LABOR OPTION #2

THE HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION v NLRC

G.R. No. 156635. January 11, 2016.

FACTS: Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation Employees Union (Union) was the duly recognized collective
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of respondent Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation
(HSBC). HSBC announced its implementation of a job evaluation program (JEP) retroactive to January 1, 1993.
The JEP consisted of a job designation per grade level with the accompanying salary scale providing for the
minimum and maximum pay the employee could receive per salary level. The Union demanded the suspension
of the JEP, which it labeled as an unfair labor practice. The Union also informed HSBC that it would exercise its
right to concerted action and on that same day, the members started picketing during breaktime while wearing
black hats and black bands. HSBC responded insisting that the JEP was an express recognition of its obligation
under the CBA. The Union’s concerted activities persisted for 11 months which impelled HSBC to suspend the
negotiations of the economic provisions of their CBA. Later, the Union conducted a strike vote after HSBC
accorded regular status to Patrick King, the first person hired under the JEP. The majority of the members of the
Union voted in favor of a strike protesting the continued implementation of the JEP, and insisted that HSBC’s
modification of the salary structure under the JEP constituted unfair labor practice. This prompted HSBC to file
a complaint to declare the strike illegal and petitioned for injunction. In the meantime, HSBC issued return-to-
work notices to the striking employees. Only 25 of them complied and returned to work. Due to the continuing
concerted actions, HSBC terminated the individual petitioners. The latter, undeterred, and angered by their
separation from work, continued their concerted activities.
The Labor Arbiter declared that the strike was illegal and that because of the illegality of the strike, the
Union members and officers were deemed to have lost their employment status. On the other hand, on appeal,
the NLRC modified the ruling and pronounced that the dismissal was unlawful for failure of HSBC to accord
procedural process to them.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the strike commenced was lawfully conducted.
(2) Whether or not the members of the Union were illegally dismissed.
RULING:
(1) No, the strike conducted was illegal. The right to strike is a constitutional and legal right of all workers
because the strike, which seeks to advance their right to improve the terms and conditions of their employment,
is recognized as an effective weapon of labor in their struggle for a decent existence. However, the right to strike
as a means for the attainment of social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy the employers. Thus, the
law prescribes limits on the exercise of the right to strike. Article 263 of the Labor Code specifies the limitations
on the exercise of the right to strike.
The procedural requirements for a valid strike are, therefore, the following, to wit: ( 1) a notice of strike
filed with the DOLE at least 30 days before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of ULP; (2) a strike vote
approved by the majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret
ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and (3) a notice of the results of the voting at least seven days before
the intended strike given to the DOLE. These requirements are mandatory, such that non-compliance therewith
by the union will render the strike illegal.
According to the CA, the petitioners neither filed the notice of strike with the DOLE, nor observed the
cooling-off period, nor submitted the result of the strike vote. Moreover, although the strike vote was
conducted, the same was done by open, not secret, balloting,42 in blatant violation of Article 263 and Section
7, Rule XIII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. 43 It is not amiss to observe that the evident
intention of the requirements for the strike-notice and the strike-vote report is to reasonably regulate the right
to strike for the attainment of the legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law.44 As such, the petitioners
committed a prohibited activity under Article 264(a) of the Labor Code, and rendered their strike illegal.
 The petitioners could not justify their illegal strike by invoking the constitutional right of labor to
concerted actions. Although the Constitution recognized and promoted their right to strike, they should still
exercise the right within the bounds of law.
(2) As a general rule, the mere finding of the illegality of the strike does not justify the wholesale termination of
the strikers from their employment.59 To avoid rendering the recognition of the workers' right to strike illusory,
the responsibility for the illegal strike is individual instead of collective.60 The last paragraph of Article 264(a) of
the Labor Code defines the norm for terminating the workers participating in an illegal strike. Conformably with
Article 264, we need to distinguish between the officers and the members of the union who participate in an
illegal strike. The officers may be deemed terminated from their employment upon a finding of their knowing
participation in the illegal strike, but the members of the union shall suffer the same fate only if they are shown
to have knowingly participated in the commission of illegal acts during the strike. Article 264 expressly requires
that the officer must have "knowingly participated" in the illegal strike.
In this case, HSBC did not satisfactorily prove the presence of one of the members during the strike,
much less identify him as among the strikers. The burden of proving the overt participation of this member in
the illegal strike belonged to HSBC, which did not discharge its burden, Accordingly, the member, albeit an
officer of the Union, should not be deemed to have lost his employment status. However, the dismissal of the
other officers of the Union was upheld by the Court. This is because they admitted to joining the picket line on
a few occasions and, Dela Chica, the Union president, had instigated and called for the strike. When said officers
urged and made their members violate the law, their dismissal became an appropriate penalty for their unlawful
act. The law granted HSBC the option to dismiss the officers as a matter of right and prerogative.
Unlike the Union's officers, the ordinary striking members could not be terminated for merely taking
part in the illegal strike. Regardless of whether the strike was illegal or not, the dismissal of the members could
be upheld only upon proof that they had committed illegal acts during the strike. They must be specifically
identified because the liability for the prohibited acts was determined on an individual basis. 72 For that
purpose, substantial evidence available under the attendant circumstances justifying the penalty of dismissal
sufficed.
Nonetheless, the termination of the employment of the 18 members of the Union is illegal for failure of
HSBC to prove that they had committed illegal acts during the strike.
 HIJO RESOURCES CORPORATION v MEJARES
G.R. No. 208986. January 13, 2016

