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POINTERS IN LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS

2016 BAR EXAMINATIONS

BY ATTY. VICTORIA V. LOANZON

PART A: THE VELASCO CASES

THE LAWYER AS A MEMBER OF SOCIETY


CORAZON T. NEVADA v. ATTY. RODOLFO D. CASUGA (A.C. No. 7591, March 20, 2012)
Question: Can a lawyer who entered into a contract of lease with a third person be held liable for
representing himself as the Administrator of his client’s hotel without having a Special Power of Attorney
executed in his favor?
Answer: Yes. The lawyer can be held liable for gross misconduct. Gross misconduct is a transgression of
some established or definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence, or the
corrupt or persistent violation of the law or disregard of well-known legal rules.
The acts of misrepresenting himself to be authorized to enter into a contract of lease, and even receiving the
benefits of the said contract constitute gross misconduct. Therefore, the lawyer can be found liable.

FIDUCIARY DUTY UNDER CANON 16, CPR


Question: Ms. Corazon Nevada delivered to Atty. Casuga pieces of jewelries worth more than
P300,000.00 in the course of her dealings with him. She asked him to sell them on her behalf. However,
despite repeated demands, Atty. Casuga failed to deliver back to Ms. Nevada the jewelries or the proceeds
of the sale.
Can Ms. Nevada file a disbarment case against her Atty. Casuga even if there is no lawyer-client
relationship between them?
Answer: Yes. Rule 16.03 of the CPR demands that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of
his client that may come into his possession. The lawyer was duty-bound to return them upon demand. The
absence of a lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Casuga and Corazon does not exonerate the former.
Both the CPR and case law penalize not only malpractice and dishonesty in the profession, but also gross
misconduct not connected with the professional duties of the lawyer.
Therefore, Atty. Casuga can be held accountable for breach of his fiduciary duty.

UPHOLDING THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION


VICTORIA C. HEENAN v. ATTY. ERLINA ESPEJO (A.C. NO. 10050, December 3, 2013)
Question: Can a lawyer be held administratively liable for issuing worthless checks?
Answer: Yes. Lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to their clients. The fact that the lawyer obtained the loan and issued the worthless checks in her private
capacity and not as an attorney of the complainant is of no moment.
Therefore, for issuing worthless checks, the lawyer may be held administratively accountable. (Lawyer was
suspended for three years. She died while serving her suspension.)
Question: Can a lawyer borrow money from his client without crossing ethical boundaries?
Answer: No. As a general rule, a lawyer should not borrow money from his client. Canon 16.04 of the
CPR provides that a lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Reason: The lawyer’s duty to society demands his uprightness in his dealings with third persons.
Thus, while the Court may not ordinarily discipline a lawyer for misconduct committed in his non-
professional or private capacity, the Court may be justified in suspending or removing him as an attorney
where his misconduct outside of the lawyer’s professional dealings is so gross in character as to show him
morally unfit and unworthy of the privilege which his license and the law confer.
Question: What circumstances may warrant a more severe penalty upon a lawyer in disbarment
proceedings where the complaint includes a criminal offense committed by the lawyer against the
complainant?
Answer: The following circumstances may warrant a severe penalty in disbarment proceeding:
1. unjustified refusal to obey the orders of the IBP directing the lawyer to file an answer to the
complaint;
2. failure to appear at the scheduled mandatory conference before the Investigating Commissioner;
and
3. blatant refusal to heed the directives of the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office for her to file her
counter-affidavit in a criminal case.
The above acts violate Canon 10.03: Failure to observe rules of procedure.

DISBARMENT PROCEEDING IS SUI GENERIS


Question: Can a disbarment case be filed against the lawyer while a criminal case remains pending which
arose from the same commission of a deplorable act by the lawyer?

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Answer: Yes. A disbarment case is sui generis in nature. Thus, a disbarment case can proceed
simultaneously with the criminal case instituted against the lawyer. To sustain a conviction in a criminal
case, the prosecution must establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt while in a disbarment case, only
preponderance of evidence is required.
LAWYER SHOULD NOT BORROW MONEY FROM HIS CLIENT (CANON 16.04)
SPS. AMADOR and ROSITA TEJADA v. ATTY. ANTONIUTTI K. PALAA (A.C. No. 7434,
August 23, 2007)
Question: Atty. Palaa borrowed from Sps. Tejada the amount of P100K with interest of P70K payable in
three months to allow him to reconstitute the title of his real property.
After the lapse of three months without fulfilling his promise to pay the principal of his loan and its
interest, Sps. Amador asked Atty. Palaa to settle his obligation. The demands remain unheeded. Can Atty.
Palaa be held administratively liable for not settling his loan despite persistent demand from the creditor-
spouses?
Answer: Yes. The complainants could not have been defrauded without the representations of respondent.
A promise of a high interest convinced the complainants to give a loan of P100K to respondent lawyer. He
knew that his representations were false since the filing fee for a petition for reconstitution and other
expenses including the publication of the filing of the petition could not have cost more than P20,000. It is
clear that he employed deceit in convincing complainants to part with their hard earned money; and the
latter could not have been easily swayed to lend the money were it not for his misrepresentations and failed
promises as a member of the bar.
Therefore, Atty. Palaa is liable for not paying his just obligation.

COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARDS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES


Question: Can a Senator who is also a lawyer in her privilege speech refer to the justices of the Supreme
Court as a court of idiots without incurring any administrative liability?
Answer: Yes. Senator Santiago’s privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary
proceeding under the Rules of Court. She is covered by her parliamentary immunity but the Court
reminded the Senator that as a member of the bar, she is sworn to give respect to the Court.
Question: Is a member of Congress bound the Canons of Professional Responsibility?
(N.B. Please refer to Canon 6, Code of Professional Responsibility)
Answer: Yes. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher
degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice. Thus, a member of
Congress can be found guilty of violating Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility if a disrespectful utterance is made against the court. As a member of the Bar and officer of
the court, like any other, a member of Congress is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the
Court and to maintain the respect due to the bench.
CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TOWARDS THE COURTS
ANTONIO CONLU v. ATTY. IRENEO AREDONIA, JR. (A.C. No. 4955, September 12, 2011)
Question: Can a client file an administrative complaint against a lawyer after the former discovered that
the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for non-filing of the appellant’s brief within the reglamentary
period?

DUTY TO SERVE CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE


Answer: Yes. The Court said that it must be remembered that a retained counsel is expected to serve the
client with competence and diligence. This duty includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the
counsel’s care and giving the client sound legal advice, but also properly representing the client in court,
attending scheduled hearings, preparing and filing required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with
reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or
her to do so. The lawyer should not be sitting idly by and leave the rights of the client in a state of
uncertainty. The failure to file a brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable
negligence. This default translates to a violation of the injunction of Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TOWARDS THE COURTS


Question: What is the liability of a lawyer who tried to mislead the court as to the date of actual receipt of
the decision?
Answer: By his act, the lawyer had indulged in deliberate falsehood, contrary to the self-explanatory
prescriptions of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01.
The lawyer should be penalized for his lack of candor to the court when he tried to mislead the appellate
court about the receipt of a copy of its decision. (The act was done to make it appear that a timely
appeal was filed.)
Question: What is the remedy of the Supreme Court when a lawyer continues to refuse its order for him to
comment on the disbarment case filed against him?

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Answer: The Supreme Court may order the National Bureau of Investigation to arrest the defiant lawyer at
his last known address or in any other place where he may be found.

EVERY CASE MUST RISE AND FALL ON ITS MERITS


ERLINDA I. BILDNER and MAXIMO K. ILUSORIO v. ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, RAMON K.
ILUSORIO, MARIETTA K. ILUSORIO, SHEREEN K. ILUSORIO, CECILIA A. BISUA, and ATTY.
MANUEL R. SINGSON (G.R. No. 157384, June 5, 2009)
Question: Can a lawyer be a subject of a disbarment proceeding for attempting to bribe a judge to secure a
favorable judgment?
Answer: Yes. Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer to refrain from
any impropriety which tends to influence or gives the appearance of influencing the court. The
possibility of an attempted bribery is not far from reality considering lawyer’s persistent phone calls to the
judge.

EVERY CASE MUST RISE AND FALL ON ITS MERITS


Question: What would be an appropriate remedy upon a lawyer who attempted to bribe a judge in order to
secure a favorable ruling?
Answer: Heeding the injunction against decreeing disbarment where a lesser sanction would suffice to
accomplish the desired end, a suspension for one year from the practice of law was found to be appropriate
in a case when the lawyer attempted to bribe a judge.

DUTY OF SHERIFF WHEN COURT ISSUES AN ORDER OF ATTACHMENT


ATTY. RICARDO M. SALOMON, JR. v. ATTY. JOSELITO FRIAL (A.C. No. 7820, September 12,
2008)
Question: Atty. Frial was the counsel of Lucy Lo (complainant) in a case against Atty. Salomon
(defendant). A writ of attachment was issued in favor of Lo for Salomon’s Volvo and Nissan Sentra. In a
complaint for disbarment, Atty. Salomon alleged that the attaching sheriff of Manila turned over the
attached vehicles to Atty. Frial without any authority from the court. Was the action of the sheriff proper?

DUTY OF SHERIFF WHEN COURT ISSUES AN ORDER OF ATTACHMENT


Answer: No. The sheriff’s action was not proper. The sheriff must deposit any object which has been
ordered attached to the premises of the court.
Therefore, the sheriff can be a subject of an administrative case for violation of his duty.

LAWYER’S DUTY AS CUSTODIAN OF ATTACHED ITEMS


Question: A lawyer assumed responsibility to take custody of two vehicles which were covered by a court
order. Unfortunately, one of the vehicles caught fire. The lawyer never informed the court that one of the
attached vehicles was now a total wreck. Can the lawyer be held liable for this unfortunate incident?
Answer: Yes. He is guilty of grave misconduct arising from his violation of Canon 16 of the CPR which
provides that “money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the
profession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any
circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him.”
Therefore, he is guilty of violating his fiduciary duty. Fiduciary duty includes the task of ensuring any
property held in favor the client is adequately preserved.
Reason: A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. As such, he is expected to respect the
court’s order and processes. He miserably fell short of his duties as such officer. He trifled with the writ of
attachment the court issued. He was remiss in his obligation of taking good care of the attached cars. He
also allowed the use of the Nissan Sentra car by persons who had no business using it. He did not inform
the court or at least the sheriff of the destruction of the Volvo car. What is worse is that he took custody of
the attached vehicles without so much as informing the court, let alone securing, its authority.

THE LAWYER AS A NOTARY PUBLIC


CORAZON T. NEVADA v. ATTY. RODOLFO D. CASUGA (A.C. No. 7591, March 20, 2012)
Question: Can a lawyer notarize a document which bears his own signature as a stockholder of the
company which entered into a contract of lease with a tenant with the same company?
Answer: No. The notarial law disqualifies a notary public from performing a notarial act if he or she is a
party to the instrument or document. When he notarized the same contract without qualification that he
signed it as a stockholder of the company, he went against the function of a Notary Public to guard against
any illegal or immoral arrangement.
Therefore, the lawyer violated his commission as a Notary Public.

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DOLORES L. DELA CRUZ, MILAGROS L. PRINCIPE, NARCISA L. FAUSTINO, JORGE V.
LEGASPI and JUANITO V. LEGASPI v. ATTY. JOSE R. DIMAANO, JR. (A.C. No. 7781,
September 12, 2008)
Question: Atty. Dimaano notarized an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights where
the complainants’ signatures were forged; they did not appear nor acknowledged the same before Atty.
Dimaano as notarizing officer; and the community tax certificates in the document were not theirs. Can
Atty. Dimaano be subjected to disciplinary action for his lapses as a Notary Public?
Answer: Yes. Atty. Dimaano violated the 2004 Notarial Law. A Notary Public should refrain from affixing
his signature and notarial seal on a document unless the persons who signed it are the same individuals
who executed and personally appeared before the notary public to attest to the truth of what are
stated therein. Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question, a
notary public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to
ascertain that the document is the party’s free act or deed. The document requires that proper formalities
be strictly observed.
Question: What are the formalities required before a Notary Public can affix his signature to a notarial
deed which requires acknowledgment?
Answer: The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice now requires a party to the instrument to present
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and
signature of the individual; and
(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or transaction who
is personally known to the notary public; and who personally knows the individual, or of two credible
witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows
the individual and shows to the notary public competent proof of identity.
The Notary Public must ascertain the identities of the affiant(s) and the witnesses to the document. He must
also ensure that all parties must sign on the left side margin of each and every page of the document.
The details of the notarized document must be recorded in the notarial register (Notarial Book) of the
commissioned lawyer.

DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES: QUALITIES OF COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE


RICKY GARAY, et al. v. JUDGE NICASIO BARTOLOME (A.M. No. MTJ-08-1703, June 17, 2008)
Question: Complainants are the accused in a criminal case wherein they were charged with qualified theft
of bus starters and different tools amounting to P187,000. Judge Nicasio Bartolome, the MTC judge
presiding over the case, issued a warrant of arrest against them and detained them in the provincial jail.
Was the judge correct in assuming jurisdiction of the case?

DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES
Answer: No. The respondent judge should have not assumed jurisdiction because at the time the case was
instituted the amount involved is P187,000 which is beyond the jurisdiction of a first level court. The
respondent judge exhibited his unfamiliarity with the Rules on Criminal Procedure. He is guilty of
violating Sections 3 and 5, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. He also betrayed his
lack of competence which is a constitutional qualification for a member of the judiciary. He likewise
violated Canon 6 of the Code of Judicial Conduct on Competence and Diligence.
Question: Respondent judge took more than three (3) months to issue the Joint Resolution ordering the
return of the cases to the provincial prosecutor for further preliminary investigation. The rule mandates that
he should resolve this issue within a period of ten (10) days. Was the action of the judge proper?
Answer: No. The Rules on Criminal Procedure requires a judge to submit his resolution of the case within
ten (10) days after the preliminary investigation and transmit the resolution of the case to the provincial or
city prosecutor. There is no question that the judge took inordinate delay of three (3) months in submitting
his resolution of the preliminary investigation. He violated Canon 6 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which
requires the qualities of competence and diligence.
Question: Under the foregoing facts, what liability did the respondent judge incur?
Answer: The judge betrayed his gross ignorance of the law. When a judge shows utter unfamiliarity with
fundamental rules and procedures, he contributes to the erosion of public confidence in the judicial
system. Ignorance of the law is a mainspring of injustice.
When judges show professional incompetence, and are ignorant of basic and fundamental rules, they are
guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedures. This is a serious charge under Sec. 8, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court.
Sec. 11(A) of Rule 140 punishes the offense. He also violated Canon 6 of the Code of Judicial Conduct on
competence and diligence.
JOSEFINA NAGUIAT v. JUDGE MARIO B. CAPELLAN, PRESIDING JUDGE, MTCC, BR. 1,
MALOLOS CITY, BULACAN (A.M. No. MTJ-11-1782 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-1807-MTJ],
March 23, 2011)

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Question: An ejectment case was filed before the MTC. On its face, the allegations do not constitute any
ground for the court to take jurisdiction. What action must the judge take under the premises?
Answer: The judge must dismiss the case. In ejectment cases, the first duty of a judge is to examine the
allegations in the complaint and the evidence appended to it, and to dismiss the case outright on any of the
grounds apparent in the allegations and order the dismissal of a civil action.
If there is a ground for dismissal existing and apparent upon the filing of the complaint, and yet the judge
allowed the case to unnecessarily drag on, the judge is guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision.
(Canon 6 on Competence and Diligence, Code of Judicial Conduct)
Question: What would constitute undue delay in rendering a decision or order?
Answer: Undue delay in rendering a judgment exists where a ground for dismissing the civil case was
patent on the face of the allegations and yet the judge did not dismiss the case outright. Also, when the
representative’s lack of personality was reflected in the corporate secretary's certificate appended to the
complaint and yet, respondent judge allowed the case to unnecessarily drag on for more than five years.
QUESTION: What would be a reasonable penalty for the administrative offense of undue delay in
rendering judgment?
ANSWER: A judge who allowed several and doubtless unnecessary postponements which contributed to
the delay in the resolution of what was otherwise a simple case may be subjected to a monetary fine. The
Court held that undue delay in rendering a decision or order constitutes a less serious offense for which
respondent judge is subjected to a fine. (Violation of Canon 6, Competence and Diligence, Code of
Judicial Conduct)
RE: LETTER-COMPLAINT OF ATTY. ARIEL SAMSON C. CAYETUNA, ET AL., ALL
EMPLOYEES OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MICHAEL P. ELBINIAS against ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE MICHAEL P. ELBINIAS, CA - Mindanao Station (A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-127-CA-J,
January 11, 2011) REMINDER: VERY IMPORTANT CASE PLEASE READ CAREFULLY ALL
RELATED QUESTIONS
*Question: How may an administrative complaint be initiated against a judge?
Answer: Sec. 1 Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides for the ways on how to institute administrative
proceedings against judges. Under this rule, the three ways to initiate the complaint are:
First, motu proprio by the Supreme Court;
Second, upon verified complaint with affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts alleged
therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations; or
Third, upon an anonymous complaint supported by public records of indubitable integrity.
*Question: Certain employees of the Court of Appeals filed a letter-complaint against a justice of the court
for: Gross Inefficiency; Bribe Solicitation; Drinking Liquor in Office Premises; Personal Use of
Government Property and Resources; Falsification of a Favored Employee’s Daily Time Record;
Disrespect Towards fellow Justices; Oppression through Intemperate, Oppressive and Threatening
Language; and Grave Abuse of Authority.
The letter-complaint was signed by all the complaining employees but was not verified. Will the case
prosper?
Answer: No. An unverified letter-complaint cannot be a basis of an administrative complaint against a
judge. Under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, an administrative case against a judge must be
verified.
A complainant must attest to his personal knowledge of the allegations embodied in his verified letter-
complaint.
*Question: Can the Court take cognizance of an anonymous letter-complaint against a judge?
Answer: Yes. In Sinsuat v. Hidalgo, the Court took cognizance of the unverified motion and subsequent
letters of complainants submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator since the unverified complaint
was properly considered as an anonymous complaint and the material allegations were not only
admitted by respondent judge but are also verifiable from public records of indubitable integrity,
i.e., records of the trial court, as aptly found by the CA.
PROSECUTOR JORGE D. BACULI v. JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, RTC, BR. 36,
CALAMBA CITY, LAGUNA (A.M. No. RTJ-09-2179, September 24, 2012)
Question: Prosecutor Baculi filed information for qualified theft against Capacete but Judge Belen
dismissed the case. In the Motion for Reconsideration, Prosecutor Baculi stated: “The dismissal of the
information by the court was motivated by hatred, ill-will, and prejudice against Asst. State Prosecutor
II Jorge Baculi, the Investigating Prosecutor at the Preliminary Investigation.”
Judge Belen found Baculi guilty of direct contempt and indirect contempt for the contemptuous nature of
the pleadings he filed.
Baculi filed an administrative case against Judge Belen because the judge did not allow him to air his side
for his alleged contemptuous conduct. Will the case prosper?
Answer: NO, Judge Belen is not administratively liable. The complainant has not presented any credible
evidence to support his allegations. The fact that Judge Belen had initiated contempt proceedings against

