Tactical Principles: Brief Overview

von PR am 31.07.2019 in den Kategorien Coaching,Tactical Theory mit 0 Kommentaren

We examine the topic of tactical principles and the importance of understanding its different meanings
and its use in coaching.

Introduction

The game of football can be approached as situations that continually unfold creating what we would
call problems (Grehaigne et al., 2012) for teams and consequently the players that make decisions.

This can be easily understood turning back to the rules of football: The obvious fact that the game
inherently encloses the notion of opposition between two teams in its rules means naturally that in any
given moment the aims and tasks of both teams are opposed.

In turn, this creates a relationship of opposition where each team works to achieve the opposite aim and
countering the opponent. By definition, implies that favourable conditions for one team are adverse for
the opponent. In other words, it is a zero sum game.

In order to solve this, players carry purposeful behaviours coordinated with their teammates to achieve
the aims in some way. Under this perspective, tactical principles are guidelines or references for the
tactical behaviour of the team or the individuals to reach some objectives or make the things in a
specific and shared way.

Hence, tactical principles can be addressed either from the collective or individual dimensions.

Collective Approach: Team Characteristics

In this dimension, the principles are the characteristics we want for our team in a more or less abstract
way.

Examples of those are:

 High pressing.

 Build-up through short passes.

 Use of cutbacks close to the opponent box.

 Creating numerical superiority in the centre.

 Counterpressing.

 Dispersion to circulate the ball.

They are something like a descriptive overview of the style of play the coach draws in order to know
“where are we going”. It should help him organising the training and creating individual principles.
For example, if high pressing is one of my principles I will need to train it, so from there I can create
training sessions, drills, individual rules, or tactics to do so.

It is important to remember that principles are just words; a simplified description (usually created on
an ad-hoc basis) of what we want to achieve. As such, a very accurate and detailed description is not
always needed or even useful.

The key element is the know-how of the coach to communicate and train them in order to get the
behaviours desired from the players.

Team principles give a rough and approximate answer to what we want to achieve (in terms of actions in
situations), but the way of turning them behaviours (thus communicating them) is not always the same.
Sometimes will be explicitly and others through specific training design.

Tactical Principles are useful for different tasks during the coaching practice:

 Describing the general collective traits: How do I want my team to play?

 Specifying the team strategy from outside in each phase in a more precise way. E.g. In build-up
finding a free man between the lines to progress.

 Planning and sequencing the training contents: What do I need to train at each time?

 Organising the training and coaching intervention: Designing drills, what to focus in each drill to
give feedback. For example, if I want to work the central play: positioning between the lines,
body shape, etc.

 Doing video-analysis with the players.[1]

 Creating, organising, and structuring the individual principles.

The set of collective principles structured and detailed to each phase is usually called Game Model.

Individual Approach: Heuristics and Action-Rules

At the individual level, tactical principles are rules and ideas that give a general answer to the question
what to do? in a given situation.

“If you receive the ball facing backwards, lay-off.”

“When you are on the ball, look for the furthest player.”

“If you are behind the fullback, give him a deep support.”

“When you get the ball from the goalkeeper try to dribble diagonally inwards and then passing to the
winger.”

“In build-up play in two touches.”

Their main characteristic is to give a general answer. This means that the answer is usually adequate and
useful in similar situations. However, it doesn’t mean it will always be adequate, neither that it will be
(always) optimal.

For example, if you receive the ball facing backwards, usually laying off gives enough safety and
likelihood to complete the pass, instead trying to turn with the ball can be risky as the opponent can
disposes you.

Subjectivity and Objectivity in Principles

Principles carry inherently a subjective idea of what is appropriate in a given situation. What to do, and
consequently what is appropriate is decided by the coach on the election of the style he wants to play.
As such, there is a connection between those and the collective principles by definition.

For example, if the coach wants a more conservative possession rather than vertical and aggressive one
he could formulate principles such as “always have two passing options to recycle the possession”[2] or
“when the fullback is in possession, then [central midfielder] support closely from behind”. It can
happen also in the reverse way, the coach wants some specific things not having the big picture of the
style.

While the principles chosen are mainly subjective in their nature as the coach himself creates them, they
need to be to some degree coherent with the most basic principles of the game.

If not, it wouldn’t be possible to achieve the objectives of the game through these specific principles as
their purpose is to nuance how to achieve them.

In an extreme way there aren’t principles that pursue losing the ball, playing backwards when is possible
to play forwards or not shooting if possible to score.

Optimising v Satisfying in the Decision Making

If the answer provided by the rules we use is optimal or not is a different issue on its nature[3]. The
coach gives for granted that his ideas are at least coherent and somehow satisfy a minimal objectivity
level.

For example, is the optimal action to make a diagonal pass or to play behind the opponent line in a given
situation? This question is mostly intractable in the practice because there is no possibility to address all
the factors involved, so we work through simplifications. This is in fact what principles are as they are
generally valid. Or we think so.

And while could be true that some of them are suboptimal (for example, in a given situation the
marginal value of switching instead of trying to penetrate could be higher) in the coaching practice we
do not care about that directly. But we take the assumption that they are. Furthermore, one critical
factor in the real-world are the abilities of the individuals.
While principles are mainly useful for the coach to communicate, they can be also valid for the player in
terms of heuristics and action-rules. However, they use them in a different way than how they are
worded, by associating some answer (as first option) to the visual cue.[4]

The rules can be used to know how to position, where to look first, where to pass, and so on.

Where to look/do as first option, what to do instead if the first option is not possible, anticipating by
looking first to know if it’s possible and to react if it is not available or to open an option by making feint.

Even if knowing them can be useful for the players, we shouldn’t forget that the objective is to execute
them through behaviours. This is usually achieved by getting experience to achieve an unconscious
execution of them. On this impacts from one side the level of skill of the player and from other the rate
of learning. Both individually dependent.

Variability in the Execution of Principles

We should not expect from the players to carry the principles in a consistent nor perfect way.

For example, a player that receives facing backwards is not going to lay-off every time he gets the ball in
such situation.

There is an inherent variability in the answer. It comes from the fact that principles are models and as
such a simplification of the reality.

The answer given by a principle is not closed. It just gives a broad response and the player needs to
manage the details of the situation. The principles do not try to answer everything, but just giving a
quick and easy answer that helps guiding the first intention of the players.

In this regard, there are two main sources of variability: Situation and players.

Variability relative to random factors in the actual situation that the model doesn’t account[5].

If a principle says “facing backwards, lay-off”, in the actual situation there could be factors that allow or
need a different sort of answer. For example, because the player can turn, because there is longer
distance towards the opponent, because there is time, because a different move is better for the space
available, etc. This is within the realm of individual decision and the possibilities accounted.

This is why the rule is no directly used by the player, but somehow gets into the decision process. The
individual does not always follow, but has some guidelines that allow a general answer to be adapted to
the situation and to his own abilities[6].

Variability related to the individual(s) involved in the situation. This is not only related to the capability
to read the situation (principles do help here, of course) but also to the individual abilities (e.g. skills)
and past experience that will prime different actions. For example, because a player has been taught to
turn, sometimes will turn even if it’s not good (this is negative), or because he is usually good in turning
so tends to “read the situation from his perspective” and turns (this is positive[7]).
Conclusion and Final Remarks

Principles can be relative to the collective (e.g. after recovery, play out of the recovery-zone) or
individual (if/then rules).

Both provide an answer for what to do given a situation (more or less specific the situation and more or
less closed what to do) in a general way.

Principles can be more specific (e.g. when the 9 gets the ball, give a passing line behind him if the 10 is
wide) or more general (e.g. creating diagonal passing lines)

Moreover, they can be more or less sophisticated if they account different possibilities (if-then-else).

Finally, the most important thing to have in mind about principles is that they are just words and what
matters is the ability to make them executed through behaviours in the game. That’s the coaching
expertise indeed.

Hopefully, in a subsequent piece on this regard hopefully more complex topics will be adressed such as
the specificity of the principles in regard to the style of play, the interplay between skills of the players
and the election of the principles among others.

[1] On this regard is important to develop a shared vocabulary that the players can understand and
relate to, it can be different than the one employed on the pitch but it should be based in the same
principles.

[2] This principle could fit into both dimensions mentioned because describes what do we want but at
the same time gives also an approximate answer to what to do which the players can use. In the practice
is better to understand collective and individual dimensions as a continuum rather than separate. While
some of them are almost exclusively individual (such as if/then rules) other are so general that are
mostly collective because the players barely can use them. However, in some way the collective
principles should be communicated to the players to have a broad framework of how we want to play.
Moreover, this conceptual issue doesn’t matter in the reality and we should not focus on defining to
which dimension belongs each principle, but simply caring about usefulness.

[3] What we care here is not about assessing the broad decision making but how to improve/modify the
players decision making through training. Principles are useful for this task.

[4] For matter of simplicity we simply say that they use them.

[5] By model I mean the principle itself.

[6] There is another part of the situation that also may impact in the execution of the players, which are
the factors related to the context such as game-state, time of the game, or more mundane ones such as
state of the pitch.
[7] Usually positive but not always. For two reasons: 1) Shared principles help teammates to coordinate
to each other as they can anticipate (the individuals will learn their teammate’s actions if they are
different anyway but it could take more time). 2) Because usually the principles are a better solution.
This is an assumption that is not always true, but still should be having into account that there is (or
should) be a reason because a rule is how it is. It is also important to remember that in the practice if
you have a player that does really well something you can use a different rule for him (and consequently
for the team).

An Exceptional Game Model (Including Generic Theory and Lessons)

von GT am 06.08.2019 in den Kategorien Tactical Theory,Team Portraits mit 0 Kommentaren

On December 2nd, 2018, Holstein Kiel travelled to MSV Duisburg and convincingly won 4-0. Last season,
under the command of Tim Walter (now the coach of VfB Stuttgart), Kiel gained popularity as a high-
pressing, possession-hungry side, using a variety of unique actions and structures not used by other
teams. Kiel were identified as promotion candidates, but inconsistency lead to a 6th place finish. Amid
this inconsistency though, were games where their approach couldn’t have been much better, with their
win against Duisburg perhaps being the best example.

Duisburg came bottom of the league in 18th position, but what I want to talk about makes the strength
of the opposition somewhat irrelevant. The purpose of this article is to portray what an exceptional
game model and systematic approach looks like by highlighting Kiel’s principles and mechanisms against
Duisburg. The game model determines, to a variety of specificities, the guidelines that players should
follow during individual and collective actions. After accounting for both their own strengths as well as
the opposition’s weaknesses, these precepts were primed into Kiel’s game model in order to dictate
how the game would be played on their own terms. This is the ultimate aim of any competent game
model.

Kiel’s progressive and aggressive style of play is risky with noticeable weaknesses. In combination with
Kiel’s other actions however, this risk was formed into a well-planned overall construct by Walter. The
way the collective system was established upon the context of Duisburg by Kiel limited the extent to
which their own weaknesses could be exploited. After going through the match, I will consider what
universal points other teams can take and implement from Kiel’s approach.

I am going to be discussing game models regarding the final in-game product, but if you would like to
learn more about creating and training a game model from inception, you can read RM’s article, as well
as PR’s newest work on tactical principles.

