of teaching in the classroom
interrelated (Fenstermacher 1992)? The method is geared to increase the
effectiveness of teaching content, the manner to developing pupils’ valued
dispositions and traits of character. However, these two objectives cannot
be put into watertight compartments. To learn content, pupils are not
just challenged at the intellectual level, but also at the dispositional and
motivational levels, which are affected by the manner of teaching. To
develop their valued dispositions and traits of character does not simply
involve habituation and training, but also reasoning about intentions and
actions, an intellectual pursuit requiring effective teaching methods.
Another example could have been ‘leading’ or ‘letting grow’ as edu-
cational approaches (Reich 2000a, 2001b): should the teachers do all
they can to rid children as fast as possible of childish views and ways,
or should children set their own pace to grow out of them? Yet another
example would be the composition of the curriculum: which and how

much subject matter should there be on account of its usefulness for
future professional life and which subject matter and how much because
of its value for furthering students’ personality, social competence, and
ethical values?
Both intercultural and anti-racist education are educational activities
that should benefit from applying RCR. A hundred years ago, many coun-
tries were strictly monocultural, e.g., Japan, Ireland, Norway. Then, the
transmission of the culture and civic education went hand in hand: be-
coming an adult immersed in the local culture as part of one’s identity
blended perfectly with growing into a citizen who values and supports
the political system. However, at present, with immigration, refugees,
the worldwide web, postmodernism and other developments, in many
countries pluralism reigns, at least as far as culture (and religion) are con-
cerned. Education then should serve two masters: ‘democracy’ (equality
and justice for all; government by the people, etc.) and ‘ethnicity’ (grow-
ing deep roots in a supporting community of ‘likes’; communicating in
one’s native tongue; celebrating important events in a particular, emo-
tionally satisfying manner; and so on). Why does RCR come in here?
Because both aspects are indispensable for living together in peaceful
and mutually beneficial ways, yet may come into conflict or at least be in
competition: how to teach history, which languages to learn at what age,
how to balance the scientific and the spiritual, what to do about moral
and civic education, in sum, in which context to emphasise which aspect.
As to religious education (cf. chapter 7), a further promising theme
would be Martin Luther’s ‘semper justus et peccator ’. How can a person be
at the same time a ‘saint’ and a ‘sinner’?
11 Social Issues
Three issues are discussed in this chapter: (a) overcoming illegal use of
drugs; (b) dealing with nuclear energy; (c) rehabilitating depressed areas.
The common thread is again what RCR-inspired solutions would look
like vs. the actual current state.
Overcoming illegal use of drugs
RCR desiderata
Abuse of drugs, illicit narcotics and other health-impairing substances
is unfortunately a real problem in many countries. What can be done
about such a state of affairs? On the one hand there are the answers of
extremists: (a) make available to every adult what they want, let them be
the judge of what is right for them; (b) fight harder, make stricter laws, put
more police on the job, punish more heavily, eradicate the evil. Clearly,
experience shows that neither (a) nor (b) alone is the solution. In fact,
some countries which had moved markedly towards liberalisation have
reversed that tendency. Where suppression alone was applied, substance
abuse has hardly lessened, if at all.
What would desiderata inspired by RCR look like? The explanandum
would be something like, ‘What does it take to maintain physical and
mental health of the greatest number of people despite the menace from
substance abuse?’ The various partial measures would be, A, preven-
tion (in the family, at school, by various communities, by the state, by
the media – reaching both non-consumers of dangerous substances and
consumers); B, repression (e.g., fighting the traffic in illegal drugs); C,
therapy (dishabituation/severance and rehabilitation of substance users);
D, social reinsertion; E, survival of persons for which C does not work
(e.g., methadone programme and comparable programmes, clean rooms,
exchange of hypodermic needles); such a programme will also be likely
to lower the rate of crime related to illicit drug use. A major effort
should concern A, because in case of success, B, C, D, and E become
165
unnecessary. Lessons learned in C, D, and E should be fed into A. B needs

to be a wide-ranging, international effort. A point of attention: as some
drug users are also dealers, the police measures should not discourage
those persons from turning to C (which implies a certain confidence to-
wards the ‘authorities’). C will much depend on motivating the potential
participant; only committed participation will result in success. D is indis-
pensable to make an initial success last. E is probably contentious. These
considerations apply to various substances likely to be abused (including
alcohol); however, in the following I shall concentrate on narcotics.
What are the practical difficulties? We look first at the situation in
Switzerland, not only because I know it best (without being an expert)
but above all because it meets several – but not all – of the RCR desiderata,
and then at Frankfurt am Main, Germany. The emphasis here is (1) on
the thought processes of the persons responsible for those programmes
which (by retroduction) are probably of the RCR type, and (2) on the
beneficial aspects. However, we are not dealing with Ohm’s law, but with
a complex, multivariate, changing phenomenon. The statistics are not
always accurate (for instance, the numbers of deaths due to drug abuse)
and the explanations of a given state of affairs and its changes may only
be more or less correct approximations. Nevertheless, the main lesson
should become clear: complex situations call for complex, differentia-
ted, and integrated solutions involving an appropriate logic, which is not
necessarily of the binary kind.
The situation in Switzerland

What is the situation in Switzerland? From the mid-1980s drug addicts
came out more and more into the open, in particular in Zürich and even
in Bern, the federal city, creating public pressure for remedial action.
(According to survey polls, in the mid-1990s, the drug problem came
second only to unemployment on the Swiss scale of worry.) At the time,
dealing with drug problems was the responsibility of the twenty-three
confederate states (of which three are further divided into ‘half-states’).
Given the ubiquity and the importance of the problem, the federal gov-
ernment started decreeing its first measures in 1991, and subsequently
developed a policy, which will be described momentarily. However, ac-
cording to the Swiss constitution, the political power is with the people.
Whenever 100,000 registered voters sign an initiative, it has to be voted
on nation-wide, and, if successful, parliament has to legislate accordingly.
The initiators of a first initiative, ‘Jugend ohne Drogen’ (‘Adolescents and
youth without drugs’), collected 140,949 signatures, and presented them
on 22 July 1993 to the authorities. The objective was a strong reduction
Social Issues 167
of illegal drug consumption, ideally its complete eradication; this through

an all-round repressive approach, the abolition of controlled medical ad-
ministration of drugs to certain narcotic addicts, etc. The Swiss rejected
that initiative on 28 September 1997, with 70.6 per cent voting ‘no’.
The initiators of a second initiative ‘Für eine vernünftige Drogenpolitik’
(Droleg – ‘For a reasonable narcotics policy’) collected 107,699 signa-
tures and presented them on 1 November 1994. That initiative proposed
the complete decriminalisation of (so far illegal) possession and con-
sumption of narcotics, the authorisation to cultivate the pertinent plants
in one’s garden, the (controlled) possibility of buying narcotics legally in
pharmacies, and so on. This time, 73.9 per cent of the Swiss voters said
‘no’ on 29 November 1998.
That left intact the ‘Four-point-programme’ of the federal government:
(a) prevention (to keep the number of new addicts as low as possible –
primary prevention – but also to limit the slide to total addiction –
secondary prevention); (b) survival help for addicts in a critical state
(to minimise damage); (c) therapy (medical, psychological, social) and
reinsertion into a normal life (as much as possible); (d) active repression
(in particular of the activity of dealers) (Dreifuss 1995, p. 33).
The Swiss governmental programme

How was that programme devised and implemented? The Swiss minister
for justice and police, Bundesrat Arnold Koller, characterised the issue
as follows:
By now we all know that overcoming illicit use of drugs is a difficult, multi-
faceted, lengthy undertaking, for which no patented recipes are available, nor
simple solutions free of contradictions. Therefore we need to be modest as to our
expectations . . . We are dealing with complex social, political, legal, economic and
medical problems. (Koller 1995, p. 15)
On 18 February 1995, a National Drug Conference took place in the

parliament building at Bern. Present were members of the federal, state,
city governments and agencies, relevant private organisations, represen-
tatives of parents of drug addicts, and former addicts. The four-point
programme was discussed in eight working groups (four in German and
four in French), and proceedings issued (Eidgenössisches Departement
des Inneren [EDI – ministry of the interior] 1995). The discussion in
the working groups illustrated (in my judgement), among other things,
the well-foundedness of the above desiderata, and the potential benefit
of applying RCR to the problems on hand. I report the problems point
by point.
The prevention first of all needs to be specified as to its aims: eradi-

cation of illicit drug use (an utopian objective?) or limiting detrimental
effects as much as possible? (In the latter case, secondary prevention gains
weight.) Next, the substances to be covered have to be agreed upon: ‘soft’
narcotics, ‘hard’ narcotics, other psychotropic drugs, alcohol, tobacco?
A third issue is the scope of the prevention: (a) providing information
on drugs to adolescents and youths, parents, schools, political decision-
makers, the media; (b) furthering personal competence of adolescents
and youths in the social and emotional domains as well as for making
decisions to lessen the danger of falling prey to drug use as a way out of
situations perceived as insoluble; (c) advertising the beneficial effects of
youth centres, sports clubs, and the like; (d) demonstrating the increased
risks due to unemployment, ostracising addicts, and cutting relations
with them. Then there is the choice between the carrot and the stick (or
both): strengthening the will to live a healthy fulfilling life versus focusing
on the likely negative consequences of taking illicit drugs (ill-health, social
stigma, possibly prison). Among the difficulties prevention has to grapple
with are the following: (i) To what extent should responsibility be shared
with the potential addict (primary prevention) or the actual addict (sec-
ondary prevention)? If too much is done for the person concerned, will
that not lessen his or her motivation to take responsibility? And if too little
is done, could that lead to disaster? (ii) How can one convince anybody
to make a personal effort, to abstain from consuming certain substances,
when living in a society built on consumption, and with advertisements
for alcohol and tobacco everywhere? (iii) What should repression look like
so as not to be detrimental to prevention? For prevention to be effective,
some confidence regarding the authorities is needed. If repression is too
indiscriminate and brutal, then at least the addicts who are small-time
dealers will not have enough confidence to listen and reflect. (iv) Strapped
of sufficient financial means, authorities have a tendency first to cut
the budget for prevention rather then the other three budgets. In brief:
there is plenty of scope for looking into mutual relations, respective ef-
fectiveness, and context dependence of the various aspects and factors
involved.
Survival help is partly a result of the acknowledgement that drug addic-
tion cannot be eradicated and will be with us in the future. Initially,
survival help was limited to addicts who agreed to a cure. With time,
the insight grew that such a restriction was counterproductive at least
in some cases. Longitudinal studies yielded the following insights (EDI
1995, p. 43 [German], p. 50 [French]): addiction develops in three/four
stages (1) pharmacological effects; (2) psychological dependence (addic-
tion); (3) reduction of previous social integration (work, home), possibly
Social Issues 169
leading to homelessness and abandonment by society; (4) after a vari-

