FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 116488 : May 31, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AARON FLORES @

RONITO, SULPECIO SILPAO y ORTEGA @ SULPING and EDGAR VILLERAN y
MAGBANUA, accused-appellants.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Sgt. Wennie Tampioc, Detachment Commander of the 7 th Infantry Brigade

detailed at Barangay Tabu, Ilog, Negros Occidental, and three (3) members of the
local Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU) under his supervision,
namely, Aaron Flores alias Ronito, Sulpecio Silpao y Ortega alias Sulping and Edgar
Villeran y Magbanua, were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan,
Negros Occidental, Branch 61, with Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention. The
Information charged as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of September, 1992, in the Municipality of Ilog,
Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with high powered firearms
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, kidnap,
detain and keep under guard one SAMSON SAYAM y GEPANAO from Km 117, Hda.
Shangrella (sic), Brgy. Tabu, of the above-named municipality, and bring the latter
to their detachment at Brgy. Tabu, under restraint and against his will, without
proper authority thereof, thereby depriving said victim of his civil liberty since then
up to the present.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1cräläwvirtualibräry

All the four accused pleaded Not Guilty when arraigned. Trial ensued and, based on
the testimonial evidence presented, the trial court found the following antecedent
facts to be undisputed.

On the night of September 29, 1992, the victim, Samson Sayam, was drinking beer
at the store owned by Terry Cabrillos located at Barangay Tabu, Ilog, Negros
Occidental. Sgt. Wennie Tampioc, Aaron Flores, Sulpecio Silpao and Edgar Villeran
were at the same store drinking beer. Sayam joined the four accused at their table.
Sometime later, all the accused and the victim left the store and walked towards
the direction of the military detachment headquarters. After the accused left the
store with Samson Sayam, witnesses heard a single gunshot followed by rapid firing
coming from the direction of the detachment headquarters. 2 That was the last
time Samson Sayam was seen, and despite diligent efforts of Sayams mother and
relatives, he has not been found.
It was the prosecutions contention that on that fateful evening, all four accused
hatched a conspiracy to kidnap the victim and thereafter detain him at the
detachment headquarters. They allegedly succeeded in their plot and, the
prosecution avers, to this day the accused have not released Samson Sayam. All
the accused, however, vehemently denied committing the acts charged.

The trial court held that the testimonial evidence failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the existence of a conspiracy among the four accused. More specifically, the
prosecution failed to show an apparent common design by and among the accused
to kidnap and detain Samson Sayam against his will. Thus, the trial court
proceeded to determine the individual liabilities of the four accused based on the
degree of their participation in the commission of the offense charged.

The trial court gave credence to the prosecutions evidence that Samson Sayam was
seen being forcibly dragged out of the store and pulled towards the direction of the
detachment headquarters by accused Aaron Flores, Sulpecio Silpao and Edgar
Villeran. Since Samson Sayam had not been seen nor heard from since then, the
trial court held that the three accused were responsible for the formers
disappearance.

As regards Wennie Tampioc, the trial court found that he left the store ahead of the
three (3) co-accused and, thus, had nothing to do with the disappearance of
Samson Sayam. Notably, none of the prosecution witnesses specifically or
categorically mentioned Tampioc as among those who actively participated in
bringing Samson Sayam by force to their headquarters. Unlike his co-accused who
are natives of the place of the incident, Wennie Tampioc was newly assigned as
Detachment Commander and did not know Samson Sayam, such that no ill-motive
was attributed to him by the trial court. Likewise, the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Nelson Golez, on the one hand, and that of Carlos Manlangit, on the
other hand, conflict as to the kind of firearm allegedly carried by Tampioc. While
Golez stated that he was armed with an Armalite rifle, 3 Manlangit testified that
Tampioc was armed with a short firearm. 4cräläwvirtualibräry

More importantly, the trial court found that the identity of Sgt. Tampioc as one of
the perpetrators of the crime was doubtful, because notwithstanding the fact that
Nelson Golez knew Wennie Tampioc even before September 29, 1992, 5 the
original complaint filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Ilog Candoni,
dated October 21, 1992, which was based on the affidavits of Golez and Carlito
Manlingit, did not mention Wennie Tampioc as one of the respondents. The said
affidavits merely mentioned an unidentified member of the 7 th IB, Philippine Army,
assigned at Brgy. Tabu, detachment. At the time of the execution of the affidavits,
the witnesses could have known that Wennie Tampioc was a sergeant, and that he
was the commander of the detachment. Finally, the straightforward and emphatic
manner in which Wennie Tampioc testified inspired belief in the trial courts
mind. 6cräläwvirtualibräry

On December 8, 1993, the trial court rendered the assailed judgment, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Aaron Flores, Edgar
Villeran and Sulpecio Silpao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined and penalized in Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code and are each sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua; and there being no proof that Samson Sayam is dead, they are ordered
to pay him jointly and severally, or, in the alternative, his heirs the sum of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and to pay the costs of this suit.

The accused Wennie Tampioc is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.

The bail bonds of the said accused are ordered cancelled and the convicted accused
ordered confined pending appeal if they so file an appeal, in accordance with
Administrative Circular No. 2-92, dated January 20, 1992 of the Supreme Court.

SO ORDERED.7cräläwvirtualibräry

Two (2) separate appeals were brought before us. Accused-appellant Sulpecio
Silpao raised the following errors:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT SULPECIO

SILPAO OF THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION,
UNDER ARTICLE 267, REVISED PENAL CODE.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT CAFGU

SULPECIO SILPAO, AS AMONG THOSE WHO FORCIBLY BROUGHT SAMSON SAYAM
TO THEIR HEADQUARTERS IN THE EVENING OF 29 SEPTEMBER 1992 AND
RESPONSIBLE FOR SAMSON SAYAMS DISAPPEARANCE.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT CAFGU SULPECIO

SILPAO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.

On the other hand, accused-appellants Aaron Flores and Edgar Villeran interposed a
joint appeal based on the sole error that:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AARON FLORES

AND EDGAR VILLERAN GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME
OF KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION BASED ON
CIRCUMSTANTIAL AND INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.

After a thorough review of the facts and evidence adduced before the trial court, we
find that accused-appellants should be acquitted of the offense charged against
them.

The crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention is defined and penalized
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
The elements of the offense are:
1. That the offender is a private individual.

2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of
his liberty.

3. That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal.

4. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are
present:

(a) That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days;

(b) That it is committed simulating public authority;

(c) That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or

(d) That the person kidnapped is a minor, female or public

officer.8cräläwvirtualibräry

Clearly, accused-appellants cannot be charged with or convicted of the crime of

Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, since the first element of the said crime is
that the offender must be a private individual. In the case at bar, accused-
appellants were members of the local CAFGU at the time the alleged crime was
committed.

The CAFGU was created pursuant to Executive Order No. 264 for the purpose of
complementing the operations of the regular force formations in a locality. 9 It was
composed of civilian volunteers who were tasked to maintain peace and order in
their localities, as well as to respond to threats to national security. As such, they
were provided with weapons, and given the authority to detain or order detention
of individuals. 10cräläwvirtualibräry

The Solicitor General recognizes the error of charging and convicting accused-
appellants of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention for the reason that the
appellants are not private individuals, but public officers. As such, the Solicitor
General submits that, under the facts alleged, accused-appellants can only be liable
for the crime of Arbitrary Detention, defined and penalized in Article 124 of the
Revised Penal Code. The prosecution maintains that inasmuch as all the other
elements of Arbitrary Detention were alleged in the criminal information filed
against the accused-appellants, they may still be convicted of said crime.

Arbitrary detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without

legal grounds, detains a person. 11 Since it is settled that accused-appellants are
public officers, the question that remains to be resolved is whether or not the
evidence adduced before the trial court proved that Samson Sayam was arbitrarily
detained by accused-appellants.
As far back as the case of U.S. v. Cabanag, 12 it was held that in the crime of
illegal or arbitrary detention, it is essential that there is actual confinement or
restriction of the person of the offended party. The deprivation of liberty must be
proved, 13 just as the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty must
also be established by indubitable proof. 141 In the more recent case of People v.
Fajardo, 15 this Court reiterated the ruling in U.S. v. Cabanag, i.e., there must be
uncontroverted proof of both intent to deprive the victim of his liberty, as well as
actual confinement or restriction.