The Match

The players at a coach’s disposal and the general trends of how other teams in the same league play are
important e.g. aggressive man-orientated high-pressing and direct, fast-paced attacking which is
common in the 2. Bundesliga. These trends influence a team’s approach, being considered when
instructing individual players and the collective unit.
 Duisburg are no exception to the
generic 2. Bundesliga team profile,
aiming to aggressively press Kiel’s build-
up with combative man-orientations.
This is what Walter and Kiel expected,
using the principle of moving away from
where the ball is to be played. This
meant using third-man movements to
manipulate Duisburg’s man-
orientations, creating passing options
for progression in addition to space in
central zones when attacking.

Duisburg have assigned a player to each of Kiel’s

back four, meaning they are unlikely to move far
unless the Kiel players do. Because Duisburg’s LCM
has had to step out from midfield to mark Schmidt,
this leaves a 3 v 2 scenario in Kiel’s favour in
central midfield. Kiel’s forwards, Schindler and
Serra, are high and wide to leave space in the
centre. All Kinsombi and Meffert must do is move
away from where Kiel want the ball to be. By
moving towards van den Bergh, they create space
to play over the top of them into Schindler’s feet,
who is then able to lay-off to Lee who is now
completely free. This puts Duisburg on the back
foot in a 3 v 3 scenario as Bieler is occupying
Duisburg’s LB away from the other defenders.

The same principles can be seen here.

Kinsombi and van den Bergh drag their markers

away from where they have a chance of
intercepting a pass to Lee from Honsak, who is
unmarked in the middle because of his teammate’s
positions occupying the Duisburg CB’s and CM’s.

Note the similarity in both situations despite being at opposite stages of the game.
A single player moving himself and his marker away from Lee was commonly all that was required to
free him. Lee routinely occupied intelligent positions between Duisburg’s defensive structure away from
the ball.

Lee positions himself in the space between the

LCM and LM out of their line of sight.
Schindler moving towards the touchline
minimalises the chance of the LB applying
pressure on Lee, who is also too far from the
LCB for him to apply pressure quickly enough.

Kiel’s centre-backs were also utilised in these

third-man actions. Meffert, Kiel’s #6, was
marked closely all game to disrupt Kiel’s build-
up. This meant that he repeatedly had to
move away from the central space so that
another player could enter this space
unmarked. This was occasionally the other
centre-midfielders, Kinsombi and Bieler, but
this task was more frequently undertaken by
Schmidt. As part of Kiel’s system, he could be
classified as an ‘attacking centre-back’.
Meffert moves away from the centre, allowing Schmidt to advance and offer a worthwhile progression
route. This will force the ST to follow him, meaning Wahl won’t be outnumbered as the temporary lone
centre-back. It also means that the LCM will have to close Schmidt after receiving the ball, meaning
Bieler and Kinsombi should be open to receive the next pass.

The solution did not always require complexity. Sometimes all that was required when facing a 3 v 2
situation was quick horizontal circulation, resulting in the third player of the passing chain having space
to dribble forward past the pressure. Duisburg’s aggressive pressure in the opening stages of the match,
involving most of their team pressing high, routinely went unrewarded, as Kiel were able to
manufacture numerical superiority while still having satisfactory attacking occupation, squeezing
Duisburg’s remaining defensive players back.
Schmidt has the most important role during Kiel’s possession relative to the other defenders. He
manipulates the positioning of the player marking him so that passing lanes to his teammates can be
created.

Meffert has moved into the left half space, attracting the attention of Duisburg’s RM. Wahl is occupying
the ST. These two actions allow van den Bergh to dribble into the centre of the field without anyone
closing him down. Schmidt then advances, taking the LM with him, generating an opportunity for a pass
to Dehm.

You can see here that the occupation of opposing defenders as a principle of the game model doesn’t
always require moving them. This is made simpler against a team like Duisburg because of their man-
marking scheme.

By advancing into the #6 space, Schmidt also permits Kiel’s midfielders to move into more advanced
positions, meaning they have greater positional superiority in attacking areas.
Schmidt advances into the #6 space. Wahl covers Duisburg’s striker by himself (if Duisburg had two
strikers, he would be left exposed by Schmidt’s attacking actions). Meffert can now temporarily operate
as the right #8, and Bieler moves into the right-wing position. Serra is occupying the LCB on his outside,
and the LB’s attention is directed at Dehm (with Bieler in his blindside). This leaves Bieler free to receive
the ball and dribble at the defence.

When the Duisburg striker was assisted by the LM or RM, Kiel could create a 2 v 1 scenario on the wings.
If the strikers could occupy the CB’s, and the full-backs could occupy their opposite number, the #8’s
could position themselves close to the touchline, as in the above scenario with Bieler.

Schmidt had a greater attacking intent in this match because of Duisburg’s lone striker system. This
wasn’t a fortuitous exploitation. If Duisburg wanted to cover both Wahl and Schmidt, a midfielder would
have to step up to assist the striker, but simple positional adjustments (as in the above scenarios)
allowed Kiel to play through the pressure with relative ease. This also meant that Duisburg had one less
midfielder to contend with Kiel’s high proximity of central players.
van den Bergh tended to move into central positions (as seen in the first 11th minute scene), almost as a
temporary left-sided #6. This usually only occurred when he was left unmarked as a result of his
teammates occupying opposing players around him. Another example of this can be seen below.

Serra’s occupation of the opposing RM, and Wahl, Kinsombi and Meffert’s control of the opposing
centre-midfielders means that van den Bergh can move into an open space in the middle of the pitch to
receive Dehm’s pass. This also makes it difficult for Dusiburg in the next stage of the attack, because the
RM or DCM will have to leave their marking assignments if they want to put pressure on the ball. This
would leave either Serra or Kinsombi unmarked.

van den Bergh would, however, infrequently move inside when there wasn’t controlled occupation of
nearby opposing players. This was done as a means of aiding build-up progression.
 van den Bergh moves through the RM’s
blindside in an attempt to dis-orientate and
deceive him as to who he thinks he’s marking,
as Bieler has now moved into the LB position
in a near opposite direction (such opposite
movements are commonly successful in
breaking down aggressive man-marking
assignments). Wahl finds Bieler via Kronholm.
Meffert is in an #8 position, so someone else
must be the situational #6. Although van den
Bergh is there initially, Wahl is able to advance
through the RM’s blindside, who is now
looking at Bieler with the ball. This means that
van den Bergh can also advance and move
back to the wing, where the RCM has now vacated this position because of his duty to follow Bieler.
Although Kiel’s players had the license to move away from their ‘positions’, whether to create space or
numerical superiority, they always had their returning points and positions to retreat to.

Kronholm was not just used as an intermediary in possession, aiding the generation of numerical
superiority over Duisburg’s press. One extra man was routinely all that was required to play through
them.

This is a 4 v 3 situation. Kinsombi and Wahl are marked, leaving one Duisburg player to cover both
Schmidt and Kronholm. Kinsombi passes the ball to Kronholm, but by the time the Duisburg RCM has
pressurised him, the ball has already been released to Schmidt, who as the extra man, is able to receive
with the time to receive, turn, and make an optimal decision as to what to do next.
Some situations required both Wahl and Schmidt to move out of the defence to receive the ball.

van den Bergh is the best passing option for Kronholm, but the next pass is less clear, as Kinsombi is
closely marked by the Duisburg LCM who would provide immediate pressure upon any pass in Kinsombi’s
direction. The RCM moves to pressurise van den Bergh whilst blocking a lane to Meffert, but Wahl
provides the solution, moving past the RCM to receive the ball. Kinsombi is still closely marked, and the
ST moves to neutralise Meffert as a passing option. This leads to the LM anticipating a pass back to
Kronholm, but Schmidt moving forward creates a lane from Wahl to him. Because of the LM having to
assist the striker, Dehm is completely open on the wing as the next pass. The size of this space has
partially been manufactured by Bieler occupying the LB. Meffert advances through the midfield to
receive the next pass, and Lee moves to drag the DCM away from applying pressure to Meffert.

Additionally, Kiel players would move against the direction that the defence was moving.
Because of the horizontal movement of the ball from Kinsombi to Schmidt, the defence move from right
to left, but Bieler moves against this movement to a space between the Duisburg centre-midfielders and
then stays there, despite teammates remaining dynamic around him. This leaves him open to receive
Schmidt’s pass.

A nice example with two vertical passes to Bieler operating between Duisburg’s structure can be seen in
the lead-up to Kiel’s fourth goal.

The spaces between Duisburg’s structure and Kiel players like Bieler and Lee occupying them meant that
line-breaking vertical passes like the ones above were common. The opportunity was there to be
exploited, and Kiel sought to exploit it prior to the game beginning and unfolding in the way it did.

It is important to remember that all of these situations required different solutions, but they all used the
same principles of moving away from where Kiel wanted the ball to be played next, third-man
movement, and the occupation of opposing defenders, both statically and dynamically.

It should be noted that Kiel’s build-up was not always well executed, but this was predominantly caused
by player errors as opposed to tactical weaknesses. Their positions were sometimes too square and
lacked depth, making it simpler for Duisburg to defend. Furthermore, Kronholm occasionally played long
passes forward when there was an open teammate to play short to.

Dehm is forced backwards by the LM directly in front

of him. The Duisburg ST and RCM are able to press
Dehm within the time it takes him to turn, while
preventing any passes to surrounding players.

Scenes like the one above were rare, though. After

initial high intensity pressure, Dusiburg’s press slowed.
Chasing after Kiel’s 62% possession of the ball only
made it easier for Kiel to routinely build from the
back. Their numerical superiority with the ball became
more difficult to contend with, and Duisburg’s
defensive transitions became slower and slower.

After regaining the ball, some of the Duisburg

players are out of position, the most important
one in this situation being the RM. This left a 4 v
2 scenario in Kiel’s favour in the centre, which
along with the RM being out of position, meant
that no one was able to apply pressure on van
den Bergh. He is able to dribble all the way
through the middle third of the pitch.

Kiel’s own defensive pressure played a major

role in tiring Duisburg out very quickly, resulting
in the game growing into Kiel’s favour as it
progressed.

Two key aims of Kiel’s press were to force

Duisburg to the wings and to play long passes.
The diagram below shows the structure with
which they accomplished this when defending
inside Duisburg’s half. They used man-
orientations within each individual player’s
zone, a less aggressive scheme than that of
Duisburg’s. This meant that Kiel players were
lurking close enough to neutralise Duisburg
players as passing options, and prevented Kiel players from being dragged out of their defensive
positions by the players they were marking. Unlike Duisburg’s man-marking assignments, Kiel’s had the
adaptability to shift between players depending on which zone of the pitch their opponents were in.

Lee is putting pressure on the ball-carrier while

keeping the LCM in his cover shadow. Any pass
in his direction would result in the 5 forward
Kiel players collapsing on the ball as part of a
pressing trap, deterring Duisburg from
attempting to play through this area. This
means they are forced to play horizontally,
even though they know that Serra and
Schindler want them to do this. The Kiel
forwards are ready to press Duisburg’s full-
backs, and the centre-back with the ball’s
options are limited. The Duisburg RB is forced
to play a long pass, but his attacking
teammates are marked. Most passes in their
direction are likely to result in losing the ball.

