Republic vs.

CA and Molina
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

FACTS:
The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel
Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got
married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both
as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his
money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in
regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their
relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio
City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned
them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes
psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction
personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet
the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldo’s
action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise
grounds for psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she
and her husband cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem
neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison
showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as
psychological incapacity.

The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this
case:
• burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff
• root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
• such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
• such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials
of marital obligations of marriage
• such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the
Family Code
• decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be
respected
• court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of
the state.
MARCOS V. MARCOS

Facts
Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging
that the husband failed to provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical
abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for psychological
incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 which was however
reversed by CA.

Issues
Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a physician is a
requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity.

Held
Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established
by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent be
examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration.
Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support
to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts
does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no
showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job
and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that
he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the
family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the
inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is
incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this Court cannot
declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of the petitioner to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurabilty and for
her failure to observe the guidelines as outline in Republic v. CA and Molina.
SANTOS VS CA

FACTS:

Leouel, a First Lieutenant of the Philippine Army, married Julia in a municipal trial court and
thereafter, in a church. She gave birth to a baby boy and was named Leouel Jr. Occasionally, the
couple quarreled over a lot of things including the interference of Julia’s parents into their family
affairs.

Julia went to US to work as a nurse and promised husband that she will return once her contract
will have expired. She never did. Leouel tried to find her in the US but somehow failed to contact
her or get in touch with her.

Leouel filed a petition to have their marriage declared null and void, citing Article 36 of the Family
Code. He argued that Julia’s failure to return home and communicating with him for more than
5 years constitute psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

RULING:

No. Julia’s failure to return to her husband and communication with him do not constitute
psychological incapacity.

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) juridical antecedence, (b) gravity and (c)
incurability.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist
at the time the marriage is celebrated.In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his
petition must be dismissed because the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife is not clearly
shown by the factual settings presented. The factual settings do not come close to the standard
required to decree a nullity of marriage.
CHI MING TSOI

Facts:

Petitioner was married to private respondent (Gina Lao-Tsoi). During their 10 months of
cohabitation (i.e., from May 22, 1998 to March 15, 1989), they never have sexual intercourse.
The wife claimed that her husband was impotent that even they sleep in the same room and bed,
nothing happened. The wife initiated the nullity case of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Though the husband does not want
to end their marriage, he claimed that he was not impotent as evidenced by his medical report
and that it is his wife who avoid to have sexual intercourse.

Issue:

WON Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitute psychological
incapacity.

Held:

Yes, Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitute psychological
incapacity. Supposed that wife refused to have sexual intercourse, the husband could have asked
his wife or discussed what was wrong or what is ailing her that she avoids him everytime he
wanted to have sexual intercourse. But he never did. Since he claimed that it was his wife who
has physical disorder, it is his burden to prove such claim.

One of the essential marital obligation is to procreate children through sexual cooperation. A
refusal of one party to consummate the marriage is considered a psychological incapacity.
Senseless and protracted refusal of one party to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent
to psychological incapacity.

“Love is useless unless it is shared with another.”

Sps. Salgado v. Luis Anson
GR 204494

Facts:
Luis Anson is the husband of Severina de Asis-Anson. They had 1 daughter, Maria Luisa
and she was wed to Gaston Maya. Severina had an older daughter to a previous relationship, Jo
ann Diaz and she was also wed to Gerard Salgado. Luis and Severina acquired several real
properties and according to him, since there was no marriage settlement, the properties pertain
to their conjugal partnership. But without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed 3
Unilateral Deeds of Sale transferring then properties in favor of Jo ann. When Severina died,
Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judcial Settlement of Estate Deceased Severina
adjudicating herself as the sole heir. Due to these acts, Luis filed a complaint for the annulment
of these Deeds against Sps Salgado and Sps Maya. The latter countered that they were not aware
of any marriage between Luis and their mother Severina but they knew they cohabited as
common-law couple and that after their cohabitation, Luis went to the US and married one
Teresita. And due to Partition Agreement that divided their properties without court
intervention, both Sps claim that the properties herewith are separate and exclusive properties
of Severina.