able time (up to many years), in many cases turning one’s back on
drugs and returning to a ‘normal’ life (about 30–40 per cent of long-
term addicts). The justification for survival help is provided by stage
(4): the objective is to get through stages (2) and (3) without irrepara-
ble damage (HIV, hepatitis, or death – about 10–20 per cent of long-
term addicts die; 30–40 per cent continue a life as addicts more or less
well, without reaching phase 4). Actual measures include hypodermic
needle exchange programmes (used needles for new needles), methadone
programmes, heroin programmes for addicts who would not survive oth-
erwise, and resocialisation programmes (work, housing, leisure). Some
of the difficulties facing prevention apply also to survival help, in par-
ticular the need to motivate the addict to take things in hand himself
or herself, and the co-ordination between survival help and repression
from the perspective of creating and preserving sufficient confidence in
the authorities. The difficulties with the heroin programme are discussed
below.
Therapy has obvious medical and psychological features, but also edu-
cational aspects. The aim is not only to heal the addicts, to strengthen
their health and social integration, but also to prevent lapsing back into
an addiction (tertiary prevention). The latter aim is facilitated if sup-
ported by society. People should understand that ex-addicts need to be
accepted, integrated, and supported. The therapy has to take into account
the particular situation of the client concerned and to respond flexibly.
However, in all cases the aim is to regain and strengthen normal func-
tioning of the client in daily life. To be effective, therapy has to have a
low access threshold. Collaboration with prevention can make prevention
more effective through better targeted, more realistic actions. Collabo-
ration with survival help can lead to a more effective therapy of a given
survivor.
Repression concerns combating drug dealers, preventing certain areas
from becoming a dealers’ and addicts’ ‘paradise’, and protecting citizens’
property and security against illegal acts by addicts. One difficulty resides
in the narcotics law, which stipulates that the possession of even small
doses of ‘soft’ drugs is a criminal offence. The consensus was that such
a possession for the purpose of personal consumption should be taken
out of the law to free the police for more important tasks, and avoid
antagonising addicts, whom one wants to free themselves from their plight
by undertaking a cure in one of the specialised rehabilitation centres
(12,000 ‘slots’ for oral methadone treatment; 1,300 residential ‘slots’ in
1993). These institutions are mostly privately owned but subsidised by
the state.
The overall consensus was that the four ‘pillars’ are all important and
the federal programme should be implemented throughout Switzerland,
even if the authority of the twenty-six states and half-states is recognised,
and it is acknowledged that their policies differ (so far). Implementation
requires co-ordination and flexibility, given the ‘internal’ links between
the four programmes. This was/is recognised, for instance, in the half-
state ‘Basle City’ (the other half-state being ‘Basle Countryside’), where
a ‘Drogenstammtisch’ (round table on drugs) held a series of meetings
for that purpose.
Some reservations concerned and still concern the heroin programme
of survival help, which was formally illegal according to the narcotics
law then in force. Consequently, the Swiss government on 18 February
1998, changed that law through a decree legalising the heroin programme,
whose validity is time-limited until a new narcotics law is in force. Citizens
not agreeing with that decree (which is not consonant with recommen-
dations by the UN World Health Organisation) successfully launched
a referendum against it (requiring 50,000 signatures), and voting was
fixed for 13 June 1999. The government explained its policy in a fifteen-
page brochure (Bundesamt für Gesundheit 1999). Two main points were:
(i) medical treatment involving the administration of heroin is strictly
limited to persons who have been heroin addicts for at least two years,
have unsuccessfully followed a cure at least twice, are 18 years of age or
older, and exhibit damages due to heroin in the medical, psychic, and
social domains; (ii) the pilot studies carried out during the first two years
of the programme clearly showed positive results, as certified by exten-
sive medical studies. In particular, homelessness of addicts was markedly
reduced, job-related activities increased, friends were more frequently
non-addicts, physical and mental health improved to some extent, the
number of delinquents strongly diminished (by about 40 per cent) – as
did the number of punishable misdeeds (by about 70 per cent) – and
about a third of the participants at some stage went into a cure with
the aim to become ‘clean’. The Swiss voters accepted the governmen-
tal decree, and thence the continuation of the heroin programme, by
a majority of 54.3 per cent. Nevertheless, as the weak majority shows,
the opposition is not convinced of its justification. Counter-arguments
are (Schweizer Ärzte 1999): (a) while the programme is clearly appli-
cable, and its success undeniable, the proof has not been established
that the success is due to the heroin per se, and not to the accom-
panying psychosocial measures, medical treatment, etc.; (b) if a heroin
treatment is imperative for survival, the maximum duration should be
about six months (followed by a different programme more likely to
lead to eventual abstinence); (c) one does not know for certain what be-
came of a number of participants who are said to have gone into a cure;
Social Issues 171
(d) putting the emphasis on ambulant treatment by controlled heroin in-

jection disfavours institutions working with stationary addicts but who are
determined to become fully ‘clean’ through abstinence (a more strenuous
and costly procedure but likely to be more effective in the long run).
Concluding, the following may be said. The number of drug addicts
in Switzerland increased markedly between the end of 1980s and the
beginning of the 1990s to about 30,000 addicts, whose activities were
more and more visible in public. The yearly death rate due to drugs
went from 85 in 1978 to 205 in 1988 and to 419 in 1992 (Gervasoni,
Dubois-Arber, Benninghoff, Spencer, Devos, and Paccaud 1996, p. 52).
A strong public concern resulted. Among other measures, it led to a
first-time involvement of the federal government, which proposed a pro-
gramme closer to the RCR desiderata than the ‘extremist’ initiatives pro-
posed by particular groups. This led to a vast public debate, sometimes
heated, but in the end beneficial. The Swiss people decided to support
the government’s programme. It is now being consolidated through ap-
propriate legislation and financing (about $700 million per year, of which
about half is for repression, but only 3 per cent for prevention). One
can ascribe the stabilisation of the number of addicts and the decrease
of drug-related deaths (to 205 in 2000 – Bundesamt für Polizei 2001,
p. 36) at least partly to that programme, in particular to the new pil-
lar, the survival help. An unanticipated side-effect of the heroin pro-
gramme seems to be that it helps to prevent adolescents from being
tempted by drugs: the adventure of experimenting with a forbidden, ex-
citing drug was great, but who wants to go into unglamorous medical
treatment two or three times a day, demonstrating, among other things,
that he or she is ill? (That the heroin programme is not uncontested has
been made clear, I hope.) All the same, not to paint too rosy a picture, it
has to be said that it remains difficult to come to a fully consensual sol-
ution, given the various medical, social, and political forces pulling and
pushing in diverging directions, not to mention the debatable funding
(or rather lack thereof ) of some activities. Recently, the state parliaments
of Basle City and of Zürich requested that the Swiss Federal Congress
should legalise the use of cannabis when re-enacting the Swiss federal
narcotics law, currently under revision. Both houses seem in favour, but
wish to exclude legalising the use of ‘hard’ drugs. The new narcotics
legislation is scheduled to be enacted in 2002.
The programme of the city of Frankfurt am Main, Germany

As we have seen, one of the conclusions of the Swiss experience was to
emphasise the importance of co-operation. Following the 1989 ‘Frankfurt
Resolution’, the city of Frankfurt took measures (Drogenreferat 1994,
1995) in consonance with the above RCR desiderata (formally unknown

to the city fathers), and developed an ever widening co-operation. That
policy starts from the recognition that our culture seems incapable of
eradicating illegal use of narcotics. The objectives were and are therefore
to minimise the risks involved, to limit the damages, and to reduce human
suffering through a common effort. Only a limited overview focusing on
the differentiation and the integration of the measures taken is provided
here.
Since the early 1990s, the Office for the Prevention of Drug Abuse
(Drogenreferat), the Public Health Service (Stadtgesundheitsamt), the
Office for Adolescents and Youth (Jugendamt), the Social Services
(Sozialamt), the relevant Municipal Administrative and Legal Services
(Ordnungsamt, Rechtsamt), the Police Commissioner (Polizeipräsident),
the (private) Associations for Assistance to Addicts (Trägerrunde der
Drogenhilfe), the Frankfurt Attorney General (Staatsanwalt), and the
Railway Police (Bahnpolizei) meet each Monday (Montagsrunde) to dis-
cuss and propose measures, evaluate their effects, and recommend im-
provements. These meetings continue to be held fruitfully (in 2001).
Since the early 1990s the Municipality has notably provided appropri-
ate medical services, exchange facilities for hypodermic needles (5,000
daily, corresponding to the number of heroin addicts), possibilities for
methadone-assisted therapy, shelters for homeless drug-addicts, training
facilities and a labour office for ex-addicts. Thanks to more sophisticated
police actions, the number of dealers and of drug-related crimes has
declined – as has the number of newly HIV-infected persons (mainly on
account of the needle exchange programme).
Apart from the main effects of improved health and diminished crim-
inality, a welcome side-effect occurred: the population, and in particular
the business community, fully support the programme of the Frankfurt
Municipality. Nobody wants a return to the situation of the 1980s, when
the police chased addicts through downtown Frankfurt, addicts admini-
stered narcotics to themselves while in public view, and drug-related
violence was a daily occurrence. Also to be noted: when the majority in
Frankfurt changed from the Social Democrats/Greens to the Christian
Democrats, the programme was continued unchanged. A particularly
controversial issue was the provision of appropriately equipped rooms
where drug addicts can exchange needles, inject substances, and so on.
However, given the beneficial effects, they were more and more accepted
by the taxpayers, and in 2001 were open twelve to thirteen hours per
day, time-shifted between 6 a.m. and 12 p.m. Frankfurt’s municipality
has introduced a heroin programme (1 November 2001), Swiss style.
They have battled for years with federal agencies and law courts to that
Social Issues 173
effect; the federal government elected in September 1998 introduced this