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him, and in fact convicted him in such contempt proceedings, does not by itself amount to ill motives on
the part of Judge Belen.
*N.B. The primary responsibility of a prosecutor is not to convict but to serve the ends of justice.
GEOFFREY BECKETT v. JUDGE OLEGARIO R. SARMIENTO, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch
24, Cebu City (A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326, January 30, 2013)
Question: Despite the approval of a compromise agreement in the annulment of marriage between spouses
Beckett, the presiding judge in a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding, ordered provisional custody of the
minor child to the mother when the agreement awarded custody to the father. Was the judge guilty of gross
ignorance of the law?
Answer: No. Gross ignorance of the law on the part of a judge presupposes an appalling lack of familiarity
with simple rules of law or procedures and well-established jurisprudence which tends to erode the public
trust in the competence and fairness of the court which he personifies.
Not to know the law as basic, almost elementary, as the Rules of Court, or acting in disregard of established
rule of law as if he were not aware of the same constitutes gross ignorance whence no one is excused,
especially an RTC judge.
However, the respondent judge, in granting provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr. in favor of his mother,
Eltesa, did not disregard the res judicata rule nor was he impartial.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. HON. LEODEGARIO C. QUILATAN (A.M. No.
MTJ-09-1745, September 27, 2010)
Question: Prior to his retirement, the OCA found Judge Quilatan liable for gross inefficiency for failure to
decide the 34 cases submitted for decision within the required period. The OCA recommended that the
erring judge be fined fifty thousand pesos (PhP 50,000). Is Judge Quilatan is guilty of gross inefficiency?
Answer: Yes. The Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for judges to resolve their cases with
dispatch. Delay does not only constitute a serious violation of the parties’ constitutional right to
speedy disposition of cases, it also erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary,
lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute. Without doubt, Judge Quilatan violated his mandate
when he failed to decide 34 cases within three (3) months from their submission, for which he should be
administratively sanctioned. (Violation of Canon 6, Competence and Diligence)

DISQUALIFICATION/INHIBITION OF JUDGES
JIMMY T. GO v. ALBERTO T. LOOYUKO (G.R. No. 147923, October 26, 2007)
Question: During the pendency of the criminal case, the prosecution on behalf of Go, wanted to present
certain witnesses to strengthen the case of the prosecution. However, the trial court felt no need for the
testimonies of the aforementioned witnesses. This prompted Go to file an administrative complaint against
Judge Nemesio Felix for partiality.
The CA dismissed the complaint of Go. Go failed to establish the partiality of the presiding judge when it
limited the number witnesses. It rationalized that Judge Felix had the discretion to inhibit himself from the
case unless the ground for his inhibition is that which calls for mandatory inhibition of the same and in this
case no such ground exists. Go insists that there is a valid ground to inhibit the judge. Is his contention
tenable?
Answer: None. There is no valid ground to inhibit the judge as there was no manifest partiality. Indeed, the
adverse rulings on the denial of the proposed testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses are judicial in
nature. Absent proof that the trial court judge had acted in a wanton, whimsical or oppressive manner or
for an illegal consideration, and similar reasons, in giving undue advantage to respondent, inhibition is
not a remedy to oust the judge from sitting on the case.
Second, the other two (2) grounds raised by petitioner are also baseless. It is an age old rule in civil cases
that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.
JOHNWELL W. TIGGANGAY v. JUDGE MARCELINO K. WACAS, Regional Trial Court, Branch
25, Tabuk City, Kalinga (A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3243-RTJ, April 1, 2013)
Question: Complainant charged Judge Wacas of Impropriety and Partiality for not inhibiting himself in the
case alleging that he is Dagadag’s second cousin by affinity, the former’s aunt is married to an uncle of
Dagadag.
Tiggangay made the allegation on the basis of "some reliable sources," not from his personal knowledge.
Judge Wacas maintained that Tiggangay never moved for his inhibition during the entire proceedings.
Should the judge inhibit himself under the foregoing facts cited by complainant?
Answer: No. In administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that respondent committed the acts
complained of rests on the complainant. In the instant case, Tiggangay failed to present substantial
evidence to prove his allegations. One who alleges a fact has the burden of proof and mere allegation is not
evidence.
N.B. As a general rule, the objection for the judge to inhibit himself must be raised during the trial and
not after the judge had rendered an adverse ruling against the complainant.
Reason: Granting arguendo that the aunt of Judge Wacas is married to the uncle of respondent Dagadag,
such reality is not a ground for the mandatory inhibition of a Judge as required under Sec. 1of Rule 137,

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Revised Rules of Procedure, since there is actually no relation of affinity between Judge Wacas and
Dagadag. Indeed, "there is no affinity between the blood relatives of one spouse and the blood relatives of
the other. A husband is related by affinity to his wife’s brother, but not to the wife of his wife’s brother.
There is no affinity between the husband’s brother and the wife’s sister.

POWERS AND DUTIES OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS


ATTY. VIRGILIO P. ALCONERA v. ALFREDO T. PALLANAN (A.M. No. P-12-3069, January
20, 2014)
Question: Complainant asked respondent sheriff not to execute an adverse decision since he has not yet
received a copy of the denial of the motion from the adverse judgment
Despite his plea, respondent sheriff still pushed through with the execution of the judgment and in
enforcing, allegedly uttered words degrading to the reputation of the complainant. The lawyer filed a
Complaint-Affidavit against the respondent sheriff for grave misconduct. Is the respondent sheriff guilty
of grave misconduct?
Answer: Yes, the respondent should be penalized for discourtesy in the performance of his official duties.
As a public officer and a trustee for the public, it is the ever existing responsibility of respondent to
demonstrate courtesy and civility in his official actuations with the public.
Public service requires integrity and discipline. At all times, employees of the judiciary are expected to
accord respect to the person and the rights of another, even a co-employee. Their every act and word should
be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy and dignity.
JUDGE PELAGIA DALMACIO-JOAQUIN v. NICOMEDES C. DELA CRUZ, Process Server,
MTCC, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan (A.M. No. P-07-2321, April 24, 2009)
Question: After complainant judge left her office a few minutes before 5:00 p.m., security guard reported
to her that process server Dela Cruz allegedly arrived in the office, apparently drunk, and hurled invectives
while pointing his fingers at other employees present. Afterwards, respondent process server attempted to
punch one of them. Can the judge institute an administrative complaint against Dela Cruz?
Answer: Yes. However, respondent’s act can only be regarded as simple misconduct since it has no direct
relation to the performance of his official duties. Respondent committed misconduct when he verbally
abused his co-employees and appeared at his place of work drunk. Drinking during office hours may
constitute misconduct and is prohibited under the Civil Service Rules. Drinking undermines efficiency and
is counter-productive. It generates an unwholesome consequence on a public servant. And when the culprit
is an employee of the court, the image of the judiciary as a whole cannot but be affected.

RETIREMENT OF A HIGH RANKING EMPLOYEE OF THE JUDICIARY


In Re: Expiration of Fixed Term of Office of Atty. Saaduddin A. Alauya, Office of the Jurisconsult,
Zamboanga City (A.M. No. 11238-Ret, August 18, 2015)
Question: In a Resolution, the Court denied Atty. Alauya’s request for a lifetime monthly pension enjoyed
by RTC judges. Alauya moved for reconsideration and argued that the Court en banc conferred upon him
the rank and privileges of a Regional Trial Court (RTC) judge effective October 1996. Armed with this
resolution, he claimed that he should enjoy the same retirement benefits extended to judges. Is the legal
argument of Alauya tenable?
Answer: Yes. Time and again, the Court has followed the practice of liberal treatment in passing upon
retirement issues and claims, particularly of judges and justices, obviously in keeping with the beneficial
intendment of retirement laws which is to reward satisfactory past services. At the same time, these
measures provide the retiree with the means to support himself and his family in his remaining years. On
several occasions, the Court has liberally interpreted retirement laws in keeping with its purpose.
Reason: In Government Service Insurance System v. De Leon: The Court held that retirement laws, in
particular, are liberally construed in favor of the retiree because their objective is to provide for the
retiree’s sustenance and, hopefully, even comfort, when he no longer has the capability to earn a
livelihood. The liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that
efficiency, security, and well-being of government employees may be enhanced.
Reason: Indeed, retirement laws are liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended
to be benefited, and all doubts are resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve their humanitarian purpose.
Upon the foregoing perspective, the term “privileges of an RTC judge” and the conferment thereof must be
considered as covering the retirement benefits under RA 910, meaning a lump-sum payment of five years’
salary and a monthly pension until death after the 5-year period.

PART B: CONCEPTS, BASIC PRINCIPLES AND OTHER LEADING JURISPRUDENCE


PART ONE – LEGAL ETHICS

I –The Attorney’s Oath


Q. Write the Attorney’s Oath

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A. “I, ________________ do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines;
I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein;
I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, neither give aid nor
consent to the same;
I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and
I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So
help me God.” (Rules of Court, Form 28)

Q. What are the sources of ethical standards for the members of the bench and bar?
A. (1) Constitution Article VIII – The Judicial Department, Sec. 5(5),
Article VI – The Legislative Department, Sec.14,
Article VII – The Executive Department, Sec. 13,
Article IX – Constitutional Commissions, IX-A, Sec. 2;
(2) The Attorney’s Oath;
(3) The Code of Professional Responsibility;
(4) The Code of Judicial Ethics;
(5) The Rules of Court; (6) 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice;
(7) MCLE Rules;
(8) JBC Rules;
(9) Issuances of the Supreme Court;
(10) Legislations from Congress (creation and jurisdiction of appellate and other lower courts, also the
Lapid Law on legal aid service of lawyers);
(11) Jurisprudence; and
(12) Scholarly Writings on Legal and Judicial Ethics.

Q. What is the four-fold duty of a lawyer?


A. The Four-fold duty of a lawyer - to Society, the Legal Profession, the Courts and Clients.

Q. What is the practice of law?


A. The practice of law is performing “any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.” Paguia v. Office of the President, 621 SCRA 600

Q. What is the privilege of the practice of law?


A. The practice of law is a mere privilege and not a right. The admission of lawyers and the rules governing
the practice of law is a constitutional mandate given to the Supreme Court. Elements of the legal
profession are: organization, learning, and the spirit of public service. (Section 5 (5), Article VIII,
Constitution)
Cayetano v. Monsod (G. R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991, 201 SCRA 210): The practice of law is not
limited to appearances in court as a litigator but also the work of a corporate lawyer in preparation of
documents and the giving of legal advice.
Paguia v. Office of the President (621 SCRA 600): A lawyer suspended from the practice of law is
precluded from applying his knowledge of law in and out of court while undergoing his suspension. A
suspended lawyer cannot even appear on behalf of a relative as a “friend” because he would inevitably
apply his knowledge of the law.

Q. What is included in the practice of law?


A. The practice of law includes: the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings; conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds; and the giving of all
legal advice to clients.

Q. A group of businessmen decided to incorporate a stock corporation with the primary objective of
giving legal guidance to their clients who regularly invest in publicly listed companies. They intend to
hire at least 25 lawyers who will perform the work. If you were the Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, will you approve the registration of the subject company?
A. No. The practice of law is not a business and lawyers cannot form stock corporations to practice the
profession. It is also prohibited for lawyers to allow non-lawyers to practice law nor are lawyers allowed to
share their legal fees with non-lawyers. Ulep v. The Legal Clinic, Inc., (Bar Matter No. 550, June 17, 1993)

Q. How may one pursue the practice of law?


A. The practice of law as a profession may only be exercised by natural persons, who are lawyers, either as
solo practitioners or in partnership with other lawyers.

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Q. What are the primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business?
A. 1. The practice of law involves a duty of public service of which the emolument is a by-product and one
may obtain eminence without making much money.
2. The practice of law creates a relation as an officer of the court whose primary role is to assist in the
administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability.
3. The practice of law creates a relation with clients with the highest fiduciary degree.
4. The practice of law creates a relation which other lawyers which requires candor, fairness and decency
avoiding any kind of encroachment upon other’s practice.
Q. What is the nature of a law partnership?
A. A partnership in the practice of law is a mere relationship or association of lawyers with the sole
purpose of rendering legal services. It is not a legal entity and is not even a taxpayer and any lawyer in the
partnership is considered a solo practitioner who is the tax payer. (Tan v. Del Rosario, Jr., 237 SCRA324)
Q. What is the rule of use of Firm Name?
A. Petition For Authority To Continue Use Of The Firm Name "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano,
HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO" AND IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO
CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES."
[G.R. NO. X92-1. JULY 30, 1979.]The Court held that: ". . . It is of the essence of a profession that it is
practiced in a spirit of public service.’ A trade’ . . .’aims primarily at personal gain; a profession at the
exercise of powers beneficial to mankind.’ x x x. But the member of a profession does not regard himself as
in competition with his professional brethren. He is not bartering his services as is the artisan nor
exchanging the products of his skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn. x x x The best service
of the professional man is often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling equivalent and it is his pride to
do what he does in a way worthy of his profession even if done with no expectation of reward. This spirit of
public service in which the profession of law is and ought to be exercised is a prerequisite of sound
administration of justice according to law. The other two elements of a profession, namely, organization
and pursuit of a learned art have their justification in that they secure and maintain that spirit.”
ADRIANO E. DACANAY v. BAKER & MCKENZIE, ADM. CASE NO. 2131 MAY 10, 1985. The S.C.
held that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule
138, Rules of Court). As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker &
McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services
of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and
investment"

Q. A disbarment case was filed against Atty. Balauitan. The basis of the complaint was a Deed of Sale
executed between the lawyer and the complainant. Atty. Balauitan moved for the dismissal of the case
arguing that the matter does involve any lawyer-client relationship. Is his legal argument tenable?
A. A lawyer cannot have a dichotomy between his private life and his professional responsibility as a
lawyer. He can be disbarred even if there is no lawyer-client relationship between him and a complainant in
a disbarment case and if the transaction involves his sale of a portion of his real property. Gacias v.
Balauitan (507 SCRA 8, 2006)

Q. Can an individual practicing before the Shai’ra court affix the prefix “ATTY.” before his name?
A. No. While the Supreme Court administers the examinations for one to practice before the Shari’ a
courts, any one admitted is not allowed to use the prefix “ATTY.” unless he is also a member of the
Philippine bar. Shari’ a courts have limited jurisdiction particularly on matters related to personal, family
and property law consistent with the provisions of the Constitution and national laws. Alawi v. Alauya,
A.M. SDC-97-2-P, February 24, 1997

II. Qualifications for Admission to the Practice of Law


Q. What are the requirements for admission to the practice of law?
A. Sec. 2, Rule138 of the Rules of Court provides for the following qualifications: One must be a citizen of
the Philippines, at least 21 years of age, must be a resident of the Philippines, must have obtained his law
degree in a local school (Sections 5 & 6, Rules of Court), possesses Good Moral Character (presentation
of proof of good moral character, certification that one does not have any pending charges or have been
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude)

Q. Mr. Roberto Lo was born in Australia of Filipino parents. After he completed his college degree in
Business Administration in Sydney, Australia, he enrolled in one of the universities in Metro Manila to
obtain his law degree. He successfully graduated with a Bachelor of Laws degree and is now processing
his documents to be able to take his bar examinations. Can he qualify to take the bar examinations?
Justify your answer.
A. Yes. Under the 1987 Constitution, Roberto Lo is considered a natural-born Filipino since both his
parents remain Filipino citizens at the time of his birth. He also completed his law degree from a local
school in Metro Manila.
Q. Can a Filipino citizen be allowed to take the bar when he obtained his law degree from Columbia
University in New York?