Issue: W/N marriage between Severina and Luis is valid and the subject lands as conjugal
partnership

Held:

Court finds that their marriage is void ab initio for lack of marriage license. Luis asserted
that their marriage was an exceptional one but he failed to justify the lack of marriage license.
He admitted that they did not seek to apply for it. The Partition agreement is valid. Valdez v RTC
Quezon City held that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations
of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Art 147 or Art
148 as the case may be, of the Family Code. Also, attesting that his marriage with Severina was
subsisting and valid, he knowingly contracted to a subsequent marriage abroad, and the Court
finds such suspicious and fraudulent thereby tainting his credibility.
Lasanas vs People GR 15903 (2014)

FACTS: On February 16, 1968, Judge Salazar of the MTC Iloilo solemnized the marriage of accused
Noel Lasanas and Socorro Patingo without the benefit of a marriage license. The records show
that Lasanas and Patingo had not executed any affidavit of cohabitation to excuse the lack of the
marriage license. On August 27, 1980, Lasanas and Patingo reaffirmed their marriage vows in a
religious ceremony before Fr. Tamayo at the San Jose Church in Iloilo City. They submitted no
marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation for that purpose.7 Both ceremonies were evidenced
by the corresponding marriage certificates. In 1982, Lasanas and Patingo separated de facto
because of irreconcilable differences. On December 27, 1993, the accused contracted marriage
with Josefa Eslaban in a religious ceremony. Their marriage certificate reflected the civil status of
the accused as single. On July 26, 1996, the accused filed a complaint for annulment of marriage
and damages against Socorro. The complaint alleged that Socorro had employed deceit,
misrepresentations and fraud in securing his consent to their marriage.

ISSUE: W/N Lasans committed bigamy

RULING: YES. This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-appellant Lasanas and
private complainant Patingo was void because of the absence of a marriage license or of an
affidavit of cohabitation. The ratificatory religious wedding ceremony could not have validated
the void marriage. Neither can the church wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for to do so,
all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage should be present. One of these
requisites is a valid marriage license except in those instances when this requirement may be
excused. There having been no marriage license nor affidavit of cohabitation presented to the
priest who presided over the religious rites, the religious wedding cannot be treated as a valid
marriage in itself.

But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have first secured a judicial
declaration of the nullity of his void marriage to private complainant Patingo before marrying
Josefa Eslaban. Actually, he did just that but after his marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently,
he violated the law on bigamy.
Republic vs. Dayot
GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008

FACTS:

Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a
marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years.
On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both
employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an
action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham
and his consent was secured through fraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn
affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.

HELD:

CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time
they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living
together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on
November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.

The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates
a marriage. Furthermore, “the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period
of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to
the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath”. Hence, Jose and Felisa’s marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an
action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe
and may be raised any time.
MATABUENA VS CERVANTES

FACTS:

In 1956, herein appellant’s brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his
common-law spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only
in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or September
13, 1962, Felix died. Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister
and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of a an
affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962, had the land declared in her name and paid
the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation
was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses,
rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a
common-law relationship.

HELD:

While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses
during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality requires that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.

As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to
prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue
and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the
same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of
nuptials.

The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily
result in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is
entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half.

Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other half.
ROXAS VS CA

FACTS
Petitioner Melania Roxas ("Melania") is married to Antonio Roxas ("Antonio"), although they are already estranged
and living separately.

Melania discovered that Antonio leased to Respondent Antonio Cayetano ("Mr. Cayetano") their conjugal lot in
Novaliches without her knowledge and consent.

Thus, Melanie filed a case before the RTC praying for the annulment of the contract of lease between Antonio and
Mr. Cayetano.

Mr. Cayetano moved to dismiss the complaint on the sole ground that the complaint states no cause of action.

The RTC Judge resolved said Motion by dismissing Melania's complaint.

ISSUE: W/N a husband, may legally enter into a long-term contract of lease involving conjugal real property without
the consent of the wife.

Ruling: No. (Case remanded to the RTC by the SC)

Even if the husband is administrator of the conjugal partnership, administration does not include acts of ownership.
For while the husband can administer the conjugal assets unhampered, he cannot alienate or encumber the conjugal
realty.

As stated in Black's Law Dictionary, the word "alienation" means "the transfer of the property and possession of
lands, tenements, or other things from one person to another ... The act by which the title to real estate is voluntarily
assigned by one person to another and accepted by the latter, in the form prescribed by law." While encumbrance
"has been defined to be every right to, or interest in, the land which may subsist in third persons, to the diminution
of the value of the land, but consistent with the passing of the fee by the conveyance; any (act) that impairs the use
or transfer of property or real estate..."

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not a lease is an encumbrance and/or alienation.

Under Art. 1643 of the New Civil Code "In the lease of things, one of the parties binds himself to give to another the
enjoyment or use of a thing for a price certain, and for a period which may be definite or indefinite...." Thus, lease is
a grant of use and possession: it is not only a grant of possession.

