FELICIANO FRANCISCO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PELAGIO FRANCISCO, respondents.

2. G.R. No. L-57438 January 3, 1984

Facts:

 Petitioner is the duly appointed guardian of the incompetent Estefania San Pedro in Special Proceedings
of the cfi of Bulacan. Respondent Pelagio Francisco, claiming to be a first cousin of Estefania San Pedro,
together with two others, petitioned the court for the removal of petitioner and for the appointment in his
stead grounded on the failure of the guardian to submit an inventory of the estate of his ward and to
render an accounting. Respondent Judge also ordered the retirement of petitioner on the ground of old
age.
 Petitioner also contended that to grant execution pending appeal would render petitioner's appeal moot
and academic that "advanced age" was not one of the, grounds raised by private respondent in the court
below; that the court a quo abuse its discretion in appointing respondent as guardian despite the fact that
private respondent is five (5) years older than petitioner.

Issue:

 Whether or not the removal of petitioner as guardian of the ward on the ground of old age is a good
ground for the execution of the decision pending appeal?

Held:

 There is need for petitioner Feliciano Francisco to be retired from the guardianship over the person and
property of incompetent Estefania San Pedro. The conclusion reached by the trial court about the "rather
advanced age" of petitioner at 72 years old (petitioner is now 76 years old) finding him unfit to continue
the trust cannot be disturbed. As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, this finds direct support in
the delay of the accounting and inventory made by petitioner. To sustain petitioner as guardian would,
therefore, be detrimental to the ward. While age alone is not a control criterion in determining a person's
fitness or qualification to be appointed or be retained as guardian, it may be a factor for consideration.
 Upon urgent and compelling reasons, execution pending appeal is a matter of sound discretion on the
part of the trial court.
 Inasmuch as the primary objective for the institution of guardianship is for the protection of the ward,
there is more than sufficient reason for the immediate execution of the lower court's judgment for the
replacement of the first guardian.
 THE GOVERNMENT OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE
MANILA
G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916

Facts:
 On June 3, 1863, an Earthquake took place in the Philippine Islands, which was then under the Spanish
Crown, that devastated lot of civilians. Therefore n Oct. 6 of that year, a central relief board was
appointed, by authority of the King of Spain, to distribute the money voluntarily contributed by donors.
After a thorough investigation and consideration, the relief board allotted $365703.50 to the various
sufferers name in its resolution.
 These were later distributed in accordance with the above mentioned allotments, the sum of $30,299.65,
leaving a balance of $365.403.85 for distribution. Upon the petition of the governing body of the Monte
de Piedad, dated February 1, 1833, the Philippine Government, by order dated the first month, directed
its treasured to turn over Monte de Piedad the sum of $80,000 of relief fund in its installment of 20,000
each. These amounts received on the following dates: February 15, March 12, April 14, and June 2,
1883, and are still in the possession of Monte de Piedad.
 The Attorney General in representation of the Philippine Islands, a file of claim for the $80000 together
with interest, for the benefit of those persons or their heirs appearing in the list of names published in the
Official Gazette instituted on May, 3, 1912 by the Government of the Philippine Islands, represented by
the Insular Treasurer, and after due trial in the lower court, judgment was entered in honor of the plaintiff
currency, together with legal interest from February 28, 1912, and cost of cause. The Monte de Piedad
then contended that the present Philippine Government cannot file suit on the ground that the obligation
of the former was wiped out when their was a change of sovereignty.

Issue:
 Whether or not the government of the Philippine Islands has capacity to file a suit against the Monte de
Piedad for the recovery of the said amount.