FACTS: Epifanio P. Mejares, Remegio C. Baluran, Jr., Dante Saycon, and Cecilio Cucharo were among the
complanants represented by their labor union named “Nagkahiusang Mamumuo ng Bit, Djevon, at Raquilla
Farms sa Hijo Resources Corporation" (NAMABDJERA-HRC), who filed with the NLRC an illegal dismissal case
against Hijo Resources Corporation (HRC). Complainants alleged that HRC, formerly known as Hijo Plantation
Incorporated (HPI), is the owner of agricultural lands in Madum, Tagum, Davao del Norte, which were planted
primarily with Cavendish bananas. In 2000, HPI was renamed as HRC. In December 2003, HRC's application for
the conversion of its agricultural lands into agri-industrial use was approved. The machineries and equipment
formerly used by HPI continued to be utilized by HRC.
Complainants claimed that they were employed by HPI as farm workers in HPI's plantations occupying
various positions as area harvesters, packing house workers, loaders, or labelers. In 2001, complainants were
absorbed by HRC, but they were working under the several contractor-growers. Complainants asserted that
these contractor-growers received compensation from HRC and were under the control of HRC. They further
alleged that the contractor-growers did not have their own capitalization, farm machineries, and equipment.
Later, complainants formed their own union NAMABDJERA-HRC and filed a petition for certification
election.
When HRC learned that complainants formed a union, the three contractor-growers filed with the DOLE
a notice of cessation of business operations. The complainants were terminated from their employment on the
ground of cessation of business operations by the contractor-growers of HRC. This prompted complainants,
represented by NAMABDJERA-HRC, to file a case for unfair labor practices, illegal dismissal, and illegal
deductions with prayer for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees before the NLRC.
Later, the Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition for certification election on the ground that there was no
employer-employee relationship between the members of the NAMABDJERA-HRC and HRC. Complainants did
not appeal the Order but pursued the illegal dismissal case they filed. Impelled Pursuant to this, HRC filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction under the principle of res judicata and on the ground that
the order of the med-Arbiter had become final and executory.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that the decision of the Med-Arbiter in a certification election case, by the nature
of that proceedings, does not foreclose further dispute between the parties as to the existence or non-existence
of employer-employee relationship between them. Thus, the finding of Med-Arbiter that no employment
relationship exists between HRC and complainants does not bar the Labor Arbiter from making his own
independent finding on the same issue. The non-litigious nature of the proceedings before the Med-Arbiter does
not prevent the Labor Arbiter from hearing and deciding the case. The NLRC, on the other hand, held that the
Labor Arbiter gravely abused her discretion ruling that the dismissal of the certification election on the ground
of lack of employer-employee relationship between HRC and the members of NAMABDJERA-HRC constitutes
res judicata under the concept of conclusiveness of judgement, and thus, warrants the dismissal of the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter, in the illegal dismissal case, is bound by the ruling of the Med-Arbiter
regarding the existence or non-existence of the employee-employer relationship between the parties in the
certification election.
RULING: NO, the Labor Arbiter is not bound by the ruling of the Med-Arbiter. There is no question that the Med-
Arbiter has the authority to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties
in a petition for certification election. The Bureau of Labor Relations has the original and exclusive jurisdiction
to inter alia, decide all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations
in all workplaces whether agricultural or non-agricultural. Necessarily, in the exercise of this jurisdiction over
labor-management relations, the med-arbiter has the authority, original and exclusive, to determine the
existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties. Once there is a determination as to the
existence of such a relationship, the med-arbiter can then decide the certification election case. As the authority
to determine the employer-employee relationship is necessary and indispensable in the exercise of jurisdiction
by the med-arbiter, his finding thereon may only be reviewed and reversed by the Secretary of Labor who
exercises appellate jurisdiction under Article 259 of the Labor Code, as amended.
In this case, the Med-Arbiter's order dismissing the petition for certification election on the basis of non-
existence of employer-employee relationship was issued after the members of the respondent union were
dismissed from their employment. The purpose of a petition for certification election is to determine which
organization will represent the employees in their collective bargaining with the employer. The union, without
its member-employees, was thus stripped of its personality to challenge the Med-Arbiter's decision in the
certification election case. Thus, the members of the union were left with no option but to pursue their illegal
dismissal case filed before the Labor Arbiter. To dismiss the illegal dismissal case filed before the Labor Arbiter
on the basis of the pronouncement of the Med-Arbiter in the certification election case that there was no
employer-employee relationship between the parties, which the respondent union could not even appeal to
the DOLE Secretary because of the dismissal of its members, would be tantamount to denying due process to
the complainants in the illegal dismissal case.
MENDOZA v OFFICERS OF MANILA WATER EMPLOYEES UNION
G.R. No. 201595. January 25, 2016