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A. No. Every person intending to be admitted to the practice of law in the Philippines must meet all the
qualifications under Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138. (In Re: Application of Adriano M. Hernandez, July 27,
1993)

Q. Christian San Juan passed the bar with a passing grade of 80.50%. He was not allowed to take his
oath because Cristina Garcia, his childhood sweetheart with whom he has a child without benefit of
marriage, filed a timely motion to exclude him from the oath taking ceremonies. Was Cristina justified
in preventing San Juan from taking his Attorney’s Oath? Why?
A. Yes, because San Juan does not possess good moral character which is a requirement for admission to
the bar.
Barba v. Pedro (61SCRA 484, 1974): A bar passer who sired a child with a public school teacher was not
allowed to take his oath for lack of good moral character but was allowed to do so after 18 years based on
testimonials of his reformation when he worked as a community social development worker after passing
the bar.

Q. Santiago Go was conditionally allowed to take the bar examinations because he indicated in his
application for admission that there are only two pending civil cases against him at that time and no
criminal charges were filed against him at the time of his application for admission to the practice of
law. Santiago Go successfully passed the bar examinations and landed 5 th in said examinations. Before
taking his oath, Leticia Sia asked the Supreme Court not to allow Go to take his oath because she
actually filed a rape case against him which case remains pending but which information Go withheld in
his application. Will her request be given due course?
A. Yes. If it can be established that the bar passer does not possess good moral character, he will not be
allowed to take his oath.
Zaguirre v. Castillo, (A.C. No. 4921, March 6, 2003): Good moral character is required for admission to
law and misrepresentation about his true legal status will be a ground for a bar passer was suspended
indefinitely upon passing the bar.

Q. Is possession of good moral character required only for admission to the practice of law?
A. Maintenance of good moral character is required to retain continued membership in the bar.
Mecaral v. Velasquez (A.C. No 8392 June 29, 2010): The Supreme Court disbarred a lawyer who founded
a religious cult and made his secretary a sex slave.
Cordon v. Balicanta (Adm. Case No. 2797, October 4, 2002, 390 SCRA 299 (2002): The S.C. disbarred a
lawyer who used his knowledge of the law to commit fraud against his client by forming a corporation out
of the estate of the deceased husband of the complainant. The lawyer made himself the sole signatory of
said company which allowed him to mortgage several properties of the corporation which were eventually
foreclosed by the creditor bank.
Arellano University, Inc. v. Mijares III, 605 SCRA 93, 2009: The S.C. disbarred a lawyer who admitted in
his Affidavit in the disbarment case against him that he asked for “facilitation fee” to bribe the Vice Mayor
of Manila in the course of his engagement as counsel. The S.C. referred the case to the Ombudsman against
the Vice Mayor and the lawyer for the crime of bribery. The Court held that a lawyer’s professional fee
does not include “facilitation fee.”

Q. What is the coverage of the annual bar examinations?


A. Bar Subjects under Sec. 9, Rule 138, Rules of Court include: Political Law, Labor and Social
Legislation, Civil Law, Taxation, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law and Legal and Judicial
Ethics and Practical Exercises.

Q. What is the essence of bar examinations?


A. Public policy demands that any person seeking admission to the bar in the Philippines be required to
furnish satisfactory proof of his knowledge of the law and ethical standards and of his possession of such
degree of learning and proficiency in law as may be deemed necessary for the due performance of the
duties of lawyer.

Q. Candido completed his law degree in October 2015. He wanted to become a lawyer but he realized
that it was too late for him to take the November 2015 bar examinations. Can he file a petition to the
Supreme Court to be allowed to take his special bar examinations?
A. No. The Supreme Court administers the bar examinations only once a year.

Q. Fernando, a Filipino citizen, completed his study of law in Spain and was allowed to practice law in
Spain. He sought permission from the Supreme Court that he be allowed to be admitted to Philippine
bar. In his petition he invoked the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and Professions
between the Philippines and Spain. How will you rule on the petition of Fernando?
A. I will deny Fernando’s petition. Fernando has remained a Filipino citizen and he cannot invoke the
provisions of the treaty which is founded on reciprocity of the nationals of each country and the grant of the
privilege is always subject to the domestic laws of both countries. In Re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 985

Q. Define the following:

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1. Attorneys-at Law: the class of persons who are by license, officers of the court, empowered to appear,
prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are developed by law
as a consequence. Cul v. Cul, 120 Phil. 729
2. Attorney-in-Fact: an agent whose authority is strictly limited by the instrument appointing him. His
authority is provided in a special power of attorney or a general power of attorney or letter of authority. An
attorney-in-fact is not necessarily a lawyer.
3. Counsel de oficio: a counsel, appointed or assigned by the court, from among such members of the bar
in good standing who, by reason of their experience and ability may adequately defend the accused. The
person need not be a member of the bar if no lawyer is available in a given locality. (Sec. 7, Rule 116,
Rules of Court)
A counsel de oficio is appointed to defend an indigent in a criminal action (Sections 3, 4, and 5, Rule 116;
Sec. 32, Rule 138); or to represent a destitute party in a case (Sec.31, Rule 138).
4. Attorney Ad Hoc: a person named and appointed by the court to defend an absentee defendant in a suit
in which the appointment is made.
5. Attorney of Record: a member of the bar appointed by a client to represent in cause of a court and upon
whom service of papers may be made.
6. Of Counsel: a member of the bar who is associated with a law office but does not normally appear as
counsel of record of cases handled by the law office.
7. Lead Counsel: a member of the bar who charged with the principal management and direction of a
party-litigant.
8. House Counsel: a member of the bar who acts as attorney for a business company as an employee of
such company and renders legal advice on matters necessary in the ordinary course of its business.
9. Amicus Curiae: a friend of the court. A person with strong interest in or views on the subject matter of
the action. One who is considered as an experience and impartial attorney to help in the disposition of
issues submitted to the Court. (Sec. 36, Rule 138)
10. Amicus Curiae par Excellence: bar associations who appear in court as amici curiae or friends of the
court. Like an individual amicus curiae, amicus curiae par excellence do not represent any party to the case
but act as consultant in a doubtful issue for resolution of the court. They do not receive any compensation
for their legal services to the court.
11. Counsel de parte: a lawyer retained by a party litigant, usually, for a fee, to prosecute or defend his
cause in court. The term implies freedom of choice either on the part of the lawyer to accept the
employment or on the part of the litigant to continue or terminate the retainer at any time.
12. Pro bono Counsel: a lawyer who renders legal services without charging any professional fees but does
not shoulder the costs of litigation on behalf of his client.
13. Advocate: a lawyer who pleads on behalf of a third party.
14. Barrister: In England, a person entitled to practice law as an advocate or counsel in superior courts.
15. Solicitor: In England, a person prosecuting or defending suits in a Court of Chancery. A Court of
Chancery is a court which administers equity and proceeding according to the forms and principles of
equity.
16. Proctor: In England , an attorney in in the admiralty and ecclesiastical courts whose duties and business
correspond exactly to those of an attorney-at-law or solicitor in a Chancery.

Q. What is barratry?
A. It is the offense of frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels in suits. It is frowned upon as it is against
public policy.

Q. What is ambulance chasing?


A. This practice originated in New York, where through a lawyer or his agent, cases are literally solicited in
hospitals or in police precincts. The evils sought to be prevented by this practice are: fomenting litigation;
subornation of perjury; mulcting of innocent persons upon manufactured causes of action; defrauding
injured parties.

III. Appearance of Non-Lawyers


Q. What is the Student Practice Rule?
A. Law Student Practice Rule: Rule 138-A of the Rules of court allows a law student to represent
indigent clients provided one has successfully completed the 3rd year of a prescribed four-year curriculum
and enrolled in a recognized law school’s clinical legal education program
> In Bar Matter No.730 dated June 10, 1998, the Supreme Court required that law student practice before
the Regional Trial Court must be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines.
> Under Section 34 of the Rules of Court, a law student may appear before the first level court as an agent
or friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar.

Q. Under what circumstances can non-lawyers represent parties?


A. Non-lawyers may appear in the following:
1. Non-lawyers in first level courts: small claims cases

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2. Non-lawyers in administrative tribunals: HLURB, DENR, DAR, NLRC, etc.
3. Proceedings where lawyers are prohibited from appearing: proceedings before the Lupong
Tagapamayapa,
4. Non-lawyers in court ordered mediation

Q. What are the sanctions for practice or appearance without authority?


1. Lawyers without authority: Contempt of Court (Sec. 1, Rule 71)
Acts constituting contempt: Misbehavior as an officer of the court, disobedience or resistance to a lawful
order of the court, abuse or unlawful interference with judicial proceedings, obstruction in the
administration of justice, misleading the court or making false allegations, criticisms, insults or veiled
threats against the court, aiding in the unauthorized practice of law, unlawful retention of clients,
advising a client to commit a contemptuous act, publications which tend to impede, obstruct, embarrass
or influence courts may degrade the court; disrespectful pleadings.
2. Persons who are not lawyers: Indirect Contempt (Sec. 3 (e), Rule 71)
Ciocon-Reer v. Lubao (674 SCRA 13): Karaan would always appear in court and he even files pleadings
without indicating any Roll of Attorney No., PTR, MCLE and IBP O.R.No. After investigation, OCA found
out that the 71 year old Karaan was not in fact a lawyer. He was found guilty of indirect contempt of court
and fined P10,000.00 without imprisonment.

IV. Public Officials and Practice of Law


Q. Are government lawyers covered by the Code of Professional Responsibility (“CPR”)?
A. Yes. CANON 6 of the CPR provides: “These Canons shall apply to lawyers in government service
in the discharge of their tasks.”(Rules 6.01-6.03, Code of Professional Responsibility).

Q. What is the one-year ban rule on government lawyers?


A. Former government attorneys are prohibited or disqualified from the representing any interest adverse to
the government within the one-year period when they were separated from service.

Q. Who are the public officials not allowed to practice law?


A. Under the Constitution: The President, Vice President, members of the Constitutional Commissions,
members of the judiciary, members of the cabinet, their deputies and assistants
Under Civil Service Rules: government lawyers in government departments/offices/bureaus, in government
owned and controlled corporations, government financial institutions and those with local government units
Under Special Laws: Governors and Mayors (Local Government Code); Solicitors and trial lawyers of the
Office of the Solicitor General, lawyers of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, Government
prosecutors under the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman
Q. What is the concept of limited practice of law among public officers?
A. With prior written authorization of the heads of office, some government lawyers may be authorized to
practice law provided they will not represent any party who has an adverse claim against the government.
Lorenzana v. Fajardo ( 462 SCRA 1 (2005)): A lawyer is guilty of violating the Civil Service rule on
double compensation when he accepted an appointment as a lawyer of the Urban Affairs Office of the City
of Manila and a member of the PLEB of Quezon City.

Q. Who are the lawyers who represent the government?


A. The lawyers tasked to represent government: OSG, OGCC, lawyers in regular departments, bureaus,
offices, lawyers in the government financial institutions, lawyers in government owned and controlled
corporations, lawyers who serve the government’s interest under special contracts/or engagements, lawyers
under the local government units.

Q. Who are the lawyers who represent the interest of the state in criminal cases?
A. Government lawyers tasked to prosecute and represent the interest of the state are the Public
Prosecutors from the DOJ and Office of the Ombudsman.
Q. Who are the government lawyers who represent indigent litigants?
A. Lawyers who work with the Public Attorneys’ Office represent the indigent litigants.
Q. Can the Supreme Court motu propio discipline lawyers?
A. Yes.
People of the Philippines v. The Hon. Juanito C. Castaneda, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 208290, December 11,
2013.CTA in conformity with the Run After the Smugglers (RATS) Group of the Revenue Collection
Monitoring Group (RCMG) of the BOC tried the private respondents for violation of the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended. S.C. said that it could not countenance the following patent
violations of the government prosecutors: failure of the prosecution failed to present certified true copies of
the documentary evidence under Section 7, Rule 130 and Section 127, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and
the petition for certiorari was filed beyond the reglamentary period. This stance taken by the lawyers in
government service rouses the Court’s vigilance against inefficiency in the administration of justice and the
presumption that the case was doomed by design from the start was doomed by design from the start.
Verily, the lawyers representing the offices under the executive branch should be reminded that they still
remain as officers of the court from whom a high sense of competence and fervor is expected. The Court

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reminded the lawyers in the BOC that the canons embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility
equally apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks.
Q. May a labor arbiter apply a principle in Corporation Law to support his decision in a labor dispute?
A. Yes. YOLANDA A. ANDRES, MINETTE A. MERCADO, AND ELITO P. ANDRES v. ATTY.
SALIMATHAR V. NAMBI, A.C. No. 7158, March 09, 2015, DEL CASTILLO, J.: This is a Complaint
for Disbarment filed against then Labor Arbiter Salimathar v. Nambi (respondent) on the ground of gross
ignorance of the law in issuing an Amended Alias Writ of Execution against M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and its
incorporators, the herein complainants, who are not parties to the case. The Court held that the labor
arbiter had legal basis to pierce the corporate veil to serve the ends of justice but he was reprimanded for
not complying with the lawful orders of the IBP and the Court.
VI. Suspension, disbarment and discipline of lawyers (Rule 139-B, Rule of Court)

Q. What is the nature and characteristics of disciplinary actions against lawyers?


A. Disbarment or disciplinary actions against lawyers are sui generis. It is c class of its own and does not
need proof beyond reasonable doubt. A disbarment proceeding is imprescriptible; all proceedings are
strictly confidential; may proceed despite withdrawal of the complaint.
Bengco v. Bernardo, 672 SCRA 352 (2012): S.C. said that administrative cases against lawyers do not
prescribe. Despite the considerable lapse of time between the commission of the infraction and the time of
filing, there is need to determine the administrative liability of lawyers.
Catalan, Jr. v. Silvosa, 677 SCRA 352(2012): A lawyer cannot escape “the disciplining arm of the Court”
despite any delay in the filing of an administrative case against a lawyer.

IBP Board of
Governors

Rules on Disbarment (Rule 139-B)


Initiation of a Complaint
By the Supreme Court motu proprio
By the IBP Board of Governors motu proprio
Upon referral by the S.C.
Upon referral by the IBP Chapter Board
Upon verified complaint by any person

Board of Governors
Chairman, CBD

REPORT
Commission
May uphold the findings
May reverse the findings
May amend the findings

No motion for Reconsideration before the Commissioner.


Every
Motion for Reconsideration before the decision
Board must be based
of Governor on
is allowed.
facts, reasons, in writing
Decision of IBP Board of Governors is reviewed by the Supreme Court.
Q. Describe the proceedings before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
A. Proceedings before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
The complaint is referred to the Investigating Commissioner.
The Investigating Commissioner presides over the disbarment proceedings allowing complainant
to prove his allegations and for the lawyer to establish his defense.
After evaluation, the Investigating Commissioner submits his findings and recommendation to the
Chairman of the Commission on Bar Discipline (“CBD”).
No Motion for Reconsideration is allowed before the Investigating Commissioner
The Chairman of the CBD submits the report of the Investigating Commissioner to the Board of
Governors.

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In a meeting called for the purpose, the Board of Governors evaluates the report and renders its
own resolution.
Motion for Reconsideration before the Board of Governors is allowed.
The decision of the Board of Governors (reviewed by SC) must be in writing supported by facts
and evidence presented during the hearing and the applicable provision of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Q. Who may initiate disbarment proceedings?


A. NESTOR FIGUERAS AND BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR. v. ATTY. DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ,
A.C. No. 9116, March 12, 2014.The S.C. held that the complainants have personality to file the disbarment
case. In Heck v. Judge Santos, the Court held that “[a]ny interested person or the court motu proprio may
initiate disciplinary proceedings.” The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients
nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment
proceedings being sui generis, the procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only
the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit will not apply.

Q. Can a disbarment case be dismissed upon motion of the complainant?


A. No. SPOUSES ROGELIO AMATORIO AND AIDA AMATORIO v. ATTY. FRANCISCO DY YAP
AND ATTY. WHELMA F. SITON-YAP, A.C. No. 5914, March 11, 2015, Reyes, J.:
The Court said that it cannot simply yield to complainants’ change of heart by refuting their own
statements against the respondents and praying that the complaint for disbarment they filed be dismissed. It
bears emphasizing that any misconduct on the part of the lawyer not only hurts the client’s cause but is
even more disparaging on the integrity of the legal profession itself. Thus, for tarnishing the reputation of
the profession, a lawyer may still be disciplined notwithstanding the complainant’s pardon or withdrawal
from the case for as long as there is evidence to support any finding of culpability. A case for suspension or
disbarment may proceed “regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainants, if the facts proven
so warrant.” It follows that the withdrawal of the complainant from the case, or even the filing of an
affidavit of desistance, does not conclude the administrative case against an erring lawyer.

Q. Can a lawyer move for dismissal of the disbarment case against him based on prejudicial question?
A. No. A disbarment proceeding being sui generis can proceed independently of any criminal action
instituted against the lawyer.
ANTONINA S. SOSA v. ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZA, A.C. No. 8776, March 22, 2015, Brion, J. This is
a complaint for the disbarment/suspension of Atty. Manuel V. Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza) filed on October 22,
2010 by Antonina S. Sosa (Ms. Sosa), for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
arising from non-payment of debt.
A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no
redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. For
violation of Rule 1.01, the lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for one year.

Q. Can a lawyer set up the defense of double jeopardy in a disbarment case against him?
A. No. The defense of double jeopardy cannot be invoked in a disbarment proceeding.
Garrido v. Garrido, 611 SCRA 508 (21010): S.C. reiterated the rule that “laws dealing with double
jeopardy or with procedure . . . do not apply in the determination of lawyer’s qualifications or fitness for
membership in the Bar. . .” The S.C. said first, that for admission a candidate must meet all the
requirements because the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and involves
service to the public; and second, admission qualifications are also required for the continued enjoyment of
the privilege to practice and lack of qualifications is a matter of public concern and S.C. may inquire into
them.