In the contract of lease, the lessor transfers his right of use in favor of the lessee. The lessor's right of use is impaired,
therein. He may even be ejected by the lessee if the lessor uses the leased realty.

Therefore, lease is a burden on the land, it is an encumbrance on the land. The concept of encumbrance includes
lease, thus "an encumbrance is sometimes construed broadly to include not only liens such as mortgages and taxes,
but also attachment, LEASES, inchoate dower rights, water rights, easements, and other RESTRICTIONS on USE."

Moreover, lease is not only an encumbrance but also a qualified alienation, with the lessee becoming, for all legal
intents and purposes, and subject to its terms, the owner of the thing affected by the lease.

Thus, in case the wife's consent is not secured by the husband as required by law, the wife has the remedy of filing
an action for the annulment of the contract.
JOVELLANOS VS CA

Facts: Daniel Jovellanos contracted with Philamlife a lease and conditional sale agreement of a
property. When the agreement took place, Daniel was still married to his first wife, Leonor, with
whom he had three children. Leonor died on January 2, 1959. On May 30, 1967, Daniel was
remarried to Annette (respondent). On December 18, 1971, Mercy (daughter from first marriage)
and her husband, built an extension at the back of the said property. On January 8, 1975, the
lease was paid and Philamlife executed a deed of absolute sale to Daniel. The following day, he
then donated the said property to his children in the first marriage (petitioners). On September
8, 1985, Daniel died.

Annette now claims that the said property is the conjugal property belonging to the second
marriage due to the fact that the deed of absolute sale was dated during the celebration of their
marriage (Jan. 8, 1975).

Issue: To which marriage does the property belong to as conjugal property?

Held: The Court held that the said property belongs to the second marriage, but also proclaims
that reimbursements should be made to the children of the first marriage (in line with ART 118
of the FC).

The contract entered into by Daniel and Philamlife is specifically denominated as a "Lease and
Conditional Sale Agreement" with a lease period of twenty years. During the twenty-year period,
Daniel had only the right of possession over the property. The lessor transfers merely the
temporary use and enjoyment of the thing leased. Generally, ownership is transferred upon
delivery, however, the ownership may still be with the seller until full payment of the price is
made.

Only at the time when the payments are made in full will the deed of absolute sale be given,
entitling the buyer (Daniel) as the true owner, rather than just having inchoate rights to the
property. The time when he was able to pay the remaining balance, he was already married to
his second wife, Annette, which makes the said property as their conjugal property.

ART 118: “any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be
reimbursed”

Depriving the children from the first will be unfair due to the fact that the lease was contracted
during the first marriage, wherein a portion of the payment came from.
DOMINGO VS MOLINA

Ponente: DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property in Tarlac During his lifetime,
Anastacio borrowed money from the respondent spouses Genaro and Elena Molina (spouses
Molina).

Ten years after Flora's death, Anastacio sold his interest over the land to the spouses Molina to
answer for his debts. The sale to the spouses Molina was annotated at the OCT of the subject
property. In 1986, Anastacio died. In May 19, 1995, the sale of Anastacio's interest was registered
under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2729677 and transferred the entire one-half
undivided portion of the land to the spouses Molina.

Melecio, one of the children of Anastacio and Flora, learned of the transfer and filed a Complaint
for Annulment of Title and Recovery of Ownership against the spouses Molina, alleging that there
was fraud, for there was no document evidencing the transfer.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of the subject property to the spouses Molina was attended with
fraud.

RULING:

The sale of the subject property to the spouses Molina was not attended with fraud.
On the issue of fraud, the lower courts found that there was no fraud in the sale of the disputed
property to the spouses Molina. The issue of fraud would require the Court to inquire into the
weight of evidentiary matters to determine the merits of the petition and is essentially factual in
nature. It is basic that factual questions cannot be cannot be entertained in a Rule 45 petition,
unless it falls under any of the recognized exceptions found in jurisprudence. The present petition
does not show that it falls under any of the exceptions allowing factual review.

Melecio's argument that no document was executed for the sale is negated by the CA finding
that there was a notarized deed of conveyance executed between Anastacio and the spouses
Molina, as annotated on the OCT of the disputed property.

Furthermore, Melecio's belief that Anastacio could not have sold the property without his
knowledge cannot be considered as proof of fraud to invalidate the spouses Molina's registered
title over the subject property. Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly holds that findings of facts of
the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court.
VITANGCOL VS PEOPLE

Facts:
On December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo (Alice). Born into their union were
three (3) children. After some time, Alice eventually discovered that Norberto was previously
married to a certain Gina M. Gaerlan (Gina) on July 17, 1987, as evidenced by a marriage contract
registered with the National Statistics Office. Alice subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for
bigamy against Norberto.

Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case. He presents as evidence
a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states that the Office
has no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and his first wife, Gina. He
argues that with no proof of existence of an essential requisite of marriage—the marriage
license—the prosecution fails to establish the legality of his first marriage. In addition, Norberto
claims that the legal dissolution of the first marriage is not an element of the crime of bigamy.

Issue: Whether the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the
marriage license issued to petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol and his first wife Gina proves the
nullity of petitioner’s first marriage and exculpates him from the bigamy charge.

Ruling: No. Petition for Certiorari is DENIED.

The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage license
is suspect. Assuming that it is true, it does not categorically prove that there was no marriage
license. Furthermore, marriages are not dissolved through mere certifications by the civil
registrar. For more than seven (7) years before his second marriage, petitioner did nothing to
have his alleged spurious first marriage declared a nullity. Even when this case was pending, he
did not present any decision from any trial court nullifying his first marriage.

Ratio:
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. Petitioner was
still legally married to Gina when he married Alice. Thus, the trial court correctly convicted him
of the crime charged.
PNB VS REYES
FACTS:
Three parcels of land owned by spouses Lilia and Venancio Reyes were mortgaged to Philippine National Bank to
secure a loan. When the Reyes Spouses failed to pay the loan obligations, Philippine National Bank foreclosed the
mortgaged real properties.

Venancio assailed the validity of the real estate mortgage and claimed that his wife undertook the loan and the
mortgage without his consent and his signature was falsified on the promissory notes and the mortgage. He averred
that
since the three (3) lots involved were conjugal properties, the mortgage constituted over them was void. The Trial
Court ordered the annulment of the real estate mortgage and directed Lilia to reimburse PNB.

Aggrieved, Philippine National Bank appealed to the Court of Appeals. It was denied. A Motion for Reconsideration
was also denied.

In this petition, the PNB insists that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court. It argues that
the real estate mortgage is valid, that the conjugal partnership should be held liable for the loan, and that respondent
Venancio C. Reyes, Jr.’s cause of action should be deemed barred by laches.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the real estate mortgage void;

2. Whether the conjugal partnership can be held liable for the loan contracted unilaterally by Lilia C. Reyes

3. Whether respondent is guilty of laches and his claim is now barred by estoppel.

RULING:

1. No, the Court of Appeals did not err in its ruling. It committed no reversible error in affirming the ruling of the
Regional Trial Court that the real estate mortgage over the conjugal properties is void for want of consent from
respondent. The Family Code is clear: the written consent of the spouse who did not encumber the property is
necessary before any disposition or encumbrance of a conjugal property can be valid.

2. Yes, the conjugal partnership can be held liable. The lower courts may have declared the mortgage void, but the
principal obligation is not affected. It remains valid.

The Regional Trial Court found that the loan was used as additional working capital for respondent’s printing
business. As held in Ayala Investment, since the loaned money is used in the husband’s business, there is a
presumption that it redounded to the benefit of the family; hence, the conjugal partnership may be held liable for
the loan amount.

3. No, the respondent is not guilty of laches. Laches does not apply where the delay is within the period prescribed
by law.

As found by the trial court, records show that upon learning about the mortgage, respondent immediately informed
the bank about his forged signature. He filed the Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Sale and Real Estate
Mortgage against petitioner within the prescribed period to redeem a mortgaged property; and since respondent
filed the Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Sale and Real Estate Mortgage within the period of redemption
prescribed by law, petitioner fails to convince that respondent slept on his right.
CASTILLO VS CASTILLO

Facts:

On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista).
On 6 January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato).

On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista.
Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended that her marriage to Bautista was null and void
as they had not secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the
denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged.

RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio on the
ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC said that
the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she married Renato on 6 January
1979, makes her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The lower court
dismissed Lea's argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could presume
the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial declaration
exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing. Lastly, RTC also said that even if respondent
eventually had her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact remains that the first and
second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to obtain
a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage to Bautista before contracting her second
marriage with Renato.

CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order and upheld the validity of the parties'
marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's marriages were solemnized in 1972
and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is the
applicable law since it is the law in effect at the time the marriages were celebrated, and not the
Family Code. Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree
is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.

Issue: W/N judicial declaration is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.

Ruling: NO, under the Civil Code. Petition is DENIED.

