(Protestant) DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs.

(Protestee) RAMOS
P.E.T. Case No. 001* | Date: February 13, 1996 | En Banc Decision | Digest by Alex
*This case is an original action in the Supreme Court, acting as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET).

DOCTRINE: Executive Department - The President - Qualifications, Election, Term and

Oath - Election Contest- Miriam abandoned her electoral protest case when she ran and
took office as Senator after the 1995 elections. Consequently, the case has become
moot and academic.

FACTS:
o Protestant Miriam Defensor-Santiago (Miriam) ran for President in the 1992 elections
and lost against Fidel V. Ramos (Ramos).
o Miriam prayed that the revision of ballots1 in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas
be dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot areas be deemed completed.
o The Supreme Court deferred its action on that motion and required Miriam and
Ramos (protestee) to submit their respective memoranda on the issue of whether
or not the case has been rendered moot and academic by the election of
Miriam as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office on
June 30, 1995.
o Miriam's side: NO. They should decide on the election contest because:
 Election contest confirms the true choice of the electorate.
 The case at hand is imbued with public interest.
 It is only moot if the term of office has expired.
 Her election as Senator and assumption of office does not mean she
abandoned the protest.
 The Court has abandoned the view that just because a case has been
declared moot, it should be dismissed.
 Miriam referred to 3 cases to bolster her arguments:
1. Sibulo vda. de De Mesa vs. Mencias - the death of the protestee did
not stop the proceedings in the protest filed against him. A protest
survives the death of the protestee, and must be prosecuted to final
judgment.
2. Lomugdang vs. Javier- If the protest succeeds and the protestee is
unseated = NOT a ground for dismissal of the protest.
3. De Castro vs. Ginete- Just because a losing candidate concedes to
the winner, it doesn't mean that the losing candidate is barred from
questioning the validity of the election of the winner.
4. (Cited by the SC in line with Miriam's cases) Moraleja vs. Relova- The
acceptance by the protestee of an appointment to another position is
NOT a ground for dismissal of the protest.
o SC's rebuttal to Miriam:
 The cases she cited does not concur with the case at hand. These are the
differences:
1. Sibulo vda. de De Mesa vs. Mencias - the protestee had been
proclaimed as the winner and assumed office, and then DIED when
the election protest was ongoing.
2. Lomugdang vs. Javier- the protestant DIED during the ongoing
protest.
3. De Castro vs. Ginete- the protestant congratulated the protestee after
the protestee won.
4. Moraleja vs. Relova-the election protest survived the protestant's

1Basically means that in an electoral protest, the protestant is entitled for a "review" of ballots to determine whether or not s/he
has a chance of winning based on 20% of the findings of said revision. It also means that they will be segregated into
contested and uncontested ballots.
 acceptance of TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT during the ongoing
election protest.
o Ramos' side: NO. There is strong legal basis for the PET to rule that Miriam is
deemed to have abandoned the protest because of the ruling in Dimaporo vs.
Mitra. They should decide on the election contest because:
 Public interest requires that the protest must be resolved because a) it
involves a matter of paramount and grave public interest, and b) the protest
was filed in bad faith.
 A resolution of the case would confirm his victory in the 1992 Presidential
elections and prove that Miriam's protest is unfounded.
 Resolving the case would establish guiding and controlling principles or
doctrines with respect to presidential election protest cases, thereby
educating the bench and the bar and prevent the indiscriminate filing of
baseless protest cases.
o SC's rebuttal to Ramos:
 SC doesn't accept his view that just because Miriam filed her certificate of
candidacy, Miriam forfeited her claim to the office of the President.
 Dimaporo case does not apply to Miriam.
 There is no logic to Ramos' reasoning that the case should be resolved
becaue of bad faith. Also, there is no reason to proceed with the case just to
establish guidelines regarding election protests involving the office of the
President or the Vice-President.