Another situation designed as a trap for Duisburg to try and play through the middle, but with different
positioning, can be seen below.

The DCM would have to be a pretty exceptional player to keep the ball in this scenario.

The next diagram portrays another scene where Kiel forced Duisburg to the wings.
The full-backs are left open, while Serra and Schindler are marking a player each. Lee puts pressure on
the GK while keeping the RCB in his cover shadow.

Occasional defensive positional errors on Kiel’s part meant that Duisburg could very seldom play
through Kiel’s large central concentration.

This is a 6 v 3 scenario, but Kiel’s two lines of 3 lack depth. Meffert’s pressure forces the receiving LCM to
turn towards the touchline where there is a passing lane to the LB open. Ideally, Bieler would be higher
up to deter any passes in the LB’s direction, which would also allow Schindler to press the LCB if
necessary.

On the rare occasion where Duisburg were able to play through Kiel, they didn’t get much further. This
was primarily because of Kiel’s unwavering compactness and speed in applying pressure.

There was also an intermittent lack of synchrony between the lines of Kiel’s press. The Kiel midfield
often lingered too far away from the defensive line, but when they dropped to amend this, the forwards
were left isolated. This only really began to occur towards the end of the game, though, a sign of Kiel
themselves fatiguing.

There is no way for the ball-carrier to play

through the middle, meaning he should turn
and play back to the LB. But the pressure
applied by the closest Kiel players, Meffert
and Schmidt, reduces his time to make a
decision and execute an action considerably.
He ends up playing through the gap in the
defensive line to no one, and Kiel can begin
another attack.

Kiel applied significant pressure in second ball

scenarios too.

A long ball is played forward, giving the Kiel

players a chance to pressurise and regain
possession. Serra puts pressure on the centre-
backs, leading to the RCB making an error
when trying to clear. Kinsombi and Schindler
are now the closest players to the ball after
having greater awareness of the situation
than their Duisburg counterparts, and
Kinsombi regains possession in a dangerous
area.

Quick combinations in attacking transitions

lead to dangerous chances. This was how Kiel
used their central numerical superiority to
produce a tangible benefit, rather than just
creating a numerical advantage and not
utilising it.
While Duisburg’s LCM is attracted to Karazor and Lee when they have the ball, Serra moves through his
blindside to receive from Lee after playing the first pass of the sequence. Bieler, Kinsombi and van Den
Bergh’s initial deep positioning means that some Duisburg defenders are further up the pitch than they
ideally should be. This means that once Serra has the ball, he is in a 4 v 3 situation with Lee, Schindler
and Kinsombi.

The quasi-wall pass that Lee played to Serra here was typical of Kiel when they wanted to
maintain/increase the tempo of their attacks. This tempo is difficult to contend with when there is a
high concentration of players within metres of each other.
Once Schmidt releases the ball when passing to Serra, Bieler positions himself in the direction and closely
in front of where the forward will receive the ball. This allows the ball to be progressed much quicker
than if Serra had to control, turn, and gain speed himself. Bieler, on the other hand, can gain momentum
before receiving the ball from Serra, triggering Lee and Schindler’s runs into depth. Their direction is
designed to dis-orientate who the Duisburg CB’s should be marking.

This can also be seen in the sequence leading to Kiel’s third goal. The combined effect of Duisburg
preventing Kronholm playing a short pass and Kiel still managing to have a high central concentration in
attacking areas lead to a cruel outcome.

Summary and Lessons

Kiel dominated Duisburg, using their pre-determined principles centering on building-up through
Duisburg’s single-forward structure, their man-marking scheme, and tiring them out. This was
comprised of mostly micro-actions based on their opponent’s weaknesses that are easily implementable
and actionable within the team’s structure and existing personnel. Kiel’s own weaknesses were minor
and hardly damaging. They were individual errors arising from lacking player quality, which is bound to
be unavoidable for a second division team. Nevertheless, Kiel’s tactical system and game plan enabled
many Kiel players to outperform themselves, which is a credit to Walter and his staff.

So, why isn’t it simple for Kiel to replicate their Duisburg performance against every opponent, or for
other teams to devise the best game model possible week in, week out? Well, Kiel had the ability to deal
with Duisburg because of the relative ease in predicting how they would play. Duisburg, on the other
hand, had a good idea of how Kiel would play, but lacked the quality in terms of structure and personnel
to do much about it.

Teams can prevent opponents from creating the best game models to play against them by increasing
and maintaining unpredictability. This applies to top-tier teams with the best personnel, good enough to
overpower most opponents by playing the same way. Unpredictability can be created to different
degrees, with major collective structural changes within and between games being at one end of the
spectrum, and minor individual changes at the other. The latter is, of course, much easier to train, which
is why many teams rarely adjust how they play as frequently as desired. But by preparing, planning, and
training multiple systems to become tactically flexible with the same personnel, unpredictability is easier
to embody, and opponents won’t know what exactly they are coming up against and what they should
be preparing for.

For example, if I played 3-1-4-2 against 4-4-2 to generate numerical superiority in all phases, I might
decide to change to 4-3-1-2 against 4-3-3 because of structural impacts that the different formation of
my opponent would bring, such as not needing three centre backs in my 3-1-4-2 against one striker in a
4-3-3, and needing more central midfielders against 4-3-3 compared to 4-4-2. Even if I couldn’t train
both formations as much as I would ideally like, I may decide to go ahead with this change anyway,
because my team should still be able to perform and adapt better to the opponent with the formation
change, despite being more familiar with the first formation and performing well with it previously. The
benefit of limiting structural weaknesses as part of my game model outweighs having a degree of
unfamiliarity arising from formation changes.
Yet, it is crucial to remember that complexity is not always required. Simple problems may only require
simple solutions. If I usually play with defensive-full backs behind wingers to generate greater control in
defensive transition, but our upcoming opponents are a weaker, defensive team that plays with full-
backs and no wingers, I could instruct my full-backs to overlap the wingers to create 2 v 1 situations on
the wings. The inability of the opponent means that our defence should be able to cope with this
change. The rest of the team would remain unchanged, but this can be the difference between drawing
and winning a match for instance.

Reality is not usually as simple as the examples I described, but the same rationale applies to both
domains.

The final thing I will mention for today is finding the optimal solutions to the opponent’s predominant
weaknesses. Schmidt, for example, was Kiel’s greatest weapon against Duisburg’s single-striker system.
In this instance, the solution to the problem presented it itself, but manufacturing solutions to problems
presented by opponents comes from experimentation and theorisation. Randomness will always linger
because that’s football, but developing the best game model possible can help minimise it.

How to create a game model

von RM am 07.03.2016 in den Kategorien Coaching,Tactical Theory mit 8 Kommentaren

One of the questions I have received most is how to create a game model. Which aspects should you
look at and how? This is my article trying to answer that.

Obviously writing in detail about all of that would probably take a whole book.

Some fundamentals are required like being able to analyze your players, the trends in your leagues,
which types of teams you’ll play often against (from a strategical, not necessarily tactical point of view)
and how to connect all of these aspects to a system. Sir Alex Ferguson or also Claudio Ranieri now have
created a successful system partly because of specific patterns recognizable in the league and thus
utilizing game theory to their and their players’ advantage.

Another thing is the ability not only to coach this from a methodological point of view (incl. man
management, didactics, etc.), but also in terms of understanding your players. I have done some work
about this in my webinar on Inspire! and in my German book “Fußball Durch Fußball” (translated as
Football by/through Football) together with Marco Henseling. Also recently I wrote an article for the
coaching magazine of the German FA on how to create an opponent specific match plan.

Still, the question mentioned at start always pops up: How do I make a game model for my team? Thus, I
want to give a small example on this.

The Base

Perhaps the most important thing is to decide which things are non-negotiable for you as a coach and
which are flexible.
Normally I do create my system, both as a coach with my amateur team or as an analyst / consultant, in
regards to the players I have at my disposal and the league we play in – because this will deduce on how
many training we have, which level we will have physically, technically and tactically but also how the
opposition will normally play. Then I / we adapt them towards the opponent on a weekly basis. Still,
there are some aspects I consider most important and thus I will look to introduce them into my team
no matter what – at least as a coach.

Man or zonal marking, pressing, counterpressing, compactness, positional play and ball oriented
movement out of possession, short passing, etc. could be such things; nevertheless specific aspects of
this can be varied in detail if the players have specific strengths or weaknesses.

When I took over a team that played man marking, I did look to introduce zonal marking but let them
play a variation of zonal marking which allowed them to man mark in their zone. This is used by Dieter
Hecking similarly and the literal English translation would be “zonal man marking”; everyone man marks
but just in the zones that belong to their opposition. As most teams don’t overload or change positions
in an organized way in this league it worked fairly fine. Thus, they had their typical orientation but did
not leave gaps as open as in man marking.

Man Marking vs Zonal Man Marking (or: Man Marking In Zone). On the left you see a player tracking his
opponent even away from his zone. On the right you can see the same player tracking his opponent until
the outer limits of his zone and then leaving him to his team mate who steps up. There are endless
variations of this, though (some do it off the ball, some only near the ball, different switches of who
moves up, etc.).

I did this also because of other external factors: Due to lack of training time on this level I would not be
able to introduce a clean and well executed zonal marking so I first did this before I would later leave it
for a proper zone. The other possibility I contemplated was to let them play a very strict zonal marking
where the extremeness of it (similar to Villarreal or Gladbach) would help me to change their mindset
faster as the message was clearer and later on introduce a more variable variation; I decided against this
way due to the players.

Also I looked at playing a positional style of play – look up Adin’s article on our site or Kieran Smith’s
great presentation on Inspire for more information on Juego de Posición – which worked well in the first
season but only in the first two thirds; in the last third the team just had players who are more suited to
a chaotic, dynamical style which lead to us building up in something akin to Juego de Posición and then
playing more ‘messy’ in the last third and even before that. After some of the players left, we changed
to a different style in possession which did not have much principles of Positional Play anymore.
Example of an asymmetrical 3-4-1-2 I used with an earlier team of mine.

Thus, it’s important to clarify which things you want to see and which things you could adapt how. Not
only your squad is important, but the whole context of the league.

Analyze The Surroundings

Different cultures, levels and leagues have different patterns. Some leagues vary a huge amount, others
have teams playing in very similar systems.

Let’s go back to the previous example: In Austrian lower leagues until a certain level most teams either
play a 3-4-1-2 with man marking and sweeper or a 4-4-2 with a mixture of zonal marking and man
marking (wings in the back four as man markers, central midfield players too). Thus, when building the
game model it’s important to reflect what this means tactically and what the strengths and weaknesses
of the oppositional systems are.

This is not focused just on the formation; it’s much more about the movement and patterns these teams
use. One example from the EPL are the positioning and passes from Fuchs and Albrighton paired with
Vardy’s movement at Leicester; they lure out the oppositional wing and full back and then play long
diagonals in behind after Vardy runs horizontally and then into deep, which attacks specific marking and
movement aspects of EPL teams. Also it uses Vardy’s ability quite well.

The left winger occupies the right full back, the left full back has now a gap to play a long ball. Vardy can
either run directly in behind or run horizontally and then into depth, depending on communication of the
players marking him, the gap, what Fuchs does on the ball and things like when eye contact occurs
between them.