Q. Can a lawyer move for dismissal of a disciplinary case against him on the ground that the
complainants are not the injured party to the case?
A. No because the practice of law is imbued with public interest and institution of complaints against
lawyers is not predicated on a lawyer-client relationship.
Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr. v. Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez, A.C. No. 9116, March 12,
2014.The S.C. held that the complainants have personality to file the disbarment case. In Heck v. Judge
Santos, the Court held that “[a]ny interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary
proceedings.” The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it necessary
that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings being
sui generis, the procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-
interest must initiate the suit will not apply.

Q. What is the effect of conviction upon the practice of law of a lawyer?


A. Catalan, Jr. v. Silvosa, 677 SCRA 352 (2012): A lawyer convicted of direct bribery can be a subject of
disbarment proceedings. Direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. The defense that his

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conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer but as a public officer betrays the unmistakable lack of
integrity in his character.
In Re: Atty. Rodolfo D.Pactolin, 670 SCRA 366(2112): The conviction of Atty. Pactolin before the
Sandiganbayan for the crime of Falsification of Public Document is contrary to justice, honesty and good
morals. This is a crime involving moral turpitude. Even if the IBP recommended dismissal of the case, S.C.
disbarred him because “disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime
involving moral turpitude.”

Q. Can a judge who has been dismissed from the judiciary still be a subject of a disbarment proceeding?
A. Yes. OCA v. Liangco, 662 SCRA 103 (2011): The dismissal of a judge from service will not preclude
the filing of a disbarment case against him before the IBP. The disbarment was based on the same grounds
for his dismissal: gross misconduct and inexcusable ignorance. He failed to make a distinction between a
Resolution and an Ordinance and that as judge, he cannot render an Opinion but rather he must receive
evidence and make a decision after termination of trial. It will be the IBP who will investigate a judge who
has retired from the judiciary and not the Supreme Court.

Q. What is the proof required to establish the culpability of a lawyer in a disbarment proceeding?
APO1 JOSE B. CASPE v. ATTY. AQUILINO A. MEJICA, A.C. No. 10679, March 10, 2015, Villarama,
J.: In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only clear preponderance of evidence is
required to establish liability. As long as the evidence presented by complainant or that taken judicial
notice of by the Court is more convincing and worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto, the imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified.

Q. Does the lawyer have the burden of proof in a disbarment case?


A. No. Joven and Reynaldo C. Rasing v. Atty. Pablo R. Cruz and Frankie O. Magsalin III, A.C. No.
7686, July 31, 2013. The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the
shoulders of the complainant. The Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant
establishes the complaint by clearly preponderant evidence that warrants the imposition of the harsh
penalty.
Atty. Alan F. Paguia v. Atty. Manuel T. Molina, A.C. No. 9881, June 4, 2014.The S.C. said in when it
comes to administrative cases against lawyers, two things are to be considered: quantum of proof, which
requires clearly preponderant evidence; and burden of proof, which is on the complainant. Here, the
complaint was without factual basis. Even if Atty. Molina did provide his clients legal advice, he still
cannot be held administratively liable without any showing that his act was attended with bad faith or
malice. The default rule is presumption of good faith.
Q. What is the effect of the withdrawal of a disbarment case?
A. Adelia V. Quiachon v. Atty. Joseph Ador A. Ramos, A.C. No. 9317, June 4, 2014. The S.C. held that the
withdrawal of a disbarment case against a lawyer does not terminate or abate the jurisdiction of the IBP
and of the Court to continue an administrative proceeding against a lawyer-respondent as a member of the
Philippine Bar. The complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the case, but a witness who
brought the matter to the attention of the Court.
Q. What are the grounds for suspension (Disbarment)?
A. Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court provides the following grounds: deceit or any gross misconduct,
grossly immoral conduct, conviction of crime involving moral turpitude, violation of lawyer’s Oath, willful
disobedience of any lawful order, or corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party in a case
without authority, malpractice which includes practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers..
Rose Bunagan-Bansig v. Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera, A.C. No. 5581, January 14, 2014. The Court
ordered Celera disbarred for contracting a second marriage when his first marriage with Complainant was
still subsisting. The Supreme Court held that for purposes of the disbarment proceeding, the Marriage
Certificates bearing the name of Atty. Celera are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he
committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar. Atty. Celera exhibited a
deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. He made a mockery of
marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage
while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Edgardo Areola v. Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza, A.C. No. 10135, January 15, 2014. This case involves a
PAO who advised her clients – “Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot
ang puso noon.”Thus, a complaint was lodged against her for violation of the attorney’s oath, deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
S. C. held that Atty. Mendoza made irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule
15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that “a lawyer shall not
counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.” Rule
15.07 states that “a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of
fairness.” However, while her remark was inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment was not
disparaging and reproachful so as to cause dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary. Thus, she was only
reprimanded and sternly warned.

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DR. DOMICIANO F. VILLAHERMOSA, SR. v. ATTY. ISIDRO L.CARACOL, A.C. No. 7325, January
21, 2015, VILLARAMA, JR., J.: The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a
presumption of a lawyer’s appearance on behalf of his client, hence: “SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to
appear. – An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears,
and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the
presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require
any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he
appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and
may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorney willfully appearing in court for a person
without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the
court who has misbehaved in his official transactions.”
An attorney-client relationship terminates upon death of either client or the lawyer. Thus, a lawyer must
be more circumspect in his demeanor and attitude towards the public in general as agents of the judicial
system.
TERESITA B. ENRIQUEZ, v. ATTY. TRINA DE VERA, A.C. No. 8330, March 16, 2015, Leonen, J. An
administrative complaint for disbarment or suspension was filed by complainant Teresita B. Enriquez
against Atty. Trina De Vera. The Court found Atty. Trina De Vera committed serious misconduct and
should be held administratively liable for the issuance and dishonor of several post-dated checks. She was
suspended from the practice of law for one year

Q. What are the guidelines in lifting of the order of suspension of the lawyer?
A. MANIEGO v. DE DIOS, 617 SCRA 142 (2010). The Court held that after the period of suspension, the
resumption to practice is not automatic. The Court issued the following guidelines:
1. After a finding that the respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court shall
render a decision rendering the penalty.
2. Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt thereof,
respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion
shall render the decision final and executory.
3. Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the Court,
through the Office of the Bar Confidant that he or she has desisted from the practice of law and has not
appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension;
4. Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the local chapter of the IBP and to the Executive
Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and where he or she has
appeared as counsel;
5. The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent’s compliance with the order of
suspension; and
6. Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the respondent under oath shall be a ground
for imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.
To summarize:
(i) File a Sworn Statement with the Office of the Bar confidant that the respondent lawyer has served the
period of suspension stating that he/she desisted from the practice of law and never appeared in any court
during the period of suspension.
(ii) Copies of the Sworn Statement must be furnished the chapter of which the respondent lawyer is a
member and the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Courts and first level courts where respondent
lawyer has pending cases.
(iii) If satisfied, the Court will lift the order of suspension and reinstate the erring lawyer

Q. What is the effect of an adverse disciplinary action instituted abroad against a Filipino lawyer?
A. A decision in a disciplinary action against a Filipino lawyer practicing abroad may also be a basis for a
disbarment proceeding against the same lawyer in the Philippines.
Velez v. De Vera, 496 SCRA 345 (2006): A finding of fact by the California State Bar can be a basis of an
administrative complaint against a Filipino lawyer before the IBP.

Q. Can the penalty of a lawyer be mitigated by virtue of relationship?


A. Yes. ALVIN S. FELICIANO v. ATTY. CARMELITA BAUTISTA-LOZADA, A.C. No. 7593, March
11, 2015. On December 13, 2005, the Court en banc promulgated a Resolution in A.C. No. 6656 entitled
“Bobie Rose V. Frias vs. Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada”3 suspending Atty. Lozada for two years for
violation of Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
During her period of suspension she represented her husband where complainant Feliciano was a party.
The Supreme Court said it recognizes the fact that it is part of the Filipino culture that amid an adversity,
families will always look out and extend a helping hand to a family member, more so, in this case, to a
spouse. Thus, considering that Atty. Lozada's actuation was prompted by her affection to her husband and
that in essence, she was not representing a client but rather a spouse, we deem it proper to mitigate the
severeness of her penalty.

Reinstatement after Disbarment


Readmission to the Bar and Resumption to Practice Law

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Q. Can a bar passer convicted of a homicide still be admitted to the practice of law?
A. Yes. IN RE: OATH TAKING OF ARGOSINO, B.M. 712, July 13, 1995 and En Banc Resolution dated
March 19, 1997. A lawyer who was involved in the fatal death of a neophyte in the initiation rites of his
fraternity was finally allowed to take his oath after he showed several proofs of testimonial of good
character.

Q. Can a disbarred lawyer be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys?


A. Yes. RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS (ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN), 586 SCRA 372 A lawyer
who leaked the bar questions in Mercantile Law prepared by a founding partner in his law firm was
reinstated upon proof of good moral character during his period of suspension.

MACARUBBO v. MACARUBBO, A.M. 6148, January 22, 2013. Macarubbo was disbarred for
contracting three marriages. While the disbarment case was pending, Macarrubo resorted to filing
separate civil actions to annul two of said marriages. Eight years after his disbarment, he filed a Petition
for Extraordinary Mercy for reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys. In granting his Petition, the Court
considered the following guidelines set forth in Re: Letter of Augustus C. Diaz, MTC Branch 37,
Appealing for Clemency (533 SCRA 534, 2010):
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the IBP, judges or judges’ associations and
prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an
administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-
reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of penalty to ensure a period of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he has still productive years ahead of him that
can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other
relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency
The Court concluded with a reminder that to enjoy continued member in the legal profession, one must
be a person of good moral character.

Resumption to Practice of a Balikbayan Lawyer


Requisites - Updating and full payment of all IBP membership dues; Payment of Professional Tax;
Completion of MCLE credit units; and Retaking of the Lawyer’s Oath

Q. Can a former Filipino resume his practice of law in the Philippines?


A. Yes. IN RE: PETITION TO RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE
PHILIPPINES (EPIFANIO B. MUNESES), 677 SCRA 364 (2012). The S.C. said that a Filipino lawyer
who has been naturalized in another country does not automatically enjoy the right to resume his practice
of law when returns to the Philippines. It held that under the Rules of Admission to the Philippine bar, one
must be a Filipino citizen. Thus, when he assumed another citizenship, he ipso facto lost his Filipino
citizenship. The returning Filipino lawyer must repatriate himself under the provisions of R.A. 9225. Said
law says that “all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of (R.A. 9225).”
R.A. 9225 provides that if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he
reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions’ (he shall apply with the proper authority for
a license or permit to engage in such practice.”
Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law of Benjamin M. Dacanay, 540 SCRA 424: To reacquire,
the authority to resume his practice of law, the repatriated Filipino must:
1. Update and pay in full his annual membership dues in the IBP;
2. Pay his professional tax;
3. Complete his 36 credit hours of MCLE to refresh him of his knowledge of Philippine laws, rules of
practice, recent jurisprudence and update him of recent legal developments (MCLE will be from the time
he was absent in the Philippines up to the time he resumes his practice);and
4. Retake his oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an
officer of the Court, but also to renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

VII. Duties and Responsibilities of a Lawyer


A. Duty to Society
1. Respect for law and legal processes
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal processes. (Rules 1.01-1.04)

Q. What does respect for rule of law include?


A. The lawyer must at all times in the protection of the rights of client ensure compliance with the law
governing the issues of the pending case. FERNANDO W. CHU v. ATTY. JOSE C. GUICO, JR., A.C.
No. 10573, January 13, 2015, PER CURIAM: Fernando W. Chu invokes the Court’s disciplinary

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authority in resolving this disbarment complaint against his former lawyer, respondent Atty. Jose C. Guico,
Jr., whom he has accused of gross misconduct. Atty. Guico was disbarred for having had violated Rules
1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding and receiving
P580,000.00 from Chu which constituted an act of extortion and misrepresentation that caused dishonor to
and contempt for the legal profession.

Q. What are the standards of morality required of a lawyer?


A. MELVYN G. GARCIA v. ATTY. RAUL H. SESBREÑO, A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457,
February 03, 2015, PER CURIAM: Two complaints for disbarment were filed by Dr. Melvyn G. Garcia
(Garcia) against Atty. Raul H. Sesbreño. The two cases, docketed as A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457,
were consolidated in the Court’s Resolution dated 30 September 2014. The IBP-CBD consolidated A.C.
No. 7973 with CBD Case No. 08-2273. The parties agreed on the sole issue to be resolved: whether moral
turpitude is involved in a conviction for homicide. The Court held in the affirmative and ordered Sesbreno
disbarred.

DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ v. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO, A.C. No.
5816, March 10, 2015, PER CURIAM. Complainant charged the two lawyers with gross immoral conduct.
Atty. Catindig was disbarred for contracting a second marriage with the complainant while his first
marriage was still subsisting. The charge against Atty. Baydo was dismissed for lack of evidence.

Tiong v. Florendo, 662 SCR A 1 (2011): The S.C. held that a lawyer’s “act of having an affair with his
client’s wife manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of
fidelity.” His illicit relationship with the wife of his client showed that he violated Canon 17 of the CPR for
abuse of the trust and confidence reposed in him. An Affidavit of Desistance or any other sworn statement
with the same effect will not excuse the lawyer because any disciplinary proceeding is clothed with public
interest.

Garrido v. Garrido, 611 SCRA 508 (2010): A charge of immorality was brought before the lawyer for
having contracted three marriages. He left his first wife to pursue his study of law. He contracted his
second marriage upon misrepresentation that he is single. He engaged in an extra marital affair with a
lawyer whom he eventually married in Hongkong while his second marriage was subsisting. Such conduct
betrayed his moral depravity for which he was disbarred. The lady lawyer was eventually disbarred for
knowing that Garrido had other two subsisting marriages when she had her romantic relationship with him
even before she became a lawyer.

Q. What constitutes deceitful conduct on the part of the lawyer?


A. Brennisen v. Contawi, 670 SCRA 358(2012): The S.C. disbarred a lawyer who acted “with deceit
when, through the use of a falsified document, he effected the unauthorized mortgage and sale of his
client’s property for his personal benefit.
Bueno v. Raneses, 687 SCRA 711(2012): The S.C. disbarred a lawyer who practically asked the client to
sell everything for the sake of winning the case, only to end up not really doing anything. By asking money
from his client for a purportedly bribery to the judge to win a case, the lawyer tarnished the image of the
judiciary and put a black mark in the legal profession as well.
Natividad P. Navarro and Hilda S. Presbitero v. Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr., A.C. No. 9872, January 28,
2014.The Court held that Atty. Solidum, Jr. violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyer’s professional duties. The test
is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor,
or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. Atty. Solidum, Jr. was held guilty
of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional capacity with respect to his client.
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty
to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client. Atty. Solidum, Jr. failed to
fulfill this duty.

2. Efficient and convenient legal services


CANON 2 - A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and convenient manner
compatible with the independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession. (Rules 2.01-2.04

Q. When is a lawyer guilty of encroaching on another lawyer’s practice?


A. Lisangan v. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672, September 4, 2009: A lawyer who allowed his
paralegal/secretary to solicit the clients of a fellow lawyer with a promise of financial assistance was
suspended by the S.C. and reminded lawyers that their calling cards must only contain their name, fields of
practice, contact details and nothing more. The prohibition applies to the non-legal staff in order to curb
any abuse of the privilege of the law.

3. True, honest, fair, dignified and objective information on legal services


CANON 3 – A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only the true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts. (Rules 3.01-3.04)

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4. Participation in the improvement and reforms in the legal system
CANON 4 – A lawyer shall participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting
efforts in law reforms and in the improvement of the administration of justice.
A lawyer is encouraged to participate in the formulation of amendments in the Rules of Court to improve
the administration of justice.
A lawyer may attend congressional hearings involving changes in substantive laws; creation of new courts;
and redefining jurisdiction of trial and appellate courts.

5. Participation in legal education program and other related activities


CANON 5 – A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education
programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law
students and assist in disseminating the law and jurisprudence.
A lawyer is expected to comply with the requirements of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education and to
participate in the activities of the IBP and other legal professional organizations.
Purpose: MCLE, what it is; who enforces the MCLE

Q. What is the composition of constitution of the MCLE Board?


A. The MCLE Board is composed of a retired justice of the Supreme Court is the Chairman, with the
following as members: an incumbent dean of a recognized law school, a representative from a designated
law center, the Chancellor of the Philippine Judicial Academy and the President of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

Q. What are the requirements to complete the MCLE?


A. Coverage of the MCLE 36-unit requirement ( corresponding units: 6 for Legal Ethics; 6 for prescribed
courses as approved by the MCLE Board, 4 for trail and pre-trial techniques, 4 for legal writing and oral
advocacy, 5 for alternative dispute resolution, 2 for international law and conventions and 9 for updates on
substantive and procedural laws)

Q. What is the period of compliance for one’s MCLE?


A. A lawyer has 3-year completion period.

Q. Who are exempted from the MCLE requirement?


A. President, Vice President, Members of the Senate and House of Representatives, Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, Governors, Mayors, incumbent and retired members of the judiciary, Cabinet
Secretaries and their undersecretaries, OSG lawyers, OGCC lawyers, Ombudsman and all Deputies of the
Ombudsman, Professor and Reviewers of law for a period of ten years.