possibility nation-wide.
Now that the basic programme is established, attention has turned
to many detailed improvements, particularly in the area of co-operation
(Drogenreferat 1998). A major drive goes towards the co-operation with
youth centres and the like. That is in line with a policy change from ‘let
the addicts come to us’ to ‘let us go out to meet potential and actual drug
addicts where they are’. Of late crack presents a new problem, and gave
rise to a crack street programme. As far as one can judge, the success of
the multifaceted, co-operative programme in Frankfurt is reflected in the
diminishing numbers of deaths linked directly with illicit drug use: from
147 in 1991 (the high point) to 68 in 1993, 47 in 1995, 22 in 1997, then
roughly stabilising with 34 in 1998, 26 in 1999, and 30 in 2000; actually,
some of the victims were ‘tourists’, that is, they did not live in Frankfurt.
Summing up, the similarities, even isomorphisms between the inde-
pendently formulated RCR desiderata on dealing with the menace from
illicit use of narcotics and the actions in the field (formally not guided by
those desiderata) are striking. One reason is presumably that the issues
we are discussing cannot be dealt with by using exclusively formal bi-
nary logic: the variables are multiply connected in not too clear ways, the
various situations are hardly fully reversible, some variables have more
weight in one context than in another, yet it is important that all are con-
sidered and attention is paid to all of them. Therefore, the RCR logic
looks like doing the job. Furthermore, cognitive complex thinking, a
major ‘component’ of RCR (Table 4.7, p. 66), is called for when dealing
with the complex problems on hand. While most of the desiderata are
being tackled, the difficulty of giving a high priority to prevention should
nevertheless not be overlooked. Maybe the other measures are closer to
the state of public opinion.1
1 After the unprecedented attacks on New York and Washington (11 September 2001),
President George W. Bush declared ‘war on terrorism’ in terms of diplomacy, finance,
military action, etc. Developing the horizons of the mind and applying the RCR heuristic
should be helpful also in that case, proceeding mutatis mutandis as in the case ‘Overcoming
illegal use of drugs’ just dealt with. Particular attention needs to be paid to the battle for
the hearts and minds of the world population by way of television pictures (and speeches).
Taking the cue from Michael Sells (Haverford College), I observe that Western TV sta-
tions offered to Osama bin Laden (and the Taliban) free of charge plenty of possibilities
for image associations (Bin Laden = pure Islam, defender of the poor and the wronged,
leader of jihad, etc.) for which the tobacco industry in their case (Marlboro Man, Sexy
Man, Sophisticated Woman, Liberated Woman, Thoughtful Man, Social Man, Powerful
Woman) has to pay many hundred millions in cash. Following Bernard Haykel (New
York University), this dangerous game has to be opposed notably in the following way:
(1) publishing a list of all Muslims, women and children who died in the World Trade
Centre attack, possibly with photographs; (2) inviting Muslim leaders to discuss these
facts with impartial and respected Islamic legal scholars, also in the Middle East (Cairo,
Nuclear power
RCR desiderata
Who is not aware of the nuclear accidents at the Three Mile Island
(TMI) nuclear power station near Harrisburg in the USA (28–29 March
1979), at the Ukrainian Chernobyl reactor no. 4 (26 April 1986), and
at the Japanese uranium-processing plant at Tokai-mura (30 September
to 1 October 1999)? The Tokai-mura accident (class 4 event on the
seven-point ‘International Nuclear Event Scale’ (INES) of the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in Vienna, Austria – INES 1992)
caused much less, and less lasting damage and human suffering than
the class 7 Chernobyl accident (Bojcun 1991; Fritsch 1992; Gonzáles
1996; Rich, 1991), with the class 5 Harrisburg accident somewhere in
between (United States 1979), yet closer to the Tokai-mura accident as
far as classification according to the IAEA INES (1992) is concerned.
The commonalities of the three accidents are at two levels: (a) all in-
volved serious human errors; (b) many public and media reactions were
at a rather low RCR level (when compared to Bertrand’s answer above,
p. 21), not infrequently of the type ‘Stop nuclear energy now. Close down
all nuclear power plants!’
What does an RCR approach look like in this case? There are two
desiderata, a narrower desideratum, (1), and a wider, (2). The explanan-
dum for (1) reads considerations and actions to minimise accidents in exist-
ing nuclear power installations. The parts which make up this functional
Mecca, Medina, Riyadh, etc.) and Asia (Pakistan, Indonesia); (3) given the teachings
of Islamic law (also concerning jihad) the ensuing fatwas (legal opinions) can only be
unfavourable to Bin Laden and unrestricted violence of the World Trade Centre horror
kind. They should be used (together with other means) to make clear that the image
associations with which Bin Laden and the Taliban invaded the world do not correspond
to reality and that their acts are in fact contrary to Islamic teachings. The importance of
image associations was also brought home to me through the following experience. Four
weeks after the beginning of the war on terrorism in Afghanistan, a thoughtful, trusted
colleague wrote an e-mail to the effect that the war should be stopped immediately be-
cause it had no effect on the Taliban but killed many innocent women and children. When
I reminded him of this mail after the collapse of the Taliban regime was clearly visible,
he explained that he had been under the strong grip of the pictures showing wounded
children in hospital (rather than remembering, e.g., the bombardments in Serbia which
led to the downfall of the Milošević regime). Could it be that after a period of a literary
culture we revert to the older pictorial and symbolic culture although in new clothes?
RCR also leads to the insight that one side’s terrorists may be the other side’s freedom
fighters and correspondingly to a preference of the label perpetrators of unrestricted violence
or equivalents. Beyond this particular aspect, RCR advocates putting oneself into the
shoes of the perpetrators and their sympathisers, and then into the shoes of those they
blame and accuse; this in order to get an understanding for the changes and actions likely
to lead to long-term solutions.
Social Issues 175
whole are A the plant (operation and maintenance), B the operating crew
(operating instructions and continued education/training), and C the
interface between A and B (control-room layout and instrumentation,
actual controls and indications).
The explanandum for (2) reads long-term provision of economic and eco-
logically acceptable energy. The relevant considerations include A, safety
of various forms of energy, B, economics of various forms of energy (in-
cluding availability), C, ecological aspects.
As before, I shall compare and contrast these desiderata with what
actually happened in the field. I present separately (a) event descriptions,
(b) dealing technically with existing nuclear power stations, (c) human
aspects; this with respect to desideratum (1). I continue with (d) coming
to grips with certain wider human problems, and (e) the question of
energy for the future; this with respect to desideratum (2). Although
being distinct, the four points (b), (c), (d), and (e) are clearly linked. To
avoid misunderstandings: what follows are not technical proposals; that
is the task of the many experts of the various national and international
agencies, and of the industry concerned. Rather, it is one more illustration
of the potential of an RCR perspective.
Event descriptions
As the root cause assessment brought out, the TMI accident at Harrisburg
was a particularly telling example of an interwoven net of technical mal-
functioning and decisive human errors. Therefore, an attempt to present
a linear sequence analysis is not really helpful, even if it were possible.
First, there were design errors and weaknesses. In the control room they
included: (a) the controls and indications for the various plant systems
and subsystems were not grouped organically; (b) for a given malfunc-
tioning, a confusing flood of alarms lit up; (c) routine indicators signalled,
for instance, the change of the status of a control switch or button, but
not the result of pressing it (i.e., the closing or opening of a valve); (d) the
dials of critical meters were too limited, making it impossible to read off
to what extent safety limit values had been overrun. Second, in a differ-
ent rubric, the quality management of the maintenance had not detected
setting errors of safety relevant components, such as closing valves in a
standby cooling circuit, which thereby blocked its automatic coming on
line when needed. Third, under the heading of operator training, it turned
out that the operators had been taught to work with procedures based on
checklists, as distinct from malfunction analysis together with devising
and applying direct counter-measures and wider remedial action.
The actual radiation danger arose from the spilling of radioactive water
through an overpressure valve which had stayed open. That safety valve
had opened due to an overpressure caused by malfunctioning of the water

system. For hours, the operators did not understand what was amiss,
were confused by the numerous malfunction indications in the control
room, yet did not call for assistance when things became suspect. They
tried several interventions until finally they brought the situation under
control, by which time among other damaging and endangering effects
some radioactive substances had escaped into the air from an auxiliary
building.
The trigger of the Chernobyl accident was the desire of some engi-
neers, reasonable per se, to study as rapidly as possible the behaviour of
the power generator under non-standard operating conditions. That in-
volved switching off the reactor, or at least diminishing very markedly
the power output. To gain time, they attempted to do that (unreason-
ably) in a way which was against the operating rules, and in addition they
switched off safety circuits which would have stopped their manoeuvres.
A Russian expert illustrated their behaviour by referring to a pilot flying
at 30,000 feet who shut off all jet engines and ordered the entrance doors
to the plane to be opened. What else than total disaster is to be expected
thereafter?
At Tokai-mura, the critical process involved mixing the correct quan-
tities of uranium-oxide powder and nitric acid, and agitating the mixture
until uranium nitrate was formed. There were two distinct procedures
(which were programmed at different times), namely (a) for preparing
fuel for regular nuclear power plants using low enriched uranium, LEU,
and (b) for preparing fuel for Japan’s experimental fast breeder reactor us-
ing medium enriched uranium, MEU. Procedure (a) requires 16 kg LEU,
that is 238 uranium enriched to contain about 3 per cent of fissionable
235
uranium (of which 0.7 per cent occurs naturally in 238 uranium). Pro-
cedure (b) uses 2.4 kg of MEU, containing 15–25 per cent 238 uranium.
After the formation of uranium nitrate in either process, it was to be col-
lected in a precipitation tank and finally processed to become the actual
fuel. According to the plant designers, the introduction of uranium-oxide
powder and nitric acid into the mixer is to be done by a fail-safe metered
pumping system. The transfer to the precipitation tank through a fil-
tering process is again automated in principle. However, to gain time,
on instruction by their superiors, the three technicians cut out the first
(slow) automated phases, prepared the MEU uranium oxide solution in
a stainless-steel bucket and poured it directly into the precipitation tank
(which is normally closed but was opened for that purpose). Also, instead
of putting in the prescribed 2.4 kg of MEU, they put in 16 kg, the appro-
priate quantity of LEU. In fact, for two out of the three technicians, it was
the first time that they worked with medium enriched uranium, yet they
Social Issues 177
had not been instructed properly about the difference. As a result, they
unwittingly transformed the tank into ‘a makeshift nuclear reactor – one
with none of the shielding or safety controls that form part of a more con-
ventional reactor’ (The Economist 1999). We note among other points
the (partial) non-observance of the safety rules, and the insufficient train-
ing of the technicians.
Dealing technically with existing nuclear power installations

From the three major accidents already referred to, at least five valu-
able lessons have been learned. (i) The Harrisburg accident has demon-
strated that a containment vessel keeps outside contamination at levels
which are no cause for alarm, even in the case of a (partial) core melt-
down. The negative proof of that statement came from Chernobyl: the
absence of such a containment vessel was the major reason why the core
meltdown led to a contamination of most of northern Europe. (ii) A
water-moderated reactor is to be preferred to a graphite-moderated re-
actor (Windscale and Chernobyl), at least from the safety point of view,
because if the water-coolant is lost, the moderator is lost too ipso facto,
and the water-moderated reactor stops automatically.2 (iii) The neg-
ative reactivity of the Three Mile Island reactor (the power decreases
with higher coolant temperature) contributed to limit the gravity of the
accident, whereas the positive reactivity of the Chernobyl reactor (the
power increases with higher coolant temperature) contributed to a dra-
matic power increase, which reached about 100 times the nominal power,
and this despite the (manual) operation of the emergency stop of the
reactor. (iv) Several safety systems, working independently from inde-
pendent power sources (absent at Chernobyl), increase reactor safety.
The authority to switch them off should be restricted to experts who
know fully what they are doing (which was not the case at Chernobyl).
(v) The ergonomics of the plant operation, and in particular the plant–
operator interface, turned out to be a weak element which needed much
strengthening, including operator-friendly status indicators. While points
(i) to (v) are important (e.g., Nicolet, Carnino, and Wanner 1989; United
States 1979), and much attention was subsequently paid in particular to
point (v), equally important lessons concern the human operators (and
their supervisors) as well as other persons involved, to whom we now
turn.
2 A graphite moderated reactor simply continues operation after the loss of cooling
water – and furthermore the graphite may catch fire (as it did in 1957 at Windscale,
a class 5 accident, and at Chernobyl). In contrast, the Tokai-mura ‘reactor’ was stopped
by emptying the cooling jacket water from the precipitation tank.
Human aspects
As we have seen, in all three accidents under discussion the operat-
ing crew turned out to be unreliable. In particular, they did not follow
operating rules, at Chernobyl to an extreme degree (switching off safety
devices, etc., cf. Reason 1987), and almost as badly in Tokai-mura (The
Economist 1999). Obviously, operators must follow safety rules. That
is also true in other occupations, and maybe some inspirations could
be gained from there how to improve the relevant operator motivation.
Furthermore, operators should not only be cognitively and emotionally
knowledgeable and basically accept their work (Nicolet et al. 1989), but
also be unlikely to fall victim to malfunction-induced aberrant behaviour
(Reason 1987). Their continued training needs to involve simulations
under ‘realistic’ conditions.
To sum up, there is again much overlap between desideratum (1) and
actions in the field, in particular after the TMI and Chernobyl accidents.
As a matter of record, no comparable accidents in nuclear power stations
have happened since, although their number is on the rise (outside the
USA and western Europe), and if the remaining reactors at Chernobyl
have been shut down after lengthy negotiations, others of the same type
are apparently still in operation.
Coming to grips with certain wider human problems