If your opponents are mostly playing man marking, you should teach your players (first) how to play
against man marking, how to read man marking schemes and how to behave individually and
collectively against that. The same applies for zonal marking, of course.

For instance, some coaches use as guideline against zonal marking to position in behind the oppositional
pressing line and move out of the cover shadows of the players in these lines. Others like to put their
players in one line with the opposition so they can turn into more space. And some put their players into
the next line of the opposition to play with lay-offs after long verticals – sometimes on purpose to
players behind oppositional players so they can feel where the pressure will be coming from.
In all of these situations the first decision for the player getting free is if he’ll run into the gap or if he’ll
already be positioned. The first decision helps him in terms of visual field of opposition who either don’t
see him or have to lose eye contact to the ball carrier. In the first picture left he drops and receives
between opposition, so he has more space to turn into. In the second picture he goes into depth, so he
can either break through or lay it off to his team mate – who is positioned in a way that if he gets
pressed he can get his body between ball and opponent most easily. In the latter he moves centrally in
between these four which gives them a tough decision who will push out to press (or if it will happen).

So depending on the tactical goal and the coaches’ preference for his players the exact position will vary.

Yet, if the opponent man marks, you don’t have such lines. The opponent will follow you, this creates
messy shapes and you’ll have problems to position yourself behind the opponent due to him marking
and running after you, normally staying at your back. Here are other things important which are called
‘dismarking’ by some experts like the people from 3four3 from the US. On a surface level there are some
fundamental (and interconnected) ways to leave your marker which I just want to mention and will
explore in a tactical theory article someday:

 Distraction & miscommunication

 Misdirection & Deception

 Dynamical Positioning

 Positional Rotation

 Specific passing patterns

 Dribbling & Receiving

Coaching these aspects could possibly be more important in a league more focused on aggressive man
marking all over the pitch which we will use in this example. Coaching instructions can precisely be
about this, too:
  Read your opponent! Does he follow you if you move higher? If you move deeper? Be active and
try to create distance.

It’s important to look at such reoccurring aspects from many perspectives and in many situations to
optimally use them.

The Players

In the end it’s the most important to create a suitable system for your players. Which players are
success stable when and act well in which situations? Where not? How do the synergies between
players look like? Could they occur more/better in other situations? Can we create these situations
consistently? If so, how? Which aspects of their play am I realistically able to coach and enhance, which
not?

This is an art in itself. Finding out how players act together is hard, especially when experimenting with
new schemes, systems and so on. Culture and age is also important to note for training and the
application of these aspects.

To show how this might look, I will create an hypothetical example so it’s more understandable.

In this example we will have following players for our first XI; please note that I kept the description of
the players very basic and simple, in truth it’s much more complex and involves also psychological
aspects, their injury history, how they orientate and position themselves naturally in some situations,
their technical or athletic ability, etc.:

 One player who can build from deep but can’t play in the back line

 Another player who is an intelligent players who gives balance with average technical and great
physical ability

 Two strong players who could act as centre backs who are dynamic enough to act as full backs
but not on a consistent basis with above average build up for this level

 A player who’s adept at building from deep, has great distribution and reads the game well out
of possession

 Two players who could play as wingbacks and wingers on each side too (although then totally
different roles) but with the left wing back being more a central midfielder or even full back

 One box to box player who is a strong runner, has good feeling for space around the box and a
great feel for finishing situations in the box

 A player with great ability on the ball in tight spaces, above average height and heading, lack of
stamina but good speed and very good distribution

 A fairly simple player who is great in holding onto the ball, simple one-touch combinations and
fast
The opponents mostly play the afromentioned man marking scheme in a 3-4-1-2 (with a sweeper as
spare man). Now how do we build a system out of these 11? I, subjectively, would choose the following
game model:

An Asymmetrical 3-2-4-1/3-4-2-1

Especially in lower levels it’s hard to find a team where you can use symmetrical shapes; even if you try
to most don’t play symmetrically. To utilize the potential to the fullest, it’s often required to play a bit
asymmetrical. In this case the 3-2-4-1 in possession has a slightly lopsided diamond in the middle and
will become a 3-4-2-1 and perhaps even a 4-3-2-1 or 5-2-2-1 out of possession.
Asymmetrical 3-2-4-1.

For simpler explanation in our hypothetical training we will pair some players which are interacting in a
specific way (positional changes and balancing movements) with each other. I like to use these pairings
because it simplifies orientation on this level and will come handy in something I will mention later on,
too.
The left holding midfielder will be paired with the sweeper; when we get pressured he should act in the
middle as option for passes and to distribute while he can drop between the left side back and the
central back. This in turn allows the side backs to become full backs and push forward. We then either
have two wings on each side or the wing backs can move towards the middle.

Our next pairing is the right holding midfielder with the right wing back. They should not move to far
away from each other, hold positions and change them in specific situations; especially prior to a switch
from the left side or in more passive situations with good marking of the opponent (obviously the cues
and triggers can be much more detailed and frequent).

The left central midfielder is paired with the left wing back; here the asymmetry occurs. While the two
holding midfielders are in one line, they are paired differently thus one of them will drop more
frequently deeper (if we train it correctly and properly) with the other moving more often towards the
wing in the second or third line of our nominal formation. The left central midfielder is positioned higher
in the basic build up but has similar movement with the wing back on his side while the right central
midfielder is free to roam, to move deeper and support there, to build play in higher zones or act as
second striker.

Our striker upfront on the other hand is instructed to move towards the sides with a tendency to go
more towards the left; he can interact with the players there and opens space for our free player on the
right side of our central midfield / “top” of our lopsided diamond.

Why do we choose this? Most teams in the league, as you can remember, have a 3-4-1-2 and man
marking. With these positions and movements we have

 More players in the central spaces

 Positional changes as team tactical tool to get free against man marking and mess up their
spacing and coverage scheme

 The ability to build with three or two / four players in the first line and overload the wings if
needed, which might be especially useful against 3-4-1-2 opponents with aggressive man
marking

 Open spaces centrally with the ability to fill them by many players surrounding these zones

We can also change our pressing fairly easily against the teams in this league. If the opponent has a 3-4-
1-2, we let them build and then advance aggressively after a sideways pass.

If their player in the first line is very wide, our wing back will advance to press him – the central players
move towards the ball and cover these zones. If their player in the first line is narrow, our central
midfielder will advance to press. If they build up with a back four we can make similar schemes or create
a 5-4-1 if we want to go more stable; with a high pressing line and compactness but without pressing
upfront at first.
The problems could lie in counters and presence in the last line which is why the movement of our right
central midfielder and our wings will be of huge importance. Without wanting to go into too much
detail: The wings and/or the central midfielder on the ball far side could already position them a bit
higher and the centre forward moves towards the ball side so we have possibilities to counter and
compensate the lack of players in the last line out of possession a bit.

Now the obvious question is: How do we coach this? Besides the sessions and the methodology it’s
important to create easy instructions and guidelines for the players that we can use.

Simplifying The System For Individual Understanding

On twitter I once wrote a very basic short article on how Barcelona can be so fluid without having too
many or too complex instructions for each player. You can find this here. Let’s create something similar
for the system we just created.

This is an example of simple instructions of a few simple points without jargon / concept language to
give players guidelines for their movement, orientation and decision making in possession – we’ll use
simple and understandable action language in our talks with the players and in the instructions we will
use as a consistent reference in training:

Goalkeeper:

 If the central back / sweeper is supporting near the ball, move away. Position yourself in the gap
between the center back and side back just 20 meters deeper.

 If the central back / sweeper is supporting away from the ball, move towards the ball. Offer
yourself for a simple back pass. When you receive, try to already face where you want to pass
next. Check your surroundings always. If you don’t find a passing option, go long towards the
sides.

 Use hand gestures: If you have space in front of you, show with your hand you want the ball in
front of you. If you are not sure, point with your hand towards your feet.

 If the back line advances, advance with them. Keep 20 meters distances to them but always be
active. Try to intercept long counters behind the back line or prevent them by helping your team
mates.

 If the ball position changes in the oppositional half – no matter who has the ball – move towards
the ball.

Central Back:

 Don’t position yourself with the side backs in one line in possession. If you do that, you cut their
connection and make smaller space. Try to be a few meters deeper. Imagine a diamond or
pentagon with the side backs and central midfielders! With this, the opposition needs to cover
more space in pressing.
  If you get pressured from the side or don’t get pressured at all and there is space in the midfield
in front of you, you are allowed to advance.

 If you feel our build up is too passive, move towards the right a bit and instruct the left holding
midfielder to drop deeper.

 When passing to the side, always look diagonally behind you after that. You should check if
there are players in the passing lanes to the other side back for switches and if the middle is
open for passes there if you should get the ball back.

 If you face the whole field, look for diagonal passes towards the wing. There we have the
positional switches and can get a free man with dynamical superiority.

Side Backs:

 If the Central Back advances, check if one of the central midfielders is dropping. If not, move 10-
15 meters towards the middle to create a back two for cover.

 When we get the ball and secured it, immediately split and make the pitch big. Don’t position
yourself in a horizontal line with the central back / sweeper.

 If there is space in front of you, you are allowed to advance.

 If there are two players in the middle – as in a midfielder dropping deeper – you should advance
forward.

 Before receiving position yourself so you face the central spaces and always try to look towards
the highest midfielders so you have the most information input for your possible passes. If you
play it to the wings, try to do it directly!

 You are allowed to position yourself in a line with the central midfielders but only if there is still
an open passing lane to your central back and you are not too near to the wing back in front of
you.

 Only move towards the middle when we have possession if you think we will lose the ball soon
or your support in the middle is the only option to stay in possession. Otherwise stay wide.

Left Holding Midfielder:

 If the central back advances, move towards the side to open space. Move backwards so you still
have an open body posture towards up front. Look around you so you don’t get pressured from
behind.

 If you don’t find space in the middle, drop deeper so the side backs can become full backs. Try
then to either find them or the central midfielders.
  Don’t move too far to the sides. Always stay in front of the gap between the central back and
the side back. Only move to get free and to escape oppositional access.

 Turn if there is a vertical or diagonal pass to the players higher than you; you should be able to
receive lay offs from them and then distribute forward again.

 Try to have an open body posture towards the right side; with this you have a good overview of
many players and can also distribute it long.

Right Holding Midfielder:

 Don’t initiate positional changes with the right wing back if you are potentially able to receive
the next pass. If you feel you won’t get the ball and can’t get free, you are free to initiate
positional changes with the right wing back.

 Don’t be in one horizontal line with the right wing back. Try to be in a line between him and the
right side back.

 If you pass to the middle, look toward the right side to see what your partner is doing. If he gets
a pass (especially from you), immediately look towards the middle so you know where you could
pass to if you receive it back immediately.

 Never be further away from the right wing back then 20 meters, except your partner in central
midfield has dropped deeper. Then move towards the middle to occupy the space in front of the
gap between him and the central back / sweeper.

 One great situation to change positions is when we circulate on the opposite side and pass it
back. Now you can move towards the wing and he can advance into the middle. Look at your
partner and create eye contact when changing position!