Ruling:
 Under the Principle of Parens Patriae, the Philippine Government being the guardian of the “rights of the
people” can represent the legitimate claimants of the beneficiary and therefore has the capacity to file a
suit against the appellant. The Philippine Government is not merely a nominal party that’s why it can
bring and prosecute this action by exercising its sovereign powers. The supreme court then held the right
of the government to file the case.
 CABALES vs. CA Case Digest
NELSON CABALES and RITO CABALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JESUS FELIANO and ANUNCIANO
FELIANO

G.R. No. 162421, August 31, 2007

FACTS:
 Sometime in 1964, Rurfino Cabales died leaving behind a parcel of land in Southern Leyte to his
wife, Saturnina and six children, namely, Bonifacio, Francisco, Alberto, Albino, Lenora, and Rito. On
1971, the brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Alberto and Albino sold the property to Dr.
Corrompido with a right to repurchase within eight (8) years. On 1972, prior to the redemption of the
property, Alberto died leaving behind his wife and son, Nelson, herein petitioner.
 Sometime later and within the redemption period, the said brothers and their mother, in lieu of
Alberto, tendered their payment to Dr. Corrompido. Subsequently, Saturnina, and her four children,
Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco and Leonora sold the said land to Spouses Feliano. It was provided in the
deed of sale that the shares of Nelson and Rito, being minor at the time of the sale, will be held in
trust by the vendee and will paid upon them reaching the age of 21.
 In 1986, Rito received the sum of 1,143 pesos from the Spouses Feliano representing his share from the
proceeds of the sale of the property. It was only in 1988, that Nelson learned of the sale from his uncle,
Rito. He signified his intention to redeem the property in 1993 but it was only in 1995 that he filed a
complaint for redemption against the Spouses Feliano. The respondent Spouses averred that the
petitioners are estopped from denying the sale since: (1) Rito already received his share; and (2) Nelson,
failed to tender the total amount of the redemption price.
 The Regional Trial Court ruled in favour of Spouses Feliano on the ground that Nelson was no longer
entitled to the property since, his right was subrogated by Saturnina upon the death of his father, Alberto.
It also alleged that Rito had no more right to redeem since Saturnina, being his legal guardian at the time
of the sale was properly vested with the right to alienate the same.
 The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court stating that the sale made by Saturnina in
behalf of Rito and Nelson were unenforceable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale made by a legal guardian (Saturnina) in behalf of the minors were binding
upon them.

HELD: With regard to the share of Rito, the contract of sale was valid. Under Section 1, Rule 96 “A
guardian shall have the care and custody of the person of his ward, and the management of his estate,
or the management of the estate only. x x x” Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of
administration of the minor’s property. It does not include the power of alienation which needs judicial
authority. Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of petitioner Rito, sold the latter’s pro indiviso share
in subject land, she did not have the legal authority to do so. Accordingly, the contract as to the share
of Rito was unenforceable. However, when he received the proceeds of the sale, he effectively ratified it.
This act of ratification rendered the sale valid and binding as to him.
 With respect to petitioner Nelson, the contract of sale was void. He was a minor at the time of the
sale. Saturnina or any and all the other co-owners were not his legal guardians; rather it was his
mother who if duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his share in the property.
Consequently, petitioner Nelson retained ownership over their undivided share in the said
property. However, Nelson can no longer redeem the property since the thirty day redemption
period has expired and thus he remains as co-owner of the property with the Spouses Feliano.
 HERNANDEZ VS SAN JUAN-SANTOS

FACTS:

 Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on February 14, 1947 to the spouses Felix
Hernandez and Maria San Juan Hernandez. Unfortunately, the latter died due to complications during
childbirth. After Maria's death, Felix left Lulu in the care of her maternal uncle, Sotero C. San Juan. On
December 16, 1951, Felix married Natividad Cruz. The union produced three children, herein petitioners.
Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of Sotero, Lulu inherited valuable real
properties from the San Juan family. In 1968, upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given full
control of her estate. Nevertheless, because Lulu did not even finish her elementary education, Felix
continued to exercise actual administration of Lulu’s properties. Upon Felix's death in 1993, petitioners
took over the task of administering Lulu's properties.
 During the period of their informal administration (from 1968 until 1993), Felix and petitioners undertook
various “projects” involving Lulu’s real properties. In 1974, Felix allegedly purchased one of Lulu’s
properties for an undisclosed amount to develop the Marilou Subdivision. Thus, Lulu signed a special
power of attorney (SPA) believing that she was authorizing Ma. Victoria to appear in court on her behalf
when she was in fact unknowingly authorizing her half-sister to sell the said property to the Manila Electric
Company for P18,206,400. In September 1998, Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin,
respondent Jovita San Juan-Santos, after learning that petitioners had been dissipating her estate. She
confided to Jovita that she was made to live in the basement of petitioners’ home and was receiving a
measly daily allowance of P400 for her food and medication.
 Respondent was appalled as Lulu was severely overweight, unkempt and smelled of urine. She later
found out that Lulu was occupying a cramped room lit by a single fluorescent lamp without running water.
Due to Lulu's poor hygiene, respondent brought her to several physicians for medical examination. Lulu
was found to be afflicted with tuberculosis, rheumatism and diabetes from which she was suffering
several complications.
 On October 2, 1998, respondent filed a petition for guardianship in the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch
76. She alleged that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and managing her estate because she
was of weak mind. Subsequently, petitioners moved to intervene in the proceedings to oppose the same.
Cecilio, Teresa and Ma. Victoria, for their part, claimed that the issue of Lulu’s competency had been
settled in 1968 (upon her emancipation) when the court ordered her legal guardian and maternal uncle,
Ciriaco San Juan, to deliver the properties for her to manage. They likewise asserted that Lulu was literate
and, for that reason, aware of the consequences of executing an SPA.
 During the hearing, Lulu was presented and asked to testify on her genealogy and experiences with the
San Juan and Hernandez families. Lulu identified and described her parents, stepmother, half-siblings
and maternal relatives. Medical specialists testified to explain the results of Lulu’s examinations which
revealed the alarming state of her health. Furthermore, they unanimously opined that in view of Lulu’s
intelligence level (which was below average) and fragile mental state, she would not be able to care for
herself and self-administer her medications.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not Lulu is an incompetent and the appointment of a judicial guardian over her person and
property is necessary.
HELD:
 YES. Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, persons who, though of sound mind but by reason
of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of themselves and their
property without outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under
guardianship. The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and her
properties without outside aid due to her ailments and weak mind. Thus, since determining whether or
not Lulu is in fact an incompetent would require a reexamination of the evidence presented in the courts
a quo, it undoubtedly involves questions of fact. Petitioners are furthermore ordered to render to
respondent, Lulu’s legal guardian, an accurate and faithful accounting of all the properties and funds they
unlawfully appropriated for themselves from the estate of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez, within
thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision. If warranted, the proper complaints should also be filed
against them for any criminal liability in connection with the dissipation of Maria Lourdes San Juan
Hernandez’s estate and her unlawful abduction from the custody of her legal guardian.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA
G.R. No. 188315, August 25, 2010

FACTS:
 AAA lived with her adoptive mother, BBB, since she was just a few months old. BBB is married to
appellant, who was working abroad for six years. Appellant came home in 1997 and lived with AAA and
BBB. BBB was working as a restaurant supervisor from 4pm to 2am for six days a week.
 In February 1999 at around 9:30 pm, AAA then 11 yrs old, was sleeping inside the house when she felt
and saw appellant touch her thighs. The following day, at around the same time and while BBB was at
work, appellant again touched AAA from her legs up to her breast.
 Two weeks after the incident, AAA was already asleep when she suddenly woke up and saw appellant
holding a knife, then appellant was able to penetrate her. Two days after, appellant again raped her. AAA
recounted that appellant raped her at least 3 times a week at the same time until October 15, 2002, when
she was 14 yrs. old.
 RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 181 counts of rape.CA
affirmed the finding that AAA was raped by appellant, but did so only on 2 counts and consider the
qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not appellant should be consider as a guardian of the victim even without court authority
 Whether that the qualifying/aggravating circumstances of relationship is applicable.