Desideratum (2) – long-term provision of economic and ecologically ac-
ceptable energy – ideally asks for an emotion-free, scientific-technical
evaluation and discussion. However, as for instance the large use of nu-
clear power in France and the decision to terminate its use in Germany
show, reality is quite distinct from the ideal. Political considerations come
in strongly, and hence public opinion. As it happens, the public has a
rationality of its own, which does not necessarily help. The mining in-
dustry has had about 100,000 fatal accidents in the twentieth century,
about 500 deaths yearly at present, but hardly anybody makes a fuss about
it. And who demonstrates against grave medical errors, the murderous
highways, alcohol, tobacco and drug overconsumption, and the like, all
causing suffering and deaths? That attitude to is be set against the reac-
tions to the Contergan drama, the Bhopal catastrophe, and accidents at
nuclear installations, in the latter case even if nobody is hurt. It seems that
humans get careless about frequently occurring risks, and risks they enter
into voluntarily. In contrast, unexpected risks coming from the outside
arouse emotions (e.g., Grob 1991, 1995) and are violently denounced.
An emotion-free risk assessment would calmly contemplate risks, then
Social Issues 179
order them on a scale and attribute numbers, taking the cue from the
Richter scale for the strength of earthquakes or the IAEA nuclear event
scale. Rationally, risk reduction would then start with the highest risks. In
the meantime, social acceptability remains a factor in any decision about
nuclear energy, along with the other factors.3 Another curious fact: ten
years after Chernobyl, fifteen power stations of that very same type were
still in operation. Why does the experience with nuclear power not facil-
itate spending more money for reducing its dangers?
How about politicians and industrialists responsible for nuclear energy?
In the past, some of them – helped, I am sorry to say, by a number of
scientists – have since the 1950s told untruths, wittingly or unwittingly.4
In particular, they have exaggerated the benefits of nuclear energy while
minimising or even denying detrimental effects and negative aspects, es-
pecially in the area of waste disposal. The design of safer reactors has not
been supported appropriately (for instance, a prototype of the German
high temperature reactor (Kugelhaufenreaktor) was scrapped before its
research potential could be fully made use of), and the work leading to
final storage areas for radioactive waste does not get the required priority.
After the Chernobyl accident, two attitudes could be observed in par-
ticular: on the one hand minimising the event (in the first place by the
Soviet authorities, see Chernosenko 1991, but also – although to a lesser
degree – by the French authorities, who are responsible for a national
electricity production which is based overwhelmingly on nuclear energy),
and on the other hand bending over backwards to underline the gravity
of the immediate consequences of the accident.5 A result of either be-
haviour has been that the public – who can rarely really judge for them-
selves the complex issues involved – have largely lost trust in the per-
sons we are discussing (e.g., Der Spiegel 1991; Editorial comment 1991;
3 In that context I have some apprehensions though. To my dismay I learned from a TV
interview that a Swiss nuclear power plant operator never mentioned his occupation when
on holiday, because he feared that nobody would talk to him any more. Would a positive
operator image not be more motivating than a negative one? If society would really set its
mind and will to get the most competent and responsible operators possible, and would
accord them a corresponding social prestige (as was done to put a human being on the
moon), should it not be possible to count on really ‘safe’ operators?
4 One result has been the public’s loss of trust in politicians, and to a lesser degree of trust in
scientists. In a different rubric, Robert Park (2000) describes how the US government’s
secrecy and lying led to a build-up of ufo-logy, and a loss of trust in official reports
concerning UFOs, even in cases when they are entirely true.
5 For instance, the government of the state (land) of Hessia lowered the maximum admissi-
ble radiation intensity of one litre of milk to 20 Becquerel (= number of disintegrations per
second), about one-twentieth of the values set by the German federal and the Swiss confed-
erate governments. One hundred measurements of milk radioactivity in the Weser/Ems
district – which was supposed to have received more than the average fallout from the
Chernobyl accident – in no case yielded values in excess of 20 Becquerel/litre.
Vrijdaghs 1988). This is not helped by the sensationalism of the media

(e.g., Kepplinger 1989). For instance, right after the Chernobyl accident,
all sorts of recommendations were made in Germany such as ‘Stop your
children playing outside’, etc., creating the impression of a huge danger
for one’s life. After the event, it turned out that apart from some regions
in the north of Scandinavia and Great Britain, the additional radiation
due to Chernobyl was of the order of what each person receives anyway or
even less. And then, as to be expected, there are some black sheep among
the industrialists, who try to cut safety corners in order to make money,
and even use bribes to prevent detection (Vrijdaghs 1988). Admittedly, in
many western countries the government’s task is not easy, given the cur-
rent, often negative social climate in regard to nuclear power. However,
that is not a good argument not to try one’s best to deal rationally and
honestly with the issues discussed.
Energy for the future

The energy issue is often treated controversially, not to say ideologically.
This state of affairs has unfortunately not furthered an ‘objective’ exami-
nation (e.g., Goldemberg 2001; Kepplinger 1989), nor a process for
reaching a consensus. Such an examination would consider, in the vari-
ous regions of the world, all possibilities of energy use (e.g., Stegelmannn
1984) particularly from technical and economic perspectives as well as
the impact on the environment (e.g., Heinloth 1987) and on the standard
of living. If, for instance, the industrialised countries decided to change
over rapidly from nuclear plants to oil- and gas-fired plants, how would
that affect the oil and gas prices, and hence the chances of poorer coun-
tries to satisfy their energy needs?6 Admittedly, an overall examination is
not easy: How will the cost for solar and wind energy develop? Will fusion
energy become practical? Can nuclear reactor safety and waste disposal
be improved significantly? How much energy saving is socially achievable?
What other possibilities are there, for instance using fuel cells? These are
important open questions. In my view that is not a reason, however, not to
try to do one’s best to clarify them progressively (Functowicz and Ravetz
1992). In the meantime, the existing solutions need improvement. Fur-
thermore, the creative study of waste disposal needs to get more attention
and support.
6 Another issue in that event is the increase of CO2 pollution of the atmosphere due
to burning more traditional fuel and the resulting danger of damage to the ozone layer
and hence increased UV radiation. A German newspaper titled the recent decision of the
government to terminate the operation of nuclear power plants (in thirty years or so),
‘Extra hundreds of millions of CO2 into the atmosphere!’
Social Issues 181
Once more, there is some overlap between desideratum (2) and what
actually happens in the field, although less than in other cases already
discussed. The existence of cognitively conceivable approaches is visibly
not sufficient to come to improved solutions. But that does not speak
against their potential. Why not try to make more use of that potential?
Ways to solve old problems and create new work
Rehabilitation of depressed areas

Under this heading I refer briefly to a pilot project of the Hessian Institute
for Habitation and Environment (Wohnen und Umwelt – Mühlich 1995)
at Darmstadt as a lesser known, yet intriguing example of applying RCR.
In contrast to several cases already dealt with (psychology as a discipline,
the organisation of education, fighting substance abuse, dealing with nu-
clear energy), the RCR heuristic was consciously ‘built’ into this project,
including my lecturing at Darmstadt.
The initiators of that project had observed for some time the decrease
of the volume of manufacturing work in the area. Before acting, they
analysed the situation. They found mainly two shortcomings: first, the
flow of information and the transfer of know-how between the successful
research institutes in the area and manufacturing enterprises was insuf-
ficient; and second, the same was true for the information flow and the
transfer into creating public works aimed at providing jobs to the un-
employed. There is a clear link between these two problems: if the new,
promising information does not reach the manufacturing enterprises, the
chances are that these enterprises are not so successful and more persons
will lose their jobs, thereby increasing the number of unemployed. In
the view of the initiators, an RCR-type approach was called for to rem-
edy the shortcomings indicated. The circle of pertinent factors taken
into account and actors involved in remedial actions had to be drawn
widely enough, and the fundamental question of co-operation and com-
petition between the various players be addressed, that is between private
enterprises, public administrations, educational institutions, etc. The in-
teractions between them (or the lack thereof ) were important elements,
as well as answering the question of the respective political/economic
weights in a given situation. Apart from concrete proposals addressing
the insufficient information flow indicated above, a kind of round-table
co-ordination was proposed, which reminds one (on a larger scale) of
the drug-fighting Drogenstammtisch in Basle or the Monday meetings in
Frankfurt (see p. 172); this for both fact finding and setting up remedial
measures.
Employment via a ‘third system’