 You are allowed to advance through the middle and towards the oppositional box, attack open
space in front of you if you see it.

 If you are on the wing, play like you think a wing back plays! (if more training time, teach them
the instructions of the wing back too)

Right Wing Back

 Look at your partner and create eye contact when changing position! One great situation to
change positions is when we circulate on the opposite side and pass it back. If you feel you saw
open space in the middle and you are not able to receive this or the next pass, move into the
open space for a positional change.

 Don’t be in one line with your partner. Try to be positioned higher so you also open space for
the side back. Move laterally into the middle or diagonally towards goal, if the side back on your
side advances.
  When passing it forward, immediately look towards the middle. When passing it backwards,
immediately look forward.

 If you pass it diagonally into the middle, advance on the side. If you played it vertically on the
side, advance diagonally through the middle.

 When being on the ball or engaged in a combination, move into the middle. This creates an
overload and chaos for the opponent while our shape allows us to cover this.

 Only move towards the middle when we have possession if you think we will lose the ball soon
or your support in the middle is the only option to stay in possession. Otherwise stay wide. If
your partner advances, fill in behind him and stay deeper if needed.

Left Central Midfielder

 Don’t be positioned in a horizontal line with you the left wing back besides you, your partner.
Try to be higher.

 One great situation to change positions is when we circulate on the opposite side and pass it
back. Now you can move towards the wing and he can advance into the middle. Look at your
partner and create eye contact when changing position!

 Keep at least 10 to 15 meters distance vertically to the holding midfielder behind you. If he
drops deeper, you are allowed to drop a line deeper. If the other holding midfielder moves
centrally, you don’t have to.

 You can move towards the sides to get a vertical pass from your wing back. He should move into
the middle then; try to find him or the centre forward with a pass.

 If the central forward is on the right side, you can advance to occupy the last line.

 Look around before receiving; when you pass to the side, immediately look towards the middle
and look for the other central midfielder. If you pass to the middle, look for the central forward
and the wing back.

Left Wing Back

 Don’t be positioned in a horizontal line with you the left wing back besides you, your partner.
Try to be deeper.

 One great situation to change positions is when we circulate on the opposite side and pass it
back. Now you can move towards the wing and he can advance into the middle. Look at your
partner and create eye contact when changing position!

 If your partner drops, you should advance. If the side back on your side advances, move towards
the middle or into the last line. If you pass it diagonally into the middle, advance on the side. If
you played it vertically on the side, advance diagonally through the middle.
  When passing it forward, immediately look towards the middle. When passing it backwards,
immediately look forward.

 When being on the ball or engaged in a combination, move into the middle. This creates an
overload and chaos for the opponent while our shape allows us to cover this.

 Only move towards the middle when we have possession if you think we will lose the ball soon
or your support in the middle is the only option to stay in possession. Otherwise stay wide.

Right Central Midfielder

 Look around you; if there is open space and our team has no passing option, fill it and act as
distributor.

 Keep about 15 meters distance vertically to the holding midfielder behind you. Imagine it as
opening space for him! The oppositional players in the middle should always have to question
themselves who to mark. This means only occasionally move into the last line so the centre back
of the opponent won’t just start to mark you. If this happens, roam towards the side or slightly
deeper.

 Don’t move towards the left side and don’t occupy the same spaces as the left central
midfielder.

Centre Forward

 Move towards the side where the ball is. Open space by moving towards the wing (opens gap
between the centre backs of the opponent) or occupying their sweeper (if your man marker
tracks you there which opens one side up).

 If they play with a back four, occupy the space behind their full back if he advances or the
channel between full and centre back.

 Try to run horizontally towards the ball side and look for long balls behind their defense into
space with abrupt vertical movements into gaps.

 If there is space open, you are allowed to drop but try to do lay offs and immediately turn and
go into depth with speed again.

 If one of the central midfielders advances forward, you can drop deeper into the opened space
to lose your marker.

 Before receiving, look around your shoulder. After passing, do that again. Try to find an open
man for possible break through and so you can get through balls yourself.

With this we have covered with a few simple instructions which we can coach our whole system which
as a whole is fairly complex. We are able to use it for coaching and it makes the players immediately
understand tactical aspects due to the consistent reference point we use.
Out of possession we also can create such instructions although I prefer simple guidelines for all players
more. Because of our system we should especially try to focus on these things in our sessions and
coaching points:

 If we lose the ball, immediately press the ball. Run towards him in full speed! If you can’t reach
it, still move towards the ball and cover for your team mates.

 If we lose the ball, don’t try to get to your nominal position; go to the nearest position in our
system.

 Imagine our system as a net or chain; if someone moves out, we follow him and move towards
the gap.

 Keep short distances and compactness (this should be focused in training sessions especially to
really keep them consistently and so the players know which distances are meant).

 First focus on the ball, then on your team mate. If the opponent near you is not having the ball
or being the next player who will get it, ignore him.

Additionally to these guidelines I’d personally create some game forms for specific aspects, go through
some situations explicitly and of course correct within the drills, at times using freezing. The drills and
methodology is important but won’t be covered in detail here.

Methodology And Coaching

In Germany Marco Henseling’s and my coaching book – incl. interviews with Robert Matosevic, Marti
Perarnau and Roger Schmidt – got published in winter. There we talked about periodization, basic
strategical and tactical aspects, pedagogy and didactics, technical training, forms of learning, etc. etc.

To talk about this in detail here would take too much: Even our book lacked many aspects and still had
nearly 240 pages without that many graphics and diagrams as we didn’t talk much about sessions but
about the fundamentals which lead to being able to build a session. The five main points were:

 Football specific

 Holistic

 Complex

 Synergistic

 Differential
A small graphic illustrating the hierarchy between these aspects; top to bottom.

Basically, being “football specific” is the base. Everything you do should be extracted from the game and
its principles itself; not the opposite. Many go the other way and do weight lifting because “you need
power too in football”. That’s the wrong starting point in my eyes. Football specific comes from the
game itself. If you do that as base, there are four basic things which have to follow.

The drill has to be holistic; should train as many aspects as possible as the game itself never has an
isolated aspect to it. There’s always context. Try to make an image of the game in your drills and put
everything you can coach for an action into it. But these aspects have to interact with each other, as
they do in the game.

That’s “complexity”. The simultaneous interaction between the aspects makes it complex. The
complexity should be arranged in a way it makes the whole thing more than the sum of its parts
(“synergistic”). Every decision in the drill interacts with what happened before and what will happen
after; the possible consequences of the next actions are part of every decision! Then it should be flexible
and varying every time with every repetition. Not repetition should be the exact same. That’s
“differential”.

These principles are based on sports science, the talks with elite coaches, among them the interview(s)
with Roger Schmidt and our former work from Spielverlagerung with Thomas Tuchel as analysts. Note:
This does not mean that everything else is ineffective; it’s just the way I deduced so far for myself to be
working best based on personal experience as coach, talking with coaches, analyzing methodologies and
the newest input from sports science reflected on the game of football. It also does not mean that there
are no instructions from the coach; they are put into the session through talks with the players,
explanations, freezing, video analysis (if possible), the session design and the patterns created based on
the session design. Also we had more than enough instructions in the last part of this article, right?

An example for a drill in this system could be this:

The size of the field should be 24m length, 36m width. Using cones on the pitch we can mark a 3×3 grid;
the central zone is twice as wide as the side zones. So the zones are 9x8m three times on each side and
18x8m three times in the central strip. On both ends there are two goals each, on the sides where the
middle bordered on the side strip.

The teams have two different instructions based on the Priming we want to accomplish for our game
model of the 3-2-4-1/3-4-2-1. I would put up one team to play in a 3-2-1 and the other team in a 2-3-1 or
in a 3-2 versus 2-3. In the latter example we would have the central back, wing backs and centre
midfielders in one team versus the side backs, holding midfielders and center forward in the other.

The rules of this game could be for instance specified like this: Maximum of two players in the same
zone in the middle strip, maximum of one player in the same zone on the wing, a maximum of two
players in the whole wing zone on one side. To this specific instructions for the players are added.

Instructions: At the beginning we could say that a back-pass option is always important to leave pressure
and being able to switch. The side backs should be positioned at the edges of their zones; basically
copying how they split in the game and the ability to advance when one of the central midfielders drops.
When they see this (remember the basic system instructions?) they have to split wider and go into the
wing zones, advance if necessary / possible.

In the 3-2 we of course have our central back building play and the wing backs already higher in before.
The wing backs should always occupy width and not move to the ball, so we can switch the sides when
needed.

The central players are free to move, but could change their position and occupy the wing, drop or
advance. As per our “non-negotiable” strategical aspects we play with immediate pressing and for
regular pressing they first have to position themselves in their shape in the central zone – and only in
that! – with all players.

This gives them high compactness and forces them to move towards the ball. The two goals on the sides
– instead of one centrally – not only force the team in possession to switch the sides fast and frequently
but to play diagonal passes behind and move with the team out of possession forced to always give
cover and defend the paths to the goal properly. One false movement or lack of connection to the team
mate would open space for an immediate through ball.

Coaching points? I actually did this with my team to test it.

First started coaching towards high intensity in passing and pressing, rarely focusing on technical aspects
and later on – when intensity was high and the rules were understood – I praised right decisions and did
not correct as much first. Then I started to correct some positions and explained them.

In the breaks (periodization of the drill was 4x8min, 90 seconds break) I gave short explanations and
feedback through asking questions about specific aspects. For instance on dismarking and movement of
the side players; the left side back for example had problems in terms of movement to open space for
himself or others which we went through in front of the team shortly.
Later he had better movement and some interesting overlaps and diagonal dribbles into the middle. The
left wing back of the 3-2 team was brilliant; he gave depth well, sometimes tried to get a diagonal pass
behind the defense, always staying on his position, a few times changing intelligently into the middle
and sometimes dropping deeper to build up from deeper zone with more space and time.

The last repetition was very nice; there were many on one side, then diagonally to the central players
who laid it off to the back line who immediately switched with one pass to the other side with
immediate movement and support. Thus, the movement was self-initiated. According to our Priming
they started to do more fast shifts, had flexible build up situations and later on started – thanks to the
coaching – to change the positions.

The right wing back was initially static, later moved often to the center and once ended up on the left;
ultimately even against the ball the positional changes started to become functional. As I coached from
outside explicitly to “not move to the original position, but the next!” this became better later on.
Athletically, the impact was also high and the players had many actions, many sprints and seemed fairly
exhausted. All in all the players gave good feedback and there were small but visible steps towards our
Priming made.

Sessions like these can – with additional drills to support this, the instructions mentioned above, some
visualizations and proper coaching – lead after some time to the game model we created.

Tactical Theory: Vertical build-up passing

von EA am 12.05.2016 in den Kategorien Tactical Theory mit 7 Kommentaren

One of the most important principles of football is moving the ball forward. As an invasion sport, the
eventual aim of any play is to reach the opposition’s end of the pitch and score. With the rise of ever
more advanced pressing and counterpressing schemes, it is increasingly difficult to do this.