HELD:

 To justify the death penalty, the prosecution must specifically allege in the information and prove during
the trial the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender.
 Jurisprudence dictates that the guardian must be a person who has a legal relationship with his ward.
The theory that a guardian must be legally appointed was first enunciated in the early case of People vs.
Dela Cruz which held that the guardian referred to in the law is either a legal or judicial guardian as
understood in the rules on Civil Procedure.
 The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the solemnity of
judicial appointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and normally
deters him from violating its objectives. The appellant cannot be considered as the guardian falling within
the ambit of the amendatory provision introduced by RA 7659.Since both logic and fact conjointly
demonstrate that he is actually only a custodian, that is, a mere caretaker of the children over whom he
exercises a limited degree of authority for a temporary period, we cannot impose death penalty
contemplated for a real guardian under RA 7659, since he does not fit into that category.
 Be that as it may, this qualifying circumstance of being a guardian was not even mentioned in the
Information. What was clearly stated was that appellant was the “adopting father” of AAA, which the
prosecution nonetheless failed to establish.
 For failure of the prosecution to prove the qualifying circumstance of relationship, appellant could only be
convicted for two counts of simple rape, and not qualified rape.
 JOSE UY VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND TEODORO JARDELEZA
GR No. 109557. November 29, 2000

Facts:
 Dr. Jardeleza suffered a stroke which left him comatose and depriving him of his mental and physical
capability to act. Upon learning that the real property he owned is about to be sold, Teodoro filed a petition
for the issuance of the letter of guardianship of his father. In the petition, he prayed for the issuance of
the letters of guardianship in favor of his mother and petitioner, Gilda.
 Days later, Gilda filed a petition for the declaration of incapacity of Dr. Jardeleza, administration of
conjugal properties, and authority of sell the same. In the said petition, she prayed for such reliefs
because of the increasing hospital bills due to the fact that Dr. Jardeleza is confined in an intensive care
unit (ICU).
 Upon the finding of the petition to be in form, the RTC issued a notice for hearing, which happened few
days after. On the same date of the hearing, the RTC, upon hearing the witnesses presented by Gilda,
granted such petition. Teodoro filed an Opposition contending that he was unaware that the case was
already decided. He also filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending that the proper remedy in the
case is not the petition filed by his mother, but the petition for guardianship proceedings. As such, the
case cannot be heard under the rules of summary proceedings as contemplated in Article 253 of the
Family Code. He also noted that the provisions on summary proceedings, found in Chapter 2 of the
Family Code, comes under the heading on “Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife” which
contemplates of a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind. Thus, he argued that were one
spouse is “comatose without motor and mental faculties,” the said provisions cannot be made to apply.

Issue:

 Whether the provision of Article 124 of the Family Code applies in this case when one of the spouse is
incapacitated to give his consent?

Held:

 No. Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:

“ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife
for a proper remedy which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such
decision.

“In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall
be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a).”

 In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code govern the
proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one where the spouse
is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained.
Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to
give consent. In this case, the trial court found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in
 comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without motor and
mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial
guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
 Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code may apply to the
wife's administration of the conjugal property, the law provides that the wife who assumes sole powers
of administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian under the Rules of Court.
 Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal property
must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians under Rule
95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code.
 In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules of Court.
Indeed, the trial court did not even observe the requirements of the summary judicial proceedings under
the Family Code. Thus, the trial court did not serve notice of the petition to the incapacitated spouse; it
did not require him to show cause why the petition should not be granted.
 ANONYMOUS v. CURAMEN
A.M. No. P-08-2549 June 18, 2010

FACTS:

 The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an anonymous complaint charging respondent with
falsification of a public document and simulation of birth.
 The complaint alleged that respondent registered the birth of a child supposedly named Rica Mae
Baldonado Curamen in the local civil registry of Rizal, Nueva Ecija. Complainant submitted the child’s
purported birth certificate to show respondent misrepresented that she was the child’s biological mother
and her husband, Ricardo Curamen, was the biological father.
 Complainant claimed respondent was, in fact, the child’s maternal grandmother. Complainant submitted
the child’s original birth certificate to show that the child’s real name was Rinea Mae Curamen Aquino
and that her parents were spouses Olga Mae Baldonado Curamen Aquino and Jun Aquino. According to
complainant, respondent included the child as additional dependent in her income tax declaration.
Respondent, on the other hand, admitted that the real parents of the child were spouses Olga Mae
Baldonado Curamen and Jun Aquino.
 Respondent claimed that the child’s parents, being unemployed, were unable to support themselves let
alone their child. Executive Judge affirmed said facts.
 Respondent was found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the " best interest of the child" can be considered to escape liability.

RULING:

 NO. The making of a false statement therein constitutes dishonesty and falsification of a public document.
Respondent cannot escape liability by claiming that she did not have any intention to conceal the identity
of the child nor cause the loss of any trace as to the child’s true filiation to the child’s prejudice.
 When public documents are falsified, the intent to injure a third person need not be present because the
principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth the document
proclaims. Respondent’s justification for her act of unreasonable. Respondent can very well continue
supporting the child as her own, as is the practice in Filipino families, without having to tamper with the
child’s birth certificate. Dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of
the performance of official duties. She is subject to discipline the moment she commits a dishonest act,
whether in her private life or in her public life.
 DSWD VS. BELEN

FACTS:

 Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both naturalized American citizens, filed a
verified petition for adoption of their niece Zhedell Bernardo Ibea before RTC of Lingayen Pangasinan.
After finding that petitioner spouses were highly qualified to adopt the child as their own, respondent
Judge Belen granted the petition. He based his decree on the findings and recommendation of the DSWD
prepared by Elma P. Vedaña. Belen decided and proceeded to dispense with trial custody.
 However, when Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain a travel clearance from the DSWD in order to
join her adoptive parents in the US, the department uncovered what it considered as an anomalous
adoption decree regarding said minor. It turned out that the DSWD did not have any record in its files
regarding the adoption and that there was never any order from respondent judge for the DSWD to
conduct a report. Furthermore, there was no directive from respondent judge for the social welfare officer
of the lower court to coordinate with the DSWD on the matter of the required reports for said minor’s
adoption.
 Belen claimed that he directed Vedaña to conduct the home and case study, and thereafter submit a
report. Since these functions were so provided to be performed by her, there was no need for him to
order Vedana to coordinate with the DSWD as he assumed that it was routine procedure for her to do
so. He also contends that no approval from the DSWD is necessary for the home and case study reports
and it need not be furnished therewith. Because of this, OCA recommended that Belen be administratively
punished for violating SC Circular No. 12-1986, and Article 33 of PD 603. On the other hand, respondent
Vedaña pointed out that there never was any directive from respondent judge for her to coordinate with
the DSWD concerning the adoption in question. She was only ordered to conduct the case study and
submit her report thereon to the court. She denied that she ever asked for money from Spouses Soriano.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not Judge Belen and Vedana guilty for violation of PD 603 and SC Circular No. 12?
 What is the proper recourse that Judge Belen should take on the commencement of the Adoption
Proceedings

RULING: Yes.