Once these first insights gathered, the state of Hessia took part in a
project of the European Union, labelled ‘Third System and Employment’
(Mühlich and Mühlich-Klinger 1999). Classically, socialists favour state
employment, and more rightist ‘conservative’ parties the free market,
each claiming their choice to be the best solution. As in other cases, RCR
is not so limited and looks further afield, beyond the existing horizon
(cf. the title picture of this monograph). The third system, neither state
nor free market, is of the co-operative kind, and is ‘located’ in the space
between the state system, the market system, and cultural activities. A
better name would therefore be ‘Intermediate System’. The initiators
of particular projects are private co-operative associations, foundations,
and other non-profit organisations. Potential project contents are wide-
ranging: health-related services, neighbourhood rehabilitation, protec-
tion of the environment, improvement of transport, providing food, waste
management, starting up new small firms, and so on. Partial projects in
four Hessian neighbourhoods made up the total project with a budget of
about $600,000.
The scientific analysis of the project aimed at (1) clarifying the aims
(a) of satisfying local demands and (b) of concomitantly creating new
work; (2) evaluating to what extent these two aims were being met; (3) po-
inting out hurdles on the way. To benefit from similar work elsewhere, an
exchange with the city of Liverpool, UK, was organised in addition.
Social problems in the neighbourhoods concerned arise in particular
from the following causes: (i) many inhabitants are not active economi-
cally, either because they are unable or unwilling to compete in the cur-
rent ‘knowledge’ economy or they are retired; (ii) the inhabitants belong
to several nationalities and/or ethnicities; (iii) given inhabitants’ lack of
adaptedness to the current economic conditions, and the resulting ma-
terial difficulties, there exists a certain amount of jealousy and ungen-
erousness with regard to the ‘favoured’ (who enjoy lower rents, higher
unemployment or retirement benefits, etc.); (iv) in a situation experi-
enced subjectively as unpromising and/or unjust, some inhabitants tend
to cling to their nationality or ethnicity, and furthermore, together with
other dissatisfied inhabitants fight bitterly perceived ‘injustices’. Such a
state of affairs not only makes neighbourhood-wide co-operation difficult
but also may worsen the ‘objective’ (material) situation.
The political need for intermediate systems results mainly from the
complexification, the rapid technological change, and the increased
importance of the new knowledge economy compared to old-style
industries. Take Silicon Valley as an illustration: success arose from the
Social Issues 183
free enterprise of outstanding visionaries and their intense creative

work, the local and global synergies, and of course favourable bound-
ary conditions. Nobody claims that a problem neighbourhood could be
turned into another Silicon Valley. However, based on the experience
of that outstanding economic success story, it is at least clear that over-
coming the ‘hopeless’ situation of a problem neighbourhood realistically
can be entrusted neither to a government bureaucracy, nor to an old-
style industry. If there is any chance at all, making a new promising
start needs an organised ‘round table’ with all actors involved: local
people, future-directed industry, administration, institutions of learn-
ing and culture, and so on. The objective is not just to find a com-
promise between diverging interests, but primarily to understand the
interrelations between the various actors and factors, and to match to
each other’s competencies and opportunities, resources and promising
possibilities.
In Hessia, a main thrust is towards the rehabilitation of housing and re-
lated facilities in problem neighbourhoods (see above). A quite different
effort is centred on biotechnology, involving notably the Hoechst cor-
poration, various research centres, and small (new) enterprises. Another
effort goes towards providing affordable help to low-income families and
single persons, in particular to retired seniors. In that effort an estab-
lished non-profit organisation took the role of Hoechst in the former
effort. A further example is in the area of public transport: maintaining
and improving installations at bus and tramway stops and at park-and-
ride locations, organising car-sharing, and so on.
Part of the effort was/is to create an information network between all
involved in a particular effort/programme. However, once more not to
paint too rosy a picture: at this stage an open point concerns the demo-
cratic justification of intermediate systems. Who takes part and who is
not admitted? Through which procedure? Is there any possibility for ap-
peal? Once more experience with such systems is gained, these questions
and related ones need satisfactory answers. Also, if inducing persons to
co-operate who are not in the habit of doing so is difficult, that turned
out to be little in comparison with effecting the required organisational
and even more structural (power) changes.
Nevertheless, progress so far is encouraging. There is a greater aware-
ness of who and what is involved, and what the respective roles and effects
are in a given context. As neither the state nor the free market is believed
to solve all problems and provide work for all, intermediate system activ-
ities should have a future, particularly if conceived in an RCR spirit, that
is, a collaboration built on agreed goals, constructive mutual interaction,
and context relevance.
Concluding remarks
The examples discussed so far will have made clear the gist of this chapter:
whenever several categorically/logically differing aspects characterise a
given phenomenon or task, each aspect should be studied in its own
right, related aspects added in (even if not consensual to begin with) and
links between them searched for, in particular those that are not of a
causal nature. Importantly, any context dependence should be brought
out. The results need to be integrated into a synopsis before judgements
can be passed and conclusions drawn. It was striking to see to what extent
successful endeavours incorporate (unwittingly) RCR desiderata.
12 Conclusions
This volume
Having presented in Part I the arguments and evidence for the existence
of RCR, its nature and its development, in Part II I have discussed a
number of cases in support of the claim that applying RCR can further
(1) scientific insights and (2) social integration, or at least diminish so-
cial strife and disruption. The status of the various examples in Part II is
visibly quite different, ranging from the tentative explicatory (e.g., ‘func-
tional background music’) to the inferential (e.g., the relation between
RCR and religious judgement, the Swiss and the Frankfurt experience
with fighting illegal use of narcotics) to the empirically supported (results
of interviews on ‘nuclear accidents’, ‘the two natures of Jesus Christ’,
and on the ‘Holy Trinity’), to initial projects (‘rehabilitation of depressed
areas’). Each time, by applying RCR a more complete, more encompass-
ing yet more differentiated view is searched for or results together with
internal links and context dependences. In that process three differing
concerns require attention (Fahrenberg 1992, pp. 52–9 – see pp. 43–5
above): the methodological, the epistemological, and the ontological.
Methodologically, each categorically distinct aspect calls for an appro-
priate research approach (cf. the example of researching anxiety, p. 151
above), which includes its own verification procedures and terminology.
Epistemologically, one wants to keep each aspect separate, in particular
as regards causal explanations, yet take all (linked) aspects into account
for a synopsis or even an overarching theory. Ontologically, one needs to
demonstrate (1) that all aspects pertain to the same phenomenon, in other
words they are coextensive, and (2) they are subject to a meta-relation,
that is mutually linked/entangled/constrained. The approach indicated
may go against the grain of our Western culture, but, in appropriate
cases, seems to lead to better results than a single-aspect approach (e.g.,
Fischer, Herzka, and Reich 1992). The effort to swim against the cultural
stream – which may be considerable (see postscript below) – therefore
seems worthwhile in such cases. However, it is important always to
185
observe carefully step 2 of the RCR heuristic, and especially the last
part (ch. 6, p. 104): listing all descriptions/explanations/models/theories/
interpretations A, B, C . . . of the explanandum, even if they are consid-
ered incompatible or incommensurable by the ambient culture, possibly
adding new ones, and dealing with any conflicts and contradictions aris-
ing (which may mean throwing out either A or B or C – it is possibly not a
case for RCR). In other words, RCR is not an excuse for unjustified inde-
cision, opportunistic compromises, and the like. Also, a successful, widely
accepted application at one point in time does not guarantee eternal vali-
dity of the result. For instance, many physicists today consider Bohr’s
explanations of the nature of light in the 1920s and 1930s as being mainly
of historical interest.
Looking back at the entire volume, what more can be said? First, while
much evidence has been provided, RCR theory remains incomplete. To
obtain more robust data, field studies and longitudinal laboratory studies
should be carried out, preferably in different cultures.1 Second, inter-
vention studies in several domains (cf. chapters 9 to 11) could provide
further evidence for the possibility of stimulating RCR and thereby en-
hancing its usefulness. It is hoped that progress to date will induce others
to participate in those endeavours.
All the same, it seems to me that I have honoured my engagement
to explicate and discuss RCR (a) theoretically, as a scientific model;
(b) empirically on the basis of research results; (c) methodologically, i.e.
as a procedure, the RCR heuristic; and (d) programmatically, that is, in
terms of possible future applications.
As regards RCR in relation to education, the following programme
outlined by Deonna Kuhn (1989, p. 266) is relevant:
I would claim that the role of cognitive development researchers in defining think-
ing skills should be a fundamental one and that it is their essential contribution
that has been missing from the thinking skills movement. There are two impor-
tant ways in which cognitive development researchers can and should ground
curriculum developers’ efforts in appropriate empirical evidence. First, they can
do research that would help define thinking skills explicitly, through careful em-
pirical observation of the thinking strategies people actually use (whether sound or
faulty), conducted across a range of contexts that make up people’s lives. Second,
they can examine the directions in which such thinking skills develop naturally,
with age and with practice.
Clearly, the present work is also a contribution to Kuhn’s programme.
1 Recently, I had an opportunity to collaborate with several colleagues from different cul-
tures in writing an article about the effect of cultural differences on research in psychology
of religion (Khalili, Murken, Reich, Shah, and Vahabzadeh, forthcoming), also a great
occasion for developing the horizons of the mind and applying RCR. It took a good num-
ber of alterations before the draft reached a stage that all could put their name to as a
joint paper but that objective was finally achieved.
Conclusions 187
Postscript
This monograph is meant to be scientifically factual, and occasionally
speculative, yet based at least on circumstantial evidence and argumen-
tative plausibility. However, certain visionaries go much further in their
claims of the benefits of RCR and their exhortations to apply it more
massively – even if they label RCR differently. I present two of these vi-
sionaries, Jones and Goeudevert; their ideas understandably have my full
sympathy.
The visions of Reginald Victor Jones

The British physicist Reginald Victor Jones (1911–97) headed scientific
intelligence for the British Air Staff in the Second World War and served
as scientific adviser to the Scientific Intelligence Service. He contributed
two chapters to the centenary volume in honour of Niels Bohr, the Danish
philosopher physicist. In the first chapter ‘Meetings in wartime and after’,
Jones described his exchanges with Niels Bohr. Jones’s second chapter
‘Complementarity as a way of life’ ( Jones 1985), occupies us here. Being
familiar with Bohr’s concept of ‘complementarity’ (cf. ch. 8, pp. 140–3
above), Jones is on the lookout for wider applications. In my terms, he
emphasises the needs (a) to keep differing categories distinct, (b) to look
for relationships between them and, most importantly, (c) to understand
their appropriateness in particular contexts. As mentioned before, I con-
sider understanding complementarity in Bohr’s sense (there are many
other senses – Reich in press) to be a result of RCR.
According to Jones, Bohr’s introduction of complementarity was trig-
gered by Werner Heisenberg’s indeterminacy principle: two conjugate
canonical variables (such as spatial location and momentum or temporal
‘location’ and energy of elementary particles) do not have simultaneously
highly precise values. The product of their indeterminacies is always larger
than a fixed threshold value. Depending on the experiment, it is more ap-
propriate to measure one variable or the conjugate variable. Jones (1985)
applied these findings to other issues.
He discusses, for instance, the issue ‘obedience’ vs. ‘initiative’. Clearly
both are needed in a functioning society. However, in long periods of
quiet, obedience can lead to stagnation, and in unruly times initiative
can lead to chaos. A similar analysis can be made about ‘tradition’ and
‘innovation’. As regards scientific laboratory work, the authority regard-
ing research issues should rest with those who know best, even if they are
young; however, the effective running of a laboratory requires that as a rule
the administrative authority of the head is not to be questioned. Again,
in unusual critical situations, decisions by one competent person may be
the best, but when diverging interests are to be taken into account, and
all persons involved have to live with the decision and support it, a deci-
sion by a representative committee may be the better choice. Yet another
complementarist issue of behaviour is ‘involvement’ vs. ‘withdrawal’:
Every prophet has to come from civilisation, but every prophet has to go into the
wilderness. He must have a strong impression of a complex society and all that it
has to give, and then he must serve periods of isolation and meditation. This is
the process by which psychic dynamite is made. (ibid., p. 323)
Once more, both the individual and the community have important roles
to play. The desirable balance of these roles changes with circumstances.
In sum, Jones pleads for changing the focus from ‘this is the single right
solution’ vs. ‘that is the single right solution’ to a life recognising that
both solutions have their merits and reflecting which is more appropriate
in the current context.
The visions of Daniel Goeudevert

