De La Salle University- Dasmariñas

College of Liberal Arts and Communication

Social Sciences Department

Political Science Program

Cases on the Provisions of 1973 Philippine Constitution

Submitted by:

Bernal, Godofredo L.

Boltron, Joyce Ann May B.

Genova, John Michael Gabriel D.

Rivas, Reylan P.

Salarda, Shaira Myron C.

PSC 21

Submitted to:

Mr. Jesse L. Atienza, MPA

November 2019
 Eastern Broadcasting Corp (DYRE) v. Dans Jr.

[137 SCRA 628; L-59329; 19 Jul 1985]

Facts:

A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was “summarily closed”
on grounds of national security. The radio station was allegedly used to incite people to
sedition. Petitioner, DYRE contends that they were denied due process. There was no
hearing to establish factual evidence for the closure. Furthermore, the closure of the radio
station violates freedom of expression. Before the court could even promulgate a
decision upon the Issue raised, Petitioner, through its president Mr. Rene Espina, filed a
motion to withdraw the petition. The rights of the station were sold to a new owner,
Manuel Pastrana; who is no longer interested in pursuing the case. Despite the case
becoming moot and academic, (because there are no longer interested parties, thus the
dismissal of the case) the Supreme Court still finds that there is need to pass a
“RESOLUTION” for the guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals in matters
as this case.

Issue:

Whether or not due process was exercised in the case of DYRE.

Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the Constitutional Right of Freedom
of Expression.

Held:

The court finds that the closure of the Radio Station in 1980 as null and void. The absence
of a hearing is a violation of Constitutional Rights. The primary requirements in
administrative proceedings are laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relation (69 Phil.635). The Ang Tibay Doctrine should be followed before any broadcast
station may be closed. The Ang Tibay Doctrine provides the following requirements:
 o The right to hearing, includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence
presented.
o The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
o The decision must have something to support itself.
o Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that is adequate to support
conclusion)
o Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing
o The tribunal body must act on its own independent consideration of law and facts
and not simply accept subordinate’s views
o Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding can know the
various issued involved and reasons for decisions rendered.

The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of Due Process,
it gives an unavoidable standard that government actions must conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty and property is valid.

The closure of the radio station is likewise a violation of the constitutional right of freedom
of speech and expression. The court stresses that all forms of media, whether print or
broadcast are entitled to this constitutional right. Although the government still has the
right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow
it. The test for the limitation of freedom of expression is the “clear and present danger”
rule. If in the circumstances that the media is used in such nature as to create this danger
that will bring in such evils, then the law has the right to prevent it. However, Radio and
television may not be used to organize a rebellion or signal a start of widespread uprising.
The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative
democracy. The people continues to have the right to be informed on public affairs and
broadcast media continues to have the pervasive influence to the people being the most
accessible form of media. Therefore, broadcast stations deserve the the special
protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression
clauses of the Constitution.
 Villegas Vs. Hiu Chiong

[86 SCRA 270; No. L-29646; 10 Nov 1978]

Facts:

The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on
February 22, 1968 and signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance making it unlawful for
any person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or
to be engaged in any kind of trade business or occupation within the city of Manila without
securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and for other purposes.

Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying for the writ
of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said ordinance.

Issue:

Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal protection clauses
of the Constitution.

Held:

It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos to enable
aliens generally to be employed in the city of Manila is not only for the purpose of
regulation.

While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an employment permit
from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in processing and
approval or disapproval of application is regulatory in character, the second part which
requires the payment of a sum of 50.00 pesos is not a regulatory but a revenue measure.

Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the basic
human right of the people in the Philippines to engaged in a means of livelihood. While it
is true that the Philippines as a state is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once
an alien is admitted he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This
guarantee includes the means of livelihood. Also, it does not lay down any standard to
guide the City Mayor in the issuance or denial of an alien employment permit fee.
 Co v. House Electoral Tribunal

[G.R. Nos. 92191-92; 30 Jul 1991]

Facts:

The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a
resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The congressional election for
the second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the
position of representative in the second legislative district are the petitioners, Sixto
Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was
proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests on the grounds that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural
born citizen of the Philippines and not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

Issue:

Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines.

Held:

Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondent’s grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the
Philippines from China and established his residence in the municipality of Laoang,
Samar. The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905
but was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915, he filed with the court an
application for naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen.

In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim. For the
elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar,
and voted there during those elections.

Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of
Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both
considered as natural born citizens. Besides, private respondent did more than merely
exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.
 On the issue of residence, it is not required that a person should have a house in
order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the
municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. To require him to own
property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a property
qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship,
voting and residence requirements.
 Taxicab Operators vs. Board of Transportation

[G.R. No. L-59234; 30 Sept 1982]

Facts:

Petitioners who are taxicab operators assail the constitutionality of Memorandum Circular
No. 77-42 issued by the Board of Transportation (BOT) providing for the phasing out and
replacement of old and dilapidated taxicabs; as well as Implementing Circular No. 52
issued pursuant thereto by the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) instructing personnel
of the BLT within the National Capital Region to implement the said BOT Circular, and
formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for
registration as public conveyances. Petitioners allege that the questioned Circulars did
not afford them procedural and substantive due process, equal protection of the law, and
protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard. Among others,
they question the issuance of the Circulars without first calling them to a conference or
requiring them to submit position papers or other documents enforceability thereof only
in Metro Manila; and their being applicable only to taxicabs and not to other transportation
services.

Issues:

Whether or not the constitutional guarantee of due process was denied to the taxicab
operators and/or other persons affected by the assailed Circular No. 52.

Held:
The Supreme Court held that there was no denial of due process since calling the taxicab
operators or persons who may be affected by the questioned Circulars to a conference
or requiring them to submit position papers or other documents is only one of the options
open to the BOT which is given wide discretionary authority under P.D. No. 101; and fixing
a six- year ceiling for a car to be operated as taxicab is a reasonable standard adopted
to apply to all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly.
The Court also ruled that neither has the equal protection clause been violated by initially
enforcing the Circulars only in Metro Manila since it is of common knowledge that taxicabs
in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure
and more constant use, thus making for a substantial distinction; nor by non-application
of the Circulars to other transportation services because the said Circulars satisfy the
criteria required under the equal protection clause, which is the uniform operation by legal
means so that all persons under identical or similar circumstances would be accorded the
same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed.
It is clear from the provision of Section 2 of P.D. 101 aforequoted, that the leeway
accorded the Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or
data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should
first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents
from operators or persons who maybe affected, this being only one of the options open
to the Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably
claim, therefore, that they were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they
state with certainty that public respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry
prior to issuing the challenged Circulars. Operators of public conveyances are not the
only primary sources of the data and information that may be desired by the BOT.
 Agustin Vs. Edu

[88 SCRA 195; G.R. No. L-49112; 2 Feb 1979]

Facts:

President Marcos issued the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which states that all owners,
users or drivers shall have at all times one pair of early warning devise (EWD) in their
cars acquire from any source depending on the owner’s choice. The Letter of Instruction
was assailed by petitioner Leovillo Agustin to have violated the constitution guarantee of
due process against Hon Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner, Hon. Juan Ponce
Enrile, Minister of national Defense, Hon. Juinio, Minister of Public Works, Transportation
and Communication and Hon. Aquino, Minister of Public Highways. Because of such
contentions, the Implementing Rules and Regulation was ordered to be suspended for a
period of 6 months. Petitioner alleges that EWD are not necessary because vehicles
already have hazard lights (blinking lights) that can be use as a warning device. Also
petitioner contest that the letter of instruction violates the delegation of police power
because it is deemed harsh, oppressive and unreasonable for the motorists and those
dealers of EWD will become instant millionaires because of such law.

Issue:

Whether or not Petitioner’s contentions possess merit.

Held:

Petitioner’s contentions are without merit because the exercise of police power may
interfere with personal liberty or property to ensure and promote the safety, health and
prosperity of the State. Also, such letter of instruction is intended to promote public safety
and it is indeed a rare occurrence that such contention was alleged in a instruction with
such noble purpose. Petitioner also failed to present the factual foundation that is
necessary to invalidate the said letter of instruction. In cases where there is absence in
the factual foundation, it should be presumed that constitutionality shall prevail. Pres.
Marcos on the other hand possesses vital statistics that will justify the need for the
implementation of this instruction. As signatory to the 1968 Vienna Conventions on Road
Signs and Signals, our country must abide with the standards given as stated in our
Constitution that “the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of International
Law as part of the law of the land. In the case at bar, the Vienna Convention also requires
the use of EWD. Vehicle owners are not obliged to buy an EDW. They can personally
create a EWD provided that it is in accordance to the specifications provided by law.
Petitioner’s allegation against the manufacturers of EDW being millionaires is deemed to
be an unfounded speculation. Wherefore, the petition is dismissed. The restraining order
regarding the implementation of the Reflector Law is lifted making the said law
immediately executory.