ISSUE, HELD AND RATIO DECIDENDI:

1) WON this case has been rendered moot by the election of Miriam as a Senator in
the May 1995 election and her assumption of office on June 30, 1995?
 YES.
 Miriam ran for Senator in the 1995 elections without any qualification,
condition or reservation. This means that her running was not conditional
based on any circumstances (e.g. her pending presidential election protest)
and that she was fully prepared to enter into a political contract with the
electorate to serve as a Senator.
 SC cited the case of Moraleja (see case 4 in the cases cited above), saying
she abandoned her "determination to protect and pursue the public interest
involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate". In short, in
assuming the office of Senator, Miriam abandoned and withdrew her protest.
 The Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal cite 5 instances in dismissing
an electoral protest. The SC reasoned that if you can dismiss a protest on
TECHNICAL grounds (like the Rules), it can also be dismissed for a stronger
reason (Miriam running and winning as Senator) if it became moot due to
Miriam abandoning the protest (which the SC implies she did when she ran
for Senator).
 ALSO, the SC says that since Miriam decided to waive her revision of the
remaining ballots from over 4,000 precincts in pilot areas, the SC resolved to:
A) Order the revision of the remaining ballot boxes
B) Require Miriam to inform the Tribunal within 10 days if, in the completion
of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas, she would present evidence
regarding the revision.
 Regarding B, Miriam has not informed the PET about presenting evidence.
The SC took it as an indication that she no longer intended to do so.
 SC also said that revision of ballots is NOT a resolution of the said protest.
Hence, a dismissal of the protest is inevitable.
RULING: The Presidential Electoral Tribunal (a.k.a. the SC) resolved to:

 DISMISS the election protest because it has been rendered MOOT and
ACADEMIC by the abandonment/withdrawal of Miriam as a consequence of her
election and assumption of office as Senator;
 DISMISS, as a consequence, Ramos' counter-protest;
 GRANT Miriam's Motion to dispense with the revision of ballots and other election
documents in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas.

_________________________________________________________________________

CONCURRING, DISSENTING OPINIONS AND THE SC'S REPLY TO PUNO

(3 dissenting/separate, 1 concurring)

Justice Puno's Dissenting Opinion:

 Miriam made the waiver regarding the revision of ballots because of her belief that
the contested ballots would lead her to victory. The waiver will also enable her to cut
the cost of the protest.
 The PET has NOT acted on the motion of deeming the revision of ballots as
complete, hence the process of revision of ballots is not formally finished.
 Miriam still has the opportunity to adduce further evidence to prove her case. It is
only after Miriam has been given the opportunity to exercise these rights that the
PET can proceed to examine the contested ballots and consequently, rule on
whether or not Miriam failed to make a case for the protest.
 The non-presentation of evidence by Miriam is not necessarily fatal. Certain types of
fraud and irregularities can be proven without testimonies of exports, etc. Fraud and
irregularities can be taken at face value sometimes, so the PET cannot evade the
duty to examine the protested ballots because the ballots are the BEST EVIDENCE
for the SC to determine the votes. Until the PET examines and appreciates the
protested ballots, it cannot dismiss the protest.
 Miriam did NOT abandon her protest when she ran for Senator and discharged her
duties. Puno cited Black's Law Dictionary, saying that there can be no abandonment
when there is no intent to abandon. The PET cannot resolve the question of fact
regarding Miriam's intent to abandon her protest because it does not have evidence
that she did. Also, Ramos has not produced evidence that Miriam intentionally
abandoned her protest. The majority of the SC relied on a deduction to support their
decision regarding Miriam's intent.
 The overarching object of an election contest is to seek and enforce the judgment of
the people on who should govern them. The majority ruling is inconsistent with the
doctrine that an election contest is concerned less with the private interest of
the candidates but more with public interest. The majority strays away from this
doctrien and dismisses the case at bar even if Miriam and Ramos are alive, the term
of the 1992 presidential office has yet to expire, and even when BOTH Miriam and
Ramos plead that the PET should determine the true will of the people by deciding
the case on its merits.
 The case should not be dismissed on the ground of mootness, because it involves a
matter of grave and public interest.

SC's rebuttal to Puno:

 There is only one reason or ground as to why the case has been rendered moot and
academic, and that is because she abandoned her protest when she ran for and won
as Senator in the 1995 elections. The majority decision never held that one of the
grounds was the waiver of Miriam regarding the revision of ballots.
  "Abandonment" is not applicable in this case because Miriam didn't abandon her
position as President because she wasn't elected to it yet. Also, Miriam did not
contradict the fact that she filed her COC for Senator, ran for Senator, and assumed
office as Senator. The facts speak for themselves that she abandoned the protest.
 Moraleja ruling implies that Miriam abandoned her protest when she assumed a
permanent appointment to a regular office.
 The rules of the PET allow for the summary dismissal of election protests, even on
less important grounds.