Q. What are the penalties for non-compliance?


A. Imposition of fines, pleadings may be expunge from records of the court, lawyer be can a subject of
suspension or disbarment.

B. Duty to the Legal Profession


1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Rule 139-A): A lawyer cannot be a full-fledged member of the
bar, he has not signed the Roll of Attorneys after taking his Oath as a lawyer.

Q. When does one become a full-fledged attorney?


A. In re: Petition of Atty. Medado to sign Roll of Attorneys, B.M. No. 2540, September 24,
2013: Petitioner Medado passed the bar examinations in 1979. He took the Attorney’s Oath thereafter, and
was scheduled to sign the Roll of Attorneys, but failed to do so. It was only in 2005 that he realized that he
did not sign the Roll after being asked his Roll number when he attended his MCLE. Thirty (30) years
after passing the bar, Medado filed a Petition to allow him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys. The Supreme
Court held that while an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal
consequences of his acts as it negates malice or evil motive, a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful
justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences. Knowingly engaging in
unauthorized practice of law transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Such Canon
also applies to law students and bar candidates. Medado was imposed a penalty akin to suspension by
allowing him to sign one (1) year after receipt of the Court’s Resolution.

Q. What is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines?


A. Purposes of the IBP: To elevate the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
Elective Officers: President, Executive Vice President and concurrently a Governor of a Region (chosen by
the Board of Governors who will succeed the national President), Board of Governors from: Northern
Luzon, Central Luzon, Greater Manila, Southern Luzon, Bicolandia, Eastern Visayas, Western Visayas,
Eastern Mindanao and Western Mindanao.

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Other officers: The IBP shall have a Secretary, Treasurer and such other officers as well as employees the
President may appoint with the consent of the Board of Governors under such terms and conditions
specified in the appointment of each officer and/or employee.
Membership and Dues: Non-payment of dues may subject the lawyer to disciplinary action including
removal of the name of the delinquent lawyer from the Roll of Attorneys. (Sec. 9, Rule 139-A)LIFETIME
DUE: P12, 500 and ANNUAL DUE: P1, 000
In the Matter of Brewing Controversies in the IBP Elections (A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC, A.C. No. 8292, April
2013): Lawyers seeking positions in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines must respect the rotational rule.
The rotational rule is adopted to allow equal opportunity for all lawyers in different regions to have access
to positions of leadership in the IBP. The S.C. also reminded IBP officers that they should not use the Court
as “referee” for their intramurals.

NOTE: THIS HAS NEVER BEEN A SUBJECT OF A BAR QUESTION


Republic Act No. 9999: FREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE ACT OF 2010
Legal services- any activity which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training
and experiences which shall include, among others, legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of
instruments and contracts, including appearance before the administrative and quasi-judicial offices, bodies
and tribunals handling cases in court, and other similar services as may be defined by the Supreme Court.
Section 4. Requirements for Availment. - For purposes of availing of the benefits and services as envisioned
in this Act, a lawyer or professional partnership shall secure a certification from the Public Attorney's
Office (PAO), the Department of Justice (DOJ) or accredited association of the Supreme Court indicating
that the said legal services to be provided are within the services defined by the Supreme Court, and that
the agencies cannot provide the legal services to be provided by the private counsel.
For purpose of determining the number of hours actually provided by the lawyer and/or professional firm in
the provision of legal services, the association and/or organization duly accredited by the Supreme Court
shall issue the necessary certification that said legal services were actually undertaken.
Section 5. Incentives to Lawyers. - For purposes of this Act, a lawyer or professional partnerships rendering
actual free legal services, as defined by the Supreme Court, shall be entitled to an allowable deduction from
the gross income, the amount that could have been collected for the actual free legal services rendered or
up to ten percent (10%) of the gross income derived from the actual performance of the legal profession,
whichever is lower: Provided, That the actual free legal services herein contemplated shall be exclusive of
the minimum sixty (60)-hour mandatory legal aid services rendered to indigent litigants as required under
the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Services for Practicing Lawyers, under Bar Matter No. 2012, issued by
the Supreme Court

2. THE LAWYER AS A NOTARY PUBLIC (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, effective August 1, 2004, as
amended)

Q. What are the purposes of the Notarial Rules?


A. Promote, serve and protect public interest; to simplify, clarify and modernize the rules governing
notaries public; and to foster ethical conduct among notaries public.
Please take note the relevant provisions of the 2004 Notarial Rules: (Take particular attention of the
date when a document was notarized. A document notarized before the effectivity of the 2004
Notarial Rules will be governed by the relevant provisions of the Revised Administrative Code where
the “cedula” will suffice as proof of identity.)
HEIRS OF PEDRO ALILANO REPRESENTED BY DAVID ALILANO v. ATTY. ROBERTO E.
EXAMEN, A.C. No. 10132, March 24, 2015. The complainants charged Atty. Examen of notarizing Deeds
of Sale where his brother was the vendee. In his defense, Atty. Examen said that at the time of the execution
of the subject Deeds of Sale the Notarial Rules of 2004 were not yet in effect. Under the Revised
Administrative Code which governed the notarial practice there was no prohibition on notarizing
documents of relatives up to the fourth civil degree of consanguinity and affinity. The Court, however, held
Atty. Examen liable for not ascertaining the details of the “cedulas” of the affiants. He relied on the entries
made by his secretary. The Court suspended Atty. Roberto E. Examen from the practice of law for TWO (2)
YEARS. In addition, his present notarial commission, if any, was likewise REVOKED, and he is
DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public for a period of two (2) years from finality of this
decision.

(1). Commissioning of a Notary Public


WILBERTO C. TALISIC v. ATTY. PRIMO R. RINEN, A.C. No. 8761, February 12, 2014: A lawyer’s
notarial commission was revoked and he was not allowed to renew the same for one year for failure to
ascertain the identities of the parties who executed an Extra Judicial Partition with Sale which allowed the
transfer to Spouses Durante of a parcel of land. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It
is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as
notaries public.
(2). Qualifications (Section 1, Rule III)

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(3). Manner of Obtaining a Commission (Sections 2, 3, 4, 5,6,7,8, 9 and 10 Rule III); and Renewal of
Commission (Sections 13 and 14, Rule III)
(4). Powers and Limitations
Powers (Section 1, Rule IV; Sections 1-4, Rule VII)
Prohibitions (Section 2, Rule IV; Section 1, Rule XII)
Disqualifications (Section 4, Rule IV)
(5). Instances when a Notary Public may refuse to notarize, issue certification (Sections 4, 5 & 6, Rule
IV)
(6). Jurisdiction and Period of Validity of Commission (Section 11, Rule III; Section9, Rule IX)
RE: VIOLATION OF RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE A.M. No. 09-6-1-SC,
January 21, 2015, MENDOZA, J.: A review of the records and evidence presented by complainants
shows that Atty. Siapno indeed maintained a law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan, just beside the law office
of one of the complainants, Atty. Elizabeth Tugade. It was also proven that Atty. Siapno notarized several
instruments with an expired notarial commission outside the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning
court. Section 11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides:
“Jurisdiction and Term – A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the
first day of January of the year in which the commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or the notary
public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court.”
(7). Reportorial Requirement (Section 12, Rule III; Sections 1-6, Rule VI; and Sections 1-2, Rule
VIII)
CRESCENCIANO M. PITOGO v. ATTY. JOSELITO TROY SUELLO, A.C. No. 10695, March 18,
2015, Leonen, J: For not faithfully reflecting the notarial deeds in his registration book, Atty. Joselito
Troy Suello was found GUILTY of violating Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Accordingly, he was SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) months; his notarial commission was immediately revoked; and was
DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary public for one (1) year
(8). Disciplinary Sanctions/Death of a Notary Public
Revocation of commission ((Section 1, Rule XI)
Suspension from practice as a lawyer
Death of a Notary Public (Section 4, Rule XI)

Q. Can a notary public dissolve marriage?


A. No. Espinosa v. Atty. Julieta A.Omana, A.C. No. 9081, October 12, 2011: The S.C. revoked the
notarial commission of a lawyer and she was likewise suspended from the practice of law for notarizing a
document which effectively dissolved the marriage of the complainants.

Q. Is a lawyer required to recall the identity of the affiants after a lapse of five years?
A. No. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Arguelles, 679 SCRA 348 (2012): The S.C. held that it is
sufficient for the Notary Public to ascertain the identities of the affiants and the witnesses at the time of the
execution of the document. The Notary Public must rely on the presumption that the proofs of identity of the
parties were issued by the public agencies in the regular course of the discharge of their responsibilities. It
is also not practical for a notary public to recall the affiants 12 years after they personally appeared before
him.

Q. Can a lawyer continue to notarize documents with an expired commission?


A. No. Tenoso v. Echanez, A.C. No. 8384, 11 April 2013: By performing his duties without renewing his
notarial commission, the S.C. said that he committed acts of falsehood and must be punished.

Q. Can a lawyer notarize the statement executed by his sister-in-law?


A. No. Jandoquile v. Revilla, A.C. No.9514, 10 April 2013: The Notarial Rules of 2004 disqualifies
lawyers from notarizing documents of relatives up to the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.
The defense of Atty. Revilla that he notarized the Affidavit-Complaint of his relative by his virtue of the fact
that he was the counsel in the criminal case is not availing according to the Court. The S.C. held that since
he signed it with the details of his notarial commission leads to no other conclusion that he signed it as a
Notary Public and not as counsel. The S.C. reiterated the rule that where the affiants are personally known
to the Notary Public, the jurat must state so, otherwise, parties must show proof of competent identity.

Q. Can VIOLATION of one’s notarial commission be included in the conduct of the disbarment of the
lawyer although the same was not raised in the complaint?
A. Yes. Virtusio v. Virtusio, 680 SCRA 1(2012): The IBP Investigating Commissioner discovered in the
course of the disciplinary proceeding against Virtusio that she failed to renew her notarial commission in
2006 and 2007. While it was not a subject of the complaint, the S.C. held that the infraction can be
scrutinized in the investigation. The S.C. revoked the notarial commission of the lawyer, did not allow her
to renew the same and suspended her from the practice of law for deliberate falsehood for holding out to
the public that she has been properly commissioned to notarized documents.

Q. What is the culpability of a lawyer for failure to ascertain the identity of an affiant?

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A. Wilberto C. Talisic v. Atty. Primo R. Rinen, A.C. No. 8761, February 12, 2014: A lawyer’s notarial
commission was revoked and he was not allowed to renew the same for one year for failure to ascertain the
identities of the parties who executed an Extra Judicial Partition with Sale which allowed the transfer to
Spouses Durante of a parcel of land. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested
with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public.

Carlito Ang v. Atty. James Joseph Gupana, A.C. No. 4545. February 5, 2014: The Supreme Court held
that Atty. Gupana’s revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a
notary public for a period of two years and suspension from the practice of law for one year are in order
for failure to require the personal presence of the affiant in an Affidavit of Loss purportedly executed in
1994.

Licerio Dizon v. Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr., A.C. No. 10185, March 12, 2014 . The S.C. held that as a
notary public, Atty. Cabucana, Jr. should not notarize a document unless the person who signs it is the
same person executing it and personally appearing before him to attest to the truth of its contents. This is to
enable him to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the
document is the party’s free and voluntary act and deed. Thus, Atty. Cabucana, Jr. was found violating
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and suspended from the practice of law for
three months. His notarial commission was revoked and he was prohibited from being commissioned as a
notary public for two years.

Q. What is the liability of a lawyer for notarizing a document when the affiant is already dead?
A. Atty.Florita S. Linco v. Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebral, A.C. No. 7241, October 17, 2011: A notary public
who notarized a Deed of Donation of another lawyer one day after his death to the detriment of the
interests of the surviving lawyer-spouse, was suspended by the S.C.

Important matters to consider:


Jurat (Section 6, Rule II) and Acknowledgment (Section1, Rule II), distinguished
Competent Evidence of Identity (Section 12, Rule 2)
JIMMY ANUDON AND JUANITA ANUDON v. ATTY. ARTURO B. CEFRA, A.C. No. 5482. February
10, 2015, Leonen, J. Without the ascertaining the personal presence of the affiants, the Court imposed
upon the errant lawyer the perpetual disqualification for notarial commission, revocation of notarial
commission and suspension from the practice of law. The lawyer was found to have notarized a Deed of
Sale of a property while the complainants were abroad.

Q. Can a notary public delegate his duties as a notary public?


A. No. MELANIO S. SALITA, v. ATTY. REYNALDO T. SALVE. A.C. No. 8101, February 04, 2015,
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed
the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the
contents and the truth of what are stated therein. These acts of the affiants cannot be delegated because
what are stated therein are facts they have personal knowledge of and are personally sworn to. Otherwise,
their representative’s names should appear in the said documents as the ones who executed the same. As a
lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, Atty. Salve is mandated to discharge his sacred duties with
faithful observance and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat.

Affirmation or Oath (Section 2, Rule II) and Signature Witnessing (Section 14, Rule II),
distinguished

3. Upholding the dignity of the legal profession


CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support
the activities of the integrated bar. (Rules 7.01-7.03)

Q. What is the liability of a lawyer for failure to uphold the dignity of the legal profession?
A. The lawyer may be disbarred by the Supreme Court which he tarnishes the image of the legal profession
which tends to erode public trust in the administration of justice.
Keld Stemmerik v. Atty. Leonuel N. Mas, A.C. 8010, June 16, 2009: A lawyer was disbarred by taking
advantage of the lack of knowledge of Philippine laws by a foreigner. Atty. Mas drew up a Deed of Sale of
a property in Subic which is part of public domain and therefore outside the commerce of man.
OCA v. Liangco, supra: S.C. said: “We are appalled by the respondent’s ignorance of the basic rules of
procedure. His wanton use of court processes in this case without regard for the repercussions on the
rights and property of others clearly shows his unfitness to remain a member of the bar.”
In Re: Pactolin, supra: The S.C. ruled: “As a rule, this Court exercises the power to disbar with caution. x
x yet this Court has also consistently pronounced that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction
by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. x xx His conduct only exacerbates his offense and
shows that he falls short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.”

4. Courtesy, fairness and candor towards professional colleagues

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CANON 8 – A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. (Rules 8.01-8.02)

Q. Can a lawyer share his professional fees with a non-lawyer?


A. No. As a general rule a lawyer is not allowed to his professional fees with a non-lawyer.
Villatuya v. Tabalingcos, 676 SCRA 37(2012): This disbarment case is hinged on the complainant’s
demand from respondent lawyer to settle money obligations out of their business transactions. The first
ground he raised involves non-payment of agreed fees for every Stay Order obtained from the court and
10% commission from every referral; the second is that the lawyer set up two financial companies as fronts
to solicit legal services and committing two counts of bigamy for having married two other women while
his first marriage was still subsisting.
On the first issue, the Court said that there is violation where a lawyer shares his fees with a non-lawyer.
In this case, complainant failed to proffer evidence. On the issue of solicitation, the Court held that it
would appear that there was an attempt to circumvent the prohibition on advertising one’s services,
reprimand is the proper penalty because there is no evidence on the prevalence to use the two financial
companies to solicit. The Court reminded lawyer to be clear as to what services they are rendering if they
have multiple professions. On the issue of gross immorality, the belated move of the lawyer to institute civil
actions to annul his marriages will not exculpate him. The Court held: “ x x x respondent exhibited a
deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him x x x. He made a mockery of marriage, x x x. His
acts of committing bigamy twice constituted gross immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of court.”

5. No assistance in the unauthorized practice of law


CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law. (Rules
9.01-9.02)

Q. What constitutes unauthorized practice of law?


A. Tapay et al v. Attys. Charlie L. Bancolo et al, A. C. No. 9604, March 20, 2013: A lawyer who allowed
his secretary to sign his pleading in the Office of the Ombudsman is guilty of violation of Canon 9.Only
lawyers are allowed to sign pleadings and the same cannot be delegated.
Atty. Edita Noe – Lacsamana v. Atty. Yolando F. Bustamente (A.C. No. 7269, November
23, 2011: A lawyer who allowed a paralegal to attend court hearings on his behalf has violated Canon 9
because only lawyers are allowed to undertake representation clients before the regional trial courts.
TUMBOKON v. PEFIANCO, 678 SCRA 60 (2012): This case also deals with the lawyer’s commitment to
share a portion of his legal fees with a non-lawyer in a case for partition of estate which complainant
referred to Pefianco. The lawyer was found guilty of this violation by his admission in a letter he wrote to
the parties in the partition case. On the second charge of abandoning his legal wife to cohabit with his
mistress with whom he has four children, the Court that it was a clear “betrayal of the marital vow of
fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage” and is “considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws.”

C. Duty to the Courts


1. Candor, fairness and good faith towards the courts
CANON 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. (Rules 10.01-10.02)
Read also Rule 138, Section 20(c) and (d), Rules of Court, Duties of Attorneys
Q. Can a Senator be exonerated from any liability for calling the Supreme Court as a “court of idiots”?
A. Antero J. Pobre v. Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009. S.C. exonerated
the respondent for calling the S.C. justices as a “court of idiots”. She invoked parliamentary immunity.
Q. Is a lawyer liable for resorting to a fraudulent order of the court to gain custody of his minor
children?
A. Yes. Natasha Hueysuwan-Florido v. Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, A.C. No. 5624, Jan.20, 2004).
S.C. suspended lawyer for resorting to a fraudulent order purportedly issued by the Court of Appeals
awarding custody of his children pending the annulment case filed by his complainant-wife.