Every team utilises different build-up patterns in order to move into more advanced areas of the pitch.
These differing principles vary widely depending on each coach and the players at their disposal. But one
such tool that many teams utilise is the use of vertical passing in the first phase of build-up. If completed
successfully, this allows for instant progression of the ball into a more advanced area of the pitch and
past one, or sometimes two, lines of opposition pressure.
Basic example of vertical passing in first build-up phase

Whilst this type of pass can be a good way to advance play, it is often difficult to complete for a number
of reasons. It has to be deliberately created by the team in possession. There are a number of ways to
do this, such as quick horizontal circulation. But regardless, if there is not a suitable support structure
around the receiving player, then they will find it hard to retain possession.

The other factor to consider is the field of vision of the receiver and supporting players. Because of the
nature of the pass, the receiving player will often be facing towards their own goal. This is not a problem
if the play is in that direction, but it limits ability to transition and progress play quickly. One of the main
advantages of a vertical pass in initial build-up phases is that it breaks two lines of opposition defense,
meaning the opposition midfield are in front of the ball once the pass reaches its destination. This
presents a potential transition chance; but this window of opportunity can quickly close. If the forward
receives the ball with his back to goal, and is expected to turn past a defender behind him, the opening
for transition may disappear.
If the centre back plays the ball into the forward in this situation, it’ll be received in a 4v1 and they can
say ‘bye bye’ to possession.

In order to stop an immediate loss of possession, the receiving player will need a suitable support
structure around him. What this structure is comprised of depends on a number of variables. For
example, the individual profile of the receiving player can alter the optimal structure. Some players are
comfortable receiving the ball with their back to goal and changing direction in one fluid movement. In
these cases, his teammates may focus on maintaining a larger distance away to create space for a 1v1
opportunity with the opposition CB. But if the receiving player is less mobile, nearby players with a
forward-facing field of vision will be more helpful.

This type of pass does more than merely winning space in an advanced area. If the nearby players are
well structure in accordance with their skillset, then it allows a number of following options. Because it
can allow for a number of options that the receiving player can utilise, it is a useful tool for teams
utilising positional play. Whilst some teams may use it to create third man runs, others may look to
create dribbling opportunities or combination play in a dangerous area behind the opposition midfield.

Speed and accuracy of the pass

Even with a good support structure, one of the most important features of a positive ball progression is
the pass itself. The pass can be particularly important if the receiving player has his back to goal or a
limited field of vision for any other reason. This is because it can act as a form of non-verbal
communication, potentially giving an indicator of the situation that is out of view of the receiving player.

If the player that drops back from the front-line to receive the pass is being tightly followed by a man-
oriented opposition defender, a pass hit with slightly more power could signal space in behind. The
increased pace on the ball makes it easier to turn and begin moving around the defender in one fluid
movement. If the defender hangs back and the forward drops into an area with more space, a slower
pass would make it easier to control and signal to the receiving player that he has more time to turn. A
slower pass into space also suggests the receiving player move into that space to receive the ball.

In a similar way, the accuracy (or aim) of a pass allows the receiving player to act differently based on
very fine margins. A pass played with power outside the receiving player’s feet will almost always force
him to turn in that direction, unless he is particularly skilled at manipulating the ball. This is useful if the
player can quickly turn that way and manoeuvre his way past the defender. But a pass played with large
power towards a player’s feet allows him to trap the ball aggressively towards a nearby teammate,
merely altering the initial passes direction rather than creating more power on the pass.

This combination of speed & direction creates many different permutations. Even then, the receiving
player’s interpretation of the pass should also be considered. The same pass may have different
meaning to a different receiving player, who will interpret it with his own skill-set in mind. If Andy Carroll
receives a ball outside his left foot at pace, it’s unlikely he’s going to turn him and sprint in on goal.
As well as using the pass as a signalling tool for the receiving player, nearby teammates can also adapt
based on the speed and accuracy. Whilst a pass is generally completed in less than a second, this still
allows the opportunity to alter body positioning and move a few valuable yards. This can make a big
difference, particularly against a compact defense.

When combined with certain needle moves from the receiving player, this can even be used to fool
nearby defenders and create an extra yard of space. Because it is understood that a strong pass to the
right makes it easier for the receiving player to turn to his right, many defenders will react as if this is
likely to happen. If the receiving player does a simple drop of his shoulder to feint a movement in that
direction, it is almost instinctive for the opponent to go that way.

In the same way, the player making the pass can utilise different body positions to manipulate the
opponent’s movement. Players will make judgements on the potential destination of a pass before the
pass is actually made. This can be achieved by looking at the player’s body & leg positioning and field of
vision. In many cases, players at the top level will hypothesise the direction of a pass before it is even
made, as the passing player’s body, leg & eye positioning suggests it. However, when this does not
happen, it gives the defenders less time to anticipate and make a decision. In some cases, it may even
fool them entirely into moving the wrong direction.

Sergio Busquets is the master of creating the illusion of passing in one direction before actually passing
in another. His head & body are positioned in such a way that the opposition believe he is passing into
the ‘fake’ passing lane; this shifts them to the side and creates space for him to pass into in a more
dangerous area.

If the nearby teammates are well-positioned, the players should be able to react in a number of
different ways based on the speed & accuracy of the pass as well as the decision making of the passing
player. This creates a dynamic support structure that the team can collectively adapt to whilst the pass is
in motion and at the whim of the passing & receiving players. This allows a number of different options
for the receiving player, and a huge number of potential patterns of play for the team in possession.
Here Bender is temporarily not available for a pass, but he will be open as soon as Gotze receives the
ball. Hummels fires a quick pass to Gotze’s right foot; the speed of the pass and aim towards Gotze’s
right makes Kacar believe that Gotze is turning that way. Kacar comes sprinting in, but Gotze notices this
and fakes to his right before passing to Gundogan and moving into a more advanced space himself.
Kacar attempts to close down Gundogan, but this temporary 2v1 makes it too difficult for him to regain
possession. Gotze receives the ball again, combines expertly with Lewandowski, and scores.

pic.twitter.com/xtLhBcE7wP

— Ed (@edAfootball) April 19, 2016

Increased speed on the pass from Hummels presents potential options for Gotze that would otherwise
not be available. Specifically, the feint to his right would be much less effective if Hummels had played a
slower pass. It is for this reason that passes hit with increased speed (but still with good accuracy) are an
extremely valuable tool in any build-up play, vertically-focused or otherwise. Indeed, when Thomas
Tuchel began his managerial stint at Dortmund, his initial training sessions were focused explicitly on
passing speed. In some cases, he even modified the ball-striking technique of some of his players. Since
then, Dortmund’s build-up has improved massively.

The Gotze goal is also an example of why a more direct pass in build-up is so effective against man-
marking. Kagawa drags his marker wide to create the space for Bender & Gotze, who has himself drifted
in from the right to lose his marker. This effectively leaves Kacar alone in the centre of the pitch to
defend three players by himself.

Whilst there are a number of different variations, man marking is an inherently reactive strategy – it
involves mimicking the movements of the opposition. This allows the team in possession to dictate the
tempo of the game, and also makes it easier to create large open spaces, or a large amount of smaller
spaces to turn into. This is helpful for teams hoping to integrate vertical passes into their build-up
scheme.

Timing of the pass

This leads onto another important facet of the pass: timing.

Because of the nature of football, any defensive scheme (man marking or not) will leave a gap
somewhere. In order to create the strongest scheme possible, teams will attempt to ensure these gaps
are in the least dangerous area. One such area that teams do not often prioritise against is central
defenders and their passing. This means they have more time on the ball than any of their teammates,
giving more opportunity to assess the situation in front of them and play the optimum pass. It also gives
them a greater chance to alter the timing of their pass to suit the receiving player. Altering the timing of
the pass by half a second will be pivotal in determining the success of a pass.

— Ed (@edAfootball) April 20, 2016

Despite (some) pressure from the opposition forward, Blind holds onto the ball a few seconds longer to
ensure Lingard receives the ball at the perfect time.

This pass is played by Blind into an area with no support structure. It is therefore imperative that the run
from Lingard is co-ordinated perfectly with the pass. If the pass reaches Lingard too early, then he will
be running quickly towards his own goal. Combine this with few potential passing options for him, and it
will be tricky to retain possession. If the ball reaches him after the ‘peak’ of his run, then he will be
facing the opponent’s goal and the ball will be more difficult to control, particularly whilst running at
speed.

These same principles apply to more team-oriented build-up plays too.

From TP’s team analysis of Hertha Berlin: the timing of the pass from the GK is vitally important in
allowing Darida to receive the ball in space. If he releases the ball too early, then Skjelbred will still be
blocking the potential passing lane. Too late, and the opposition will have time to react, and can limit
Darida’s space.

On-ball forward movements from central defenders

Because central defenders (and goalkeepers) are generally given more time to play the ball, there is
often room for them to move into with the ball (maybe not goalkeepers). In order to leave a man free at
the back themselves, the man-marking team will task their striker with man-marking both of the
opposition central defenders. Depending on which player has the ball, the striker has to shift laterally to
defend that player. Not only can this be tiring and inefficient for the individual, but it can also create
serious issues for the defensive structure if the in-possession central defender utilises a sharp forward
movement with the ball.
The principle of provoking the press (or ‘Andribbeln’) is a vital feature of positional play, and a key
aspect of German coaching education. This concept is easier to initiate against a man-marking system in
this way. This is because if the initial sharp movement forward from the CB is successful, then they can
advance into midfield and create numerical superiority. This forces a midfield player from the opposition
to make a decision: stay with your current marker, or confront the new opponent. Both options are
dangerous. If they choose to move away from their direct opponent to confront the onrushing CB, then
they risk leaving that player free in space. If they choose to stay with their direct opponent, then that
player can merely drift away from the CB’s potential dribbling lane, meaning he can continue
progressing forward into an even more advanced area.

Assuming that merely allowing the CB to move forward is not a suitable option, the two most efficient
ways of dealing with this for a man-marking side are both difficult to perform.

1) Perform a switch of direct opposition to mark. When the CB progresses with the ball, a midfielder
confronts him, and the striker (originally tasked with marking the CB) moves back to cover the
opposition player left free. This still relies on larger backwards movements from the striker, meaning he
is out of position for a quick transition if possession is regained. As well as this, it also means the other
CB is available for a quick outlet pass, and the process can begin again. This creates huge [often
unnecessary] physical demands on the striker in question.

2) Rely on the onrushing midfielder to confront the forward-moving CB *and* close the passing lane to
the player he was previously marking. Considering the CB is moving at high speed to evade the striker,
and the previously-marked midfielder may make a lateral movement at any moment, this is very difficult
to perform successfully.

— Ed (@edAfootball) April 21, 2016

Pep Guardiola aggressively utilised this strategy against Bielsa’s man-marking Bilbao team. Here,
Mascherano steps past Llorente, and moves into midfield. Bilbao are able to perform a switch of
markers between Llorente & Muniain, and the build-up play does not break through the midfield. But no
problem. Recycle back to Geri Pique, and more of the same. Poor Llorente.

This aggressive forward positioning from his central defenders (Mascherano particularly) was mentioned
in Marti Perarnau’s book ‘Pep Confidential’. Guardiola was explaining to Javi Martinez how he
attempted to get Messi into space in dangerous areas by moving Mascherano forward, forcing one of
the Bilbao markers to abandon their man and move towards Mascherano. Messi would then drop into
the vacated space, and offer himself as an immediate passing option. Even if Messi were not available,
someone else would be.