Detention is defined as the actual confinement of a person in an enclosure, or in

any manner detaining and depriving him of his liberty. 16 A careful review of the
records of the instant case shows no evidence sufficient to prove that Samson
Sayam was detained arbitrarily by accused-appellants. While the prosecution
witnesses testified that accused-appellants were seen walking with Samson Sayam
toward the direction of the detachment headquarters, there is no shred of evidence
that he was actually confined there or anywhere else. The fact that Samson Sayam
has not been seen or heard from since he was last seen with accused-appellants
does not prove that he was detained and deprived of his liberty. The prosecution,
however, argues that Samson Sayam was deprived of his liberty when accused-
appellants forced him to go with them when they left the store of Jerry Cabrillos
and brought him to the detachment headquarters.

We assayed the testimonies of the prosecutions main witnesses, namely, Carlito

Manlangit and his son Jerry Manlangit. Carlito Manlangits testimony was offered to
prove that Samson Sayam was forcibly taken from the store and that the latter
tried his best to free himself from his abductors. And yet, all that Carlito testified to
was that he saw Samson Sayam crossing the street alone from the store of a
certain Moleng; that the four accused, who were armed, followed Sayam and asked
for his residence certificate; that the four accused apprehended Samson Sayam and
brought him to the detachment headquarters; and that he went home after he saw
Samson Sayam talking to the accused. 17cräläwvirtualibräry

It is readily apparent that Carlito Manlangits testimony failed to prove the stated
purpose thereof, i.e., that Samson Sayam was taken forcibly to the detachment
headquarters. To be sure, the witness did not state that Samson Sayam was pulled,
dragged, or coerced to go with accused-appellants. Neither did he say that Samson
Sayam was taken at gunpoint. There is also no relevant testimony to the effect that
Samson Sayam tried his best to free himself from the clutches of accused-
appellants. For if that were the truth, the reactions of Carlito Manlangit do not
conform to human experience. If he really witnessed Samson Sayam being
apprehended, forcibly taken, and trying to free himself, it cannot be logically
explained why Carlito Manlangit just went home, 18 instead of doing anything to
help Samson Sayam. He admitted that he did not immediately report the incident
to the authorities. 19 More telling is the absence of testimony to the effect that
Samson Sayam was being taken to the detachment headquarters against his will,
that he was protesting his apprehension, or that he was asking for help, considering
that there were other people within hearing and seeing distance. Most damaging is
Carlito Manlangits statement that he did not see Samson Sayam in the detachment
headquarters with any or all of the accused. 20 In fine, Carlito Manlangits testimony
failed to prove that Samson Sayam was arbitrarily detained or deprived of his
liberty.

Jerry Manlangit, son of Carlito, also testified for the proseuction. According to him,
he and Samson Sayam went to Barangay Tabu to have a sack of palay milled on
September 29, 1992. At around six in the evening, while on their way home, they
passed by the store of Terry Cabrillos to buy kerosene. There, he saw the four
accused drinking beer. Samson Sayam told him to go home because he had to
show his residence certificate and barangay clearance to accused-appellant Aaron
Flores. Jerry Manlangit then proceeded to his residence in Hacienda Shangrila,
located about half a kilometer away from the center of Barangay Tabu. Later, he
told his father that Samson Sayam stayed behind and asked him to fetch Samson.
He also testified that he heard gunshots coming from the direction of the
detachment headquarters. 21cräläwvirtualibräry

The testimony of Jerry Manlangit does not prove any of the elements of the crime
of arbitrary detention. Neither does it support nor corroborate the testimony of his
father, Carlito, for they dealt on a different set of facts. Jerry Manlangit did not see
any of accused-appellant apprehend or detain Samson Sayam. He did not even see
if accused-appellant Flores really inspected the residence certificate and barangay
clearance of Samson Sayam. The rest of his testimony comprised of hearsay
evidence, 22 which has no probative value. 23 In summary, Jerry Manlangits
testimony failed to establish that accused-appellants were guilty of arbitrary
detention.

The prosecution also presented the testimony of Nelson Golez, who identified the
four accused as the persons with Samson Sayam, drinking inside the store of Terry
Cabrillos. He also stated that following a heated argument, the accused and
Samson Sayam left the store and went towards the direction of the detachment
headquarters. He said that the accused were holding and pulling Samson Sayam
towards the road. Ten minutes later, Nelson Golez heard a single gunshot followed
by rapid firing. 24cräläwvirtualibräry

On cross-examination, however, Nelson Golez did not affirm his earlier statement
that the accused and Samson Sayam were engaged in a heated argument. Rather,
he said he did not hear them arguing as they were leaving the store. Although
Nelson Golez attested that Samson Sayam was protesting while the accused were
dragging him, he did not do anything to help Samson Sayam, who happened to be
his cousin. 25cräläwvirtualibräry

Again, no conclusion of guilt can be inferred from Nelson Golezs testimony. First of
all, he was unsure of his assertion that there was an argument. The mere fact that
Samson Sayam was being dragged towards the road does not constitute arbitrary
detention. There is no showing that Samson Sayam was completely deprived of his
liberty such that he could not free himself from the grip of the accused, if he was
indeed being held against his will. The incident transpired in a public place, where
there were people milling about, many of whom were his friends. It is puzzling that
Samson Sayam did not cry out for help. Nobody bothered to report the incident, if
indeed it happened, to the barangay authorities. No one else came forward to
corroborate the testimony of Nelson Golez.

The testimony of Nelson Golez, by itself, lacks credibility. He wavered on material

points, even as the prosecution failed to substantiate by direct or corroborative
evidence the bare testimony of Nelson Golez.

It is basic and elemental that in criminal prosecutions, before the accused may be
convicted of a crime, his guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Although
the findings of fact made by trial courts are generally not disturbed on appeal, if
there are substantial facts which were overlooked but which may alter the results of
the case in favor of the accused, such facts should be taken into account by the
appellate court. 26 And where it appears that the trial court erred in the
appreciation of the evidence on record or the lack of it, the factual findings of the
trial court may be reversed. 27cräläwvirtualibräry

After thoroughly reviewing the records of this case and weighing the testimonial
evidence on the scale of creditworthiness and materiality, this Court finds the
evidence of the prosecution grossly insufficient to sustain a conviction. Again, the
fact of detention, whether illegal or arbitrary, was not clearly established by
credible evidence. There was no showing that Samson Sayam was locked up,
restrained of his freedom, or prevented from communicating with anyone. Likewise,
there was no proof that there was actual intent on the part of accused-appellants to
arbitrarily deprive Samson Sayam of his liberty. It is necessary that there must be
a purposeful or knowing action by accused-appellants to restrain the victim by or
with force, because taking coupled with intent completes the crime of illegal or
arbitrary detention. 28cräläwvirtualibräry

The prosecution, however, maintains that the evidence, even though circumstantial,
sufficiently establishes the guilt of the accused-appellants. It cites the following
circumstances:

1. On September 29, 1992, at about 6:00 oclock in the evening, accused-

appellants, together with their companions Sergeant Tampioc and fellow CAFGU
Sulpecio Silpao, were seen with Samson at the store of Terry Cabrillos. Accused-
appellants were having a drinking spree. Later, they were seen engaged in a heated
argument.

2. Thereafter, Samson was forcibly brought out of the store by accused-appellants

by holding and pulling him towards the road. From another angle, another
prosecution witness saw accused-appellants on the road arresting Samson.

3. Accused-appellants brought Samson towards the direction of the detachment of

Brgy. Tabu.

4. Ten (10) minutes later, a gunshot was heard coming from the direction of the
detachment followed by rapid firing.
5. After the incident, Samson was never seen again or heard
from.29cräläwvirtualibräry

As already discussed, the above-enumerated circumstances were not established by

clear and convincing evidence. And even if these acts were proven to be true, the
combination of all these circumstances would still not be able to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To our mind, the totality of these
circumstantial evidence do not constitute an unbroken chain pointing to the fair and
reasonable conclusion that the accused-appellants are guilty of the crime charged.

For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the

circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused-appellants
are guilty, and inconsistent with the possibility that they are innocent. 30 Thus:

Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is

sufficient for conviction if:

a) There is more than one circumstance;

b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction

beyond reasonable doubt.31cräläwvirtualibräry

The rule is clear that there must be at least two proven circumstances which in
complete sequence leads to no other logical conclusion than that of the guilt of the
accused. 32 It is admitted that Samson Sayam was seen drinking with accused-
appellants on that fateful night. However, the circumstances that there was a
heated argument among them, and that the accused-appellants held and pulled
Samson Sayam to the road and brought him towards the direction of the
detachment headquarters was not sufficiently proven by material or relevant
testimony.