The Court held that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of
her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was no
judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second marriage was
contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the
subsequent Decision of the RTC declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to
strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
REPUBLIC VS SARENOGON

FACTS:

On November 4, 2008, respondent Jose B. Sarefiogon, Jr. filed a Petition before the Regional Trial
Court of Ozamiz City-Branch 15 the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Netchie S.
Sareñogon. Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis Occidental in 1991, They
later became sweethearts and on August 10,1996, they got married in civil rites at the Manila
City Hall. However, they lived together as husband and wife for a month only because he left to
work as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. For three months, he
did not receive any communication from Netchie. He likewise had no idea about her
whereabouts. While still abroad, he tried to contact Netchie''s parents, but failed. He then
inquired from Netchie''s relatives and friends about her whereabouts, but they also did not know
where she was. Because of these, he had to presume that his wife Netchie was already dead. He
filed the Petition before the RTC so he could contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of
the Family Code.

Jose's testimony was corroborated by his older brother Joel Sareñogon, and by Netchie''s aunt,
Consuelo Sande. These two witnesses testified that Jose and Netchie lived together as husband
and wife only for one month prior to their leaving the Philippines for separate destinations
abroad. These two added that they had no information regarding Netchie''s location.

The RTC held that Jose had established by preponderance of evidence that he is entitled to the
relief prayed for under Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC found that Netchie had disappeared
for more than four years, reason enough for Jose to conclude that his wife was indeed already
dead.

ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged efforts of respondents in locating his missing wife do not
sufficiently support a “well-founded belief” that the absent wife is probably dead.

RULING:

The "well-founded belief" requisite under Article 41 of the Family Code is complied with only
upon a showing that sincere honest-to-goodness efforts had indeed been made to ascertain
whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse.

The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case
basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her
belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse
and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the
absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).

The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we consider the State''s
policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage. Since marriage serves as the family''s
foundation and since it is the state''s policy to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social
institution, marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the parties.

Given the Court''s imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the Family Code, it must follow that there was no basis at all for the
RTC''s finding that Jose''s Petition complied with the requisites of Article 41 of the Family Code,
in reference to the "well-founded belief standard. If anything, Jose''s pathetically anemic efforts
to locate the missing Netchie are notches below the required degree of stringent diligence
prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare claims that he had inquired from alleged
friends and relatives as to Netchie''s whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand specific
individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or quest for the
allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he sought the assistance of the pertinent
government agencies as well as the media, Nor did he show mat he undertook a thorough,
determined and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least two years (and what those years
were), and naming the particular places, provinces, cities, barangays or municipalities that he
visited, or went to, and identifying the specific persons he interviewed or talked to in the course
of his search.
Gloria Zoleta-San Agustin v. Ernesto Sales
G.R. No. 189289 August 31, 2016
Ponente: Reyes, J.
FACTS:
The plaintiffs, having no knowledge of any relatives of Spouses Fernandez, directed the action
against unknown defendants. However, on May 30, 1994, the petitioner raised her opposition.
She alleged in her Amended Answer filed on July 26, 1994 that she is the niece of Louis and that
the Spouses Fernandez informally adopted her as their child when she was only 2 years old. She
insisted that the father of the plaintiffs is Corpus Micabalo (Corpus), the former houseboy of the
Fernandez household. One of the principal allegations in the amended answer of the petitioner
is that the documents presented by the plaintiffs to sustain the complaint were spurious. RTC
issued an order denying the admission of the photographs presented by the petitioner seeking
to prove that she was 'treated by the Spouses Fernandez as their own child. the RTC in a
Decision14 dated July 12, 2007 ruled in favor of the recognition of the plaintiffs as the illegitimate
children of Louis.
ISSUE: whether or not the documents executed by Louis are valid to acknowledge voluntary
recognition of Teodoro and Ernesto as his illegitimate children
RULING:
The Court held that The legitimate filiation of a child may be established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the present concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proven by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
These requirements likewise apply to establish the filiation of illegitimate children. In order to
cast doubt as to the · authenticity of the documentary evidence presented by Ernesto, the
petitioner purported that the circumstances surrounding the execution and notarization of the
said documents are highly suspicious thereby warranting the overturn of the presumption of
regularity in favor of these documents. The petitioner claimed that during the execution and
notarization of the documents, Louis could still write, rendering incredible the mere affixing of
his thumbprints to the contested documents. However, Ernesto testified before the RTC that
Louis was no longer capable of writing his name as he was already blind and bedridden at the
time he affixed his thumb mark to the document dated November 11, 1980. The witnesses to the
document were Margarita Almeda, the hairdresser of Louis' sister, and Romeo Gadones,
Teodoro's acquaintance. A thumb mark has been repeatedly considered as a valid mode of
signature. The other inconsistencies cited by the petitioner are of no importance and insufficient
to overcome the presumption of regularity in favor of the notarized documents.