The build-up to Hummels’ assist for Reus during the turbulent Europa League match between Liverpool
& Dortmund. Liverpool’s situational man-marking means it only takes one pass from the central
defender to the striker (and then… to the net).

This relies on good passing speed in the horizontal passes leading up to the forward movement from the
central defender, to ensure the striker does not have time to adjust. The same principle applies when
facing a zonal marking system, especially if the opponent are particularly ball-oriented. A quick lateral
shift in play may create space in a more advanced area by disrupting the horizontal compactness in the
opposition block, unless they are all able to maintain equal distances whilst shifting.

For obvious reasons this is more difficult to achieve if the opposition’s first line of pressing has two
players, but in these cases there are potential for overloads elsewhere and the need for a central
defender to move forward is lower. Although, this also presents the opportunity for a move to a back
three with the free man again advancing to create a situational numerical overload in midfield. This is
also a tool that Guardiola has utilised, with David Alaba being played as a ‘box to box CB’. This can also
be achieved with a situational back three with a midfielder dropping into the first build-up line, or a full-
back moving into a more central position.
Of course, there are enough potential combinations for any attacking system and the resulting man
marking response for a whole other article. But these principles generally apply regardless.

Breaking down zonal marking systems using vertical passing is slightly more difficult because these free
spaces cannot be created so easily. Whilst it is easy to break down a man-marking system before the
initial vertical pass is even made, playing against a zonal system also necessitates an adequate response
to the pass itself and therefore the following support structure is vital.

This can be achieved, for example, through the use of a basic one-two pass. For obvious reasons, most
central defenders do not have the luxury of following their pass with an off-ball movement. But
midfielders, who have more license to move into advanced areas, can combine passing accuracy & aim
with runs of their own. This creates a number of different passing options and combinations, which
present the chance to break down even the most well-organised & compact defense.

Utrecht attempt to break down a compact man-oriented zonal marking system from Groningen.
Because of the well-spaced triangle formed in the centre of the pitch, there are a number of off-ball
movement options for each player. The receiving player has an inward-facing field of vision, so the
passer opts to aim the pass at his right foot and makes the movement inside.

The forward movement of the initial passer creates a temporary overload if the midfield fail to adjust to
his new positioning. This overload of the zone where the ball will be immediately after the vertical pass
is a key way of exploiting the space between the lines that is more apparent in zonal marking systems
than man marking. When this temporary overload is combined with a number of potential movement
options and a variable support structure, more potential combinations of play and movement patterns
are created. This makes the attack more fluid, less predictable, and harder to defend.

Utilising support structures to facilitate re-circulation

Creating a suitable support structure prior to the vertical pass from defense is one key way to overload a
zonal marking system. Because of the nature of long, vertical, ground passes, the opposition needs to be
well-covered in a number of zones to defend them successfully. It is difficult to balance a high press with
successful deep coverage within one system. Generally, there is more space deeper in the opponent’s
midfield if they are attempting to press high as they attempt to utilise their players in more advanced
areas of the pitch. This leaves less players to cover a larger space in deep areas.

If the opponent is attempting to utilise a high line to facilitate a compact shape *and* high press, then
this leaves space in behind. As mentioned earlier, a pass hit with slightly more power may allow the
recipient to make use of this space more easily. Ideally, the primary supporting player will be positioned
so as to be able to make a movement in behind the defense, or into the space between the lines,
depending on the pass.

“In all of these situations the first decision for the player getting free is if he’ll run into the gap or if he’ll
already be positioned. The first decision helps him in terms of visual field of opposition who either don’t
see him or have to lose eye contact to the ball carrier. In the first picture left he drops and receives
between opposition, so he has more space to turn into. In the second picture he goes into depth, so he
can either break through or lay it off to his team mate – who is positioned in a way that if he gets
pressed he can get his body between ball and opponent most easily. In the latter he moves centrally in
between these four which gives them a tough decision who will push out to press (or if it will happen).” –
RM in his article on creating a game model.

When these principles are utilised collectively by a team, it can create a support structure with huge
variation. If the ball is lost, then it is important to complement this structure with an aggressive
challenge for second balls. An additional advantage of having a temporary overload in an advanced area
of the pitch is that there is an immediate opportunity to counterpress and regain possession quickly.

The fact that these vertical passes can break two lines of opposition pressure instantly progresses play
forwards and deep into the opposition’s block. Whilst this presents potential for an immediate transition
into even more dangerous situations, there is no need for the team to be too aggressive in their
decision-making. Much like in the previous example when Mascherano was unable to break through the
opposition’s midfield, a sharp vertical movement presents opportunity for all of his teammates to move
forward. When the ball was returned to Gerard Pique, he was 20 yards further forward than when
Mascherano began his movement. This same principle can apply to the use of vertical passes.

Whilst this is not the perfect situation for the team in possession, it offers a handy failsafe should the
initial attempt at penetrating the opposition defense fail. They attempted to aggressively attack the lack
of compactness in Team White’s midfield, and when this was unsuccessful (perhaps due to poor passing
speed or any other reason), they were able to recover and regain possession.

For some teams, this recycling of possession into a more advanced position can be the end-goal of this
type of pass. Instead of aggressively pursuing combination play behind the opposition midfield, their aim
will be to ensure they are well structured for build-up when the ball is returned to the defenders. This
might mean, for example, that a winger in a 4-4-2 shape would stay wider rather than move inside to
involve himself in potential combination play. Instead, remaining wider would allow for a route out of
the inevitable pressure that will come from all directions once the initial vertical pass is made. Once the
vertical pass is made and the opposition midfield attempt to move behind the ball. This allows the first
build-up line to collectively progress into a more advanced area utilising positional play.

Using the vertical pass to move first build-up line forwards: Team White recover their lack of
compactness quickly, and Team Red are simply able to recycle possession in a more advanced area.

Some teams may use longer diagonal passing in much the same way. This has the added advantage of
being even more separated from the high press of the opposition, and gives more opportunity for added
overloads. It does also run the risk of separating the players involved from the play if a long diagonal is
not utilised, though.

Deliberate deepening of play

It can also be effective to utilise the exact opposite of this strategy: moving the ball backwards to
provoke the press and disrupt a compact opposition shape. When confronted with a team who is well-
drilled at shifting sideways to adjust for horizontal ball circulation, provoking the press may come in the
form of disrupting the opposition’s vertical compactness.

Shifting the ball backwards can disrupt the distances between the opposition forwards and midfield. If
an opposition forward moves to pressure the ball-player, a well-structured backline will often have a
spare man (particularly if the goalkeeper is utilised as part of the first build-up line). This 3v1, 3v2 or 4v3
can be punished with a pass to the open man and a quick circulation of the ball into a more advanced
area of the pitch.

Whilst the ball may end up in the same space that it was in before the backwards pass, the opposition
defensive block will be stretched and there will be more space for the receiving player. This can present
immediate transition opportunities if the team builds with good passing speed and is well-structured in
advanced areas of the pitch.

Badly executed pressing from Ingolstadt, too easy for Neuer to find Müller in the halfspace. Nice ball
circulation. pic.twitter.com/adHIbFm19y

— István Beregi (@szteveo) May 9, 2016

Ingolstadt shift well horizontally, but the diagonal-backwards pass from Kimmich to Neuer creates a
more complex set of movements to collectively co-ordinate. The vertical compactness is broken and
many spaces open in midfield for Thomas Müller to feast on.

Effect of passing angles

Passing angles also alter the effectiveness of build-up play for ground passes too, and diagonal passes in
initial build-up phases are often preferable to horizontal or vertical passes. As well as the field of vision
benefits mentioned previously, they also combine some of the best features of each pass type. Much
like vertical passes, they progress play into a more advanced area and often break opposition pressing
lines. They also contribute to shifting the opposition sideways, potentially creating space between
players and breaking horizontal compactness. Against zonal marking systems, disrupting the
opposition’s defensive spacing can be key to finding the space needed to break through.

Whilst having more strategical advantages, these diagonals are also more difficult to play. Man-marking
systems can be manipulated into creating space, but well-spaced zonal marking systems are generally
able to better close diagonal passing lanes. This is where passing speed becomes increasingly important.
As well as this, some players have developed individual styles to open passing lanes that may not be
available to others. As mentioned previously, Busquets creates the illusion of passing in one direction
before actually passing in another. Mats Hummels seems to have mastered an outside-of-the-boot
through ball into the left halfspace, allowing the runner to receive the ball curving towards goal.
Leonardo Bonucci is capable of chipping the ball over one line of pressure but dropping it into a small
space, often rendering cover shadows meaningless. Xabi Alonso has developed a bullet pass that skids
along the ground at huge speed, making it difficult to intercept. These individual skillsets can alter a
team’s build-up style quite significantly because of the additional passing lanes they create.

Pass locations

By the very nature of the vertical pass, the first supporting player cannot be in the same vertical line as
the player receiving the initial pass; otherwise they’d be in the way. Because of this, the first supporting
player will have a tilted field of vision towards the play. If this pass takes place in the halfspace, it allows
the player to have an improved view of the play.
This same principle applies for players receiving a vertical pass in the halfspace and then immediately
turning inwards towards play rather than playing a wall pass to a nearby player. If this happens in the
centre, they have to turn in one direction, meaning they cannot immediately see the other side of the
pitch. But in the halfspace, this means they are temporarily oblivious to merely part the wing area.

However, it should be noted that if this logic were extrapolated, it would indicate the wing is the ideal
area for the vertical pass (as they can see the whole pitch from the wing, right?). This is clearly not true.
It is important to manage the benefits of a clear field of vision with the increased number of potential
passing options and strategic advantages that the halfspace offers. If the initial vertical pass is made into
the halfspace, and the receiving player has limited options in the centre, then it’s likely there will be
space to utilise wide. But if the initial pass is made into a wide area, there is only one direction to move.

This also highlights the advantages of diagonal passes into the halfspace from the centre for players
attempting to turn quickly. The player receiving the ball will have an inward-facing field of vision,
allowing for more of an immediate view of play. It also means they have to perform a half-turn rather
than a full 180-degree rotation to move towards the opposition goal. Some players are even capable of
performing a half-turn before the ball gets to them by altering their body positioning whilst the pass is in
motion.
Gotze checks behind him before the pass, and then opens up his field of vision whilst the pass is in
motion. As the pass is being played, he is facing Alonso completely. By the time he takes his first touch,
he is facing horizontally. Finally, his second touch completes the rotation. Beautiful. The firm pass from
Xabi Alonso further aids this process, and the natural pace on the ball forces Gotze that way and into the
open space.

If the receiving player is on the end of diagonal balls from the centre to the halfspace, and has this
ability, it can allow for halfspace penetration even without a necessary support structure. It goes
without saying that this can greatly increase the build-up possibilities for a team.
Zonal Marking / Zonal Coverage

von RM am 01.07.2014 in den Kategorien Tactical Theory mit 4 Kommentaren

The two main types of defense used in soccer are man-marking and zonal marking. In this article we will
explain the different types of zonal marking and their advantages and disadvantages.