FACTS: Allan M. Mendoza was a member of the Manila Water Employees Union (MWEU), a DOLE-registered
labor organization consisting of rank-and-file employees within Manila Water Company (MWC). The
respondents herein named were MWEU officers during the period material to this Petition, with Borela as
President and Chairman of the MWEU Executive Board, Quebral as First Vice-President and Treasurer, and
Cometa as Secretary.
In a letter, MWEU through Cometa informed Mendoza that the union was unable to fully deduct the
increased union dues from his salary due to lack of the required check-off authorization from him. Mendoza was
was warned that his failure to pay the union dues is in violation of Section 1(g), Article IX of the MWEU’s
Constitution and by-laws which would result in sanctions upon him. In turn, Borela referred the charge to the
MWEU grievance committee which recommended that Mendoza be suspended for 30 days. Mendoza took
exception to the imposition and indicated his intention to appeal the same to the General Membership
Assembly and in a reply, Borela denied such appeal, stating that the prescribed period for appeal had expired.
When petitioner was charged with non-payment of union dues for the third time, he was meted the penalty of
expulsion from the union, per unanimous approval of members of the Executive Board. His pleas for appeal
were unheeded. Mendoza then filed a complaint against MWEU for unfair labor practices before the National
Labor Relations Committee (NLRC). Mendoza accused the MWEU of illegal termination from MWEU in
connections with the events relative to his non-payment of union dues; unlawful interference, coercion, and
violations of the rights of MWC employees to self-organization. MWEU, however, claimed that the Labor Arbiter
had no jurisdiction over the dispute which is intra-union in nature and that the Bureau of Labor Relations was
the proper venue in accordance with Article 226 of the Labor Code. They also claim that they were not guilty of
unfair labor practices, discrimination, coercion or restraint.
The Labor Arbiter issued a decision stating that the filing of the case is still premature and referred it
back to the Union level for the General Assembly to act on the appeal. Mendoza appealed before the NLRC
which declared that the Commission lacks the jurisdictional competence to act on the case. Article 217 of the
Labor Code,32 as amended, specifically enumerates the cases over which the Labor Arbiters and the
Commission have original and exclusive jurisdiction. A perusal of the record reveals that the causes of action
invoked by complainant do not fall under any of the enumerations therein, hence, the NLRC has no jurisdiction
over the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC properly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
RULING: NO. It is true that some of Mendoza’s causes of action constitute intra-union cases cognizable by the
BLR under Article 226 of the Labor Code. An intra-union dispute refers to any conflict between and among union
members, including grievances arising from any violation of the rights and conditions of membership, violation
of or disagreement over any provision of the union’s constitution and by-laws, or disputes arising from
chartering or disaffiliation of the union. However, petitioner’s charge of unfair labor practices falls within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters, pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code. In addition,
Article 247 of the same Code provides that "the civil aspects of all cases involving unfair labor practices, which
may include claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages, attorney’s fees and other
affirmative relief, shall be under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters." Unfair labor practices may be committed
both by the employer under Article 248 and by labor organizations under Article 249 of the Labor Code.
Petitioner contends that respondents committed acts constituting unfair labor practices – which charge
was particularly laid out in his pleadings, but that the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA ignored it and simply
dismissed his complaint on the ground that his causes of action were intra- or inter-union in nature. Specifically,
petitioner claims that he was suspended and expelled from MWEU illegally as a result of the denial of his right
to appeal his case to the general membership assembly in accordance with the union’s constitution and by-laws.
On the other hand, respondents counter that such charge is intra-union in nature, and that petitioner lost his
right to appeal when he failed to petition to convene the general assembly through the required signature of
30% of the union membership in good standing pursuant to Article VI, Section 2(a) of MWEU’s Constitution and
By-Laws or by a petition of the majority of the general membership in good standing under Article VI, Section 3.
However, contrary to respondents’ argument, the petitioner was illegally suspended for the second time
and thereafter unlawfully expelled from MWEU due to respondents’ failure to act on his written appeals. The
required petition to convene the general assembly through the required signature of 30% (under Article VI,
Section 2[a]) or majority (under Article VI, Section 3) of the union membership does not apply in petitioner’s
case; the Executive Board must first act on his two appeals before the matter could properly be referred to the
general membership. Because respondents did not act on his two appeals, petitioner was unceremoniously
suspended, disqualified and deprived of his right to run for the position of MWEU Vice-President in the
September 14, 2007 election of officers, expelled from MWEU, and forced to join another union, WATER-AFWC.
For these, respondents are guilty of unfair labor practices under Article 249 (a) and (b) – that is, violation of
petitioner’s right to self-organization, unlawful discrimination, and illegal termination of his union membership
– which case falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters, in accordance with Article
217 of the Labor Code. Hence, the petition is partially granted.
SAMAHAN NG MAGSASAKA AT MANGINGISDA NG SITIO NASWE, INC. (SAMMANA) v TAN
G.R. No. 196028. April 18, 2016.