2. Respect for courts and judicial officers


CANON 11 – A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers
and should insist on similar conduct by others (Rules 11.01-11.05)
Q. Are professors of law considered engaged in the practice of profession and are therefore subject to
disciplinary action of the Supreme Court? De Castro, J.
A. Yes. Re: Letter of the U.P. Law Faculty on Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation of the
S.C., A. M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011. The S.C. reminded the faculty members of the U.P.College of
Law to be more circumscribed with the filing of similar complaint against the members of the judiciary. It
noted that the concerned justice already admitted the lapse and that it was not done with malice. His good
faith relieved him from any kind of administrative liability.

3. Assistance in the speedy and efficient administration of justice

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CANON 12 – A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. (Rules 12.01-12.08)
Read also Rule 138, Section 20(g) Rules of Court – Duties of Attorneys; and
Article III, Section 16, Constitution – Right to speedy disposition of cases.

4. Reliance on merits of his cause and avoidance of any impropriety which tends to influence the
appearance of influence upon the courts
CANON 13 – A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause refrain from any impropriety which tends to
influence or gives the appearance of influencing court. (Rules 13.01- 13.03)

Q. Can a lawyer be held liable for drafting the decision on behalf of a judge in an effort to help declog
court dockets?
A. Yes. Lantoria v. Bunyi, A.M. Case No. 1769, June 8, 1992. A lawyer should not take it upon himself to
prepare a draft decision on behalf of a judge. Such an action of the counsel undermines the competence of
the judiciary and will tend to erode confidence in the judicial system.

Q. Is it proper for a lawyer to make pronouncements in the media regarding a pending case?
A. No. Cruz v. Salva, G. R. 12871, July 25, 1959, 105 Phil. 115. The S.C. cautioned lawyers from
attracting media attention over a pending case.

Q. Are court decisions subject to criticism?


A. Yes. In Re: Almacen G.R. No. L-27654, Feb. 18, 1970. Lawyers as part of free speech may criticize
decisions of the Court but such post litigation utterances must never be resorted in order to malign the
Court.

D. Duty to Clients
(i) Services regardless of a person’s status
CANON 14 – A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy. (Rules 14.01-14.04)
Read: Rule 138, Section 20, Rules of Court on Duties of Attorneys (h) and (i)
Rule 138, Section 31, Rules of Court on Attorneys for Destitute Litigant
(ii) Services as counsel de oficio primarily in CRIMINAL CASES
- Appointment as Counsel de oficio (to represent accused in criminal proceedings)
Read: Rule 116, Section 6, Rules of Court, Right to Counsel of an Accused
Rule 117, Section 7, Rules of Court, Appointment of Counsel de oficio during trial

Q. Who may be appointed as counsel de oficio?


A. A lawyer in good standing; or any person who reside where the case is filed, of good repute for probity
and ability where there is no lawyer in the jurisdiction.

Q. What factors are considered in the appointment of a counsel de oficio?


A. The following factors are considered: gravity of the offense, difficulty of the issues involved and
experience and ability of the appointee.

Q. What is the rule of the designation of Counsel de officio before an appellate court?
A. Rule 124, Section 2, Rules of Court: Conditions for appointment: accused is in prison, there is no
counsel de parte on appeal and accused signed notice of appeal himself.

Q. What are valid grounds for refusal to be engaged as counsel?


A. The following grounds may be invoked: where engagement may result into conflict of interest, when
lawyer is unable to represent a party due to pressing professional matters that need his attention, when what
the client wishes the client to undertake is patently illegal, when the client agrees in writing to retire his
representation or where after due notice and hearing, the court allows the counsel to withdraw his
appearance in an action or special proceeding, other similar grounds.

2. Candor, fairness and loyalty to clients


CANON 21 – A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client
relation is terminated.
(i) Confidentiality rule: Rule will cover partners in legal profession and non-legal staff working for
the lawyer.
(ii) Privileged communications. Sec. 21(b), Rule 130 will apply.
(iii) Conflict of interest: Disclose matters that would give rise to representation of two adverse
interests. Conflict of Interest, concept; when lawyer may lawyer may held accountable; liability

Q. When can a lawyer be found liable for conflict of interest?

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A. Pacana v. Pascual-López, A.C. No. 8243, July 24, 2009. A lawyer who acted as a retained counsel of a
company was disbarred for also rendering advice to the creditors of the company. The S.C. reminded
lawyers to avoid at all times any occasion where they will represent two adverse interests.
Notes on Issue of Conflict of Interest: The nature of lawyer and client relationship is one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree.
1. A lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or
former clients.
2. A lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially related
matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after
consultation.
3. Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected
with the client’s case, including the weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge and
information gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred and guarded with
care and to avoid the appearance of treachery and double- dealing, for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of
justice.

3. Candid and honest advice to clients: Give a fair assessment of the case referral.
CANON 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with
his clients. (Rules 15.01-15.08)
When lawyer-client relationship commences: no formal contract is needed, it is sufficient that the advice
and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any manner pertinent to his profession.
Ferdinand A. Samson v. Atty. Edgardo O. Era, A.C. No. 6664, July 16, 2013. S.C. said that the
termination of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to
or in conflict with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is that the client’s confidence once
given should not be stripped by the mere expiration of the professional employment. As a general rule, the
ban on disclosure of client’s confidences is perpetual. Thus, Atty. Era was found guilty of Rule 15.03 of
Canon 15 and Canon 17 of the CPR and was suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years
4. Compliance with laws: No one is above the Rule of Law
5. Concurrent practice of another profession: pay separate PTRs; one profession is governed by the
Professional Regulation Commission and the legal profession by the Supreme Court.
5. Dealing with Client’s monies and properties
CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
profession. (Rules 16.01-16.04)
(i)Fiduciary relationship
(ii) Co-mingling of funds: A lawyer must not co-mingle his personal funds with those of his client.
(iii) Delivery of funds: A lawyer must promptly surrender to his client and/ or account for any money
received by way of a money judgment or proceeds from a transaction he handled in the course of his
engagement.
(iv) Borrowing or lending: A lawyer must refrain from borrowing money from his client.
Please note: Article 1491(5), New Civil Code which covers the prohibition against lawyers to
participate in any public or judicial auction of a property or rights where his professional
services were engaged.

Q. Is it proper for a lawyer to ask from her client for an advance for her professional fees and thereafter
not render any kind of legal service to the client? A.
A. No. Victoria C. Heenan v. Atty. Erlinda Espejo, A.C. No. 10050, December 3, 2013. S.C. found Atty.
Espejo guilty of gross misconduct for failure pay a personal loan to her client which she initially asked as
an advance for her professional fees. The deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless
checks constitute gross misconduct. A lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in
his profession but also for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity. Thus, Atty. Espejo was
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.
CECILIA AGNO VS. ATTY. MARCIANO J. CAGATAN [558 SCRA 1, December 7, 2010] A lawyer
who paid another with a personal check from a bank account which he knew has already been closed
exhibited an extremely low regard to his commitment to the oath he took when he joined his peers, thereby
seriously tarnishing the image of the profession which he should hold in high esteem.

Q. What instances would indicate violation of a lawyer’s fiduciary duty?


A. Bayonla et al v. Atty. Purita A. Reyes, A. C. No. 4808, November 22, 2011. For her failure to turn over
to her clients the just compensation in an expropriation case, S.C. disbarred the respondent lawyer.
Freeman v. Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes, A. C. No. 6246, November 15, 2011. S.C. disbarred respondent-lawyer
for employing deceit to personally gain from the proceeds of the insurance claims and retirement benefits
of the deceased British spouse of the complainant.

Important matters to consider on fiduciary duty:


(1). Lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received in the course of his
engagement as counsel.

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(2). Even if a lawyer has a lien for fees, he is bound to turnover any property or money received on
behalf of his client.
(3). The turnover of money or property to his client is subject to lawyer’s lien.
All costs of litigation must be borne by the client.
5. Fidelity to client’s cause

CANON 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
Q. What is the nature of a lawyer-client relationship?
A. Josefina Carranza vida de Zaldívar v. Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr., A.C. No. 7749, July 8, 2013. S.C.
suspended respondent lawyer for gross negligence in violation of Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of
Canon 18 of the CPR. S.C. reiterated that the relationship between an attorney and his client is one imbued
with utmost trust and confidence. Whether his services are paid or rendered pro bono, a lawyer’s duty of
competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel’s care or giving
sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal,
attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the
handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the
court to prod him or her to do so. While such negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation,
the Court has consistently held that the lawyer’s mere failure to perform the obligations due his client is
per se a violation.
Notes on Issue of Conflict of Interest: The nature of lawyer and client relationship is one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree.
4. A lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or
former clients.
5. A lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially related
matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after
consultation.
6. Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected
with the client’s case, including the weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge and
information gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred and guarded with
care and to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of
justice.

(iv) Duty to apprise client: The lawyer must inform the client of the status of the case.

CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. (Rules 18.01-18.04)

Q. What characterizes the duty of a lawyer to serve his client with competence and diligence?
A. Felipe C. Dagala v. Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. and Atty. Amado T. Adquilen, A.C. No. 5044, December
2, 2013. S.C. reiterated the need for lawyers to be ever mindful of the cause of their clients and accordingly
exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is required to
maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and
competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He is
expected to act with honesty in all his dealings, especially with the courts. These principles are embodied in
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, Canon 17 and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the CPR. Atty.
Quesada’s failure to attend the scheduled conference hearings, despite due notice and without any proper
justification, exhibits his inexcusable lack of care and diligence in managing his client’s cause in violation
of Canon 17 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR.
Stephan Brunet and Virginia Romanillo Brunet v. Atty. Ronald L. Guaren, A.C. No. 10164, March 10,
2014. For having violated Canons 17 and 18 of the CPR, Atty. Guaren was suspended from the practice of
law for six months. Despite acceptance of the amount of P7,000.00 for the titling of complainants’ lot, he
failed to perform his obligation and allowing 5 years to elapse without any progress on the referral. S.C.
reiterated that the practice of law is not a business and it reminded lawyers that the duty to public service
and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate
their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-
making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits
Julian Penilla v. Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr., A.C. No. 9149, September 4, 2013: The Court held that Atty.
Alcid, Jr. violated Canon 18 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
filed a criminal case for estafa when the facts of the case would have warranted the filing of a civil case for
breach of contract; when the case was dismissed he committed another similar blunder by filing a civil

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case for specific performance and damages before the RTC, when he should have filed it with the MTC;
and he did not also apprise complainant of the status of the cases. Atty. Alcid, Jr. is not only guilty of
incompetence in handling the cases. His lack of professionalism in dealing with complainant is gross and
inexcusable. The legal profession dictates that it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to
accord the highest degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the protection of the client’s interest.
Carlito P. Carandang v. Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina, A. C. No. 7813, Apr. 21, 2009.In a June 3, 2013 case,
S.C. reiterated that the Attorney’s negligence to file an appellate brief and his failure to inform the client
that the case was dismissed because of his negligence is guilty of violating Canon 18. Similarly, a lawyer
who falsifies the date of receipt of the decision to make it appear that the time was filed within the
prescriptive period is also guilty of negligence and was slapped with a monetary fine.
Ermelinda Lad vda. De Dominguez, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, Vicente A. Pichon v. Atty.
Arnulfo M. Agleron Sr.,A.C. No. 5359, March 10, 2014.The S. C. held that once a lawyer takes up the
cause of his client, he is duty bound to serve his client with competence, and to attend to his client’s cause
with diligence, care and devotion regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity
to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. For his failure to
promptly file a pleading he already signed on the ground that his client did not send the filing fees and 30%
of his professional fees, the S.C. was suspended for three months The Court said that this act exhibited his
lack of professionalism.

To summarize:
On the Duty to Serve with Competence and Diligence
(i) Adequate protection: A lawyer must ensure the appropriate legal reliefs for his client.
(ii) Negligence: A client is bound by the negligence of his counsel.
(iii) Collaborating Counsel: With the consent of the client, a collaborating counsel may participate
in an on-going case

7. Representation with zeal within legal bounds

Q. What is the recourse of a party who has lost a case?


A. Re: Verified Complaint of Tomas S. Merdegia against Hon. Vicente S.E. Veloso, etc. /Re: Resolution
dated October 8, 2013 in OCA IPI No. 12-205-CA-J against Atty. Homobono Adaza II, IPI No. 12-205-
CA-J/A.C. No. 10300, December 10, 2013. S.C. held administrative complaints against justices cannot and
should not substitute for appeal and other judicial remedies against an assailed decision or ruling. While a
lawyer has a duty to represent his client with zeal, he must do so within the bounds provided by law. It
found Atty. Adaza guilty of indirect contempt for his failure to impress upon his client the features of the
Philippine adversarial system, the substance of the law on ethics and respect for the judicial system, and
his own failure to heed what his duties as a professional and as an officer of the Court demand of him in
acting for his client before the courts.
(i) Use of fair and honest means: A lawyer must only employ such legal strategy allowed by the
circumstances.
(ii) Client’s fraud: A lawyer must not condone any illegal acts of his client.
(iii) Procedure in handling the case: The lawyer’s acceptance and the limits of the engagement of his
services must be made clear at the commencement of the lawyer-client relationship.

CANON 19 – A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.
Q. When will the lawyer be held accountable for violation of the responsibility to serve his client with
zeal within the bounds of law?
Dimagiba v. Montalvo, Jr. Adm. Case No. 1424, October 15, 1991. Lawyer was disbarred for stretching
for almost 49 years a case involving a probate of a will from which more than other ten criminal and civil
suits were instituted.
Ong v. Unto, Adm. Case No. 2417, February 6, 2003. S.C. suspended a lawyer for six months for using
harassing tactics to harass a party from him his client wanted to obtain child support.

CANON 20 – A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.


Czarina T. Malvar v. Kraft Foods Phils., Inc., et al., G.R. No. 183952, September 9, 2011: The case
stemmed from the execution of a final decision with the C.A. in a labor litigation. Petitioner Malvar,
however, entered into a compromise agreement with the respondents pending appeal without informing her
counsel. Malvar’s counsel filed a Motion to Intervene to Protect Attorney’s Rights.
S.C., on considerations of equity and fairness, disapproved of the tendencies of clients compromising their
cases behind the backs of their attorneys for the purpose of unreasonably reducing or completely setting to
naught the stipulated contingent fees. It said that even if the compensation of the attorney is dependent
only on winning the litigation, the subsequent withdrawal of the case upon the client’s initiative would not
deprive the attorney of the legitimate compensation for professional services rendered.
Attorney’s fees: (i) Acceptance fees; (ii) Contingency fee arrangements; (iii) Attorney’s liens; (iv)
Fees and controversies with clients; (v) Concepts of attorney’s fees - (a) ordinary concept and (b)
extraordinary concept.
On Lawyer’s fees and other charges:

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Read Rule 138, Section 24, Rules of Court on Compensation of Attorneys
Rule 138, Section 12, Rules of Court on Compensation for Attorneys de officio
Rule 138, Section 37, Rules of Court on Charging Lien

Q. What is a charging lien?


A. A charging lien is the right which the attorney has upon all judgments for payment of money, and
executions in pursuance of such judgments, obtained in favor of the client, to secure reimbursement for
advances made and payment of attorney’s fees.
Q. What is a retaining fee?
A. A retaining fee can partake of an acceptance fee and covers professional fees for services rendered
including the payment of such amount of amount as may be agreed upon by the parties in the course
of handling a legal matter for the client.
Read Rule 20.01 of CPR and Rule 138, Section 24 on factors to consider in charging fees (importance of
the subject matter of controversy, extent of services rendered, professional standing)
Q. What is the concept of Quantum Meruit?
A. A lawyer will receive such amount commensurate the services he rendered during the period of lawyer-
client relationship which may have been severed by either party during the pendency of the referral. It may
also collected in event of the death of counsel before the resolution of the case.
Q. What is champerty?
A. A champertous contract may result where a lawyer assumes all expenses for litigation and
reimbursement is contingent on the outcome of the case. This is strictly prohibited under Rule 16-04 of the
CPR.
Champerty is different from a contingent fee contract because in the latter the lawyer gets reimbursed
for the advances made for the client in the course of representation, whether he wins the suit or not;
only the amount of professional fees is contingent upon winning.
Q. May a lawyer have a lien on a judgment to protect his professional fees?
A. Yes. Conchita Baltazar, et al. v. Atty. Juan B. Bañez, Jr., A.C. No. 9091, December 11, 2013.
Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court allows an attorney to intervene in a case to protect his rights
concerning the payment of his compensation. The court, may at its discretion, allow the lawyer to have a
lien upon all judgments for the payment of money rendered in a case in which his services have been
retained by the client. In this case, however, the contract for legal services is in the nature of a
champertous contract – an agreement whereby an attorney undertakes to pay the expenses of the
proceedings to enforce the client’s rights in exchange for some bargain to have a part of the thing in
dispute. Such contracts are prohibited under Canon 16.04 of the CPR, which states that lawyers shall not
lend money to a client, except when in the interest of justice, they have to advance necessary expenses in a
legal matter they are handling for the client.
Q. What is the nature of a champertous contract?
A. In Re: The Conjugal Partnership of the Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo
(both deceased), substituted by their Heirs, namely: Herminia, Pastora, Heirs of Fructiosa, Heirs of
Raquel, Evangeline, Vicente, Jr., and Armand, all surnamed Cadavedo, G.R. No. 173188. January 15,
2014.The Court held that the contingent fee of P2000 should control the agreement of counsel and his
clients although the same was contingent upon winning the case. The Court said that granting arguendo
that the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya indeed entered into an oral contingent fee agreement securing
to the latter one-half of the subject lot, the agreement is void. The agreement is champertous and is
contrary to public policy. Any agreement by a lawyer to “conduct the litigation in his own account, to pay
the expenses thereof or to save his client therefrom and to receive as his fee a portion of the proceeds of the
judgment is obnoxious to the law.”