Written by Rene Maric

Translated by @rafamufc

General information about Zonal Marking

Zonal marking was the first way defense was played. The original zonal marking had very little to do with
the modern style because it lacked organization. One might call it chaos marking as everyone just sort of
stood around and occasionally tried to win the ball.

Today, zonal marking is anything but chaotic. The advance of athleticism, game intelligence, and
especially the professionalization of football, have led to the dying out of man-marking as players are
individually stronger and better coordinated as a team. The gaps are now narrower and better covered,
which mitigates the vulnerability of zonal marking between the horizontal and vertical lines.

In the late eighties, zone defense was extended further by Raumvernappung (squeezing space). In this
style, the game was basically kept compact and the effective playing field compressed by the factors of
time, space, and the offside rule. Arrigo Sacchi trained his players to use four reference points:

“Our players had four reference points: the ball, the space, the opponent and his own teammates. Every
movement had to happen in relation to these reference points. Each player had to decide which of these
reference points should determine his movements. “
– Arrigo Sacchi

In order to play zonal coverage, the team must consider these reference points when shifting and
pressing to remain stable and prevent opening any holes.

That being said, it should be noted that playing a ball-oriented game is not zonal marking. The ball-
oriented game refers to the adjustment of the player and his team to the movement of the ball. Which,
in zonal marking, is usually applied much more when pressing and squeezing space.

Theoretically, it is possible to play zonal marking without being ball-oriented. It used to be quite
common to not man-mark but mark space; yet not indent or constantly move in the direction of the ball
at all.

It is also a mistake to believe that Sacchi’s four reference points only apply to squeezing space and
pressing. They are generally used in the defensive game and the attacking game, which has the added
benefit of the reference points providing reasons for playing the different types of zonal marking.

Zonal marking as a team

First, we will explain collective zonal marking, which is practiced by the entire team, and its variants.

For easier understanding all of the scenes in this article will be based on a 4-4-2 formation in defense

Variant 1: Position-oriented zonal marking

In position-oriented zonal marking, the player’s reference point is his “teammates”. The team simply
operates in a closed block. This ‘block’ is nothing but a formation, in which the respective positions are
clearly defined and a player “covers” his own position. The term position marking could also be used.

Some examples include Lucien Favre’s Gladbach or Valeriy Lobanovskyi’s Dynamo Kyiv. At Gladbach, it is
striking how effectively they move back and forth while often exerting little pressure on the opponents
or the ball. Instead, they focus on thwarting attacks by controlling space. If the opposing team resorts to
circulating the ball, Gladbach move so quickly and precisely that the supposedly “open” wings can’t be
played.
At the same time, the vertical and horizontal compactness is preserved, so the opponent can hardly find
space within the block. If they try to play into the narrow space, then the lines move toward each other
(or only one line moves, depending on the game philosophy) and closes the space. Over time, this puts
the opponent under pressure; resulting in winning the ball off bad passes or other technical errors.

The characteristics of position-oriented zonal marking are: clearly recognizable banks in defense and
midfield, giving space to the opposition on the wings, and straight lines. However, the formation must
not consist of equally wide chains or equal spacing between the various parts of the team. The goal is to
keep the gaps and the space between the lines as small as possible.

In effect, this often looks somewhat passive because little pressure can be generated against an
intelligent and cautious ball circulation. This season, Favre played it so that he pulled apart the space
between the lines or intelligently moved the lines up to establish access for their pressing.
Example of position-oriented zonal marking

The opponent builds play on their right side, with what seems to be a 4-1-2-3 as a variation of the 4-3-3
with wide wingers. For illustrative reasons, we (blue team) are standing in an ultra-defensive formation.

The opponent plays to the right and the team moves as a group to that side of the pitch. The space that
appeared to be open on the side for the winger is suddenly very tight and can not be safely played. The
ball goes into the center and our (semi) left striker gets access and moves to press. The team follows his
example and take the same running paths.

The opponent is approached slowly and step by step, which sometimes seems a bit laid-back. Despite
the passivity and reduced access, however, the block remains stable and compact. Passes into the space
between the lines are difficult and can be compressed by narrowing the team’s spacing.

Variant 2: Man-oriented zonal marking

In man-oriented zonal marking, you play with a basic formation in which the reference point is the
“opponent.” From their respective base positions, the players orient themselves flexibly in the space
they cover in order to maintain a certain distance to the opponent closest to them.

The contrast to man-marking is obvious. In man-marking, a player sticks very tight to an opponent,
oftentimes even tracking just the one opponent. In zonal marking, a player must cover the space around
his position, loosely moving his position to any nearby opponent and staying close to them.

In a way, it’s a compromise between position-oriented zonal marking and man-marking. The advantage
over man-marking is fewer open holes. The advantage over position-oriented zonal marking is the
increased access gained via the shorter distance to the opposition.
Example of man-oriented zonal marking

The opposing right-back receives the ball, so our team shifts to the left. It is striking that our sixes
behave differently: one is based on the opponent’s right eight, one on their center forward. Our striker
is also man-oriented, however not in the classic sense, but in space: he cuts off the passing lane for the
opposing six, who is playing behind the other eight.

Alternatively, our other six could have oriented to the opposing left-half eight and the winger would
have remained in space. So all the pass routes and options are blocked directly (by cover shadows or
even situational man coverages) or indirectly (through access and narrowness).

The opposing full-back does not risk the line pass, but plays back. Our team therefore pushes out. The
striker separates from the space around his opponent and begins to press. The far winger pushes out
and, until the opposing center back handles the ball and continues playing, our winger is again near the
opponent’s left-back. Our left six runs past the opposing right eight and is now “suddenly” oriented on
the six of the opposing team.

In a way, one could say that man-oriented zonal marking, in contrast to position-oriented zonal marking,
does not wait for access and pressing, but seeks it. The difference to man-marking is that the opponent
will not be tracked or handed over to another teammate, but left to stand in space, and one can reorient
themselves at any time. Furthermore, one does not focus on the opponent, but the action space and the
access distance.

Variant 3: Space-oriented zonal marking

In this third variant, which is used much less frequently than man- and position-oriented zonal marking,
the reference point is space. The team shifts toward the effective playing space “in the moment” and
tries to occupy it.

On paper, one might think that sounds intelligent. The space would be overloaded and the opponent’s
short pass combinations would be destroyed by a lot of pressure. In practice, however, this is not the
case, if the opponents are even remotely smart. They can move into the many open spaces, particularly
away from the ball, and destroy the opponent’s formation.

One example was the match between Valencia and Malaga, where Valencia wanted to restrict Malaga’s
fluidity and situational narrowness with a space-oriented zonal marking, which failed completely.
Example of space-oriented zonal marking

In a sense, it was the lost twin of man-marking; in terms of idiocy. The pass goes as usual to the
opposing right-back and the entire team is oriented on the new space.

They have no access, the pass goes into the middle, and they move there. What happened?

Right, away from the ball the space is wide open. Every variant of zonal marking (with space squeezing,
at least) results in open spaces, but in space-oriented zonal marking they arise throughout as a natural
occurrence. They will also be so large that they can be played not only on long dangerous diagonal balls
but, from halfway intelligent adversaries, through short passing combinations – as in this case.

In the game between Valencia and Malaga, Valencia tried this coverage to some extent and failed. In
this article you’ll find a few nice pictures from laola1.tv including a brief explanation.
Option 4: Option-oriented zonal marking

With the option-oriented or even ball-oriented zonal marking, the reference point is the ball – how can it
harm us, how do we prevent that? The team moves out of position differently, depending on the
position of the ball and the opportunities that arise for the opponents.

This option was practiced by Laudrup’s Swansea and, to some extent, FC Barcelona. It is important that
the players play smart and are well coordinated, otherwise numerous holes will be opened and the
formation torn apart.

Example of option-oriented zonal marking

It’s the same scenario, but with different movements. The opponent passes to the right-back (“our” left)
and our team moves. However, our right-back thinks, “Well, hey, if they play a sexy diagonal ball, there’ll
be trouble” and breaks off from the chain.
Our left winger cuts off the opponent’s right winger in his cover shadow, while the left six prevents a
dangerous pass coming to the opposing center-forward through the open space. The left striker cuts off
the opposing right eight with his cover shadow. His partner, the right striker, therefore moves up in
anticipation.

Why does he move up? We can see it in the attack development. The opposing right-back’s pass is risky,
the left striker tries to intercept him, fails and runs wider; now cutting off the opposing right-back in his
cover shadow. The second striker can now press and attack the opponent’s six.

Our team moves on, the far winger focuses on the flank. If we win the ball, he thrusts into space. If it is
passed off, he covers the far side from diagonal balls.

Zonal marking as an individual

Under certain circumstances, zonal marking can be operated in mixed or man-marking systems with
“space-markers”. Even if this is not the norm, we will dedicate ourselves briefly to two such options.
Though the possibilities are probably endless.

Option 1: The Libero

The most famous free man in the history of football is the libero. He traditionally played behind a
defensive line and had no opponent to mark, covering open spaces. The libero wanted to plug the many
holes left open by man-marking. Behind the tempestuous man-marking line, the libero was solid as a
rock; positioning himself behind holes in anticipation of intercepting passes or taking over from a
vacating teammate.
Bayern’s formation in the 1975 European Super Cup against Dynamo Kyiv, with Beckenbauer playing as
libero behind a man-marking team.

Option 2: Space interpreter and zonal marker

Some players act as free agents in front of the defense; sometimes even in zonal-marking systems. They
play a role isolated from the formation or a different zonal-marking than their teammates. So, a
defensive six could be the only one in his midfield playing position-oriented, and thus hold his position
while his teammates man-mark or organize their man-oriented zonal marking.

On the other hand, a ten could also play as a “hunter” and always orient towards where the opponent is
playing. Then he would repeatedly swing from a number ten role to the half positions and make space
there compact.

Anything else?
Actually, very much so. One can still incorporate a lot more reference points to put a greater emphasis
on pressing and especially counter-pressing, and build new zonal marking options. Time coverage would
be possible as well as ball coverage, structure coverage, Dynamik coverage and much more.

There are also tons of different variations to the previously mentioned zonal marking styles. These relate
to movement, the involvement in the defensive work (see Cristiano Ronaldo’s “gambling”), the exact
implementation of the defensive positional play, asymmetric possibilities, the defense’s behavior when
switching to the base formation and back, etc., etc.

This list above is intended to provide only a general overview of the two large and two smaller uses of
zonal marking; outside of these four variants, there are still ways to create new ideas; within these four
variants there are also an incredible number of variations.

How does the chain move when a player leaves position to press? Does one press backwards, or return
to their position? How exactly do you decide who presses backwards and what do the remaining players
do in their positions? Who provides defensive security and when?

The possibilities are endless thanks to the countless combinations and the many complex facets of the
game, Which is what makes football so incredibly diverse.

Even as a standard the use of a zonal marking system is not clearly defined. Most teams mix it up
positionally. Using situational or flexible man-marking and varying them in the different phases of the
defensive game. Starting from a position-oriented zonal marking against the opponent’s deep buildup in
order to remain stable and organized, then, switching to a man-oriented zonal marking when the
opponent is higher, in order to get faster access. During the pressing phase, they are then option-
oriented and cover the potential passing lanes or something similar. As you can see, a defensive
standard does not exist.