Moreover, the circumstance that gunshots were heard on that night have no
relevancy to the case. Even if it were, it cannot be concluded that the gunshots
came from the direction of the detachment headquarters. The witnesses who
testified that they heard the gunshots were at least half a kilometer away from the
center of the barangay, while the detachment headquarters itself was also some
distance from the barangay. At night, especially in the rural areas when all is quiet,
loud sounds such as gunshots reverberate and would seem to come from every
direction. An ordinary person a kilometer away cannot, with certainty, point to the
exact location where the gunshots would be coming from. That would otherwise be
attributing expertise on such matters to the prosecution witnesses.

That Samson Sayam was never seen or heard from again cannot be the basis for
the trial court to render judgment convicting the accused-appellants. In fact, it has
no bearing in this case because it is not one of the elements of the crime of
arbitrary detention. Consequently, only one relevant circumstance was proved, i.e.,
that accused-appellants were the last persons seen with Samson Sayam. However,
said circumstance does not necessarily prove that they feloniously abducted him,
then arbitrarily detained him. 33cräläwvirtualibräry

Moreover, mere suspicion that the disappearance of Samson Sayam was a result of
accused-appellants alleged criminal acts and intentions is insufficient to convict
them. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is the required quantum of evidence. 34 An
uncorroborated circumstantial evidence is certainly not sufficient for conviction
when the evidence itself is in serious doubt. 35 The prosecution was not able to
prove a possible motive why accused-appellants would arbitrarily detain Samson
Sayam. In sum, there is no unbroken chain of circumstances leading to the
conclusion that accused-appellants are guilty. Since the pieces of circumstantial
evidence do not fulfill the test of moral certainty that is sufficient to support a
judgment or conviction, the Court must acquit the accused. 36cräläwvirtualibräry

In the recent case of People v. Comesario, 373 we had occasion to rule that:

Accused-appellants conviction by the trial court hinged on circumstantial evidence.

To validly invoke circumstantial evidence, it must be shown that there is more than
one circumstance and the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven.
The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain of events
that can lead reasonably to the conclusion pointing to the accused to the exclusion
of all others as the author of the crime. Logically, it is where the evidence is purely
circumstantial that there should be an even greater need than usual to apply with
vigor the rule that the prosecution cannot depend on the weakness of the defense
and that any conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt of
the accused. Like a tapestry made of strands which create a pattern when
interwoven, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads
to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person.

Accused-appellants enjoy the presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved.

In the case at bar, the pieces of testimonial evidence relied on by the prosecution
and the trial court to support a conviction have failed to overcome the constitutional
precept of the presumed innocence of accused-appellants. Among other grounds,
not only is there a lot of room for reasonable doubt in regard to their guilt, there is
a virtual dearth of convincing evidence to prove that a crime had been committed.

There is no need even to assess the evidence of the defense, for the prosecution
bears the onus to distinctly and indubitably prove that a crime had been committed
by accused-appellants. 38 It is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish its case
with that degree of proof which leads to no other conclusion but conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. The evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merits for it cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
for the defense. 39 Clearly, the prosecution in this case has failed to prove the guilt
of accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. In similar cases, this Court has
often and consistently ruled that it is better to acquit a guilty person than to convict
an innocent one. 40cräläwvirtualibräry

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. Accused-

appellants are ACQUITTED. Unless being held or detained for some lawful reason,
accused-appellants are ORDERED RELEASED immediately. The Director of Prisons is
DIRECTEDto inform this Court, within five (5) days from notice, of the date and
time when accused-appellants are released pursuant to this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Puno, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Kapunan, J., on leave .

EN BANC

A.M. No. MTJ-93-813 September 15, 1993

FERNANDO CAYAO, Complainant, vs. JUDGE JUSTINIANO A. DEL

MUNDO, Respondent.chanrobles virtual law library

PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative complaint filed by Fernando R. Cayao with the Office of the
Court Administrator charging respondent Judge Justiniano A. Del Mundo, MTC,
Indang Cavite with abuse of authority.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

Acting on said complaint, the Office of the Court Administrator directed Judge
Enrique M. Almario, Regional trial Court Branch XV, Naic, Cavite, to conduct an
investigation and to submit his report and recommendation
thereon.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Based on the records as well as the report submitted by the investigating Judge, it
appears that on or about October 22, 1992 at 9:25 a.m., while traversing the
stretch of Mataas na Lupa, Alulod, Indang, Cavite, complainant, as driver of
Donny's Transit Bus with Plate No. DWB 315, overtook a Sto. Niño Liner with Body
No. 5282 driven by one Arnel Ranes Muloy. As a consequence thereof, the bus
driven by complainant almost collided head-on with an oncoming owner-type
jeepney with Plate No. PJT 752. It turned out later that the jeepney was registered
in the name of respondent Judge Del Mundo who, at the time of the incident, was
one of the passengers therein along with his sons Rommel and June and one
Edward Rommen. Respondent's son Rommel was behind the
wheel.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

At 3:30 p.m. of the same day, even before complainant could properly park his bus,
he was picked up by policemen of the Philippine National Police Station of Indang,
Cavite at the Indang Public Plaza and was immediately brought before the sala of
respondent judge. There, complainant was confronted by respondent judge and
accused by the latter of nearly causing an accident that morning. Without giving
complainant any opportunity to explain, respondent judge insisted that complainant
be punished for the incident. Whereupon, complainant was compelled by
respondent judge to choose from three (3) alternative punishments none of which
is pleasant, to wit: (a) to face a charge of multiple attempted homicide; (b)
revocation of his driver's license; or (c) to be put in jail for three (3) days. Of the
three choices, complainant chose the third, i.e., confinement for three (3) days, as
a consequence of which he was forced to sign a "waiver of detention" by
respondent judge. Thereafter, complainant was immediately escorted by policemen
to the municipal jail. Though not actually incarcerated complainant remained in the
premises of the municipal jail for three (3) days, from October 22 up to October 25,
1992, by way of serving his "sentence". On the third day, complainant was released
by SPO1 Manolo Dilig to the custody of Geronimo Cayao, complainant's co-driver
and cousin.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The fact of detention of complainant in the premises of the municipal jail for three
(3) days was confirmed and corroborated by the testimony of the jail warden of
Indang, Cavite, SP04 Adelaida Nova. The fact of complainant's release therefrom
after three (3) days detention was testified to by SPO1 Manolo Dilig who prepared
the corresponding document of release. For his defense, respondent judge merely
made general denials.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The actuations of respondent judge herein complained of, constitute abuse of

authority. To begin with, respondent's verbal order for the arrest of complainant at
the Indang Public Plaza without the requisite complaint having been filed and the
corresponding warrant of arrest having been issued in order that complainant may
be brought to his sala is characteristic of personal vengeance and the abusive
attitude of respondent. Being a judge, respondent above all, should be the first to
abide by the law and weave an example for others to follow (Ompoc vs. Torres, 178
SCRA 14 [1989]). Instead, respondent judge opted to avail of his judicial authority
in excess of what is allowed by law to gratify his vindictive
purposes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

If respondent honestly believes that complainant committed violations of traffic

rules and regulations which nearly caused the accident involving their respective
vehicles, respondent judge should have caused the filing of the appropriate criminal
charges against complainant and left it at that. On the contrary, respondent is not
one to let the law run its own course. This is a classic case where respondent took it
upon himself to be the accuser, prosecutor, judge and executioner at the same time
to condemn complainant for his alleged wrongdoing without the benefit of due
process. Without even an opportunity to air his side, complainant was
unceremoniously made to choose his own penalty. Left with no other choice but to
face his predicament and overpowered by the imposing authority of respondent,
complainant picked the lesser evil of the three alternatives given to him.
Complainant can hardly be blamed for so doing. A perusal of the two (2) other
choices presented to him will illustrate why.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

The first choice given to complainant was to face a charge of multiple attempted
homicide. To threaten complainant with a criminal case for multiple attempted
homicide is indicative of respondent's gross ignorance of the law. As a judge, he
should know very well that such at charge will not hold water in any court of law
considering that no accident per se ever occurred and hence, no life threatening
injury was even sustained. To a mere bus driver who is not at all familiar with the
intricacies of the law, such a threat spelled not only the possibility of long-term
imprisonment and all the hardship it entails but also the onus and shame that will
forever attach to his name. Surely, to his mind, a threat of prosecution coming
from a municipal trial court judge is alarming
enough.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The second alternative punishment offered to complainant to choose from involves
his very means of livelihood - revocation of his driver's license. This is tantamount
to economic death penalty and just as repulsive as the first
alternative.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Faced with these grim prospects complainant voluntarily submitted himself to the
jail warden of the Indang Municipal Jail for detention after executing his "waiver of
detention," complainant felt that he had no other choice but to serve out the
"penalty" forcibly and arbitrarily imposed upon him by
respondent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