8. Preservation of client’s confidences: (i) Prohibited disclosures and use; (ii) Disclosures, when
allowed: The disclosures made a client to a lawyer are covered by the privileged communications rule.
The lawyer may, however, disclose information relayed to him by a client when the latter is about to
commit a crime or when there is a dispute between the lawyer and his client and the information is vital
in the defense of the lawyer.

Q. When is lawyer released from his non-disclosure duty?


A. Palm v. Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr. A.C. No. 8243, July 24, 2009. The S.C. held that a lawyer is released
from his non-disclosure duty when he files with a government agency a pleading or any document on behalf
of his client. The Court said that the right to information is protected under the Bill of Rights.

CANON 22 – A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the
circumstances.
9. Withdrawal of Services: valid, justifiable reasons for withdrawal

PART TWO - JUDICIAL ETHICS

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I. Sources of Judicial Ethics: 1. The Constitution; 2. The Rules of Court; 3. Statues creating courts;
4. The New Canons of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (took effect on June 1, 2004 per
A.M. 03-05-01-SC) which was patterned after the Bangalore Draft of Code of Judicial Conduct; and
.5. Code of Judicial Conduct
II. Membership in the Judiciary
Qualifying to the Bench
1. Members of the Supreme Court and lower appellate courts: Section 7(1), Article VIII, 1987
Constitution mandates that a Justice of the Supreme Court and all collegiate appellate courts must
be a natural born Filipino.
Qualifications of SC Justice: natural born Filipino, at least be 40 years old, must have been for 15 years or
more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
2. Members of the lower courts (regional trial courts and first level courts): Section 7(2), article VIII,
1987 Constitution provides that Congress shall provide for qualifications but one must be citizen of the
Philippines and member of the Philippine Bar.
3. Common qualification for all members of the judiciary, Section 7(3), Article VIII, 1987
Constitution provides: “A member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity,
probity and independence.”
4. Term of Office: Section 11, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution provides that members of the judiciary
“shall hold office during good behavior until they reach 70 years old or they become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office.”
5. Manner of Selection and Appointment (Read Section 8, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution for the
composition, powers and term of office of members of the Judicial and Bar Council)
Chavez v. JBC, et al., G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012: Congress is entitled only to one seat in the JBC
and not one for each house.
Recent rulings related to the JBC:
Villanueva v. JBC (2015): A first level trial court must await a 5-year period before he can be promoted as
RTC judge. The Court sustained the power of the JBC to prescribe rules in the screening of qualified
candidates to the judiciary to ensure that only men of proven competence, integrity, probity and
independence will be appointed to the bench.
Jardeleza vs. Chief Justice Sereno and JBC (2015): Having been denied due process, Jardeleza should be
included in the list of nominees to be appointed as justice of the Supreme Court. An issue about his
integrity was raised in the selection process but Jardeleza was never given the opportunity to be heard to
overturn the allegation against him.
Law
Appointments made by the President in the judiciary do not need any confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments. (Section 9. Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
Please note that:
Any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof.
(Section 4(1), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
For lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within 90 days from the submission of
the list. (Section 9, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
Requirements in the discharge of responsibilities of members of the judiciary:
1. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly,
the facts and law on which it is based. (Section 14, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
2. Dedicated service to the judiciary
3. Members of the judiciary shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions. (Section12, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
4. SALN Requirement
Members of the Supreme Court shall not only report all their assets, liabilities, and net
worth upon assumption to duty but they must disclose such to the PUBLIC in the manner
provided by law. (Section 17, Article XI, 1987 Constitution)
5. Allegiance to the Philippine Government. Any public officer owes allegiance to the
Philippine government and its Constitution and a public officer who seeks to change
citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall
be dealt with by law.(Section 18, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)

III. Qualities (Commit this MEMORY AS THIS REPRESENTS THE SIX CANONS OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT: I.I.I. PECd):
Canon 1: Independence
Canon 2: Integrity
Canon 3: Impartiality
Canon 4: Propriety
Canon 5: Equality
Canon 6: Competence and diligence
A. Uphold the Dignity and Independence of the Court
CANON 1 – A judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the Judiciary. (Sections 1-7)
Two aspects of independence: institutional independence and personal independence: What is expected of
judges: to discharge their functions based solely on a fair assessment of the facts and invoking the

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appropriate provision of law in resolving issues presented before the court; and shield themselves from any
kind of influence from any party involved in the case.
In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, 664 SCRA 465 (2012): A complaint against
justices of the Court of Appeals must be dismissed if the same is baseless and the recourse of the party is to
seek judicial relief from an adverse decision.
In Re: S.C. Resolution dated 28April 2003 in G.R. Nos. 146817 and 145822, (Atty. Pena) 669 SCRA
530(2012): A motion to inhibit the ponente in a pending case before the S.C. based on suspicion of bribery
in the form of a brand new Mercedes Benz and collusion with another senior associate justice of S.C.
cannot be given due course. Counsel must show proof that a connection and direct correlation exists
between his failure to receive a copy of its Motion for Clarification of the other party. He alleged that the
incident did not allow him to refute the allegations therein. The Court said that such imputation is
“completely untenable and irresponsible.”
Talens-Dabon v. Arceo, A.M. 1. No. RTJ-96-1336, July 25, 1996: A judge was dismissed from service for
gross misconduct for sexually harassing his Clerk of Court.
Go v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992, 206 SCRA 165. The Court held that the
complainant was not deprived of due process when the charge against him was upgraded from grave
serious injuries to homicide. It said that when the death occurred after the filing of the first information the
same can be amended as a matter of course.
B. Avoid Impropriety: CANON 2 – A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety
in all activities. (Sections 1-3)
Rex M. Tupal v. Judge Remegio V. Rojo, etc., A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842. February 24, 2014.The Court held
Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and Circular No. 1–90, and of gross
ignorance of the law. He was suspended for six months for having notarized affidavits of cohabitation,
which were documents not connected with the exercise of his official functions and duties as solemnizing
officer. He also notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public were
lacking in his court’s territorial jurisdiction. As a solemnizing officer, the judge’s only duty involving the
affidavit of cohabitation is to examine whether the parties have indeed lived together for at least five years
without legal impediment to marry. The Guidelines does not state that the judge can notarize the parties’
affidavit of cohabitation. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to examine the
parties’ requirements for marriage. Circular No. 1–90 dated February 26, 1990. Circular No. 1–90 allows
municipal trial court judges to act as notaries public ex officio and notarize documents only if connected
with their official functions and duties.
Samson v. Judge Caballero, A. M. No. RT J-08- 213, 595 SCRA 423. The newly appointed judge was not
allowed to assume his post as RTC judge of Cabanatuan City for his material misrepresentation in his
application form. Caballero did not disclose that a graft and corruption charge was filed against him
before the Office of the Ombudsman when he served as a prosecutor.
Suarez v. Judge Dilag, A. M. No. RT J-06-2014, March 4, 2009, 580 SCRA 491. A judge was dismissed
from service due to gross misconduct. The judge was found to have officiated several marriage rites in a
short span of time without having resolved the numerous cases pending before his court.
Santos v. Judge Arcaya- Chua, A. M. No. MT J-07-20093, February 17, 2009. A judge was suspended by
the Court for having accepted money to intercede on behalf of her husband’s relative in a pending case
before the Supreme Court where she was previously employed.
Inonog v. Judge Ibay, A. M. No. RT J-09-2175, July 28, 2009, 594 SCRA 168. A judge was fined by the
Court for “oppressive” conduct for citing a driver in contempt of court for having parked the car of his
employer in the parking slot assigned to the judge. The judge imposed upon the driver a monetary fine.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Edwin C. Larida, Jr., RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, A.M.
No. RTJ-08-2151, March 11, 2014. The Court held that Judge Larida, Jr. committed several lapses,
specifically the non-submission to the Court of the required inventory of locally-funded employees, and his
allowing Marticio to draft court orders. Such lapses manifested a wrong attitude towards administrative
rules and regulations issued for the governance and administration of the lower courts, to the extent of
disregarding them, as well as a laxity in the control of his Branch and in the supervision of its functioning
staff. The omission to submit the inventory should not be blamed on Atty. Calma as the Branch Clerk of
Court. Although it was very likely that Judge Larida, Jr. had tasked Atty. Calma to do and submit the
inventory in his behalf, Judge Larida, Jr. as the Presiding Judge himself remained to be the officer directly
burdened with the responsibility for doing so. Further, for knowingly allowing detailed employees to solicit
commissions from bonding companies, Judge Larida, Jr. contravened the Code of Judicial Conduct, which
imposed on him the duty to take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against court personnel for
unprofessional conduct of which he would have become aware.
Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2, Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-
2200, April 2, 2014. The Court held the conduct of Judge Austria of and posting a picture with indecent
attire for the public’s consumption in her Frendster account is inappropriate. The Court held that she was
guilty of impropriety. While judges are not prohibited from becoming members of and from taking part
in social networking activities, they do not shed off their status as judges. They carry with them in
cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her
everyday activities. Judge Austria was guilty of impropriety when she posted her pictures in a manner
viewable by the public. Joining Friendster per se does not violate the New Code of Judicial Conduct. The
Court said Judge Austria disregarded the propriety and appearance of propriety required of her when she

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posted Friendster photos of herself wearing an “off-shouldered” suggestive dress and made this available
for public viewing. .
C. Maintain Impartiality
CANON 3 – A judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence. (Sections
1-6)
Paco v. Quilala, et. Al., A. M. No. RT J-02-1699, 413 SCRA 364. A judge together with the Clerk of Court
and the court stenographer assigned to his court were also sanctioned by the S.C. The Court said that
except for clarificatory questions, the judge may not be allowed to ask questions that would elicit answers
to favor one of the parties to the case. It is not also proper for the judge to allow the Clerk of Court to
conduct any proceeding in the absence of the judge and for the stenographer to transcribe such
proceedings.
Complaint against Chief Justice Corona dated Sept. 14, 2011 filed by Inter-Petal Recreational Corp.,
A.M. No. 12-6-10 SC, June 13, 2012. The complaint raised the issue on the capacity of then Chief Justice to
decide on a pending case without any bias. The S.C. dismissed the complaint because the same has become
moot and academic with the impeachment and eventual removal of Chief Justice Corona from office.
Villaluz v. Mijares, A. M. No. RT J-98-1402, April 3, 1998, 288 SCRA 594. This case was filed by Justice
Villaluz, the former spouse of Pasay City RTC Judge Mijares, against her. The S.C. called the attention of
Mijares that the Rules of Court prohibit judges from hearing cases involving relatives up to the sixth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity. In the same fashion a member of the bench may not hear cases where a
counsel is a relative up to the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.
D. Duty to Improve the Law and the Administration of Justice
CANON 4: A judge may, with due regard to official duties, engage in activities to improve the law, the
legal system and the administration of justice. (Sections 1-15)
Albos v. Alaba, A.M.No. MTJ-91517, March 11, 1994. A judge who failed to sign the order granting bail to
the accused and who left for an out of town was found to have been remised of his responsibility as a judge.
Danilo E. Lubaton v. Judge Mary Josephine P. Lazaro, Regional Trial Court, Br. 74, Antipolo, Rizal,
A.M. RTJ-12-2320, September 2, 2013. The S.C. held that the 90-day period within which a sitting trial
Judge should decide a case or resolve a pending matter is mandatory. The rule, albeit mandatory, is to be
implemented with an awareness of the limitations that may prevent a Judge from being efficient. Under the
circumstances specific to this case, it would be unkind and inconsiderate on the part of the Court to
disregard Judge Lazaro’s limitations and exact a rigid and literal compliance with the rule. With her
undeniably heavy inherited docket and the large volume of her official workload, she most probably failed
to note the need for her to apply for the extension of the 90-day period to resolve the Motion to Dismiss. .
Re: Cases Submitted for Decision before Hon. Teofilo D. Baluma, Former Judge, Branch 1, Regional
Trial Court, Tagbilaran City, Bohol, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2355, September 2, 2013.For his failure to
sufficiently explain why he failed to act on the twenty-three (23) cases submitted for decision/resolution, the
S.C. imposed upon him administrative sanctions. Every judge should decide cases with dispatch and should
be careful, punctual, and observant in the performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases
erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into
disrepute.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Santiago E. Soriano, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1683, September 11,
2013.
The S.C. held that Judge Soriano has been remiss in the performance of his judicial duties for his failure to
decide thirty-six (36) cases submitted for decision in MTC and MTCC, which were all due for decision at
the time he compulsorily retired. Such unreasonable delay in deciding cases and resolving incidents and
motions, and his failure to decide the remaining cases before his compulsory retirement constitutes gross
inefficiency.
Re: Failure of Former Judge Antonio A. Carbonell to Decide Cases Submitted for Decision and Resolve
Pending Motions in the RTC, Branch 27, San Fernando, La Union, A.M. No. 08-5-305-RTC, July 9,
2013.
The S. C. said that Carbonell’s failure to decide cases within the reglamentary 90-day period without any
justifiable and credible reasons constitutes gross inefficiency. The reiterated that as a frontline official of
the Judiciary, a trial judge should always act with efficiency and probity. He is duty-bound not only to be
faithful to the law, but also to maintain professional competence. The pursuit of excellence ought always to
be his guiding principle.
E. Duty to Avoid Conflict with Judicial Responsibilities
CANON 5: A judge should regulate extra-judicial activities to minimize the risk of conflict of judicial
duties. (Sections 1 - 5)
Re. Conviction of Judge Angeles, A. M. No. RT J-06-9-5215, 543 SCRA. The Court held that a judge
cannot be suspended in the discharge of her responsibilities until after conviction of a criminal offense she
allegedly committed has become final and executory.
Guanzon v. Judge Rufon, 537 SCRA 38. The Court reminded the family court judge to avoid using vulgar
language in the course of the trial. Use of vulgar language insults a witness and may also diminish the
respect of the litigants towards the court because court proceedings are held in public.
Sy v. Judge Fineza, A. M. RT J-03-1808, October 15, 2003, 413 SCRA 374. The Court will not condone
the acts of judges of accepting money from a litigant with a pending case before his court nor should a
judge be seen dining with a litigant facing a criminal case before his court.
F. Duty to Exhibit Competence and Diligence

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CANON 6: Competence and Diligence (Sections 1-7)
Narciso G. Dulalia v. Judge Afable E. Cajigal, RTC, Br. 96, Quezon City, A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 10-3492-
RTJ, December 4, 2013. S.C. said that as a matter of public policy, a judge cannot be subjected to liability
for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. To hold otherwise
would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in
the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. The Court reminded parties that
resort to judicial remedies must be exercised to question the decision of the trial judge. Bad faith on the
part of the trial judge should never be imputed unless the same can be supported by evidence.
Biggel v. Judge Pamintuan, A. M. No. RT J- 08-2101, 559 SCRA 344. The apparent bias exhibited by the
judge shown in the delay in the legal procedure cannot be condoned. S.C. held reminded judges of their
pivotal role in the administration of justice.
Bayaca v. Judge Ramos, A. M. No. MT J-07-1676, 577 SCRA 93. S.C. held that gross misconduct and
serious lapses in the conduct of the affairs of the court merit dismissal from the judiciary except for reasons
of compassion, the Court awarded the retirement benefits of the judge who died during the pendency of this
administrative case.
Ma. Liza M. Jorda, City Prosecutor’s Office, Tacloban City v. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC, Branch 7,
Tacloban City; Prosecutor Leo C. Tabao v. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC, Branch 7, Tacloban
City,A.M. No. RTJ-14-2376/A.M. No. RTJ-14-2377. March 5, 2014. The Court held Judge Bitas judge
liable for gross ignorance of the law when he deviated from the requirement of a hearing where there is an
application for bail and aggravated his offense when he also granted bail to Miralles without neither
conducting a hearing nor a motion for application for bail When an error is so gross and patent, such
error produces an inference of bad faith.
Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2, Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-
2200, April 2, 2014. The Court reiterated the rule that in administrative cases and disbarment proceedings,
the complainant bears the onus of proving the averments of his complaint by substantial evidence. In this
case, the allegations of grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the performance of duty, grave bias and
partiality, and lack of circumspection are devoid of merit because the complainant failed to establish Judge
Austria’s bad faith, malice or ill will. The complainant merely pointed to circumstances based on mere
conjectures and suppositions. These, by themselves, however, are not sufficient to prove the accusations.
Even granting that the judge erred in the exercise of her judicial functions, these are legal errors
correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial remedies that are readily available to the
complainant. An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous
order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal.
Gershon N. Dulang v. Judge Mary Jocelyn G. Regencia, MCTC, Asturias-Balamban, Cebu, A.M. No.
MTJ-14-1841, June 2, 2014. The Supreme Court held that pursuant to Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to
duty of judges. In this case, the civil case was already submitted for resolution. Being an ejectment case, it
is governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure which clearly sets a period of 30 days from the submission
of the last affidavit or position paper within which a decision must be issued. In violation of this rule, Judge
Regencia rendered judgment only more than two years later the judge failed to proffer any acceptable
reason in delaying the disposition of the ejectment case, thus, making her administratively liable for undue
delay in rendering a decision. .