The second visionary is Frenchman and European Daniel Goeudevert
(1942– ). He worked for car makers Citroën and Renault in France, and
held top management positions with Ford, Germany, and Volkswagen.
His best-selling autobiography is titled Ein Vogel im Aquarium (A bird in
an aquarium), indicating how he felt as a member of a high-level manage-
ment ‘team’ given to radical neoliberalism and to achieving short-term
profits. Since leaving Volkswagen, Goeudevert is attempting to set up
a private university-cum-research and technology centre embodying his
visions (at Dortmund, Germany), is active in a foundation for the lasting
development of European regions, and advises the Director General of
UNESCO. His objective is a long-term future-directed capitalism with a
human face.
In his volume Mit Träumen beginnt die Realität (Reality begins with
dreaming) Goeudevert (1999, pp. 194–204) has a chapter ‘Die Sowohl-
als-auch-Gesellschaft’ (The both-and society), from which I take most
of what follows, ending with a few items from the preceding chapters.
As a European by conviction and experience, Goeudevert first discusses
the issue ‘National state or European Union?’ He rejects the notion that
these two groupings are mutually exclusive alternatives (which they are
in the eyes of a fairly large number of persons), and points out that both
are needed, yet fulfil differing functions. The European history of the last
fifty years clearly demonstrates that
the quality of life improves as one communicates better with one’s neighbours.
And one communicates the better, the more one reminds oneself of communali-
ties, and the less one turns one’s own ‘treasures’ into separations, for instance by
Conclusions 189
considering one’s language, one’s culture, one’s economy as superior . . . We have

to evolve from an either-or society toward a both-and society, in which different
cultures can benefit from mutual exchanges without losing their identity. (ibid.,
pp. 195–6)
Such a living together needs both (passive) tolerance and active soli-
darity. Goeudevert illustrates this by referring to an apartment building,
in which live persons of rather varied backgrounds who differ greatly
as to how they dress, what they cook, which music they listen to, what
they do to celebrate, when they go to bed and get up, and so on. For
the ordinary days ‘live and let live’ is a good guide, but when the base-
ment gets flooded, a fire breaks out or another major calamity arises, ac-
tive mutual help is called for. So once again, not either-or set behaviour
but both-and context-related conduct is the order of the day. Extending
the spatial, temporal, and cultural dimensions, Goeudevert recalls life
in Granada (or Cordoba or Toledo for that matter) from the thirteenth
to the fifteenth centuries, where Muslims, Jews, and Christians lived to-
gether (under Arabic rule) and benefited from each other’s culture and
mutual exchanges. It all ended with the ‘reconquista’ by the Spaniards
in 1492, a most unfortunate example not to be followed again.
While the European Union has progressed in many ways, Goeudevert
sees the need for more both-and actions. Economic considerations,
(mega-)mergers (such as Chrysler-Daimler), are an unavoidable reality in
a global world, but social policies are also needed. A ‘reasonable’ national
social security system is to be welcomed, but if free movement through-
out Europe is to be achieved, an overall system is required so that moving
to another European country does not entail a loss of social benefits and
pension entitlements. Again, a mother tongue is a precious asset, but if
really free movement within Europe is to be achieved, a lingua franca is
required, to be taught as a communication facilitator in all schools from
early on.
Elsewhere in the book Goeudevert pleads for linking learning, work-
ing, continued training and education, researching, and living over agai-
nst keeping these activities in tight compartments (ibid., p. 149). In
Dortmund he tries to put these novel ideas into practice, a difficult
enterprise.
As to his views on the managers of large corporations, Goeudevert
(ibid., p. 98) argues that they should take into account considerations
of social well-being and the common good along with aiming at top fi-
nancial benefits for their own corporation. Sufficient weight should be
given to the ‘why’ of any decision, not just to the ‘what’ and ‘how’. Con-
cerning the internal organisation, Goeudevert uses the analogue of a ve-
hicle with a four-wheel drive: (1) marketing, (2) personnel and finance,
(3) production and planning, and (4) research and development all need
to have a certain autonomy, but must work synchronously hand in hand,

with (1) and (2) determining the direction in which the corporation is
headed (pp. 99–101). Similarly, innovative teams should be composed of
persons of both genders, with different ages, and coming from different
cultures (p. 102).
Finally, if it is not considered too frivolous to refer in a scientific mono-
graph to a publicity text, I would quote the punchline of Deutsche Bank’s
advertisement in Forbes Global, of 1 May 2000: ‘Look beyond the Age of
Either/Or.’
As will be obvious from the dedication of this volume, I do hope that
these visions will become more and more a reality for the benefit of all.
Appendix 1 Interviewing techniques
Preparations
This appendix focuses on the type of interview used for ascertaining the
RCR level at which the interviewee argues, not on interviewing in gen-
eral. To produce satisfactory interviews for the stated purpose, a future
interviewer needs to be trained threefold. First, he or she needs to learn
how to encourage the interviewee to present his or her genuine views
as distinct from what just comes to mind, is thought to be the desired
answer, or is a repetition of something heard or read. Second, the future
interviewer needs to learn RCR theory, and have the level descriptions
(see Table 4.1, p. 18) firmly in mind, this in order to ask clarifying ques-
tions in case of ambivalent answers regarding discriminating level crite-
ria. Third, the interview dilemmas need to be known from all angles and
‘interiorised’. For convenience, the three standard dilemmas are repro-
duced below:
Pianist. The young pianist is fully immersed in her playing: her fingers speak to the
chords via the keys, the movement of her body follows the music’s rhythm, and
her mimic gestures express her intense inner participation. After she has played
the last note, the audience applauds enthusiastically. The pianist is satisfied with
her performance, but wonders whether it is more due to her practising or to her
natural endowment. What is your view?
Accident in a nuclear power plant. A TV news station reports on an accident in a
nuclear power station. The main cooling pump had stopped working, and the
back-up pump did not function. The emergency shutdown did not function
either. To add to the difficulties, the operating crew became aware of the danger
rather late and then underestimated it. The water temperature suddenly rose. A
steam pipe cracked and leaked radioactive steam. What or who is to blame? What
should be done to avoid another such accident in the future?
Model of humans (mind–body problem). Since Antiquity it is recognised that hu-
man beings have a body, a mind, and a soul/a spirit. What is at issue in philosophy,
and lately also in various sciences, is the nature of the relationship between the
body and the other parts. How do you see that?
191
192 Appendix 1
Taking into account the age of the interviewee

Questions to children need to be more concrete and explicit than to
older persons. Also, some children may need to get acquainted with the
interviewer and the interviewing situation. Letting them tell a story about
their home or their pet, and the like, may help to make the transition.
Again, doing the interview in two or three parts, separated by a day or
two, may be helpful in that respect. As to the particular dilemma on which
the interview focuses, the ‘conflicting’ aspects need spelling out, perhaps
even in writing on a card to be put before the interviewee. Thus, for the
pianist, the card might read:
A: The pianist plays well because she practises a lot.
B: The pianist plays well because her talent is inborn.
Similarly, in the accident dilemma (A) would be a technical failure and
(B) a human error. Children change their minds during the interview
more often than older persons. Therefore it is particularly important to
check in between and perhaps at the end whether they are still of the same
opinion.
With adolescents and adults, the spelling out of the dilemma is not
indicated, because they are potentially able to do that by themselves,
and the way it is done, or not, immediately gives an indication of their
cognitive competence. Particularly in the case of the power plant accident,
it may be necessary to nudge the interviewee towards the actual problem
as distinct from general philosophising about nuclear energy.
The actual interview

The text of the chosen dilemma is read to grade-school children (or
told as a story to the younger ones), and given to older interviewees for
them to read. The interviewer’s task is then to bring out the responses
characteristic for a particular level of RCR : does (A) or (B) explain the
whole story; if so, is the other reading really wrong? Are they perhaps
both needed for a full explanation; if so, how do they hang together; how
about any context dependence? Too precise questions at an early stage
of the interview are to be avoided, particularly if they would give away a
stage-determining answer. Good questions are: ‘Why do you say that?’;
‘Would any other answer be wrong?’; ‘You said (A) is correct; does that
mean (B) is quite wrong?’
If an interviewee, for instance, argues only for (A) as correct (or only
for B), one could argue for (B) (respectively A), and see how firm the
interviewee’s opinion really is. To see here means to probe ever more
firmly, without, however, upsetting the respondent. In another case, if
Appendix 1 193
the immediate answer is ‘Both A and B are right’ (an answer at stage III),
then one could ask for more explanations, and gradually find out how far
that participant has advanced towards level IV. A helpful question could
be, ‘Is that true always and everywhere?’
It is useful to take some notes during the interview or immediately
afterwards: what was the general impression of the respondent and his or
her developmental stage, were the answers already at hand or were they
worked out for a first time during the interview, were there any special
occurrences? This is in addition to the standard data such as name, date
of birth, location and date of interview, name of interviewer, etc.
Appendix 2 Scoring manual for RCR
Brief summary of RCR levels

Scoring of the interview transcripts involves (a) a knowledge of the theory
of RCR, (b) a precise understanding of level differences, (c) checking the
provisional result against the template answers below, and (d) comparing
the scores with those of a second, independent rater. To be accepted, the
interrater agreement has to be about 80 per cent or better, disregarding
a third of a level difference (the base scoring uncertainty).
For a first impression, the schema of Table A1 (a reproduction of
Table 4.3, p. 54) is helpful:
Table A1 Developmental logic of relational and contextual reasoning

(RCR)
RCR involves describing/explaining certain explananda (entities, functional
wholes, phenomena) with the help of competing descriptions/explanations/
theories/interpretations A, B, C, . . .
Stage according to
Level of RCR Core characteristic of level Piaget and Garcia
I A or B (or C) intra
II A, but also B (C) inter
III A and B (and C) trans-intra
IV Logic of and (context) trans-inter
V Synopsis/theory trans-trans
Level I: Only one aspect considered in isolation

Level II: A further aspect comes into the field of vision
Level III: All aspects are needed for a full understanding
Level IV: The relations between the various aspects come into view as
well as the context dependence of their explanatory weight
Level V: Completion of level IV; a synopsis or perhaps a theory obtains.
194
Appendix 2 195
Looking at the complexity of the argumentation (differentiation and in-

tegration) may be of help in deciding on a particular RCR level. At level I
the argumentation is simplistic, at level V sophisticated and complex
(cf. Table 4.1, p. 52, for a level description).
Investigating the logic(s) used can further assist the elucidation of the
RCR level of the interviewee’s argumentation.The limits of classical binary
logic are transcended from level III upward (‘It is not logical but it is true’).
Also, a respondent arguing at a higher level usually brings in more
factual knowledge about the matter at hand than a participant at a lower
level. This obtains in addition to the more developed forms of thought
displayed in the interview.
RCR also involves a certain amount of procedural knowledge. Some
clues as to the approximate RCR level may be gained from observing
how the interviewee deals with unfamiliar issues: at lower levels ‘I don’t
know’ is more likely than at higher levels. Interviewees at higher levels
will venture into unknown territory more systematically and confidently.
Exemplars of interview excerpts as a help for scoring