While it is true that complainant was not put behind bare as respondent had
intended, however, complainant was not allowed to leave the premises of the jail
house. The idea of confinement is not synonymous only with incarceration inside a
jail cell. It is enough to qualify as confinement that a man be restrained, either
morally or physically, of his personal liberty (Black's Law Dictionary, 270 [1979]).
Under the circumstances, respondent judge was in fact guilty of arbitrary detention
when he, as a public officer, ordered the arrest and detention of complainant
without legal grounds (Article 124, Revised Penal Code; U.S. vs. Battallones 23 Phil.
46 [1912]). In overtaking another vehicle, complainant-driver was not committing
or had not actually committed a crime in the presence of respondent judge (Section
6, Rule 113, Rules of Court). Such being the case, the warrantless arrest and
subsequent detention of complainant were illegal. In the case at bar, no less than
the testimony of the jail warden herself confirmed that complainant was indeed
deprived of his liberty for three (3) days:

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:chanrobles virtual law library

Q Alright, did you or did you not in fact detain Fernando Cayao on that premises?
On the ground of that premises?chanrobles virtual law library

WITNESS (jail warden):chanrobles virtual law library

A I did not put him inside the jail, your Honor, but he was inside the police station.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:chanrobles virtual law library

Q Alright, as a police officer, I ask you again, did you or did you not detain
Fernando Cayao based on the premises that you said under oath before this
Court?chanrobles virtual law library

A Yes, your Honor, inside the police station.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles

virtual law library
Q Does it mean that he could not have gone freely of his own volition outside the
police station without your authority or permission?chanrobles virtual law library

A He can move freely.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

COURT:chanrobles virtual law library

Q When you said that, you meant he could have gone home, he could have gone
eating in restaurant, he could have gone to a theatre or in any public place. Is that
what you mean?chanrobles virtual law library

WITNESS:chanrobles virtual law library

A No, your Honor. Only inside the police

station.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Q Why only in the police station? Inside? What is your order? What did you tell
him?chanrobles virtual law library

A Because he voluntarily went to the police station to be

detained.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Q Alright, so, had he told you that he would have gone to other places, you will
have no objection? You will have no interpolation or you would not feel that you
have a right to have him under your custody. Is that correct?

xxx xxx xxx

WITNESS:chanrobles virtual law library

A I will still prevent him.

(TSN, November 19, 1992, pp. 9-10)

Of equal importance is the perception of complainant himself as to whether his

liberty, was actually restricted or not:

xxx xxx xxx

Q So, summarily speaking, you feel that you were detained in the municipal jail of
the station of Indang, Cavite?chanrobles virtual law library

A Yes, your Honor, because I was not able to get out from the police station from
the time that I was detained.

(TSN, November 19, 1992, p. 16)

It would be well to emphasize at this point that the gravity of the misconduct of
respondent is not alone centered on his order for the detention of complainant.
Rather, it is ingrained in the fact that complainant was so detained without
affording him his constitutional rights.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

As previously mentioned, complainant was condemned by his own accuser without

the benefit of due process. Complainant was not even accorded any of the basic
rights to which an accused is entitled. When respondent insisted on punishing hire
without a chance to air his side, complainant was deprived of the presumption of
innocence, the right to be heard by himself and counsel, the right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him as well as the right to an
impartial and public trial. Moreover, complainant was made to execute a waiver of
detention without the assistance of counsel. Worse, the aforesaid waiver was even
subscribed by complainant before the very same judge who was his accuser.
Certainly, such intentional and blatant violations of one's constitutional rights
committed by respondent cannot be tolerated by this
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

As public servants, judges are appointed to the judiciary to serve as the visible
representation of the law, and more importantly, of justice. From them, the people
draw their will and awareness to obey the law (De la Paz vs. Inutan, 64 SCRA 540
(1975)). If judges, who swore to obey and uphold the constitution, would conduct
themselves in the way that respondent did in wanton disregard and violation of the
rights of complainant, then the people, especially those with whom they come in
direct contact, would lose all their respect and high regard for the institution of the
judiciary itself, not to mention, cause the breakdown of the moral fiber on which
the judiciary is founded.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Undoubtedly, the actuations of respondent judge represent the kind of gross and
flaunting misconduct on the part of those who are charged with the responsibility of
administering the law and rendering justice that so quickly and severely corrodes
the respect for law and the courts without which the government cannot continue
and that tears apart the very bonds of our polity (Ompoc vs. Judge Torres, 178
SCRA 14 [1989]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Furthermore, the reprehensible conduct exhibited by respondent judge in the case

at bar exposed his total disregard of, or indifference to, or even ignorance of the
procedure prescribed by law. His act of intentionally violating the law and
disregarding well-known legal procedures can be characterized as gross
misconduct, nay a criminal misconduct on his part (Babatio vs. Tan, 157 SCRA 277
[1988]). He used and abused his position of authority in intimidating the
complainant as well as the members of the Indang police force into submitting to
his excesses. Likewise, he closed his eyes to the mandates of the Code of Judicial
Conduct to always conduct himself as to be beyond reproach and suspicion not only
in the performance of his duties but also outside his sala and as a private
individual. (Castillo vs. Calanog, Jr. 199 SCRA 75
[1991]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Clearly, there is not, an iota of doubt that respondent, through his oppressive and
vindictive actuations, has committed a disservice to the cause of justice. He has
unequivocably demonstrated his unfitness to continue as a member of the judiciary
and should accordingly be removed from the
service.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, respondent judge Justiniano A. Del Mundo of the Municipal Trial Court
of Indang, Cavite is hereby DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits except accrued leave credits with prejudice to reinstatement or
reappointment to any public office including government-owned or controlled
corporations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo,
Melo, Quiason, Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

Feliciano and Griño-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HERSON TAN y VERZO, accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:

May the confession of an accused, given before a police investigator upon invitation and without
the benefit of counsel, be admissible in evidence against him?

Accused-appellant Herson Tan, along with Lito Amido, were charged with the crime of highway
robbery with murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, of Gumaca, Quezon Province,
under an information1 dated February 8, 1989, which reads as follows:

That on or about the 5th day of December 1988, along the Maharlika Highway at
Barangay Tinandog, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, armed
with bladed and pointed weapons, with intent to gain, by means of force, violence,
threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and carry away from one Freddie Saavedra, a Honda TMX motorcycle
with a sidecar bearing Plate No. DW 9961 valued at THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P30,000.00) Philippine currency, belonging to the said Freddie Saavedra, to the
damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid amount; and that on the
occasion of said robbery and by reason thereof, the said accused, with intent to
kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, and taking advantage of their
superior strength and in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon
said Freddie Saavedra, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple stab wounds on
the different parts of his body, which directly caused his death.

Contrary to law.

On arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge.

The relevant facts established by the prosecution are as follows:

On December 5, 1988, at about 7:00 o'clock p.m., tricycle driver Freddie Saavedra went to
see his wife, Delfa, at Our Lady of Angeles Academy in Atimonan, Quezon, where the
latter is a third year high school student, to inform her that he will drive both accused to
Barangay Maligaya. It was the last time, however, that Freddie was seen alive. When the
latter failed to return that evening, Delfa, as early as 4:30 o'clock a.m. of December 6,
1988 inquired on his whereabouts from relatives and friends. In the course of such
inquiry, a certain Arnel Villarama revealed that the lifeless body of her husband was
discovered on the diversion road at Barangay Malinao in Atimonan. Forthwith, they
proceeded to the said place and found him sprawled on the ground with fourteen stab
wounds in different parts of his body.
Meanwhile, relying on the information that an abandoned sidecar of a tricycle was
sighted at Barangay Malinao, Lucena Philippine National Police (PNP) led by Lt. Carlos
Santos proceeded to the scene of the crime and recovered a blue sidecar which they
brought back with them to their headquarters. Subsequently, Lt. Santos, Cpl. Numeriano
Aguilar and Pat. Rolando Alandy invited appellant in connection with the instant case
and with respect to two other robbery cases reported in Lucena City. During their
conversation, appellant allegedly gave an explicit account of what actually transpired in
the case at bar. He narrated that he and co-accused Amido were responsible for the loss
of the motorcycle and the consequent death of Saavedra. Moreover, he averred that they
sold the motorcycle to a certain Danny Teves of Barrio Summit, Muntinlupa for a sum of
P4,000.00. With the help of appellant as a guide, the Lucena PNP immediately dispatched
a team to retrieve the same.