IV. Disqualification of Justices and Judges (Rule 137)


Prohibition on practice of profession: No member of the judiciary may practice their profession
during their incumbency.
A. Prescriptive Duty to resolve pending matters
All matters pending with the Supreme Court must be resolved with 24 months;
Twelve (12) months for all collegiate appellate courts; and
Three (3) months for all other lower courts. (Section 15(1), 1987 Constitution)
B. Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges: may be voluntary or involuntary: There are two
rules governing the qualification and voluntary inhibition of judges: Section 1, Rule 137 of the
Rules of Court; and Rule 3. 12 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides:” Disqualification of judges. – No judge or
judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as
heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise , or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree
of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the
rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or
counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the
subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered
upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in case, for
just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.” (ex. If judge served as wedding sponsor
to one of the litigants or litigant is his “kasambahay.”)
Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states:
“Rule 3.12. – A Judge should take no part in proceeding where the judge’s impartially might
reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among others, proceedings where:

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The judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustees or lawyer in the case or matter in
controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the
judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;
The judge’s ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or to co-
counsel within the fourth degree;
The judge knows that his spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor,
fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any
other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.”
1. Voluntary Inhibition: When voluntary inhibition be done: A judge is allowed under the second
paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, supra, to voluntary inhibit from a case
for just or valid reasons other than those grounds of disqualification.
Re: Complaint filed by Lucena B. Rallos against Justices Gabriel T. Ingles, Pamela Ann Maxino,
and Carmelita S. Manahan, IPI No. 12-203-CA-J/A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA, December 10, 2013.
Complainant charged Justice Hernando with manifest bias because he voluntarily inhibited himself in
CA-G.R. CEB SP. No. 06676 only after the promulgation of the March 28, 2012 and April 13, 2012
resolutions. Complainant alleged that she should have been informed of the voluntary inhibition. The
Court, however, said that under the internal rules of the C.A., the same was not necessary. In the spirit
of transparency, the Court held that henceforth all the parties in any action or proceedings should be
immediately notified of any mandatory disqualification or voluntary inhibition of the Justice who has
participated in any action of the court, stating the reason for the mandatory disqualification or
voluntary inhibition. The requirement of notice is a measure to ensure that the disqualification or
inhibition has not been resorted to in order to cause injustice to or to prejudice any party or cause.

How voluntary inhibition is effected: A judge may motu proprio or on motion of a party voluntarily
recluse from a case if he has good or valid reasons which render him incapable of acting objectively on the
case.
When a judge should not inhibit himself: Absent any ground for disqualification, a judge should not
inhibit and if a motion to that effect is filed, he should deny it if, despite the circumstances cited by the
movant, he honestly believes that he can act on the case objectively.
2. Remittal of Disqualification: Nature of remittal: Remittal of disqualification is the process by which a
judge who is disqualified to sit on a case on any of the grounds enumerated in Section 5, Canon 3, may
purge himself of such a disqualification so that he may act upon the case.
How remittal is effected: This process is allowed under Section 6 of the same Canon which provides:
“A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the
record the basis of disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers, independently of
the judge’s participation, all agree in writing that the reason for inhibition is immaterial or unsubstantial;
the judge may then participate in the proceeding. The Agreement, signed by all the parties and lawyers,
shall be incorporated in the record of the proceedings.”
V. Discipline of Members of the Judiciary
A. Members of the Supreme Court: Impeachment. (Section 2, Article XI, 1987 Constitution);
Grounds; and Proceedings
In re: Undated letter of Mr. Louis C. Biraogo, A.M. No. 09-2-19, S.C. The Court fined a retired justice of
the Supreme Court with P500, 000.00 and indefinite suspension for premature release of a decision
involving the citizenship requirement of a member of the House of Representatives.
In Re: Letter Complaint of Atty. Pena against Justices Carpio and Sereno, A.M. No. 12-6-11- SC. The
Court dismissed the complaint for failure of Atty. Pena to substantiate his allegations and that the same are
purely conjectures which cannot be a subject of judicial review.
B. Discipline of Appellate Justices and Lower Court Judges: Read Section 11, Article VIII, 1987
Constitution
1. Jurisdiction over disciplinary cases: The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline
appellate justices and lower court judges.
2. Vote required dismissing a member of the judiciary: A majority vote of all justices who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
3. Grounds for disciplinary action over appellate and trial judges
4. Sanctions: fines, suspension, dismissal from office, forfeiture of benefits and disbarment
Office of the Court Administrator v. Atty. Daniel R. Liangco (A.C. No.5355, December 11, 2011). A trial
court judge was dismissed from service for gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law. He allowed a
local government unit to take possession and awarded ownership of a private property without any
expropriation proceedings having been filed by the government. As a defense, the judge said that what he
rendered was not a decision but only an opinion. After his dismissal, the Court initiated disbarment
proceedings against him before the IBP. The IBP recommended his disbarment which the Court affirmed.

VI. Administrative Aspects over Court Matters, Responsibilities and Discipline of Court Personnel
A. Powers and Duties of Courts and Judicial Officers (Rule 135)
B. Court Records and General Duties of Clerks and Stenographer (Rule 136)

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C. Legal Fees (Rule 141): Manner of payment: legal tender; principles of Negotiable Instruments
Law will apply; fees in lien; and persons authorized to collect legal fees
D. Costs: Recovery of costs (Rule 142): a) Prevailing party; b) Dismissed appeal or action
c) Frivolous appeal; d) False allegations; and e) Non-appearance of witness

Survey of Recent Jurisprudence involving employees of the judiciary:


Executive Judge Ma. Ofelia S. Contreras-Soriano v. Clerk III Liza D. Salamanca, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 55, Malabon City, A.M. No. P-13-3119. February 10, 2014. The Executive Judge filed an
administrative case against respondent for unauthorized/unexplained absences and other infractions: (1)
failure to account for and turn over the partial settlement amount of a civil obligation; and (2) failure to
account for and turn over the payment for legal fees she received in a case. The Court held that the acts of
Salamanca constitute dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Dishonesty is defined as dispositions to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud. It implies untrustworthiness, lack of
integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle on the part of the individual who failed to
exercise fairness and straightforwardness in his or her dealings. Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
service, on the other hand, pertains to any conduct that is detrimental or derogatory or naturally or
probably bringing about a wrong result; it refers to acts or omissions that violate the norm of public
accountability and diminish – or tend to diminish – the people’s faith in the Judiciary.
De Castro, J. Angelito R. Marquez, et al. v. Judge Venancio M. Ovejera, etc., et al., A.M. No. P-11-2903,
February 5, 2014.In finding the sheriff guilty, the Court cited Section 8 of RA 6713 which requires all
public officials and employees to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of their assets and
liabilities. The requirement of SALN submission is aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for
official corruption, as well as at maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. With such
disclosure, the public would, to a reasonable extent, be able to monitor the affluence of public officials,
and, in such manner, provides a check and balance mechanism to verify their undisclosed properties
and/or sources of income. S.C. held that based on Section 8 of RA 6713, “all other assets such as
investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like”, should be declared by the public
official in his or her SALN. In this case, however, it was established that she only declared the original
amount of her time deposits in her SALN for the years 2004 and 2005, and did not disclose the interests
which had eventually accrued on the same.
Veronica F. Galindez v. Zosima Susbilla-De Vera, A.M. No. P-13-3126, February 4, 2014. The Court
found respondent guilty of grave misconduct Vera for soliciting money to supposedly facilitate a legal
proceeding in court. She was dismissed from service for violating Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel has enjoined all court personnel from soliciting or accepting any gift, favor
or benefit based on any or explicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their
official actions.
The Court further said that to deserve the trust and confidence of the people, Susbilla-De Vera was
expected to have her dealings with the public to be always sincere and above board. She should not lead
others to believe that despite her status as a minor court employee she had the capacity to influence the
outcomes of judicial matters. Her acts did not live up to the expectation, for the records unquestionably
showed how she had deliberately and fraudulently misrepresented her ability to assist the complainant in
the adoption of her niece and nephew.
Concerned Citizen v. Nonita v. Catena, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Br. 50, Puerto Princesa,
Palawan, A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1321-P, July 16, 2013.Respondent stenographer was dismissed from
service for gross dishonesty in connection with her Civil Service eligibility where she was accused of
causing another person to take the Civil Service Eligibility Examination in her stead. Before the Decision
was imposed, however, respondent resigned but the Court said that despite this, it did not lose jurisdiction
over the complaint and that it did not warrant the dismissal of the same. The Court emphasized that
cessation from office by virtue of her intervening resignation did not warrant the dismissal of the
administrative complaint against her, for the act complained of had been committed when she was still in
the service. Nor did such cessation from office render the administrative case moot and academic.
Otherwise, exacting responsibility for administrative liabilities incurred would be easily avoided or
evaded. The Court therefore also ordered her eligibility to be cancelled, her retirement benefits to be
forfeited, and her disqualification from re-employment in the government service to be perpetual. Her
intervening resignation necessarily means that the penalty of dismissal could no longer be implemented
against her. Instead, fine is imposed, the determination of the amount of which is subject to the sound
discretion of the Court.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Noel R. Ong, Deputy Sheriff, Br. 49, et al., A.M. No. P-09-2690. .”
The Court held that respondents” acts of using the levied car for personal errands and losing it while
under their safekeeping constitute grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty. The Court said misconduct
is “a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty,
unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior.” A misconduct is “grave” or gross”
if it is “out of all measure; beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful” or “such conduct as is not to be
excused. Such flagrant and shameful acts and should not be countenanced. Respondents’ acts warrant the
penalty of dismissal as provided in Rule 10, Section 46 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service. As for respondent Buencamino, his death is not a ground for the dismissal of the Complaint
against him. Respondent Buencamino’s acts take away the public’s faith in the judiciary, and these acts
should be sanctioned despite his death.

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Sheriffs are reminded that they are “repositories of public trust and are under obligation to perform the
duties of their office honestly, faithfully, and to the best of their abilities.” Being “frontline officials of the
justice system,” sheriffs and deputy sheriffs “must always strive to maintain public trust in the performance
of their duties.”
Development Bank of the Philippines, etc. Vs. Damvin V. Famero, Sheriff IV, RTC, Br. 43, Roxas,
Oriental Mindoro, A.M. No. P. ___________: For the respondent’s lapses in the procedures in the
implementation of the writ of execution, he was found guilty of simple neglect of duty, defined as the failure
of an employee to give attention to the task expected of him. Under Section 52(B)(1) of the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, simple neglect of duty is a less grave . Section 53 of the same
Rules allows the disciplining authority to consider mitigating circumstances in favor of the respondent. The
court considered his length of service in the Judiciary, acknowledgment of infractions, remorse and other
family circumstances, among others, in determining the proper penalty. He was also found to be entitled to
the following mitigating circumstances: (1) his more than 24 years of service in the Judiciary; (2) a clear
record other than for the present infraction which is his first offense, (3) the resistance of the informal
settlers to leave the property; (4) fear for his life; and (5) his well-grounded recognition that he could not
undertake any demolition without the appropriate court order. After considering the attendant facts and the
mitigating circumstances, the court also considered that the efficiency of court operations may ensue if the
respondent’s work were to be left unattended by reason of his suspension. Thus, he was imposed the
penalty of fine instead of suspension from service.
Anacleto O. Villahermosa, Sr., et al. v. Victor Sacia, Executive Assistant IV and Efren R. Rivamonte,
etc., A.M. No. CA-14-28-P, February 11, 2014. The Court held that the act of soliciting or receiving money
from litigants constitutes grave misconduct. The S.C. reiterated that The Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel requires that court personnel avoid conflicts of interest in performing official duties. It mandates
that court personnel should not receive tips or other remunerations for assisting or attending to parties
engaged in transactions or involved in actions or proceedings with the judiciary. Further, court personnel
cannot take advantage of the vulnerability of party–litigants. In this case, respondents were found guilty of
grave misconduct and thus, dismissed from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual
disqualification from holding public office in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
government–owned or controlled corporations.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Donabel M. Savadera, et al., A.M. No. P-04-1903, September 10,
2013. The S.C. once again called the attention of court personnel that no position demands greater moral
righteousness and uprightness from its holder than a judicial office. Those connected with the dispensation
of justice, from the highest official to the lowliest clerk, carry a heavy burden of responsibility. As
frontliners in the administration of justice, they should live up to the strictest standards of honesty and
integrity. They must bear in mind that the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct,
official or otherwise, of the men and women who work there.
The respondent court employees were meted out with penalties because the audit team of the Court
discovered cash shortages in the books of accounts of the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Lipa City. As
clerk of court, Atty. Apusen is primarily accountable for all funds collected for the court, whether
personally received by him or by a duly appointed cashier who is under his supervision and control. As
custodian of court funds, revenues, records, properties and premises, he is liable for any loss, shortage,
destruction or impairment of said funds and properties. Being a cash clerk, Savadera is an accountable
officer entrusted with the great responsibility of collecting money belonging to the funds of the court.
Clearly, she miserably failed in such responsibility upon the occurrence of the shortages.
Atty. Rhea R. Alcantara-Aquino v. Mylene H. Dela Cruz, etc., A.M. No. P-13-3141. January 21, 2014.
The Court held that in this case, Dela Cruz failed to live up to these exacting standards. The inculpatory
acts committed by Dela Cruz are so grave as to call for the most severe administrative penalty. Dishonesty
and grave misconduct, both being in the nature of a grave offense, carry the extreme penalty of dismissal
from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual
disqualification for re-employment in the government service. This penalty is in accordance with Sections
52 and 58 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino, etc., et al. /Re: Report on the
financial audit conducted in the Metropolitan Trial Court etc., A.M. No. P-05-2051/A.M. No. 05-4-118-
MeTC. January 21, 2014. The Supreme Court held that the admission of Mapue of her liability does not
exculpate Atty. Buencamino from her own negligence. A clerk of court has general administrative
supervision over all the personnel of the court. The administrative functions of a clerk of court are as vital
to the prompt and proper administration of justice as his judicial duties. As custodian of court funds and
revenues, the clerk of court is primarily accountable for all funds that are collected for the court, whether
personally received by him or by a duly appointed cashier who is under his supervision and control. Atty.
Buencamino was remiss in the performance of her duties as clerk of court. Atty. Buencamino failed to
supervise Mapue and to properly manage the court funds entrusted to her,
Alberto Valdez v. Desiderio W. Macusi, Jr., Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 25, Tabuk, Kalinga, A.M. No. P-13-
3123, June 10, 2014. Sheriff Macusi was held to be remiss in his duties and thus liable for simple neglect of

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duty which is the failure to give attention to a task, or the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or
indifference. The Court held that the 30-day period imposed for the execution of the writ after the judgment
has been received by the sheriff, as well as the periodic report every 30 days, is mandatory. A return which
Macusi referred to as his Partial Report is not acceptable because the court issues a writ, it is incumbent
upon the sheriff to enforce it.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Sarah P. Ampong, etc., A.M. No. P-13-3132, June 4, 2014. The Court
dismissed from service Ampong for being liable for dishonesty in impersonating and taking the November
1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers on behalf of one Decir. Under section 58(a) of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS), the penalty of dismissal carries
with it the following administrative disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of
retirement benefits; and (c) perpetual disqualification from re-employment in any government agency or
instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation or government financial
institution. Ampong should be made to similarly suffer the same. Every employee of the Judiciary should be
an example of integrity, uprightness, and honesty. Court personnel are enjoined to adhere to the exacting
standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good
name and integrity of the courts of justice.
Atty. Virgilio P. Alconera v. Alfredo T. Pallanan, A.M. No. P-12-3069, January 20, 2014. The Court said
that absent a TRO, an order of quashal, or compliance with Sec. 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,
respondent sheriff has no alternative but to enforce the writ. The S.C. did not find the sheriff guilty of the
charge of grave misconduct. He did not enforce the writ of execution because there was still a pending
Motion for Reconsideration before the trial court. S.C. said that misconduct has been defined as “a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by a public officer.” The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, all of which must be
established by substantial evidence, and must necessarily be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. In
this case, there was no element of misconduct established against the accused.
The sheriff’s duty in the execution of a writ is purely ministerial; he is to execute the order of the court
strictly to the letter. He has no discretion whether to execute the judgment or not. When the writ is placed
in his hands, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to proceed with reasonable
celerity and promptness to implement it in accordance with its mandate. It is only by doing so could he
ensure that the order is executed without undue delay. This holds especially true herein where the nature of
the case requires immediate execution.

Elpidio Sy, President, Systems Realty Development Corporation v. Edgar Esponilla, Legal Researcher
and Officer-in-Charge, et al., A.M. No. P-06-2261, December 11, 2013. Respondent Esponilla, Legal
Researcher and then Officer-In-Charge of Br. 54 of RTC Manila, and Atty. Buendia, clerk of court and ex-
officio sheriff of RTC Manila were charged with Gross Misconduct, Negligence and Dishonesty for the
irregular withdrawal of deposits for monthly rentals in a civil case based on a purported Ex-Parte Motion
to Withdraw Rental Deposits filed by Atty. Bayhon in the civil case. S.C. held that Atty. Bayhon violated the
Lawyer’s Oath and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for failing to explain,
in good faith the circumstances surrounding the filing of the Ex-Parte Motion which he himself filed, for
proffering misleading claims in the course of the subject administrative investigation, and for not having
shown and proved that he exerted his best efforts to secure and submit a copy of the Ex-Parte Motion – all
in violation of the resolutions issued by the Court. Atty. Bayhon was suspended for six (6) months from the
practice of law.

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