These exemplars are listed in Table A2, separately for the three standard
dilemmas. If one starts reading with the level-V examples, then one ac-
quires immediately a yardstick for the full measure of RCR. Continuing
with levels IV–III–II–I, one notices each time what is missing compared
to full RCR at level V.
All excerpts are taken from genuine interview transcripts and in case of
need (slightly) edited (see Oser and Reich 1987, pp. 182–3 for more
excerpts from the ‘pianist’ interview). Depending on the RCR level, the
following differences of the exemplars are noted. At level I, contradictory
statements (a), (b), (c) from different interviewees are reproduced; this
in keeping with the characteristics of the level I structure. A given person
will produce one answer or the other, but, as a rule, not both. At levels II
and III, several statements (from different interviewees) are again shown,
but at these levels they do not disagree contentwise (nor structurally)
with each other. At levels IV and V, a (composite) single, longer answer
is reproduced. Supposedly it touches on all the relevant issues.
For scoring, the entire given interview is used, affirmations as well
as negations, statements about relations, dependences, and so on. Each
scorable partial answer is assessed, and a total score established by weight-
ing the partial scores.
All examples refer to full levels. Not reaching a level fully is indicated
by adding the lower level, e.g., III (II), transcending it by adding the next
higher level, e.g., III (IV).
196 Appendix 2
Table A2 Excerpts from interview transcripts about three standard RCR

interviews (translated from German and slightly edited)
Level Pianist Power plant accident Mind–body problem
I (a) If it is inborn, then (a) That technology was (a) People are like
a little practising not reliable. machines.The body
does the trick; you The operating crew acts the same way as
then can play real is not to blame – a robot.
good. Her father they have done their (b) It’s the head which
already played well. duty, day in, day keeps us going, it
(b) Practising does it. If out. gives the orders.
you practice a lot, (b) It’s the operators’ (c) It’s really the heart
then you play very fault: they did not which does it all. No
very good. pay attention. heart, no life.
II (a) ‘Practising explains (a) It is true that a (a) It’s the body. Every
it all’, maybe – if technical breakdown living creature is
you do a lot. Inborn has occurred for made up of cells.
ability, maybe that’s starters. But it But the mind and
important too. But appears that the the soul exist too.
practising is more operating crew has The body
important; without not been up to it determines what a
practising nothing either. That made it person looks like,
goes. much worse. mind and soul what
(b) Inborn ability and (b) It’s due to a she does and feels.
practising are technical (b) Without a body you
important. You breakdown. But the can’t move about.
need to practice, operating crew is The soul keeps you
but being gifted also also at fault. They from being afraid all
helps. did not pay enough the time.
attention.
III (a) If you are not gifted, In the beginning a (a) Body and mind are
then it doesn’t go so malfunctioning different things. But
well. If you are occurred. But then, the one can’t do
gifted, but do not such systems without the other. If
practise, then it can’t work without such a situation
doesn’t go well human control. The occurs, then
either. You start to operating crew has something is
play, and then you simply not noticed absolutely wrong.
do not know how to that the instruments (b) That’s simple: the
continue. You need indicated a problem. body does not
both, being gifted Or perhaps they have depend on the mind
and practising. seen it but not but they both belong
(b) Practising is taken the right to humans. You
important. One can countermeasures. cannot exist without
also be gifted, of The people were a mind, a soul or the
course. But being excited. The like.
Appendix 2 197
Table A2 (cont.)
gifted does not accident involves both (c) The body consists of
determine your life a technical and a cells but a soul is
entirely. If you human deficiency. also needed to guide
practise more, you you if you will.
have more success.
IV Both, being gifted and It began as a technical You can’t separate body
practising, are needed. breakdown, but, then, and mind. They belong
If you are gifted, then the plant was built by together. You can see
practising produces people. Lots of stuff the body but not the
faster and better results; fouled up. The mind. And then, you
that is the relation. And operators were stressed. also have a soul. It can
therefore, practising is Maybe they reacted influence the body, for
more fun, you like it different from normal. instance when you are
better. And you Perhaps they should be somehow very unhappy.
become a much better trained for facing such I think that the links
pianist. The audience? situations. The second often are much stronger
Of course, the pianist time you react better. than you think. Apart
feels confirmed by their When they are all from illness of the body,
enthusiasm. Being together, they confuse there are illnesses where
gifted counts more each other, and make your psyche comes in.
when you improvise. faults. Typically, when At the university your
Practising makes for a such rare accidents mind usually counts
faultless performance. occur, they do not more. But in the
Everything is just right. notice or do the wrong dreamless phase of sleep
If you are gifted, and thing because they lack even the psyche takes a
have practised, then experience. The more rest, l believe. And
you enjoy playing, and complex the system, the sleeping, that is a
your joy gets greater the potential different world. Body
transmitted to the danger. They were not and soul then organise a
piano. And to the aware of that danger. world that has little to
audience! do with that of daytime
consciousness.
V If the native In this accident I situate this issue at two

endowment is too technical and human levels, first at the
weak, then progress failure are philosophical. The
towards perfection will interconnected. One has question is, then, how
be arrested somewhere to look at the whole much of the body and of
along the line. Certain thing as a system, the the soul appear to be
techniques can’t be plant and the operating acting in a particular
learned. You cannot crew. And one has to situation. Second, the
replace lack of study the mutual pragmatic level in the
giftedness by practising interaction, the type of sense of wholeness and
more. A gifted person effects they have on each completeness: Now the
198 Appendix 2
Table A2 (cont.)
learns rapidly to get other. One really wants question is how body
something out of to train crew members and mind/soul influence
playing the piano. with the help of a each other. What is still
Playing will become sophisticated simulator missing, is a third
part of her identity. She so that they become consideration, namely
will meet other pianists aware of the many ways the respective
and get more in which something can expressions via acts.
stimulated by such go wrong, they Often, both are in it
contacts. The audience experience their together. Clearly,
mostly consists of individual and collective feelings express
music enthusiasts, who reactions, and learn how themselves via the body;
will encourage her to to assess such situations they may even originate
become an even better as well as how to deal within the body. That
pianist. To a small with them successfully. enables one to make
extent, being gifted and In such simulations the friends, to live together
practising can replace psychological stress with a partner in
each other, but only a must of course also be marriage. In some jobs
little. Their effect generated, not just the the body is more
depends on the task. To sequence of technical important, in others the
play well from the sheet events. It is precisely mind or the soul. The
music for the first time such a chain reaction of respective weights shift
is more a matter of technical and human in other situations like
being gifted. To play malfunctioning which is at a cocktail or a dinner
without a glitch at an so hard to foresee. party, on the operating
examination has more table in a hospital, when
to do with practising. skiing or jogging, when
The two do not add playing chess or when
arithmetically. seeing a movie.
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Index
aims of this monograph, 1 Baker-Brown, G. (et al.), 13, 65, 84,