After admitting that it was purchased from both the accused and upon failure to present
any document evidencing the purported sale, Teves voluntarily surrendered it to the
police who turned it over, together with the sidecar, to the Atimonan Police Station for
safekeeping.

Lt. Carlos, on cross-examination, testified that when he invited appellant to their

headquarters, he had no warrant for his arrest. In the course thereof, he informed the
latter that he was a suspect, not only in the instant case, but also in two other robbery
cases allegedly committed in Lucena City. In the belief that they were merely conversing
inside the police station, he admitted that he did not inform appellant of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel; nor did he reduce
the supposed confession to writing.2

Appellant, on the other hand, alleged that he had no participation in the offense charged
and contended that his only involvement in the matter was the referral of accused Amido
to Teves. He recounted that sometime in December 1988, Amido sought him at his house
and told him that the motorcycle he was riding on was being offered for sale. Upon proof
shown that it was indeed registered under Amido's name, he accompanied the latter to
Manila on board the said motorcycle and they approached Antonio Carandang. The
latter, thereafter, brought them to a certain Perlita Aguilar and Danilo Teves with whom
the sale was finally consummated. He allegedly received P150.00 as his commission.

Amido presented alibi as his defense. He alleged that although a tricycle driver by
occupation, he was at Barangay Malusak, Atimonan on the day in question, some seven
kilometers from the town, busy assisting in the renovation of his mother's house. He
narrated that the victim was his friend and, therefore, he could not have participated in
the gruesome death of the latter.

In a decision dated April 21, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premised in the foregoing considerations, this Court finds Herson

Tan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Highway Robbery with
Murder and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of RECLUSION
PERPETUA. He is further ordered to indemnify the family of the deceased in the
amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
 Due to insufficiency of evidence, Lito Amido is hereby ACQUITTED of the charges
against him and the Provincial Warden of Quezon, Provincial Jail, Lucena City, is
hereby ordered to release from custody the person of said Lito Amido, unless he
is being detained thereat for some other lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.3

Appellant assails the finding of conviction despite failure of the prosecution to positively
identify him as the culprit of the crime and to present clear and convincing circumstantial
evidence that would overcome his innocence.

In light of the above facts and circumstances, the appealed decision is set aside and
appellant acquitted on the ground that his constitutional rights were violated.

It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission

and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in
evidence against the confessant. Article III, Section 12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of the
Constitution provides:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding

section shall be inadmissible against him.

Republic Act No. 7438 (R.A. No. 7438),4 approved on May 15, 1992, reenforced the
constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial investigation, a
pertinent provision5 of which reads:

As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing
an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting"
officer for any violation of law.

Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities

after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant manner. The rules on custodial investigation begin to operate as soon as the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus a
particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a
process of interrogations that tends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the
rule begins to operate.6
Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite function of the
investigating officer, the duty to explain those rights to the accused but also that there
must correspondingly be a meaningful communication to and understanding thereof by
the accused. A mere perfunctory reading by the constable of such rights to the accused
would thus not suffice.7

Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be

admissible must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must
be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be
express; and (4) it must be in writing.8

While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it must, however, be
"voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and must be made in the presence and with the
assistance of counsel."9 To reiterate, in People v. Javar,10 it was ruled therein that any
statement obtained in violation of the constitution, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in
whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession contains a
grain of truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible
in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily
given.

The records of this case do not indicate that appellant was assisted by counsel when he
made such waiver, a finding evident from the testimony of Lt. Santos on cross-
examination, thus:

Q Now, when you brought Herson Tan to the Headquarters, did you
tell him that he is one of the suspects in the robbery slain (sic) that
took place in Atimonan on December 5, 1988?

A Yes, sir, and he was also suspect to the robbery case which was
investigated at Lucena Police Station. There were two (2) cases
which were investigated on Herson Tan.

Q Now, so in addition to the Atimonan case, you also took Herson

Tan to your custody in connection with another case that happened
in Lucena?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you happened to have Herson Tan in your list as suspect in

both cases because Herson was previously incarcerated at Lucena
City Jail in connection with a certain case, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q Just for curiosity sake, you invited him in your headquarters, is

that what happened in this case?

A Yes, sir.
 Q And it just happened that without applying third degree to him he
gave you that information?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you notify him of his constitutional right to counsel before you
propounded questions to him?

A No, sir, because we are asking question only to him.

Q Before propounding question or information you sought to elicit

from him, did you inform him of his constitutional right not to testify
against himself because he is a suspect in these two (2) cases?

A No, sir, because we were just conversing.11 (Emphasis supplied)

The evidence for the prosecution shows that when appellant was invited for questioning
at the police headquarters, he allegedly admitted his participation in the crime. This will
not suffice to convict him, however, of said crime. The constitutional rights of appellant,
particularly the right to remain silent and to counsel, are impregnable from the moment
he is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, even
if the same be initiated by mere invitation. "This Court values liberty and will always
insist on the observance of basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua
non against the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of government."12

What remains of the evidence for the prosecution is inadequate to warrant a conviction.
Considering the circumstances attendant in the conduct of appellant's investigation
which fell short of compliance with constitutional safeguards, we are constrained to
acquit the appellant.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Gumaca, Quezon (Branch 62) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant HERSON TAN y
VERZO is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged and his immediate release from
confinement is hereby ordered, unless there is any other lawful cause for continued
detention. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Kapunan, Francisco and Purisima, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-61388 July 19, 1985

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS FOR DR. AURORA PARONG, NORBERTO PORTUGUESE, SABINO PADILLA,
FRANCIS DIVINA GRACIA, IMELDA DE LOS SANTOS, BENJAMIN PINEDA, ZENAIDA
MALLARI, MARIANO SORIANO, TITO TANGUILIG, LETTY BALLOGAN, BIENVENIDA
GARCIA, EUFRONIO ORTIZ, JR., JUANITO GRANADA and TOM VASQUEZ, JOSEFINA
GARCIA PADILLA, petitioner,
vs.
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GENERAL FABIAN C. VER GENERAL FIDEL V. RAMOS,
and LT. COL. MIGUEL CORONEL, respondents.

Lorenzo Tanada, Jose W. Diokno, Joker P. Arroyo, Efren H. Mercado and Alexander A. Padilla
for petitioner.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Garcia Padilla v. Minister Enrile, 1 is an application for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus
on behalf of fourteen detainees, nine of whom were arrested on July 6, 1982, 2 another four on
July 7, 1982, 3 and the last one on July 15, 1982. 4 The writ was issued, respondents were
required to make a return, and the case heard on August 26, 1982. 5

In such return, it was alleged: "The detainees mentioned in the petition, with the exception of
Tom Vasquez, who was temporarily released on July 17, 1982, after his arrest on July 15, 1982,
are all being detained by virtue of a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) issued on July 12,
1982, pursuant to LOI No. 1211 dated March 9, 1982, in relation to Presidential Proclamation
No. 2045 dated January 17, 1981. The said PCO was issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos
for violation of P.D. No. 885 ... ." 6

The facts were set forth thus in the opinion of the Court penned by retired Justice Pacifico de
Castro: "At the time of the arrest of the nine (9) of the fourteen (14) detainees herein on July 6,
1982, records reveal that they were then having conference in the dining room of Dr. Parong's
residence from 10:00 a.m. of that same day. Prior thereto, all the fourteen (14) detainees were
under surveillance as they were then Identified as members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) engaging in subversive activities and using the house of detainee Dr. Aurora
Parong in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, as their headquarters. Caught in flagrante delicto, the
nine (9) detainees mentioned scampered towards different directions leaving on top of their
conference table numerous subversive documents, periodicals, pamphlets, books,
correspondence, stationeries, and other papers, including a plan on how they would infiltrate the
youth and student sector (code-named YORK). Also found were one (1) .38 cal. revolver with
eight (8) live bullets, nineteen (19) rounds of ammunition for M16 armalite, eighteen thousand
six hundred fifty pesos P l8,650.00) cash believed to be CPP/NPA funds, assorted medicine
packed and ready for distribution, a sizeable quantity of printing paraphernalia, which were then
seized. 7
According to the main opinion of the Court, concurred in full by six other members: 8 "The
function of the PCO is to validate, on constitutional ground, the detention of a person for any of
the offenses covered by Proclamation No. 2045 which continues in force the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, if the arrest has been made initially without any warrant.
Its legal effect is to render the writ unavailing as a means of judicially inquiring into the legality of
the detention in view of the suspension of the privilege of the writ. The grant of the power to
suspend the said privilege provides the basis for continuing with perfect legality the detention as
long as the invasion or rebellion has not been repelled or quelled and the need therefor in the
interest of public safety continues." 9 Further: "The significance of the confernment of this
power, constitutionally upon the President as Commander-in-Chief, is that the exercise thereof
is not subject to judicial inquiry, with a view to determining its legality in the light of the bill of
rights guarantee to individual freedom." 10