Justice Kapunan's Dissenting Opinion: (omitted arguments already made by Puno's dissent)
 The case is not moot and academic just because Miriam ran and won as Senator.
When Miriam ran for the Senate in 1995, she was not the President and therefore,
had nothing to relinquish/give up. When Miriam ran for Senate in 1992, she was not
an elective official and there was NO position to abandon.
 Just because Miriam filed her certificate of candidacy to run for Senator, it does not
mean that she abandoned her protest. She made it clear in her senatorial campaign
that if she was proclaimed President in the 1992 elections, she would assume the
Presidency and shorten her term as Senator.
 When the voters voted for Miriam as Senator, they made their choice and were fully
aware that she may not be able to complete her term as Senator.
 There have been cases where members of Congress gave up their positions before
their terms of office expired to accept appointments to the cabinet and other high-
profile positions.

Justice Vitug's Separate Opinion:

 Cannot agree with the majority decision of the PET dismissing the case simply
because it is moot and academic. The office in question pertains to the HIGHEST
position in the land.
 The submission of the Court re: Miriam's "abandonment" of her protest is something
that Vitug does not agree with. The tribunal must act on the basis of equal
opportunity for Ramos to present his own evidence as well.
 Vitug votes to allow the PET to resolve the case rather than dismiss it on the ground
of abandonment.

Justice Padilla's Concurring Opinion:

 Miriam must choose from between the two positions involved. She cannot have both
within overlapping periods of time. (Ex. She won as Senator, and also won the
election protest after; She can't abandon her position as Senator to become the
President.)
 Miriam made a choice to become Senator.
Re: Failure of Former Judge Antonio A. Carbonell to
Decide Cases Submitted for Decision and to
Resolve Pending Motions in the Regional Trial
Court, Br. 27, San Fernando, La Union, 700 SCRA
806, July 09, 2013 (A.M. No. 08-5-305-RTC)
January 30, 2018
FACTS: This administrative case originates from the judicial audit conducted by the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on March 3 and 4, 2008 in the Regional Trial
Court of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 27, in view of the disability retirement of
Presiding Judge Antonio A. Carbonell on December 31, 2007. According to the Audit
Team’s Report, Branch 27 had a total caseload of 231 cases, consisting of 147 criminal
cases and 84 civil cases, and Judge Carbonell failed to decide 41 criminal cases (one
inherited) and 22 civil cases (four inherited). Judge Carbonell was also reported to
have failed to resolve pending motions or incidents in four criminal cases and 12 civil
cases. The OCA recommended to the Court that a fine of P50,000.00 be imposed upon
Judge Carbonell for gross inefficiency for failing to promptly decide the cases and to
resolve pending motions and incidents.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Carbonell is liable for gross inefficiency for failing to
promptly decide the cases and to resolve pending motions and incidents.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: As a frontline official of the Judiciary, a trial judge should at

all times act with efficiency and probity. He is duty-bound not only to be faithful to
the law, but also to maintain professional competence. The pursuit of excellence
ought always to be his guiding principle. Such dedication is the least that he can do to
sustain the trust and confidence that the public have reposed in him and the
institution he represents.

RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES: The Court cannot overstress its

policy on prompt disposition or resolution of cases. Delay in the disposition of cases is
a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judicial system, as
judges have the sworn duty to administer justice without undue delay. Thus, judges
have been constantly reminded to strictly adhere to the rule on the speedy disposition
of cases and observe the periods prescribed by the Constitution for deciding cases,
which is three months from the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum for
lower courts. To further impress upon judges such mandate, the Court has issued
guidelines (Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999) that would insure
the speedy disposition of cases and has therein reminded judges to scrupulously
observe the periods prescribed in the Constitution.

EXTENSIONS OF TIME TO DECIDE CASES BEYOND THE 90-DAY

PERIOD: Nonetheless, the Court has been mindful of the plight of our judges and
understanding of circumstances that may hinder them from promptly disposing of
their businesses. Hence, the Court has allowed extensions of time to decide cases
beyond the 90-day period. All that a judge needs to do is to request and justify an
extension of time to decide the cases, and the Court has almost invariably granted
such request.

GROSS INEFFICIENCY: Without a doubt, Judge Carbonell’s failure to decide several

cases within the reglementary period, without justifiable and credible reasons,
constituted gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions,
like fines. The fines imposed have varied in each case, depending chiefly on the
number of cases not decided within the reglementary period and other factors,
including the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances like the damage
suffered by the parties from the delay, the health condition and age of the judge, etc.
Thus, in one case, the Court mitigated the liability of a Judge who had been suffering
from illnesses and who had later retired due to disability, and imposed upon him a
fine of P20,000.00 for failure to decide 31 cases.