 Under Art 33 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, “No petition for adoption shall be granted unless
the DSWD, or the Social Work and Counselling Division, in case of Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Courts, has made a case study of the child to be adopted, his natural parents as well
as the prospective adopting parents, and has submitted its report and recommendations on the
matter to the court hearing such petition. The DSWD shall intervene on behalf of the child if it
finds, after such case study, that the petition should be denied.”
 Circular No. 12 was issued by the SC to obviate the mishandling of adoption cases by judges, particularly
in respect to the aforementioned case study to be conducted in accordance with Article 33 of PD 603 by
the DSWD itself and involving the child to be adopted, its natural parents, and the adopting parents. It
directs the RTCs hearing adoption cases to:

"(1) to NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development, thru its local agency, of the filing of
adoption cases or the pendency thereof with respect to those cases already filed;

(2) to strictly COMPLY with the requirement in Article 33 of the aforesaid decree.
 The Staff Assistant V (Social Worker) of the RTCs, if any, shall coordinate with the Ministry of Social
Services and Development representatives in the preparation and submittal of such case study. x x x”

 The proper course that respondent judge should have taken was to notify the DSWD at the outset
about the commencement of Special Proceedings so that the corresponding case study could
have been accordingly conducted by said department which undoubtedly has the necessary
competence, more than that possessed by the court social welfare officer, to make the proper
recommendation. Moreover, respondent judge should never have merely presumed that it was
routinary for the social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD regarding the adoption proceedings.
It was his duty to exercise caution and to see to it that such coordination was observed in the adoption
proceedings, together with all the other requirements of the law.
 The Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a magistrate should be the embodiment of, among other
desirable characteristics, judicial competence. It need not be stressed here that among the prime duties
to which a judge of the law must ever be faithful is that of being abreast with the law and jurisprudence,
since, as has so often been advanced, the administration of justice requires the continuous study of law
and jurisprudence. Respondent judge has obviously not been able to achieve the level of this expectation.
 In like manner, respondent Elma P. Vedaña should have been well aware not only of the scope of her
duties and responsibilities but that she should have likewise been familiar with current laws, rules and
regulations pertinent to her position as such social welfare officer. By her misfeasance, she has
compromised the prescribed process in the administration of justice in proceedings such as the one under
consideration.
 ACCORDINGLY, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be
dealt with more severely by this Court, respondent Judge Antonio M. Belen of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 38, of Lingayen, Pangasinan is hereby CENSURED for violating Article 33 of Presidential Decree
No. 603 and Circular No. 12 of this Court; and respondent Elma P. Vedaña, Social Welfare Officer II of
the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, is REPRIMANDED for
violating Circular No. 12.
 IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM
G.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009
Topic: As a general rule, a petition for adoption shall be filed jointly by the husband and wife.

Facts:

 Petitioner is an optometrist by profession, married Primo Lim. They were childless. Minor children, whose
parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban. Being so eager to have a
child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear that they were the children’s
parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael).
 The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. Unfortunately, Primo died.
Petitioner married Angelo Olario, an American citizen.
 Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to
those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, petitioner filed separate petitions for the
adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption,
Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was 18 years old.
 Michelle’s husband gave his consent to the adoption of Michelle. Olario likewise gave his consent.
 Trial court dismissed the petitions.

Issue:

 Whether petitioner, who has remarried, adopt singly.

Held:

 No. Joint adoption by husband and wife

The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:

SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:

xxx

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That
the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other,
joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.

 The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and
the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child
which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is
but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
  Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the
petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial
court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground. Neither does petitioner fall under
any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7.
 The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does
not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must
meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has
diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines
for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain
such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country;
and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these
qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.

Effects of adoption

 Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children have been
emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is untenable.
 It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when he attains the age of
majority or 18 years of age — emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property
of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. However, parental authority
is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption.

Adoption has, thus, the following effects:

(1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent
is the spouse of the adopter;
(2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and
(3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and
child, including but not limited to:
a. the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and
b. the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other.

Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child
of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child such as:

(1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother;

(2) to receive support from their parents; and
(3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights.

Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological
parents are entitled such as support and successional rights.
 IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA HONORATO B.
CATINDIG, Petitioner
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

FACTS:
 On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie
was born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using
her mother's middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting
parent. He prayed that Stephanie's middle name Astorga be changed to 'Garcia, her mother's surname,
and that her surname 'Garcia be changed to 'Catindig, his surname.
 Finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural
mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioner's legitimate child and legal heir.
Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE
NATHY CATINDIG.
 On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie
should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not, an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name?