The opinion then went on to reiterate the doctrine that with the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, the right to bail is likewise suspended and to hold "that under LOI 1211, a
Presidential Commitment Order, the issuance of which is the executive prerogative of the
President under the Constitution, may not be declared void by the Courts, under the doctrine of
'political question,' as has been applied in the Baker and Castañeda cases, on any ground, let
alone its supposed violation of the provision of LOI 1211, thus diluting, if not abandoning, the
doctrine of the Lansang case." 11 Finally, the Court held "that upon the issuance of the
Presidential Commitment Order against herein petitioners, their continued detention is rendered
valid and legal, and their right to be released even after the filing of charges against them in
court, to depend on the President, who may order the release of a detainee or his being placed
under house arrest, as he has done in meritorious cases." 12

The dispositive portion of the decision promulgated on April 20, 1983 reads as follows:
"[Wherefore], the instant petition should be, as it is hereby dismissed." 13

Thereafter, on June 6, 1983, a motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner Garcia Padilla.
The stress is on the continuing validity of Garcia v. Lansang 14 as well as the existence of the
right to bail even with the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The motion
asserted further that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not vest
the President with the power to issue warrants of arrest or presidential commitment orders, and
that even it be assumed that he has such a power, the Supreme Court may review its issuance
when challenged. It was finally alleged that since petitioners were not caught in flagrante delicto,
their arrest was illegal and void.

In the comment of respondents on the motion for reconsideration, it was the submission of
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus raises a political, not a judicial, question and that the right to bail cannot be invoked
during such a period. On the question of whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus vests the President with the power to issue warrants of arrest or
presidential commitment orders, this is what the Comment stated: "It is to be pointed out that
this argument was not raised in the petition. Nonetheless, suffice it to point out that an arrest
order by the President incident to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
essentially preventive in nature." 15 It added: "Besides, PD No. 1836 and LOI 1211 have
vested, assuming a law is necessary, in the President the power of preventive arrest incident to
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In addition, however, it should be
noted that the PCO has been replaced by Preventive Detention Action (PDA), pursuant to PD
No. 1877 dated July 21, 1983. As provided for in the said decree, a PDA constitute an authority
to arrest and preventively detain persons committing the aforementioned crimes, for a period
not exceeding one (1) year, with the cause or causes of their arrest subjected to review by the
President or by the Review Committee created for that purpose." 16 The last argument of
petitioner, namely that the detainees were not caught in flagrante delicto and therefore the
arrest was illegal was refuted in the Comment thus: "Again petitioner simply misses the point.
As this Court correctly observed, the crimes of subversion and rebellion are continuing offenses.
Besides this point involves an issue of fact. 17

It suffices to refer to the above Comment for the resolution of the motion for reconsideration. As
therein noted, Presidential Decree No. 1877 dated July 21, 1983 limits the duration of the
preventive detention action for the period not exceeding one year. In the language of such
Decree: "When issued, the preventive detention action shall constitute authority to arrest the
subject person or persons, and to preventively detain him or them for a period not exceeding
one year and sequester all arms, equipment or properly used or to be used in the commission of
the crime or crimes." 18 There is no need to mention the amendments as there is no change as
to the preventive detention period remaining at "not exceeding one year." This Presidential
Decree No. 1877 explicitly provides in its Section 8: "The Minister of Defense shall promulgate
the rules and regulations to implement this Decree." 19 Such implementing rules and
regulations were issued on September 7, 1983 by Minister of National Defense, respondent
Juan Ponce Enrile and duly approved by the President of the Philippines. One of its Sections
deals with the period of detention under a presidential commitment order thus: "The period of
detention of all persons presently detained by virtue of a Presidential Commitment Order or its
derivatives shall not extend beyond one (1) year from and after the date of effectivity of
Presidential Decree No. 1877, as amended. Upon the effectivity of these rules and regulations,
all cases of persons presently detained under a presidential commitment order or its derivatives
shall be governed by Presidential Decree No. 1877, as amended, and its implementing rules
and regulations." 20

Subsequently, on May 28, 1985, respondents filed the following Manifestation: "1. The persons
listed below who were detained by virtue of Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) issued on
July 12, 1982, and in whose behalf the above-captioned cases was filed have been released
detention by the military authorities concerned on the dates appearing opposite their names, to
wit: Names of Detainees — Dates of Release: a. Dr. Aurora Parong-December 12, 1983: b.
Norberto Portuguese- January 31, 1985; c. Sabino Padilla — January 31, 1985; d. Francis
Divinagracia — January 31, 1985; e. Imelda delos Santos — October 20, 1983; f. Benjamin
Pineda — January 3l 1985; g. Zenaida Mallari — January 31, 1985 h. Tito Tanguilig — October
21, 1983; i. Letty Ballogan — March 4, 1983; j. Bienvenida Garcia — October 20, 1983; k
Eufronio Ortiz, Jr. January 31, 1985; 1. Juanito Granada — October 20, 1983. 2. The foregoing
information was received from the Off ice of Civil Relations, Ministry of National Defense,
through Major Felizardo O. Montero, JAGS-GHO 3. As regards Tom Vasquez, who was
included in the instant petition, he was released on July 17, 1982, after his arrest on July 15,
1982, since he was not named in the PCO 4. Anent Mariano Soriano, the undersigned have
been informed by the Office of Civil Relations that the subject escaped from detention two (2)
years ago and as of date hereof is still at large." 21

There is no question, therefore, that the force and effectivity of a presidential commitment order
issued as far back as July 12, 1982 had ceased to have any force or effect.

WHEREFORE, pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1877 and Section 8 of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 1877-A, the motion for
reconsideration should have been granted, and the writ of habeas corpus ordering the release
of the detainees covered by such Section 8 issued, but in the light of the foregoing manifestation
as to Norberto Portuguese, Sabino Padilla, Francis Divina gracia, Imelda de los Santos,
Benjamin Pineda, Zenaida Mallari, Mariano Soriano, Tito Tanguilig, Letty Ballogan, Bienvenida
Garcia, Eufronio Ortiz, Jr., Juanito Granada, and Tom Vasquez, having been released, the
petition as to them has been declared moot and academic. As to Dr. Aurora Parong, since a
warrant of arrest against her was issued by the municipal court of Bayombong on August 4,
1982, for illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions, the petition is likewise declared moot
and academic. No costs.

Fernando, * CJ., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas
and Alampay, JJ., concur.

Makasiar, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur in the result.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

I concur in the result, i.e. to dismiss the case for having become moot and academic. And if I
had my way I would set the original decision aside because of its slavish tone.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I maintain my original dissent from the decision of April 20, 1983, thus: "I am constrained to
dissent from the all encompassing scope of the main opinion of Mr. Justice de Castro which
would overturn the landmark doctrine of Lansang vs. Garcia1 which upheld the Supreme
Court's authority to inquire into the existence of factual bases for the President's suspension of
the privilege of writ of habeas corpus in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof
and would revert to the retrogressive and colonial era ruling of Barcelon vs.
Baker 2 and Montenegro vs. Castañeda 3 that the President's decision to so suspend the
privilege of the writ 'is final and conclusive upon the courts and all other persons,' and would
further deny the right to bail even after the filing of charges in court to persons detained under
Presidential Commitment Orders," and " 'The continuous flow of petitions for habeas corpus'
filed with this Court should not be decried nor discouraged. The Court stands as the guarantor
of the constitutional and human rights of all persons within its jurisdiction and must see to it that
the rights are respected and enforced. It is settled in this jurisdiction that once a deprivation of a
constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment or before whom the
case is pending is ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail
the legality of the detention. 4 So accused persons deprived of the constitutional right of speedy
trial have been set free. 5 And likewise persons detained indefinitely without charges so much
so that the detention becomes punitive and not merely preventive in character are entitled to
regain their freedom. The spirit and letter of our Constitution negates as contrary to the basic
precepts of human rights and freedom that a person be detained indefinitely without any
charges."
As stated therein, "the higher and superior mandate of the Constitution guarantees the right to
bail and vests the courts with the jurisdiction and judicial power to grant bail which may not be
removed nor diminished nor abdicated. We cannot but so hold, if we are to be true to the
fundamental precept that 'The Constitution is a law for rulers and for people equally in war and
in peace and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men at all times and under all
circumstances.'