analogical thinking 199
break-up of a partnership, viewed by, Barbour, I. G., 105–10, 114, 128, 199
90 Basseches, M. A., 13, 15, 19 (n.10), 48,
concept, 42–3, 95 56, 57, 86, 87, 88, 199
general, 13, 23, 28, 31, 87, 88, 90, Bedau, H., 45, 200
135, 143 Beller, M., 140, 141, 200
problem for probing interviews, 95 Bickhard, M. H., 28–30, 33, 75 (n.1), 200,
RCR, and, 3, 22, 41–3, 46, 48, 56, 74, 201
89, 95–7 Bohr, N., xvii, 2, 16, 140–2, 144, 186, 200
anthropology, 25–6, 112 Boutilier, R. G., 13, 23, 201
application of RCR Brannock, J., 61, 208
break-up of a partnership, to the, 90 Brown, W. S., 118, 120, 201
Chalcedonian Declaration, to the, 121–3 Bundesamt für Gesundheit, 170, 201
coordination of worldviews, to, 126–9 Bundesamt für Polizei, 171, 201
doctrine of the Holy Trinity, to the,
123–5 Campbell, R. L., 28, 30, 33, 201
education, other examples, 163–4 Carpendale, J., 28, 201
employment via a third sytem, to 182–3 Chandler, M. J., 13, 23, 28, 201
illegal use of drugs, to, 165–73 Chinen, A. B., 29, 201
individual psychological development, Claar, A., 33, 202
to, 149–50 Clinchy, B., 34, 91, 209
learning about functional music, to, cognition (see also development)
152–6 cognitive unconscious, 12
methodology, 103–4 concept, 11
nuclear and other energies, to, 21–2, development, of, 11, 29–31, 34
55–8, 174–80, 191, 196–8 epistemic, 31, 33, 129
psychology as a discipline, to, general, 14, 116, 120, 129, 147, 148
145–9 logico-mathematical (see Piaget)
psychophysiological phenomena, to, 151 cognitive complex thinking (see also
rehabilitation of depressed areas, to the, development)
181, 183 concept, 84–5, 92–3, 94
religion and the nature of human beings, data, empirical, 66–9, 85
to, 118–20 development, of, 64, 72
responsibility for the educational system, general, xviii, 3, 13, 16, 22, 23, 55–8,
to the, 157–8 65–70, 84–5, 94, 96, 97
science and religion, to, 111–15 problems for probing interview, 65
teaching the investiture contest, to, RCR, and, 56–8, 64–70, 89, 96
158–9 complementarist, 4, 5, 52, 135, 136, 139,
understanding religious development, 188
to, 129–32 complementarity, 2, 3, 13 (n.2), 140, 141,
war on terrorism, 173 (n.1) 149, 158, 187
219
220 Index
constructivism (in epistemology, in Gentner, D., 13, 34 (n.3), 87, 88, 205
psychology), 36–7 God, 28, 30, 42, 51, 108 (n.7), 109, 114,
117, 118, 120–30, 131, 142 (n.11)
Deacon, T. W., 17, 202 Goeudevert, D., 187, 188–90, 205
Dennett, D. C., 25–6, 202 Goswami, U., 75 (n.1), 87, 206
development (of forms of thought)
cognitive complex thinking, of, 64, 72 Heisenberg, W., 4, 141, 144, 149 (n.5),
concept, 26–33 167, 206
dialectical thinking, of, 19 (n.10), 85–7 Holyoak, K. J., 12, 14, 16, 55, 144, 201,
general, 1, 2, 12, 19, 26–7, 29–31, 47, 206
126, 129–32, 149–51, 186
logical, 29 INCR group, 32, 110–11
ontological, 28 INES, 174, 206
reflection, of, 29–31 Intelligent Design, 105 (n.1)
RCR, of, 25, 27–33, 53–5 intra–inter–trans, xxv, 25, 32–3, 51, 52,
dialectical thinking 53, 54
concept, 19 (n.10), 23, 42, 85–7, 90
development, of, 85–7 James, W., xviii, 2, 136–7, 207
RCR, and, 13, 42, 48, 56–8, 84, 89 Jeeves, M. A., 118, 120, 201
dialogue, fruitful, 108 (n.6) Jones, R. V., 187–8, 207
Dreifuss, R., 167, 203
Drogenreferat, 172, 173, 203 Kainz, H. P., 76, 77, 207
Kaiser, C. B., 120, 207
EDI, 167, 168, 203 Kay, W. K., 128, 207
ego-centredness, effect of, 110 (n.10) Keil, F. C., 27, 28, 207
Emerson, R. W., 16, 203 Kelly, M. H., 28, 207
Emmons, R. A., 73, 148, 203, 211 Kitchener, K. S., 31, 36, 91, 208
epistemology Kitchener, R. F., 167, 208
children’s, 33–4, 91–2 Koller, A., 167, 208
concept, 31 Kuhn, D., 29, 61, 186, 208
RCR, of, 44, 46, 185
Epstein, S., 148, 203 Lamb, S. M., 17 (n.9)
Laudan, L., 36, 41, 209
Fahrenberg, J., 35, 44, 151, 185, 203 location, spatio-temporal, 141 (n.10)
faith stages (Fowler), 129–30 logic
Fathers of the Council of Chalcedon, 121, analogies, of, 95
122, 133–4, 143 assessment, 66, 70–2
Fenstermacher, G. D., 163, 204 concept, 15, 41–4, 76–8, 121
Fetz, R. L., 29, 30, 126, 204 data, empirical, 70–2
Fischer, E. P., 134, 136, 204 dialectical, 23, 29, 42, 94–95, 143
Flavell, J. H., 27, 204 formal binary (classical, Aristotelian),
Fondation Archives J. Piaget, 75, 204 1–2, 15, 16, 27 (n.1), 29, 41, 44,
forms of thought, 1–2, 13, 16–20, 23–4, 57, 58, 64, 71, 75–84, 89, 92, 93,
41–3, 64, 72–4, 88–97 95–6, 106 (n.4), 110, 116, 132,
concept, 18–20, 89 143, 160, 162, 166, 173, 195
foundationalism, 36 fuzzy, 15
Fowler, J. W., 129–30, 204 general, xvi–xviii, 2–3, 15–16, 20, 28,
Francis, L. J., 128, 207 29, 41–3, 58, 70–2, 79, 80, 89,
Frank, A., 118 (n.4) 91–2, 97, 103–4, 125, 130, 134,
Fülleborn, U., 137, 139, 205 136–7, 143, 162–3
Fulljames, P., 111, 129, 204, 205 RCR, of, 1–4, 12–13, 15–16, 22, 23, 34,
41–3, 45–6, 52, 56–8, 63, 64, 70–2,
Garcia, R., 32, 51, 54, 194, 212, 89, 100–4, 132, 134, 173, 195
Geertz, C., 146 (n.2), 205 trivalent, 3, 16, 46, 134
Index 221
Mansfield, A., 34, 91, 209 pragmatic reasoning schema, 14, 144
matching thought form to problem psychology, 4, 26, 77, 87, 145–9, 154
structure, 92–7 religion, of, 117 (n.3), 129–32
Meacham, J., 87, 209 Putnam, H., 12, 24 (n.13), 29, 35, 36, 37,
metaphor, 37, 38, 117 (n.3) 212
methodology
adopted here, 41, 59–60 Qur’an, 5 (n.1)
concept, 41
RCR, of, 45, 129 Raman, V. V., 108 (n.7), 109 (n.8),
scientific, 41, 147, 156 212
Montangero, J., 32, 209 RCR (see also application of RCR)
Moshman, D., 14, 31, 87, 309 components, 16–19
Mühlich, E., 181, 182, 209, 210 concept, 12–15
Mühlich-Klinger, I., 182, 210 development
Mühling-Schlapkohl, M., 142 (n.11), levels, 52
210 logic, 32–3
music, functional, 152–6 epistemology, 44
Musil, R., 139–40, 143 heuristic, 103–4
interviewing techniques, 191–3
naturalism, 106 (n.4) limitations of empirical studies, 47–8
logic, 45–6
ontology methodology
adopted here, 40 applying RCR, 45, 103–4, 185
concept, 28–9 studying RCR, 49–50
general, 120 ontology, 43–4
RCR, of, 35–7, 40, 43–4 philosophical analysis, 41–3
Oppenheim, P., 45, 200 pilot study 1, 41–3
Oser, F. K., 28, 31, 51, 52, 53, 62, 63, 73, pilot study 2, 50–5
74, 120, 126, 129, 130–2, 195, 210, pilot study 3, 55–9
211 pilot study 4, 59–63
Overton, W. F., 17, 26, 35, 40, 145, 148, problems for probing interviews, 50,
211, 212 191
relations with other thought forms,
partnership break-up and forms of 18, 72, 89, 95–7
thought, 90–1 scoring manual, 191–8
philosophy of knowledge stimulation in the classroom, 160–3
adopted here, 37–41 structure, 18
concept, 35–7 realism (naive, critical, etc.), 35–41
evolution, 36, 104–5, 147 (n.5) reflection, definition of, 14
Piaget, J., 1–2, 11, 13, 32, 34, 51, 52, 54, reflection, modes of
55, 59, 61, 73, 76, 83, 88, 93, 128, object-reflecting, 29–31
148, 194 means-reflecting, 29–32
Piagetian thinking/operations, 1–3, 13, unreflected, 29–30
18–20, 22–3, 33, 43, 46, 47, 56–9, Reich. K. H., 3, 13, 19 (n.11), 20, 28, 30,
62–5, 71–3, 74, 75–84, 88, 89, 91, 31, 35, 37 (n.2), 50, 52, 53, 56, 62,
93, 95–6, 143 63, 66, 70, 72, 89, 103, 106 (n.3),
data, empirical, 62–3, 72, 73 109, 111, 117, 126, 121, 122, 123,
development of, 2, 19, 73 125, 126, 127, 128, 130, 131, 133,
RCR, and, 33–4, 41–3, 59–65, 72, 74 134, 136, 152, 156, 159, 161, 162,
stages, characteristics of, 54, 56, 57, 58, 163, 185, 186 (n.1), 195, 204, 210,
63, 72, 73 211, 212–14
tasks for probing interviews, 59–62, religion, 1, 3, 14, 84, 103, 104–11, 112
64–5, 76, 83, 93 (n.12), 115, 119, 126–8, 129–32,
postformal thought, 2, 19–20 146, 164
222 Index
religious judgement (Oser/Gmünder), problem, of, 2, 3, 20, 21, 23, 65, 75–7,
130–2 87, 88, 91, 93
Riegel, K. F., 13, 17, 87, 214 Suedfeld, P., 84, 85, 216
Rilke, R. M., 137–9, 143
Russel, R. B., 142 (n.11) Tetlock, P., 84, 85, 216
theology, 3, 103, 104, 105, 107–10, 113
Schweizer Ärzte, 170, 215 (n.14), 114, 117 (n.2), 118, 124,
science, 3, 38, 50, 51, 103, 104–15, 128, 146
126–9, 132, 136, 146, 150 concept, 107
concept, 39–40 theory
religion, and, 104–10, 126–9 CEST, 153 (n.7)
applying RCR, 111–15 cognitive development, of, 26–7
Secretan, P., 41, 215 light, of, 24 (n.13), 46 (n.9), 113 (n.16)
Sellers, R. V., 133, 216 postformal, 19
Sinnott, J. D., 2, 19, 20, 202, 216 RCR, of, 41–6
son, prodigal, etc., 162 truth, whose, 38 (n.6)
Spelke, E. S., 26, 27, 216
structure, Valentin, P., 28, 30, 31, 73, 126, 204, 214
brain, of the, 17–18 Van de Kemp, H., 38, 217
concept, 17 van Gogh, V., 134–6, 143, 217
general, 18, 28, 30, 32, 36, 54, 86, 122, Venn, J., 78, 217
137
mental, 12, 13, 14, 16–19, 50, 54, Wellman H. M., 28, 217
95 Wulff, D. M., 119, 218

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Developing the Horizons of the Mind

.   has had successful careers as a physicist and as a

  

© K. Helmut Reich 2004

First published in printed format 2002

ISBN 0-511-04275-2 eBook (netLibrary)

List of figures page x

Part I The Theory of Relational and Contextual Reasoning

3. Metaphysical Assumptions and Theor y of RCR 35

4. Empirical Studies of RCR 47

Pilot study 4: RCR, Piagetian operations, cognitively complex thinking,

5. Other Thought Forms and Matching Them to the Problem

Part II Applications of RCR

8. The Archaeology of RCR 133

10. Education 157

11. Social Issues 165

12. Conclusions 185

Appendix 1: Inter viewing techniques 191

2.1 Evolution of cognition page 30

1.1 The four structural levels of the model of thought

7.1 Frequencies of individual scores of RCR levels and

No book is complete without giving thanks to all those who contributed

(a large part of ) a pertinent posting (in agreement with the author), I

The main purpose of this monograph is to present the findings of fifteen

irrespective of their particular content. Such operations involve a num-

either compatible (both true concurrently), incompatible (never both true

Urged on years ago by colleagues and one editor of a leading profes-

or linked manner, to illustrate how RCR furthers understanding through

Although my understanding has reached a level which makes commu-

The Theory of Relational and Contextual

Likewise, it seems incontrovertible that all thought processes are based

The nature of relational and contextual reasoning

explanations, models, theories or interpretations of the very same entity,

classical sense. The link can consist in mutual enabling or limiting, in an

case the issue is to ‘co-ordinate’ two or more ‘rivalling’ descriptions, ex-

Preliminary remarks on logic

(and other forms of thought). The emphasis here is on structure, not on

Structural level Example

1: Elementary operations discerning a particular item or event within

correlate in a most realistic manner: language and the biological “hard-

1, 2, and 3.10 It is thinking and reasoning at that fourth structural level

RCR, a postformal theory

is informed by and extends critical, feminist, and postmodern thought.

An empirical finding and its first analysis

sentence shows that Bertrand is aware of the complexity of the respective

Previous work on relational thinking

Summary of the introduction

can be co-ordinated accordingly. The meaning of the three terms rela-

To refocus on Bertrand’s response reproduced in the Introduction

going on with it. Thus Darwinian selection was continued by operant

Theories of cognitive development

Although none of these considerations concerns RCR explicitly, and

Cognitive development and RCR

insight through more adequate reasoning in terms of ‘theories’ about par-

Unreﬂected, object-reﬂecting, and

Level 1a Level 1b Level 1c

Environment Environment Environment

Figure 2.1 Evolution of cognition aimed at ‘seizing up’ the environ-

is told – and immediately tries to relate this to a firsthand experience

Intra-inter-trans – the ‘logic’ of RCR development

An everyday example for a development of the intra-inter-trans type

Input to the present study from earlier work