HELD:

 YES. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear
surname of her father and her mother. Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname as her middle
name will maintain her maternal lineage. The Adoption Act and the Family Code provide that the adoptee
remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can assert her hereditary rights
from her natural mother in the future.
 Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 10 of the
New Civil Code provides that: In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the sense that
Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother's surname 'GARCIA as her middle name. Let the
corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of adoption.
 LAHOM VS SIBULO

Facts:
 A couple. Dr. Diosdado and Isabelita Lahom decided to adopt Isabelita’s nephew, Jose Melvin Sibulo to
bring him up as their own child. They filed an adoption decree on the civil registrar of Naga City which
was granted and changed the name of Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom.
 In a sad turn of events, Mrs. Lahom being a widow and suffering for a leg ailment filed a petition to the
lower court of Naga to annul the adoption decree on the ground that the attitude of her adopted son was
not expected of him and he does not care for her health and welfare.
 The latter also refused to use the name of Lahom and instead continue using Sibulo in connection to his
practice of profession.
 It was also found out that the motive of the adopted son for adoption was his rights to the property of his
mother and father. Melvin Sibulo opposing and moved for the dismissal of the petition filed by his mother
was granted by the lower court by dismissing the petition of the petitioner.
 Insisting on her rights, Mrs. Lahom filed a petition for a review in the Supreme Court.

Issue:
 Whether the decree of adoption could still be revoked/annulled by the adopter even after the effectivity
of R.A. 8552.

Ruling:
 No. it was months after the effectivity of R.A. 8552. that Mrs. Lahom filed an action to annul the decree
of adoption. The new law had already been abrogated and repealed. For valid reasons it can cause the
forfeiture of certain benefits if the child is undeserving.
 Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five
year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the
adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a
condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. Rights are
considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional and
perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional
guarantee of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice
is protected against arbitrary state action. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a
"right", it is not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of
a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest
and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter
to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given by a
statute may be taken away at any time before it has been exercised.
 But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause
the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like denying him his legitime,
and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of
his estate
 DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN VS. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 164948

FACTS:

 Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a
resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon
Ramos and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on.
 The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner’s brother (deceased), and Amelia
Ramos- who went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her second marriage and no
longer communicated with her children .

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the petition for adoption is invalid for lack of consent of the biological mother?

HELD:

 No. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural
parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to
safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. When she filed her
petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the
written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of
the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed
abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.
 REPUBLIC VS. HERNANDEZ

FACTS:

 Herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a
petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran.
 In the very same petition, private respondents prayed for the change of the first name of said minor
adoptee to Aaron Joseph. Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same
petition for adoption.
 Petitioner reiterated its objection to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for change
of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petitions should be conducted and pursued as two
separate proceedings.
 The trial court ruled in favor of herein private respondents.
 Petitioner challenges said order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City by certiorari.
ISSUE:

 Whether or not the prayer for the change of the registered proper or given name of the minor adoptee
embodied in the petition for adoption be granted.

RULING:

 Yes. The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter,
upon issuance of the decree of adoption even if not prayed for by petitioner. However,
the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it
was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer
upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee’s registered Christian or first name. The automatic
change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of
adoption.

 On the foregoing premises, the assailed order of respondent judge is hereby MODIFIED. The court
uphold the propriety of the portion of the order of the court below granting the petition for adoption. The
legally adopted child of private respondents shall henceforth be officially known as Kevin Earl Munson y
Andrade.

Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provide one of the legal effects of adoption:

For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire
the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the
adopted to use the surname of the adopters;

NOTE: A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious
grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b)
when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion;
(d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of
alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith
and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that
the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest2. Respondents reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to,
recognized grounds, however.