It should be noted that the Court's Resolution at bar reaffirms the restrictive interpretation of
preventive detention under section 3 of P.D. 1877 dated July 21, 1983 adopted by it in
the Jimenez 6 and Villaber 7 cases, that it will set at liberty persons preventively detained
without charges for over one year. Specifically cited is section 8 of the Defense Minister's
implementing rules and regulations duly approved by the President that "The period of detention
of all persons presently detained by virtue of a Presidential Commitment Order or its derivatives
shall not extend beyond one (1) year from and after the date of effectivity of Presidential Decree
No. 1877, as amended. Upon the effectivity of these rules and regulations, all cases of persons
presently detained under a Presidential Commitment Order or its derivatives shall be governed
by Presidential Decree No. 1877, as amended, and its implementing rules and regulations." The
Court's Resolution further authoritatively states with the unqualified concurrence of at least ten
(10) members that "There is no question, therefore, that the force and effectivity of a presidential
commitment order issued as far back as July 12, 1982 had ceased to have any force and
effect," since the detention exceeded the prescribed one-year limitation and that "pursuant to
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1877 and Section 8 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Presidential Decree No. 1877-A, the motion for reconsideration should have been
granted, and the writ of habeas corpus ordering the release of the detainees covered by such
Section 8 issued," but for the release of the detainees effected earlier, mostly in January this
year.

The crucial issues raised in petitioner's motion for reconsideration of June 6, 1983 8 will have to
await determination in pending appropriate cases awaiting the Court's resolution.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

I concur in the result, i.e. to dismiss the case for having become moot and academic. And if I
had my way I would set the original decision aside because of its slavish tone.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I maintain my original dissent from the decision of April 20, 1983, thus: "I am constrained to
dissent from the all encompassing scope of the main opinion of Mr. Justice de Castro which
would overturn the landmark doctrine of Lansang vs. Garcia1 which upheld the Supreme
Court's authority to inquire into the existence of factual bases for the President's suspension of
the privilege of writ of habeas corpus in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof
and would revert to the retrogressive and colonial era ruling of Barcelon vs.
Baker 2 and Montenegro vs. Castañeda 3 that the President's decision to so suspend the
privilege of the writ 'is final and conclusive upon the courts and all other persons,' and would
further deny the right to bail even after the filing of charges in court to persons detained under
Presidential Commitment Orders," and " 'The continuous flow of petitions for habeas corpus'
filed with this Court should not be decried nor discouraged. The Court stands as the guarantor
of the constitutional and human rights of all persons within its jurisdiction and must see to it that
the rights are respected and enforced. It is settled in this jurisdiction that once a deprivation of a
constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment or before whom the
case is pending is ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail
the legality of the detention. 4 So accused persons deprived of the constitutional right of speedy
trial have been set free. 5 And likewise persons detained indefinitely without charges so much
so that the detention becomes punitive and not merely preventive in character are entitled to
regain their freedom. The spirit and letter of our Constitution negates as contrary to the basic
precepts of human rights and freedom that a person be detained indefinitely without any
charges."

As stated therein, "the higher and superior mandate of the Constitution guarantees the right to
bail and vests the courts with the jurisdiction and judicial power to grant bail which may not be
removed nor diminished nor abdicated. We cannot but so hold, if we are to be true to the
fundamental precept that 'The Constitution is a law for rulers and for people equally in war and
in peace and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men at all times and under all
circumstances.'

It should be noted that the Court's Resolution at bar reaffirms the restrictive interpretation of
preventive detention under section 3 of P.D. 1877 dated July 21, 1983 adopted by it in
the Jimenez 6 and Villaber 7 cases, that it will set at liberty persons preventively detained
without charges for over one year. Specifically cited is section 8 of the Defense Minister's
implementing rules and regulations duly approved by the President that "The period of detention
of all persons presently detained by virtue of a Presidential Commitment Order or its derivatives
shall not extend beyond one (1) year from and after the date of effectivity of Presidential Decree
No. 1877, as amended. Upon the effectivity of these rules and regulations, all cases of persons
presently detained under a Presidential Commitment Order or its derivatives shall be governed
by Presidential Decree No. 1877, as amended, and its implementing rules and regulations." The
Court's Resolution further authoritatively states with the unqualified concurrence of at least ten
(10) members that "There is no question, therefore, that the force and effectivity of a presidential
commitment order issued as far back as July 12, 1982 had ceased to have any force and
effect," since the detention exceeded the prescribed one-year limitation and that "pursuant to
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1877 and Section 8 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Presidential Decree No. 1877-A, the motion for reconsideration should have been
granted, and the writ of habeas corpus ordering the release of the detainees covered by such
Section 8 issued," but for the release of the detainees effected earlier, mostly in January this
year.

The crucial issues raised in petitioner's motion for reconsideration of June 6, 1983 8 will have to
await determination in pending appropriate cases awaiting the Court's resolution.
G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL,

ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P.
DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG.
GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 84581-82 October 3, 1991

AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,

vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN, RAMON MONTANO, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 84583-84 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T.

ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE: DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON
CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARIÑO, LT. COL.
REX D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and
Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents.

G.R. No. 83162 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA

AND DANNY RIVERA: VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR
MARIANO, respondents.

G.R. No. 85727 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DEOGRACIAS

ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN.ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.

G.R. No. 86332 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO:

ALFREDO NAZARENO,petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa,
Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD,
and P/SGT. MALTRO AROJADO, respondents.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567 and G. R. No. 83162.

Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82

Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.

Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.

The Solicitor General for the respondents.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above-entitled petitions,
seeking reconsideration of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for
brevity) which dismissed the petitions, with the following dispositive part:

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No.
85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby
ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.

The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the statement that the
decision did not rule — as many misunderstood it to do — that mere suspicion that one is
Communist Party or New People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant.
Moreover, the decision merely applied long existing laws to the factual situations obtaining in
the several petitions. Among these laws are th outlawing the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) similar organizations and penalizing membership therein be dealt with shortly). It is
elementary, in this connection, if these laws no longer reflect the thinking or sentiment of the
people, it is Congress as the elected representative of the people — not the Court — that
should repeal, change or modify them.

In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:

1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests made
without warrant, and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly
Section 5 of Rule 113 (Arrest), disregards the fact that such arrests violated the
constitutional rights of the persons arrested;

2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile 1 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be
abandoned;

3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons arrested
as to their membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army,
and their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and subversive documents
found in their possession at the time of arrest, inasmuch as those confessions do not
comply with the requirements on admissibility of extrajudicial admissions;
 4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts;

5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and academic.

We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.

It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus,
filed by petitioners under the Rules of Court. 3 The writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy
and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. 4 Therefore, the function of the
special proceedings of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention, 5 so that if
detention is illegal, the detainee may be ordered forthwit released.

In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not, the Court
before rendering decision dated 9 July 1990, looked into whether their questioned arrests
without warrant were made in accordance with law. For, if the arrests were made in accordance
with law, would follow that the detention resulting from such arrests also in accordance with law.

There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or
authority to arrest anyo without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized by
law. 6 The law expressly allowing arrests witho warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court which states the grounds upon which a valid arrest, without warrant, can be
conducted.

In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the
said Rule 113, which read:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it; and

. . . (Emphasis supplied).

The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 81567) without
warrant is justified it can be said that, within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural)
was committing an offense, when arrested because Dural was arrested for being a member of
the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership penalized, 7 and for
subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, 8 a continuing
offense, thus:

The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit

such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance (sic) on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential
Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart
from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy
of nationwide magnitude. . . .

Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for
the overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be, or became less of a
subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest,
confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day
before his arrest, without warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM
policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part
of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then. Dural, given another
opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or
representatives of organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like rebellion (or
insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called "common"
offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission,
subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of
the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing
organized government is attained.

Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers
of his membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by
actual facts that will be shown hereafter.

Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said, under the facts of the Umil
case, that the arrest of Dural falls under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, which requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrestt without warrant: first, that the person
to be arrested has just committed an offense, and second, that the arresting peace officer or
private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the
one who committed the offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted, refers to arrests without
warrant, based on "personal knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private
person.

It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based
upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense,
is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. 10 A reasonable suspicion
therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officers making the arrest. 11
These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.

In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched to the St.
Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was
received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the
said hospital with a gunshot wound; that the information further disclosed that the wounded man
in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom
mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road
hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; that based on the same information,
the wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-
two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna. 12

Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA
member ("sparrow unit") was being treated for a gunshot wound in the named hospital, is
deemed reasonable and with cause as it was based on actual facts and supported by
circumstances sufficient to engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in the said hospital.
The actual facts supported by circumstances are: first — the day before, or on 31 January 1988,
two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City by five (5)
"sparrows" including Dural; second — a wounded person listed in the hospital records as
"Ronnie Javellon" was actually then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot
wound; third — as the records of this case disclosed later, "Ronnie Javellon" and his address
entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the wounded man was in reality Rolando
Dural.

In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate
attention and action and, in fact, it was found to be true. Even the petitioners in their motion for
reconsideration, 13 believe that the confidential information of the arresting officers to the effect
that Dural was then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the attending
doctor and hospital management in compliance with the directives of the law, 14 and, therefore,
came from reliable sources.

As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by
the officers who make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural are
deemed to have conducted the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed
to regularly perform their official duties. The records show that the arresting officers did not
appear to have been ill-motivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore clear that the arrest,
without warrant, of Dural was made in compliance with the requirements of paragraphs (a) and
(b) of Section 5, Rule 113.

Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest, without warrant,
an information charging double murder with assault against agents of persons in authority was
filed against Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. C-30112). He
was thus promptly placed under judicial custody (as distinguished fro custody of the arresting
officers). On 31 August 1988, he wa convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. The judgment of conviction is now on appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 84921.

As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), Domingo

Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple (G.R. Nos. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their
arrests, without warrant, are also justified. They were searched pursuant to search warrants
issued by a court of law and were found wit unlicensed firearms, explosives and/or ammunition
in their persons. They were, therefore, caught in flagrante delicto which justified their outright
arrests without warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court. Parenthetically, it should be
mentioned here that a few davs after their arrests without warrant, informations were filed in
court against said petitioners, thereby placing them within judicial custody and disposition.
Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo habeas corpus by announcing to this Court
during the hearing of these petitions that he had chosen to remain in detention in the custody of
the authorities.

More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are:

1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information imparted by a former NPA
about the operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain house
occupied by one Renato Constantine, located in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St.,
Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila was being used as their safehouse; that in
view of this information, the said house was placed under military surveillance and on 12
August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant duly issued by court, a search of the house
was conducted; that when Renato Constantine was then confronted he could not
produce any permit to possess the firearms, ammunitions, radio and other
communications equipment, and he admitted that he was a ranking member of the
CPP. 16

2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in

the evening of 12 August 1988, and admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had
with him letters to Renato Constantine and other members of the rebel group.

3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the arrest of
Buenaobra who had in his possession papers leading to the whereabouts of Roque; 17
that, at the time of her arrest, the military agents found subversive documents and live
ammunitions, and she admitted then that the documents belonged to her. 18

4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested without
warrant on 13 August 1988, when they arrived at the said house of Renato Constantine
in the evening of said date; that when the agents frisked them, subversive documents,
and loaded guns were found in the latter's possession but failing to show a permit to
possess them. 19

5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without warrant when she arrived (on
12 May 1988) at the premises ofthe house of one Benito Tiamzon who was believed to
be the head of the CPP/NPA, and whose house was subject of a search warrant duly
 issued by the court. At the time of her arrest without warrant the agents of the PC-
Intelligence and Investigation found ammunitions and subversive documents in the car
of Ocaya. 20

It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that the
reason which compelled the military agents to make the arrests without warrant was the
information given to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato
Constantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon) were being used by the CPP/NPA for their
operations, with information as to their exact location and the names of Renato Constantine and
Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof.

And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of
Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple), which confirmed the belief of the military agents
that the information they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probably
guilty of the commission of certain crimes: first: search warrant was duly issued to effect the
search of the Constantine safehouse; second: found in the safehouse was a person named
Renato Constantine, who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his
possession were unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third: at the time of their
arrests, in their possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive
documents, and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA.
And then, shortly after their arrests, they were positively identified by their former comrades in
the organization as CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances, the corresponding
informations were filed in court against said arrested persons. The records also show that, as in
the case of Dural, the arrests without warrant made by the military agents in the Constantino
safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house, do not appear to have been ill-motivated or
irregularly performed.

With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-
named persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent an can
say that it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any
arrest. That would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for
disciplinary action against the peace officers involved.

For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the
hands of executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts
constituting the alleged violation of law and to prosecute and secure the punishment
therefor. 21 An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to
arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113
are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our
communities.

In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the
conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons
arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for which they were arrested. 22 Not evidence
of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the
performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest without
warrant. 23

The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under
the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the
arrested persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not
liable. 24 But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers can be
held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, 25 for damages under Article 32 of the Civil
Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.

In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on the basis
of the attestation of certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November
1988, at the corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu
spoke at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers, where he said, among other things:

Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27 (Emphasis supplied)

and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the National
Press Club (NPC) on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of
jeepney and bus drivers) on 23 November 1988. 28 Espiritu was arrested without warrant, not
for subversion or any "continuing offense," but for uttering the above-quoted language which, in
the perception of the arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.

Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling
within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost the right to
insist, during the pre-trial or trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right to free
speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of the
peace officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon
thereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously
becomes difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but
only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the
bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.

Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot and academic.
For Espiritu had before arraignment asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the peace
officers did not appear. Because of this development, the defense asked the court a quo at the
resumption of the hearings to dismiss the case. Case against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 88-
68385) has been provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled.

In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988,
Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at
about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in
the said killing, was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions
during the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988), the police
agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation. 29

Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without
warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest fans under Section
5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to
know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had
to be made promptly, even without warrant, (after the police were alerted) and despite the lapse
of fourteen (14) days to prevent possible flight.

As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest without warrant
of Nazareno noted several facts and events surrounding his arrest and detention, as follows:

. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant), an information
charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo
Bunye II was filed wit the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is dock
eted therein as Criminal Case No. 731.

On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the motion was
denied by the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post
bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial
court.

On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of
Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus,
retumable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bifian, Laguna, Branch
24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the
petition.

At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition
for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the
respondents by reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Metro Manila which liad taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact,
denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the
strength of the evidence against him).

This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the corresponding
informations against them were filed in court. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based
on probable cause and supported by factual circumstances. They complied with conditions set
forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests.

Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a
quo for murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He has appealed the judgment of
conviction to the Court of Appeals where it is pending as of this date ( CA-G.R. No. still
undocketed).

Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds for
admissibility of an extrajudicial admission.

In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30 that he was an NPA courier. On
the other hand, in the case of Amelia Roque, she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms,
ammunition and subversive documents found in her possession during her arrest, belonged to
her.

The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their
membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms,
ammunitions and documents in their possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed by
the records, strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon which the arresting
officers based their arrests without warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e. that the
persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in compliance with
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To note these admissions, on the other hand, is not
to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon which their warrantless
arrests were predicated. The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested
without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. It pertains to the trial of the case on
the merits.

As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs. Enrile should be
abandoned, this Court finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly ln
the light of prevailing conditions where national security and liability are still directly challenged
perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels. What is important is that everv arrest
without warrant be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding. This Court. will
promptly look into — and all other appropriate courts are enjoined to do the same — the legality
of the arrest without warrant so that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of Court,
as elucidated in this Resolution, are not met, then the detainee shall forthwith be ordered
released; but if such conditions are met, then the detainee shall not be made to languish in his
detention but must be promptly tried to the end that he may be either acquitted or convicted,
with the least delay, as warranted by the evidence.

A Final Word

This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party
member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect.
The Court predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions, not
on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5,
Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress, are probable
cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers, and, further, on the basis of, as the records
show, the actual facts and circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of
popularity or palatability to some groups, what is important is that the Court be right.

ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are
DENIED. This denial is FINAL.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
concur.